<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Steve Springett on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Steve Springett on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@steve_springett?source=rss-6779cc53646d------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:49:40 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@steve_springett/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“SBOM” should not exist! Long live the SBOM.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@steve_springett/sbom-should-not-exist-long-live-the-sbom-4554d5c31ff9?source=rss-6779cc53646d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4554d5c31ff9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sbom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[appsec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[owasp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crm]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Steve Springett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 09 Apr 2022 19:47:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-09T19:47:47.662Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Xh4PHmRKR3eFJKDNO63NQ.png" /></figure><p>In 2008, my professional career led me to work on supply chain security for the pharmaceutical industry. I learned a lot from that experience. One of the most important lessons was the value of simplicity in standards development.</p><p>Fast forward four years to 2012, I started researching and working on supply chain security for build pipelines and the software and hardware devices my employer brought to market. My requirements have evolved over time; however, one thing remains the same; the need to inventory all software and hardware components, along with any services the software relied on is essential for transparency and traceability. These fundamental principles along with many of the lessons learned working on supply chain security in the pharmaceutical industry, formed the basis for the object model in <a href="https://dependencytrack.org/">OWASP Dependency-Track</a> and what would later become the <a href="https://cyclonedx.org/">OWASP CycloneDX Bill of Materials (BOM) standard</a>.</p><p>BOMs are not a new concept. Their use in manufacturing have been widespread since the 1970’s. In the manufacturing world, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_lifecycle">Product Lifecycle Management (PLM)</a> is the set of practices that integrates data, processes, business systems, and people to help bring products to life, and to eventually retire them. The software industry has a similar approach called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_development_life_cycle">Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)</a> which serves the same purpose. Within PLM, the BOM serves specific purposes based on the lifecycle of the product. For example, if the product is being planned, a Planning BOM may be used. If the product requires parts to be procured, a Procurement BOM is often used. When the product is being engineered, an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engineering_bill_of_materials">Engineering BOM (eBOM)</a> is used, and when the product goes through the manufacturing process, a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manufacturing_bill_of_materials">Manufacturing BOM (mBOM)</a> is used. In all cases, the complete inventory, regardless of what type of component it is, is documented in the BOM with information specific to the lifecycle and intended audience.</p><p>When I began working in software supply chain security in 2012, the terms “SBOM” and “Software Bill of Materials” were unknown to me. I had full stack requirements, like I do today, so confining a BOM to such a narrow set of things did not occur to me. It wasn’t until 2018 that I first heard the term when the <a href="https://www.ntia.gov/">National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)</a> kicked off their <a href="https://www.ntia.gov/SBOM">SBOM initiatives</a>.</p><p>What is perplexing is the question of <strong>why</strong> BOMs are being intentionally limited to only software components. Imagine a BOM for an automobile that was only capable of describing plastic parts, and other BOM types were necessary to describe the aluminum, steel, leather, and carbon fiber parts. Now imagine having a Plastic Parts BOM without any indication about what lifecycle the product is in. Should you order the plastic parts? Do they need to be engineered or manufactured? Perhaps they were delivered with the final goods. Who knows? Lifecycle is omitted from the conversation. Obviously, PLM does not operate this way, and for good reason. It’s unfortunate the software industry is subjected to an arcane approach that is both limited in scope and without lifecycle context.</p><p>A common myth is that SBOMs will be a roadmap to the attacker. This myth is addressed in <a href="https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/sbom_myths_vs_facts_nov2021.pdf"><em>SBOM Myths vs Facts</em></a><em>. </em>However, assumptions are made pertaining to lifecycle, specifically, that SBOMs are intended for software consumers. In my experience, the overwhelming majority of SBOMs created and consumed today are used for internal purposes, without the intent of ever being distributed. If an SBOM contained architecture design documents, threat models, or information about how the software was created (<a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/Component_Analysis#formulation">formulation</a>), it would absolutely provide a roadmap to the attacker. This type of information is exceptionally useful during the design, implementation, and testing phases of the SDLC, and many organizations are producing such content for inclusion in internally accessible SBOMs. Lifecycle matters. Omitting it from the conversation is careless and introduces confusion to the market.</p><p>When the CycloneDX BOM standard was created, the term “BOM” was used throughout the specification because it can represent full-stack inventory including software, firmware, hardware, and services. As a security architect and leader, I care about the full stack, especially services since they can dramatically increase the attack surface. Software hasn’t lived in a vacuum for 20 years. Modern software regularly relies upon services to provide just-in-time information from the Internet or from the environment the software is operating in. It may also fetch updates from the manufacture’s website. In many cases, services make up a substantial part of an applications inventory. In the case of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serverless_computing">serverless</a>” applications, services may make up the entire inventory. At a minimum, the services an application relies on in its default configuration should be a requirement for any organization requesting BOMs from suppliers. Omitting services from a BOM provides purchasers insight about a supplier’s lack of maturity and subsequent risk.</p><p>The term “SBOM” intentionally omits services, hardware, and other traditional non-software inventory, nor does it communicate lifecycle to the target audience. Elementary definitions of SBOM describe it as a “simple list of ingredients”. However, in practice the term is confusing as it means different things to different people based on their role and data expectations. As a result, the term should not exist. So, what should we use instead? That’s a great question that I don’t really have an answer to. But here’s a few ideas.</p><ul><li>Cybersecurity Bill of Materials (CBOM) — Since security is the primary use case and main driver for SBOM adoption, “CBOM” may be useful since it doesn’t describe the “what”, it describes the purpose. If lifecycle was a requirement of CBOM, this would be an ideal term in my opinion.</li><li>SDLC specific BOM terminology including Design BOM (DBOM), Implementation BOM (IBOM), Testing BOM (TBOM), Release BOM (RBOM), and Operational BOM (OBOM). By the way, OBOM is a common practice and is an observed behavior within <a href="https://www.bsimm.com/">BSIMM</a>. OBOM is also <a href="https://cyclonedx.org/capabilities/obom/">supported by CycloneDX</a>.</li><li>Reuse PLM terminology including eBOM to describe design documents and threat models, mBOM to describe full stack inventory along with formulation, and simply BOM to describe the inventory itself.</li></ul><p>With the popularity of the NTIA SBOM initiative and the subsequent Executive Order requiring SBOM for U.S. federal procurements, the term “SBOM” as been forever cemented in the lexicon of software terminology. I’m reminded of this daily from the frequent vendor pitches I get on LinkedIn or the SBOM startup of the week appearing in my Twitter feed. The CycloneDX team even had to update their website replacing BOM with SBOM for <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_engine_optimization">SEO</a> purposes, thus feeding into this nonsensical mess.</p><p>Alas, long live the SBOM.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4554d5c31ff9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Using Software Bill-of-Materials to drive change and reduce risk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@steve_springett/using-software-bill-of-materials-to-drive-change-and-reduce-risk-5901b7a339e3?source=rss-6779cc53646d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5901b7a339e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cbom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sbom]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Steve Springett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 Mar 2019 20:47:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-03T20:47:47.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The practice of software engineering has changed dramatically over the last 20 years. Aside from technological advancements and improved agility, software has morphed from being pure creations to being assembled.</p><p>Modern software is assembled using open source components, glued together in complex and unique ways, and integrated with original code to provide the desired functionality. The amount of open source software used can vary dramatically based on the type and size of application, and the technology stack used in the softwares creation. Software containing hundreds or thousands of open source components is not uncommon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DY19OL2m_kvCCuRXzLN9Cg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The use of open source software is critical to continue the velocity of technological advancement. Modularity and reuse are valued over re-invent, especially when time-to-market is crucial for success.</p><p>While open source software provides the necessary building blocks, it also comes with risk. Organizations ultimately take responsibility for code they did not write. Fear of license compliance, vulnerabilities, and open source projects being abandoned, are real. The <a href="https://www.owasp.org/">Open Web Application Security Project</a> (OWASP) has an article on <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Component_Analysis">Component Analysis</a> that provides an overview about the various types of risk organizations should be cognizant of.</p><p><em>Component Analysis</em> is the strategy and process of identifying potential risk in third-party and open source software and hardware components. Component Analysis takes into consideration the entire supply chain and acknowledges that components are created, forked from other projects, distributed, combined, modified, re-distributed, and so on. Tracking and analyzing component pedigree is necessary in order to have comprehensive understanding of inherited risk. The term <em>Software Composition Analysis</em> (SCA) is widely used to describe the practice of analyzing open source components used during the creation of software. The term is a subset of Component Analysis with limited scope. Both practices are part of the wider <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/supply-chain-risk-management">Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management</a> (C-SCRM) domain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_nQMkWagEyjnTOVClMVp1A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Market forces and an increased awareness of open source risk have resulted in a need for greater transparency. Globally, governments are attempting to define what that means. <em>Software Transparency</em> is achieved through Bill-of-Materials (BOM). A BOM is synonymous to the list of ingredients on food packaging. Both are an implementation of transparency designed to provide consumers with information they can use to evaluate risk. The terms Software Bill-of-materials (SBOM) and Cyber Bill-of-Materials (CBOM) are widely used to differentiate from traditional BOMs which focused primarily on physical goods.</p><p>There are a growing number of organizations utilizing SBOMs. The generation of SBOMs from modern software build environments is easily achievable, even for complex software with thousands of open source components. Financial services, independent software vendors, manufactures, and cyber-security service providers are among the types of organizations utilizing SBOMs today. Much like cyber-security itself, Software Transparency is a journey, not a destination. Organizations first need to be transparent and honest with themselves. They need to collect and analyze the components they’re using. They need to track component pedigree, license compliance, project and technical risks. And they need to have strategy, policy, and governance to reduce risk to a level that is acceptable to market forces, regulation, and compliance. Software Transparency requirements will ultimately come knocking on their door.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xUV5zAC_-7CmPCI7qZoL_A.jpeg" /></figure><p>There are a handful of SBOM specifications available today including <a href="https://cyclonedx.org/">CycloneDX</a>, <a href="https://spdx.org/">SPDX</a>, and <a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/65666.html">SWID</a>. We’ll focus on CycloneDX as it’s the newest, it’s lightweight, and it focuses on software security use-cases. Some of the achievable use-cases include:</p><ul><li>Vulnerability analysis (software and hardware)</li><li>Outdated component analysis</li><li>License identification and compliance</li><li>File verification</li><li>Hierarchical representation of component assemblies</li><li>Document a components pedigree including ancestors, descendants, variants, and commits, representing a components lineage from any viewpoint and what attributes make it unique</li><li>Analyze modified open source libraries without any loss of fidelity</li><li>Human and machine readable format designed to be simple to use, extensible, and easily adoptable</li></ul><p>The CycloneDX specification is an open source project without a standards organization or committee. The specification has benefited from this approach which has allowed the community around the project to foster and innovate at a rate comparable with the technological change around it. The specification has grown rapidly since its launch in 2017 and has been adopted by several thousand organizations, many of which are automatically creating SBOMs during the development process.</p><p>In CycloneDX, everything is a component. Components can be included within other components, and the level of granularity can be defined by the organization utilizing it. This is similar to the system, sub-system, parts assembly that is common in physical supply chains. In general, a component will be the name and version of an open source application, library, or framework. However, a component may also be an operating system or file.</p><p>The process of generating CycloneDX BOMs varies slightly depending on the technology stack used, but the approach remains the same; generate one automatically when the software is built. Once the BOM is produced, the components within can be tracked and continuously analyzed throughout the softwares lifecycle. Applications such as <a href="https://dependencytrack.org/">Dependency-Track</a>, a flagship OWASP project, are specifically designed for this purpose.</p><p>The following is an example BOM with two components. One of the components has been modified and contains pedigree information.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ab6153b54e431ae9a12a0aa0170cab15/href">https://medium.com/media/ab6153b54e431ae9a12a0aa0170cab15/href</a></iframe><p>With the introduction of Software Bill-of-Materials into the development process, the traditional SCA approach of scanning build-time dependencies has changed slightly. Organizations may opt to generate BOMs after the fact from their SCA solution, or adopt a BOM-first approach where they can include build-time, runtime, environmental, and other kinds of dependencies and their pedigree, providing a more holistic view of inherited risk. This approach provides a pathway to greater Software Transparency.</p><p>Organizations concerned with cyber supply chain risk should investigate the benefits of a BOM-first approach to Component Analysis as well as the available specifications themselves. Correlating the capabilities of each to organizational concerns, should be part of an overall open source strategy.</p><p>Cyber supply chain risk affects us all. Collectively adopting a Software Transparency mindset may be our secret weapon to protect our applications and the Critical Cyber Infrastructure they’re built on.</p><p><strong>About the author</strong></p><p>Steve is a senior security architect for a large SaaS provider and is passionate about helping organizations identify and reduce risk from the use of third-party and open source components. He is an open source advocate and creator of the CycloneDX BOM specification and OWASP Dependency-Track. He’s also a core member of the Package-URL specification, OWASP Dependency-Check, and participates in multiple working groups on Software Transparency. When not devoting time to community projects, he likes to have fun with his family in Chicago.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5901b7a339e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>