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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Steven Carbuhn on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Steven Carbuhn on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Steven Carbuhn on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Email Security for Laypeople and Help Desk Technicians]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stevencarbuhn/email-security-for-layman-and-help-desk-technicians-32f65d68a2ed?source=rss-a4560024ef8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Steven Carbuhn]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 21:01:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-26T14:45:57.269Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Human beings have always been an attacker’s favorite target, and that isn’t going to change anytime soon. While cybersecurity tools evolve and organizations build defense-in-depth strategies, one constant remains: <strong>humans are inherently trusting.</strong> In an age of information overload, even basic phishing red flags can be easy to miss.</p><p>That’s why it’s every employee’s responsibility to stay alert and recognize social engineering attempts. This guide takes a two-pronged approach:</p><ul><li>For standard users: clear explanations of phishing tactics and how to stay safe</li><li>For IT technicians: deeper technical context and practical tools</li></ul><p>The technical sections are marked, but even non-technical readers may find them useful.</p><h3>Name Spoofing</h3><p>First and foremost, the most obvious technique that scammers will use, is they will spoof their display name. This is a great example</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/376/1*ibZHoqs3oz4IoirRWZlQWg.png" /></figure><p>As you can see, the attacker is pretending to be Jeff Bezos from Amazon, but if we take a quick look, we can see the email itself is suspicious and from a gmail.com domain. This is extremely easy to check, just on sight, if you see this, it’s a major red flag. Sometimes they won’t be so transparent though. Sometimes an attacker might put something like frank@livinspaces.com where it would normally be something like frank@livingspaces.com, so you have to have a diligent eye.</p><h3>Psychological Tactics</h3><p>Scammers rely on psychological tricks to make you act quickly. Be alert for:</p><ul><li><strong>Authority</strong>: “This is your CEO, transfer the funds now.”</li><li><strong>Urgency</strong>: “Your account will be locked in 30 minutes.”</li><li><strong>Scarcity</strong>: “First 10 people to respond get a reward.”</li><li><strong>Familiarity</strong>: “Hey, this is Bob from West Branch!”</li></ul><p>These and other psychological tactics not mentioned are designed to short-circuit your usual caution. Always pause and verify.</p><h3>Email Headers</h3><p>Now we are starting to get a little more technical. Don’t worry though, you’ll only have to pay attention to a select bit of information. Based on your email provider, you may have to get your headers from different locations, but once you do get access to it, what you want to look for can all be found in the “Authentication-Results” field as you can see below</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/978/1*_vp2TWIaZpBPnbUaHQAN6g.png" /></figure><p>So, as we can see here, SPF, DKIM, and DMARC have all passed. If any of them fail, this is a red flag.</p><h3>Email Headers Explained: Technicians</h3><ul><li>SPF: Utilized to allow other company’s or entities to send emails based upon declared IP or domain name on your behalf.</li><li>DKIM:<em> </em>Imagine I send out letters to a bunch of people, and I include one half of a locket with each letter. Everyone already has the other half of the locket — it’s publicly available and the same for everyone. When the recipient clicks the two halves together, they either fit perfectly, or they don’t.<em> </em>If they fit, the recipient knows that the letter really came from me (or at least someone with access to my private locket half). If they don’t fit, then either the letter was faked, or it was changed along the way. That’s how DKIM works.<br> The sender uses their private key to “sign” the message (like locking their half of the locket).<br> The recipient uses the public key (the other half of the locket) to check if the match is real.<br> If it is, the message is trusted.</li><li>DMARC: Works alongside DKIM and SPF, it essentially just tells receiving email servers what to do with the email, if it fails. The common options DMARC will use are None (just send the email through) Quarantine (send the email to a quarantine box) and Reject (flat-out reject the email, though the administrator will get a notification and code to be able to review and see why the email got rejected) It also helps with reporting and getting a better idea of what is happening with your emails at scale</li></ul><h3>How to handle attachments</h3><p>If an email appears copasetic, but you’re wary of the attachment (ESPECIALLY if it’s password-protected), you have a couple options.</p><ul><li>Utilize the technique listed below “Out-of-band verification”</li><li>Pass the email off to your IT professionals</li></ul><h3>How to handle attachments: Technicians</h3><p>Warning: DO NOT AND I REPEAT DO NOT EXECUTE A FILE IF YOU DON’T KNOW WHAT IT DOES, NOT EVEN IN A VM RAN ON A LOCAL HOST UNLESS YOU HAVE TOOLS PROVIDED BY YOUR SENIOR IT TEAM OR YOU KNOW EXACTLY WHAT YOU’RE DOING</p><p>Technicians are going to LOVE this part. I’m going to give you guys some really cool tools to use to check attachments. One thing you can do is save the attachment, and either drop it into <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/upload">VirusTotal — Home</a> or get the hash through either PowerShell or CMD (a little homework to lookup certutil and get-filehash) and submit the hash to virus total. And It will check that file against all the popular anti-virus signature databases to see if it’s been caught. This is an example of a known malware hash I grabbed from <a href="https://bazaar.abuse.ch/">Malwarebazaar</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AcAkBwKOFX10D1ehanC03g.png" /></figure><p>where we can see there have been at least 28 anti-virus repositories that have caught this. If you’d like you can actually explore this site further, as it provides a lot of REALLY cool information that will help you along your cybersecurity journey… if you’re into that kind of thing lol. The other tool you can use, to see what happens if you execute it, is <a href="https://any.run/">ANY.RUN — Interactive Online Malware Sandbox</a> here you can see I’ve run the same Malware mentioned before. If you check in the upper right corner, it says “Malicious Activity”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_37WbCcsqlR_bGGHMWzpPg.png" /></figure><p>Again, to reiterate, because of things like hyperjacking (<a href="https://www.twingate.com/blog/glossary/hyperjacking">What Is Hyperjacking? How It Works &amp; Examples | Twingate</a>) and vm escape (<a href="https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/virtual-machine-escape">What is a virtual machine escape attack? | Definition from TechTarget</a>), please don’t execute (or detonate in other words) a file, unless you know exactly what you’re doing, or have proven tools to do so. These attacks are rare, but still possible.</p><p>Another thing to note: some sophisticated malware, can detect the presence of a VM or sandbox and will know it’s being run in that environment. So, if you’re still wary about a file, either pass it up higher, if you have a SOC, or utilize the method below: out-of-band verification</p><h3>Out-of-Band Verification</h3><p>Out of band verification is going to be your best friend. No matter what stage of checking an email you’re in, out-of-band verification is always a solid idea. If you’re ever in doubt of an email’s authenticity, one of the best moves you can make is to go online, lookup the actual company (if it exists of course) and call a known, trusted number. Also, if you know the person who sent the email. You can contact them directly either in person, on the phone, or through a personal email (though this might be compromised as well, so maybe utilize the other two instead preferably) and verify that they indeed sent the email</p><h3>Business Email Compromise (BEC), a Cybersecurity Nightmare</h3><p>This is the Smokey the Bear portion of the blog. BEC is an attack so clever, and difficult to stop, I have to call it out by name. An attack that, by email filters, seems to play by all the rules. It passes the trifecta mentioned earlier (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) and other tools meant to prevent it (unless they attach a malicious document of course). This attack happens when a hacker has gotten hold of a legitimate email address. A lot of times, from a company you work with. So when the email comes, it seems to come from a trusted source. At this time, this method is able to bypass almost every tool. The solution: You. This is where all of this training is absolutely quintessential. This is where the rubber meets the road. Each employee, at the end of the day, is often the last line of defense when it comes to BEC attacks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32f65d68a2ed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mental Toolkit for Beginners of Practical Forensics and Threat Hunting.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stevencarbuhn/mental-toolkit-for-beginners-of-practical-forensics-and-threat-hunting-dc070d8b506e?source=rss-a4560024ef8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[threat-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Steven Carbuhn]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 17:07:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-18T17:26:42.662Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ps1byrmdpg3b85hgGGmTBw.png" /><figcaption>Intro image, displaying icons discussed in article</figcaption></figure><p>Getting started in Cybersecurity and DFIR can be pretty challenging. It’s also hard to know what’s going to build a powerful base. Now, this guideline won’t be for people that are trying to learn the theory of DFIR, because there’s a ton of that out and available in various certifications. This also won’t be a deep dive on actual tools utilized for DFIR, because the tools aren’t of much use without the right mindset.</p><p>I want to list, what I believe are some of the most important things to put in your toolbelt, to make the actual process of threat hunting, and DFIR more effective. I know it can feel like looking for a needle in a haystack, if you’re looking without a specific reference point.</p><p><em>Short Disclaimer: All examples in this blog are based on simulations, lab exercises, and research done through my Certified CyberDefender training. I’m not a SOC analyst (yet), but I’m training like one.</em></p><p>What I find to be the most important elements of Digital forensics and Threat hunting (outside of actual tools) are:</p><ul><li><strong>Red flags in PowerShell Commands</strong></li><li><strong>Specific Event IDs</strong></li><li><strong>Checking Known Persistence Techniques</strong></li><li><strong>Suspicious Process Behavior</strong></li><li><strong>Checking for Protocols</strong></li></ul><p>With these concepts in mind, you can build and layer on top of them, but this will give you a jump out of the gate to know what to start looking for, if it’s not immediately apparent</p><h3><strong>Red Flags in PowerShell Commands</strong></h3><p>Suspicious flags in Powershell often indicate malicious behavior. Key examples include:</p><ul><li><em>-EncodedCommand</em></li><li><em>-NoProfile</em></li><li><em>-ExecutionPolicy Bypass</em></li><li><em>-Hidden</em></li><li><em>Invoke-Expression</em></li></ul><p>important to note: a lof of these commands can be abbreviated or obfuscated, so you might have to look for various versions of them.</p><h3><strong>Specific Event IDs</strong></h3><p>I recommend memorizing certain event IDs that help research attacks. Event IDs related to suspicious behavior like process creation, scheduling/deleting tasks, PowerShell script block logging, login events, account creation/deletion, registry events, pipe detection, and logons with elevated privileges are a few highlights that can help you find IOAs or IOCs.</p><p>some of these include:</p><ul><li><em>4104: PowerShell script block logging (actually shows what code was ran)</em></li><li><em>4697: New scheduled task was created</em></li><li><em>4672: Privileged Logon</em></li><li><em>18: Pipe detection</em></li><li><em>4648: Logon attempt with explicit credentials</em></li><li><em>1102: Audit log cleared</em></li></ul><p>There are many more, and I actually have a Quizlet flashcard collection to reference if you’d like <a href="https://quizlet.com/1054133270/important-windows-event-ids-for-dfir-flash-cards/">Important Windows Event IDs for DFIR Flashcards | Quizlet</a></p><h3><strong>Checking Known Persistence Techniques</strong></h3><p>Knowing where attackers like to bed down to make sure they can get back into networks/devices is crucial. Attackers will typically utilize:</p><ul><li><em>Scheduled tasks</em></li><li><em>Registry keys such as</em></li></ul><ol><li><em>Run Keys</em></li><li><em>RunOnce Keys</em></li><li><em>Service Keys</em></li><li><em>Scheduled Tasks Keys</em></li><li><em>AppInit_DLLs keys</em></li><li><em>Winlogon Keys</em></li></ol><h3><strong>Suspicious Process Behavior</strong></h3><p>It’s important to understand process trees, and singletons, to detect suspicious behavior like multiple instances of LSASS for example or svchost.exe firing somewhere other than services.exe to name a couple of process behaviors that should raise an alarm.</p><p>an example of a suspicious process tree might look something like this</p><p>explorer.exe<br>├─chrome.exe<br>├─notepad.exe<br>└─lsass.exe</p><p>where we see lsass.exe running from explorer.exe where it is supposed to run from wininit.exe</p><h3><strong>Checking for Protocols</strong></h3><p>Lastly, one of the best ways to detect malicious behavior is to investigate protocols. Things to check when it comes to protocols are:</p><ul><li><em>Tunneling, an attacker can utilize protocols to exfiltrate or even run remote code execution.</em></li><li><em>Protocols that aren’t typically utilized in your environment especially protocols like IRC which are popularly used in CC.</em></li><li><em>Lastly, look for “heavy talkers” that might be utilizing legitimate protocols such as HTTP, FTP, SFTP etc for exfiltration</em></li></ul><h3><strong>Final Thoughts</strong></h3><p>This toolkit is by no means exhaustive, but it gives you a practical foundation to build upon, and a place to start when you have actual DFIR tools.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc070d8b506e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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