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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by LunaTajik on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by LunaTajik on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by LunaTajik on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[US: The Enemy Iran Can’t Afford to Lose.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tajikluna/the-enemy-iran-cant-afford-to-lose-24407009f537?source=rss-081ca52c95d9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[iran-us-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[america]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[LunaTajik]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 14:42:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T14:43:19.249Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LYrPb-PSuzqWYdz1-zSE9g.png" /></figure><p><em>On 4 November Iran staged its founding story of enmity while its chief negotiator welcomed an American election. The story matters more than the slogans.</em></p><h3>The Issue</h3><p>On Wednesday 4 November 2026 Iran marked the 47th anniversary of the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran. The state calls the date the National Day of Fighting Global Arrogance, and also Students’ Day. Tehran Times and Press TV, both Iranian outlets, reported rallies at more than 900 locations. Al Jazeera, working from agency reports, described thousands marching in central Tehran and burning American and Israeli flags.</p><p>This year the ritual carried new dead. The war that began on 28 February killed the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The final statement of the rallies, as Press TV reported it, demanded retribution for him and justice for the pupils of a girls’ primary school in Minab, struck on the first day of the war. The statement put their number at 168. It also called for Iran to leave the NPT.</p><p>On the same day Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament and Iran’s chief negotiator with Washington, posted in English on X. Americans had voted the day before in midterm elections that gave Congress to the Democrats. He wrote that they had said “NO TO WAR” and that Iran endorsed the message, as Gulf News reported. Two days earlier the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, had described indirect talks through Qatar and Pakistan as very intensive, according to Arab News.</p><p>That leaves a question. Can a state end a war with the enemy that its founding story requires?</p><h3>The Analysis</h3><p>Start with the story that each side tells about how this quarrel began, and ask what that story justifies today.</p><p>Duncan Bell, a Cambridge historian of political thought, argues that communities live by simple stories of origin, with founders, heroes, and moments of rebirth. These stories do a job. They tell members who they are, and they legitimate whoever holds authority now. Bell adds a warning. Such stories are rarely defeated by a better argument, because identities rest on them.</p><p>Tehran’s story folds three events into one date, as Tehran Times sets out. They are the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1964, the killing of protesting students in 1978, and the embassy seizure of 1979. What the date justifies is a state defined by resistance to America.</p><p>Washington has its own version of the same day. For Americans it opens 444 days in which 52 of their diplomats and citizens were held hostage. Each country begins the story at the other’s offence, and each is the injured party in its own telling.</p><p>Bell makes a second point about scholars that I think holds for states. Ideas last when people are trained to carry them. This year, Tehran Times reported, schools rang an Anti Arrogance Bell, and a national campaign encouraged pupils to document the rallies. The education minister spoke at a girls’ school in Tehran. This is how a state forms a certain kind of citizen. A rally shows what a state can stage. It does not show what a generation thinks.</p><p>Then look at the labels. Global Arrogance is a label, and so is rogue state. Each tells officials what is permitted. The flag burned in Tehran becomes the agency photograph that confirms Washington’s picture of Iran, and that picture justifies the pressure that fills the next rally.</p><p>Yet Ghalibaf’s post shows that the story has a hinge. It separates the American people from the American government. A story that needs America as an enemy has just found a use for American voters.</p><h3>The Scenarios</h3><p>What follows are judgments about what could happen. They are not forecasts.</p><p>Scenario one. The story absorbs the deal. Reason from inside Tehran’s own fears and incentives. A leadership that lost its Supreme Leader on the first day of a war cannot be seen to yield, yet it can sign terms that it presents as the enemy’s retreat. On 2 November the first vice president, Mohammad Reza Aref, claimed that American messages acknowledged Iran’s victory, as CBS News reported. Negotiators and mediators gain. Those who need a visible surrender lose.</p><p>Scenario two. The story blocks the deal. Nearly everyone assumes that rallies are theatre and negotiators decide. Test that. The rally demanded an exit from the nuclear treaty, and the security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, has said that Iran is weighing a change in its nuclear doctrine, according to Al Jazeera. American forces struck Qeshm Island on 2 November, according to CBS News. If slogans harden into law, the room for a deal shrinks. Hardliners in both capitals gain. The Persian Gulf states and ordinary Iranians lose first.</p><p>Scenario three. A new story replaces the old one. Look through every pair of eyes the event touches. For Iran’s establishment, 28 February may become a new founding date. For Washington, the war now carries an electoral price. For the Persian Gulf capitals, 2026 is the year the Strait of Hormuz closed, and Anwar Gargash, an adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates, has warned of a long period of uncertainty, as Türkiye Today reported. For Iranian schoolchildren, it is the year they were asked to carry a story they did not choose. Whoever builds the institutions that tell this story gains. Anyone still reading the region only through 1979 loses.</p><h3>The Proposals</h3><p>Each scenario calls for a different move.</p><p><strong>A) If the story absorbs the deal: let both sides claim a win.</strong></p><p>A deal only lasts if each government can sell it at home. So the mediators, Qatar and Pakistan, should write terms that Washington and Tehran can each present to their own public as a victory. <strong>Like lifting the American naval blockade and reopening the Strait of Hormuz on the same day. Washington can say it reopened the strait. Tehran can say it broke the blockade.</strong></p><p>Washington’s job is to focus on what the agreement actually commits each side to, and to stop caring how Tehran describes it. If Iran’s leaders need to call the deal an American retreat, let them. The wording costs Washington little. Demanding a visible surrender could cost it the deal.</p><p>I believe it is time to negotiate the substance and leave the adjectives to each side.</p><p><strong>B) If the story blocks the deal: don’t sit and wait for some; don’t turn brags and bluffs into law for some others!</strong></p><p>This one has two audiences.</p><p>The Persian Gulf states are not at the negotiating table, yet they are among the first to pay when talks fail. They should not sit and wait for Washington and Tehran to settle things. Al Jazeera reports that Iran and Oman have already designated shipping routes in the strait. That is a practical arrangement made outside the main talks, and the Gulf capitals should build on it. <strong>Like asking for seats on the joint Iran–Oman working group on navigation, so every coastal state helps set the rules for the water its trade depends on.</strong></p><p>Tehran’s negotiators have a different task. The rallies demanded that Iran leave the NPT As long as that stays a slogan, it is flexible: leaders can soften it, reinterpret it, or quietly drop it. Once it becomes law, it binds those who passed it and everyone who comes after them. So it should stay a slogan and be kept out of law. <strong>Like answering the rallies with a non-binding statement from parliament instead of a withdrawal bill.</strong></p><p><strong>C) If a new story is being written: the least likely because governments stick to their identity.</strong></p><p>As I mentioned at the beginning, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s identity is tangled with resistance ideology, and to resist, you need a threat or enemy, so I believe it is less likely for a new narrative to take place which can hypothetically be a long-term deal to be signed and successfully executed between the parties, or for the US to surrender to the resistance power of Iran’s government, to keep the world order and stabilize the world economy back to normal.</p><p>You might ask: if it is less likely, why should we think of it and write about it? The reason is actually that it is needed. What this field is missing is considering any possible scenarios and being prepared for them.</p><p>People will later understand 2026 through whatever record survives. That record is being made right now.</p><p>Universities and editors in Tehran, Doha, Riyadh, and Dubai should document this year while it is still fresh. They should do it in Persian and Arabic, the languages of the people living through it. <strong>There are news publications and posts on X, but there is less of an oral-history archive of 2026, including recorded interviews in both languages and documented analysis in Persian by Persians and in Arabic by Arab states of Persian. </strong>We tend to find more Western documentation, which is going to shape the thoughts of future generations by how the West wrote the narrative</p><p>The lesson I take from Bell is that whoever builds the archive writes the world. Put plainly, whoever keeps the record decides how the story gets told later.</p><p>Sources:</p><ul><li>Bell, Duncan. “Writing the World — Disciplinary History and Beyond.” International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009) 3–22</li><li><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2026/11/4/photos-iran-marks-us-embassy-takeover-with-rallies-against-america-israel">Al Jazeera, 4 Nov: Iran marks US embassy takeover with rallies</a></li><li><a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/531837/Iran-s-students-day-rallies-resound-with-defiance-pledge-to">Tehran Times: Students’ Day rallies</a></li><li><a href="https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/11/04/779926/trumps-electoral-defeat-western-crises-fruits-of-irans-resilience-tehran-mayor-tells-13-aban-ceremon">Press TV, 4 Nov: rally final statement</a></li><li><a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/iran-top-negotiator-says-americans-voted-no-to-war-1.500735242">Gulf News with AFP, 4 Nov: Ghalibaf on the midterm vote</a></li><li><a href="https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/09/20/776678/Iran-lawmakers-NPT-withdrawal">Press TV, 20 Sept: lawmakers submit NPT withdrawal bill</a></li><li><a href="https://parsi.euronews.com/2026/11/12/assembly-experts-reviewing-iran-withdrawal-npt-confronting-improper-hijab">Euronews Persian, 12 Nov: Assembly of Experts statement</a></li><li><a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/11/13/iran-mps-debate-possible-shift-in-nuclear-doctrine-and-exit-from-npt">Euronews, 13 Nov: MPs debate nuclear doctrine and NPT exit</a></li><li><a href="https://www.iranintl.com/202611126447">Iran International Persian, 12 Nov: Assembly of Experts</a></li><li><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/11/strait-of-hormuz-will-never-return-to-pre-war-status-ghalibaf">Al Jazeera, 11 Nov: Hormuz will “never return” to pre-war status</a></li><li><a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/middle-east/strait-of-hormuz-will-never-return-to-pre-war-status-ghalibaf-says-ball-in-us-court-on-peace-talks20261112062000/">ANI, 12 Nov: Ghalibaf on Hormuz</a></li><li><a href="https://www.sharghdaily.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/1111602-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%AF">Shargh: Ghalibaf on Hormuz</a></li><li><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/11/11/can-tehran-survive-a-zero-oil-budget-if-us-blockade-on-iran-persists">Al Jazeera, 11 Nov: Can Tehran survive a “zero oil” budget</a></li><li><a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Iran-Braces-for-a-Budget-Without-Oil-Revenue.html">Oilprice, 13 Nov: Iran braces for a budget without oil revenue</a></li><li><a href="https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/159993-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%AC%D9%87-%DB%B1%DB%B4%DB%B0%DB%B6-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF/">IranWire Persian: zero oil revenue scenario for the 1406 budget</a></li><li><a href="https://www.iranintl.com/202611102920">Iran International Persian, 10 Nov: arrests on Iranshahr Street</a></li><li><a href="https://www.mehrnews.com/news/7006468/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1">Mehr: arrests on Iranshahr Street</a></li><li><a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2026/11/14/2003867738">AFP in Taipei Times, 14 Nov: Iranian women defy restrictions</a></li><li><a href="https://www.arabnews.com/middle-east/iran-foreign-minister-says-in-very-intensive-indirect-talks-with-washington-3009444">Arab News, 2 Nov</a>, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-trump-negotiations-midterms/">CBS News, 2–3 Nov</a>, <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/region/qatar-sees-progress-in-us-iran-talks-cites-positive-signals-from-both-sides-3232133">Türkiye Today, 10 Nov</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/1/mediators-continue-us-iran-negotiations-amid-war-rhetoric-what-we-know">Al Jazeera, 1 Nov</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24407009f537" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The JCPOA Was Never Built to Survive.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist/the-jcpoa-was-never-built-to-survive-ef5f7bba54fc?source=rss-081ca52c95d9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[jcpoa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[LunaTajik]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:26:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T13:08:38.465Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z-p2V1gdqffq9FOavARHGg.png" /></figure><h4>An analysis of the reasons for the JCPOA’s failure using Thomas Weiss’s five-gaps diagnostic tool.</h4><p>Two sentences, said eight days apart this September, expose everything wrong with how the JCPOA debate gets argued.</p><p>Rafael Grossi, the IAEA’s Director-General, on Iran’s post-strike silence: <em>“The agency has neither received information from Iran regarding the status of its declared nuclear material or facilities nor had access to any of those facilities.”</em></p><p>Donald Trump, reported by the Christian Science Monitor, on whether he still wants a deal: he <em>“could not care less.”</em> A reversal from July, when a negotiated agreement was still the price of ending the war.</p><p>These two statements represent the whole public fight over Iran’s nuclear issue, boiled down to its two main accusations. One camp treats Tehran’s silence as proof of bad faith. The other treats Washington’s indifference as proof the whole project was abandoned by the side that built it. Every headline from this year arrives with its verdict pre-loaded into the framing: “Do not let Iran enrich uranium” from one corner, “Why the US appears to have given up on nuclear deal with Iran” from the other. Two newsrooms, two defendants, no shared tria</p><p>That’s the wrong question to be litigating. The real question is whose failure was the JCPOA? A state that never intended to comply, or an agreement engineered without the structure to survive a single change of government? Before answering, it’s worth asking what exactly would count as evidence either way, because most of what gets cited as proof of Iranian bad faith or American abandonment turns out, on inspection, to be evidence of something else entirely.</p><p><strong>A Five-Link Chain, Not a Single Verdict</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*abRfNCO7RSlXvXttO7rdkg.png" /></figure><p>Thomas Weiss, writing with Ramesh Thakur, built a diagnostic for precisely this kind of stalemate, one designed to resist the impulse to assign blame before establishing where a system actually broke. Global governance failures, in their account, rarely trace to a single collapse. They trace to a specific, identifiable link in a five-part chain:</p><ul><li>agreement on the facts (Knowledge)</li><li>agreement on what should happen (Norms)</li><li>an actual workable plan (Policy)</li><li>an institution with the authority to run it (Institutions)</li><li>and, last and hardest to secure, whether anyone actually follows through once all four prior conditions exist (Compliance)</li></ul><p>The framework’s discipline is that it refuses to average blame across the chain. It forces the analyst to locate the earliest link that genuinely snapped, because that link, not the loudest one, is usually the actual cause of everything downstream. Ask yourself which failure you’re more comfortable blaming, a state’s bad intentions or an institution’s bad design, and notice how much easier the first one is to write a headline about.</p><p>Iran’s file, run through that chain, produces a finding inconvenient to both sides of the argument: most of it held.</p><p><strong>What Actually Held</strong></p><p>Start with the facts, since a nuclear standoff running this long should, by most people’s intuition, be a story about missing information. It isn’t. The IAEA has operated one of the most intrusive verification regimes in the history of arms control, and Western intelligence services, Iranian officials, and the agency itself have spent years staring at overlapping data and reading it differently, not because the data was scarce but because each side’s prior convictions shaped what the same evidence was taken to prove. If two agencies can examine identical inspection records and reach opposite conclusions about intent, what exactly does “more transparency” solve? That question deserves a harder answer than either side of this debate has offered.</p><p>The norms question is murkier, and the standard framing gets it wrong. Non-proliferation is close to the nearest thing international politics has to a genuinely universal norm, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s membership is close to total. But Iran has never rejected that norm outright. Officials have consistently pointed to Israel’s undeclared arsenal as evidence of selective enforcement rather than evidence the rule itself is illegitimate. That distinction is not a technicality. A state challenging a norm’s application is fundamentally different from a state rejecting the norm’s premise. Most Western commentary often treats these two as the same, but they are not. Confusing them leads to incorrect recommendations.</p><p>The policy record is where the JCPOA earns genuine credit, and where the evidence is least ambiguous. This was not a statement of aspiration. It specified enrichment caps by percentage and stockpile size. It built in intrusive inspection rights. It tied sanctions relief to verified, sequenced compliance steps rather than promises. And it followed four earlier rounds of Security Council sanctions, Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, passed between 2006 and 2010, that had already established the Council could reach unified, enforceable positions on this exact file. The 2015 deal then secured unanimous backing through Resolution 2231. Three links in Weiss’s chain, closed in sequence, exactly as the framework predicts they should close before anything durable can follow.</p><p><strong>Where It Actually Broke</strong></p><p>Three links closing still wasn’t enough. The failure sits one link earlier than where the argument usually lands, and that fact alone should unsettle anyone confident they already know who to blame.</p><p>The JCPOA was structured as an executive agreement, not a ratified treaty, and no independent body existed anywhere in that architecture with the standing to compel continued participation once a signatory chose to leave. This is the entire mechanism of failure. When the United States withdrew in 2018, nothing in the deal’s structure was insulated from that single decision. The facts held. The norm, imperfectly, held. The policy itself was sound, one of the most technically detailed nonproliferation agreements ever negotiated. What gave way was durability, the absence of any skeleton strong enough to survive an election in one of five signatory states.</p><p>Would you sign a decade-long security commitment whose survival depended entirely on the domestic politics of a single foreign election cycle? Nobody negotiating the JCPOA would have answered yes to that question if it had been posed to them directly in 2015. And yet that is precisely the structure they built.</p><p>Everything reported since reads differently once this becomes visible. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the April dispute over whether a renewed enrichment ban should run twenty years or five contains a line from a US official that states the entire problem more precisely than any academic framework could: “It’s one thing for the Iranians to say that they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon. It’s another thing for us to put in place the mechanism to ensure that’s not going to happen.” That is the institutions gap, articulated by someone with no interest in the theory behind it.</p><p>Grossi’s silence and the enrichment activity continuing despite years of layered sanctions read, on this account, as symptoms rather than the underlying disease. Abbas Milani called the 2018 withdrawal “arguably the worst policy option for addressing problems in what was the least-bad possible deal when it was signed,” writing before any of the subsequent collapse had occurred. He was not making excuses for Tehran. He was identifying, in real time, that dismantling the one structural safeguard holding a fragile arrangement together guarantees the exact outcome the policy claimed to prevent.</p><p><strong>Where the Case Against My Own Argument Deserves a Hearing</strong></p><p>A defensible argument survives its own counterevidence, so consider the strongest case against this reading.</p><p>None of the above establishes that Iran is blameless, and no honest version of this argument should claim otherwise. A state genuinely committed to a peaceful program has no structural need to keep IAEA inspectors locked out once active hostilities end. That opacity is a decision, made in the present tense, not an inheritance from 2018. Weiss’s sequencing explains why the compliance gap opened when it did. It does not retroactively excuse what is now filling it. If institutional collapse explains the first compliance failure, what explains the second, third, and fourth?</p><p>So this is not an argument that assigns innocence to one side and guilt to the other. The claim is narrower and, I would argue, considerably harder to dismiss: the compliance crisis dominating this year’s headlines was made close to structurally inevitable on the day the JCPOA was designed without anything capable of outlasting a single election. That is not incidental to the current standoff. It is the design flaw the entire current argument sits downstream of, whether either side acknowledges the lineage or not.</p><p><strong>What This Means for Whatever Comes Next</strong></p><p>This matters beyond one file, because the same pattern is repeating in real time.</p><p>Facts can be established, sixteen years of IAEA reporting proves that much is achievable even under hostile conditions. Contested norms can still function as norms, the JCPOA’s construction proved that too. A technically rigorous policy can be written and unanimously endorsed, Resolution 2231 is the proof. What keeps failing, across nuclear files, trade regimes, and climate commitments alike, is the fourth link: building an institution durable enough to survive the domestic political mood of the government that signed it.</p><p>So here is the question worth carrying into whatever negotiation comes next, with Iran or with any other file where this pattern threatens to repeat:</p><p>What would it actually take, structurally, for an agreement to survive the government that made it losing an election?</p><p>If nobody at the table can answer that question with something more concrete than good faith, the next deal is already carrying the same design flaw as the last one, and you will not need a framework to recognize how that story ends. You will read it in the papers, the same way you read this one.</p><p>Sources:</p><ul><li>Al Jazeera. “IAEA Warns over Iran Nuclear Access as Western Powers Push UN Referral.” <em>Al Jazeera</em>, September 8, 2026.</li><li>Al Jazeera. “Why Are the US, Iran Arguing over Duration of Uranium Enrichment Ban?” <em>Al Jazeera</em>, April 14, 2026.</li><li>LaFranchi, Howard. “Why the US Appears to Have Given Up on Nuclear Deal with Iran.” <em>The Christian Science Monitor</em>, September 10, 2026.</li><li>Milani, Abbas. “The Imprudence of Unilateral US Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal.” <em>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</em>, May 8, 2018.</li><li>Weiss, Thomas G. “What Are Global Governance Gaps.” In <em>Global Governance — Why? What? Whither?</em>, 128–163. Polity Press, 2013.</li></ul><p><strong>Luna Tajik — International Affairs Candidate</strong></p><p><strong>Author’s Note:</strong></p><p><em>The views and analyses presented in this article reflect my personal interpretations &amp; assessments based on my current knowledge, research, experiences &amp; understanding of the subject matter.<br>As with any field of inquiry, political, historical &amp; social analysis is subject to revision as new information emerges, circumstances evolve &amp; understanding deepens. Consequently, the perspectives expressed here should not be interpreted as absolute truths or definitive judgments regarding the correctness or legitimacy of any individual, government, ideology, or event.<br>The purpose of this article is to offer an analytical perspective &amp; contribute to thoughtful discussion &amp; debate.<br>I write from the perspective of a student of International Affairs, a political researcher &amp; someone deeply interested in understanding social, historical &amp; geopolitical phenomena.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef5f7bba54fc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist/the-jcpoa-was-never-built-to-survive-ef5f7bba54fc">The JCPOA Was Never Built to Survive.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist">The Geopolitical Economist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Iranian Diaspora Bellicized?:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist/is-iranian-diaspora-bellicized-1d4c9d3c8955?source=rss-081ca52c95d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d4c9d3c8955</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-deal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diaspora]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iranian]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[LunaTajik]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 09:08:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T13:10:26.214Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bokym14GJKeVNUMj1HITSw.png" /></figure><h3>An Analysis on the Behavioral Patterns of the Iranian Diaspora During the Ramadan War</h3><p>This year, as an Iranian immigrant, I understood my deep intellectual differences with some of my fellow Iranians, and even with some family members, friends, and colleagues, more than ever before. This happened after the war between the United States and Iran. These differences were so intense that on some days I felt as if I was walking around with the label “<strong>warmonger</strong>” written on my forehead. I was full of contradictory emotions that I had never experienced before.</p><p>Calling people “warmongers” or “traitors,” and applying those labels to all Iranian immigrants, or even to all Iranians who supported political change in Iran, only simplifies the issue. It can also create damage that may not be easy to repair.</p><p>So in this piece, I have tried to offer a narrative and analytical reading of the behavioral roots and mental structure of the Iranian diaspora, so that perhaps we can look at this issue from another angle.</p><h3>Chapter One: A Cultural and Identity-Based Analysis of the Diaspora</h3><p>My personal experience of migration taught me that distance does not reduce love for one’s homeland. Sometimes, it even increases it.</p><p>But love for a frozen version of the homeland can itself become an obstacle to seeing <strong>the real homeland.</strong></p><p>When we migrate, we cannot take our country with us. The only thing we carry is an image of it, an image frozen at the moment we left. The farther away we go, and the more homesick we become, the more attached we become to this fixed image. But we forget that the real Iran has continued to change behind that frame, indifferent to our nostalgia. This gap between image and reality creates a blind spot. That blind spot shapes the fate of our relationship with the homeland. It determines whether we can help change it, or whether we only mourn it from far away.</p><p>But why does this image and definition of homeland remain frozen for immigrants?</p><ol><li><strong>The temporal dimension: The homeland that stopped at one moment</strong></li></ol><p>Every immigrant stops their mental clock at the moment they leave. Someone who left in 2009 carries one Iran in their mind. Someone who left in 2022 carries another. When these two people speak with each other, they think they are discussing one country. But each of them is speaking about the Iran of their own time. This is one of the roots of many tensions within the diaspora itself, and also between the diaspora and Iranians who still live inside the country.</p><p>The historian Shelly Chan calls this “diaspora moments.” The immigrant and the homeland live in two different times, and this distance constantly creates tension between them.</p><p>We usually think that the immigrant changes while the homeland remains the same. But research on the Vietnamese diaspora shows the opposite. In reality, the homeland changes faster than the immigrant. It is the immigrant’s mental image that freezes at the moment of departure.</p><blockquote>What the diaspora remembers is not the homeland itself. It remembers the condition of the homeland at one specific moment in time. Because that moment remains fixed, the distance between image and reality grows with each passing year.</blockquote><p><strong>2. The generational dimension: The homeland that is inherited</strong></p><p>The second generation of the diaspora loves a homeland it has never seen. Their attachment to the homeland does not come from memory. It comes from the stories of their parents. For this reason, the frozen homeland of the first generation becomes even more idealized in the second generation. It becomes a second-hand version of the homeland, sometimes more passionate than the real one.</p><p>Here, a strange paradox appears. The person who is farther away, both geographically and historically, can sometimes become more nationalist.</p><p>The key concept in this section is “postmemory.” Postmemory refers to memories that a person has not personally experienced, but has received from the previous generation. These memories are so powerful that they feel as if they belong to the person directly.</p><p>What keeps this inherited homeland emotionally heated? The psychologist Vamik Volkan calls this “chosen traumas and chosen glories.” These are the wounds and proud moments that a group selects from its past in order to define its identity. In this way, the second generation becomes more passionate because it lives not with a complex reality, but with a pure and selected narrative. In my view, the way Generation Z looks at the record of the Pahlavi government is an example of this mechanism, and it has played an important role in shaping the position of this generation.</p><blockquote>The intensity of attachment to the homeland does not necessarily depend on the level of direct experience with it. Sometimes, the more indirect the story and the weaker the first-hand experience, the more idealized the image becomes. As a result, the attachment becomes stronger.</blockquote><p><strong>3. The psychological dimension: The homeland that justifies our departure</strong></p><p>Keeping the homeland frozen also has a psychological function. If the country we left remains “the same hell,” then our departure is easier to justify. But if we accept that some things there have changed for the better, and that people have built lives for themselves, then we must face an uncomfortable question: “So why did I leave?”</p><p>The frozen image of an unpleasant homeland sometimes acts as a shield against the feeling of having left.</p><p>Psychology explains this state through the concept of an “eschatological stance.” It says that after migration, the homeland is no longer a real place in our mind. It becomes an ideal that is supposed to be fulfilled one day, though no one knows when. And because the homeland has become a promise, it can no longer, and perhaps should no longer, be judged by its present reality.</p><p>This is why return is not always desirable. In many cases, it is so difficult that people prefer to remain in the diaspora. Even those who return sometimes face a bitter emotional experience. If the country does not meet their expectations, they may feel alienated. Keeping the homeland frozen saves us from this painful confrontation.</p><blockquote>Keeping the image of the homeland fixed is not only a perceptual error. It also has a defensive function, because accepting that the homeland has changed requires us to review the justification for our migration.</blockquote><p><strong>4. The political dimension: When our old image of the homeland becomes a political weakness</strong></p><p>When our image of the country is old, our political proposals are also made for a country that no longer exists. A large part of the diaspora opposition’s limited effectiveness begins here. It raises a basic question: is the diaspora prescribing solutions for today’s Iran, or for the Iran it once left behind?</p><p>The sociologist Asef Bayat argues that the diaspora opposition often wants to lead protests inside Iran and speak on behalf of protesters, without truly being involved in their daily life and difficulties. Life in exile separates the opposition’s understanding from what is really happening inside Iran to a great extent. This is why some groups know more clearly what they are “against” than what they are “for.”</p><p>The Clingendael Institute examines the same gap from a generational angle. It explains why diaspora opposition parties were unable to become a serious challenge to the Islamic Republic when the protests of autumn 2022 began, after September 2022, Mahsa Amini, and the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. According to that analysis, several reasons came together at the same time.</p><p>First, the main diaspora opposition parties were still led by the same generation that had left Iran during the 1979 Revolution. The problem was that this generation had left Iran at a point when its political system, concerns, and even language of struggle were different from today. Their worldview had been shaped around the experience of the revolution and the early years of the Islamic Republic. But a young immigrant who left after 2022, for example, had lived through a completely different Iran. The result was that the homeland imagined by the leaders of these parties was often unfamiliar with the demands and language of the new generation. This was exactly the same “frozen” homeland we saw in the temporal and generational dimensions, now appearing at the level of political leadership.</p><p>Second, the new generation did not believe in centralized leadership. Younger activists were fundamentally suspicious of the “party and leader” model. Many of them believed in what political science calls “horizontalism.” This means a movement that intentionally avoids one central leader and a strict hierarchy. Decisions are made in a networked and distributed way, instead of coming from the top. This approach has strengths. It is harder to suppress because there is no single leader to arrest. But it also has a major weakness. When the moment of decision or negotiation arrives, there is no clear authority that can speak on behalf of the movement or define its direction.</p><p>So, the very philosophy that protected the movement from repression also prevented the formation of coherent leadership.</p><p>Third, a large part of those who had recently migrated from Iran were tired of politics and wanted to distance themselves from it abroad.</p><p>When these three reasons come together, they create a contradictory image:</p><p>Older leaders had lost their connection with today’s reality.</p><p>Younger activists did not want to build centralized leadership.</p><p>And new immigrants often did not want to enter the game at all.</p><p>For this reason, exactly at the critical moment when the protests inside Iran needed coherent external support, the diaspora could not fill that role.</p><blockquote>When the image used as the basis for decision-making is not up to date, proposed solutions will not match the real problem on the ground, no matter how determined they may sound.</blockquote><p><strong>5. The technological dimension: Internet and communication with today’s homeland, or with the homeland of our beliefs?</strong></p><p>The common assumption is that in the age of Instagram, Telegram, and video calls, no one can freeze their homeland in their mind anymore, because they are connected to it at every moment. But the reality is the opposite.</p><p>Our feed does not show us the real Iran. It shows us the version we already wanted to see. In other words, instead of melting the frozen image, technology repackages it in fresh ice.</p><p>Why? Because the algorithm is built for one purpose: to keep us more engaged.</p><p>A 2026 research review explains that social media algorithms do not show a balanced picture. Instead, they amplify the views that create more reaction and push the rest aside. This makes our view of Iran and migration more polarized. The New Lines Institute also warns that these same algorithms deepen political divisions both within the diaspora and between the diaspora and people inside Iran.</p><p>Another study in 2025 gave a new name to this phenomenon: “algorithmic nostalgia.” This research shows that Instagram and Twitter show us more nostalgic content because they know we engage with it more. In simple terms, the algorithm does not melt the frozen image of the homeland. It places exactly the version of the past we are most likely to like in front of our eyes.</p><blockquote>Constant connection does not necessarily lead to more accurate information. When the mediator of this connection is an algorithm optimized for engagement, the result is the confirmation of previous beliefs, not their correction.</blockquote><p><strong>6. The return dimension: When the image meets reality</strong></p><p>As an immigrant, I returned to Iran six years after migration and saw that the homeland in my mind did not match the real homeland. This was an identity shock for me.</p><p>Before returning, many of us live with a belief that migration literature calls the “myth of return.” This is the idea that one day we will go back and everything will still be exactly where we left it. But the moment of return breaks this belief. Research on the Vietnamese diaspora calls this moment “synchronization trauma.” It is the moment when our mental image of the homeland must align with the real homeland, but it cannot. That is when we realize we do not fully belong there, and we do not fully belong here either.</p><blockquote>The main gap is not geographical. It is not even a gap between the person and the homeland. It is a gap between two images: the real homeland and the mental homeland. This gap often remains hidden until the moment of direct confrontation.</blockquote><p>These six dimensions are six different paths that lead to one conclusion: the diaspora often lives with a version of the homeland that is frozen in time. This freezing is not a moral failure. It is a structural condition. But this condition shapes motives. And once motives are involved, the real fate of Iran is involved too.</p><h3><strong>Chapter Two: From Motive to Destiny</strong></h3><p>In the first chapter, we saw how the diaspora thinks. Now we ask why it acts the way it does, and what effect this action has on the destiny of Iran, both in a critical moment such as the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel, and in the long term.</p><p>In reality, the motives of the diaspora cannot be understood without understanding the frozen homeland. What looks from the outside like “warmongering” or being “more zealous than the people actually inside the situation” often comes from that same freezing. It does not necessarily come from cruelty. It comes from distance.</p><p><strong>Where do the motives come from?</strong></p><p>If we put the six dimensions from the first chapter together, three main motives can be understood. These motives explain the political behavior of the diaspora.</p><ol><li><strong>First, the impatience of someone who does not pay the cost, or pays a smaller cost</strong></li></ol><p>When the homeland is a fixed photograph for us rather than a daily life, radical solutions seem easier. Someone who does not hear explosions every night can more easily support “any solution that ends it sooner.” This impatience does not necessarily come from heartlessness. It comes from the absence of personal cost. The psychological and political dimensions we examined in the first chapter together create this motive.</p><p><strong>2. Second, the desire to settle a delayed account</strong></p><p>For us in the diaspora, and this may be painful to admit, the fall of the Islamic Republic is not only a political event. It is also the final justification for our departure. If that system collapses, then it proves that leaving the homeland was the right decision. The same “eschatological stance” we saw in the third dimension now becomes a powerful political motive. Waiting for that promised moment becomes so intense that it can sometimes overshadow the calculation of consequences.</p><p><strong>3. Third, the illusion of consensus created by the algorithm</strong></p><p>The technological dimension showed that our feed presents a version of Iran that we already believed in. The result is that many in the diaspora sincerely believe that “all the people of Iran” are ready to rise up, or that they want the same thing the diaspora wants, because their feed shows nothing else. This illusion of consensus creates a confidence that does not match the complex reality inside Iran.</p><p><strong>But what did these motives do during the war?</strong></p><p>The 2026 war activated all three of these motives at the same time. The diaspora’s distance allowed it to become the loudest voice without paying the heaviest cost. But here we must also be fair. Otherwise, our analysis will fall into the same trap of one-sided judgment that we usually criticize. Three inconvenient points must not be ignored.</p><p>First, the diaspora was not a completely unified or single-minded group. A significant part of anti-war activists, moderate analysts, and independent journalists came from within this same diaspora. They were often attacked by the more radical factions of the diaspora. “The diaspora” is not one actor. It is a field of opposing forces.</p><p>Second, the line between “outside as provocative” and “inside as victim” is not that clean. Evidence shows that at the beginning, and even during the attacks, a significant part of people inside Iran supported military actions by the United States and Israel, at least while the attacks were targeted and aimed at government institutions. So the desire for radical change was not limited to the diaspora.I have examined this point in more detail in the article <a href="https://medium.com/@tajikluna/iran-us-war-defeat-or-victory-f95d7608e088">“The Iran-US War — Victory or Defeat.”</a></p><p>Third, and this point must be made carefully, saying that the diaspora “paid no cost” is incorrect. The cost paid by Iranians inside Iran was certainly heavier. They were on the ground, and their lives and everyday security were directly at risk. But the diaspora also paid a cost, with one important difference: its cost was predictable in type, yet it was not expected by many. These costs were quieter:</p><p>The residency of many Iranians living in the UAE was suddenly suspended. Some residencies were reactivated after a while. But the residency of some people remained suspended even after one month, and these individuals were practically unable to return to their normal lives.</p><p>The closure of Iranian schools and hospitals in the UAE created confusion for many people, especially parents whose children were students there and patients who were receiving treatment and suddenly found themselves without a clear point of support.</p><p>Residency conditions, and even tourist visa applications for holders of Iranian passports, became more complicated and more difficult in many countries.</p><p>Perhaps heavier than all of this was the sudden uncertainty over the future of many Iranians abroad. The stable life they had migrated to build was suddenly called into question.</p><p>But the different nature of these two kinds of cost is exactly what both confirms and corrects the idea of being “more zealous than the people inside the situation.” The cost paid by Iranians inside Iran was conscious and immediate. They were in the field. A person standing in the street knows what danger they are accepting. The cost paid by the diaspora was indirect and unwanted. It fell from the sky.</p><p>And this difference points to the heart of the matter. The problem is not the passion of the diaspora. The problem is the distance between the loudness of the voice and the weight of the cost. One can be the loudest voice in favor of a decision whose conscious price is paid by others. In my view, this is the most dangerous political feature of the diaspora.</p><p>The effect on Iran’s long-term destiny</p><p>Beyond the war, the frozen homeland has a long-term consequence that matters more than any single critical moment.</p><p>The Iranian diaspora is one of the greatest reserves of talent, capital, and managerial experience that any migrant nation has in the world. This capacity can play two very different roles.</p><p>If we in the diaspora remain trapped inside the image of the frozen homeland, we become a force that prescribes solutions for an Iran that no longer exists. We become passionate, costly, and at best only partly effective. Our solutions may work for the country we left ten or perhaps twenty years ago, but not for the country that exists today.</p><p>But if we can lower the frame and look at the real Iran of today, with all its changes, new generations, and realities that may not please us, then we can become something rare. We can become a bridge between global experience and local need. Not by trying to lead from far away, but by joining the process and first listening to the reality inside the country.</p><p>These two destinies differ in only one thing: whether we are ready to accept that the homeland has changed without us.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The gap we see today between Iranians inside and outside the country is, at its deepest level, not a gap of opinion.<strong> It is a gap of time</strong>. Both sides speak about “Iran,” but they mean <strong>two different countries in two different times.</strong> One lives in today’s Iran. The other lives in a photograph taken years ago. One speaks from the place where they currently live. The other speaks from memories of a past they have moved away from.</p><p>The label “<strong>warmongering diaspora,</strong>” like most labels, contains a piece of truth and also distorts it. What looks from the outside like warmongering is often the product of distance: a love for the homeland that, because its image is not up to date and because it pays a smaller chosen cost for decisions, can support solutions whose heaviest and most conscious price is paid by people on the ground.</p><p>So the main issue is not whether we in the diaspora have the right to have an opinion or not. We clearly do, and we have paid our own share of the cost too. The question is where our opinions come from: from the real Iran of today, or from the Iran that existed before our migration?</p><p>And here we return to the starting point. Nostalgia is not a crime, and loving a country from far away is not betrayal. But there is a key difference between loving a country and loving a frozen photograph of it.</p><p>A country changes over time, whether we are there or not. But the frozen image in our mind stays where it is, unchanged and fixed.</p><p>Perhaps the most important issue that neither people living in Iran nor we immigrants pay enough attention to is this: we in the diaspora are one of the greatest reserves of talent and experience of the Iranian nation. We can turn this capacity into a bridge for building our Iran, instead of becoming a force that prescribes solutions for a country built from our own frozen mental image.</p><p>We only need the courage to lower the frame and look at the real Iran of today, the Iran that has changed without our presence.</p><p>In my view, the homeland should not be framed and hung on a wall. It should not only be remembered. A country does not live on a wall. It is changing, and it is waiting for someone who has the courage to see it again.</p><p>Missing the homeland is easy. Seeing it as it is today is hard.</p><p>But only the second one is useful for Iran.</p><p><strong>Luna Tajik — International Affairs Candidate</strong></p><p><strong>Author’s Note:</strong></p><p><em>The views and analyses presented in this article reflect my personal interpretations &amp; assessments based on my current knowledge, research, experiences &amp; understanding of the subject matter.<br>As with any field of inquiry, political, historical &amp; social analysis is subject to revision as new information emerges, circumstances evolve &amp; understanding deepens. Consequently, the perspectives expressed here should not be interpreted as absolute truths or definitive judgments regarding the correctness or legitimacy of any individual, government, ideology, or event.<br>The purpose of this article is to offer an analytical perspective &amp; contribute to thoughtful discussion &amp; debate.<br>I write from the perspective of a student of International Affairs, a political researcher &amp; someone deeply interested in understanding social, historical &amp; geopolitical phenomena.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d4c9d3c8955" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist/is-iranian-diaspora-bellicized-1d4c9d3c8955">Is Iranian Diaspora Bellicized?:</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist">The Geopolitical Economist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran–US War: Defeat or Victory?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tajikluna/iran-us-war-defeat-or-victory-f95d7608e088?source=rss-081ca52c95d9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f95d7608e088</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2026-usa-israel-iran-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[LunaTajik]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 07:00:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T13:14:12.410Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9ZaJlo03gAIOfR27YlmWsQ.png" /></figure><p>Following Operation <em>Epic Fury</em> (the Ramadan War), two key questions emerged in public discourse:</p><ol><li>Why did widespread dissatisfaction with domestic conditions in Iran not lead to internal collapse during the war?</li><li>Why, despite the overwhelming military power of the United States and its allies, has the Islamic Republic neither surrendered nor suffered defeat?</li></ol><p>The United States entered the war against Iran relying on two major sources of strength:</p><ul><li>The support of Iranians dissatisfied with the Islamic Republic.</li><li>Its own military power.</li></ul><p>But after more than two months, where do things stand today?</p><h3>Part One: Operation Epic Fury, From “Liberation” to “The Destruction of a Civilization”</h3><p>Operation <em>Epic Fury</em> began under the banner of “freedom” and “saving the people,” a message that initially found significant support among many Iranians. Most people in Iran were seeking greater social freedoms, improved economic conditions, and normal relations with the rest of the world.</p><p>However, only a few days after the operation began, as the Strait of Hormuz was closed and the conflict became prolonged, leading figures in the American and Israeli governments made statements in interviews that appeared to reveal objectives beyond the liberation of Iran.</p><p>For example, the President of the United States repeatedly referred to ideas such as:</p><ol><li>Unconditional surrender.</li><li>Using the name “Iran” rather than “the Islamic Republic” in hostile statements.</li><li>The complete destruction of a civilization.</li><li>Claims that Iran, in its current form, would not remain and would emerge in a different or weakened state.</li><li>Threats to “send Iran back to the Stone Age.”</li></ol><p>It appears that the early exposure of these intentions triggered the first decline in support for military action against Iran among segments of Iranian society.</p><h3>Part Two: The Destruction of Infrastructure and Historical Heritage</h3><p>The second wave of declining public support for military action against Iran emerged when sites of historical, cultural, or national significance were damaged, including:</p><ul><li>The Pasteur Institute of Iran</li><li>Sharif University of Technology</li><li>Naqsh-e Jahan Square</li><li>Chehel Sotoun Palace</li><li>Shah Mosque</li><li>Jameh Mosque of Isfahan</li><li>Golestan Palace</li></ul><p>At the same time, schools, steel factories, and petrochemical facilities were also damaged.</p><p>Such destruction directly targeted both Iran’s economic infrastructure and its ancient historical heritage. For many people, it became difficult to believe that the objective of these attacks was the liberation of the Iranian people.</p><p>These developments weakened the belief that military intervention could lead to a better future for Iran.</p><p>In practical terms, the United States lost one of its two principal instruments of power: military power and Iranian support for the war. At least temporarily, it lost the latter.</p><p>Yet an important question remains.</p><p>If American military power alone appears sufficient to overcome Iran, as some argue based on other historical examples, why has the conflict not yet reached its conclusion?</p><h3>The Two Wings of Iranian Power</h3><h3>Ancient Persian Civilization and Shi’a Ideological Beliefs</h3><p>Iran possesses two fundamental pillars of strength that cannot be ignored:</p><ul><li>The ancient civilization of Iran and the culture that emerged from it.</li><li>Shi’a ideology, which contains two foundational values: martyrdom and the appearance of the Savior.</li></ul><h3>Part Three: Ancient Iran, the World’s Oldest Civilization</h3><p>For approximately 2,570 years, since the era of the Achaemenid Empire, Iran has been known as <em>Aryan</em>, the land of the Iranian people, and is often regarded as one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations.</p><p>This long history has created a deep-rooted identity among Iranians. Iranian identity functions as an exceptionally powerful central reference point capable of uniting people under the most difficult and complex circumstances, even at the cost of their own lives.</p><p>Oversimplifying such a civilization and failing to account for its complexities may have contributed to miscalculations among some military strategists and policymakers in the United States.</p><h3>Part Four: Shi’a Ideological Beliefs, Martyrdom and the Awaited Savior</h3><p>Within Shi’a religious culture, particularly in the interpretation embraced by supporters of the Islamic Republic, martyrdom represents the highest attainable rank.</p><p>The Quran states in Surah Al-Imran (3:169) and Surah Al-Baqarah (2:154) that those who are martyred remain alive in the presence of God after death. Likewise, traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, recorded in <em>Al-Kafi</em> and <em>Sunan Ibn Majah</em>, state that above every act of goodness there is a greater act of goodness until a person is killed in the path of God and becomes a martyr.</p><p>This suggests that death in jihad, warfare, or the defense of one’s homeland can be viewed as the highest possible achievement for many Shi’a believers.</p><p>As a result, fear of death may be transformed into a desire for martyrdom, making surrender significantly less likely.</p><p>At the same time, Shi’a belief holds that the promised Savior, Imam Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam, will one day appear. According to this belief, the Prophet of the Christians, Jesus Christ, will also return. Together, they will rescue the oppressed and bring an end to injustice.</p><p>Consequently, this worldview provides a foundation for long-term planning and encourages actions whose objectives may unfold across historical timescales rather than within short political cycles.</p><p>This creates an additional layer of complexity for the American side.</p><p>Together, these two beliefs contribute to the complexity, long-term orientation, and resistance to surrender that characterize Iran’s ideological Shi’a community.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>In my view, the primary reason the US failed to achieve complete success in its soft-war efforts against Iran was the loss of support from many Iranians after American intentions toward Iran became increasingly visible.</p><p>The second factor was the lack of success in the military domain, which stemmed from insufficient attention to two critical variables:</p><ul><li>The long-term nature of Iranian identity.</li><li>Its fusion with Shi’a ideology.</li></ul><p>Together, these factors produced an Iran that proved far more complex than many American policymakers had anticipated.</p><p><strong><em>Author’s Note:<br></em></strong>This article represents my personal analysis based on my current studies, research, and understanding of the subject. Its purpose is to explore ideas and perspectives, not to establish absolute truths. Like any analytical work, these views may evolve as new information and insights emerge.<br><a href="http://www.linkedin.com/in/lunatajik"> <strong>Luna Tajik</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f95d7608e088" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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