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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sunoo Park on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sunoo Park on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@sunoo?source=rss-dcd3bd43b768------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Sunoo Park on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@sunoo?source=rss-dcd3bd43b768------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Sovereignty in Cyberspace (or, Who’s Influencing Whom on the Internet?)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/perceptions-of-sovereignty-in-cyberspace-c0ac3c56cd7?source=rss-dcd3bd43b768------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-speech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[acces]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunoo Park]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2018 00:33:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-21T19:44:18.885Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7wA8NmISmWEpd_Ktc2YxZw.png" /><figcaption>Credit: Image created from photos by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/Q1p7bh3SHj8?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">NASA</a> and <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/3E3AVpvlpao?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Pro Church Media</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/nasa?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>A few months ago, I went to China for the first time ever. The topic of the trip, organized by MIT’s <a href="https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/">Internet Policy Research Initiative</a>, was Internet policy with a focus on U.S. and Chinese perspectives. I was fascinated by the glimpses we got of the principles and human processes behind China’s legal system, and the evolution of an Internet policy that differs so radically in many ways from closer to home.</p><p>What drives such radical differences? For one, the tenets underlying a country’s legislative and policy-making processes are essential to the policies that eventually emerge from it — but many a time they are also left unstated, whether for political reasons or because locally, they’re considered so fundamental as to be implicit. The letter of the law is only, so to speak, the final take of a performance; the policy-making process behind the scenes is an essential unwritten part of its character.</p><p>As one example, an oft-implicit tenet of fundamental importance in the U.S. is the imposition of checks and balances on governmental power, as embodied by the separation of powers in the Constitution and by the Fourth Amendment protection against “unreasonable [governmental] searches.”</p><h4>A perhaps similarly core tenet in China seems to be sovereignty, and in the context of the Internet, “cyberspace sovereignty.”</h4><p>What does this fluffy term really mean? Well, to start with, it has been a key buzz term in Chinese Internet policy over the last few years, and a driving force and justification associated with policies such as online censorship, arrest of dissidents, targeted Internet blackouts, and governmental control and surveillance of online activities. Today, it is not difficult to encounter the term “cyberspace sovereignty” predominantly in the context of China and the way that the media reports on China. Against this backdrop, a natural tendency could be to associate the meaning of the term with its reported manifestation in concrete policies — and perhaps, thereby conclude that the concept itself is overall opposed to ideas such as freedom of speech or the conception of the Internet as an open and global information medium.</p><p>But it would be a mistake to deduce the nature of cyberspace sovereignty only from such examples; the concept is much broader and globally relevant than shown within this scope and appropriation, and deserves to be understood in and of itself. Taking a closer look at the notion of cyberspace sovereignty and understand better what it means in its own right, as well as how disparately it can be viewed from the perspectives of different countries, was one of the more intriguing elements of my experience.</p><p>Sovereignty is a tricky term, even without any other words attached. Among the definitions given by the Oxford English Dictionary is “the authority of a state to govern itself […];” and among those of Merriam-Webster is “freedom from external control.” The latter definition betrays an interesting connection between sovereignty and the typically much less controversial notion of self-sufficiency: without some sort of self-sufficiency, a nation can hardly be said to be truly free from external control. (In this context, it’s also interesting to observe that the concept of self-reliance is in fact written into the Chinese Constitution.)</p><p>Starting from these definitions, the term “cyberspace sovereignty” could be painted as a key underlying argument to almost every issue in international Internet policy. It used to be that the power exerted over a people by governments not their own was not an issue that arose, except in comparatively rare cases. It used to be that you could not do business with, or communicate widely with, or commit crimes against, or facilitate the commission of crimes by the people of a country without a physical presence there. With the Internet, the exercise of a state’s authority over itself is now much more susceptible to external influences; and this fact can be seen as the root of most of the gnarlier issues of global Internet governance.</p><p>The U.S. is in a globally unique situation with regard to these issues. Today, the Internet is not, in practice, an idealized information medium where any user can conduct ephemeral communications in anonymity with anyone across the world. It is, rather, a network that average users are only accustomed to access through a relatively small number of centralized service providers and information providers which store and process large quantities of sensitive data about their users, of which the overwhelming majority are based in the United States. The extent of data gathered by service providers and what exactly it is used for is known only to them. Since the Snowden revelations, even many Americans are highly concerned about the extent of their own government’s and businesses’ access to such data. That puts a little into perspective the concern of other countries about a <em>foreign </em>government that does not even in principle have their interests at heart, and in whose decisions their people have no vote.</p><p>In U.S.-based discussions, from the perspective of being here in the middle of it all, an all too easy impression can be formed of the Internet as being global and unbiased, and supporting the free flow of information except as encroached upon by influences outside of the U.S. But can the flow truly be considered to be free and global when nearly all the current leads to one place? Hardly any would challenge the U.S. for the title of “country exerting greatest influence on other countries via the Internet” — an asymmetry that can be easy to overlook from within. Returning to the more tangible notion of self-sufficiency: the U.S. is arguably the only country in the world with a credible claim to Internet self-sufficiency; China is another strong candidate for such a claim. Given the increasing integrality of the Internet to all aspects of many countries’ affairs, this observation seems fair cause for a second thought, even if not for immediate alarm.</p><p>At the same time, however, countries across the world are grappling with many of the same global issues related to Internet policy — indeed, sometimes many of our concerns may be more similar than it might appear at first glance, given the different perspectives from which they tend to be portrayed. Even from the U.S. vantage point, some notions of cyberspace sovereignty are much more favored than others (though the term “sovereignty” seldom rears its head in the debate).</p><p>Freedom from external influence in domestic affairs, for instance, is a flavor of sovereignty that it has recently been made abundantly clear that much American public sentiment stands behind. Indeed, the ongoing U.S. discussions over fake news, information campaigns, and online propagation of misinformation have borne thought-provoking parallels to the statements of longstanding concerns described by other countries such as China over, for example, the “creat[ion] or disseminat[ion of] false information to disrupt the economic or social order” (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016).</p><p>I found in this trip to China a fascinating chance to try to step into another country’s shoes and learn about their laws and processes with a rare dash of inside perspective. It is illuminating to witness the same policies being evaluated divergently based on different values, and also to see similar problems being described in disparate terms when starting from distinct perspectives. Going forward, I personally would love to see more Internet policy discussions deliberately framed through more than one international lens.</p><p><em>A version of this post was concurrently published on the blog of the MIT Internet Policy Research Initiative.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0ac3c56cd7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/perceptions-of-sovereignty-in-cyberspace-c0ac3c56cd7">On Sovereignty in Cyberspace (or, Who’s Influencing Whom on the Internet?)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center">Berkman Klein Center Collection</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Decentralize all the things?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative/decentralize-all-the-things-84702944f3fe?source=rss-dcd3bd43b768------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-web]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunoo Park]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Aug 2017 21:18:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-31T22:18:44.926Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From some of the excitement these days about Bitcoin and related technologies, you might think that anything can be made better if you decentralize it… or at least, that a whole lot of geeks and multimillion-dollar businesses seem to think so. In this post we’ll try to pick apart what this means, and pin down some substance behind the hype.</p><p>A common view is that likely even more important than Bitcoin’s function as a cryptocurrency is its underlying technology, called the <em>blockchain</em>. In a nutshell, the blockchain provides a new way for a decentralized network of parties (i.e., one without a central coordinating party) to maintain a <em>public ledger</em> of logged information that everyone agrees on, even when the parties may be mutually distrusting and may come and go as they please. In Bitcoin, the logged information essentially consists of all the transactions that ever occurred since the start of Bitcoin. (That’s how you know how much money each “wallet” contains: by checking all the transactions it’s ever been part of.) After witnessing the effectiveness of the blockchain in building an unprecedentedly successful decentralized currency — no central bank involved! — it’s certainly exciting to think of applying similar ideas to other domains and to see what cool new things can be built.</p><p>But on the other hand, “applying similar ideas to other domains” sounds pretty wishy-washy. <strong>What is the excitement really about — is it even well-defined? </strong>Should we really decentralize all the things, and what does that actually mean? (What’s a decentralized banana anyway, and does it taste better than a regular banana?)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GoFQr2CuCl9zz1ftnc97aQ.png" /></figure><p>The key feature of decentralized systems is that they avoid the inherent drawbacks of depending on a central authority. A central authority can potentially be a catastrophic <em>single point of failure</em>: if the authority is malicious (or coerced or hacked, or simply incapacitated by a power outage) then, for example, the entire system could shut down, or users’ privacy could be compromised, or the system could deceive users to think that it’s operating properly when it’s not — potentially tricking them into accepting false information as true, or into handing over further sensitive data. Or all of the above.</p><p>A particularly controversial scenario is that of governments compelling companies to censor or discontinue their services, or to hand over users’ private data. Such demands have been made routinely by the US government, both about targeted users (e.g., suspected criminals) and in indiscriminate bulk without users’ knowledge, as the Snowden revelations (summarized <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/65-65-things-we-know-about-nsa-surveillance-we-didnt-know-year-ago">here</a> by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Frontier_Foundation">EFF</a>) showed in 2013. The latter has been widely considered to be an gross violation of unknowing people’s privacy and trust.</p><p>A well-designed decentralized system could avoid such problems, because <strong>there would be no central entity with control over the data in the system, and no individual or small group of individuals would have the power to shut the system down</strong>. <em>Even if nobody is malicious, this can be useful.</em> For example, system components are bound to fail from time to time, but unless most of the components fail all at once, a decentralized system could stay up and running. Also, grassroots-style efforts that serve popular interest could potentially be realized at large scale, even without the clout of an established company or wealthy backer.</p><p>It’s not just a bed of roses, though. In the realm of coercion and malicious behavior, things can be more complex. By building technology that reduces the power of an oppressive government to suppress free speech and harass peaceful activists, to track its population’s every move and impose a regime of fear, we inherently also reduce the power of a well-meaning government to track and hold accountable criminals who engage in human trafficking, black market trades, and other unsavory activities that can be coordinated in a decentralized way. One could say it’s always been that way: if the good guys discover sliced bread, the bad guys will too. What’s clear is that <strong>decentralization is by no means a panacea:</strong> the reality is that there are complex trade-offs between privacy and security, and most people are willing to tolerate some (small) amount of privacy loss in order to feel they and their children are safe in their homes at night.</p><p>For now, though, without delving deeper into the ethics of giving sliced bread to the dark side, let’s consider the fact that those in power have always had the potential to abuse it — and though history has seen some inspirational leaders who have used their powers for good, humankind has consistently demonstrated a woeful capacity for abuse of power.</p><blockquote>As digital data, online interactions, <em>and mass surveillance</em> are becoming an ever more pervasive part of people’s lives and livelihoods worldwide,<strong> </strong>the potential for damage from abuse or coercion of digital power is fast growing alongside.</blockquote><p>And data, once stored, can be pretty much forever. I’d say this isn’t something we want to gamble our future world on, much less our children’s.</p><p><strong>So let’s say that decentralization can be pretty useful sometimes</strong>, and get back to what it means to decentralize all the things. Decentralization isn’t a generic procedure that can be thrown at any system; rather, decentralization is an <em>approach</em> to a complex problem, and it’s hard to do it really well. Each network has its own structure, and each system its own requirements. You can’t just tack on a blockchain to any system, and a blockchain is only one of many possible approaches to decentralization!</p><p>Centralized designs are generally more intuitive than their decentralized counterparts. For example, a natural outline of a centralized file-sharing system is as follows: users upload files to a central server where they’re stored (maybe encrypted), and other users can download those files from the server. When designing a <em>decentralized</em> file-sharing system (think, e.g., Bittorrent), one has to ask some trickier questions: how to store a file among a network of machines, so that users can add files to the network and retrieve any file upon request, and yet there is no small group of machines that has control over the content or availability of the files?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kCBgMHvmYV4K7Kp_huL6vw.png" /></figure><p>It becomes yet more complicated when you consider that not all machines are always online; instead, they may come and go at will. Some might crash and never come back. Often there is some trade-off between decentralization and performance (or other desirable properties), and compromises may be made: for example, even in a decentralized system, certain machines may have “more power”, or different types of power, compared to others (e.g., the Tor network comprises nodes of different types, which perform different functions in the network, and some are more performance-critical than others). Such compromises can be worthwhile and beneficial: it’s important to recognize that many complex systems are not simply “decentralized” or “not”. Rather, <strong>decentralized systems encompass a diverse design space</strong>, and it’s meaningful to weigh the pros and cons of <em>whether</em> and <em>how</em> to decentralize each aspect of a system.</p><p>We’ve learned a lot in the last few years with the explosion of interest in decentralized technologies: <strong>we’ve learned lessons about how to build them wrong, how to build them better, and their potential to abet both good and evil</strong>. We’ve seen (somewhat) decentralized versions of digital money (e.g., Bitcoin), file-sharing (e.g., Bittorrent), instant messaging (e.g., Jabber), blogging and other online media (e.g., Freenet), scientific research projects (e.g., SETI@Home), and more. While recognizing the reality that decentralization can be touted as a buzzword without a precise meaning, and that it is <em>not</em> a magic wand that transforms systems into better ones, and that decentralizing a system can be risky if you don’t do it right, and it’s challenging to get it right… it still seems an exciting and worthwhile goal to work towards designing these systems really well and exploiting all their potential to do good and insure against evil. Regardless of whether you consider “evil” to take the form of innocuous technological failures, a Donald Trump presidency, a Hillary Clinton presidency, or a conspiracy of aliens to take over the world, I hope we can agree that this is something well worth pursuing.</p><p><em>The author of this post is a Ph.D. student in cryptography at MIT, and a member of the Digital Currency Initiative (DCI) at the MIT Media Lab. The DCI and MIT Media Lab’s Center for Civic Media recently released a report titled “</em><a href="http://dci.mit.edu/decentralizedweb"><em>Back to the Future: The Decentralized Web</em></a><em>,” discussing ways that decentralized systems could help address the risks of mega-platform consolidation, which may be of interest to readers who want to dive deeper.</em></p><p><em>Images are by the author and may be reused under a </em><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/"><em>Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial</em></a><em> license.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84702944f3fe" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative/decentralize-all-the-things-84702944f3fe">Decentralize all the things?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative">MIT Media Lab Digital Currency Initiative</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Theory of blockchains (and some applications)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative/theory-of-blockchains-and-some-applications-4e223db790be?source=rss-dcd3bd43b768------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e223db790be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sunoo Park]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2016 00:09:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-27T19:00:10.943Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Back in June, I attended the first <a href="https://bitcoinschool.gr/">IACR Summer School on Blockchain Technologies</a>. Cryptocurrency experts from around the world gathered on a small Greek island to impart their wisdom to students, and discuss the following intriguing questions (among others):</p><ul><li>What are the problems that a blockchain solves?</li><li>What are the essential features of blockchains that enable solving these problems?</li><li>Can we do it better? How?</li><li>What are the problems that blockchains do not solve?</li><li>What else can we use these ideas for?</li></ul><p>Several months later, I’ve finally quit procrastinating and put together a post summarizing some of the interesting topics discussed. It is intended to be neither comprehensive nor representative of the breadth of talks at the summer school; it simply comprises some bite-size summaries of topics that I happened to write about, with a bias towards the theoretical underpinnings of Bitcoin/blockchains. (I also mention some related work that I learned about independently.) The full summer school program, including slides from all the talks, is <a href="https://bitcoinschool.gr/#schedule">available online</a>.</p><h3>Consensus</h3><p>The ability of Bitcoin’s blockchain to achieve <em>consensus</em> is considered by some to be one of its most powerful features. Technologists and entrepreneurs alike seem excited by the potential of blockchains to address problems in diverse new domains including personal insurance, land registry, and others. But before we get too excited: what’s consensus? In fact, it has a precise technical definition stemming from decades of research in theoretical computer science.</p><p>The <em>consensus problem</em> is a famous problem in the field of distributed computing which is deceptively simple to state. When many parties are communicating over a network, and some fraction of the parties may crash or behave maliciously, how can all the (honest and not crashed) parties agree on a common value? <strong>Surprisingly, this simple task can be very hard or even impossible</strong>, depending on the type of protocol and network you have.</p><p>The consensus problem (sometimes also called the Byzantine Generals problem) was first proposed more than three decades ago. In asynchronous networks (i.e., networks where messages may be transmitted with variable delays), a <a href="https://groups.csail.mit.edu/tds/papers/Lynch/jacm85.pdf">classic result</a> from 1982 showed it is <em>unsolvable by any deterministic protocol</em> if even one party is faulty. Even for randomized protocols, in the setting where the malicious parties can change over time, only very inefficient protocols were known for twenty-some years, until a <a href="https://www.cs.unm.edu/~saia/papers/BA-polytime.pdf">recent breakthrough</a> that gave an expected-polynomial-time protocol that works as long as no more than a 1/500 fraction of parties are faulty.</p><p>And yet, in some sense, <strong>Bitcoin efficiently solves the consensus problem on the world’s biggest asynchronous network: the Internet.</strong> Everyone in the Bitcoin network agrees on a common value: namely, the <em>blockchain</em> that records all transactions that happened in Bitcoin since its beginning. How can this be? Well, Bitcoin is designed for robustness in the presence of profit-seeking parties (“Bitcoin miners”) who do not try to disrupt the protocol in <em>arbitrary</em> ways, but will only behave in ways that are likely to increase their profit. In game theory, such parties are known as <em>rational agents</em>. Analyses of the stability and consensus properties of Bitcoin (e.g., Satoshi Nakamoto’s <a href="http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf">original paper</a>) and other cryptocurrencies all depend on the assumption that parties in the network behave rationally. Since <em>rational</em> behavior is a subset of <em>all possible</em> (adversarial) behavior, this assumption restricts the behavior of bad parties, and therefore allows for protocols that achieve some strong properties (such as agreement) which are impossible in the case of truly adversarial behavior.</p><h3>The Bitcoin “backbone”</h3><p><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/765.pdf">This recent paper</a> aims to distill the core features of the Bitcoin protocol that are important for achieving consensus. They call these core features the “Bitcoin backbone”: they formally define a <em>Bitcoin backbone protocol</em> and analyze and prove desirable properties of this protocol under well-defined model settings. The properties they prove include</p><ul><li><em>common prefix</em> (i.e., the blockchains maintained by honest players will share a large common prefix) and</li><li><em>chain quality</em> (i.e., the blockchain contains at least a certain fraction of blocks contributed by honest miners, with overwhelming probability).</li></ul><p><strong>Decoupling the incidental protocol features of Bitcoin from those that really matter for achieving its core goals is a great idea</strong>, and the work of Garay et al. made a pioneering step in this direction. Their analysis is done in a fairly restricted model, however, which is in several respects far from the reality of cryptocurrencies on the Internet: for example, among the simplifying assumptions made are that the network is synchronous and that the number of parties (miners) is fixed.</p><p>This research direction has been developing further, towards achieving rigorous analyses in other, sometimes more realistic models. Ultimately, developing a model that is both complex enough to capture “most” relevant aspects of a real-world system and yet simple enough to allow for rigorous analysis would involve striking a very elusive balance between the idealized world of theory and the chaotic world of real systems. Theory for theory’s sake can be beautiful; that said, I think it’s worth remembering that formal analyses of blockchains are fundamentally trying to usefully model an observed phenomenon, rather than an end unto themselves. It will be interesting to see where this goes.</p><h3>Building things based on the blockchain</h3><p>A recently popular perspective is to view the blockchain as a tool — a means to an end, rather than an end in itself — and to consider what interesting functionalities can be achieved assuming that a blockchain infrastructure such as Bitcoin already exists.</p><p>Before diving in deeper, I want to draw a distinction between two similar-sounding concepts. <em>Building cryptography based on the blockchain</em> is different from <em>using blockchains (primarily) for a purpose other than Bitcoin/cryptocurrency</em>. Many of Bitcoin’s desirable properties depend crucially on the assumption that participants are rational and seek to maximize their monetary gain. This, in turn, hinges on the cryptocurrency that is inherent in the Bitcoin mining infrastructure. It is thus intriguingly unclear whether “removing the cryptocurrency aspect” from the Bitcoin blockchain design can be a useful approach to building other (cryptographic) tools that leverage desirable properties of Bitcoin.</p><p>A perhaps more straightforward question to ask is: can we build better cryptographic tools by <em>using</em> Bitcoin’s blockchain? That is, we’re not seeking to adapt the Bitcoin protocol itself. Instead, we’re asking:</p><blockquote>Given that Bitcoin exists, can we do certain tasks more efficiently and/or securely?</blockquote><p>The answer seems to be <em>yes</em>, for a number of tasks not limited to:</p><ul><li>Fair multi-party computation</li><li>Securely outsourcing computations to the cloud</li><li>Verifiable lotteries</li></ul><p><strong>Fair computation.</strong> Multiple <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/129">recent</a> <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/574.pdf">papers</a> in this direction have shown how to bypass a <a href="http://kodu.ut.ee/~swen/courses/crypto-ii/2008/cleve1986.pdf">long-standing impossibility result</a> in <em>secure multi-party computation</em> by using Bitcoin (and invoking the assumption that participants behave to maximize monetary gain). The impossibility result says roughly the following: if Alice and Bob have inputs <em>x</em> and <em>y</em> respectively, and they want to run a <em>secure protocol</em> to compute the output of some function <em>z=f(x,y)</em> on their inputs, then it is impossible to guarantee that both Alice and Bob will learn <em>z</em>. The intuition is that it is not possible to guarantee that Alice and Bob learn <em>z</em> at exactly the same moment, and whoever learns <em>z</em> first could quit as soon as they learn it, thereby “running away with the answer” before the other person learns it. This can be very undesirable in certain settings: e.g., if Alice and Bob have pooled their knowledge of the stock market and <em>z</em> is the resulting investment advice.</p><p>In a nutshell, the recent research has taken the approach of using Bitcoin to incorporate a penalty (implemented by a clever combination of Bitcoin scripts / smart contracts) for “running away with the answer,” thereby incentivizing rational participants to complete the protocol such that all parties learn the answer.</p><p><strong>Secure outsourcing.</strong> People and companies are storing increasing amounts of data not on their own computers and disk drives, but on the “cloud,” which means that the data is physically stored somewhere else and entrusted to an external entity’s care (e.g., entrusted to Google, Apple, Amazon, etc.). More and more, not only is data being <em>stored </em>elsewhere, but it’s also being <em>computed on</em> elsewhere. That raises questions of privacy (who gets to see the data while it’s being computed on?) and authenticity (how can I be sure that the computation was performed correctly if I didn’t run it myself?). “Do the computation yourself if you’re so worried” is not a satisfactory answer: cloud computation offers many advantages that society would like to reap, and in some cases (e.g., scientific/medical research involving big data), performing computations oneself may be prohibitively costly or time-consuming. One approach to this problem is <em>verifiable computation</em>, in which the cloud is required produce a short, easily-checkable proof that a computation was performed correctly. (It’s important that the proof is short and easily checkable, since we’re interested in keeping the client’s workload minimal.) <a href="https://people.csail.mit.edu/ranjit/papers/incentives.pdf">A recent alternative proposal</a> has suggested using monetary penalties, implemented via cryptocurrencies and smart contracts, to incentivize correctness of cloud computations.</p><p><strong>Verifiable lotteries.</strong> Many common processes require randomness, and sometimes there are high stakes involved: lotteries with monetary prizes are an obvious example; others include the “random” choice of children to be admitted to oversubscribed public schools, applicants for subsidized housing, or ballots to be examined in a post-election audit.</p><p><strong><em>How can we be sure that these processes are really random?</em></strong><em> </em>Truly unpredictable randomness can be essential towards achieving fairness, reducing corruption and institutional bias, and preserving the integrity of democratic processes.</p><p>One approach is to try to guarantee randomness by physical processes: drawing lottery tickets blindfolded out of a well-shaken hat, for example. But such processes can be rigged, and it’s even harder to win the confidence of people who can’t be physically present. In an ideal world, we would like to have a universally trusted third party who sits in a tower isolated from world events, and spends all day rolling fair dice and announcing the outcomes (in a way that is unforgeable and visible to everyone in the world). Given that this seems a slightly tall order, a number of more practical proposals have arisen, involving the “extraction” of randomness from empirically hard-to-predict data sources such as detailed weather patterns, radioactive decay, closing prices of stocks, or the Bitcoin blockchain. A <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1015.pdf">recent paper</a> gives a formal treatment of using the blockchain for publicly verifiable randomness. Of course, if you run a lottery with high enough stakes based on the blockchain, attackers will be incentivized to attack the blockchain in order to manipulate the outcome: accordingly, the paper includes an analysis of how high the stakes would have to be (around $10,000) for such attacks to be a rational concern.</p><p><strong>I’m curious about the limits of what’s possible and what’s not in a world where blockchains exist. </strong>Hopefully I’ve provoked your curiosity too.</p><p><em>The author of this post is a Ph.D. student in cryptography at MIT (CSAIL), and a member of the </em><a href="http://dci.mit.edu/"><em>Digital Currency Initiative</em></a><em> at the MIT Media Lab. Many thanks to the Digital Currency Initiative and the summer school sponsors for jointly supporting my trip to the summer school!</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e223db790be" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative/theory-of-blockchains-and-some-applications-4e223db790be">Theory of blockchains (and some applications)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mit-media-lab-digital-currency-initiative">MIT Media Lab Digital Currency Initiative</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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