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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Along the digital Silk Road in East Africa on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[A brief genealogy of technological acceleration in Africa]]></title>
            <link>https://surge-msca.medium.com/a-brief-genealogy-of-technological-acceleration-in-africa-61c7d9b5b39e?source=rss-322812d774d4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[acceleration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Along the digital Silk Road in East Africa]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Nov 2021 12:27:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-20T07:16:09.161Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>from Walt E. Rostow to Jack Ma</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*vcBfBptCEe7UjgaL.jpeg" /><figcaption>Zambian Afronauts, circa 1964 — source <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-01-11-00-the-afronauts-a-zambian-space-odyssey/">Mail &amp; Guardian</a></figcaption></figure><p>July 2017. On a semi-clouded Nairobi afternoon, students, academics, journalists and several government officials are crowded in the auditorium of the 22-storey tower that has recently altered the brutalist, low-rise skyline of the University of Nairobi’s central campus. The reason of the gathering is a public lecture by Jack Ma ( <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E9%A9%AC">马</a><a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E4%BA%91">云</a> — <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:IPA/Mandarin">Ma Yun</a>), founder of the Alibaba e-commerce empire and one of China’s wealthiest entrepreneurs.</p><p>On his first-ever trip to Africa — a trip on which he is accompanied by an entourage of other Chinese investors and entrepreneurs, and by unprecedented media coverage both on <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-09/03/c_136580167.htm">Chinese </a>and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/chinese-tycoon-jack-ma-promises-to-market-kenya-abroad-1369968?__cf_chl_captcha_tk__=pmd_1fc0f02e4a6ee5a77a3874edd152eb7b8e5601bd-1627902106-0-gqNtZGzNAw2jcnBszQmO">Kenyan </a>news outlets— Ma has met with local startups at <a href="https://ihub.co.ke/">iHub</a>, one Africa’s most talked-about tech incubators, has rubbed shoulders with business leaders of the Kenyan Private Sector Alliance, and will be saluting Nairobi with a lecture titled “Empowered African Young Entrepreneurs and small Businesses — a game changer”. Co-hosting the event is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (<a href="https://unctad.org/">UNCTAD</a>), to which Ma is a Special Advisor.</p><p>Energetic and witty, Jack Ma has given many similar talks before. After September 2014, when Alibaba raised more than 20 billion dollars in the biggest IPO in history, Ma’s rags-to-riches tale of success has traveled the world. In the wake of the company going public, his crisp, mandarin-collar shirts and blue suits (and, occasionally, <a href="https://api.time.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/jack-ma1.jpg">head-to-toe leather outfits</a>) have become just as famous as Alibaba’s foundation story. Perhaps, this is one of the peculiarities of Jack Ma’s presence at the University of Nairobi. He is one of very few Chinese entrepreneurs whose charismatic personas are known outside of China, Africa included. More subtly, however, Ma’s trip, his entourage of millionaires, the media frenzy, and the shared feeling that the tour would inaugurate a new season of China-Africa business partnerships, are all reminders of another tradition of Chinese visits to Africa.</p><p>With annual cadence, since 1991, Chinese foreign ministry leaders have toured Africa to discuss both business and aid opportunities. <em>The Diplomat</em> lately <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/agency-bargaining-power-and-african-leadership-visits-to-china/">reported</a> that, between 2009 and 2018, 82 visits by China’s political leaders took place in 40 different African countries. Even before then, albeit more sporadically, as Deborah Bräutigam narrates in her book <a href="https://deborahbrautigam.com/books/books/"><em>The Dragon’s Gift</em></a>, African tours had been a cornerstone of Sino-African partnerships — with the first diplomatic and aid missions dating back to Mao’s era, when upper-echelon Communist leaders started a long tradition of strategic multilateralism in the continent. In more recent times, it was during a South African trip in 2015 — at the second summit of the F<a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">orum on China–Africa Cooperation</a> — that Xi Jinping inaugurated a new season of yuan-fueled “<a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2015/xi1204.htm">win-win cooperation and common development</a>” based on five principles and ten action points.</p><p>It is in the light of this history that Jack Ma’s mercurial speech in Nairobi seemingly falls within a trajectory that has long been drawn. At least since the late 1990s, when the “going out” strategy was officially enshrined as a priority of China’s economic policy, state-owned and private companies have been encouraged to invest overseas, with African and other countries in the Global South playing the role of experimental landing pads, especially for construction and technology firms. In this sense, Alibaba’s initiatives in Nairobi are almost late to the game. For good measure, Huawei has been active in East-Africa for almost two decades, as Yun Wen explains in her wonderfully detailed <a href="https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p085338">corporate history</a> of the Shenzhen-based tech giant. And yet, precisely because of this long-standing nationalistic alliance of China’s corporate and state powers in Africa, Jack Ma’s words to young Nairobians are also oddly unique. Not only is Ma a privare entrepreneur who’s had an often fraught relationship to the Chinese government, culminating in his <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/24/what-really-happened-to-jack-ma/?sh=399ec4777c7e">recent disappearance</a> from the public eye, his address is also an overt critique of state intervention in business. At times, he is hilariously dramatic:</p><blockquote>I’m not a politician, I am a business[person] As business people, we are result-driven. We’re efficiency-driven. We’re fair-driven [sic]. We are result-driven because you <em>have</em> to get results. Otherwise you only talk, no results, you die.</blockquote><p>At other times, his pragmatic business philosophy also resonates with China’s official non-interventionist foreign policy towards Africa (most recently spelled out in Xi’s five pillars):</p><blockquote>Business people can never force people to do business with me. It’s about a fair trade so, I would say, let’s move up. Africa will be the next driving force, or driving energy of the world, after today’s Asia. And this is what I truly believe. And [as] I come here, I don’t want to sell anything to you, guys. I want to help <em>you </em>to sell your great stuff to the world, using Internet.</blockquote><p>What’s interesting about Ma’s words is not the idea of “Africa rising”, a common trope that recursively appears and wanes in portrayals of the continent’s economic outlook. Nor is it Jack Ma’s rhetoric about win-win business opportunities. Instead, it is in the notion that fast, business-driven technological innovation will accelerate African development against an army of inefficient politicians, slow bureaucrats and corrupt state officials. A reader familiar with the history of development will no doubt recognize in this worldview a particular flavour of neoliberalism — one which became dominant in the 1980s with the World Bank’s and IMF’s structural adjustment programs and with the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Washington-consensus">Washington Consensus</a>. Although economic historian Philip Mirowski <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.4159/9780674495111-013/html">rightfully warns us</a> against simplistic readings of the tenets of neoliberalism, in particular for what concerns the relationship between the “state” and the “market”, it is undoubted that neoliberal, anti-state sentiments prevailed in Africa at the time, at least in the technocratic apparatus of foreign development experts. The debt crises and the falling productivity of sub-Saharan economies which had began during the second half of the Seventies were interpreted as failures of the “African state”. The response: privatization, fiscal austerity and price stability.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/214/0*zzGosHo-ZhkY8iA4.JPG" /><figcaption>The <em>Berg Report</em>’s cover [1]— source <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berg_report#/media/File:Accelerated_Development_in_Sub-Saharan_Africa.JPG">Wikimedia</a></figcaption></figure><p>Nowhere were this interpretation and the consequent policy directions more explicit than in the <em>Berg Report</em> of 1981, an influential World Bank paper named after its principal author. The actual title of the <em>Berg Report</em>, <em>Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa</em>, gives a better sense of both the perceived urgency and need to rethink the ways in which development had been “done” until then. The Word Bank authors argued that African nations had focused too much on becoming independent political entities and too little on technological advancement and productivity <a href="#_ftn3">[1]</a>. As an explanation of the report’s headline, they wrote: “without a <em>faster </em>rate of production increase, other objectives cannot be achieved, nor can past achievements be sustained” (my italics). In other words, newly independent states in Africa had gotten development wrong (I am oversimplifying here). But what was the right path, then?</p><p>Let me open a brief parenthesis here. In 1979, the World Bank’s African governors had sent an official memorandum to Robert McNamara, the bank’s long-standing president (and former US defense secretary) who had initiated a radical transformation of the institution in the years before. The letter had addressed a specific request to McNamara: the preparation of a “special paper on the economic development problems” of African countries. That paper would eventually become the 1981 <em>Berg Report</em>. Between 1979 and 1981, however, another important event would set a different course for what the World Bank authors argued in the special paper. In April 1980, several African leaders had met on the Nigerian coast, under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity, and collectively drafted the <em>Lagos Plan 1980–2000</em>. Couched in <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2019/03/samir-amin-and-beyond">dependency theory</a> — in short, an interpretation of underdevelopment as convenient to wealthier economies in the core of the global capitalist system — the plan was a public rejection of what would later become known as structural adjustment, and a call for development for Africans on African terms. In practice, the<em> Lagos Plan</em> suggested delinking African economies from Western capitalism, and it included a number of policy options to do so: for technological advancement, for example, the plan envisioned centralized research institutions that, in each country, would set the course of a tailored route of industrial innovation.</p><p>The <em>Berg Report</em> authors, therefore, were not simply responding to the World Bank’s governors, but also to the rather radical content of the <em>Lagos Plan</em>. As a matter of fact, the report opens with a lip-service avowal of the latter plan, an endorsement of its developmental objectives but not of its proposed means. Rebuking the possibility of delinking African economies from richer countries, the <em>Berg Report</em> implicitly resuscitated Walter E. Rostow’s “<a href="https://www.economicsdiscussion.net/economic-growth/rostows-take-off-stage-of-economic-growth/4572">take-off model</a>”. According to Rostow, a New York City-born economist who’d been an instrumental figure in US aid policy during McNamara’s time in government, economic growth could be understood as a series of stages on the path of modernization. Of these stages, the most important for underdeveloped nations was that of the “take off”, the moment when a country accelerates its industrial output and therefore generates demand for additional economic activities and expands its consumption base. To achieve the “take off”, Rostow had enucleated a number of socio-economic ingredients, including the nurturing of an export-oriented, job-intensive manufacturing specialty, as East-Asian nations had successfully done with their version of the “developmental state” <a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>.</p><p>Conscious of the difficult applicability of this model to African countries, Berg and his colleagues reframed the take-off in different terms, suggesting that advancement in the agricultural sector, combined with a resource- rather than labour-intensive industrial acceleration would do the trick. More importantly, they compounded these suggestions with a number of seemingly more pragmatic recommendations— reduce public spending, privatize parastatals, etc — based on data that showed how African nations had instituted overextended bureaucracies and inefficient, cost-ineffective public sectors. Put differently, the <em>Berg Report</em> recast Rostow’s model in terms that were more palatable to the neoliberal spirit which was taking hold of the international development apparatus in those years.</p><p>In this linkage between development, technological acceleration and anti-state sentiments, it isn’t hard to hear an uncanny resonance with Jack Ma’s words to Nairobi’s youths, his skepticism towards government intervention in the innovation economy, and his call for accelerating the temporal qualities of entrepreneurial cycles:</p><blockquote>And [the] advice I give to Kenya, and Africa, is<em> speed up</em>. You know what I’m saying. For one day [you have] some feeling, you have a vision, but you have to get things down, and with speed (my italics).</blockquote><p><em>Speed up</em>. This correlation between fast-paced entrepreneurialism and mistrust of government is hardly unique to Jack Ma’s perspective, or limited to the context of African development, for that matter. Many Silicon-Valley tech entrepreneurs are well known for sharing similar views. Donald Trump-donor and supporter Peter Thiel is arguably the most prominent crusader of this high-tech <em>laissez-faire</em> ideology. Having cofounded PayPal in the late 90s, and a number of other ventures named after Tolkien artefacts (Palantir, Mithril, Valar…), Thiel is the latest heir to a libertarian tradition that emerged into 1970s Californian countercultures and evolved into a full-blown, mostly right-wing movement seeking to influence Washington politics.</p><p>Libertarianism — the individualistic political philosophy which Peter Thiel vocally embraces — was indeed the primer of what political theorists Richard Barbrook and late Andy Cameron famously called “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Californian_Ideology">Californian Ideology</a>”, a thought-collective that combined free-market neoliberalism with a promethean faith in the possibilities of digital technologies. One of the forefathers of this ideology was futurologist Alvin Toffler, who had skillfully captured the zeitgeist of the early Silicon Valley days in his 1980 <em>The Third Wave </em><a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. The book theorized human evolution across three waves of radical change, the last of which, paired with the inevitable obsolescence of the state in the Information Age, was the <em>end</em> of history itself. Forget Rostow’s take-off stage, and industrialization, Toffler seems to write in what has perhaps become the most discussed chapter of <em>The Third Wave</em>. Digital technologies will allow poorer countries to “leapfrog”, skip the industrialization phase, and annihilate history through an accelerated jump into the Information Age. To conjure this vision, Toffler describes airborne devices that will bring connectivity to rural, remote parts of the underdeveloped world. Fast forward almost forty years, these futuristic, aethereal imageries have become a real developmental project, with Google’s helium-filled balloons bringing broadband Internet to rural Kenya.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*rGWJlXQJzc_t0-4t" /><figcaption>Google’s Loon in Kenya, a now defunct project — source <a href="https://www.cloudpro.co.uk/leadership/7583/googles-loon-project-delivers-internet-to-kenya-via-balloon">CloudPro</a></figcaption></figure><p>I admit here that I am portraying a caricatural version of the Californian Ideology, particularly in the ways in which it — literally — lands in Africa. In fact, it does so in much more nuanced and sophisticated manners. Bill and Melinda Gates, for example, often <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8lztMXCdz0M">suggest </a>that, while billionaires should be taxed more, the kind of innovation necessary to lift people out of poverty and poor health will not come from the “state”. Through the work of their multimillionaire foundation, they showcase how philanthropic capital can be extremely effective in those domains dominated by chronic state failure across the continent and beyond.</p><p>Despite this, the trust-in-tech and mistrust-in-the-state marriage upon which the Californian ideology rests is also conveniently blind to its hidden costs and pasts. On the one hand, as McKenzie Wark elaborates in her <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/3762-capital-is-dead"><em>Capital is Dead</em></a>, digital technooptimists blissfully ignore to the racial, environmental and class violence from which Silicon Valley capitalism originates. On the other hand, in her book <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Entrepreneurial_State"><em>The Entrepreneurial State</em></a>, economist Mariana Mazzucato outlines another willful misconception: the myth that while the private sector is fast and innovative, the public sector is a slow, paralyzed behemoth incapable of change. In fact, a more accurate, longer history of Silicon Valley shows a very different picture: many, almost all the technological breakthroughs that gave us revolutionary digital innovations were funded by taxpayers’ money. The state, Mazzucato argues, was much better at experimenting because it had many more failsafe mechanisms than the private sector in allowing what Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction”, in economic sectors that were risk-averse. In <em>Surveillance Valley</em>, Yasha Levine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jan/06/surveillance-valley-by-yasha-levine-review">portrays </a>a more sinister angle of this story, highlighting the role of military research and the paradoxical relationship between libertarianism and the surveillance state—ranging from the more hawkish Peter Thiel to the soft-spoken Edward Snowden <a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>.</p><p>While these may read as unrelated digressions, there is a thread that connects Jack Ma’s Chinese version of acceleration, California’s libertarians, and the reinvention of modernization theory in the age of the “digital leapfrog” in Africa. Although the <em>Berg Report</em> has long been buried in a drawer by the World Bank <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-7660.00105">itself</a>, several contemporary experiments of African development are still framed around the linguistic, temporal and economic categories of technological acceleration. This is the argument that I make in a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2021.1968675">paper</a> that I have just published on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/reso20/current"><em>Economy &amp; Society</em></a>, titled <em>Acceleration, development and technocapitalism at the Silicon Cape of Africa</em>. Writing from Cape Town, a city that has become known as one of Africa’s most innovative and thriving tech hubs, I trace the ways in which market solutions to structural poverty have become infused with the technopoetics that one finds in the writings of Silicon Valley evangelists such as Eric Ries, Paul Graham and Brad Feld. These eloquent entrepreneurs, I show in my paper, have produced a global written culture of technological acceleration, one that usefully matches the practical needs of the African development project, by placing the elusive figure of the startup entrepreneur at the centre of it.</p><p>And yet, this is not an uncomplicated chronicle of Silicon Valley technocapitalism making strides towards its African unexplored frontiers. In fact, I narrate in the paper, the Californian ideology and the world of economic development rub against each other producing frictions and failures. Not only that. Africa hosts a growing constellation of new technological thinking, new emerging philosophies of technics which cannot be sorted out by just looking at Western technocapitalism, as Clapperton Mavhunga, Felwine Sarr, Achille Mbembe, and other African scholars have been suggesting for some time. Across politics, business and the arts examples abound—the most memorable, in my opinion, Namwali Serpell’s A<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Old_Drift">fronauts and mosquito-shaped microdrones</a>: airborne, yes, but so radically different from Toffler’s and Google’s flying devices.</p><p>Moreover, Jack Ma’s anecdote and speed-up mantra also point to another genealogy: to the fact that we need to look East, to the Pearl River delta and other tech hubs in China, if we are to even just get a glimpse into the increasingly sinocentric future of an accelerated Africa. It is to these Afro-Chinese technological alternatives that my current <a href="https://surge-msca.medium.com/sino-african-cosmotechnics-along-the-digital-silk-road-in-nairobi-aa439baa2267?source=user_profile---------0-------------------------------">research projec</a>t and <a href="https://surge-msca.medium.com/">this Medium page</a> are dedicated. Stay tuned for more.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> The classical analysis of the developmental state is Chalmers Johnson’s <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=2791">volume </a>on Japan’s industrial policy. For an analysis of Rostow’s ideas in USAid policy under John F. Kennedy and in Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society program, Nils Gilman’s 2003 <a href="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/mandarins-future">Mandarins of the Future</a> is a wonderful account. My high-school friend and historian <a href="https://www.socium.uni-bremen.de/about-the-socium/members/michele-mioni/">Michele Mioni</a> pointed me to Gilman’s book.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Alvin Toffler would later become a favourite of conservative US politician and Speaker of the House <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newt_Gingrich">Newt Gingrich</a>, who is credited for creating a bridge between the Washington DC-based new right and the more hippy Northern California ideologues.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Another beautifully told history of military surveillance, behavioral science and the early days computing is in Jill Lepore’s <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9781631496103">If/Then</a>.</p><p>Reading is always <em>more</em> work in progress…</p><h4>The author: <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrea-Pollio">Andrea Pollio</a> is Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow jointly at the <a href="https://www.africancentreforcities.net/about/acc-at-uct/">African Centre for Cities</a>, University of Cape Town, and at the <a href="https://www.dist.polito.it/en/">department of urban and regional studies and planning</a>, of the Polytechnic of Turin, Italy. SURGE is funded through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 MSCA research and innovation programme under grant agreement № 886772 .</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61c7d9b5b39e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Technologies with an accent]]></title>
            <link>https://surge-msca.medium.com/technologies-with-an-accent-6ed71b1a5163?source=rss-322812d774d4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6ed71b1a5163</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nairobi-kenya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accents]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Along the digital Silk Road in East Africa]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 2021 07:13:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-16T12:43:26.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d7UGRslfjgMrJ7p_tp_lzg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Luthuli Avenue, downtown Nairobi — photo of the author, July 2021</figcaption></figure><p>During my doctoral studies, I used to teach a few subjects to undergraduate students at Western Sydney University, my academic home back then. Despite my background in social sciences, my favourite unit to teach was a subject called Analytical Reading and Writing, a core unit designed to introduce the rules of academic writing to first-year students of Humanities. They would learn how to structure a sentence, a paragraph, and a whole essay. We would cover the difference between a thesis statement and an argument, as well as the annoyingly subtle variations in citation styles. Most importantly, we would talk about English. Written English, spoken English, and everything in between.</p><p>Why did I love teaching academic writing? I could list a few reasons. The unit coordinator was an incredibly generous teacher; my student’s creative essays were an endless source of whimsicality; they knew so little about academic writing that with a small effort they would feel extremely empowered to treat essay composition as just another technical skill that they needed to master. But my most treasured memory of teaching academic writing was discussing something called “standard language ideology” with them.</p><p>A term coined in the 1980s by pioneer sociolinguists <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Milroy">James</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesley_Milroy">Leslie Milroy</a>, standard language ideology is the belief that there exists a natural, standard form of English that is superior to other dialects, accents and variations of it. In the 1990s, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosina_Lippi">Rosina Lippi-Green</a> — also a sociolinguist and prolific novelist—would go on to explain that the tacit acceptance of such ideology resulted in multiple forms of racialized discrimination, ranging from the workplace to the court system, in which accent is weaponized as a tool of exclusion.</p><p>While the notion that there was no standard English would surprise my students, they did not need any convincing that accent bias was a reality. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Western_Sydney">Western Sydney</a>, the region where my university was located, is a place of both old and recent migration. According to the most recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/blaming-migrants-wont-solve-western-sydneys-growing-pains-77403">census</a>, some 40% of people in the area are foreign born. Many of my students would describe themselves as first-generation Australians. Time and again, they had pretended to be their parents while on the phone to government officials or customer service operators — to avoid that their thick-accented mums and dads would not receive proper assistance. Or worse, that they would be mocked for their “broken English”. They themselves had, at some point in life, tried to overcompensate their voices with impossibly strong Australian sounds. Some of them admitted to speaking two different versions of English, one with friends and family, and one with people in power; the latter, with a deeper Australian twang. Accent was a territory they were extremely familiar with.</p><p>There was then something liberating about teaching that English-without-an-accent is just another English accent. That there wasn’t any standard to aspire to. It was also contradictory: with its odd rules, academic writing itself is, after all, another ideologically standardized form of language. This irony was not lost on my students: one afternoon, one of them facetiously pointed out that his syntax mistakes were just part of his own version of a non-standard academic English. The class laughed.</p><p>I war recently reminded of this episode when, for my <a href="https://surge-msca.medium.com/sino-african-cosmotechnics-along-the-digital-silk-road-in-nairobi-aa439baa2267">current research on the Digital Silk Road in Kenya</a>, I bought a portable speaker with a Chinese accent. Namely, I bought a TECNO wireless speaker, model S2, at an electronics store on Moi Avenue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bkhu53LFYjDP7TLzssLpAA.png" /><figcaption>Nairobi uptown and downtown separated by Moi Avenue — source: Openstreetmap</figcaption></figure><p>Busy and loud, Moi Avenue separates the quieter, leafy uptown Nairobi from the hustle and bustle of downtown Nairobi. A colleague and friend had told me to notice how even the avenue itself, on its two sides, feels different. The uptown side, with its grander and better-kept buildings, its more airy awnings, seems spacious and neat. The downtown side, with its smaller, crowded arcades cluttered with all sorts of signs, appears rowdy and unruly. Both sides of the avenue, in the section that leads to the statue of Tom Mboya (one of the founders of the Kenya African National Union), are dotted with dozens of electronic stores. Some of these are branded with global corporate logos, such as Samsung, Oppo, LG, Sony, Huawei, and obviously TECNO, the biggest-selling phone brand in Kenya. Other shops more boisterously combine multiple labels— their windows covered with stickers and decorated by custom-printed packaging tape featuring various technology manufacturers. Where Moi Avenue bends, at the National Archives, one can walk past the colonial building and step into Luthuli Avenue, which boasts even more tech stores along a colourful stretch of LED lights, billboards and hoardings.</p><p>Having decided to buy a cheap handset to use M-Pesa, the mobile money platform which only works on Safaricom SIM cards, I stopped at various shops along Moi Avenue, asking for recommendations and prices. Eventually, a very animated, young sales assistant convinced me to settle on a TECNO POP 5, a phone that suspiciously does not appear on the official website of the manufacturer. “It’s the cheapest Chinese phone we have but if you only need it for the M-Pesa app, it’s fine”, she said.</p><p>TECNO is, indeed, Chinese. It is a phone brand owned by Transsion, the Shenzhen-based technology company that in the last decade has come to dominate the African feature- and smartphone market, with a series a different labels targeting different user segments. In fact, not every TECNO phone is cheap. “This one, we don’t even keep it on display”, the sales assistant told me, referring to the POP 5 model. She had been showing me a number of mid-range TECNO phones, all with high-quality specs, and had finally resigned to opening a drawer full of cheaper handsets. “That’s all I need”, I explained, trying to counter her visible disappointment.</p><p>Then, as we walked towards the till desk at the back of the shop to conclude the transaction, the sales assistant asked me whether I was going to pay with cash or with a credit card. “If you pay cash”, she smiled pointing to a wireless speaker playing South African music, “I can give you this for 1000 shillings”. I looked at the speaker, a white cylinder glowing an orange shade of red. “It’s TECNO as well”, she added, almost enigmatically. I could not resist. I blame the first wave of Covid-19, during which I found myself stuck in my 40-sqm apartment with the sole sound-producing company of a Bose bluetooth speaker. Since then, I have had a lot of fondness for electroacoustic devices. I rapidly calculated that KSh 1000 equaled less than 8 euro, and I bought it.</p><p>For a few days after the purchase, I did not think about the wireless speaker, which remained unboxed in my backpack. Given <a href="https://surge-msca.medium.com/sino-african-cosmotechnics-along-the-digital-silk-road-in-nairobi-aa439baa2267">my research</a> interest in the diffusion of Chinese communication technologies in Kenya, I was much more excited about the POP 5 phone, which was a device I needed in order to activate an M-Pesa account, but also an object useful to my ethnographic study. What were the specific features of a Chinese phone that did not exist in China but only in Africa? Which apps would I find preinstalled by default on the device? What other apps would I discover on the Palmstore — the Transsion version of Android’s Play store? This is a story for another essay. Eventually, after neglecting the TECNO S2 speaker for almost a week, I resolved to set it up, pour myself a glass of wine, and listen to some music on a cloudy, curfew-ed Nairobi evening.</p><p>The S2 speaker felt light — not a good sign for quality sound production — and, unsurprisingly, cheap. Yet. compared to more expensive devices, I noticed it featured multiple input ports beyond the bluetooth option: a USB Type A, a USB Micro, an Auxiliary port (AUX), and even a slot for TransFlash cards. TECNO, after all, is popular for its technological flexibility. Several Shenzhen manufacturers of earlier days, Transsion’s ancestors, produced devices which had many more technical features than those they took “inspiration” from. In <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/working-class-network-society"><em>Working-Class Network Society</em></a>, media scholar Jack Linchuan Qiu has explained that the first customers of cheap, copycat phones were working-class rural migrants in urban China, “information have-less” who had many more and more variegated communication needs than their middle-class counterparts. Copycat phones were designed for these additional necessities, often with features that have since become standard in current smartphones.</p><p>In a similar manner, and a decade later, TECNO and other Transsion phones target the African market with specifications that are tailored to local media and communication practices. For example, most Transsion devices host up to three SIM cards, something unheard of in other brands. <a href="https://restofworld.org/2020/transsion-from-china-to-africa/">Accordingly</a>, this is because Transsion’s designers studied how most African customers would switch between different SIM cards for different purposes, or would spread their monthly data consumption across more than one network provider. Another characteristic of Transsion smartphones is that the usual compromise between battery life and processing power is tilted in favour of the battery — a feature that makes these handsets particularly suited for those parts of the world in which electricity access can be patchy. In sum, it wasn’t too far fetched to interpret my S2 speaker’s multiple ports as a design strategy to ensure maximum compatibility capabilities for a “market that values flexibility over loyalty to any particular brand or solution”, as a Kenyan phone importer would later tell me, during an interview.</p><p>So it was while pondering on the nature of the device that I turned on my TECNO S2 for the first time. With an intense red glow (“Also work [sic] as emergency light”, says the description on the packaging), a female voice introduced herself: “The bluetooth device is ready to pair” —the last “r” of “pair” perfectly intelligible and yet unequivocally Mandarin/Cantonese. I turned S2 off and on again a few times, amused and unsettled. Each time, “pair” sounded more and more English with a Chinese inflection. It was funny. While most synthetic voices seem to strive for a kind of robotic neutrality, my TECNO S2 speaker had a boldly, unapologetically Chinese accent.</p><p>This wasn’t the first time that a hardware or software had bemused me with an idiosyncratic accent. At 23, when I set out to learn Spanish using Duolingo, the first successful language learning app designed for smartphones, a Colombian friend pointed out with a slight disdain that I had been memorizing Mexican-sounding sentences. More recently, my Mandarin tutor is constantly entertained by the fact that Google Translate would randomly— and likely by mistake — offer us the Cantonese pronunciation of a certain character. As I used to teach my Western Sydney students, we only notice accents when they veer off an expected neutrality, but neutrality is an accent in itself. In fact, just like the humans who engineered them, all speech-synthesizing technologies have accents.</p><p>Current research on Artificial Intelligence bias has looked at English accents specifically. Tech news abound with reports about the various forms of language discrimination embedded in the software that listens and speaks back to us. For example, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/business/alexa-does-not-understand-your-accent/?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.2e36db258eb3">a study of the Washington Post</a> in collaboration with two testing companies, Globalme and Pulse Labs, found that there was an “accent gap” in the speech recognition capacities of Amazon’s and Google’s smart speakers. These devices seemed to perform particularly poorly with Spanish- and Chinese-accented English speakers, especially compared to the speech-recognition accuracy of seemingly “more standard” accents. In the same way as people adopt a “telephone voice” to hide their race or their class background, researchers have also noticed a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/10/texas-regional-accent-siri-apple-voice-recognition-technologyhttps://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/10/texas-regional-accent-siri-apple-voice-recognition-technology">machine voice</a>” that people with non-standard accents use to interact with their smart speakers. <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2020/03/23/automated-speech-recognition-less-accurate-blacks/">Another study from Stanford University</a> discovered that major batch transcription services misunderstood the speech of Black speakers at almost double the rate of white speakers.</p><p>The reason of these forms of language discrimination is that machine-learning algorithms which convert speech to text need to be trained. Not only do speech datasets used for training likely reflect a lack of diversity in the programmers who create the software, they also mirror what Lippi-Green would call their “standard language ideology”. And with speech recognition becoming more and more common in hiring practices, or in the language tests required to obtain working visas in English-speaking countries, accent bias is a more deeply problematic issue than any joke about Alexa’s stubborn incapacity to understand English with an accent. In fact, as sociologist Ruha Benjamin has pointed out in<em> </em><a href="https://g.co/kgs/V4EwLW"><em>Race After Technology</em></a>, we should not see these biases as technical glitches, but as specimens of the systemic forms of discrimination upon which technology is built. While it is not impossible to <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2018/08/11/using-ai-and-big-data-to-address-the-accent-gap-in-voice-recognition-systems/">retrain automated speech recognition algorithms</a>, their current mode of existence should give us pause.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UyqCXsf3vh63SrzabsJN6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>S2 in the evening of a rainy season day in Nairobi — photo of the author</figcaption></figure><p>My S2 is not a particularly smart device. I should not read too much into the fact that it has a Chinese accent. Perhaps, the designers at TECNO ran out of time and could not hire a trained voice actress with a standard English pronunciation. Perhaps, they simply asked a female member of the team to record the few sentences that S2 utters. Or maybe they unabashedly believed that a piece of Chinese technology designed for the African market should speak a Chinese-accented English. Whatever the case, S2 unwittingly points to one of the concerns of <a href="https://surge-msca.medium.com/sino-african-cosmotechnics-along-the-digital-silk-road-in-nairobi-aa439baa2267">my current research project</a>, in which I ask: what will happen to our understanding of African technological transformations in a more and more sinocentric world, if we abandon the notion that technology is an anthropologically universal — read “Western” — mode of making stuff work? Accents may be a small, inconsequential feature of the technological diversity that I want to chart. Yet, it is hard not to romanticize my TECNO S2, as it plays music casting warm orange shadows across my bedroom.</p><h4>The author: <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrea-Pollio">Andrea Pollio</a> is Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow jointly at the <a href="https://www.africancentreforcities.net/about/acc-at-uct/">African Centre for Cities</a>, University of Cape Town, and at the <a href="https://www.dist.polito.it/en/">department of urban and regional studies and planning</a>, of the Polytechnic of Turin, Italy. SURGE is funded through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 MSCA research and innovation programme under grant agreement № 886772 .</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ed71b1a5163" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sino-african cosmotechnics along the Digital Silk Road in Nairobi]]></title>
            <link>https://surge-msca.medium.com/sino-african-cosmotechnics-along-the-digital-silk-road-in-nairobi-aa439baa2267?source=rss-322812d774d4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa439baa2267</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nairobi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cosmotechnics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Along the digital Silk Road in East Africa]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jun 2021 10:54:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-23T11:46:53.218Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4C5jRS2k57AKVKAhkR8NJg.jpeg" /></figure><p>After a few months of hearings, on August 13 2018 the US Congress approved the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), a 164-page bill designed to overhaul national security protocols concerning foreign direct investments in key sectors of the economy. “<em>Modernization</em>”, as a wry <a href="https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-reform-becomes-law-what-firrma-means-industry">blog post</a> from a large US law firm noted, was in fact “a euphemism for addressing concerns about Chinese investments” in technology companies. Not only did the Act introduce a mandate for the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) to produce a biannual report on any transactions made by entities of the People’s Republic of China, it also expanded the government’s oversight with a much broader definition of “critical technologies”.</p><p>The repercussions of FIRRMA became immediately clear when the CFIUS terminated MoneyGram’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/03/us-blocks-moneygram-sale-chinese-firm-security-concerns">takeover </a>by Ma Yun’s Alibaba (through its subsidiary Ant Financials), and forced the <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-cfius-scrutiny-forces-chinese-sale-of-grindr">sale </a>of gay-dating app Grindr, which had been acquired by Chinese billionaire Zhou Yahui a couple of years earlier. Both takeovers had raised concerns — often tainted by unsavoury sinophobic discourses — around US users’ financial and health data becoming available to private Chinese players with ties to Beijing. However, the media was also quick to report that both Ma and Zhou had been for some time scoping for alternative avenues of investment in Africa, where the promise of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3041063/why-chinese-capital-venturing-africas-fintech-future">new frontiers</a> of technological profit seemed at hand. Ma had undertaken a series of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/21/africa/jack-ma-kenya-visit/index.html">much-publicized</a> African <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/49512/chinas-jack-ma-the-chess-game-he-refuses-to-lose-in-africa/">travels</a>, almost in the traditional fashion of Chinese state leaders, and had launched a few initiatives designed to foster African startups through investment-readiness programs and competitions. Zhou, on the other hand, had bought Norwegian company Opera, with <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/09/opera-doubles-down-on-africa/">plans </a>to expand its suite of software services specifically designed for the African market, including a data-efficient mobile browser, a chat service, a dedicated news platform, and a number of microlending wallets powered by mobile money. Meanwhile, by 2019 Shenzhen-based Transsion and Huawei had become, respectively, the most important providers of smartphones and connectivity hardware in Africa.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0IWoo6YhsnEz_GrLUs1G6A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Transsion’s TECNO advertising in downtown Nairobi</figcaption></figure><p>These examples are cases in point of the increasing anxieties over technological sovereignty, of the <a href="https://g.co/kgs/Ec29ee">bifurcation of US-China Internet spheres</a>, and of the flight of Chinese capital to friendlier investment environments, namely countries that have joined the infrastructural program of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. All these are important geopolitical facets of the future of global technology. However, the presence of Chinese corporations in Africa also raises a number of questions around the different meanings of technology that are mobilized in an increasingly sinocentric continent. Writing about Chinese construction and mining companies in the Zambian copperbelt, sociologist Ching Kwan-Lee has argued that only by recognizing different “<a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo22657847.html">varieties of capital</a>” one can fully fathom the diverse regimes of labour, accumulation and management that are engendered by the presence of Global China in Africa. Can the same be said about “varieties of technology” — that is, the competing technological imaginations that exist at the frictional interfaces between Chinese companies, African tech startups and Silicon Valley-imported cultures of innovation?</p><p>This is perhaps the main point of departure for my research project, which seeks to chart the impact of private Chinese technocapital in Nairobi, a city that in the last few years has emerged as one of Africa’s leading tech hubs, and also as a landing pad for important Chinese players, including CGTN, StarTimes, Transsion, Tencent, Alibaba, Opera, UnionPay, Huawei and others. Kenya was also one of the first African countries to join the Belt and Road Initiative, as attested by a growing number of infrastructure projects funded, built and sometimes run by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Yet, as Tim Winter’s <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo43233616.html">book </a>aptly demonstrates, the economic ties of the new silk roads are just but a part of a much broader <em>geocultural platform</em> for writing new, non-Eurocentric histories of the present, in which Global China is imagined as a benevolent provider of technological connectivity.</p><p>If, for the Belt and Road Initiative, technocultural imaginaries are as important as financial strings, then, the matter of technological difference cannot be left unaddressed. In fact, according to the thesis captured by Yuk Hui’s concept of <a href="https://www.e-flux.com/journal/86/161887/cosmotechnics-as-cosmopolitics/">cosmotechnics</a>, there is no single, anthropologically universal technology, but multiple ontologies, epistemologies and moral cosmologies of technics exist and have always existed in the world. He <a href="https://g.co/kgs/qLB8ZZ">writes</a>:</p><blockquote>There is a general misconception that all technics are equal, that all skills and artificial products coming from all cultures can be reduced to one thing called technology. And indeed it is almost impossible to deny that technics can be understood as the extension of the body or the exteriorization of memory. Yet they may not be perceived or reflected upon in the same way in different cultures.</blockquote><p><a href="https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/recursive-colonialism-and-cosmo-computation/">Techno-diversity </a>does not imply, however, falling into the trap of cultural relativism or, worse, orientalism. For sinologist Francois Jullien, for example, addressing the irreducible exteriority of Chinese thought allows the reciprocal “<a href="https://g.co/kgs/UoGcv7">unthought-of</a>” in different systems of knowledge to become viable objects of analysis: exteriority, in other words, might be a reflexive antidote to the incapacity of European sciences to engage alternative universalities. The question, therefore, is not <em>what is Chinese about Chinese technology</em>, but <em>what is technology beyond the universalizing categories of Western technics</em>?’</p><p>Such a line of inquiry does not need to limit itself to Chinese conceptions of technology or infrastructure, and how they are transported along the new silk roads. For some time, contemporary African thinkers have been challenging us to consider emerging African philosophies of technics on equal footing as their western counterparts (Clapperton Mavhunga, Francis B. Nyamnjoh, Felwine Sarr and others). For <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6p8pUU_VH0&amp;ab_channel=AfricanStudiesAssociation">Achille Mbebme</a>, this is not so much a decolonial effort as it is a call for engaging a constellation of technological thinking that is very much alive in reshaping knowledge in and of Africa. In fact, these epistemic “reorganizations” — what legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos would perhaps call “<a href="https://www.eurozine.com/beyond-abyssal-thinking/">post-abyssal thinking</a>” — have less to do with unearthing a precolonial philosophical archive, and more with how new forms of techno-humanism are emerging, in Africa and elsewhere, in these catastrophic — in the sense of<a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catastrophe"> change-ridden</a> — times.</p><p>What does all of this mean, in practice, for studying Chinese-funded African startups, or Chinese tech companies creating new markets in the continent? What kind of urban economies shape and are shaped by technological diversity in a city like Nairobi? What mechanical recursions and vitalist contingencies — to use again two categories of Yuk Hui’s <a href="https://g.co/kgs/TFSbma">imaginative work</a> — bring recent pasts and near futures into the technical configurations of the urban present in Africa? These are the questions that — still very much unanswered — guide the beginning of my research. As an economic geographer and urban researcher, I am obviously interested in the transactional materiality of these technological shifts, and in the ways in which a city like Nairobi becomes more than the background, but a foil against which to comprehend the transformations provoked by Chinese technocapital. Yet, I am also convinced that, as I wrote above, this is only possible by recognizing, and therefore researching, how these different configurations are not just the expression of a single technology but emerge as a result of multiple cosmotechnics.</p><p>How to do it practically? I am listing here a few examples that inspire me. This is a still incomplete list of both ontological and epistemic “reorganizations” that I plan to expand and retrofit as I forge ahead in this intellectual project. The list is, by design, messy and promiscuously undisciplined. I will keep pilfering ideas around to rewire some of the circuits that inevitably orient my current research questions.</p><ul><li>A different perspective on the relationship between <em>technical failure and technological success</em>, as narrated in Thomas S. Mullaney’s “<a href="https://g.co/kgs/YSeLac"><em>The Chinese Typewriter</em></a>”</li><li><em>Incompleteness as an inherent feature of technology</em>, as in Prince Guma’s <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0306312720927088">challenge </a>to teleological understandings of infrastructure (even when the latter are recognized to be diverse and heterogeneous)</li><li><em>Digital-analog coevolution</em>, and the idea of <em>bypassing technologies</em> as pointed out by Hallam Stevens in <a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2019/07/23/digital-infrastructure-in-the-chinese-register/">this commentary</a> about the Chinese registers of digital infrastructure</li><li><em>Shanzhai </em>(山寨) as a form of technological carefulness, as portrayed in Ziaowei Wang’s <a href="https://g.co/kgs/NEQVbN"><em>Blockchain Chicken Farm</em></a></li><li>The<em> under-contruction-ness</em> of the meanings of China in Kenya, as Wangui Kimari <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/under-construction-everyday-anxieties-and-the-proliferating-social-meanings-of-china-in-kenya/CB8190471AB8D301052B1311ACD2A04D">has written</a></li><li>The <em>displacements of technological promise</em> as experimental acts of prototyping happening beyond the Western canon of Silicon Valley practices of innovation, as in Silvia Lindtner’s <a href="https://g.co/kgs/4trBCp"><em>Prototype Nation</em></a></li><li>The idea of a uniquely Chinese form of <em>experimental urbanism</em>, as explained by Juan Du in her beautiful <a href="https://g.co/kgs/4XK35u">book </a>on Shenzhen’s histories</li></ul><p>More to come….</p><p>Reading is always a work in progress…</p><h4><strong>The author</strong>: <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrea-Pollio">Andrea Pollio</a> is Marie <strong>Skłodowska</strong>-Curie fellow jointly at the <a href="https://www.africancentreforcities.net/about/acc-at-uct/">African Centre for Cities</a>, University of Cape Town, and at the <a href="https://www.dist.polito.it/en/">department of urban and regional studies and planning</a>, of the Polytechnic of Turin, Italy. SURGE is funded through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 MSCA research and innovation programme under grant agreement № 886772 .</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa439baa2267" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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