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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Sylvester Mobley on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Sylvester Mobley on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Sylvester Mobley on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Insurgent’s Playbook for Startup Founders]]></title>
            <link>https://sylvestermobleyvc.medium.com/the-insurgents-playbook-for-startup-founders-9e6f27c12206?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 18:16:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-23T18:16:04.226Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What decades of insurgency research reveals about what actually determines startup survival</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sybNKbzABWpXUQ-wAqxSkg.png" /></figure><h3>I. Introduction: Why The Comparison</h3><p>As a startup founder, you are building something new with limited capital, a small team, no infrastructure, few resources, very little support, imperfect information, and very little room for error. You are competing against incumbents with brand recognition, established distribution channels, political and regulatory influence, deep pockets, and armies of people whose full-time job is to defend the company’s position. You can’t win by being bigger, richer, or more powerful, because you aren’t. And you can’t win by competing the same way they compete, because you don’t have the capital, resources, or people needed to win that way. You win by being smarter, faster, more creative, more adaptive, and by gaining support from the people who matter.</p><p>As a startup founder, you face many of the same challenges as insurgents, and, like insurgents, you are also fighting asymmetric battles.</p><p>I want to be absolutely clear. I’m not writing about violence, nor is this about the tactics or weapons of war. I’m also not trying to be provocative simply to be provocative, nor do I want to condone violence. This is about the similarities in conditions and strategies, and more specifically, what insurgencies teach us about how weaker competitors can defeat stronger ones in real-world, high-stakes environments.</p><p>I’m also using insurgencies because they are among the most deeply studied forms of asymmetric competition. Governments, militaries, and researchers have spent enormous amounts of time and significant amounts of money trying to understand why small, poorly resourced groups are sometimes able to outlast, outmaneuver, and even replace far more powerful incumbents. The result is a surprisingly rich body of research that, at its core, studies legitimacy, adaptation, organizational design, endurance, and systems-level competition.</p><p>When you strip away the military context, what remains is a set of conditions and a playbook that looks surprisingly familiar to anyone who has tried to build a startup.</p><p>It is important to acknowledge at the outset that most startups fail and most insurgencies fail. But the small percentage that succeed tend to do so for recurring, identifiable reasons. It’s the patterns that we can see in the ones that succeed that we are concerned with, such as being able to secure external support, embedding themselves within a population, learning faster than their opponents, avoiding direct confrontation with superior forces, and, above all, they survive long enough for conditions to shift in their favor.</p><p>Founders talk about “runway,” “product-market fit,” “early adopters,” and “distribution moats.” Insurgency researchers talk about “sanctuary,” “legitimacy,” “popular support,” and “endurance.” Different language, with remarkably similar dynamics.</p><p>This comparison matters because the startup ecosystem often frames success solely in terms of talent, technology, and capital. Insurgency research suggests those factors are necessary but insufficient. What actually determines outcomes in asymmetric competitions is not raw strength, but how effectively the weaker side builds legitimacy, learns in real-time, adapts under pressure, and converts small wins into sustained momentum.</p><p>For founders, this lens is useful not because startups are fighting wars, but because building a startup is a struggle against entrenched competitors and systems. They are attempting to replace an existing way of doing things with a new one. They require people such as customers, employees, partners, and investors to believe in them before they are proven and often before anything substantial exists.</p><p>Insurgencies succeed when they make their eventual victory feel inevitable long before it is actually guaranteed. The same is true of the best startups.</p><p>My goal here is simple. I want to translate what decades of insurgency research tells us about winning asymmetric fights into lessons that startup founders and venture capitalists can actually use. I want to provide practical insights about legitimacy, adaptation, endurance, and strategy that apply directly to building companies from nothing.</p><p>If you are a founder competing against larger, better-resourced incumbents, or an investor trying to identify which fragile under-resourced startups might actually survive, understanding how insurgencies win turns out to be surprisingly relevant.</p><h3>II. What Is an Insurgency?</h3><p>Before we can discuss parallels, we need to be clear about what an insurgency actually is, and just as importantly, what it is not.</p><p>The word insurgency is often used loosely, and it tends to get conflated with terrorism. This misunderstanding can make it harder to see why insurgency theory is useful for founders.</p><h4>A Simple Definition</h4><p>At its core, an insurgency is a sustained effort by a weaker group to challenge, undermine, and eventually replace a stronger, more established authority.</p><p>That authority is usually a government, but the defining feature isn’t who the insurgents are fighting. It’s the imbalance in power. Insurgents start from a position of weakness. If they were strong enough to win outright, they wouldn’t need an insurgency in the first place.</p><p>The three elements that matter most in this definition are:</p><ul><li>Asymmetry: The insurgent is materially weaker than the incumbent.</li><li>Duration: This is not a single event, but a long struggle.</li><li>Replacement: The goal is not to protest or reform alone, but to establish a new order, or at least force a fundamental power shift.</li></ul><p>Violence may be present, but it is not the defining characteristic. Insurgencies are fundamentally political and organizational projects, not just military ones.</p><h4>How Insurgencies Actually Function</h4><p>Insurgencies do not function like conventional armies. They don’t fight head-on using conventional tactics, and they don’t win through superior firepower. Trying to do that is one of the fastest ways for an insurgency to fail.</p><p>At a high level, insurgencies typically:</p><ul><li>Avoid the incumbent’s strengths: They do not fight where the incumbent is strongest. They avoid direct confrontation, battles, or competition on terms set by the dominant power.</li><li>Exploit the incumbent’s weaknesses: They operate where the state is slow, rigid, corrupt, inattentive, or lacks legitimacy.</li><li>Rely on people more than infrastructure: Insurgencies survive through networks of supporters, sympathizers, and neutral civilians, not through bases, factories, or formal institutions early on.</li><li>Learn constantly: Tactics, messaging, organizational structure, and strategy evolve based on what works and what doesn’t.</li><li>Play a long game: Insurgents rarely expect quick victory. Survival itself is progress. Each year they remain intact is a form of success.</li></ul><p>In other words, insurgencies are less about overpowering an opponent and more about outlasting, out-adapting, and out-legitimizing them.</p><h4>The Central Role of Legitimacy and Support</h4><p>One of the most important and most misunderstood elements of insurgency is the role of the broader population.</p><p>Insurgencies do not survive in isolation. They require some combination of:</p><ul><li>Active supporters</li><li>Passive sympathizers</li><li>Or at least a population unwilling or unable to help the incumbent eliminate them</li></ul><p>This is often summarized in military literature as “winning hearts and minds,” but that phrase can obscure the deeper point. Insurgents don’t need to be loved by everyone. They just need enough legitimacy to operate, recruit, gather information, move resources, and avoid being isolated.</p><p>When an insurgency loses legitimacy with the population it depends on, it tends to collapse quickly, regardless of how tactically skilled it is.</p><h4>What Insurgencies Are Not</h4><p>To keep this analogy grounded, it’s essential to be explicit about what insurgencies are not.</p><ul><li>Not random violence: Sustained insurgencies are organized, strategic, and purposeful.</li><li>Not chaos: Even decentralized insurgencies have leadership structures, decision-making processes, and internal discipline.</li><li>Not purely military: Insurgencies are as much about narrative, governance, and legitimacy as they are about force.</li><li>Not irrational: Insurgents respond to incentives, constraints, and feedback from their environment. They fail when they misread those signals.</li></ul><h4>Why This Matters for Founders</h4><p>Once you understand insurgencies as weak challengers operating within hostile systems against much stronger competitors, the relevance to startups becomes clearer.</p><p>Startups, like insurgencies:</p><ul><li>Begin with far fewer resources than the incumbents they are competing against</li><li>Cannot win by competing on the incumbent’s terms</li><li>Depend on early supporters for survival</li><li>Must build legitimacy before they can scale</li><li>Succeed or fail based on how quickly they learn and adapt</li></ul><p>The point is not that startups are insurgencies. The point is that both operate under the same structural conditions of asymmetric competition.</p><p>Understanding how insurgencies function gives founders a tested framework for thinking about survival, legitimacy, adaptation, and strategy when the odds are stacked against them.</p><p>With that foundation in place, we can now examine why insurgency theory is such a valuable lens for understanding startups and how the parallels become actionable rather than merely metaphorical.</p><h3>III. Why Insurgencies Are a Useful Analogy for Startups</h3><p>Once you strip away the military context, insurgencies and startups share a surprising amount of strategic DNA. Both are small, fragile challengers confronting large, entrenched power structures. Both have to change the behavior of large populations. Both must survive long enough to turn an idea into a new reality. And, both usually fail.</p><p>But to understand why this analogy is useful, we need to explicitly call out the strategic parallels.</p><h4>Both Start Weak and Unproven</h4><p>Startups begin their lives as insignificant blips on an incumbent’s radar. They have no brand recognition, limited resources, minimal infrastructure, tiny teams, and no political or economic leverage. They possess belief, not power.</p><p>Insurgencies begin in exactly the same position. They are outspent, outmanned, out-organized, and out-legitimized from the very beginning. Their early survival depends not on force, but on creativity and conviction.</p><p>For both, weakness is not a temporary inconvenience. It’s the defining condition in which strategy must work.</p><h4>They Compete Against Dominant Incumbents</h4><p>Insurgents don’t pick easy fights. They go up against states, the most powerful actors in society.</p><p>Founders do the same thing when they challenge companies with distribution monopolies, regulatory influence, deep cash reserves, and market inertia in their favor.</p><p>This creates a shared strategic question: How do you win when you can’t possibly outspend or overpower your opponent?</p><p>Fortunately for founders, insurgency research has spent decades studying that question.</p><h4>They Must Earn Legitimacy to Survive</h4><p>A startup without customers dies. An insurgency without supporters dies.</p><p>In both cases, legitimacy precedes scale, adoption precedes infrastructure, and trust precedes power.</p><p>The early currency of success isn’t revenue or territory, it’s belief: “This new thing deserves to exist.”</p><p>Startups call it product-market fit. Insurgents call it popular support. Functionally, it’s the same concept.</p><h4>They Rely on Superior Adaptation, Not Superior Strength</h4><p>Incumbents optimize around stability. Insurgents and startups optimize around learning speed.</p><p>Insurgents change tactics constantly based on what works in the field. Successful startups iterate continuously based on continuous problem and customer validation, and experimentation.</p><p>Both operate using fast feedback loops, not long-term plans. They win because they learn faster than the incumbent adjusts.</p><h4>They Turn Small Wins Into Strategic Momentum</h4><p>Insurgencies rarely win decisive battles. Instead, they accumulate minor gains, narrative shifts, local footholds, and visible signs of inevitability.</p><p>In startups, the equivalents are early adopters, growth spikes, small but meaningful revenue, and positive investor signaling.</p><p>Momentum creates credibility. Credibility attracts support. Support increases momentum. It’s a compounding legitimacy loop.</p><h4>They Win by Reshaping the System, Not Beating It at Its Own Game</h4><p>Insurgencies aren’t trying to be a better version of the government; instead, they are trying to replace the rules of power.</p><p>Likewise, successful startups don’t usually beat incumbents by playing the same playbook better. They redefine business models, create new expectations, and change what people expect and how they behave. They shift the gravitational field of the market.</p><p>Uber didn’t out-taxi taxis. Stripe didn’t out-bank banks. Figma didn’t out-enterprise Adobe. They changed the paradigm.</p><h4>Research Shows Predictable Patterns of Success</h4><p>This is what makes the analogy more than a metaphor: insurgency outcomes are empirically studied.</p><p>Decades of global research show consistent predictors of success, including access to external support, popular legitimacy, organizational adaptability, exploiting incumbent vulnerabilities, and endurance over time.</p><p>These are the same underlying drivers of startup success according to innovation strategy research.</p><blockquote><strong>KEY TAKEAWAY</strong></blockquote><blockquote>When founders view themselves as insurgents operating inside a system designed to favor incumbents, they focus on surviving to fight another day, winning believers before winning markets, learning faster than competitors, exploiting weaknesses in the status quo, and building legitimacy until power shifts. The difference isn’t symbolic. Insurgencies win by creating a future that appears inevitable. Startups must do the same.</blockquote><h3>IV. The Five Factors That Most Often Determine Whether Insurgencies Win</h3><p>Not every insurgency succeeds. In fact, most fail, often quickly and brutally. But decades of research reveal that a small percentage succeed for predictable, recurring reasons.</p><p>The factors below appear again and again across history, geography, and ideology. And as you’ll see, they mirror the core drivers of startup success.</p><h4>Factor 1: External Support and Safe Havens</h4><p>Successful insurgencies rarely go it alone. They almost always have external sponsors, such as foreign states, diaspora funders, neighboring territories providing sanctuary, or social and political networks that shield them.</p><p>External support contributes capital (funding, equipment), protection (places to hide and regroup), legitimacy (“someone powerful believes in us”), and longevity (the ability to survive early mistakes without being wiped out).</p><p>This doesn’t guarantee victory. But without external support, the margin for error disappears.</p><p>Founders would call this runway, investors, or ecosystem advantage.</p><h4>Factor 2: Popular Legitimacy and Local Support</h4><p>Insurgencies are embedded inside the societies they aim to transform. They rely on the population for information and intelligence, supplies and logistics, recruitment and participation, and protection and concealment.</p><p>And support isn’t only about active participation. Passive acceptance can be just as important.</p><p>The population doesn’t have to love the insurgency, they just have to feel aligned enough (or angry enough at the incumbent) to quietly enable its survival.</p><blockquote><em>When the population believes “They’re on our side,” the insurgency gains durability. When the population believes “They are the problem,” the insurgency collapses.</em></blockquote><p>In startup terms: Without true user support and advocacy, nothing else matters.</p><h4>Factor 3: Adaptability and Learning Speed</h4><p>Insurgencies operate in chaotic environments full of uncertainty. Plans rarely survive first contact with the real world.</p><p>The insurgent advantage lies in rapid experimentation, tactical flexibility, learning from failure faster than the incumbent can respond, and decentralized decision-making allowing quick adjustments.</p><p>Rigid insurgencies die. The most successful ones are constantly shifting: their tactics, strategies, narratives, and even their organizational structures evolve under pressure.</p><p>This is the OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act): decide and iterate faster than the opponent can make sense of the situation.</p><p>Startups call this Lean, AGILE, and pivoting. But the underlying dynamic is identical: adapt or die.</p><h4>Factor 4: Exploiting Incumbent Weakness</h4><p>Insurgents do not take the incumbent head-on. They look for corruption, slow decision-making, bureaucracy, failure to meet the needs of key populations, and complacency or blind spots. Then they attack those vulnerabilities relentlessly.</p><p>They win by competing where the opponent cannot keep up, not where the opponent is strongest.</p><p>This is asymmetric strategy 101: Incumbents depend on stability. Insurgents depend on disrupting that stability. The bigger the incumbent, the harder it is for them to respond quickly. Complexity becomes a liability.</p><p>In startup language: disruptive innovation is asymmetric warfare.</p><h4>Factor 5: Endurance and Time Horizon</h4><p>Insurgencies don’t win because they overpower the state. They win because they outlast the state.</p><p>Their goal isn’t a knockout punch, it’s a long war of erosion: erode legitimacy, erode the incumbent’s will to fight, erode stakeholder confidence in the status quo, and build a narrative of inevitable future success.</p><p>Every year the insurgency survives is a signal: “We’re still here, maybe the incumbent won’t win after all.”</p><p>Time becomes a weapon. Survival becomes progress. Endurance becomes strategy.</p><p>Startups call this runway. Investors call this staying alive long enough to get lucky.</p><p>Insurgencies don’t win because they start strong. They win because they become stronger over time and do it faster than the incumbent can respond. Over time, their power compounds.</p><h3>V. Why Founders Should Care</h3><p>This is not romantic, and it is not a metaphor for its own sake. It is pattern recognition.</p><p>Startups live or die by the same forces: early believers, sponsorship and capital, fast learning cycles, finding weaknesses in competitors and the market, and extending runway to ensure they live to fight another day.</p><p>If you are building a startup today, you are engaged in a form of insurgency. You are engaged in a strategic and psychological contest to replace an existing order with what you believe is a better one.</p><p>And insurgency research gives you one of the clearest playbooks ever developed for how the weak beat the strong.</p><h3>VI. Translating Insurgency Success Factors into Startup Strategy</h3><p>The previous section described five factors that repeatedly show up in insurgencies that survive and eventually win. Those factors, external support, popular legitimacy, adaptability, asymmetric strategy, and endurance, aren’t just interesting historical observations. They translate directly into how successful startups behave in the early stages.</p><p>If you reframe these insurgent dynamics into business terms, you get a surprisingly practical playbook for founders operating under extreme asymmetry.</p><p>Below is what each insurgency success factor looks like when translated into startup strategy.</p><h4>1. External Support: Capital, Ecosystem, and Strategic Sponsorship</h4><p>Insurgencies rarely survive their early stages without external support. That support might come from foreign states, sympathetic populations, or supporters in the diaspora networks providing money, resources, and sanctuary.</p><p>For startups, the equivalent is capital and ecosystem support.</p><p>Early investors, accelerators, advisors, and strategic partners function as a startup’s external sponsors by providing:</p><ul><li>Runway to experiment and survive early mistakes</li><li>Legitimacy that signals credibility to customers and talent</li><li>Access to networks and distribution channels</li><li>Protection from immediate competitive pressure</li></ul><p>Importantly, external support doesn’t guarantee success. But without it, the margin for error becomes extremely small.</p><p>Many startups fail not because the problem was wrong, but because they ran out of time before they could figure out the right one.</p><p>External support buys time to learn.</p><h4>2. Popular Support: Customers and Early Adopters</h4><p>Insurgencies survive by embedding themselves within a population. They need people who will:</p><ul><li>Provide intelligence</li><li>Offer protection</li><li>Supply recruits</li><li>Accept their presence</li></ul><p>In startups, the “population” is the customer base.</p><p>The early stage of a startup isn’t about maximizing revenue or growth metrics. It’s about winning a group of early adopters who believe strongly enough in the product to use it, support it, give feedback on it, recommend it, and tolerate its imperfections.</p><p>Without real customer belief:</p><ul><li>Marketing won’t save you</li><li>Capital won’t save you</li><li>Growth hacks won’t save you</li></ul><p>Just as insurgencies collapse when the population turns against them, startups collapse when users stop believing the product effectively solves a real and significant problem they have.</p><h4>3. Adaptability: Iteration, Pivoting, and Fast Feedback Loops</h4><p>Insurgencies survive because they adapt continuously. Their tactics evolve based on real-world feedback.</p><p>They experiment, observe results, and adjust quickly.</p><p>Startups operate the same way.</p><p>The early stages of company building are not about executing a perfect plan. They are about running fast learning loops:</p><ul><li>Ship something small</li><li>Observe how people behave</li><li>Learn from what works and what doesn’t</li><li>Adjust and try again</li></ul><p>This is the core logic behind Lean Startup methodology, but insurgencies have been practicing this kind of adaptive behavior for centuries.</p><p>Rigid organizations lose asymmetric competitions. Flexible ones survive.</p><p>The founder’s real advantage over incumbents is not intelligence or resources, it’s learning speed.</p><h4>4. Exploiting Incumbent Weakness: Disruptive Strategy</h4><p>Insurgents don’t attack the strongest part of the state. They attack where the state is weakest.</p><p>That might be:</p><ul><li>Regions the government neglects</li><li>Communities that feel underserved</li><li>Bureaucratic gaps that the state cannot respond to quickly</li></ul><p>The principle is simple: avoid the incumbent’s strengths, while exploiting their weaknesses.</p><p>Successful startups do the same.</p><p>Incumbents are often vulnerable because they are:</p><ul><li>Slow to change</li><li>Optimized for existing customers</li><li>Locked into legacy infrastructure</li><li>Culturally resistant to new models</li></ul><p>Startups win by targeting those blind spots.</p><p>They don’t try to beat incumbents at what incumbents already do best. Instead, they create new expectations, new workflows, or entirely new business models.</p><p>That’s why many successful startups initially look small or strange to established players. They’re attacking a flank the incumbent doesn’t yet consider important.</p><h4>5. Endurance: Runway, Resilience, and Staying Alive</h4><p>Insurgencies almost never win quickly.</p><p>Victory typically comes after years, sometimes decades, of survival, adaptation, and gradual accumulation of legitimacy.</p><p>The same dynamic appears in startups.</p><p>Most of the companies that eventually become dominant platforms did not look inevitable in their early years. They looked fragile, experimental, and often strange.</p><p>Their real advantage wasn’t that they started stronger.</p><p>It was that they survived long enough for:</p><ul><li>Technology to improve</li><li>Markets to shift</li><li>User behavior to change</li><li>Incumbents to make mistakes</li></ul><p>Endurance creates opportunity.</p><p>For founders, this translates into three strategic priorities:</p><ul><li>Manage burn carefully so the company can stay alive</li><li>Maintain team cohesion through difficult periods</li><li>Keep learning so that each year your company survives, your company’s capability increases</li></ul><p>Startups rarely fail because a competitor kills them directly. They fail because they run out of time.</p><h4>The Strategic Pattern</h4><p>When you look at these five factors together, a pattern emerges.</p><p>Winning insurgencies don’t start strong. They become strong through a compounding process:</p><ul><li>External support provides breathing room</li><li>Early believers create legitimacy</li><li>Rapid learning improves strategy</li><li>Asymmetric tactics exploit incumbent weaknesses</li><li>Endurance allows momentum to accumulate</li></ul><p>Startups that succeed follow the same arc.</p><p>They begin as small, fragile experiments. But if they secure support, win early believers, adapt quickly, and survive long enough, their position gradually strengthens until the balance of power shifts.</p><p>At that point, what once looked like a tiny challenger starts to look like an inevitable success.</p><p>That’s how insurgencies win.</p><p>And it’s how many of the most important startups in the world began.</p><blockquote><strong>KEY TAKEAWAY</strong></blockquote><blockquote>Insurgencies succeed when they make their eventual victory feel inevitable long before it is actually guaranteed. The same is true of the best startups. Understanding how insurgencies win gives founders a tested, research-backed framework for survival, legitimacy, adaptation, and strategy when the odds are stacked against them.</blockquote><p>(This was originally published at <a href="https://www.zerovectorventures.com/insights/insurgents-playbook-startup-founders">https://zerovectorventures.com/insights/nature-character-war-clausewitz</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e6f27c12206" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Nature and Character of War: What Clausewitz Can Teach Founders and VCs About Startup Advice]]></title>
            <link>https://sylvestermobleyvc.medium.com/the-nature-and-character-of-war-what-clausewitz-can-teach-founders-and-vcs-about-startup-advice-a6a1910cc462?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a6a1910cc462</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-16T13:31:01.852Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>The Nature and Character of War: What Carl von Clausewitz Can Teach Startup Founders and Venture Capitalists About Startup Advice</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OIefHJcHR-8Q6tSlIxrUkA.png" /></figure><h3>I. The Problem with Startup Advice</h3><p>Startup founders are surrounded by advice. Some of it comes from founders who have already built successful companies. Some comes from investors, advisors, board members, accelerators, podcasts, and the broader startup community. And, all of it sounds authoritative and comes across with a high level of confidence.</p><p>It usually sounds familiar. Launch early. Raise as soon as possible. Stay lean. Hire ahead of growth. Do things that don’t scale. You need enterprise sales. You need PLG. Ignore competitors. Obsess over competitors. Build community first. Build your product first. Build in stealth. Build in public. Once product-market fit appears, pour fuel on the fire.</p><p>What makes this advice powerful is not merely that it is repeated. It’s that it usually comes attached to real success. A founder who built a large company in a previous startup cycle explains how a specific decision changed their business’s trajectory, and an investor points to patterns observed across multiple breakout companies. The advice carries the authority of lived experience.</p><p>And yet one of the most common failures in startup ecosystems is not a lack of advice but too much of it, combined with too little of an understanding of context. Founders often inherit tactics that worked under a particular set of market, capital, and technological conditions and then treat those tactics as if they describe the permanent logic of company-building. Investors do something similar when they turn the visible features of previous winners into criteria for finding the next ones.</p><p>The result is a familiar yet underrecognized problem where founders and investors repeatedly prepare for an environment that no longer exists. They absorb lessons from the last cycle and carry them into a different one. They confuse what was contingent on context with what is enduring. They take strategies shaped by a particular competitive landscape and mistake them for universal principles.</p><p>A useful way to think about this problem comes from an unlikely source. In <em>On War</em>, Carl von Clausewitz drew a distinction between the nature of war and the character of war. Though developed in the context of military conflict, that distinction offers an unusually precise way of understanding why startup advice ages badly, why venture capitalists often overlearn from previous cycles, and why both founders and investors need a more disciplined way of thinking about strategy and context.</p><h3>II. Clausewitz’s Distinction: Nature and Character</h3><p>Clausewitz’s central insight is that war has an enduring nature, but a constantly changing character.</p><p>By the nature of war, he meant the underlying features that make war what it is: a contest between opposing wills, conducted for political purposes, under conditions of uncertainty, friction, danger, and chance. These are not temporary features tied to a specific century or technology. They persist whether the conflict is fought with muskets, tanks, aircraft, or drones.</p><p>By the character of war, Clausewitz meant the way war presents itself in a particular time, place, and context. The character of war changes with technology, organizational evolution, doctrine, culture, geography, and the identity of the actors involved. Napoleonic warfare did not look like the First World War. The First World War did not look like the Second. Contemporary conflicts increasingly involve cyber systems, autonomous platforms, and ubiquitous sensors. The visible form changes. The underlying nature remains.</p><p>Clausewitz famously described war as a chameleon. Its outward appearance shifts constantly, but it does not cease to be what it is. That distinction matters because strategists often confuse the two. They study the most recent conflict, absorb its surface lessons, and then prepare as though those visible features define war itself. In doing so, they risk mistaking transient conditions for permanent truths.</p><p>The same error appears in business, and particularly in startups. Within startups, there is an enduring logic of competition and an ever-changing set of tactics, tools, and market conditions through which that competition plays out. And as with military strategy, people are tempted to convert recent success into timeless doctrine. And there, too, the cost of doing so can be severe.</p><p>Clausewitz’s framework is valuable not because startups are literally warfare, but because both domains involve strategy under uncertainty, adaptation by intelligent opponents, and the constant need to distinguish between structural realities and temporary conditions. That is exactly the distinction startup ecosystems often fail to make.</p><h3>III. The Nature of Startup Competition</h3><p>Startups, like wars, have an underlying and unchanging nature.</p><p>At the most basic level, startups are contests between adaptive actors. A founder is not building in a vacuum. Customers respond. Competitors respond. Incumbents respond. Distribution channels shift. Platforms change incentives. Investors alter the constraints under which companies operate. The economics of markets change. Every serious startup enters an interactive environment where each move reshapes the landscape for everyone else.</p><p>Startups also unfold under conditions of deep uncertainty. In the earliest stages, founders usually do not know with confidence whether the problem they are building their company around is truly significant, whether the market for solving it is large enough, whether the proposed solution is compelling, whether the buyer is the right one, whether adoption will spread, or whether the market itself will develop in the direction they expect. Early-stage startup-building is not simply execution against a known blueprint. It is exercising judgment under incomplete information and extreme uncertainty.</p><p>Then there is friction. Everything takes longer than expected. Customer behavior doesn’t line up with what they say they want. The product reveals problems that were invisible at the whiteboard. Hiring introduces complexity faster than clarity. Distribution channels that appeared promising become crowded or expensive. In startups, as in war, reality pushes back quickly.</p><p>Chance matters too. Timing, regulation, talent availability, capital markets, technological readiness, competitor missteps, and just plain luck all shape outcomes in ways no founder can fully control. Good judgment matters enormously, but so does entering the market at a moment when the market is susceptible to the kind of company being built.</p><p>Finally, startups are deeply human endeavors. They depend on leadership, morale, persuasion, endurance, and the ability to keep making decisions under pressure when there is no certainty. Teams become tired. Founders become emotionally attached to ideas that don’t fit the market. Organizations begin telling themselves stories they want to be true. Human behavior is not an accidental feature of startup building. It is part of its nature.</p><p>Taken together, these features form the enduring logic of startup competition. Markets change. Tools change. Business models change. But startups remain contests of adaptation under uncertainty, constrained by finite resources and shaped by timing, resistance, and judgment.</p><p>That is the nature of the startup game.</p><h3>IV. The Character of Startup Competition</h3><p>What changes, often dramatically and continually, is the character of startup competition.</p><p>The character of startups is shaped by the specific environment in which companies are built: the cost of starting, the speed of shipping, the dominant distribution channels, the availability of capital, the expectations investors hold, the saturation of customer attention, the maturity of infrastructure, and the technical capabilities available to even very small teams.</p><p>The startup environment of the early consumer internet days was different from that shaped by cloud infrastructure and SaaS. The SaaS-heavy 2010s were not the same as the product-led growth era. Neither looks exactly like the current moment, in which AI is lowering development costs, compressing product cycles, reducing the scarcity of certain technical capabilities, and potentially eroding the defensibility of features that once looked durable.</p><p>Each of these periods encouraged different tactics. In one environment, rapid fundraising might create a decisive advantage, while in another, it might encourage premature expansion. During one period, self-serve, bottom-up adoption might be the cleanest path to scale. In another, trust, integration, and workflow ownership might require a more direct and deliberate go-to-market motion. In one cycle, talent could be assembled cheaply and quickly. In another, even small hiring mistakes could become existential.</p><p>This is why startup advice so often sounds contradictory. The contradiction is frequently real, but it does not always reflect confusion. It often reflects the fact that different advice was rational in different competitive environments.</p><p>What founders and investors are really arguing about, much of the time, isn’t the nature of startups but their character. The danger begins when the tactical recommendations that emerged from one context are treated as though they belong to the permanent logic of all startup building.</p><h3>V. Fighting the Last Startup Cycle</h3><p>Clausewitz’s distinction matters because it explains why startup ecosystems are so prone to fighting the last cycle.</p><p>The most dangerous advice is rarely obviously wrong. More often, it is advice that once worked under a previous character of competition and is now repeated as though it were part of the enduring nature of startups. That is how tactical lessons harden into written-in-stone law.</p><p>When this happens, founders start to imitate visible behaviors without understanding the conditions that made them effective. Investors begin to search for echoes of prior success rather than for the capabilities required in the present environment. Entire categories of companies can be funded, built, and advised according to assumptions that are no longer true.</p><p>This is not just a problem of stale tactics. It is a problem of strategic misdiagnosis. A founder using old advice may end up optimizing for the wrong bottleneck. An investor using old patterns may back the wrong teams or pressure the right teams in the wrong direction. Both sides can become attached to a script that no longer matches the terrain.</p><p>That is the deeper relevance of Clausewitz. His framework offers a way to separate what is durable from what is temporary. It encourages more disciplined judgment about which lessons transfer and which do not. And it suggests that much of what passes for startup wisdom should be treated not as law, but as history.</p><h3>VI. Why Founder Advice So Often Becomes Obsolete</h3><p>Advice usually doesn’t travel in the form in which it was originally learned. It often arrives compressed and out of context.</p><p>A founder who succeeded in one environment rarely passes along a full account of the conditions that shaped that success. What gets transmitted is a distilled version of the lessons learned. The contextual nuance turns into raise earlier, stay leaner, launch sooner, hire sales now, avoid sales entirely, focus on virality, go enterprise, ignore enterprise, build community first, or push monetization later. The advice may be sincere. It may even have been correct at some point. But it was correct somewhere else, under a different set of conditions, against a different set of constraints. By the time it becomes common startup advice, much of that context has been stripped away.</p><p>This is how advice decays.</p><p>It decays because startup narratives are written after the fact. Success creates the illusion of inevitability. The story of a company becomes coherent in hindsight. A founder identifies the decisive moves they made: the early launch, the aggressive fundraise, the refusal to pivot, the unusual hiring decision, the obsession with a specific metric. But lived reality is rarely that clean. Most successes are shaped by a mix of judgment, timing, luck, market structure, buyer behavior, competitor weakness, and changing opportunity. The final narrative highlights the visible move and quietly removes the rest of the context.</p><p>It decays because advice is survivor-filtered. The ecosystem mostly hears from the companies that made it through. For every founder who says an early large round unlocked speed and market leadership, there are ten others for whom too much capital too early created the illusion of progress and the burden of expectations before the business had found the right direction. For every founder who says manual early effort built durable customer insight, ten others simply built a labor-intensive company that looked like a software business from a distance. The advice survives because the company survived, not necessarily because the lessons transfer.</p><p>It decays because once a tactic becomes widely known, it changes the environment in which it operates. A playbook often works in part because it is scarce. Once it becomes common, the advantage fades. When every company tries to build an audience before product, or run the same product-led motion, or optimize for the same fundraising markers, what was once differentiating becomes crowded and expensive. Success generates imitation. Imitation changes the character of the market. And ultimately, the advice loses effectiveness.</p><p>It decays because startup advice is often formed inside a financing cycle. Founders built during periods of abundant capital learn one set of habits, such as hiring quickly, depending on capital for speed, raising before capital is necessarily needed, and using capital as strategic leverage. Founders shaped by tighter environments learn a completely different set of lessons, such as preserving runway, earning conviction before scaling, delaying fixed costs, and building with smaller teams. Neither worldview is universally right or wrong. Each is partly a rational adaptation to a particular capital regime. Trouble begins when those adaptations are reintroduced later as timeless laws.</p><p>That is why so much startup advice becomes misleading precisely when it sounds most confident.</p><p>Take the claim that venture capital should be raised as early as possible. Sometimes that is correct. When the market is moving quickly, distribution is open, and additional capital will finance real learning or meaningful acceleration, early fundraising can be strategically valuable. But when capital arrives before clarity, it can distort priorities, encourage performative growth, and reduce the space a company has to discover what problem it should actually be solving.</p><p>Or take the instruction to focus relentlessly on growth. Growth matters. But growth of what, and at what stage? Early top-line movement can conceal confusion as easily as it can signal product-market fit. A company that does not yet understand its user, its use case, or its retention dynamics can easily mistake activity for progress.</p><p>Even the celebrated advice to do things that do not scale is conditional. It is sound only when the unscalable work produces learning that can later be translated into a scalable system. If the manual effort merely props up a model whose economics or behavior never improve, it’s not a strategy, it’s camouflage.</p><p>In Clausewitzian terms, the mistake is always the same: tactics born from a particular character of competition are mistaken for truths about the nature of startup building itself.</p><p>What, then, should founders do?</p><p>The first step is to assess all advice through a contextual lens. The relevant question is not whether advice is good in the abstract, but under what conditions it would be true. That single question restores context. It forces the founder to ask what assumptions are embedded in the recommendation, like the kind of buyer, the kind of budget climate, the kind of distribution channel, the kind of capital market, the level of product maturity, the degree of urgency in the customer, and the level of certainty in the business.</p><p>The second step is to pay attention to warning signs. Advice should be handled carefully when it is delivered in universal language, when it travels too easily across very different types of companies, or when it is most attractive precisely because it relieves the discomfort of uncertainty. Startup advice in the form of folklore is often compelling because it offers the emotional comfort of a script. It turns ambiguity into ritual. But action is not the same thing as strategy.</p><p>The third step is to anchor decisions in present reality. The founder’s actual task is to diagnose the situation in front of the company to determine what remains unknown, where the real resistance lies, what kind of learning is currently most important, what constraints are temporary, and what constraints are structural. Once that diagnosis is clear, advice can be interpreted contextually rather than simply obeyed.</p><p>This is a more Clausewitzian posture toward company-building. It does not reject precedent. It just refuses to accept it whole. It assumes that strategy must fit the campaign being fought, not merely resemble one that was previously won.</p><h3>VII. The Investor Version of the Same Error</h3><p>The same confusion appears on the investor side, but in a more consequential form because it becomes institutional.</p><p>When founders inherit outdated advice, one company may be pushed off course. When investors inherit and internalize outdated advice, entire portfolios can be shaped by stale assumptions about what good founders, good companies, and good strategy look like.</p><p>Venture capital is especially prone to this problem because it relies heavily on pattern recognition. Firms look for echoes of prior success, such as familiar founder profiles, familiar markets, familiar go-to-market motions, familiar signs of “velocity,” and familiar stories that fit prior winners. Pattern recognition is not irrational; it is one of the few tools the venture capital asset class has. But it becomes dangerous when it is detached from the conditions that made the earlier pattern meaningful.</p><p>Investors also become imprinted by cycles. Those formed in periods of easy capital may internalize speed, fundraising strength, and organizational aggression as indicators of quality. Those formed in harder markets may overcorrect toward austerity, early revenue, and default to survival, even when a category requires longer product development or more deliberate market creation. In both cases, what is being treated as wisdom is often the residue of a particular regime.</p><p>Then there is the problem of advisory pressure. Investors are expected to be helpful. A board seat creates an implicit obligation to contribute. But that obligation can produce a subtle failure in which advice is given not because the investor has superior contextual knowledge, but because silence feels like abdication. The result is guidance that is too tactical, too confident, or too detached from the company’s actual context.</p><p>This matters because founders usually possess an advantage that investors do not, which is proximity. Founders see the customer conversations, the product friction, the quality of demand, the internal confusion, and the timing of learning. Investors see more companies, but each individual company at a much lower resolution. That broader view can be valuable. But it becomes harmful when the lower-resolution perspective overrides the higher-resolution one simply because it carries status.</p><p>This is how investors end up pressuring companies into scripts that no longer fit. A firm whose identity was forged during one period may continue to push fundraising benchmarks that made sense then but not now. A partner who saw one go-to-market motion generate outlier returns may recommend it broadly, even where buyer behavior, product complexity, or market maturity point elsewhere. A board member may prefer a familiar narrative because it is easier to understand and easier to sell internally, even when the company’s actual path is messier and less legible.</p><p>Clausewitz’s framework suggests a different role for investors.</p><p>The enduring part of venture investing is not a fixed playbook. It is the challenge of allocating capital under uncertainty, identifying teams capable of adaptation, and helping companies think clearly in interactive competitive environments. Everything else is like the founder archetypes that look promising in a given moment, the metrics downstream investors reward, the openness of distribution channels, the cost of talent, the tolerance for burn, and the credibility of particular market narratives are contingent.</p><p>That distinction should change both underwriting and advising.</p><p>On the investing side, it means looking past superficial resemblance to previous winners. The stronger question is not whether a founder looks like someone who won the last cycle, but whether the founder appears able to navigate a changing one. Can this person learn quickly? Can they separate signal from noise? Can they update beliefs without losing strategic coherence? Can they make hard decisions under uncertainty? Those qualities speak more directly to the nature of startup competition than any passing preference for a particular biography or style.</p><p>On the advising side, the most useful investor behavior is usually less prescriptive and more diagnostic. Good advice clarifies trade-offs, sequencing, and assumptions. It helps founders reason. It asks what must be true for a strategy to work, what remains unknown, what bottleneck actually matters, which decisions are reversible, and what evidence would change the recommendation. That kind of advice respects the founder’s contextual knowledge while still contributing a broader pattern-based perspective.</p><p>Just as important is knowing when not to give advice. Investors should be cautious when the founder has materially better information than the boardroom about the relevant decision, when the recommendation derives mainly from a prior cycle whose assumptions no longer hold, or when the firm’s desire to be useful is greater than its confidence that the recommendation actually fits the company’s present reality. There is a significant difference between helping a founder reason and pressuring a founder to imitate past startup successes.</p><p>One of the most damaging habits in venture is the conversion of anecdote into obligation. A famous company hired a head of sales at a certain stage, raised a particular round, delayed monetization, or pushed aggressively into enterprise. The example then becomes normative. The investor is no longer sharing precedent but implying that the founder is behind if the same moves are not made. This collapses the distinction between historical example and present strategy.</p><p>The better investor role is narrower and stronger at the same time, becoming narrower in tactical prescription and stronger in strategic discipline. The aim should be to create clarity without imposing scripts, to help founders distinguish enduring realities from temporary conditions, and to resist turning a portfolio’s past into another company’s future.</p><h3>VIII. A Better Use of History</h3><p>The implication is not that advice is useless or that history has nothing to teach. It is that both founders and investors have to treat advice historically and contextually, as something that emerged from a particular competitive environment and must be tested against the one in front of them.</p><p>That is the enduring value of Clausewitz’s distinction. It forces a separation between what is structural and what is circumstantial. It reminds founders that startups are always shaped by uncertainty, friction, adaptation, and the pressure of limited resources. It reminds investors that no cycle grants permanent authority to its playbooks. And it offers both groups a more disciplined way to think about strategy in markets that change faster than their stories do.</p><p>Startup ecosystems are unusually prone to borrowing confidence from the past. A company succeeds, a narrative forms, a tactic hardens into doctrine, and the doctrine gets exported into a new environment that no longer shares the conditions from which it came. This is how founders end up taking obsolete advice from successful operators. It is how investors end up funding and coaching as though the last cycle were still underway. It is how founders and investors essentially end up fighting the last war.</p><p>Clausewitz’s lesson is not that precedent should be ignored. It is that precedent should be interpreted. The nature of startup competition endures. Its character changes. Good judgment depends on knowing the difference.</p><p>(This was originally published at <a href="https://zerovectorventures.com/insights/nature-character-war-clausewitz">https://zerovectorventures.com/insights/nature-character-war-clausewitz</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a6a1910cc462" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Is Enterprise Sales and Why Most Early-Stage Startups Shouldn’t Do It]]></title>
            <link>https://sylvestermobleyvc.medium.com/what-is-enterprise-sales-and-why-most-early-stage-startups-shouldnt-do-it-842553a23da5?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/842553a23da5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[saas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enterprise-software]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 16:23:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-25T16:23:06.454Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oETaMVSi_Pk_0loXUgKilg.png" /></figure><p>Increasingly, I’ve heard people refer to B2B SaaS companies as “enterprise SaaS companies,” implying that an enterprise SaaS company is a distinct type of company. It isn’t. Enterprise sales is a customer acquisition strategy, not a type of company. Some B2B SaaS companies use enterprise sales as their primary customer acquisition strategy, while others utilize product-led growth, founder-led sales (which may or may not be enterprise-focused), content-led growth, community-led growth, and so on. Additionally, many B2B SaaS companies employ a combination of strategies, adopting a hybrid approach. The other issue I see is that many founders define enterprise sales by the size of the customers they are selling to. If they are targeting large companies, they then consider themselves enterprise sales SaaS startups. However, the size of the companies you sell to doesn’t in itself make a B2B SaaS startup and an enterprise sales startup.</p><p><strong>What then is enterprise sales?</strong></p><p>While there isn’t a universal definition for enterprise sales, a set of conditions is typically used by most investors, including our firm, to determine if a company is truly employing an enterprise sales strategy or not. When determining whether a startup is an enterprise sales startup, I consider the average contract value, the complexity of the sales motion, and the buying process for the companies the startup is selling to.</p><p>Based on these three characteristics, a startup is using an enterprise sales strategy if:</p><ul><li>The average contract value exceeds $50,000 per year.</li><li>There is a complex sales motion that requires things like security reviews, procurement, legal reviews, multiple stakeholders, pilots, and a 6–18+ month sales cycle.</li><li>The buying process requires executive sponsors, must fit within budget cycles, and the people who directly experience the problems the software solves aren’t the same people who can pay for it.</li></ul><p><strong>Why should most early-stage companies not be focused on enterprise sales from the beginning?</strong></p><p>When our firm assesses teams that say they are enterprise sales companies, we find that they either haven’t raised enough capital to sustain the long, complex sales cycles or have an average contract value that is well below $50,000.</p><ul><li>Most founders don’t raise enough capital. Based on what we typically see from companies pitching us and looking at data from Pitchbook and Carta, the typical pre-seed B2B SaaS company raises somewhere between $900,000 and $1.2 million. When you account for monthly burn, the cost and time associated with building enterprise-ready software, the length of the sales cycles, and the complexity of the sales process $900,000 to $1.2 million isn’t enough to sustain the business through that. It doesn’t take much to model this out for a company and see that the company will inevitably run out of cash. A company in this position will then struggle to raise more capital to stay alive because it doesn’t have enough traction, due to the small number of customers it has acquired, if any, making it a less compelling investment opportunity to other VCs.</li><li>The average contract value for their customer contracts is too low. Many startup founders are using enterprise sales strategies for contract values that are too low to use enterprise sales efficiently. If the annual contract value is less than $25,000, it is almost always inefficient to use an enterprise sales strategy, considering the cost of selling and the time required to sell to customers. This leaves founders committing a significant amount of time and money to a capital-inefficient acquisition strategy.</li></ul><p><strong>What should founders do?</strong></p><ul><li>Acknowledge their reality and be realistic. I see many founders who disregard the realities associated with enterprise sales. They are overly optimistic about how long it will take to close sales, especially if they have a couple of pilot customers, because they convince themselves that every customer will be like that. They are overly optimistic about their potential to raise more capital, believing that if and when they start running out of money, they’ll be able to just raise more money. They are overly optimistic about the cost and time required to build truly enterprise-ready software. They convince themselves that the big contract they need is right around the corner. As an investor, I’ve heard this countless times from founders. Every founder believes that the huge contract they’ve been waiting for is right within reach, and they just need a little more money to reach it. Having seen this play out over and over, the reality is that this rarely happens, and nine times out of ten, they never get that contract.</li><li>Experiment with other acquisition strategies. If a founder hasn’t initially raised enough money to sustain an enterprise sales strategy, their reality is that the only way they can survive and succeed is through a more capital-efficient acquisition strategy. Therefore, they need to start experimenting with other acquisition strategies early to find the right one.</li><li>Raise more money. If a founder is determined to use enterprise sales, they must accept the realities of this approach, methodically model the economics of their business, and raise sufficient capital to sustain themselves through the challenges of enterprise sales.</li></ul><p>Does this mean that I think founders should never use enterprise sales for customer acquisition? Of course not. It simply means they either need to raise enough money to make it work from day one or use an acquisition strategy that is more capital-efficient until they have enough traction and money in the bank to make enterprise sales work.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=842553a23da5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your Startup Is Probably Not An AI Company.]]></title>
            <link>https://sylvestermobleyvc.medium.com/your-startup-is-probably-not-an-ai-company-e84e99b6ac7c?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e84e99b6ac7c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2025 15:16:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-29T15:16:26.331Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2Oi470KM2mn9uclJpcM3Pg.jpeg" /></figure><p>While it may not seem like it with all the hype and noise, it’s okay if your company isn’t an AI company. But it’s not okay if you don’t understand why it’s not.</p><p>Our team meets with a lot of founders who are raising capital for their companies and calling their companies AI companies. We even see these founders putting AI in their company’s name and using .ai domains. The problem is they are absolutely not AI companies. For context, we are B2B SaaS investors, and before the explosion of generative AI companies like OpenAI, it was extremely rare for a company that pitched our firm to call themselves an AI company. However, with the popularity of AI companies and investors rushing to push capital into them, most of the founders I meet now call their companies AI companies. Almost none of these companies are AI companies. Do I think there’s an explosion of founders intentionally lying to investors? No, I don’t think that’s it at all. I think the reasons are far less nefarious. The first reason is simply that many founders don’t know the difference between an AI company and a company that uses AI. The second reason is that founders want to raise money for their companies and see investors investing in companies that call themselves AI companies. You combine those two things, and you get founders who don’t actually understand AI but need to raise capital, calling their companies AI companies.</p><p>So, what’s the difference between a company that uses AI and an AI company?</p><h3>A company that uses AI:</h3><p>Your product or service utilizes AI as a tool to make something better, faster, or cheaper. While the AI may be integrated into your product, it is just an ingredient, not the core product.</p><p>Example: Your product is a SaaS platform that uses an off-the-shelf model like GPT or a computer vision API to improve search, automate tagging, or provide better recommendations. The AI may improve the product and even add customer value, but the core business value comes from the application, not the AI itself.</p><h3>A company that is an AI Company:</h3><p>Your company’s main product is the AI. You are building, training, or advancing new AI models or systems that other people or companies rely on. The business value comes directly from the AI technology itself, not just the application. Essentially, other companies are paying to use the AI models you build in their platforms to make their products better.</p><p>Examples are OpenAI building GPT models, Anthropic creating Claude, or a startup developing a new specialized LLM for law or medicine.</p><h3>An analogy using cloud computing:</h3><p><strong>Using the Cloud (AI as a tool):</strong></p><p>Most SaaS companies today run their software on AWS, Google Cloud, or Azure. They benefit from cloud infrastructure for storage, compute, and scalability. But that doesn’t make them “cloud computing companies.” They’re just companies that use the cloud as a part of their businesses.</p><p>A startup that uses GPT or an API to power features (like summarizing emails, detecting fraud, analyzing data, or automating customer service) is like a SaaS app running on AWS. They’re not an “AI company,” they’re an application company that leverages AI.</p><p>Example: A project management SaaS app hosted on AWS.</p><p><strong>Being a Cloud Company (AI as the product):</strong></p><p>AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure are cloud companies because their core product is cloud infrastructure. They build and operate the underlying systems that other companies rely on.</p><p>A startup building new models or core AI systems (like OpenAI, Anthropic, or a company training custom domain-specific LLMs) is like AWS. They are an AI company because their primary product is the AI technology.</p><p>Example: AWS creating EC2, S3, and Lambda, which are the infrastructure that other businesses pay to use.</p><p>We are now at a point where every SaaS company should leverage AI to provide more value, operate more efficiently, or just remain competitive. Companies that do that and solve a real problem or need will still be able to provide significant value to customers and raise capital. And they’ll be able to do it without calling themselves AI companies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e84e99b6ac7c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Founders Get Wrong About Successful Startups]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/codedbyventures/what-founders-get-wrong-about-successful-startups-5a0531cfa318?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5a0531cfa318</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-market-fit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-advice]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 12:31:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-10T12:31:39.131Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Startup founders often begin with an idea that interests them. But without a real problem, your startup has a low probability of success.</h4><figure><img alt="Startup founders who started with an idea instead of a real problem and now they are frustrated because their company isn’t finding product-market fit." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZjCwjs9p-rNcIFkHn705mw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Ideas vs. Problems: The Foundation of Startup Success</strong></h3><p>When building a startup, <strong>where you begin matters more than most founders realize</strong>. Your starting point is your business’s foundation, and just like with building a house, if your foundation is bad, everything you build on top of it has the risk of crumbling. The difference between starting with an <em>idea</em> and starting with a <em>problem</em> can determine whether you are starting with a strong foundation that will lead to success or a weak foundation with a high probability of failure.</p><p>At a high level:</p><ul><li>An <strong>idea</strong> is a concept or vision a founder believes could be valuable. It often stems from <strong>imagination</strong>, <strong>inspiration</strong>, <strong>personal experience</strong>, or <strong>personal interest</strong>.</li><li>On the other hand, a <strong>problem</strong> is a <strong>real, painful need</strong> that a significant number of people or businesses face, which creates true market demand for a solution.</li></ul><p>Ultimately, <strong>problem-driven startups are far more likely to succeed</strong> because they are built based on real customer needs and pain points.</p><h3>Ideas vs. Problems: What’s the Difference?</h3><h4>Origin</h4><ul><li><strong>Ideas</strong> often come from a founder’s personal interests, experiences, or inspiration and rarely originate from in-depth research or customer discovery.</li><li><strong>Problems</strong> are grounded in reality and identified and validated through research. They’re uncovered through methods such as user interviews and user observations and reflect a <strong>pain that already exists</strong> in the market.</li></ul><h4>Market Demand</h4><ul><li><strong>Ideas</strong> require founders to <em>create</em> demand by trying to convince users to want what they are building.</li><li><strong>Problems</strong> already have natural demand because the users are actively seeking a solution or using a solution they are unsatisfied with.</li></ul><h4>Validation Approach</h4><ul><li><strong>Ideas</strong> are typically validated <em>after</em> the product is built, with founders looking for confirmation that they’ve built something the market wants.</li><li><strong>Problems</strong> are validated <em>before</em> anything is built by confirming with real people the problem is real, frequent, and truly painful.</li></ul><h4>Solution</h4><ul><li><strong>Ideas</strong> result in products that are often shaped around the founder’s vision instead of being shaped by validated customer needs.</li><li><strong>Problems</strong> result in products shaped around real pain points and needs, making product-market fit more likely.</li></ul><h4>Risk Level</h4><ul><li><strong>Ideas</strong> are higher risk because you’re betting on people buying into your vision even though they may not need what you’ve built.</li><li><strong>Problems</strong> are lower risk because users already spend time or money solving them.</li></ul><h3>Examples: Idea-Based vs. Problem-Based Startups</h3><p><strong>Let’s look at some examples:</strong></p><h4>Idea-Based Startups</h4><ol><li><strong>Smart Toaster App<br></strong> A founder wants to create a smartphone-controlled toaster so people can toast bread remotely. While inventive, this solution does not solve a painful problem. Currently, people aren’t struggling to use their toasters.</li><li><strong>Pet Social Media App<br></strong> A founder who loves sharing photos of their dog wants to create a pet-only social platform. However, there’s no clear gap in the market, and existing platforms like Instagram already serve this use case well.</li><li><strong>VR Office Simulator<br></strong>Inspired by remote work trends, a founder builds a VR-style office space so remote teams can “walk around” virtually. It’s novel, but there’s little evidence that teams want to simulate a traditional office.</li><li><strong>Blockchain Signature Tool<br></strong>A founder builds a document-signing tool on the blockchain because they believe the blockchain is the future. However, if current tools (e.g., DocuSign) already solve the problem well, the blockchain angle may be unnecessary and not solve a true pain point.</li></ol><h4>Problem-Based Startups</h4><ol><li><strong>Restaurant Waste Optimization<br></strong>After interviews and market research, a founder discovered that food waste is a significant cost driver for restaurants due to unpredictable customer demand. They build a predictive analytics tool to reduce waste. The product solves a real, costly problem identified through customer discovery.</li><li><strong>College Student Storage Platform<br></strong>A founder learns from students that summer break creates a recurring need for affordable short-term storage. They make a peer-to-peer storage marketplace. This solution is built <em>from a validated</em> user pain point.</li><li><strong>Compliance Monitoring for Financial Services<br></strong>Through conversations with compliance teams, a founder learns that monitoring internal communications for policy violations is time-consuming and inefficient. Based on user research backed by customer data, they build an AI-powered monitoring platform, and there is existing demand.</li><li><strong>Supply Chain Risk Alerts<br></strong>After speaking with procurement teams across industries, a founder discovers a need for real-time visibility into supply chain disruptions. They build a monitoring system to alert teams of risk factors. The system directly addresses a known business risk identified through customer discovery.</li></ol><h3>The Takeaway for Founders</h3><h4><strong>Start with a problem</strong></h4><ul><li>Starting with a problem ensures that what you’re building is needed.</li><li>It connects you to the needs and pain points of real users already looking for a solution to their problems.</li><li>It gives you a stronger foundation for validation, growth, and product-market fit.</li></ul><p>Ideas are often <strong>solutions in search of a problem</strong>.</p><p>Want to find out if you’re starting from a real problem or just an idea? Our team created a simple self-assessment founders can use. You can access it at the following link: <a href="https://mjj6sh35c31.typeform.com/to/FZstGjD4">https://mjj6sh35c31.typeform.com/to/FZstGjD4</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a0531cfa318" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/codedbyventures/what-founders-get-wrong-about-successful-startups-5a0531cfa318">What Founders Get Wrong About Successful Startups</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/codedbyventures">Zero Vector Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Framework for Monthly Investor Updates]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital/a-framework-for-monthly-investor-updates-5792a889e99f?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5792a889e99f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Apr 2024 15:19:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-14T15:19:22.093Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3veUgfd_YhS4B-Qbz1DR5g.png" /><figcaption>Startup Founders Presenting Their Company</figcaption></figure><p>Between startups in our portfolio and companies that we haven’t invested in but still share their monthly investor updates with us, I get to see a lot of updates. I get to see extremely well-put-together updates, pretty bad updates, and everything in between. While teams may structure their updates differently and focus on different key items, the best updates I see share a set of core common elements and information.</p><p>What you will find below is a framework you can use for your startup for regular investor updates that pulls from elements of the best updates I’ve seen.</p><h3><strong>A Guide for Monthly Investor Updates</strong></h3><h4><strong>Why You Should Send Investor Updates</strong></h4><p>Of course, investor updates are a great way to keep your investors updated on what’s going on with your company, but when used effectively, they also provide other benefits. Some of those benefits include:</p><ul><li>Maintaining and increasing existing investors’ confidence in your leadership and company making it easier for you to raise more capital from them in the future.</li><li>Establishing confidence with potential investors and making the case for why they should invest.</li><li>Showing investors who have passed on investing in your company your progress and traction to make the case for why they should invest in the next round.</li><li>Being able to consistently and clearly communicate what assistance you need from your investors to help them provide you with real value.</li><li>Building an open and transparent relationship with your investors.</li></ul><h4><strong>Who You Should Send Investor Updates To</strong></h4><p>Investor updates should go to:</p><ul><li>Your current investors.</li><li>Investors you’ve met with but who have passed on investing in your company. When an investor passes, ask if adding them to your distribution list is okay.</li><li>Investors you are interested in raising money from but haven’t formally pitched yet. Again, just ask if adding them to your distribution list is okay.</li></ul><h4><strong>Update Dos and Don’ts</strong></h4><p><strong>Dos</strong></p><ul><li>Make the update as concise as possible.</li><li>Be open and transparent.</li><li>Use the update to show why your company is a great investment and why you are a great leader.</li><li>Focus on outcomes, not activity.</li></ul><p><strong>Don’ts</strong></p><ul><li>Don’t include fluff.</li><li>Don’t try to hide problems.</li><li>Don’t talk about what you did without talking about the impact what you did had on the company.</li></ul><h4><strong>Update Template</strong></h4><p><strong>Update Summary</strong></p><p>This is a summarized overview of the key details of the update. Not all of your investors will read through the entire update, so your summary should include the most important information you want to communicate to someone who may not read everything.</p><p><strong>Key Metrics</strong></p><p>What is a metric? A quantitative item used to measure, assess, and track performance.</p><p>What are your company’s five to seven most important metrics to track, and how did you perform against them between this and your last update?</p><p>Identify the most important metrics for your company’s growth and success. These metrics could be user growth, retention, churn, active users, conversion rate, burn rate, runway, or any other critical metric. Regardless of what metric you select, the key here is to focus on actual metrics that are quantified with numbers.</p><p><strong>Highlights</strong></p><p>What are three to five great things that occurred since your last update?</p><p>Focus on tangible things that move the business forward and clearly communicate why each highlight is good for the company and how each highlight moves the company forward.</p><p><strong>Lowlights</strong></p><p>What are three to five negative things that occurred since your last update?</p><p>There will always be something that isn’t going the way you want it to or a problem that comes up. Proactively communicating those issues to investors is critical to maintaining a relationship built on trust and transparency and alerting them to issues you may need help with.</p><p><strong>Asks</strong></p><p>What are the most important asks that you currently have for investors?</p><p>Things often come up that you need your investors to help you with. This is when you should communicate those needs to your investors.</p><p><strong>Product Updates</strong></p><p>What are the three to five most significant product updates that occurred since your last update?</p><p>Your product will drive the success of your company. Due to the importance of your product, it warrants its own section in your update. This is where you can provide updates regarding significant new features and their value to users, validation conducted, upcoming critical roadmap items, and other key product updates.</p><p><strong>What’s Next</strong></p><p>What are the three to five most significant things you have coming up?</p><p>Here, you can provide insight into some of the important activities, events, milestones, etc. you have coming up. These can include extending an offer to a new critical hire, opening a new investment round, or crossing a major milestone on your roadmap.</p><h4><strong>Sample Update</strong></h4><p><strong>Update Summary</strong></p><p>Welcome to our update for this month!</p><p>We are experiencing challenges filling two key positions and need help closing this fundraising round.</p><p>From a runway perspective, we are currently in a strong position and have decreased our burn to strengthen that position moving forward. We’ve added four new customers and have successfully maintained a high user retention rate while increasing user engagement.</p><p><strong>Key Metrics</strong></p><ul><li>Runway: 12 months — increased our runway by two months by decreasing our monthly burn.</li><li>Investment commitments for the current fundraising round: three commitments totaling $350,000 — no new commitments were added since the last update</li><li>Burn rate: $63,000 per month — monthly burn decreased by $12,000 over the last month.</li><li>Monthly active users: 142 — added 32 new active users since last month</li><li>Customers: 35 — added four new customers since last month</li><li>Customer retention rate: 100% — unchanged from the previous month</li><li>Customer conversion rate: 5% — increased by 3% since last month</li></ul><p><strong>Highlights</strong></p><ul><li>We hired a new Head of Product with significant Product-Led Growth experience, who is helping us increase our customer conversion rate.</li><li>We’ve seen significant increases in user engagement from the last set of features we launched.</li><li>We were accepted into an accelerator program providing $100,000 in non-dilutive capital.</li></ul><p><strong>Lowlights</strong></p><ul><li>One of our lead software engineers left for a higher-paying role at another company, which has slowed down the speed of our software development team.</li><li>We are still struggling to hire a new UX researcher, which is impacting our ability to validate potential new product features.</li><li>We needed to pay an external consultant to help us address internal compliance issues. Both the compliance issues and the cost to address them were unexpected.</li></ul><p><strong>Asks</strong></p><ul><li>Help us find a new lead software engineer. If you are connected to software engineers who may be looking for new roles, please reach out to us for the job description and salary range.</li><li>Help us find a UX researcher. If you are connected to UX researchers who may be looking for new roles, please reach out to us for the job description and salary range.</li><li>We still need another $750,000 to close this round. Please connect us to potential investors in your network.</li></ul><p><strong>Product Updates</strong></p><ul><li>We conducted user interviews with more than 200 potential users over the last month, focused on gaining a deeper understanding of the context users are currently working in when they encounter the problem we are solving.</li><li>We improved our onboarding flow for new users to improve user engagement.</li><li>We added a core feature based on in-application user feedback and testing to increase user engagement at a touchpoint with low user engagement.</li></ul><p><strong>What’s Next</strong></p><ul><li>We are launching a digital marketing campaign to drive new potential customers into our PLG funnel.</li><li>We are launching two new product features focused on increasing user engagement.</li><li>We are conducting another round of user research to refine our user personas and gain deeper insights into our users.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5792a889e99f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital/a-framework-for-monthly-investor-updates-5792a889e99f">A Framework for Monthly Investor Updates</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital">Plain Sight Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[5 Podcasts Early-Stage Startup Founders Should Listen To]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital/5-podcasts-early-stage-startup-founders-should-listen-to-f8c49fb18d76?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f8c49fb18d76</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[user-experience]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[podcast]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Mar 2023 19:22:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-03T19:22:04.504Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gEYQ7jFETAh9XzqhN3hy1A.jpeg" /></figure><p>As a founder, I always found the number of new things I had to constantly learn and the speed at which I had to learn them to be daunting. Honestly, I still find it just as challenging now as a VC.</p><p>However, over the years, I’ve adopted various strategies to consistently learn and grow as a founder, leader, operator, and now investor. A core part of this is podcasts.</p><p>Below is a list of five podcasts that I listen to that I believe can provide a lot of value to any early-stage founder:</p><p><a href="https://rocketship.fm/"><strong>1) Rocketship FM</strong></a></p><p>Why? An early-stage CEO will often need to play the role of Product Manager. Understanding product management practices and frameworks will help you successfully build and deliver a product that customers get real value from.</p><p>Rocketship FM covers everything product-related, providing actionable insights that you can immediately apply.</p><p><a href="https://www.thetwentyminutevc.com/"><strong>2) 20 Minute VC</strong></a></p><p>Why? Most early-stage founders are or will, at some point, raise capital. The more you understand the strategies of companies that have successfully raised and the mindset of top VCs, the better prepared you will be.</p><p>Each episode of 20 Minute VC provides valuable insights from some of the world’s top venture capitalists and startup founders.</p><p><a href="https://www.userinterviews.com/podcast"><strong>3) Awkward Silences</strong></a></p><p>Why? A large part of the success of early-stage founders depends on their ability to be hyper-focused on learning everything they can about their users.</p><p>Each episode of Awkward Silences covers various UX research topics giving listeners extremely tactical tips they can put into practice.</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/this-is-product-management/id975284403"><strong>4) This is Product Management</strong></a></p><p>Why? The why for This is Product Management is the same as the why for Rocketship FM. The more you understand product as an early-stage founder, the more effective you will be.</p><p>Like Rocketship FM, This is Product Management covers all things product with episodes ranging from go-to-market and product-led growth to data-driven strategies and validating opportunities.</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/nn-g-ux-podcast/id1527196035"><strong>5) The NN/g UX Podcast</strong></a></p><p>Why? Great UX is a crucial component of building products people love. Every founder should understand why and how UX can give them a competitive advantage.</p><p>The Nielsen Norman Group UX Podcast provides actionable insights on topics ranging from user experience research to user experience strategy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f8c49fb18d76" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital/5-podcasts-early-stage-startup-founders-should-listen-to-f8c49fb18d76">5 Podcasts Early-Stage Startup Founders Should Listen To</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital">Plain Sight Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Is A Startup?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital/what-is-a-startup-460856fb2628?source=rss-b4418d1f7583------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/460856fb2628</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvester Mobley]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Feb 2023 02:02:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-06T20:01:12.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NAL3vcu2fBcQfZ8VdtaNrA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I often talk to founders still figuring out what they’re building and how. At the same time, they have a ton of terms flying at them — startup, lifestyle business, venture capital, angel investment, and more. There can also be different definitions depending on where you look for answers and who you ask. The various terms and definitions can be confusing and overwhelming at times. I understand this because I went through it as a founder myself.</p><p>Some people dismiss the word startup as just a label. While labeling people can be problematic, labeling businesses can help founders raise the right capital, adopt the best model, build a winning strategy, and recruit the right talent. Interestingly, the people who often say the labels don’t matter are the people who understand the differences between them.</p><p>To make things more complicated, some terms like startup have evolved as they began being used by people outside of tech over time, meaning providing a clear, universally accepted definition is difficult. I wrote this as a guide for people looking for a starting point to understand what a startup is.</p><p><strong>What is a Startup?</strong></p><p>A startup is a company that is intentionally created to scale in size extremely quickly while addressing a huge problem or need, using some type of innovation to enable that rapid growth.</p><p><strong>What does that mean?</strong></p><p>A startup is a company just like any other business. When launched, most startups meet the definition of a small business because of how much revenue they generate and the number of employees they have. Also, some startups are brand-new businesses, while some have been around for years.</p><p>However, unlike traditional businesses that grow fairly steadily, startups are intentionally created to grow rapidly. The rapid growth of a startup is usually enabled through some combination of innovation and technology.</p><p><strong>Traditional Business Growth vs Startup Growth</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZYpEcnJxoRC0yR0FxL6gsQ.png" /><figcaption>Traditional Business Growth Example</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3rxh-7GlVbUbJ0Ybl-VTdw.png" /><figcaption>Startup Growth Example</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Traditional Business vs Startup Example</strong></p><p>A Restaurant vs. DoorDash — The growth of a traditional brick-and-mortar restaurant will always be limited by the number of tables the owners can fit in the restaurant, how much the restaurant can charge for food, and the number of people the restaurant can hire. Once a restaurant reaches its maximum capacity for the number of tables in it and how much it can charge for food, it can no longer grow. At that point, if the restaurant owner wants to grow their business, they will need to open another restaurant with the same limitations as the first restaurant.</p><p>DoorDash’s growth is limited by things such as the number of people in the world who want to order food online to either pick it up or have it delivered to them and the number of restaurants that want to give people the ability to order from them to either pick their food up or have it delivered. This allows DoorDash to grow far faster and larger than the restaurant ever could. DoorDash’s growth is enabled through the combination of an innovative business model supported by technology. Their business model allows people anywhere to order food from their phones without DoorDash needing to take on the cost of owning or operating restaurants.</p><p><strong>How are startups financed?</strong></p><p>Like traditional businesses, startups can be financed through bootstrapping, angel investment, and debt in the early stages. Unlike traditional businesses, early-stage startups can also be funded through venture capital.</p><p><strong>Bootstrapping</strong> — When a founder uses their own money or revenue from operations to fund and grow their business.</p><p><strong>Angel investment</strong> — Capital received from an individual investor at the early stages of a business in exchange for equity.</p><p><strong>Debt</strong> — Money an entrepreneur obtains for their business using loans or lines of credit.</p><p><strong>Venture capital</strong> — Capital invested in a company by professional venture capital investors representing venture capital firms in exchange for equity in the business.</p><p>It is not uncommon for startup founders to use a combination of financing methods to launch and grow their businesses. For example, a founder may bootstrap their startup to get it launched, raise capital from angel investors to conduct early validation, and finally raise venture capital to scale. It is, however, far less common for early-stage startups to use debt financing for their companies.</p><p><strong>Why do startups raise venture capital?</strong></p><p>A startup is far riskier than a traditional business. Startups are often using novel technologies and models to go after large markets. This results in startups having extremely high failure rates. Because of the risks involved with startups, they are generally too risky for a traditional bank to lend to them. But they still need capital to grow. Venture capital fills this void by providing capital to startups that, while too risky for banks to lend to them, have the potential to generate massive returns because of their innovative business models and technologies. The potential for extremely large returns is why venture capital investors are willing to take on the risks of investing in these companies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=460856fb2628" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital/what-is-a-startup-460856fb2628">What Is A Startup?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/plain-sight-capital">Plain Sight Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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