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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Stefano Carulli on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Citizenship and the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stefanocarulli/citizenship-and-the-mechanism-of-inclusion-and-exclusion-a80ce15fb7c5?source=rss-f7039860249------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefano Carulli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jun 2016 22:27:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-28T18:42:57.050Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Citizenship and the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion</strong></p><p>This article is situated in the wider debate of national and collective identity in Europe and it will argue that citizenship constitutes the first step towards a process of inclusion and exclusion, where individuals tend to create boundaries and, therefore, define an in-group as opposed to an out-group, and where the out-group comes to be represented as different and often threatening. In so doing, citizenship promotes a strong mechanism of othering. But how does this process exactly work? This is the issue that I will be analysing in this article. In particular, I will try to understand what is the role of citizenship in the process of inclusion and exclusion, and what is the role that it plays in the exercise of identity-formation. It could be argued that citizenship displays similar patterns of inclusion/exclusion and identity-formation throughout the world, but for the purpose of this article — and for a matter of space — I have decided to analyse this mechanism only in relation to some European countries, for I believe the European continent offers a good representation of the issue at stake.</p><p>Rather than taking into consideration the othering process as externally given, which means that the othering process would be promoted by mechanisms taking place outside the realm of the state, this article will focus on the role of the society and nation-states as othering actors, thus analysing the problem from a completely different perspective. In addition, the piece will be structured into three main sections. Firstly, I will analyse the concept of citizenship from a definitional perspective, taking into account both the national concept of citizenship — what we call ‘nationality ’ — and how this relates to the idea of collective identities . Then, I will go on analysing the process of collective identity-formation trough citizenship from a societal perspective, where the decline of traditional identity-formation will be analysed in order explain the rise of new forms of identity and boundary-creation, and I will then conclude by presenting a number of European examples where citizenship has been used to promote mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, namely the Turkish accession talks with the EU in relation to a form of inclusion, and the Estonian legislation regarding non-citizens and the so called ‘Polenpolitiek’ as forms of exclusion. The role of these cases studied is that of showing the connection between theory and practice in the process of inclusion and exclusion through citizenship and as such, they are indeed important for a better understanding of the issue at stake.</p><p>Citizenship is a very complex concept, which entails a number of different definitions depending on the perspective taken by whom comes to study it. I have, therefore, decided to start this paper with some necessary definitional comments. On the one hand, citizenship may be seen as the plethora of activities and responsible behaviors that make us active citizens in relation to the polis. On the other hand, citizenship may be defined as the status of a “person who has the legal right to belong to a particular country. However, citizenship does not only express the legal status of an individual, but it also plays a major role in the identity-formation of human beings as members of a political community. This process is both created and reinforced through what Isin and Nielsen have described as “acts of citizenship”, namely “the constitutive and disruptive moments when rights are claimed, responsibilities asserted and obligations imposed” (Isin and Nielsen: p. 36). In other words, an act of citizenship is an occasion through which the subjects constitute themselves as citizens.</p><p><strong>Theory and Methodology</strong></p><p>The mechanism of inclusion/exclusion regarding citizenship can be analysed from a number of different theoretical perspectives. For instance, one theoretical framework offered to explain such processes is othering, a concept first created within post-colonial theory. The concept draws on an understanding of self which is a simplification of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic as put forward in Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hegel is therefore often understood as a theory of self and other in which the association concerning the other establishes the self. Indeed, the inherent dualism that happens to be necessary for the human mind to categorize reality may be seen as an embryonic form of inclusion/exclusion. Besides, early postcolonial writing is another theoretical reference point (Said 1978). Said writes about an illusory geography, which constructs the Orient as other in a reductionist and Eurocentric perspective. At the same time as being exotified, the Orient is assimilated and fixed, as the role of Orientalism is ‘at one and the same time to characterize the Orient as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, managers and actors are for Europe, and only for Europe’ (pp. 71–72, emphasis in original). Once more, this phenomenon partly explains how the human mind handles differences, that is, by categorizing them and separating ‘us’ from ‘they’.</p><p>All these theories could be used as theoretical frameworks for explaining how inclusion and exclusion may be promoted through the meaning of citizenship. However, I think that for the purpose of this article a functional approach to the study of citizenship and collective identity as developed by Karolewsky (2010) would be more suitable. In particular, I believe that the so-called ‘cognitive function’ of collective identity is ideal because it focuses on the creation of groupings based on social relations amongst individuals. In the words of Karolewsky, the cognitive function ‘departs from the assumption that human social relations are assumed through the definition and elaboration of collective self-categories, through which individuals organize their social relations’ (Karolewsky 2010, p. 169). This theoretical reference point is important because it explains how this particular perception reduces social intricacy for individuals by making it understandable and decreases perceived social complexity and uncertainty. In so doing, it frames citizenship as an ordering activity through which members of a political community understand reality. This categorization is important for the process of boundary creation (and, therefore, inclusion and exclusion). Moreover, this particular theoretical framework helps us comprehend the process of European identity-formation, for in this case European identity becomes progressively related to ‘shared categories’, images and frames used by citizens in their perception (Karolewsky, 2010). This particular theoretical analysis relates to my research because by presenting a framework where identities are categorized according to shared principles, it works as a two-tier system. On the one end, it matches with the inherent need of the human mind to categorize ideas in order to understand them. On the other, by categorizing it differentiates, and therefore, it creates boundaries between different ‘groups’ which help us explain the process of social and political inclusion/exclusion. I will now go on arguing how citizenship fits in this observation.</p><p><strong>Section I: Citizenship</strong></p><p>Citizenship is a concept that may express a number of different meanings. However, here the value of this word does not lie as much in its definition, but rather in the role that it plays in the process of collective identity-formation. Yet, here I think it is important to take a stance regarding citizenship, as its definition may cause misunderstandings due to the complexity of the concept that it expresses. Historically, the idea of citizenship has taken many different forms and has developed alongside the evolution of — in our case — western societies. One of the first forms of collective citizenship is to be found in the ancient Greek society, where the polis itself was based on the concept of citizenship. This concept was founded on two pillars, which are still extremely important in defining citizenship today, namely rights and duty. These two founding notions of citizenship have been accurately described by Ali Isyar in ‘Acts of Citizenship’, wherein in relation to the death of Socrates, he states that it ‘becomes a moment of the performance of citizenship not only through his acceptance of the jury’s decision, hence a duty, but also through practicing philosophy, hence a right1’ (Isin and Nielsen: p.83). This event, therefore, shows the true spirit and the starting point that characterize the western idea of citizenship. Nevertheless, this does not mean that while citizenship interpreted as an act promotes mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion, citizenship as status does not. Indeed, the distinction here lies in the definition of citizenship, but it may be argued that if the outcome is the same — be it inclusion or exclusion — then the two definitions could be also used interchangeably. In fact, the act of incorporating someone as a citizen by expanding the polity, and the grant of the status of citizen to an individual both imply the concession of a position on the grounds of rights and duties.</p><p>However, such an idea of citizenship implies a stable identity in relation to one’s membership in a political community. As a consequence, nowadays the ancient interpretation does not fit modern or post-modern societies. For instance, throughout the 19th century T.H. Marshall’s definition of citizenship seemed to be widely accepted. For him, citizenship entailed a plethora of social rights mainly related to the status of taxpayer. However, as argued by Isin and Turner, he was not able to see the limitations of such a limited understanding of citizenship. In their words ‘Marshall took the definition of citizenship for granted, whereas contemporary theories of citizenship have been primarily concerned with rapidly changing identities’ (Isin and Turner 2007, p. 8). And yet, it is possible to see a continuum between the Athenian and Marshallian concepts of citizenship in the fact that they both prioritize rights and duties. What has changed over time is, therefore, not as much the definition of citizenship but rather the role of the state and its very own identity, that is, the concept of citizenship as a status.</p><p>What links these two different definitions is the fact that, in both cases, a citizen is entitled to have rights and perform duties on the grounds of membership to a community. But membership through social and political action implies inclusion as much as exclusion because it is the very same concept of membership which, being based on a sense of belonging, naturally creates a situation where some are considered members as opposite to the outsiders. That is why I would like to pose for a second on what Isin and Nielsen described as ‘Acts of Citizenship’ (Isin and Nielsen, 2008). Certainly, normally citizenship implies membership to a specific political community, through which every citizen performs certain duties and is entitled to certain rights — a good example of this ambivalent role would be the right/duty of the citizen to vote. This perception of citizenship was the very same expressed by Aristotle in ancient Greece wherein he would keep repeating to his students that action is the real essence of politics. However, this action through which an individual constitutes himself as a citizen provokes a certain degree of distinction between what — or, even better, ‘who’ — is inside the community and those who come to be represented outside of it (the Others). Indeed, ‘acts of citizenship involve those constitutive and disruptive moments when rights are claimed, responsibilities asserted and obligations imposed’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008, p. 36) and in so doing, they draw a line between an in-group and an out-group.</p><p>In the modern society, this distinction is extremely important because it is the very founding concept of national and collective identity. As stated by Karolewsky, ‘although the ideology of homogeneous nations is always based on a myth, homogenization and the construction of national identity are at the core of every project of nation-building and nationalism’ (Karolewski 2010, p. 2). However, Holmes and Murray (1999) claim that traditional forms of national identities are declining as a result of Europeanization. Consequently, it is claimed that Europeanization and globalization are causing the rise, on the one hand, of new and non-traditional forms of identity, and on the other it seems as though the trend is towards anachronistic forms of national identity, namely through the membership to a particular ethnic group. In the words of the authors, ‘in several countries, ethnic identity has become more salient again partly as a way, for some, of coping with major societal change and the rise or influx of new identities’ (Homes and Murray 1999, p. 5). This fragmentation could possibly lead to what Karolewski (2010) has described as the decoupling between citizenship and collective identity. Effectively, this separation would bring to an end the definition of citizenship as an integrative mechanism for equal membership in a political community aspiring to collective exercise of political power and to become ‘either an ephemeron (encompassing rights that are non- judiciable) or a description of a status (expressing asymmetrical privileges)’ (Karolewski 2010, p. 2).</p><p><strong>Section II: Citizenship and Identity-formation</strong></p><p>The above section exemplified how citizenship has evolved as a defining concept and how it can be linked to the idea of collective identity. More specifically, here I will describe how citizenship actually promotes the process of identity formation through the creation of boundaries and, therefore, also a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion.</p><p>Following the functional view of collective identity, Karolewski (2010) argues that, at least in Europe, identity is constructed through categorization technologies used by political authorities of the European Union. In her own words,</p><p><em>‘political authorities categorize and classify people by assigning them to categories that are associated with consequential identities. Thus, they enhance and freeze the salience of certain collective identities through political practices of categorization, for instance by means of restrictive visa policies stressing the dichotomy between citizens and non- citizens’ (Karolewski: p. 170).</em></p><p>Here it is clear to see how collective identity becomes increasingly associated with shared categories, images and frames, but at the same time it stresses what Karolewski herself calls the ‘dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens’. These distinctions are based on the concession of rights to some, and negation of the same for others. Therefore, in the case of citizenship identity, collective identity relates to the core of citizenship as defining a community of which individuals define themselves as members on the grounds of common rights and duties. Consequently, by defining these individuals as members, citizenship works as a two-tier system in which the members are defined in opposition to the ‘outsiders’ through the creation of categories based on shared principles. However, this does not mean that the collective identity I am referring to is strictly related to the national state. Indeed, while the Marshallian definition of citizenship may be limited to the plethora of rights provided by the state, Isin and Turner (2007) claim that since no state exists in a social, economic or political isolation, citizenship — through the promotion of rights of mobility and rights of transaction — could be the first step towards a global conception of collective identity. Such a definition of identity is extremely important because it would partially invalidate the very notion of inclusion and exclusion. As argued by the authors themselves, ‘while citizens may be contained within state boundaries with their rights and obligations, neither their social existence nor the practices of their own state follow such containment’ (Isin and Turner, 2007, p. 14).</p><p>A remarkable example of this transformation is described by Sassen (2002) when she refers to ‘global cities’ as partly denationalized places that enable a partial reinvention of citizenship. According to her, this reinvention in necessary as a result of the decline of traditional forms of identity. For instance, it could be argued that the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization have affected the traditional idea of identity linked to the state, causing the creation of a multi-layered form of citizenship. The European Union represents a satisfying example of this phenomenon. However, this does not mean that this new form of collective identity is necessarily more inclusive. Indeed, ‘legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights. Citizenship is affected by the position of different groups within the nation-state’ (Sassen 2002, p. 11). As a result, one could see how, undeniably, citizenship does not represent the only form of internal differentiation within a society, but it is the one that categorize individual based on the concession or denial of certain rights.</p><p>To sum up, the role of citizenship in the process of identity-formation can be analyzed from a number of different perspectives. First of all, as argued by Karolewski, identity-formation can be viewed as a result of categorization technologies that promote the dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens and, therefore, through a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion. Secondly, as put forward by Sassen, identity-formation through citizenship can be analyzed as a shift from the national dimension of identity to the global dimension of collective identity as a consequence of globalization and the rise of ‘global cites’, wherein the city as a denationalized space gives individuals the possibility to reinvent and rearticulate new forms of citizenship. Lastly, the decline of the traditional concept of citizenship and the role of the state may give raise to a multi-layered citizenship associated with an extension of collective identity as it is the case for the European Union. What these discourses share is a common understanding of citizenship as a practice of membership based in on the concession of certain rights, and they therefore all promote similar mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.</p><p><strong>Section III: mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion</strong></p><p>In this section, I will first go on discussing the process of inclusion/exclusion per se, trying to describe how this mechanism actually works in the context or Europe as a whole, and then I will conclude by briefly taking into consideration two examples of inclusion and exclusion. The first one will contemplate the EU’s promise to offer membership to Turkey, and can therefore be considered as an example of inclusion through membership. The second one will take into account the Estonian use of citizenship as a way to exclude Russian citizens from accessing certain services, and can therefore be seen as a mechanism of exclusion through citizenship.</p><p>If we assume that citizenship equals membership to a political and social community, then it follows that the citizen is that individual who has access to the political and public life of its community. Today, that community — despite its temporary decline — is the state. Consequently, it could be argued that the very notion of citizenship creates a stark dichotomy between the members of a community, and the ‘Others’, namely the out-group members that do not have the same rights. This dichotomy then creates a situation where the distinction between citizens and non-citizens does not only refer to a legal status (rights), but it also invokes practices and discourses of inclusion and exclusion in relation to one’s identity. Therefore, it seems that the current understanding of citizenship cannot exist without drawing boundaries. In the words of Sassen, ‘citizenship is partly produced by the practices of the excluded’ (Sassen, 2002, p. 11). But how does this mechanism actually work in the context of modern and post-modern societies?</p><p>Over the last fifty years, modern societies have experienced a number of extraordinary developments and transitions. Within the European Union, the creation of an area of free movement of goods and people has accelerated a process of cross-cultural impact that has led to the rise of strongly multicultural societies. Within the same country there could potentially be people coming from twenty-eight different member-states, and as a result, there might be coexisting a variety of different identities. This creates a paradox, in the sense that today more than ever we might be confronted with citizenship (as a legal status based in rights and duties) without shared identity. Indeed, Karolewski (2009) claims that such condition has resulted in a situation where citizenship and collective identity at the level of citizenship practice are no longer intertwined. As a result, citizenship does no longer describe a practice of participation, but rather becomes only the description of a legal status and ‘therefore can be viewed as a proxy for group specific rights in diverse and heterogeneous societies’ (Karolewski, 2009, p.3). This might create tensions in those societies where historically, the population has been more homogeneous than in others. For instance, the recent response of some countries in central Europe to the refugee crisis where hundreds of thousands of people have crossed those countries in order to seek legal protection elsewhere has indeed destabilized their national unity. Consequently, the on-going refugee crisis and the following crisis of European integration could be also framed as the result of these new forms of identity-formation. But let us now move on analyzing the first example of citizenship and the mechanism of inclusion/exclusion.</p><p><em>Inclusion — the example of Turkey:</em></p><p>The European Union and Turkey share a long history of accession negotiations. Indeed, the Turkish government has declared its intention of joining the EU since the 80s. However, the first form of cooperation dates as far back as 1963, when the European Economic Community signed the so-called ‘Ankara Agreement’ with Turkey, aiming towards the accession of the country2. In addition, over the past decades, Turkey has taken important steps forward in order to live up to the European expectations and, therefore, gain the necessary recognition for accession. For instance, ‘Turkey promised to adopt EU regulations concerning human and minority rights and the supremacy of law, as well as undertake a wide range of reforms in the economic, political and legal field’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008, p. 209). As a response, the European Union has promised that, eventually, it would make Turkey the first country perceived as mostly Muslim to be granted full membership. This promise is extremely important because it re-articulates the whole understanding of citizenship in Europe. The European continent has always been predominantly Christian and over the course of many centuries, this factor has become a constitutive part of its identity. The fact that a predominantly Muslim country might eventually become a full member of the Union means that for the first time, we can see a major shift in European identity in relation to what many in the EU would refer to as ‘the Other’. Indeed, Isin and Nielsen claim that ‘this agreement marks an unprecedented moment of large-scale metamorphosis in the European perception of citizenship and identity’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008, p. 210). Here, the concept of citizenship is exceptionally important because the promise of Turkish accession marks an example of large-scale inclusion through the very meaning of citizenship. In fact, it could be argued that this one of the most salient examples of how citizenship has been used in order to bring together two entities so different in terms of identities, but nonetheless sharing a common aim, that is, integration. Indeed, here inclusion becomes a means for to fulfill a common interest. In so doing, Europeans would constitute themselves as citizens through an act of extensive incorporation. Consequently, this move shows the incredible inclusive potential that the concept of citizenship has regarding both the inclusion of the Other and the process of identity-formation. In relation to the latter, one could also claim that such an act of citizenship would articulate a post-modern European society that has been able to go beyond the idea of a simply multicultural Europe — where the different groups share the same nationality but live separately as if they were different blocs — to embrace a new concept of what Beck and Grande (2007) call ‘cosmopolitan realism3’.</p><p><em>Exclusion — the countries of Eastern Europe and the ‘Polenpolitiek’</em></p><p>What I have just described is an example of how citizenship can be the necessary backbone of large- scale inclusion. However, this is not always the case. Indeed, at times the understanding of citizenship can trigger an opposite mechanism of exclusion towards what come to be perceived as the out-group. For instance, the treatment of Russian citizens living in Estonia after the collapse of the USSR may be framed as an example of exclusion through the meaning of citizenship. What is striking here is the fact that both inclusion and exclusion represent acts of citizenship, because the creation of boundaries through this concept may reinforce the idea of an in-group as much as the inclusion of the Other as it has been the case with Turkey.</p><p>Hence, I will now briefly analyze the Estonian controversy regarding Russian citizens living in the country as an example of exclusion through the meaning citizenship.</p><p>After the collapse of the USSR, many post-communists governments decided to adopt a rather exclusive understanding of citizenship, especially in relation to Russian citizens. It could be argued that the harsh treatment towards Russians living in Estonia is the result of many years of de facto foreign occupation4. As a response, throughout the 90s, Russians living in Estonia faced discrimination on grounds of nationality. Holmes and Murray (1999) claim that ‘one of the most widely reported dimensions of official exclusion is the narrow approach adopted by some post- communist governments’ (Homes and Murray 1999, p. 126). Certainly, the Estonians introduced legislation in November 1991, February and April 1992 that defined citizenship in exclusive terms ‘and in practice appeared to sanction the disenfranchisement of ethnic minorities’ (Holmes and Murray 1999, p. 126). However, within the country this treatment was perceived to be directed towards Russian citizens, whose presence was indeed not well-accepted in Estonia. An example that corroborates this argument is the fact that the Estonian authorities announced in May 1997 that passports issued by the former USSR would not be longer recognized (Holmes and Murray, 1999). This kind of legislation nullified the travel documents of many people residing in Estonia who were not Estonian citizens. As a consequence, these individuals would either have to apply for non-citizen passports or else officially apply for citizenship of another state. Either way, it could be argued that the Estonian government used citizenship as a means to exacerbate the internal divisions within the country and at the same time reinforce the process of othering in Estonia. It is interesting to note how this example shows the fact that the concept of citizenship per se does not always reinforce the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Nevertheless, it can astutely be used by certain governments to exacerbate the very same mechanisms.</p><p>Yet, I also think that it is important to stress a further point here, namely the fact that using citizenship as a means for exclusion is not an Eastern European instance only. In order to demonstrate this argument, I will briefly describe the process of exclusion implemented by 19th century Germany toward Polish nationals. In so doing, I hope to provide the reader with a more comprehensive account of how citizenship can promote mechanisms of social and political inclusion/exclusion in Europe. In particular, the brief description that follows is theoretically important because it makes us understand how citizenship can be used to remove a threat and at the same time reinforce one’s own identity, which in turn is also extremely important to understand how some European countries have historically dealt with the issue of migration.</p><p>Due to economic, political and geographical reasons, in the 19th century many Poles decided to move to Germany in order to work, both permanently and seasonally. However, the large number of Polish nationals moving into Germany caused much tension amongst German politicians. Indeed, German authorities feared that such a large number of polish nationals situated on the eastern borders of Germany might cause a destabilizing political and ethnic conflict. As a result, Bismark decided to implement what has been described as ‘Polenpolitiek’. In relation to this issue, Sassen (1999) wrote that:</p><p><em>‘Poles were only five to ten percent of the larger number of immigrant workers in industry, mines and other sectors. Indeed, only about a third of all foreign workers in Germany were Poles, and a much smaller share of residential foreign workers were Poles because most Poles were seasonal. Yet the public discussion and debate about immigration was dominated by the imagery of the ‘’alien Pole’’, and more generally the idea of massive invasions of Slavs and Jews from the East’ (Sassen, 1999).</em></p><p>This fragment reveals three important aspects about the concept of citizenship as a means for exclusion and about identity-formation. First of all, it shows us that in the 20th century, Germany had a perception of citizenship grounded on biological assumptions rather that cultural ties. Secondly, it shows how the coupling of state sovereignty and border control made the foreigner an outsider. As a result, he state was able to define migrants as not belonging to the national society and as not being entitled to the rights of citizens. The Poles were thus excluded from the civil society through the use of citizenship, and they were relegated to the so-called out-group. Lastly, Sassen’s research fits incredibly well with Karolewsky’s understanding of categorization, because here citizenship was used to create categories and shared images, and then applied to promote a mechanism of exclusion.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>The scope of this article was to analyze how the concept of citizenship is central in promoting mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. I have decided to take the European continent as an example to demonstrate my argumentations, but it must be remembered that citizenship — as formulated here — promotes the same mechanisms throughout the West. These mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion have, therefore, been analysed using the functional approach — and its cognitive function — as developed by Karolewsky as theoretical framework. This approach has proven particularly useful because, by stressing the process of grouping and categorization based on a shared understanding of reality, it naturally enriched the mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion and identity formation promoted by the concept of citizenship.</p><p>Hence, in order to prove my point, I have decided to divide this paper into three different sections, each of which has dealt with a particular aspect of citizenship. However, as I have already argued elsewhere, for a better comprehension I would advise the reader to grasp each section as a single moment of a unitary process. Thus, the first section dealt with a definitional analysis of citizenship, its historical roots and how it relates to the process of identity formation. The second part dealt more specifically with the process of identity-formation through citizenship, and in particular, following Karolewsy’s functional approach, I have described how identity-formation can be viewed as a result of categorization technologies that promote the dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens and a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion. Moreover, the decline on the traditional concept of identity connected to the nation-state was analyzed. The last section was instead less theoretical. Here I first analysed the process of inclusion and exclusion through the meaning of citizenship, and then I went on presenting a number of cases where the use of citizenship for promoting inclusion or exclusion is clear. Thus, I described the process of Turkish accession to the European Union as an instance of inclusion and redefinition of the Other, and the Estonian treatment of Russian citizens after the collapse of the USSR and the Polenpolitiek implemented by Bismark in the second half of the 19th century as instances of exclusion through the meaning of citizenship. What all these sections have in common is both the central thesis of my article and at the same time the underlying principle that governs the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion through citizenship, that is the idea that citizenship exploits rights and duties in order to create boundaries and identities. In so doing, not only it may represent a form of institutional discrimination — as shown by the case of Estonia — or large-scale incorporation — as it happened with Turkey — but it also epitomize an inherent need of the human mind to categorize and differentiate.</p><p>Bibliography:</p><p>Beck, U. and Grande, E. (2007). Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way Out of Crisis. European Journal of Social Theory, 10(1), pp.67–85.</p><p>Isin, E. and Nielsen, G. (2008). Acts of citizenship. London: Zed Books Ltd.</p><p>Estonica.org, (2016). Estonica.org — Soviet occupation and takeover of Estonia in 1940. [online] Available at: http://www.estonica.org/en/History/1939- 1945_Estonia_and_World_War_II/Soviet_occupation_and_takeover_of_Estonia_in_1940/.</p><p>Eur-lex.europa.eu, (2016). EUR-Lex — e40113 — EN — EUR-Lex. [online] Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ae40113.</p><p>Isin, E. and Turner, B. (2007). Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship Studies.Citizenship Studies, 11(1), pp.5–17.</p><p>Karolewski, I. (2010).Citizenship and collective identity in Europe. London: Routledge.</p><p>Murray, P. and Holmes, L. (1999). Citizenship and identity in Europe. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate.</p><p>Said, E. (1979). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.</p><p>Sassen, S. (1999). Guests and aliens. New York: New Press.</p><p>Sassen, S. (2003). The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics.CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(2), pp.41–66.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a80ce15fb7c5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The whole world stands in solidarity with Orlando’s LGBTI community as the nation weeps for the…]]></title>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefano Carulli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2016 14:18:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-18T14:01:29.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8pZSa-rlK_SIki90htJ46A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jose Hernandez, center, joins hands with Victor Baez, right, as they mourn the loss of their friends Amanda Alvear and Mercedez Flores in the Pulse nightclub shooting. Photograph: David Goldman/ AP</figcaption></figure><blockquote>‘Homophobia must not be tolerated […] anymore. So many of us lesbian, gay, bisexual,transgender and intersex people have lived our lives in fear far too long. Fear of holding hands on the street, fear of being called names, fear of being thrown out of houses, schools or jobs’</blockquote><blockquote>MEP Ulrike Lunacek</blockquote><p>The whole world stands in solidarity with Orlando’s LGBTI community as the nation weeps for the recent terrorism casualties. Writing about such a horrendous mass shooting, where 49 people lost their lives and many others were injured, is not easy. It is not easy because of the anger, pain and frustration that these violent acts involve. But above all, it isn’t easy because it is hard to stop thinking that behind each and everyone of those innocent victims there is now a distressed family shedding tears for their loss. However, in such a tragic event, I believe it is vitally important not to give raise to even more hatred. Love is the reason why there is pain. When we lose someone precious to us, hate is born. Vengeance is the product of that hate and so death follows. But in death there is only more death. Religion, ideology, resources, land, spite, love or just because. No matter how pathetic the reason, it’s enough to empower the viscous circle of hatred. However, while it is true that love and hatred are strictly intertwined, it is also natural to say that love is the only cure to so much pain. The overwhelming support of so many people for the mass shooting in Orlando is a crystal clear example of how empathy and fraternity are the strongest weapons that we have in the fight against radicalization, as shown by the hundreds of manifestations organized all around the world in support and solidarity with the victims of the Orlando massacre.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uWQ5YLlW1Uhx3JlOaYtnbw.jpeg" /><figcaption>People gather in Old Compton Street in the Soho district of London for a vigil in commemoration and solidarity with the victims of the Orlando massacre. Photograph: Justin Tallis / AFP / Getty Images</figcaption></figure><p>The topic of radicalization opens up the discussion about possible political implications of such a tremendous attack, which is, sadly, a recurring theme in US history. Just to give you some numbers, it has been reported that in 2016 alone, there have been around 130 mass shootings in the United States. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that the Orlando mass shooting happened less than six months before the US presidential elections. Consequently, it is putting a lot of pressure on the candidates as for how to tackle a number of hot topics related to US politics, such as gun control, immigration and the war against ISIS. Sad to say, the manipolation of a tragedy for political purposes is another recurring theme in politics, yet at the same time it can become a tool for raising awareness about inequality, internal policies and external relations — as shown by the media coverage of the Orlando Mass Shooting. For instance, how is it possible that a man under investigation for terrorism could purchase a rifle? Is gun control the real problem or just a symptom? How can we stop the process of radicalization? These are just some of the questions that the on-going political debate is trying to answer.</p><p>In addition to this, the political debate both in the US and Europe has been recently shifting from an economic perspective to a security one. France has decided to extend the state of emergency to cover Euro2016, while Donald Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States — ignoring the fact that Omar Mateen was a ‘homegrown terrorist’. Nationalism and increased security measures have become the norm in the EU, not to mention the possible collapse of Schengen as a result of the on-going refugee crisis and the recent terrorist attacks both in Paris and Brussels. But all these discourses seem to be grounded on a very dangerous misconception, namely the belief that Islam equals terrorism. However, I am lucky to have many incredible Muslim friends and I know all too well that it is never a matter of religion. As a non-religious person, I am also aware of the fact that it is never God to blame or bless, but rather human nature and its constrasting and simultaneous desire of violence and peace. I was taught that religion should be a synonym of peace and harmony, yet nowadays its real meaning has been completely torn apart.</p><p>Thus, by limiting the definition of ‘terrorism’ to mean ‘violence perpetrated by Muslism’, we are creating the false impression that all terrorists are Muslims, ingoring that, instead, terrorism has no religion. Tragedies like the Orlando Mass Shooting should unite, rather then divide us. This is what I would like to see, and I am sure that this is also what the victims’ families and friends would like to witness.</p><p>Unfortunately, hatred against the LGBTQIA community is widespread in our societies. Important steps forwards have been taken, but this tragedy shows us that there is still so much to do. Yet in all this agony, I choose to remain positive and optimistic about the future: this is the only way to go on. It is true, our community was attacked, but our resilience will empower us to keep campaigning to end the hatred still prevalent in society.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3JD-4XVedC2xVQcn3Hg6Hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A vigil for those killed and injured in the mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Photograph: ZUMA Wire/REX/Shutterstock</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=afbe29ea9fe4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Process of Securitization and the Social Construction of Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stefanocarulli/the-process-of-securitization-and-the-social-construction-of-security-6cdcb39418ea?source=rss-f7039860249------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6cdcb39418ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[home]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefano Carulli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2016 14:07:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-09T21:02:57.675Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k0kmqTcjOybjlj-7sEONKA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The notion of speech act is central for understanding the social construction of securitization, because it can be understood as a process that requires intersubjective relations between individuals to create something and to redefine a particular issue as a matter of security.</figcaption></figure><p>The last couple of years have been tragic for many reasons. The social and economic crises, climate change and the recent terrorist attacks have undermined the belief that humans have the ability to master all things. However, here in Europe, there has been one tragic event that, more than others, has shaped our lives and understanding of humanitarian crises and foreign policy, namely the Syrian refugee crisis.</p><p>First of all, I would like to start by trying to redefine this term. I personally believe that for the purpose of this article, the expression ‘refugee crisis’ may be adapted to the European context as a ‘European crisis’. Be careful: here I am not trying to say that Europe has been recently facing an internal refugee crisis, but rather the fact that the Syrian refugee crisis and the crisis of European integration are strictly intertwined as a result of social and geographical reasons. However, what makes the crisis of European integration even more absurd is the way in which it has developed over the past few years.</p><p>Indeed, Europeans tend to perceive the Syrian refugee crisis as a threat to their national identities, and some even believe that this flow of migrant is an ‘organized invasion’, as recently stated by Milos Zeman, the Czech President. But the European response to this issue shows one important factor that has shaped the European Union foreign policy over the last couple of years, that is to say, the securitization of borders and the social construction of the Syrian refugee crisis as a European security issue. Consequently, this article will mainly deal with how the aforementioned refugee crisis has been constructed as a security threat in Europe. Yet, here I think that it is important to stress an important factor, namely the actuality that the EU is formed by twenty-eight member states that have adopted different approaches to this crisis following their different foreign policies and role conceptions. The current Syrian refugee crisis has, therefore, stressed the internal divisions of the European Union and has consequently demonstrated the link that exists between the refugee crisis and the one about European integration. Nevertheless, I believe that it is still possible to draw a line that connects the reaction of all the EU member-states, a response that is in line with the process of securitization that has taken place in Europe since the start of the European integration process.</p><p>The on-going refugee crisis has triggered a number of different responses within the EU, which is not surprising given the fact that the Union is made up of twenty-eight member-states. However, it could be argued that all these negative discourses have one important trait in common, namely the idea that refugees are perceived as a threat to both national identities and the wider national social systems. For instance, Huysmans argued that the political process of connecting migration to criminal and terrorist attacks does not take place in isolation, but rather it is ‘related to a wider politicization in which immigrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identities and welfare provisions’. Indeed, the discourse about a likely negative impact of huge flows of migration on the welfare system is a recurring argumentation, as shown by a number of policies implemented by the EU with regards to the issue of migration and refugees. For instance, Huysmans argues that the restrictive policies that were implemented by the EEC in the 60s and 70s of the 20th century were mainly motivated by quite important changes in the labor market within Europe and by a desire to protect the social and economic rights of the domestic workforce. Here we can see how migration was primarily seen negatively by the local population and how the issue of migration was constructed in negative terms.</p><p>As a consequence, it may be stated that, as a response to this negative perception of migration, the European institutions acted accordingly. For example, one of the first forms of differentiation — and therefore also securitization of the issue — was the Council Regulation 1612/68 which ‘distinguished between the right of free movement of nationals of Member-States and the right of free movement of nationals from third countries’. This decision could also be interpreted as the first step towards what many call ‘Fortress Europe’ in the area of immigration. Indeed, the very notion of a fortress implies a certain degree of securitization. Therefore, the term has been wisely chosen to describe the issue. In addition, I believe that the securitization of borders and migration by the European institutions has also been reinforced by two main factors: first, the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement in the acquis communitaire after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Indeed, when analysing the problem of refugees, it is important to bear in mind the importance of state borders. Borders are only possible through mutual recognition by other states because they are a human construction. In other words, they could not exist if we as human beings did not give them meaning. By extension, it may be argued that foreigners themselves would not be labelled as such without the establishment of borders, because they would not find problematic to have access to a border that did not exist. Similarly, this argumentation shows how not only borders, but also refugees themselves can be seen as a social construction. As a matter of fact, the Schengen Agreement may be perceived as an encouraging policy within the European Union, for its implementation facilitated the free movement of people and goods. Yet, on the other hand, it reinforced the concept of securing external borders which is the foundation of the process of securitization and ‘othering’. However, in order to securitize the border control question, the incorporation Schengen Agreement and the creation of an area of free movement of people and goods had to be connected to an internal security issue. In Europe, Huysmans argues that what linked the two was the identification of a specific ‘side-effect’ of the establishment of the Schengen Area. This side-effect was pinpointed in the fact that an area of free movement of goods and people would eventually facilitate terrorism, internal criminal organizations and drugs trafficking. It is, therefore, possible to see how a security issue continuum was socially constructed, institutionalized and then securitized around the issue of migration and refugees. Secondly, a further point that confirms this argumentation is the implementation of the Dublin Convention, which is perceived as ‘heavily over-determined by a policy aimed at reducing the number of applications’. Indeed, the Dublin Convention does limit the number of applications, or, at least, it prevents asylum-seekers to apply for the status of refugees in some countries, namely the ones not situated on the borders of the EU. According to this regulation, asylum-seekers can only apply for the status of refugees in the country where they have first arrived, but in practice, the Dublin Convention often leads to ‘serious delays in the examination of asylum claims’. All these regulations show how the issue of migration in the EU has been institutionalized in negative terms and therefore securitized as a result of the perception of refugees as a threat to national identities and national security.</p><p>I hope that this article has made some of you realize how important the social construction of norms and the intersubjective interactions between individuals are in the realm of international relations. Framing something as a matter of national security, then, becomes an important tool in the hands of populist political parties. And against the backdrop of illiterate judgement, information and education are our only weapons.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6cdcb39418ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The US through my eyes: the epitome of change]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stefanocarulli/the-us-through-my-eyes-the-epitome-of-change-e960a8d3183b?source=rss-f7039860249------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e960a8d3183b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[babel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[america]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefano Carulli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2016 15:12:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-13T19:29:03.596Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My personal relationship with the United States is rather bizarre, so to say contrasting. On the one hand, I cannot but acknowledge the vital role played by the US in the period following the end of WWII in Europe — it would be hypocritical not to do so. Though on the other hand, I find it hard to comprehend how such a big power in the international system happened to make so many bad decisions in terms of foreign policy, especially after the start of this century.</p><p>The American intervention in the Middle-East has had huge repercussions on its image worldwide, and it could be even argued that the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq contributed to the radicalization of many Muslims not only in the region, but also in Europe. Consequently, some may believe that the present situation is, in part, the result of bad policy-making in the US. However, let us not forget that the tendency to simplify international issues should be avoided for the sake of truth and scientific research. Stating that the current situation in the Middle-East is a consequence of American intervention alone is indeed misleading: the Middle-East has been a battlefield for centuries, especially with regards to European interventions. In fact, it is European colonialism that created the term ‘Orientalism’ to describe an idealised Orient in opposition to the West.</p><p>However, one thing is for sure: <em>the US is witnessing the rise of other powers in the international system, and has therefore had to adjust its vision and mission according to this factor</em>. Donald Trump’s pathetic attempt to become the new US President may be analysed in light of this dynamic: Americans believe that a nationalistic and realist rhetoric is all they need to restore the glorious image of the United States worldwide. Yet, just like in Europe, populism does not pay off in the long term; it makes unrealistic promises that do not take into consideration the overall context.</p><p>Periods of transition have always been rather turbulent, and I believe that we are living in such an age. As a consequence, my image of the United States is that of a country that is struggling to keep up with a fast-changing and increasingly multifaceted world. What should we expect in the next decade? Making predictions has never been my forte, thus only time will tell.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e960a8d3183b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[#BTP]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stefanocarulli/europe-without-europeans-d60b2e09e79e?source=rss-f7039860249------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d60b2e09e79e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[home]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Stefano Carulli]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2016 14:13:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-10T17:54:45.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://medium.com/u/186495878df1">#BTP</a></p><p>Europe without Europeans?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NadhIJdqCg1_2oCvwLJRHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>EU flag</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The 9th of May was Europe Day, so I thought it’d be a good idea to start this project with something I care about very much.</strong></p><p>There are a lot of downsides to growing up in a small village located in the middle of nowhere, but with time I have come to appreciate both my childhood and town more than many would expect. For sure, I seem to have developed a better and wider picture of how the world actually works, but what I find extremely intriguing is that I have come to appreciate so many things that others wouldn’t even notice.</p><p>However, when it comes to knowledge about the European Union, its functions and structure I must say that rural areas have one big problem, which is lack of information, or rather, of interest. We all know that the EU is facing a number of different difficulties: an endless stagnating economic and debt crisis, terrorism, an assertive Russian foreign policy and the on-going refugee crisis — and the list goes on. Yet, what will put an end to the almost 70 year-old project of European Integration won’t be the result of external pressures, but will probably be the outcome of apathy and indifference by the very ‘Europeans’.</p><p>Hardly anyone in my home town knows what the EU institutions are and how they are organized within the overarching system. Even fewer know the meaning of words like ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ and I’d be very surprised if my dad could name the President of the European Commission or the President of the European Parliament. However, it is, in part, the EU that is to blame for their lack of information. Indeed, the European Union does not invest enough in making sure that its core values reach everyone. When I asked my older brother his opinion about the EU, all I got in return was a list of negative traits such as the loss of national sovereignty, bad economic policies or too much bureaucracy. Though how could I possibly blame him? After all, he lives in a country where the youth unemployment rate is almost 40%, which is not a great start for a man in his twenties. And yet, the vast majority still struggles to understand that the present situation is the result of bad national and internal policies. There is much confusion about the distinction between EU and national competence, which is in turn a consequence of the very nature of the European Union, with its overly complicated acronyms like CSDP, CFSP, PCS — just to name a few — or its ad hoc solutions that seem to ignore the wider picture.</p><p>This short reflection has reminded me of a widely known statement, which goes like ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make the Italians’, referring to the initial state of social chaos following the Italian unification in 1861. And even though no one here is trying to create an ‘EU Super State’ (we certainly do not want to scare our fellow Brits) I have a feeling that, although we are securing socio-political and economic integration, we have lost out on shaping the concept of an EU identity, especially in those secluded and remote areas where this very identity is needed the most.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d60b2e09e79e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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