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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by liminal traversals on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by liminal traversals on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@struthious?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by liminal traversals on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Aptness of Trans Folks’ Anger]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/the-aptness-of-trans-folks-anger-da771bc20c6a?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[power]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[injustice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transgender]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jan 2020 03:29:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-15T03:29:45.787Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Affective injustice in academic philosophy’s transphobic discourse</h4><p>Professional Anglophone philosophy has become a hotbed of transphobia, with prominent academics peddling transphobic tropes that make their way into <a href="https://twitter.com/christapeterso/status/1166093885379997696?s=20">Supreme Court amicus briefs</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/2damntrans/status/1203030564577726464?s=20">peer-reviewed journals</a>. Trans activists and vocal allies find themselves smeared and misrepresented on prominent professional blogs.</p><p>While the abuse of power by certain philosophers may be attributed to a few bad actors, the more depressing reality is that many philosophers who have remained on the sidelines and who are ignorant of the history of trans studies are inclined to a kind of both-sides-ism. From their perspective, there’s a vitriolic social media war with verbal abuse being hurled from both trans people + allies and transphobes. I have a read a number of comments from philosophers watching from the sidelines expressing the idea that they see equal misbehavior on both sides. (These include people who are supportive of trans people in their daily lives, so the comments are not always about the <em>conclusions</em> of either side, but sometimes about the modes of expression used.)</p><h3>The Aptness of Anger</h3><p>Amia Srnivasan’s <a href="http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_files/jopp.12130.pdf">recent paper</a> [pdf] on the aptness of anger offers a way to respond to beliefs of both-sides-ism, and more generally to situations in which justifiably aggrieved parties and reprimanded for being too “shrill” and undermining their own cause.</p><p>In the paper, she defends the idea that there are situations in which it is apt to feel anger — just as there are situations in which it is apt to appreciate certain aesthetic objects. If someone forms all the correct moral beliefs and carries out the correct moral actions all their lives, but never feels anger about any instance of injustice, we might think there’s still something missing about them — the ability to appreciate an unjust situation.</p><p>If you accept this idea of aptness, then you can think of certain situations as manifesting what she calls <em>affective injustice. </em>These are situations in which, for a given individual, it is apt for them to feel anger, but it is also not prudential for them to feel anger. The aptness of anger and the demands of instrumental reason come apart. To see how this is an injustice, notice that this dilemma is a problem largely for marginalized groups who are punished by the dominant group for displaying anger. The source of the anger is oppression imposed by the dominant group, but the dominant group also uses the anger of the oppressed as a reason to maintain the status quo. In American society, tone policing, such as calling women “shrill”, is a tactic that is inflicted far more on women and blacks (for example) than on white men. White men have both less reason to be angry and more leeway to be angry. In fact, for certain groups,</p><blockquote>it is possible that getting aptly angry about some first-order injustice would actually improve one’s situation. But that is likelier to be true for someone who anger is not generally seen as sufficient reason to dismiss her from the public sphere.</blockquote><p>The both-sides-ism in the sidelines of philosophy’s festering transphobia is a manifestation of philosophers’ inability to recognize affective injustice. Using Srnivasan’s framework, we can say that with regards to transphobic philosophy, trans folks’ anger is apt, and transphobes’ anger isn’t.</p><p>The following reasons make the anger of trans folks and their allies apt:</p><ul><li>Gender critical feminists are weaponizing discourses that will erode trans folks’ rights, such as access to medical care, employment opportunities, and being able to use public bathrooms. As a clear example of weaponized discourse, gender critical feminists are <a href="https://twitter.com/christapeterso/status/1166093885379997696?s=20">cited</a> in the current US Supreme Court case about whether employees can be fired for being LGBTQ.</li><li>Gender critical feminists are <a href="https://twitter.com/christapeterso/status/1198425565646049280?s=20">defending fascists</a>, supporting a movement that directly harms trans people.</li><li>Organizations propounding gender critical feminism receive support from right-wing organizations using them as a <a href="https://twitter.com/CaseyExplosion/status/1089115433477853184">wedge</a> to erode LGBTQ+ rights.</li><li>In the professional philosophy context specifically, the leading gender critical feminists are mostly white cis women with secure academic positions and who are regularly invited to give talks on gender despite having no prior published research in the area and admitting to not reading feminist and trans philosophy. On the other hand, their interlocutors are largely graduate students who need good reputations to get academic jobs, but whose names are being <a href="https://twitter.com/christapeterso/status/1043562094216409088?s=20">slimed</a> by the gender critical feminists and their allies, including allies with well-read professional blogs and allies who send threatening emails to their opponents. (There are also silent victims, such as all the trans philosophers who don’t get jobs because of implicit or explicit transphobia.) Yet, gender critical feminists act as though they are the oppressed ones, when it is their interlocutors in insecure positions who face far more material risk in speaking up.</li></ul><p>Compare this to the harms that gender critical feminists might want to feel angry about:</p><ul><li>They may be invited to give fewer keynotes, if trans right activists have their way.</li><li>They may have to share public bathrooms with trans people. There is no evidence that allowing trans people in the bathroom of their choice is dangerous.</li><li>They may have to cope with women’s groups they participate in admitting trans women as members.</li></ul><p>Let’s grant that both sides have to put up with foul language, insults, and so on, so they suffer equal harm on that front. Let’s imagine someone on the sidelines thinking that both sides are being equally uncivil. Even so, the dangers that gender critical feminists are creating for their opponents’ lives and livelihoods are much more apt as reasons for anger, compared to the discomfort and lack of keynote opportunities that gender critical feminists potentially face. Focusing on the fact that both sides are angry in (perhaps) instrumentally unhelpful ways distracts from the fact that one side has much more apt anger.</p><h3>Civility as Distraction</h3><p>Srnivasan also points to a dynamic in the policing of trans folks’ anger, in which the policing of their language serves as a distraction to turn the conversation away from the space of reasons and instead towards instrumental advice. By expressing their anger, trans folks and allies are making a point about what it is right to do. By switching the conversation to be about what it is prudent to do, the tone police direct attention away from the fact that the other camp is advocating the wrong ends. They also direct attention away from the existence of structural injustice — the same structural injustice that actually puts the onus on the oppressors, not the oppressed, to fix the situation. The distraction switches the perceived onus, making the oppressed seem like the bad actors here. Relatedly, other thinkers have made the point that arguments for preserving “civility” are often <a href="https://blog.apaonline.org/2019/09/03/what-incivility-gets-us-and-what-it-doesnt/">implicitly defences of the status quo</a>.</p><h3>Emotion vs Reason</h3><p>Another dynamic that’s happening under the surface is a false dichotomy between emotion and reason. As Srnivasan points out, black and feminist thinkers have argued for the epistemic benefits of anger — among other things, anger can serve as a source of clarification through which women better perceive their oppression. This intertwines with a long history of “objectivity” being associated more with privileged white men. Srnivasan that the existence of this dichotomy is not just a philosophical mistake, but that it survives because it helps preserve the status quo — it gives dominant groups a reason to continue ignoring “unreasonable” people.</p><h3>Another Edition of “Why is Philosophy So Transphobic”</h3><p>In writing this post, I can’t shake off the nagging feeling that all this is pretty obvious to most people in the humanities, with the exception of academic philosophers. The use of civility as a weapon against oppressed groups. Unequal power distributions. And so on. Yet, philosophers seem to be terrible at detecting and understanding structural injustice and power relations. Most trans folks and allies involved in the debate are tired of educating people on the last 60 years of trans history and on re-addressing transphobic tropes that were first spouted in the 1980s and that have been thoroughly addressed by earlier scholars. Please, do the reading and let us pee in peace.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da771bc20c6a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Measuring Progress in Machine Learning]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/measuring-progress-in-machine-learning-bd68d5f47cc2?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jul 2018 05:00:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-02T05:00:36.633Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is not a post comparing metrics for predictive accuracy in machine learning. Rather, it is a post about how we evaluate machine learning software from the point of view of the entire research and development cycle, which is the point of view that is most important to society. It is a point of view that takes into account the fact that machine learning researchers are humans who are fallible, not always able to write optimized software, and cannot predict the future in complex situations.</p><p>When I talked to machine learning professionals about becoming a data scientist, some of them recommended doing well in machine learning competitions like <a href="https://www.kaggle.com/">Kaggle</a> (and some jobs explicitly ask for this as a qualification), while others expressed skepticism about the utility of ranking in such competitions. At that time, I had a vague intuition as to why the latter group would have such a view — having studied idealized models in physics, I knew full well that there is always a significant gap between the skills required to succeed in an idealized environment and those required to succeed in real environments. A couple of machine learning research papers that appeared on my Twitter feed recently, however, clearly articulated reasons that justify that intuition I had. The first, by a group of Google researchers (<a href="https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/de//pubs/archive/43146.pdf">Sculley et al</a>), discusses various ways that technical debt is incurred by machine learning algorithms and often overlooked as a risk factor. The second, by <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.00610">Martinez-Plumed et al</a>, models progress in artificial intelligence on several dimensions, where accuracy is only one of them.</p><h3>Success Metrics in Competitions</h3><p>In order to evaluate large numbers of entries by the same metric, machine learning competitions usually specify a mathematical formula that they use to evaluate the predictions submitted by contestants. Contestants submit a text file containing their predictions, and some metric like <a href="https://datawookie.netlify.com/blog/2015/12/making-sense-of-logarithmic-loss/">logarithmic loss</a> is used to evaluate them. We’ll set aside questions about whether the selected metric is the correct one for evaluating accuracy. What the two papers I’m discussing throw doubt on is whether accuracy should be the primary consideration when choosing machine learning methods. All other things being equal, organizations would prefer their algorithms to be as accurate as possible. But all other things are not equal —as Sculley et al argue, you might have to incur the software engineering equivalent of high-interest credit card debt in order to maximize accuracy. This cost — which they term technical debt — could even be a necessary trade-off in order to obtain a high accuracy.</p><h3>The Pesky External World</h3><p>In software engineering, it is considered good practice to make your code as modular as possible. Modularity is a measure of how easy it is to modify code in one component without having to make drastic changes to other components. A modular system is the opposite of a system that is susceptible to the butterfly effect. In the latter, a small change in one part can lead to drastic effects in other parts. This is troublesome when you are trying to design a complex system with many interacting parts.</p><p>Sculley et al argue that machine learning software systems in particular are hard to modularize, because they are highly dependent on external data — which is not controlled by the makers of the software.</p><p>When it comes to external data, the analog of the butterfly effect in machine learning is what the authors call the Changing Anything Changes Everything (CACE) principle. One way in which this principle manifests itself is in the selection and weighting of features to train your machine learning model on. It is impossible (and impractical) to incorporate all features of a real system in your model, so typically only a subset of features is used, with each feature weighted according to what works best on past data. But as the external data changes, new features may become important for modelling reality. When you incorporate these new features, you may have to drastically change the weights of other features and how they are incorporated in the model. The authors point out that changes in other aspects of the model, such as sampling methods and the smoothness of the functions used, can have similarly wide-ranging effects.</p><p>Often, it can be tempting to incorporate an additional feature that leads to a minor gain in accuracy. However, the fact that the feature now exists in the model could lead future versions of the model to be drastically sensitive to changes in that feature. That is, you could be trading off a short-term, small gain in accuracy for long-term instability of the model.</p><p>The authors list a range of other manifestations of CACE, which more-or-less stem from the fact that it is hard to design a machine learning system that adapts well to changes in the external data. This also means that it is hard to adapt a machine learning model trained to solve one problem to perform optimally on a slightly different problem. To use a term from Martinez-Plumed et al, machine learning methods often lack <em>replicability</em>.</p><h3>General Methods and Glue Code</h3><p>Wait, but aren’t there general machine learning packages that many people use, which are self-contained and reusable? Indeed, but for these packages to perform well on specific problems, they require lots of <em>glue code</em> — a term Sculley et al use to describe supporting code that is used to insert data and extract results from general-purpose algorithms. The core idea is as follows: In order to perform optimally on most problems, you need an algorithm that is optimized for the feature set and dynamics relevant to that problem. To use a general-purpose algorithm rather than one designed specially for that problem, you will have to transform your preferred features and your preferred conception of the problem so that you can feed in well-formed data that the general-purpose algorithm accepts. To implement this transformation, and the corresponding transformation when you extract results and transform it into the kinds of outputs most suitable for that problem, you write glue code. Glue code is not easily reusable, because it is a kludge constructed specifically so you can glue your non-ideal, specific problem and data to a general-purpose algorithm. If you choose to use another algorithm or if you switch to a different problem, you will need to write a whole new set of glue code.</p><h3>Other Dimensions of Evaluation</h3><p>The lack of replicability and the inability to adapt easily to new problems and new data amount to what Sculley et al call a tax on innovation. An algorithm may achieve short-term “progress” by achieving the best accuracy among all its competitors on a specific problem. But it may not be the best starting point for making better algorithms for future problems.</p><p>Martinez-Plumed et al suggest other aspects on which we should measure progress in artificial intelligence. They use a utility function across the desirable features of AI to model what counts as progress. As they point out, utility metrics will differ across different subjects. Some subjects might be more willing to achieve short-term gains in accuracy at the expense of long-term adaptability. Some might care more about replicability than others. Some may be more willing to maintain large quantities of glue code than others. Martinez-Plumed et al point out that it is not a good thing to have everyone be on the “Pareto front” of progress (the front on which the utility function is maximized). Sometimes, alternative approaches that are not on the Pareto front are good starting points for future algorithms that will be optimal. Today’s optimal algorithms are not necessarily going to be tomorrow’s winners — a point backed by Sculley et al’s CACE principle.</p><h3>Values and Progress</h3><p>All this feeds into points that will be familiar to philosophers of science — there is not going to be an obvious choice of which is the “best algorithm” that can be divorced from questions of social values. The tradeoffs I mentioned above are going to be decide partly on social values. For example, how far we should value accuracy versus other dimensions of progress is going to depend on the potential social impact of a less accurate algorithm. If we’re talking about targeted advertising for luxury goods, a slight drop in accuracy may have little social impact. For algorithms that determine how to allot subsidized housing to homeless people (for example), inaccuracies have a much greater social impact. This <em>might </em>be a reason to value accuracy more in these algorithms.</p><p>Even within the context of a profit-maximizing corporation that may not care about social values, the choice between algorithms is still going to depend on organizational values. It will depend on how long-term the organization’s vision for this line of research is. For example, the more long-term it is, the less willing they should be to take short cuts by using general-purpose packages supplemented by large quantities of glue code.</p><p>When we encourage people to rank high in machine learning competitions in order to break into the data science job market, we may be skewing incentives in a way that is not ideal for machine learning research. We are recruiting people who score highest on one dimension of success in machine learning. Getting a good ranking in these competitions is a non-trivial time commitment that distracts from some of the most interesting questions: Why is the problem formulated this way? How was the data set obtained? Are these the appropriate features to use? Is it worth it to use this highly-tuned model with tonnes of glue code, rather than something less accurate but more easily modified?</p><p>This discussion is important because it draws attention to how far the choice of a machine learning algorithm is based on weighing different factors that cannot be measured on the same scale. This freedom of choice means that the person who decides on one algorithm over another cannot pretend that their choice was simply driven by value-free considerations, as <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/artificial-intelligence-could-identify-gang-crimes-and-ignite-ethical-firestorm">appeals to “basic research”</a> often pretend to be. When you design a machine learning model, you ought already to be thinking about how it performs on other data sets and other problems, not just on this one problem you have now. That calculation is also part of basic research — nobody wants to have to write an entirely new set of code again, not even in basic research.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd68d5f47cc2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Our Complicity in Academic Precarity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/our-complicity-in-academic-precarity-701ed8af4ce0?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/701ed8af4ce0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neoliberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2018 04:33:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-18T04:33:50.688Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Robin Zheng’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hypa.12401">recently published article</a> on how academic precarity is a feminist issue is a lucid exposé of the perniciousness of academic ideology. It’s a must-read for academics who work at elite institutions — especially if you also consider yourself to be an ally of underrepresented minorities. Elite institutions, and those that strive for elite status, are most complicit in this ideology, and it is very likely that if you are a member of one of those institutions, you are either acting out or encountering daily practices that perpetuate academic precarity and hence (disproportionately) hurt minorities.</p><p>Once I gained a basic awareness of how academic philosophy’s ideology systematically disadvantaged various minorities, it was really difficult to participate in many commonplace academic interactions. Zheng’s paper lucidly highlights how many of these commonplace interactions serve to prop up neoliberalism and precarity in the academy.</p><p>Zheng identifies two myths that perpetuate neoliberalism in the academy and (thus) the continuing oppression of minorities: the myth of meritocracy, and the myth of work as its own reward. I think of these two myths as follows: The first perpetuates neoliberalism, while the second perpetuates the pretense that academia is an eden free of the vicissitudes of neoliberalism (or that neoliberalism is only a problem imposed by external factors, and that academic norms are still in accord with said eden). Many of her points resonated with me, but I say this after years of reflection — if you had asked me last year, I might not have readily identified how the chase for academic prestige contributes to precarity.</p><p>Academics like to think of the prevalence of precarious labor as an externally imposed factor that they cannot help. Yet, looking back on my academic career, it’s now obvious to me that many of the “progressive” academics I knew were what I now think of as <em>recreational progressives</em>. Their actions were thoroughly influenced by the two myths identified above, yet they would never think of themselves as entrenching neoliberalism (or precarity) in the academy.</p><h3>Recreational Progressives</h3><p>I borrowed the term “recreational racism” in <a href="https://medium.com/@struthious/recreational-antiracism-in-the-academy-257758ef0c5">one of my recent posts</a> to refer to progressives who are like to think that they are not racist because they cannot discern any implicit or explicit racist beliefs in themselves, but continue to act in ways that cement structural racism, such as only making job offers to white men. I think the phenomenon of academic precarity is propped up by a similar group of <em>recreational progressives</em>.</p><p>One example of a recreational progressive could be someone I know, who attends an elite PhD program, is groomed by her advisor to get an R1 job, sees herself as an ally yada yada, but nonetheless accused a peer of “selling out to capitalism” when the latter revealed that they were looking at corporate jobs. They also see no problem in assiduously recruiting prospective students to a PhD program that is obsessed with academic prestige. This person is a recreational progressive, because they are discouraging actions that would help ameliorate academic precarity, while themselves propping up the prestige hierarchy that contributes to academic precarity. They say all the right things to convince themselves that they are progressive, but where it matters most, i.e. in their actions, they are conservative — both in terms of propping up the existing economic system, and also in maintaining existing academic ideology.</p><p>It can be hard for recreational progressives to recognize the purely recreational nature of their progressivism, because academic ideology is pervasive and clouds the judgment of most people in “top” PhD programs. Zheng does a fantastic job of detailing all the actual, precarity-enhancing material conditions that this ideology brings about, via its influence of academics’ behavior.</p><p>Take the pursuit of academic prestige, for example. As Zheng points out, elite institutions have a record of opposing unionization of academic workers, on the basis that since what academic workers do is so different from what hotel workers do (for example), the reasons why unionization might be good for the latter do not extend to academic workers. Indeed, Yale even argued at one point that unionization might be appropriate at lesser schools, but not at Yale, where academic workers should be grateful for their special opportunity (see footnote 20 in Zheng’s paper). This is completely parallel to the <a href="https://www.solidarity.net.au/unions/racism-white-australia-and-the-union-movement/">divide-and-rule strategy</a> that white unions across the world have pursued against non-white workers. You may be an adjunct with no health insurance and no prospects for promotion, but <em>at least you’re not a hotel worker</em>. After all, don’t you at least <em>love your work</em>?</p><p>Academics also act as though the fact of precarity is imposed externally, whitewashing their own complicity in it. This is not to deny that there are partially external factors to do with a reduction of monetary resources from the government, say. But when you discuss the neoliberalization of the university, academics forget that they are part of the university, and that they too have propped up neoliberalism. An excellent example, which had never crossed my mind before I read Zheng’s paper, is the increase in advice for <em>individuals</em> going on the academic job market. As the job market worsened, departments spent more resources prepping their individual graduate students to ace interviews, prepare a dossier, and so on. An epitome of neoliberalism might be an example, cited by <a href="http://hepg.org/HER-Home/Issues/Harvard-Educational-Review-Volume-87-Number-4/HerArticle/We-Are-All-for-Diversity,-but-%E2%80%9D">DiAngelo and Sensoy</a>, of advice by a higher education newspaper on how to ace diversity questions in an interview — targeted towards candidates who did not have real-life experience with diversity initiatives. All of this adds up to increased attention on helping individuals, with much less emphasis (comparatively) on collective action.</p><p>Indeed, the “selling out to capitalism” remark is pertinent to the issue of collective action. Collective efforts to prepare more PhD graduates for non-academic jobs have been less emphasized relative to individual-level coaching sessions on how to get academic jobs. Yet such collective efforts are one of the routes to reduce precarity, as a collective exodus of academics from the contingent labor supply would reduce universities’ ability to force underpaid teaching onto people. At the same time, the lack of such collective efforts is indicative of the internal ideology of academia: Especially at “top” PhD programs, faculty are way more concerned about their academic placement rate than about their non-academic placement rates (it is rare in the humanities to be <em>at all</em> concerned about the latter). The value system that is academic prestige leads faculty, prospective students, and administrators to place an undue weight on this measure. But this very ideology influences an absurd number of PhD graduates to accept precarious labor in the hope of one day finally “making it” by the lights of the ideology. As Zheng points out, the “making it” hope is where the myth of work as its own reward ingeniously acts as both carrot (the idealistic dream of what life as a tenured professor is like) and stick (the idea that people with non-academic jobs don’t enjoy their work).</p><h3>Our Actions Have Not Changed</h3><p>There are many, many more facets of the Zheng article than I have time to cover here. But I want to speak to how much it resonates with my painful experience in leaving academia — painful largely because of the ideology I had been acculturated to.</p><p>One of the most difficult parts of leaving academia is the amount of guilt that one is conditioned to feel about such an act. From my current perspective, it’s a <em>sine qua non</em> of anyone who sees themselves as progressive and an ally of oppressed minorities, that they support a culture where it is acceptable to <em>choose</em> to leave academia (even without trying to stay), where no value judgment is placed on those who leave, whether voluntarily or not. Yet, I see people who otherwise act in ways that promote inclusivity engage in the following behaviors:</p><ol><li>Accuse those who leave or think of leaving as settling for something less noble (according to their ostensibly leftist values), while themselves being open to taking R1 jobs that are just as enmeshed in capitalism.</li><li>Expect people to feel “grateful” for having some temporary academic job just because it’s “prestigious” or just because it’s rare to even get any kind of academic job. During my postdoc, I felt an intense pressure to pretend that this was a <em>great opportunity</em> that I was <em>excited</em> about, when really I spent most of those two years feeling oppressed by climate issues and being freaked out by financial anxiety.</li><li>Use the language of desert to praise those who get “good” jobs, while selectively deciding that some other hiring choices are just “bad luck”. If you believe it’s not a meritocracy, then that judgment should also apply when your friend gets a job — unless you somehow think that you can better discern merit than search committees can, despite not having read most of the dossiers they read. It should also apply when you get a job, but, as Zheng points out, people who get jobs viscerally experience that as affirming their worth. I did that, and I know people who did the same, all while complaining about how it was not a meritocracy. The ideology runs deep, and it seizes even those of us who explicitly disavow it. That is not to say that you shouldn’t be happy when someone you like gets a job — your happiness should be akin to the kind of happiness you feel for a friend who wins the lottery.</li><li>Place a high emphasis on academic placement rates when recruiting prospectives to their graduate program. Yes, you are technically simply stating a “fact”. But you’re operating in a context where you know those prospectives are coming with a certain ideology, and you’re reciting the usual script in accordance with that ideology. If you’re not changing the way things are done, you’re perpetuating the status quo. The prestige economy is not going to change if this is what allies of the oppressed continue to do.</li><li>Search committees continue to act as though the myth of meritocracy were true. I can’t really do better than Zheng’s words:</li></ol><blockquote>even when we explicitly recognize that there are far more candidates worthy of TT jobs than there are jobs — a problem calling for structural reform — the majority of the profession does not act on this recognition. Instead, we act <em>as if the myth were true…</em> search committees, after all their time, effort, and investment, can hardly afford to feel they have not successfully discerned the most meritorious (pp. 4–5).</blockquote><p>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=701ed8af4ce0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Racial Cartels in Academia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/racial-cartels-in-academia-b2e9b4ebcbbf?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b2e9b4ebcbbf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Apr 2018 17:17:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-01T17:17:49.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the challenges I often face when calling out racism is the phenomenon of <a href="http://libjournal.uncg.edu/ijcp/article/view/249">white fragility</a>. Once you mention racism, people immediately think of paradigm examples of racists (e.g. Trump) which represent people very different from what they conceive themselves to be. Their first reaction springs from defensiveness rather than thoughtfulness. Talking about implicit bias helps ameliorate the white fragility response somewhat, but it has <a href="https://medium.com/@struthious/recreational-antiracism-in-the-academy-257758ef0c5">other negative effects</a>.</p><p>This is why many progressives prefer talking about institutional or structural injustice, avoiding appeals to explicit or implicit bias. I recently came across a powerful framework for thinking about how structural injustice comes about and persists — Dana Roithmayr’s framework of <a href="https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol16/iss1/2/">racial cartels</a>. A cartel gains unfair competitive advantage by forming an exclusionary club, membership of which grants certain benefits. For example, if the cartel happens to own most of the world’s oil supply, they can control oil prices if their members all agree to restrict oil output.</p><p>Discrimination can seem to be economically irrational. If you fail to consider collective action, it may seem that competition for profits will weed out firms that discriminate. Firms that hire from a more restricted pool of candidates will have to pay higher costs — either in terms of missing out on the “best” candidates, or having to pay higher wages because a smaller supply means higher prices. This argument can be used to conclude that discrimination doesn’t happen, or at least that it’s rare because firms that discriminate don’t survive for long (“why would our department want to hire anyone but the best?”). However, as Roithmayr points out, economists who make this argument about the irrationality of discrimination admit that the possibility of collective action throws their conclusions into doubt.</p><p>Cartels are a form of collective action: For them to work, members have to agree not to step out of line. OPEC’s price-fixing wouldn’t work if some members decided to increase output beyond OPEC’s policy. Similarly, in Roithmayr’s examples of racial cartels in housing (homeowners associations that prevented their members from selling homes to non-white buyers), a cartel’s policy and its intended effects (such as maintaining high property values) would have failed if some members sold to non-white buyers.</p><p>Cartels make it <em>rational</em> to discriminate based on cartel membership. Individuals need not bear any prejudice, implicit or explicit, against non-members. They need only be acting in ways that benefit themselves. In the homeownership example, white homeowners had an interest in keeping their neighborhood all-white, as that kept their own property values high. They also had an interest in not selling to people of color (even if that narrowed the pool of potential offers for their home) because members who went out of line would be punished by the cartel. Roithmayr describes instances where the names of homeowners who sold across racial lines were published in newspapers. Brokers feared economic retaliation (e.g. loss of clients) if they brokered a sale from a white homeowner to a non-white buyer.</p><p>Besides being based on self-interest, racial cartels also tend to be self-perpetuating and persistent. They are self-perpetuating because they often <a href="http://law.usc.edu/assets/docs/Them_that_Has.pdf">start positive feedback loops</a> [pdf]. The idea that property values would drop if one acquired black neighbors was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fact that neighborhoods became segregated based on cartels perpetuated the undesirability of non-white neighborhoods, as they affected school quality, amenities, property values in those neighborhoods, and a host of other factors that cause people who have options to avoid living in that neighborhood. Racial cartels are persistent because they affect many generations of people, long after the initial actors who started the cartels. The impact of racial cartels can still be seen in the wealth disparity between different racial groups, many decades after explicit segregation has been outlawed.</p><h3>Academic Cartels</h3><p>So how is all this relevant to academia? One way to see it, which I think is particularly relevant to the context of Anglophone philosophy, is to think of practitioners of a given academic discipline as forming a guild:</p><blockquote>Posner’s hypothetical weaver’s guild restricts the supply of cloth by forbidding members to make cloth at night or on holidays, or to hire beyond the minimum number of apprentices necessary to replace existing members. The guild also requires its members to use only those tools that would facilitate cloth production by hand. Members who violate such restrictions are shunned and expelled from the guild.</blockquote><blockquote>To promote compliance with these restrictions, and to keep supply artificially low, Posner’s guild deploys some very specific racialized norms about the identity of “craftsmen” and the need to exclude non-craftsmen from production, because of the inferior quality of cloth that would be produced by non-craftsmen. Accordingly, the guild bars membership of Jews and other “aliens” because, in the members’ view, these groups will not “share [with existing members] a common core of basic tastes and values for quality.” The guild protects racial identity boundaries by encouraging members to form a strong web of social relationships, with frequent intermarriage and the hiring of apprentices from guild member families. (“Racial Cartels”, p. 62)</blockquote><p>All the ingredients that drive the exclusionary mechanism in the guild example exist in academia. I’ll restrict myself to philosophy to keep things simple, but I think analogs can be found in any academic discipline.</p><ul><li><strong>Restricting the supply of people considered good enough for a position</strong>: the various ways in which people are considered ‘real’ philosophers, ‘brilliant’, ‘geniuses’, having a sufficiently impressive pedigree, doing ‘rigorous’ work, not being ‘too empirical’, etc. etc. Moreover, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-schwitzgebel-cherry-philosophy-so-white-20160306-story.html">various</a> <a href="https://cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/documents/Singing%20the%20post-discrimination%20blues.pdf">philosophers</a> have argued that these are racialized norms.</li><li><strong>Internal norms in the discipline/club that establish ‘a common core of basic tastes and values of quality’</strong>: Check. Despite superficial talk about interdisciplinarity, many, many of us have had to deal with boundary policing who insist that X is ‘not philosophy’, ‘just engineering’, etc.</li><li><strong>People who violate internal norms are punished</strong>: Yes, philosophers will gossip about how this or that hiring decision which seemed to violate the norms was ‘embarrassing’, about how someone or other was only hired based on their race/gender, how that person doesn’t even do real philosophy, etc. Philosophy is a small field where senior philosophers in the same subfield are likely to know each other — it happens a lot that at the final stage of interviews, everyone left in the running is the protege of someone you know. But this fact typically does not trigger any self-examination — more likely, that relationship is taken as <em>evidence</em> of the candidate’s quality. They like to believe that they were being objective in hiring their friend’s or collaborator’s student/son. Junior people who are not sufficiently networked are blamed for not being sufficiently go-getting — never mind that networking might be particularly difficult if many senior people have a habit of harassing people of your demographic group.</li><li><strong>‘Frequent intermarriage and the hiring of apprentices from guild member families’</strong>: Yes, R1 departments prefer to hire from departments that are ranked high according to a ranking that is itself determined by polling powerful people in the discipline. The same family of powerful people gets to determine standards of good work, hiring, and who is even qualified to be an apprentice, i.e. grad school admissions. Another contributor to the positive feedback loop.</li><li><strong>Arbitrary restriction of tools of trade</strong>: Yes, philosophers love to draw boundaries based on methodology, c.f. abovementioned objections like ‘just engineering’ and ‘too empirical’. Related objections may be things like ‘just sociology’, ‘only a matter of practical details’, ‘not fundamental’.</li><li><strong>Compensation for not hiring from a wider supply</strong>: As explained earlier, discrimination can be economically rational if there are factors that compensate for the loss of efficiency caused by discrimination. In the guild case, compensation for not selling more cloth (which they could if they used machines instead of hand-weaving) comes through being able to restrict supply and keep prices higher than they would be with machines. In the academic case, philosophy may be losing out by sacrificing perceived social relevance (for example in the eyes of students who care more about ‘practical’ issues or who want more non-white faculty) for higher prestige. Many philosophers who want to defend analytic philosophy from the scourge of feminism etc. place a lot of weight on the fact that philosophy is not like the other humanities; that it has not yet succumbed to that wishy-washy stuff — they see this as a source of intellectual prestige. It is, in fact, other disciplines also have the phenomenon that the less “applied” fields are more prestigious: see <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/science-in-context/article/prestige-asymmetry-in-american-physics-aspirations-applications-and-the-purloined-letter-effect/7421B49270A1E216DCE37E08E95F4B22">this paper</a> on the relative prestige of condensed matter vis-a-vis particle physics for one explanation of how this dynamic persists.</li><li><strong>Positive feedback loop</strong>: The same people who define what counts as good philosophy/a good philosopher disproportionately train the apprentices who would be considered candidates for jobs where they can determine what counts as good philosophy. There is very little ‘contamination’ of the supply by those who come from “lowly ranked” PhD programs. People panic about how the quality of philosophy will drop if we consider race or gender as relevant factors in a hiring decision. Misogynists, sexists, and racists are tolerated as long as they produce good philosophy, thus weeding out apprentices who don’t want to deal with that kind of behavior and ensuring that the next generation of apprentices will continue to largely tolerate that behavior.</li></ul><h3>tl;dr</h3><p>You don’t need to be explicitly or even implicitly prejudiced to keep minorities out of philosophy: You just need to unquestioningly accept narratives about what counts as “good philosophy”, what even counts as “philosophy”, and what types of physical markers or behavior count as evidence for “brilliance”. When this happens on a collective level (and it is indeed collective action, since we have discipline-wide rankings that many people base their behaviors on, and departmental standards about grad student admissions and hiring), the vast majority of people may simply be maximizing their self-interest, trying to help their students, trying to maintain “standards” in the discipline, or trying to help make the department better. In the same way, many people who contribute to housing segregation are simply trying to find a home that would help their children grow up in a safe community with various amenities, and that would also serve as a good store of wealth.</p><p>There is one important disanalogy, which actually ends up strengthening my case that an academic discipline acts as a cartel: With the housing segregation case, a white homeowner who is considering selling to a non-white person might actually have to sacrifice something economically (at least in the short term) in order to avoid social censure — they might have to take a less desirable offer because a non-white person made a particularly good offer which the seller had to reject to honor the cartel’s policy. In the academic hiring case, it’s much more nebulous whether there even is a tradeoff. Even if the non-white candidate was actually the “better” candidate, the department is unlikely to “feel the pain” of hiring the white candidate instead — it’s not like there is an entire alternate history laid out in front of them detailing what they had actually missed out on. It would be very easy for the department to convince themselves that they made the best choice even if they didn’t, because there is no clear metric of what would count as making the best choice. The only way to investigate the counterfactual (imperfectly) is if the candidate they passed over did very well at a different position — if they did much better than the candidate than the department actually hired. Moreover, the passed-over candidate would have to be so accomplished that it cannot be denied through selective tweaking of standards that they have indeed done better. This latter condition is pretty hard to fulfill, so my guess is that this scenario is relatively rare. Not to mention that there are many minorities who simply don’t get an offer from somewhere else when they are rejected by a department, and thus don’t provide any “alternate history” for the rejecting department to view.</p><p>This disanalogy to other cartels, however, implies that academic cartels are easier to maintain, because there is less need to maintain a harsh regime of punishment for those who go out of line. The incentives for going out of line are low anyway, so one need not work very hard institutionally to maintain the cartel. One simply has to passively accept the prevailing norms of the discipline.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2e9b4ebcbbf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Evasion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/evasion-2c31c88d8ded?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c31c88d8ded</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ideology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[society]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Feb 2018 05:36:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-18T05:36:37.370Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As I suggested at the end of my <a href="https://medium.com/@struthious/recreational-antiracism-in-the-academy-257758ef0c5">last post</a>, I’ve been bothered by how the terrible academic job market has been used as a way to justify hiring practices. Because no one should expect to get an academic job, regardless of their qualifications, any instance of someone not getting one can be put down to “bad luck”. In that post, I was concerned about how this automatically neutralized claims about the role of white male supremacy in hiring, at least when it comes to discussing why any one over-qualified minority didn’t get a job: the failure of any <em>individual</em> to get a job can always be attributed to bad luck, because of course there are plenty of over-qualified people not getting jobs.</p><p>Shortly after I wrote that post, <a href="http://erinbartram.com/uncategorized/the-sublimated-grief-of-the-left-behind/">another piece of quit-lit</a> appeared, making related points. The author, Erin Bartram, felt that she was not allowed to grieve over the end of her academic career, partly because she wasn’t supposed to expect a job in the first place. Relatedly, she felt that the profession did not grieve over such losses either — quit-lit is confined to those who quit. Part of the lack of grief is because, as she reports, many of her soon-to-be-former colleagues reassure her that she can still contribute to the profession by publishing.</p><p>In that essay, I see many threads related to the general theme of evasion of responsibility. Bartram writes:</p><blockquote>I just want us to be honest with ourselves about who exactly we’re trying to comfort when we offer people this advice [to continue publishing] and what we’re actually asking of those people when we offer it.</blockquote><p>Reading this made me realize the following: So much of what stayers say to quitters when they leave is to comfort the stayers themselves; to avoid acknowledging the loss to the profession, and to avoid facing how they share responsibility for the loss.</p><p>Take this juxtaposition for example. We continue to tell many quitters that their work is “valuable” or “worth doing”. Yet, we also propagate the narrative that they shouldn’t expect to get a job, or that the people who get fancy jobs deserve them because of their genius. I’m interested in interrogating what we mean by “valuable” in these contexts. As Bartram acknowledges, it sounds petty to ask how your work is valuable if no one will pay you a living wage to do it. But is it really petty?</p><p>One way to interrogate the phrase is: Worth doing <em>to whom</em>? Clearly, it’s not worth doing for the person who is being encouraged to do it. Is there some sense of worth doing that is not indexed to its worth for the quitter? Academics like to think that there is, I suppose. That’s the whole basis for sifting people based on their pieces of writing, deciding which essays should be published, and so on. So this person’s work is valuable in some objective sense, but she shouldn’t have expected a job anyway. It’s valuable enough that it ought to continue to be disseminated — hence the plea for the person to continue publishing without monetary compensation. Perhaps the thinking is that in an ideal world, that person would still be able to be paid to do that research.</p><p>Somehow, retreating to this notion of “valuable” makes me uneasy. I’m not saying that the only notion of “valuable” worth having is one in which the only valuable actions are those that get you money. It’s more the continued use of the term in these contexts — contexts which are very far from the ideal world. It smacks a little of how white people<a href="http://douglasficek.com/teaching/phi-102/mills.pdf"> do political philosophy by appealing to ideal theory</a> [pdf], and in doing so, end up ensuring the irrelevance of their debates to people of color. In some way, the “reassurance” from peers that your work is “valuable” feels a little like the claim from many white political philosophers that one day their theories will lead to actual racial justice.</p><p>I need to think more about why that is. In both cases, I think there is something evasive about the answers being given. I’ve already suggested in my previous post that part of what’s going on is an evasion of responsibility, and that’s part of what’s going on in the ideal theory case too — the framework of mainstream Anglo political philosophy defines the details of implementation as out of its purview, and so evades any responsibility as to how useless the framework is for ongoing concerns that merely <em>happen </em>to harm certain groups disproportionately.</p><p>The flip side of evading responsibility or even feelings of loss for those who leave is worshipping those who “succeed”. We go on and on about how so many who don’t get a job are unlucky but we don’t acknowledge how their supposed lack of luck is premised upon lucky people getting jobs that they aren’t necessarily qualified for. Instead, the usual academic prestige games go on undisrupted: the disparity in hero-worship between those who get fancy jobs and those who get “only” teaching jobs doesn’t seem to have lessened. (<a href="https://twitter.com/26pglt/status/965027453595918336">This tweet</a> describes the asymmetry well.) So many self-proclaimed progressives in the academy play lip service to social justice and diversity, but will happily swoon at the feet of the next great white genius as much as any conservative would.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c31c88d8ded" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Recreational Antiracism in the Academy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/recreational-antiracism-in-the-academy-257758ef0c5?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/257758ef0c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[race]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender-equality]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Feb 2018 04:36:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-05T05:12:54.317Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’ve been trying to make sense of why some incidents in academia rankled with me. These incidents can be generically described as follows. A hiring committee or department is composed almost entirely of cis white men. They all consider themselves to be progressives who are open to diversity and so on. They are proud that they have read the implicit bias literature, and openly joke about how they’ll never know if they themselves are implicitly biased because they already know the purpose of implicit bias tests before taking them. But year after year, they continue to hire only cis white men. Their acquaintances are hesitant to use this as evidence of something wrong, because these men profess to be progressives, are aware that implicit bias exists, and openly wonder why women keep dropping their classes.</p><p>This type of situation, in my experience, is much more common than the “paradigm” case of someone who explicitly professes beliefs about certain demographic groups being inferior. But I was grappling for a theoretical framework to explain what exactly is wrong with this situation — the culprits seemed to have engaged in certain performative acts that made it harder than usual to pin wrongdoing upon them. Thankfully, Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo’s paper, <a href="http://hepg.org/HER-Home/Issues/Harvard-Educational-Review-Volume-87-Number-4/HerArticle/We-Are-All-for-Diversity,-but-%E2%80%9D">“We’re All for Diversity, but…”</a> (paywalled) and Chanda Prescod-Weinstein’s <a href="https://medium.com/space-anthropology/diversity-is-a-dangerous-set-up-8cee942e7f22#---1058-1180">review</a> of a book-length critique of implicit bias discourse helped to crystallize a lot of thoughts that had been vaguely squirming in my pre-verbal consciousness.</p><p>Between the two articles, I learned two concepts that really help put my observations into context.</p><ol><li>The danger of focusing on private, individual intentions as a source of bias — which is accentuated by the focus on implicit bias over structural issues.</li><li>The commodification of diversity: when a minority is hired, institutions make a big deal out of it to paint themselves as diverse, but at the same time, they do not consider a lack of competence in diversity as a significant factor against hiring certain candidates. Diversity is considered as a nice bonus to be capitalized on for image reasons, but not being competent to handle an increasingly diverse student body is not considered as even a moderate disadvantage.</li></ol><p>When these two concepts are combined, you get an overall lack of <em>accountability</em> for failing to improve the situation of minorities in academia. Focusing on intentions makes it impossible to accuse any cis white man who appears sufficiently well-intentioned of wrongdoing, even if their actions perpetuate white male supremacy. Relatedly, the emphasis on private intention and the view that diversity is just a nice “bonus” leads to a lack of interest in <em>operationalizing</em> how we evaluate candidates for competence in diversity — and it’s hard to hold people accountable if you let them get away with saying “but we tried to hire minorities”, without requiring them to operationalize this “trying”.</p><h4>“I’ll never know if I’m implicitly biased”</h4><p>I’ll start with the relationship between implicit bias discourse and the focus on private intentions. For a fuller account, read Prescod-Weinstein’s <a href="https://medium.com/space-anthropology/diversity-is-a-dangerous-set-up-8cee942e7f22#---1058-1180">post</a> or the <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/race-on-the-brain/9780231184243">book</a> she’s reviewing, but the core of it is that cognitive psychology frames implicit bias as something that is in an <em>individual’s</em> mind, and in doing so, takes away the focus from <em>structural</em> white male supremacy. Because it is hard to epistemologically access an individual’s beliefs, this makes it harder to pin wrongdoing on individuals who may be implicitly biased. Of course, all this is compounded by the recent failures to replicate certain implicit bias studies. Prescod-Weinstein quotes Charles Lawrence III, a law professor, who warned about this:</p><p><em>I further express my fear that cognitive psychology’s focus on the workings of the individual mind may cause us to think of racism as a private concern, as if our private implicit biases do not implicate collective responsibility for racial subordination and the continued vitality of the ideology and material structures of white supremacy. In its most extreme manifestation, this view of implicit bias, as evidence of only private, individual beliefs, is expressed as a right to be racist.</em></p><p>I’ve experienced this use of implicit bias to escape any kind of responsibility. The title of this section is a quote from an interaction I had with white male philosophers in a department that has serious diversity problems. They had a habit of interviewing almost exclusively white men for jobs, even when there were minorities who worked in the same areas as those white men and had a better research output (they did not care about teaching). Yet, when in the company of minorities, they would happily joke about how they had taken the implicit bias tests but would never know if they were actually implicitly biased, because they couldn’t help gaming the test if they knew what it was testing for. As a statement of fact, it’s true that the tests cannot show whether they are implicitly biased. But their declaring this, in the current climate of discourse, also made it hard for anyone to accuse them of doing wrong in their hiring practices. <em>But they’re good men! They were so </em>nice<em> to you! They even know about implicit bias!</em></p><h4>Diversity as a Mere Bonus</h4><p>The Sensoy and DiAngelo paper focuses on diversity in academic hiring in particular. While their experiences come from the field of education departments in particular, they will sound familiar to many minorities. They go through an extended list of statistics showing that racial diversity has increased among students, but faculty diversity has not. All the same,</p><blockquote>position calls that “encourage” and “invite” underrepresented groups and especially visible minority applicants are ubiquitous. (p. 558)</blockquote><p>This sentence painfully hits the spot for many minorities. Diversity-oriented language is in so many job ads, but the actual hiring process does not reflect this supposed “encouragement” — or maybe they really want you only to apply, but not to actually get any jobs.</p><p>The quote above also reflects how institutions want to appear to be welcoming of underrepresented groups, which is why they put such language in job advertisements, but in terms of the<em> actions</em> that lead to people being hired, they do not demonstrate serious efforts to produce faculty diversity. For example,</p><blockquote>When hiring committees are considering a candidate of color, the fact that the candidate would “add” diversity to the faculty is most always talked about, yet when a White candidate is at the top of the list, the fact that that candidate would <em>not </em>add diversity is not talked about. (p. 573)</blockquote><p>The root cause of such behavior, I suspect, is that hiring someone who maintains the department’s status quo (demographics-wise) is not an action that raises any issues that have to be talked about. It’s considered neutral, the same way that people consider it neutral or normal for most protagonists in Hollywood movies to be white, but throw a fit when certain minorities get starring roles. Whiteness is invisible. But when you are seriously considering hiring a person of color, the fact that they add to diversity suddenly becomes a way to market that candidate to the powers that be.</p><p>Of course, since lack of diversity is not taken seriously, institutions make little effort to make themselves accountable for their lack of diversity. This lack of accountability is buttressed by my earlier point on how it is assumed that if one cannot demonstrate discrimination on an individual basis (implicit or explicit), then there isn’t a problem in the hiring process. Lack of accountability manifests as a complete absence of any way to operationalize efforts to make your faculty more diverse. <em>Words</em> are thrown about how nice it would be to hire someone diverse, but these are not translated into actions that increase the likelihood of diverse candidates being hired. For instance, there is typically no discussion of how to evaluate a candidate’s competence in diversity. Hiring committee members often switch off or leave the room when a diversity-related question is being asked — and often these are ‘optional’ and therefore not asked at all. There is also no operationalization of what consists of a good answer to such questions — indeed, higher education publications routinely offer sound-bite advice on how to answer such questions, suggesting that answers borne of genuine experience are not demanded. Hiring committees frequently allow for evaluative (rather than descriptive) language in discussions of candidates, without considering how certain evaluations may encode white supremacy (e.g. <em>friendly, relaxed, great sense of humor, cool style, fits in</em>).</p><p>(One example of an evaluation that I know for a fact actually happens in academic philosophy: “He’ll grow into it.” Think about the people of whom this phrase is uttered— they will most likely not be women of color or queer-presenting people. What is the <em>it</em> that this person will grow into? What image comes to your mind, when you think of the prototypical brilliant philosopher?)</p><p>There is also no operationalization of which faculty members are competent to serve in on a hiring committee if there is a strong desire to hire a member of an underrepresented group. This feeds off the fact that there is no operationalization of whether a candidate is competent on diversity issues.</p><p>Sensoy and DiAngelo offer many concrete ways to operationalize hiring diverse faculty, and I highly recommend reading the article to learn what they are. If you really do not want to put in the effort to hire diverse faculty, they suggest that you stop marketing yourselves as pro-diversity:</p><blockquote>As a committee, you should ask whether your practices and outcomes are in line with the institution’s professed values. If not, then be honest about the department’s unwillingness to be accountable to those values and remove any misaligned statements from marketing and other materials promoting your faculty. (p. 574)</blockquote><p>Importantly, keeping your current hiring process unchanged, if you are a disproportionately white department, is the same as maintaining white supremacy. If you have been hiring only white candidates for a long time, and you make no effort to institute concrete measures to change this, then it is reasonable to expect that you will continue to hire only white candidates (claims that there weren’t any suitable non-white candidates have been, in my experience, false — it’s usually something like the situation <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/numberlandadventures/">narrated by Alice Silverberg</a> in her Sept 17, 2017 post, “We’d love to hire a woman”). As Sensoy and DiAngelo put it,</p><blockquote>when a predetermined formula generated by the institution is used, the default is the reproduction of power; such formulas were not originally constructed to address diversity and thus cannot be relied on to achieve diversity. (p. 564)</blockquote><h4>Concluding Thoughts</h4><p>My analysis here has been deliberately simplified in some parts to avoid writing a whole academic treatise on the subject. One thing to consider is that while implicit bias may turn our attention away from structural injustice onto inaccessible individual intentions, there’s still room for theories of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/#MorRes">moral responsibility for implicit bias</a>.</p><p>Another aspect to consider is how implicit bias discourse interacts with <a href="http://libjournal.uncg.edu/ijcp/article/download/249/116">white fragility</a> [pdf]: Are the white men I discuss above, who joke in an apparently self-aware manner about implicit bias but continue to act to maintain white male supremacy, attracted to implicit bias as a doctrine because it relieves them of the need to defend themselves? While they may have never expressed explicit biases, perhaps they had always felt slightly guilty about the fact that women keep dropping out of their classes, and they secretly worry that they <em>are</em> doing something explicitly discriminatory… but the implicit bias framework comes along and saves them from worrying about their actions!</p><p>Finally, considering academic hiring in particular, has the terrible state of the job market become an excuse to classify any incident of obviously better-qualified minorities not being hired as just “bad luck”? (Yes, I’ve seen this happen too.) This is another way that institutions can escape responsibility — <em>we think their work is good, but given the competitive market, there are so many other good people out there, and almost all of them happen to be cis white men</em>. Recreational racism* — when you get to sincerely express regret that this or that minority is no longer in the profession, but you have zero accountability for contributing to that situation.</p><p>*This term was introduced by the book that Prescod-Weinstein reviews.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=257758ef0c5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Resharing Partisan News on Social Media]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/resharing-partisan-news-on-social-media-c4885c75f25a?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c4885c75f25a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fake-news]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 Dec 2017 18:37:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-30T18:37:33.494Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just finished reading Regina Rini’s paper, <a href="https://kiej.georgetown.edu/fake-news-partisan-epistemology/">“Fake News and Partisan Epistemology”</a>. I find her idea of social media re-sharing as a form of “bent” testimony pretty compelling. The core idea is that we have unclear norms about whether a retweet/reshare is an endorsement of the claims in an article, so when someone retweets an article without necessarily endorsing the claims in it, others may take it as more of an endorsement than it actually is. This makes social media a more potent vehicle for spreading falsehoods.</p><p>However, I’m not so sure about the part where she argues that it’s rational to favor the testimony of those who share our political views (she calls these people our <em>co-partisans</em>). This relies on an idea of “political importance”: our judgment of what news counts as politically important depends on our normative beliefs. Given this, she argues, it is rational to trust our co-partisans’ judgments of what counts as politically important, because they share (many of) our normative beliefs.</p><p>I worry that the notion of political importance she uses includes both normative and descriptive elements, and that consumers of social media can and do distinguish between these elements, and selectively share articles from their co-partisans based on this discernment. One can identify co-partisans who are more likely to share descriptively inaccurate news, even if that news would be <em>important if true</em>. For example, as someone with strong leftist sympathies, I know many co-partisans whom I think hold factually inaccurate views about genetically modified foods, localvorism, the effects of MSG, and so on. (These are all related beliefs held by a certain class of “natural foods” obsessed Americans.) I may confidently reshare certain kinds of articles from them, such as articles to do with how the recent tax cuts are devastating, but I would not confidently reshare articles to do with the latest “natural foods” fad. However, I do agree with these co-partisans that news about the dangers of MSG would be important if true.</p><p>One objection is that perhaps this discernment on my part could be interpreted as my simply not sharing normative beliefs with certain leftists on food-related issues. In that case, my not sharing food-related articles they share would be in line with Rini’s characterization. But I do not think this is true. I think that I do share with these leftists the broad ecological and public health goals that they have. I simply do not think that banning GMOs and going localvore are correct approaches towards those goals, because I disagree with them on whether GMOs in fact have the negative effects they claim (for example).</p><p>Rini makes the good point that sharing articles based on shared judgments of political importance is particularly powerful when it comes to evidence for the characters of politicians. One can selectively reshare only those articles that report negative information about a politician. Since everyone has both positive and negative sides to their character, this can easily skew other people’s perceptions of the politician. When I regularly reshare your articles about a politician’s character, I am implicitly trusting your judgment about how representative those articles are of the person’s character. This trust is possible because I share your values about what is relevant to this judgment.</p><p>I think it’s worth looking at how this notion of “representativeness” hides both normative and descriptive elements. Something that is judged to be false will also be judged to be unrepresentative. But there are also true facts that are not representative of a person’s character, because there may be many other countervailing true facts that contradict what the former say about a person’s character. My sense is that people have been particularly outraged about the recent spate of fake news because it’s the kind of news that is unrepresentative in virtue of being false, not in virtue of being cherry-picked. The pizza parlor conspiracy raised by Rini is an example of such fake news. It may be rational to share news about a person’s character that is true but perceived as unrepresentative by one’s political opponents. But I do not see how it can be rational to share news that is unrepresentative by virtue of being false, and I think it’s feasible for people to distinguish between these two different kinds of news shared by co-partisans.</p><p>That being said, perhaps other people reshare articles from their co-partisans without regard to how truth-conducive they are. For example, perhaps one way that scientifically unsubstantiated ideas about “juice-cleansing” methods become popular in leftist circles is from people uncritically sharing articles just because their co-partisans posted them. It’s an empirical question whether this is indeed the case, but I don’t think it’s a rational practice.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c4885c75f25a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Third Wave Coffee Shops Are My McDonalds (and that’s OK)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/third-wave-coffee-shops-are-my-mcdonalds-c37faebca436?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c37faebca436</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authenticity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[airbnb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Dec 2017 05:46:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-01T22:27:19.372Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/3/12325104/airbnb-aesthetic-global-minimalism-startup-gentrification">This Verge article</a> introduces the concept of Airspace, a globalized interior design aesthetic with strong mid-century modern influences, as part of a critique of how AirBnB promises to offer you the chance to live like a local, but results in guest bedrooms all over the world having the same aesthetic.</p><p>I find this concept of Airspace useful, because the article’s application of it to third wave coffee shops led me to experience one of those gestalt shifts gave me a completely new perspective on my travel behavior. I seek out third wave coffee when I travel the same way that some American tourists might seek out a McDonald’s. I want the same style of coffee wherever I go, because it comforts me. (I do not care so much about the interior design as long as it lets in a generous amount of natural light, but I don’t mind the typical hipster coffee shop aesthetic either.) Much as I might mock others for not taking advantage of being in a foreign locale by sampling the local food, I am doing the same by choosing a third wave coffee shop when I could seek out alternative beverages.</p><p>The article’s general critique, of people wanting to ‘live like a local’ but still wanting to stay within their (fairly small) comfort zone, is a valid one. But I tire of people complaining that “Silicon Valley” does this or that when the phenomenon existed before Silicon Valley. In many cases, it may be the case that the technology exacerbates the problem, but I’m not even sure that it does that in this case.</p><p>The critique of AirBnB is that AirBnB often markets itself as providing a local experience, but at the same time incentivizes hosts to provide a uniform experience, with a homogeneity approaching that of hotels. I think this is true, but I also do not think AirBnB started this phenomenon or made it worse. As the article points out, traditional hotels already cater to homogenous tastes. AirBnB might replace traditional bed-and-breakfasts, which do tend to market more to the ‘local experience’ crowd than hotels do. However, thinking back to the times when I stayed in traditional BnBs, I always had strong expectations that they would have a more-or-less “cozy inn” aesthetic. Granted, I’ve only stayed in BnBs in the West (America and Europe), so maybe AirBnB displaced accommodations outside the West that had less homogenous aesthetics. I do not know. But I’d like to see more evidence that AirBnB has somehow replaced BnBs that offered more “genuine” local experiences. (I will comment on the “genuine” bit of this later on.)</p><p>Now, AirBnB does make it <em>easier</em> for hosts to homogenize their aesthetic, by offering advice for hosts on how to do so, and by allowing hosts to compare their interiors easily with other hosts’ interiors. However, I also feel more empowered with AirBnB to seek out an offbeat living experience, should I choose to do so (normally, I just choose based on price, location, and a minimum standard of cleanliness). There are so many more hosts to choose from, and it’s not been true in my experience that the aesthetic they adhere to is the one described in the article. I can believe that the Airspace aesthetic is dominant in the posher brackets of AirBnBs, but at the same time, there are plenty of offerings in major cities that are literally just someone’s couch, and the pictures for those rarely convey the spacious, luxurious vibes that Airspace gives off. An AirBnB host can choose to decorate their place with more “local” flavor, and I would think that by doing so, they can attract travelers who prefer that. This is another aspect of the technology that is a pro rather than a con — traditional BnBs had to implement a sort of uniform “cozy” look because that was the image that that category of accommodation invoked — they had to cater to a wide range of customers that expected something in that vicinity of aesthetic space. With AirBnB, if you are hosting in a place with high tourist volume, there’s more opportunity to target people who really want to stay somewhere with an offbeat aesthetic, as these people can more easily find you on a search engine, and if it’s just your spare room that you’re letting out and not an entire building, you don’t need a lot of these people to come into town to make some money. Essentially, it’s the same reason why the internet in general helps people with niche interests to find each other more easily.</p><p>Finally, I take issue with the idea that the “flawed community bed &amp; breakfast[s]” were more authentic than AirBnB. As I argue above, I don’t think AirBnB has eliminated the “flawed community bed &amp; breakfast” aesthetic, but more importantly, the idea that traditional B&amp;Bs are more “authentic” buys into an unproven idea of authenticity. Assuming that traditional B&amp;Bs are authentic seems as dangerous as assuming that your local Chinese restaurant in America serves authentic Chinese food. In both cases, the proprietors of the business make careful decisions about which customers to target. They change their product to suit the prevailing winds. In addition, the fetishization of “flaws” seems to be as problematic as fetishizing mid-century modern decor. There’s a certain kind of “hippie vegetarian cafe” aesthetic that appeals to many people I know, and part of what it does is celebrate “flaws” in its home-like design (although these cafes are clearly very deliberately designed to look like someone’s messy home while not being anyone’s home). However, it’s just as homogenous an aesthetic as the third wave coffee shop aesthetic. The nostalgia expressed in the article for traditional BnBs in the name of authenticity seems to be as naive as celebrating a vegetarian cafe for offering a home-cooked meal experience.</p><p>I agree with those critics who point out that AirBnB unfairly competes against hotels and hostels that have to pay taxes that AirBnBs don’t. But if there’s one thing that AirBnB can be praised for, offering more options for accommodation (more locations, more price points, more varied living situations) is one of them. The Silicon Valley types might seek out rooms that look like Silicon Valley condos, but most of us are not in that class of travellers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c37faebca436" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Women (not) asking questions in seminars]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/women-not-asking-questions-in-seminars-148191815ce6?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/148191815ce6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[women-in-academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[women-in-stem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 Dec 2017 01:03:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-03T01:03:17.954Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>More <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.10985">great research</a> in women in the academy confirming what many feminist epistemologists have suspected. To non-academics, the issue studied may appear less important than it is: the relative frequency of women asking questions in academic seminars. However, in academia, asking questions after talks (whether at conferences or at talks within the department) is an important way of showing off your smarts, networking, and learning. It’s also a crucial conduit for practicing public speaking skills, which matter for job interviews, giving your own talks, and teaching.</p><p>For me, verbal interaction, especially in Q&amp;As, was the most terrifying part of academia. I’m not the kind of person who thinks on my feet quickly, and I have extremely low self-esteem, so I’m very unlikely to think that I have a good enough question or comment in a short Q&amp;A period. (The same applies to occasions involving intellectual banter over dinner with a speaker, and the myriad ‘small’ social interactions that determine whether you will be recognized as a Bright Young Thing.)</p><p>It’s refreshing to see people do empirical work to validate the experiences of women and other minorities. Some of what’s found in the study isn’t surprising: For example, they found that men are 2.5 times (relative to their actual prevalence in the audience) as likely to ask questions as women. The real interesting bits are their proposed reasons for this phenomenon (as inferred from their causal model), and their proposed interventions.</p><h3><strong>Reasons</strong></h3><p>The studies included self-reports on how frequently people asked questions and their reasons for not asking questions, in addition to actual observations of audience question-asking behavior in many institutions in Europe, across three disciplines (biology, psychology, and philosophy). In line with other research on women in universities, they found that women were more likely to attribute not speaking up to internal factors such as worrying that they are not clever enough, whereas men were more likely to cite external factors like a lack of time. This is in line with other studies such as those in <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/unlocking-clubhouse">Unlocking the Clubhouse</a>, where it was found that women tended to blame their innate qualities when they did badly in a computer science course, whereas men were more likely to blame external factors like the instructor (unsurprisingly, this caused women to drop the major at a higher rate, even if they weren’t actually performing worse than men).</p><p>Two reasons that may not have been obvious to even feminist epistemologists stood out:</p><ol><li>The gender of the first person to ask a question. When the Q&amp;A time was less than 20 minutes, there is a large gender imbalance in question-askers if the first questioner is a man, but no imbalance if the first questioner is a woman.</li><li>How long the Q&amp;A lasts. The authors estimate that the gender imbalance disappears when the Q&amp;A is about 50 minutes long.</li></ol><p>Conveniently, these are factors that lend themselves to relatively easy intervention. The authors propose that moderators make an attempt to call on a woman as the first question-asker. They also propose longer Q&amp;A times, and attempted to conduct an experiment where they asked some organizers to shorten the period allotted to talks. However, this experiment failed because the organizers in question failed to do this, letting the speakers go over time. To those of us who’ve been through academia, it should be no surprise that it’s really difficult to limit how long a speaker goes on — many people are bad about being firm enough to just shut down someone when they exceed the time limit.</p><p>Drawing from my own experience, however, one measure that could be taken to increase Q&amp;A is simply to have more seminars (or conferences) that don’t have a conventional “talk” as the main body of the seminar. Instead, have more workshop-style seminars where the author doesn’t present a full “talk”, but gives the audience a paper beforehand, which everyone is expected to have read before the seminar. The author can then give a very abbreviated summary of the paper, or there can be short commentaries on the paper followed by a short author’s response. The bulk of the time can be reserved for discussion. I’ve only had one such conference experience, at the <a href="https://www.thevspc.com/">Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference</a>, and the workshop format is one of the reasons why it is the only conference in my life that I’ve enjoyed. The Q&amp;A definitely met the threshold of 50 minutes, the moderators were excellent, and the organizers had a quota system to ensure that nobody asked too many questions over the course of the conference.</p><h3>Miscellaneous</h3><p>The social epistemology revealed by the paper is pretty in line with feminist epistemology. For example, men consistently under-estimated the gender imbalance in Q&amp;A (though on average they did perceive one), and also the reasons for why women don’t speak up.</p><p>One factor, however, that many might expect to matter but didn’t in the study is the proportion of women in the home department who were faculty or graduate students. These negative results are also key to informing our interventions — we can’t just assume that hiring or admitting more women will ameliorate all gender-related obstacles (though it may ameliorate some).</p><p>I’ll end with one finding that is so stereotypical it’s almost funny: Men were more likely than women to cite having spotted a mistake in the talk as a reason to ask a question.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=148191815ce6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Progressive Othering]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@struthious/progressive-othering-b13c881ffc98?source=rss-541743df79c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b13c881ffc98</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[food]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[race]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[orientalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cuisine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[liminal traversals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2017 08:01:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-29T03:27:24.224Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s been on my backlog for a while to write about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/t-magazine/asian-american-cuisine.html?_r=1">this frustrating New York Times article</a>, which perpetuates racism while purporting to interrogate it.</p><p>Let’s start with the first sentence, which an Asian friend said already made her want to poke her eyes out. The NYT decided that the best lede for this article was to compare an Asian dish to a dragon’s eye. <a href="http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/LandOfDragons">Orientalism</a> much? The next paragraph tries to make up for this by acknowledging that century eggs are an “utterly commonplace food” for many people. Unfortunately, the order of those descriptions mean that the net effect is to paint Chinese people as those weird Orientals who eat dragon’s eyes regularly.</p><p>The paragraph after this strengthens this interpretation by characterizing “Asian” food as being “alien to Western culinary ideals in appearance, aroma, flavor and texture”. This claim is repeated later in the article and never justified. (I will come back to this.)</p><p>That’s not enough, though. They have to go on and claim that Americans were once “beholden to the Old World traditions of early settlers”, but that they now “crave ingredients from farther shores” — as if Asia is not part of the Old World! Yes, I get it that (most of) Asia is further from America than (most of) Europe, but this artificial introduction of sharp boundaries is a symptom of what’s so wrong about this article — what many critics of the unnecessary exoticisation of Asian food point to is the forgotten continuities between “Asian” and “European” cuisines, and the many “weird” European foods that are conveniently left out of the popular imagination of what “European” cuisine looks like. Just look at another excerpt from the same paragraph: “pickled cabbage with that heady funk so close to rot. Vinegar applied to everything. Fish sauce like the underbelly of the sea.” One does not need to be a foodie to know that sauerkraut is widespread in Europe, vinegar is central to many European cuisines, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garum">fish sauce was widely used by the Romans</a> (and lives on in European cuisine at the very least in the form of Worcestershire sauce).</p><p>Don’t get me wrong — there is a story to be told about the relative marginalization of Asian methods and ingredients in American haute cuisine, and they tell part of it in this story. But they tell it while perpetuating the dominant narrative that we should be astonished and weirded out that such strange cuisines could become fashionable in gourmand circles. And they tell it with too much emphasis on how the food is allegedly radically different, and too little attention to the socioeconomic factors that are actually behind the relative marginalization of Asian foods in American haute cuisine.</p><p>I like that they point out the snobbery of arbiters of haute cuisine such as the Culinary Institute of America (CIA), and the experiences of Asian chefs who went to the CIA. I like that they mention the universal experience of Asian American schoolkids who brought their home food to school, of being mocked for the aromas of their food. I like the fact that they mention the “model minority” stereotype. I like that they explain how Asian chefs are pressured to produce dishes from their “native” cultures even if they are primarily trained in other cuisines. I do not like the numerous stereotypes about Asian food that they continue to to prop up in the article, all while criticizing “reductive” approaches to Asian or fusion cuisine.</p><p>What books like <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/04/09/472568085/why-hunting-down-authentic-ethnic-food-is-a-loaded-proposition">The Ethnic Restaurateur</a> point out, and what this article misses, are the following facts that are key to the marginalization of certain cuisines in haute cuisine circles.</p><ol><li>Various European cuisines have also been marginalized in haute cuisine circles, roughly (but not perfectly) corresponding to how white/civilized the ethnicities behind those cuisines were perceived to be in America. The Ethnic Restaurateur plots, for example, the rise of Greek and Italian restaurants into the circles of expensive restaurants, showing that it parallels the increasing interpretation of Southern Europeans as “white”. For many non-European cuisines, rising towards haute status strongly tracks the wealth of the nations they are associated with. These are social, not gastronomic, reasons for being excluded from haute cuisine.</li><li>It’s no coincidence either that the so-called weird textures and flavors they think are so unique to Asian cuisine have also existed in various European foods that are excluded from what Americans perceive as haute cuisine. It’s also no coincidence that poorer Europeans were also more inclined to consume parts of animals that were more gelatinous than your all-American steak or chicken breast.</li><li>Even though they mention “jungle Asian” food, there is no further explanation of how, to the extent that Asian food has penetrated haute cuisine, it is overwhelmingly east Asian (particularly Japanese) influences rather than southeast Asian influences. (There is arguably more south Asian haute cuisine in America than southeast Asian haute cuisine — again, read The Ethnic Restaurateur for a more nuanced discussion of these issues.) This differential influence of different Asian cuisines is clearly more social than gastronomic — I really don’t see how textures in Japanese cuisine are less alien to the “American” palate than textures in Malaysian cuisine.</li><li>Although it is mentioned that many Asian-American chefs reject the label of “fusion”, it is not explained why. My hypothesis: “fusion” has come to mean a certain combination of unnecessarily expensive combined with watering-down-of-flavors-to-satisfy-white-people, so the label doesn’t fly well with the foodies that the chefs they interview are going for. In reality, many other kinds of (Asian) chefs will embrace the label as it is still a good way of marketing to certain sectors of allegedly less sophisticated restaurant-goers. It would have been interesting to explore this fusion/not-fusion marketing divide and how it rests on false notions of authenticity, but instead the article just casually mentions the fact that “fusion” was pioneered by non-Asian chefs and Asian-American cooking is like “other American-born cuisines with tangled roots”. (But what American-born cuisine <em>doesn’t</em> have tangled roots??? Have you tried to get one of the American styles of pizza in Italy? Why are the only “tangled roots” cuisines they mention the ones that involve non-white ethnicities?)</li></ol><p>I get that they don’t have the space to discuss these issues at the level of detail that I would find satisfactory. But what makes this insulting rather than merely disappointing is that they keep using that precious space to beat the dead-horse point that Asian food uniquely (or particularly) involves alien textures or flavors — alien to some falsely unified idea of European (American?) cuisine. The article ends as it begins, hammering in this point. According to them, Asian food</p><blockquote>celebrates crunchy cartilage and gelatinous ooze, that openly stinks, that declares: This is what<em> I</em> like to eat. What about you? Do you dare?</blockquote><p>Well, perhaps your idea of haute cuisine (I guess, French cuisine) does not involve gelatin and oozing, but plenty of other European cuisines do. As for stinking, ever heard of something called blue cheese? Roger Babb in the comments section has it spot on:</p><blockquote>So reductive and silly. Do you dare to eat a ripe Camembert? When I was a kid other kids teased me about what I ate: good food. Not all Americans are unaware of oysters or lobsters or organ meats and funky food.</blockquote><p>Final bit of irony before I sign off — the article rightly mentions how Asians have been “a population that has historically kept quiet and encouraged to lay low.” It then pictures the rise of Asian food as a sign of “a new cockiness” belying this model minority reputation. It pictures those of us who eat “weird” foods as finding it “fun” that certain ingredients make Western diners squeamish, moving on from being mocked in school for our lunch foods from home. But this move in itself is trivializing the actual harm of exoticizing Asian food. In re-interpreting the squeamish reactions as something that is only “fun”, they are proposing just another way for Asians to grin and bear it when racism is perpetuated in the gastronomic sphere. Oh, it’s just fun, I shouldn’t take this NYT article so seriously. But I do, because I know exactly the kind of white audience they are writing for, the kind that thinks of themselves as educated and cosmopolitan about food, and it’s definitely not fun to think that they’re only interested in my food because it’s alien and looks like dragon something-or-other. It’s not fun because this dragon crap is part of a larger picture of socioeconomic oppression which this article incorporates in only the most superficial fashion.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b13c881ffc98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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