<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sunil Yedla on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sunil Yedla on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Sunil Yedla on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sunilyedla?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Attackers able to manipulate slot timings of venues and get free hours for same price leading to…]]></title>
            <link>https://sunilyedla.medium.com/attackers-able-to-manipulate-slot-timings-of-venues-and-get-free-hours-for-same-price-leading-to-7610f3d28c76?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7610f3d28c76</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2025 20:03:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-07T20:03:22.430Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Attackers able to manipulate slot timings of venues and get free hours for same price leading to financial loss</h3><p>Hello everyone, I trust you all are healthy and safe. The purpose of this write-up is to share my knowledge with a broader audience and to present complex attacks in a clear and easy manner.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F2rd3lJM0DPdwcLcSDk%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExZzAzZGJicHVpZzBqc3p0YjhjNjF1dmJ0enpwYnM1M3djdm16dmczZyZlcD12MV9naWZzX3NlYXJjaCZjdD1n%2F2rd3lJM0DPdwcLcSDk%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExM3RxbXU5aWFmZThpM3c4eGptbjh3MTRzZmtyZzVldDU0bm1rMXM2NCZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2F2rd3lJM0DPdwcLcSDk%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b822046c73b86cc2ba4be8dd8ea87854/href">https://medium.com/media/b822046c73b86cc2ba4be8dd8ea87854/href</a></iframe><p>Today’s writeup is identified on a online venue booking company that provides a platform for users to plan and book venue services. This report can be helpful while you are penetration testing any hotel/Venue booking applications.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FxZsfgxuBCMdLU9I6Hl%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FxZsfgxuBCMdLU9I6Hl%2Fgiphy.gif%3Fcid%3Decf05e47xw7ygw5okn91iu3lyi8bfdltm3og7zdkwe3hq8qu%26ep%3Dv1_gifs_search%26rid%3Dgiphy.gif%26ct%3Dg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExZ2EyZTA4bHlyNGx3cWkycG9lNjIyMXRsMXE2NG5zNTN2aGVlNjAzZCZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FxZsfgxuBCMdLU9I6Hl%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ea565b47efd64169de90983485211fd8/href">https://medium.com/media/ea565b47efd64169de90983485211fd8/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Target details:</strong></h3><p>Its a Private program on Bugcrowd. Their website allows users to sign-in and later book venue’s on selected date and time. The interesting part here is after selecting <strong>Venue</strong> and <strong>Date</strong> the available slots are pre-set by the venue manager. For example on 8th march 2025 only two slots are available, each one of 1 hour duration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F132IU8X84WYwu9S4IMnHA.png" /></figure><p>After selecting any one slot and proceeding to payment focus on the slot ending parameter from the backend request.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hQ5SywWeB_6o62txdAr-kQ.png" /></figure><p>I have manipulated the “<strong>end_time”=”0400”</strong> parameter by extending it to another 1 hour, i.e “<strong>end_time”=”0500”</strong>. The request is successful and the booking was made for 2 hours for the same price. That is from <strong>0300</strong> to <strong>0500</strong> for the original slot price of <strong>0300</strong> to <strong>0400.</strong></p><p>The impact here allows attackers to make reservations for any number of hours for the price of 1 hour slot. This was accepted as <strong>P2</strong> since this could lead to financial loss to the company</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Sz1ANSFDYx6lZYer0M3MjA.png" /></figure><p>I hope you like my explanation. If you have any queries feel free to ping me via twitter:<a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2</a> . Stay Positive and Spread Positivity :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7610f3d28c76" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[‘Websocket Hijacking’ to steal Session_ID of victim users]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/websocket-hijacking-to-steal-session-id-of-victim-users-bca84243830?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bca84243830</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Aug 2021 18:31:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-15T04:37:06.395Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello everyone, I hope you all are healthy and safe. Today’s writeup is about one of my find in a gaming website. The interesting part here is that, I always thought this type of attack is just a theory. As always I will try to keep my writeup not soo technical so that it will be easy to understand for any beginner. Let’s start!</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FS8ToH7Zt8gZ4u2iClh%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FS8ToH7Zt8gZ4u2iClh%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FS8ToH7Zt8gZ4u2iClh%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="314" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5d167e4d52434385408ea023f7ba1d94/href">https://medium.com/media/5d167e4d52434385408ea023f7ba1d94/href</a></iframe><p>Before getting into the details, let’s discuss about websocket requests:</p><p><strong>What are Websocket’s ?</strong></p><p>Using websocket requests, it’s possible to open a two-way interactive communication session between the user’s browser and a server. With this API, you can send messages to a server and receive event-driven responses without having to poll the server for a reply. If you want to know more check this — <a href="https://sookocheff.com/post/networking/how-do-websockets-work/">https://sookocheff.com/post/networking/how-do-websockets-work/</a></p><p><strong>Exploitation:</strong></p><p>So I was hunting on this private Hackerone program &lt;redacted&gt;.com. Before start attacking, I have the habit to quickly check the website by intercepting requests in Burpsuite. During this process, I found few websocket requests carrying messages. So I started checking if it’s vulnerable to websocket hijacking or not. So for that I have used this website: <a href="http://websocket.org/echo.html">http://websocket.org/echo.html</a> [This is a vulnerable website created for connecting to websockets]. All you have to do is to enter the websocket url in location input and check if you are able to send and receive messages. I have entered the targets websocket url like this: <em>wss://www.&lt;redacted&gt;.com/xns-service/secure/client/desktop/000/xxxxxxxx/websocket</em> and immediately I got a response in 3rd party website like this</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/777/1*XgY3e-pJ7lBRpIw-HoZqrg.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Note:</strong> 000 — In the actual url this in alphanumeric value but I found that it is accepting any values and same goes to XXXXXX</li></ul><p>So far good but what is the Impact? So I started exploring the website further and found that when a user updates their profile then they receive message like this which is disclosing the username of the user</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/691/1*jZJ5QX5Tc4QLEvW8yG-DYA.png" /></figure><p>So I understood that if victim is performing any action, the websocket connection established 3rd party is receiving websocket responses with sensitive content. So I went on performing sensitive actions, all actions resulted in same response. But that is when I performed password change action and then boom!! This time Session_Id disclosed : )</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/753/1*d9oKlj5SY54O-yCmPndAxw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>What is the Impact again?</strong></p><p>So an attacker will be creating a website and host the vulnerable code. Now when the victim opens the attackers website, the connection will be established immediately and they can start seeing the websocket messages whenever the victim is performing an action. The highest impactful action is when victim is trying to update the their password, the attacker can see the Session_Id of the victims account.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FxT5LMQ8rHYTDGFG07e%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FxT5LMQ8rHYTDGFG07e%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FxT5LMQ8rHYTDGFG07e%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="331" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3fad12dc902968625943ca91957cc149/href">https://medium.com/media/3fad12dc902968625943ca91957cc149/href</a></iframe><p>To create a real life attack scenario use the code available via: <a href="http://websocket.org/echo.html">http://websocket.org/echo.html</a> , using which an attacker can acts as the 3rd party and intercept the websocket responses. So I quickly reported the vulnerability in Hackerone and the report was accepted with little less severity and less bounty due to few reasons but the identifying part made me happy since I was always thinking that this type of vulnerability is just a theory!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xVNFHxPL1HxAloXjgmmmmw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Quick summary:</strong></p><ol><li>Found websocket requests while playing requests in Burpsuite.</li><li>Open: <a href="http://websocket.org/echo.html">http://websocket.org/echo.html</a> and check if I can send and receive websocket response</li><li>Received response from target.</li><li>Tried to escalate the severity and found that session_Id is getting disclosed to 3rd party when victim user is updating password.</li><li>To show a Real life attack scenario used the code available via: <a href="http://websocket.org/echo.html">http://websocket.org/echo.html</a></li></ol><p>I hope you like my explanation. If you have any queries feel free to ping me via twitter:<a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2</a> . Stay Positive and Spread Positivity :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bca84243830" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/websocket-hijacking-to-steal-session-id-of-victim-users-bca84243830">‘Websocket Hijacking’ to steal Session_ID of victim users</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Information Disclosure to Account Takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://sunilyedla.medium.com/information-disclosure-to-account-takeover-a21b2b54147a?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a21b2b54147a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2021 16:09:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-28T16:09:48.380Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi everyone! This is Sunil Yedla, Bug bounty hunter from Andhra Pradesh, India. Hope you all are healthy and safe. Today’s writeup is my recent find on external private program where I was able to completely takeover any users account who signed up using OAuth flow or connected social accounts without victims interaction. As always I will try to keep my writeup not soo technical so that it will be easy to understand for any beginner. Let’s start!</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FL9bVhfDi9Va3pKPNje%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FL9bVhfDi9Va3pKPNje%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia4.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExM2c3Y3N4dmQ4dTEwc204b2JpdWxyeHczZjJndmwyNDczaHJzcno2YSZlcD12MV9naWZzX2dpZklkJmN0PWc%2FL9bVhfDi9Va3pKPNje%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="246" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a308904a5a23b63590b34aa347e5d70c/href">https://medium.com/media/a308904a5a23b63590b34aa347e5d70c/href</a></iframe><p>On July 9th, I found couple of Low/Medium severity vulnerabilities on an external private program. One of the vulnerability is happening at this endpoint: <em>https://&lt;target.tld&gt;/proxyservices/v1/users/validate?searchUser =&lt;Victims_email&gt;</em></p><p><strong>What is the Initial vulnerability?</strong></p><p>This vulnerability is captured when user is intercepting login requests, when user enter credentials and click on login then the system will first verify if that users exists in targets database or not. The vulnerability at this endpoint: <em>/proxyservices/v1/users/validate?searchUser =&lt;Victims_email&gt;</em> is that, in the response full details of the registered user is displayed which includes, their status, plan, phone number etc,. I reported this responsibly on July 9th.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mb9aJp0feOnBTddC7uUilQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Escalating the Vulnerability:</strong></p><p>I am not sure why but on July 13th I was retesting the same endpoint but this time I have given email address which is connected to google Social account. I got an additional parameter value this time. i.e, ``idToken`` it is a base 64 encoded data and even after decoding I found couple of other token values but not sure where to use it. So I kept that aside and move to another target.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Nwv1PT0owD45KLiEc5HYNg.png" /></figure><p>In the evening, I again started re-testing this target and when I captured OAuth sign-in, I found ``idToken`` parameter in the request . You already knew what I would do here : )</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fui1hpJSyBDWlG%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fui1hpJSyBDWlG%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fui1hpJSyBDWlG%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="291" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6073c2b16a33c89c099a906f55438092/href">https://medium.com/media/6073c2b16a33c89c099a906f55438092/href</a></iframe><p>So I quickly created two accounts on target and connected OAuth to both accounts. For clarity let’s call the two accounts as attacker@gmail.com and victim@gmail.com. Attacker now send a GET request to this endpoint: <em>https://&lt;target.tld&gt;/proxyservices/v1/users/validate?searchUser =victim@gmail.com</em> and copy the idToken value from the response. Now Login as attacker@gmail.com using social account [Google]and capture the request in Burpsuite. The request will be like this:</p><p>POST /proxyservices/v1/auth/add/SocialMailUser HTTP/1.1<br>Host: target.tld<br>XXX</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — -274014344326728136281788800409<br>Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”idToken”</p><p>&lt;Attackers_idToken&gt;<br> — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -274014344326728136281788800409<br>Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”authType”</p><p>SOCIAL_GMAIL<br> — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -274014344326728136281788800409<br>Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”genPassword”</p><p>&lt;genpassword&gt;<br> — — — — — — — — — — — — — — -274014344326728136281788800409 —</p><p>Now simply replace ``idToken`` value of attacker with victim’s and send the request [Keep the genpassword value as it is]. The attacker will successfully Login to victims account without victims interaction.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fl0MYt5jPR6QX5pnqM%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl0MYt5jPR6QX5pnqM%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia4.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExenBsaHprdnU1eGFjOXUyMXA3Z2dnN3pmdXQwMHRtbW5yenZpc3hiaSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2Fl0MYt5jPR6QX5pnqM%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/726109d2528153d5ccce41d66f0cb726/href">https://medium.com/media/726109d2528153d5ccce41d66f0cb726/href</a></iframe><p>This was reported responsibly to the Private program on July 13th and the bounty is not yet rewarded. I hope this writeup is informational, feel free to share your feedback via twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">Sunil Yedla</a> . Stay positive and Share Positivity.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a21b2b54147a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stealing Chat session ID with CORS and execute CSRF attack]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/stealing-chat-session-id-with-cors-and-execute-csrf-attack-f9f7ea229db1?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9f7ea229db1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2021 10:23:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-13T04:52:42.620Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Everyone, Hope you all are healthy and safe. Today’s writeup is my recent find on Bugcrowd private program. This writeup explains how I was able to chain CORS with CSRF attack to steal chat session Id of victim user and send messages on behalf of victim. Without wasting time let’s get into details of the vulnerability.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fl0K4hO8mVvq8Oygjm%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl0K4hO8mVvq8Oygjm%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl0K4hO8mVvq8Oygjm%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8e7cfa340e3a88079907ed7f1e82123c/href">https://medium.com/media/8e7cfa340e3a88079907ed7f1e82123c/href</a></iframe><p>In 2nd week of January, while exploring the &lt;redacted&gt; domain. I found that the target domain has in built chat feature. For sending a new message, system will send a POST request like this:</p><p>POST /ha/chat/&lt;Chat_Session_ID&gt; HTTP/1.1<br>Host: &lt;redacted&gt;<br>User-Agent: XXXXX<br>Accept: application/json, text/plain, <em>/</em><br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate<br>Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8<br>Host-Site: XXX<br>Content-Length: 75<br>Origin: XXXXX<br>Connection: close<br>Referer: XXXXXXX</p><p>{“content”:”HI”,”event”:”MESSAGE”,”clientSideSequence”:4,”role”:”CUSTOMER”}</p><p>On further investigation, I found that this POST request is vulnerable to CSRF attack. So YAY! Attackers can send messages on behalf of Victim user.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F3ornkdtVzQfIRpwfug%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3ornkdtVzQfIRpwfug%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3ornkdtVzQfIRpwfug%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="326" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7463e9dfd04d0a0e9410cbc5f3300c4a/href">https://medium.com/media/7463e9dfd04d0a0e9410cbc5f3300c4a/href</a></iframe><p>But Wait!! If you observe carefully the end-point includes victim’s chat session_id **/ha/chat/&lt;Chat_Session_ID&gt;** and it has format like this: XXXXXX-CHAT_XXXXXXXXXX–XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F3oEjHGr1Fhz0kyv8Ig%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3oEjHGr1Fhz0kyv8Ig%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3oEjHGr1Fhz0kyv8Ig%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="343" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5c3a6264767e18255f787f8c49b4f39c/href">https://medium.com/media/5c3a6264767e18255f787f8c49b4f39c/href</a></iframe><p>Now I came so close and don’t want to give up on this. At this moment, I have the complete clarity, all I need to do is find a way to steal that chat session ID of victim user. So continued exploring and came across an end-point which helps me create chat session_ID of the victim user. **https://&lt;redacted&gt;/ha/chat/create** and in addition to this, end-point does not have CORS and CSRF protection. So quickly created a CORS POC code and verified that this end-point is vulnerable to CORS : )</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NAGbB2IaJfM6yTy2rpfbxw.png" /></figure><p><strong>CORS POC code example: </strong><em>[Change values accordingly]</em></p><p>&lt;html&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br>var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.onload = reqListener; req.open(‘GET/POST’,’&lt;Vulnerable URL&gt;’,true); req.withCredentials = true;<br> req.send(‘{}’); function reqListener() { alert(this.responseText); };<br>&lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>So to create an impact, attacker will first steal Chat session Id of victim user and then execute CSRF attack to send messages as victim users. After getting the complete clarity, quickly raised a report on Bugcrowd on Jan/12/2021. Bugcrowd Triage team Triaged this report with severity P3 on Jan/26/2021</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*qhzGm20GSPr1KdDEaGmH4g.png" /></figure><p>I hope you like my explanation. You can ping me on twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2</a> if you have any queries. Good Day and spread positivity!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9f7ea229db1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/stealing-chat-session-id-with-cors-and-execute-csrf-attack-f9f7ea229db1">Stealing Chat session ID with CORS and execute CSRF attack</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Simple & Sweet: Bypassing email update restriction to change emails of team members]]></title>
            <link>https://sunilyedla.medium.com/simple-sweet-bypassing-email-update-restriction-to-change-emails-of-team-members-6ce5770e7929?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ce5770e7929</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2021 12:18:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-18T12:18:20.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Simple &amp; Sweet: Bypass email update restriction to change emails of team members</h3><p>Hello everyone, I hope you all are healthy and safe. Today I would like to explain my recent find that I have found in 1st week of Jan this year. As I always say, Test each and every functionality and break it. Today’s report also falls under the same.</p><p>One day, I received a Bugcrowd notification about my old accepted report raised on &lt;redacted&gt;.com, since it’s been so many months since I tested this program, thought of giving it a look. That makes this program as my first target this year and switched to work mode almost immediately.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fl0K4hO8mVvq8Oygjm%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl0K4hO8mVvq8Oygjm%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fl0K4hO8mVvq8Oygjm%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8e7cfa340e3a88079907ed7f1e82123c/href">https://medium.com/media/8e7cfa340e3a88079907ed7f1e82123c/href</a></iframe><p>In this website, users can invite other users in various different roles. Only admin users are allowed to edit details of other admins and low level users but admin’s are only allowed to edit profile details but restricted to change emails of any user. When you go to all users list and trying to edit profile details of other users, email field will be like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/803/1*wuIVMpM9JRolRNp-hI-yzw.png" /></figure><p>Which means you cannot edit email address. So I’ve started various techniques to break it. One old technique we all knew was to inspect the element. I did the same</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/510/1*vTmE-27KxEzdLQyOEUiK5A.png" /></figure><p>Now to bypass this, I have simply removed <strong><em>readonly=””</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/766/1*0CMq4Wv-JStOqcC8GaBoUQ.png" /></figure><p>As you can see, the blocker is removed now. So I have edited email address in this field and submitted form and to my surprise email got updated successfully.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F54YeJKsHggPxoQWXKL%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F54YeJKsHggPxoQWXKL%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F54YeJKsHggPxoQWXKL%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2cd0c9a3da525edab9cd7fbd2f14fa76/href">https://medium.com/media/2cd0c9a3da525edab9cd7fbd2f14fa76/href</a></iframe><p>So right now any admin can change email address of any other team member which according to targets workflow should not happen. Which confirms that client side validation exists but backend validation is missing. Quickly Raised a report on Bugcrowd. Report got Triaged within a week with Severity P3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/757/1*11vPWhlP3W13j_H6TMAv6A.png" /></figure><p>The severity is accepted because as per the website workflow only admin role users can change email address of other users and victim user can still login with old credentials since the website did not allow email update but any action victim performs will be recorded with attacker updated email. So the severity is accepted.</p><p><strong>Timeline:</strong></p><ul><li>Report sent : 4–01–2021</li><li>Triage Team requested for more information : 07 Jan 2021</li><li>Triaged Report with severity P3 : 11 Jan 2021</li></ul><p>I hope you like my above explanation. All is well. Want to connect? You can send your queries via Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2</a> / Instagram: <a href="https://www.instagram.com/sunil_yedla/">https://www.instagram.com/sunil_yedla/</a> . Good Day!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ce5770e7929" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Information Disclosure through  Signup Endpoint]]></title>
            <link>https://sunilyedla.medium.com/information-disclosure-through-signup-endpoint-86d2d66dfef1?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86d2d66dfef1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugcrowd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Jan 2021 16:58:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-06T16:58:14.343Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Information Disclosure through Signup Endpoint</h3><p>Hello everyone, Hope you all are having a good day! Today’s Writeup explains how I was able to fetch any registered users FirstName, LastName and Phone number details through signup end-point, which ideally should not happen as per Targets workflow. Let’s get into the details : )</p><p>I found this target in Bugcrowd, let’s call this domain as: &lt;redacted&gt;.com. Since the target does not have wide scope I directly landed on signup and started checking the functionalities. Later and went ahead and created a new account and landed on Dashboard page. I found couple of bugs which were falling under P4 severity, so hoping to find any cool bug. Then suddenly this writeup I read a week ago flashed in my mind.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F3oKIPdiPGxPI7Dze7u%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3oKIPdiPGxPI7Dze7u%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3oKIPdiPGxPI7Dze7u%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/30724799367cd82ef7969db1d0fba153/href">https://medium.com/media/30724799367cd82ef7969db1d0fba153/href</a></iframe><p>This Writeup talks about, when there is no proper validation, if an attacker signup with already registered victims email by giving a new password, that will change the password of existing victims account leading to Full Account Takeover. I got curious and immediately logged out of my account and proceeded to create new account page. For creating a new account user should first give email Id value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/496/1*aCY2N60G5Ssk-MAOBjCJOg.png" /></figure><p>In the background website analyses if given email ID is registered or not. Here in my cases, After entering registered Email Id, I’ve got an error response like this: “You already have a &lt;redacted&gt; account. Please continue by entering your &lt;redacted&gt; password below.” All my hopes are gone.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FISOckXUybVfQ4%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FISOckXUybVfQ4%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExcDFyZjNhZWtqanJrMHEwbTY4dHVtd3BnczBrbjQyODBodm0zMDR2ZyZlcD12MV9naWZzX2dpZklkJmN0PWc%2FISOckXUybVfQ4%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="294" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9cfbca317b85abf7c2acd2c7c766060d/href">https://medium.com/media/9cfbca317b85abf7c2acd2c7c766060d/href</a></iframe><p>But then I thought why not check the server request. So I quickly setup Burp suite, signed up again with same email and entered a Random password. I was surprised to see the server request, the request body looks like this:</p><p>{“email”:”&lt;Victims_Email&gt;”,”password”:”Randompas”,”verifyPassword”:”Randompas”,”firstName”:”&lt;firstname of victim&gt;”,”lastName”:”&lt;lastname of victim&gt;”,”phoneNumber”:”&lt;victims phonenumber&gt;”}</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F14udF3WUwwGMaA%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F14udF3WUwwGMaA%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F14udF3WUwwGMaA%2F200.gif&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="353" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3c5097d92204fbea6e80affafc1e6c55/href">https://medium.com/media/3c5097d92204fbea6e80affafc1e6c55/href</a></iframe><p>Impact here is that an attacker can fetch the FirstName, LastName and Phone number details of any registered users but according to the website workflow this should not happen. Quickly created a Report and submitted through Bugcrowd. For better understanding adding steps below</p><p><strong>Steps</strong></p><ol><li>[Victim] In browser-1, create a new account with email: &lt;redacted&gt;@gmail.com and Pass: Pass123!</li><li>[Attacker] In browser-2, Go to signup form Enter registered email Id: &lt;redacted&gt;@gmail.com</li><li>[Attacker] You will see error message like this: “You already have a &lt;redacted&gt; account. Please continue by entering your &lt;redacted&gt; password below.”</li><li>[Attacker] Since you do not know the password Enter random password and capture the request in burp suite</li><li>[Attacker] Check the server request body.</li></ol><p>Happy to share this find with you all. Maybe If you found anything interesting feel free to share. Ping me on <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">Twitter</a> if you have any queries. Good Day!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86d2d66dfef1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Exploiting Max. Character Limitation]]></title>
            <link>https://sunilyedla.medium.com/exploiting-max-character-limitation-cde982545019?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cde982545019</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[médium]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jan 2021 10:32:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-05T10:46:10.560Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi everyone, First of all Happy new year and I hope&amp;Pray you all are safe and sound. I always love to break functionalities and find some cool bugs. As I always highlight, It is very important to understand the functionalities and do search every possible way to break them for finding valid security loopholes. Today I would like to explain a find which falls under this category.</p><p>6 months ago, I got a private invite in Hackerone, I quickly opened the invite and saw that it is a cryptobased Program. Since I am not a big fan of Recon, I have started testing all the functionalities one by one. Then I have observed that there is no character limitation for Name field. Now I have two options:</p><ul><li>I can ignore this since this will anyway fall under informative or P5 or sometimes N/A</li></ul><p>OR</p><ul><li>I can further explore and see where this lengthy name can be a further escalated to a potential threat either to a company or users or functionality.</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FCKBPCoHcq9b56%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FCKBPCoHcq9b56%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FCKBPCoHcq9b56%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="381" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/03ee4fd6918eaba3f6d832b6f6337136/href">https://medium.com/media/03ee4fd6918eaba3f6d832b6f6337136/href</a></iframe><p>So started checking all the features and Initially I have found that this is causing DOS attack. But since this is happening only in chrome browser Triage team did not accepted this and closed my report as informative.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/913/1*wpofY66gODnfz8bpZLz7cg.png" /></figure><p>So….</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2Fh99SOT2cABIUE%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fh99SOT2cABIUE%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fh99SOT2cABIUE%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/dbdee8bf96310b028bad1b956c39286b/href">https://medium.com/media/dbdee8bf96310b028bad1b956c39286b/href</a></iframe><p>and I continued exploring and found that admin users can invite other users and only the admin user can remove the invited user anytime he wants. Removing invited users option exists only in one page where list of all users details like: FirstName, LastName, Email, Role will be displayed. But when the invited person changes their name to lengthy characters then admin user is not able to view remove option.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HSxSZTJeGTomZ90wNPTyVQ.png" /></figure><p>So the impact here is that invited user can stay in the team forever. For better understanding, will be adding steps below. Triage team accepted this Report with severity 5.0 and awarded $$$</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/811/1*Qc0h3mxT0HsKkDhSLRgC1g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Steps:</strong></p><ol><li>Login as User-1, create business and invite User-2</li><li>As User-2, join business of User-1.</li><li>Now user-2 will update his name to lengthy name [More than 1000 characters].</li><li>Now User-1 wants to remove User-2, so they should go to Go to settings &gt; Members</li><li>Here for the User-1, you will not find remove option.</li></ol><p>I hope you like my explanation. I have found multiple other bugs based on character limitation, so always try to escalate when you find such flaws this is the sole purpose of publishing this writeup. Do ping me in <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">twitter</a> if you have any queries. Good Day!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cde982545019" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SQL injection for $50 bounty, but still worth reading!!]]></title>
            <link>https://sunilyedla.medium.com/sql-injection-for-50-bounty-but-still-worth-reading-468442c1cc1a?source=rss-17732dfb2914------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/468442c1cc1a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sql-injection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunil Yedla]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Mar 2019 18:54:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-12T08:23:27.520Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey guyzz …!!! I hope you all are doing well. Today I’m fully disclosing a PoC demonstration along with some brief documentation of this exploit.</p><p>This is a writeup of bug which I found in one of the private programs of Hackerone. Since it is a private program i can’t disclose the name of the program(please note that, i will be referring the program name as : “<strong>Redacted</strong>” throughout this article). I found SQL injection, in one of their endpoints: “/rest/aom/index?id=”</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FQJvwBSGaoc4eI%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FQJvwBSGaoc4eI%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExZ2o1aWwxN3ByNHdwemp6bnFxZ2U5M2h6bnlzZXE5Y2c1MXNiazgxZyZlcD12MV9naWZzX2dpZklkJmN0PWc%2FQJvwBSGaoc4eI%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="315" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/df73f6c09d1622acd356d392fa884949/href">https://medium.com/media/df73f6c09d1622acd356d392fa884949/href</a></iframe><p>I’ve been investigating this program since many days and i always end up finding low severity bugs. One day while while loading a url : <a href="https://hackerone.com/redirect?signature=7a10849f287d764bea37b7961b265b229ca480a0&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.colourbox.com%2Faom%3Futm_source%3DFrontpage%26utm_medium%3Dbanner%2520popup%26utm_campaign%3DFrontpage%2520popup%2520June17%2520AOM">https://www.<strong>redacted</strong>.com/aom?utm_source=Frontpage&amp;utm_medium=banner%20popup&amp;utm_campaign=Frontpage%20popup%20June17%20AOM</a> , found an endpoint where I’ve seen id parameter. Old/Basic trick ( ‘ after the ID value ) worked and that is how i found my first sql injection 2 years ago. Below are the complete steps of reproduction.</p><p><strong>Steps to reproduce :</strong></p><ol><li>loaded the url : <a href="https://hackerone.com/redirect?signature=7a10849f287d764bea37b7961b265b229ca480a0&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.colourbox.com%2Faom%3Futm_source%3DFrontpage%26utm_medium%3Dbanner%2520popup%26utm_campaign%3DFrontpage%2520popup%2520June17%2520AOM">https://www.<strong>redacted</strong>.com/aom?utm_source=Frontpage&amp;utm_medium=banner%20popup&amp;utm_campaign=Frontpage%20popup%20June17%20AOM</a> in mozilla firefox broswer.</li><li>Click on the “ FOLLOW “ and capture the requests in Burpsuite.</li><li>Now you will get many request followed by host :<a href="https://hackerone.com/redirect?signature=3f36030b2235beb73ec90bdb05ec105b45cd0f93&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fcolourbox.com">https://<strong>redacted</strong>.com</a>, wait for the right endpoint.</li><li>I found an endpoint like this:</li></ol><p>GET /rest/aom/index?id=3 HTTP/1.1<br>Host: <a href="https://hackerone.com/redirect?signature=39431eeeefe37d64defc2f52b587029e4e7b416c&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.colourbox.com">www.<strong>redacted</strong>.com</a><br>User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0<br>Accept: <em>/</em><br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br<br>X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest<br>Referer: <a href="https://hackerone.com/redirect?signature=eecb0653b481544319ab1443226a82420a40e789&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.colourbox.com%2Faom%3Futm_source%3DFrontpage%2522%253E%253Cscript%2520%253Ealert%28document.cookie%29%253C%2Fscript%253E%26utm_medium%3Dbanner%2520popup%2522%253E%253Cscript%2520%253Ealert%28document.cookie%29%253C%2Fscript%253E%26utm_campaign%3DFrontpage%2520popup%2520June17%2520AOM%2522%253E%253Cscript%2520%253Ealert%28document.cookie%29%253C%2Fscript%253E">https://www.<strong>redacted</strong>.com/aom?utm_source=Frontpage%22%3E%3Cscript%20%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E&amp;utm_medium=banner%20popup%22%3E%3Cscript%20%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E&amp;utm_campaign=Frontpage%20popup%20June17%20AOM%22%3E%3Cscript%20%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E</a><br>Cookie: __utma=155410345.398014507.1478469081.1478469081.1478724130.2; _ga=GA1.2.398014507.1478469081; aom_popup=1; thumbnail_size=large; __stripe_mid=414d123e-85b7–4737-a479–7693beba627c; _gid=GA1.2.1421519450.1497256887; PHPSESSID=3celt75q8oh51e2jjkdl86iihjo7t3bcrh0lilfauq7odi5behjavnd8i3hsrog6ek1lb437uvu6pv3c8qd2jalt0l1jkjekl93a8f1; language=en; heartbeat=1497297643; _gat=1<br>Connection: close</p><p>5. The very basic check for confirming if a site is vulnerable to SQL Injection is by keeping : ‘ after id value. That is exactly what i did.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FHWM6LIwxmu7vi%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FHWM6LIwxmu7vi%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FHWM6LIwxmu7vi%2F200.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="323" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8c4a17536d007001dda6bd446dc90b4a/href">https://medium.com/media/8c4a17536d007001dda6bd446dc90b4a/href</a></iframe><p>6. Now, Server response is like this :</p><p><strong>{“message”:”SQLSTATE[42000]: Syntax error or access violation: 1064 You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near ‘’) LIMIT 1&#39; at line 1, query was: SELECT </strong><strong>aom_campaign.* FROM </strong><strong>aom_campaign WHERE (id=3&#39;) LIMIT 1&quot;}</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F5GoVLqeAOo6PK%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F5GoVLqeAOo6PK%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F5GoVLqeAOo6PK%2F200.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="339" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3174f7570f1567cfe7f1b63461f3e5c6/href">https://medium.com/media/3174f7570f1567cfe7f1b63461f3e5c6/href</a></iframe><p>7. I have confirmed that this is not browser or device specific and proceeded with submission.</p><p>They awarded me a bounty of $50 and 15 points and HOF. yeah i do think $50 was low for a SQL injection but knowing the fact that the minimum bounty of this program is only 10$, I was okay with it. BTW I found another sql injection on the same day in another endpoint which awarded me the same amount.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F7syoBBth7N0He%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F7syoBBth7N0He%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F7syoBBth7N0He%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="530" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c27f884596681c487e839839c285f3ec/href">https://medium.com/media/c27f884596681c487e839839c285f3ec/href</a></iframe><p>Report Time Line :</p><p>Submitted report on Hackerone — Jun 13th (2 years ago)</p><p><strong>Redacted</strong> commented — Jun 13th (<a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/239331#activity-1750595">2 years ago</a>)</p><p>Report Triaged — Jun 13th (<a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/239331#activity-1752037">2 years ago</a>)</p><p>Added more info–Jun 15th (<a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/239331#activity-1756110">2 years ago</a>)</p><p>Status changed to Resolved — Jun 16th (<a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/239331#activity-1760714">2 years ago</a>)</p><p>Awarded 15 points and $50 — Jun 19th (<a href="https://hackerone.com/reports/239331#activity-1764755">2 years ago</a>)</p><p><strong>Thanks for reading!!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=468442c1cc1a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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