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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sal Jameson on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sal Jameson on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@stinkerssales?source=rss-8dfd64354aca------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sal Jameson on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stinkerssales?source=rss-8dfd64354aca------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Road Doesn’t Lie: What America’s Pavement Says About Us]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stinkerssales/the-road-doesnt-lie-what-america-s-pavement-says-about-us-277c0a081898?source=rss-8dfd64354aca------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[transportation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sal Jameson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 20:30:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T20:30:42.280Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U5Ne_oUdXQpL2Sl6M5C4xg.jpeg" /></figure><h4><em>America is spending more on roads than ever, yet 1 in 8 miles of major road is still in poor shape. Here’s what the state-by-state data reveals.</em> (my pick: it’s specific and carries the tension of the essay)</h4><p>Every driver has a story about the pothole. Maybe it ate a hubcap, knocked your alignment out, or turned your morning coffee into a Jackson Pollock on the dashboard. We treat these as private misfortunes, like a bad parking spot or a long red light. But if you zoom out, the roads under our tires add up to something closer to a public confession.</p><p>Construction Coverage recently analyzed Federal Highway Administration data on the condition of America’s major roads, and the numbers tell a story that is more complicated than “our infrastructure is crumbling.”</p><h3>Good news, bad news, and a stubborn number</h3><p>Start with the good news. In 2000, about 45.5% of major roadways were rated in good condition. By 2024, that figure had climbed to 55.1%. Spending has followed. After years of flat real-dollar investment, highway and street construction spending rose from roughly $120 billion annually in mid-2022 to nearly $150 billion in inflation-adjusted terms. Much of that is credited to the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which set aside $110 billion for roads and bridges.</p><p>Now the bad news: the share of major roads rated <em>poor</em> hasn’t gone down. It was 11.8% in 2000 and 13.1% in 2024. More than one in every eight miles of major road is still in disrepair, even after the biggest federal infrastructure push in a generation.</p><p>How can both things be true? Look at the middle. Roads rated “fair” fell from 42.6% to 31.9% over the same period. The middle of the distribution has been hollowed out. Some roads got repaired and moved up, while others slid past the point of “okay” into “bad.” Our road network is becoming a more polarized place, with more excellent pavement and a stubborn slice of terrible pavement that money has yet to reach.</p><h3>A map of the misery</h3><p>The state-by-state breakdown is where it gets interesting. Rhode Island ranks worst in the nation, with 36.2% of its major roads rated poor. That is nearly seven percentage points worse than the next state, Massachusetts at 29.3%. California (28.4%), Hawaii (26.5%) and New York (24.3%) round out the top five.</p><p>At the other end of the list are Kansas (2.8%), Wyoming (3.0%) and Indiana (4.1%). A road in Kansas is roughly thirteen times less likely to be in poor shape than one in Rhode Island.</p><p>It would be easy to turn this into a morality tale, with virtuous prairie states on one side and negligent coastal ones on the other. That would be lazy. The patterns in the data point to a more structural explanation.</p><p>The Northeast has some of the oldest infrastructure in the country, packed under dense cities and carrying heavy traffic. Freeze-thaw cycles crack pavement, and salt and plows add to the damage. Every mile of road there works harder than a mile in rural Wyoming, where traffic is light and there is far more of the open, low-volume highway that is cheap and easy to keep smooth. California’s problem is, in part, scale and car dependence: an enormous population driving enormous distances. And Hawaii, with its small population and small footprint, ranks fourth worst. That is a good reminder that geography, climate and a limited tax base can create their own problems.</p><p>In other words, the map doesn’t rank which states <em>care</em> about roads. It rewards the states with the easiest job and punishes the ones with the hardest.</p><h3>What “poor” actually means</h3><p>One caveat is worth knowing before we all start cursing at our state DOTs. The study measures road quality using the International Roughness Index, which counts how bumpy a ride is. A road is “poor” when the index exceeds 170 inches per mile and “good” when it is below 95. That is a measure of <em>ride quality</em>, which is a real concern for fuel economy, vehicle wear and comfort. It is not a direct measure of structural failure or crash risk. A rough road is not necessarily a dangerous one, though the two often travel together.</p><p>It also covers only major roads: interstates, freeways, and principal and minor arterials. The residential streets and county roads where many of us actually live are a separate story.</p><h3>The real lesson</h3><p>The most useful takeaway from this data is that money alone moves the needle slowly. A 25% jump in spending is a huge commitment, and the share of good roads has ticked up in the years since. But roads degrade continuously, a maintenance backlog compounds, and a few years of extra funding can’t undo decades of deferred repair. The poor-road share inched up from 12.8% in 2022 to 13.1% in 2024, even as spending rose. That suggests the new funding is mostly keeping pace with decay rather than outrunning it.</p><p>There is also a political lesson in how visible the problem is. A bridge collapse makes the news, but a slowly worsening road does not. Deferring maintenance is the easiest budget cut to make and the hardest one to notice, until the cost shows up all at once. Rhode Island’s 36.2% is the product of many small decisions, none of which felt like a crisis at the time.</p><p>So the next time you swerve around a pothole, remember that it’s a data point. It’s a small piece of a national ledger showing where we invested, where we waited, and where the bill is still coming due.</p><p><em>Source: Construction Coverage’s “U.S. States With the Worst Roads” study, based on the 2024 FHWA Highway Statistics Series.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=277c0a081898" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Blueprint of Denial: What 1960s Water Planning Teaches Us About Our Crisis-Driven Future]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@stinkerssales/the-blueprint-of-denial-what-1960s-water-planning-teaches-us-about-our-crisis-driven-future-1e144b943541?source=rss-8dfd64354aca------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[future]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sal Jameson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 20:18:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-29T20:18:17.862Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Decades ago, the architects of Arizona’s water system predicted today’s crisis. Why did we ignore their warnings?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uC3QNxuptE8ZikPm0R6Nsw.jpeg" /></figure><p>If you want to understand why modern society feels entirely unequipped to handle long-term systemic threats — from climate change to economic instability — you don’t need to look at Washington’s current gridlock. You can look at a 336-mile concrete ditch cutting straight through the Arizona desert.</p><p>The Central Arizona Project (CAP) is an engineering marvel [cite: “It’s an engineering marvel”]. It is also a monument to a very human addiction: kicking the can down the road.</p><p>As Alex Hager recently reported for NPR, Arizona’s lifeline from the Colorado River is drying up, threatening deep cutbacks to the water supplies that sustain Phoenix and Tucson. But what makes this crisis uniquely frustrating is that it isn’t a surprise. The architects of the system knew it would happen. They just figured future generations would deal with it.</p><h3>The Optimism Trap</h3><p>When the CAP was signed into law in 1968 by President Lyndon B. Johnson, America was riding high. Fresh off a World War II victory and the monumental engineering feats of the interstate highway system, policymakers believed human ingenuity could conquer any physical limit.</p><p>Back then, the planners weren’t blind to the math. Floyd Dominy, then commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, explicitly forecasted that water availability for the CAP would plummet between 1990 and 2030. Visionaries like Congressman Mo Udall championed the project while openly admitting that it would eventually require “augmentation” — massive, external fixes like pipelines from the Pacific Northwest or ocean desalination plants.</p><p>So, what happened to those grand backup plans?</p><p>Nothing. They were too expensive, too politically fraught, and fundamentally required spending money today to solve a problem that felt comfortably far away tomorrow.</p><h3>The Luxury of Kicking the Can</h3><p>It’s easy to point fingers at mid-century politicians for possessing a “we’ll build our way out of anything” mindset. But look around. Aren’t we doing the exact same thing today?</p><p>Whether we are talking about water rights in the West, global carbon emissions, or national debt, our political and economic systems are structurally optimized for short-term relief over long-term survival. Admitting that a system is fundamentally unsustainable requires difficult political fights — like deciding whether expanding cities should grow at the expense of local agriculture. Building a pipeline or funding a futuristic desalination plant sounds expensive, but it’s often deployed as a politically convenient fairytale to avoid the immediate, painful conversation about simply using less.</p><p>As Brad Udall, a water and climate research scientist at Colorado State University, noted of his forebears: <em>“They figured, like many humans do, we’ll do some of the hard work later… We’re going to kick the can down the road and hope it all works out.”</em></p><h3>Facing the Structural Deficit</h3><p>Today, the era of “hoping it works out” is officially over. Climate-supercharged droughts, record-low reservoirs, and structural deficits in the Colorado River basin have forced a reckoning. Arizona cities are looking at expensive advanced wastewater purification, while policymakers scramble for regional compromises that continuously fail to materialize.</p><p>The lesson of the Central Arizona Project isn’t just a localized western water story; it’s a mirror for our modern era. Every complex system built on the assumption of infinite resources eventually hits a hard biological or physical wall.</p><p>Blaming the architects of the 1960s won’t refill Lake Mead. But recognizing our own generational habit of deferring the hard choices just might. We can’t engineer our way out of a reality where we simply ask for more than nature can provide. Sometimes, the only viable infrastructure project left to build is restraint.</p><h3>Sources and Further Reading</h3><ul><li><strong>NPR Report:</strong> <a href="https://www.npr.org/2025/08/20/nx-s1-5507054/woman-sources-carat-diamond-engagement-ring-arkansas">Arizona’s lifeline to the Colorado River is drying up. Its designers warned us decades ago</a> by Alex Hager (Reporting on the history and current crisis of the Central Arizona Project).</li><li><strong>Western Resource Advocates:</strong> Policy insights on the structural deficit of the Colorado River basin and long-term water demand management.</li><li><strong>Central Arizona Project (CAP) Archives:</strong> Historical documentation regarding the 1968 legislation signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson and statements by Floyd Dominy and Mo Udall.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e144b943541" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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