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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tanya Goyal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tanya Goyal on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tanya Goyal on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:15:04 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Impostor Admin: Token Edition]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/impostor-admin-token-edition-dfcd1f5643b0?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-program]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2025 14:54:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-16T14:54:21.301Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Everyone , I hope you all are doing well. Sorry for not posting any blogs here for a while. So without further delay, let&#39;s dive into today&#39;s bug story.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7nsk-QOFA_XnJZSg.png" /></figure><p>One day, while hunting on a program, I came across a user management system that had two roles: <em>owner</em> and <em>normal user</em>. The owner had the right to delete any list on the website, while the normal user could only download the list.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iHSy_W2UBzYKjussohyLaw.png" /></figure><p>Now, my hacker instincts told me something was off here. I immediately fired up Burp Suite and captured the request for deleting the list.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/1*s-jVaNuX08oDoKO04Z_tNQ.png" /></figure><p>I noticed a bearer token in the request. I simply changed the bearer token from the owner to that of a normal user — and to my surprise, the list was deleted. That meant I could delete any list even though I was logged in as a normal user. All I had to do was replicate the request.</p><h3>Here are the steps to reproduce:</h3><p>1. Invite any user and give him low privilege i.e he cannot delete the list</p><p>2. Now with your admin account , initiate a list delete request</p><p>3. Change the bearer id to low privilege user</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KlHtf-3_amxuIbfJpgrxIA.png" /></figure><p>You’ll see that the list gets deleted — even though the user doesn’t have the permission to do so.</p><p>Sadly , I never received any reply from the company regarding this that’s why I am not hiding the name here .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/0*Tm8JkJhPIN4qoV91.gif" /></figure><p>I hope you enjoyed this blog . Let’s meet in the next post. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dfcd1f5643b0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Leaky Response, Easy Takeover!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/leaky-response-easy-takeover-25367c18f0dc?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25367c18f0dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 14:57:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-08T14:57:29.020Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Happy New Year, everyone! 🎉 I hope you’re all doing great. A huge thank you for 200+ followers – I’m truly grateful that you enjoy my blogs. Without further delay, let’s dive into today’s bug story.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MzAKnjZx_wdl_jBj.jpg" /></figure><p>One day, while I was hunting on a site, I came across a functionality to invite users. And you know how much I love exploring such features! I invited a user through the site while running Burp Suite in the background. Afterward, I checked Burp Suite’s history to look for any interesting requests or responses. That’s when I stumbled upon a particular response.</p><p>This response contained user data such as ID, GID, email, and other details related to my organization’s users. While such information is often present in responses, what caught my attention was a parameter called key. It contained a seemingly random string. Intrigued, I decided to inspect further.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/1*bdEliFldKtak2tWO9hCIpg.png" /></figure><p>I checked the invitation link of the user I had invited. The link looked something like this:</p><p>https://xyz.com/register?invitation=<em>Value of key</em></p><p>Interesting, right? I repeated the process by inviting another user and reloading the site. Sure enough, the response once again included the key parameter. I copied the key, replaced it in the invitation URL, and... BOOM! It redirected me to a page asking me to set a password.</p><p>I assumed that after creating a password, the site would send a verification link to the invited user. But to my surprise, it didn’t! This meant I could create an account on behalf of the invited user, take control of their account, and even enable 2FA. As a result, the victim would lose access to their account entirely.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*ebTNq5eeZkpjAHPL10Reyg.gif" /></figure><p>I reported my finding and mailed it to the company but I never received any reply. No worries , I still love my finding.</p><p>I hope you enjoyed this blog . Let’s meet in the next post. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25367c18f0dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[IDOR : Deleting Comments Like a Boss!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/idor-deleting-comments-like-a-boss-0413a375024f?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0413a375024f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Aug 2024 10:05:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:37:41.555Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>IDOR : Deleting Comments Like a Boss!</h3><p>Hello everyone, it’s been a while since I last posted some blogs. In this post, I’m going to share how I found IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerabilities on two websites. Unfortunately, I didn’t get any response from one of the websites, and on the other, my report was marked as a duplicate. So without further delay, let’s discuss the bugs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VTnvJOI99barDQrn.jpg" /></figure><h3>First Website</h3><p>While exploring the website’s functionality, I came across the comment section, which often feels like a treasure trove for vulnerabilities. I posted a comment on the site and then checked the request and response in Burp Suite. Everything seemed normal at first. Next, I deleted my comment and observed the request and response again. This time, the request included two parameters: Token and reply id.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/1*bnY49gKLdgA0twfal6IdjQ.png" /></figure><p>I wondered if I could change this reply id to another user&#39;s reply id. But the main challenge was: How would I get another user&#39;s reply id? To figure this out, I liked another user’s comment and intercepted the request. In that request, I found the user’s reply id.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/401/1*z2TApQlQNai5HprjUNirsA.png" /></figure><p>I copied the other user’s reply id and replaced it in the delete comment request. And WOW! The comment was deleted.</p><p>STEPS :</p><ol><li>Like the comment of the victim and intercept the request</li><li>Copy the reply id and drop the request</li><li>Post any comment on the website</li><li>Delete the comment and intercept the request</li><li>Change the reply id to victim reply id and forward the request</li><li>Victim’s comment is deleted</li></ol><p>With this method I was able to delete the post of the other user’s also. But sadly, I never received any response for this bug.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*tFuiAXkf2iRQmTFn" /></figure><h3>Second Website</h3><p>On the second website, I again found a comment section, so I posted a comment and then deleted it. In the delete comment request, I noticed two parameters once more.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/482/1*naye02qJpmJ2amrrTcT4pg.png" /></figure><p>Again, I thought about changing the comment id to the victim’s comment id, but I wasn’t sure how to obtain the comment id. In this case, there was no option to like comments. So, I searched through my Burp Suite history, and guess what? I found a request where all the comment ids were leaking in the response. I simply copied the other user’s comment id and replaced it in the delete comment request, and boom — the comment was deleted. Sadly, this report was marked as a duplicate, but no worries — I got some content for my blog from this finding.</p><p>I hope you enjoyed this blog . Let’s meet in the next post. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0413a375024f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I found my First Valid bug]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/how-i-found-my-first-valid-bug-2a9c87ce7a91?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a9c87ce7a91</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2024 14:54:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:38:57.938Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5Aa0P7eQ8oMRZN4Q.jpg" /></figure><p>Hello everyone! I am really happy to announce that I got my first valid bug from a target, and not only that, I uncovered two bugs from that target. So in this blog, I am going to talk about those two bugs.</p><h3><strong>First Bug</strong></h3><p>When I opened my target on Google Chrome, there was no signup or login page functionality. So I thought, why not start with subdomain enumeration? I used the site <a href="https://subdomainfinder.c99.nl/">https://subdomainfinder.c99.nl/</a> and gathered all the subdomains. There were around 20–30 subdomains, and I started opening every subdomain. Most of the subdomains were showing 403 Forbidden, and the others were of no use. Then, I came across one subdomain that was asking for Google sign-in to continue accessing that page. I clicked on my Google account, and boom! I got the admin panel. This bug was purely recon-based, and that’s why I understood why everyone says recon is a must.</p><p>Tip from my side: Check every functionality of your target. If I had stopped by seeing the Google sign-in prompt, I might have missed this bug.</p><h3>Second Bug</h3><p>As I have already told you, there were no signup and login pages, so I fired up my WaybackURL tool, and one of the URLs redirected me to a sign-up page. I was checking its functionality, and I found the bug, which was no rate limit on the forget password feature. In this bug, there is no mechanism to prevent an attacker from making numerous forget password requests in a short period of time. This can be used to send an unlimited number of forgot password requests to any random email that is registered on the website.</p><p>So, how to check this bug? First of all, fire up your Burp Suite and click on “Intercept on”. Then click on “Forget Password”. Your request will be captured in the proxy. Then send this request to Intruder and click on null payload to start the attack. You can see something like this on your Burp Suite.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/669/1*V-Pw7bXINp4yOq8pCHJwNQ.png" /></figure><p>After the attack is completed, check your email, and you will be surprised to see that you got multiple emails about forgetting your password.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/387/1*j-UEzpTN-aYGz4HHmsXT4g.png" /></figure><p>The impact here is if the company is using any email service which costs them for the emails they are sending, then the company can have financial loss due to this bug. Also, if the company is sending too many emails, the user can stop using their service or just send their email to spam.</p><p>So that’s all from my side. I hope you enjoyed this blog. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a9c87ce7a91" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logical Error leads to DOS for victim]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/logical-error-leads-to-dos-for-victim-8e4f6d18ae90?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8e4f6d18ae90</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Jan 2024 12:48:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:39:49.616Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/0*hq6uSjgqRC5nljR9.png" /></figure><p>Happy new year everyone . I hope you all are doing good . Let’s discuss about my first bug of 2024 which was closed as NA. It’s really sad but no worries , I learnt something new with this bug . So without any delay , let’s discuss the bug .</p><h3>Functionality of the Website</h3><p>While looking at the functionality of the website , I saw the verification process to verify an email id . So the verification process was like this :</p><ol><li>User entered their first name , last name and email address</li><li>A verification link is sent to the email</li><li>When an user click on the verification link , it redirect the user into the password setup page</li></ol><p>I found an loophole in this process . After entering the email address in sign up option , user can still use the website with that email address without even verifying itself. User can click on the profile option and setup the password from the profile . There is no need to setup the password from the verification email. In this , we can call it as pre auth takeover . But this was not the case here .</p><p>If an user setup the password from the profile option , they will not be able to implement 2FA. It can only be implemented after clicking on verification email.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*Fyk3XA58c65MuW6J" /></figure><p>You might be wondering why there is a need for 2FA. Suppose we set the password of the victim’s email without the verification link. When the victim tries to access the website with their email, the website will show that the email already exists, right? But the victim can click on “forgot password” and gain access to the account. So if there is 2FA implemented, the victim needs to have the code of the account to gain access. Thus, 2FA is necessary.</p><p>I lost all the hope and I was just scrolling the website checking for some another bug. After looking at website more closely I got an idea .</p><p>I signed up as an attacker on the website , verified my account and setup the 2FA. Then there was an option as secondary email where we can add a secondary mail to the account . I added the victim’s mail in the secondary account. Victim will get an verification mail on his mail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/615/1*abJx5ehacmnlipM737bMsA.png" /></figure><p>As you can see it is still showing that we need to verify our secondary mail to enable 2FA. But let’s see what will happen if the victim tries to sign up on the website with the same email.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/632/1*ZkN6789BUCNs7661hcdPDQ.png" /></figure><p>Okay so victim is not able to signup on the website. Let’s see what happen if the victim tries to access the account by forget password functionality.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*n9VbjlPNs2qMo1Ib87qIXw.png" /></figure><p>So even if victim tries to access the account by forget password, he stills need to verify the account which is the most favourable thing in our condition. If the victim verifies the email , we will get complete access to the account which will lead to pre account takeover .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/0*CgxHXCMWcr2hyZwh" /></figure><p>I hope you enjoyed this blog . Again happy new year everyone . Keep spreading knowledge .</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8e4f6d18ae90" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exploiting Exposed .git File to Access Webmail Credentials]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/exploiting-exposed-git-file-to-access-webmail-credentials-4b47a3afff38?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b47a3afff38</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Nov 2023 16:13:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:40:17.526Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Exploiting Exposed .git File to Access Webmail Credentials</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sN2Q_Q2bQwc4XD-c.jpg" /></figure><p>Hello everyone, I’m back with a new bug. I discovered this issue on a domain that offers free internships to everyone. Despite the absence of a bug bounty program, I attempted to contact the company through various social media handles. Unfortunately, they did not respond to my messages, and the bug still persists on their domain.</p><p>So, Without further delay, let’s delve into the details of the bug.</p><p>While scrolling through their website in search of an internship, I noticed that a .git file was exposed on their domain. You can use the Dotgit Chrome extension to be notified if a .git file is exposed. I checked the .git file on their domain and was able to access it easily.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*RRgTe1KDIGSIX0Tzri84KA.png" /></figure><p>Now, the key question arises: How to exploit it? I fired up my Kali Linux and began downloading all the files using the following command:</p><pre>wget — — mirror -I .git https://www.xyz.com/.git</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RTBaWhaKR9Yl8aTTZBhpBw.png" /></figure><p>After downloading the .git file, navigate to the directory where it is stored and type git status.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fq74fDJoftzTPgwoervtCw.png" /></figure><p>You will see a number of deleted files. To restore them, type git restore. This process allows you to recover all the deleted files and folders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/356/1*YsN7uFFkO0RxwSUYNayIPQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pm1Xtr_kF9lfOUKjgzgalQ.png" /></figure><p>As you can see we have recovered all the deleted files and folders.</p><p>Now check every single files and see if it is leaking any sensitive info.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uIW_f5DjqgHbnhCH8r-fIg.png" /></figure><p>I found credentials in a PHP file but couldn’t determine the URL of their webmail service. To address this, I performed subdomain enumeration and discovered a subdomain: webmail.xyz.com. Using the obtained credentials, I successfully accessed their webmail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*u1N7rOFXJs0I8Gf4_sIOpg.png" /></figure><p>Despite my attempts to contact the company, they did not respond to my messages. Regardless, I gained valuable knowledge from this experience. That concludes today’s post. I hope you enjoyed reading this blog. Let’s meet in the next post. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b47a3afff38" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Uncovering Hidden Likes through Parameter Manipulation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/uncovering-hidden-likes-through-parameter-manipulation-44346f2fcee8?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/44346f2fcee8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Aug 2023 15:26:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:40:51.476Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JYP0RsCAe-eXuTjc.png" /></figure><p>Hello everyone, welcome back to yet another blog. Thank you so much for showing your love in my previous post. Without any further delay, let’s dive into the world of bug hunting.</p><p>I discovered a website where users can create, share, like, and comment on posts. Whenever I encounter such websites, only two vulnerabilities come to mind: Race Condition and Parameter Tampering.</p><p>I tested the race condition vulnerability, but unfortunately, it did not work. Then, I captured the request while liking a comment. I noticed two main parameters: “consumer id” and “action.” I thought, why not try changing the consumer id to another user id and see what happens? However, this approach didn’t work.</p><p>Next, I started experimenting with the “action” id. I replaced the action id with a random positive number, but it also didn’t work. Then, I had an idea to enter a negative number, and to my surprise, it increased my likes by 2. As I repeated the same process with other negative numbers, my likes increased by 2 or 3 each time.</p><p>With this vulnerability, I can easily increase my like on any post.</p><p>So, that’s it for today. I hope you enjoyed reading this blog. Let’s meet in the next post. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44346f2fcee8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Account takeover through Response Manipulation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/account-takeover-through-response-manipulation-db66c2f8830?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db66c2f8830</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Jul 2023 21:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:36:41.878Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*fbm9u87tCzhnvSiN.jpg" /></figure><p>Hello everyone, I am back again with another bug. In this blog, I will discuss a bug that I encountered through response manipulation. Without further delay, let’s delve into the bug.</p><p>If you’re unfamiliar with response manipulation, let me explain it in simple terms. When you attempt to register on a website, you receive an OTP (One-Time Password) in your email. Let’s say you entered the correct OTP and captured the request using Burp Suite. If you send the request to the server using the repeater tool and examine the response, you will typically receive a “200 OK” status code, along with some headers, and ultimately a “success” message. However, what happens if you enter an incorrect OTP? In such cases, you usually receive a “400 Bad Request” status code, along with some headers, and finally an “Error” message.</p><p>Now, the interesting part begins. By manipulating the response of an incorrect OTP to mimic the response of a correct OTP, it may be possible to bypass the OTP verification process. If this concept is still unclear, allow me to explain how I discovered this bug in a particular domain.</p><h3>How I reproduce this bug</h3><p>I found a parameter called “change password.” It is a common feature on most websites, allowing users to update their passwords. However, imagine if it were possible to change anyone’s password without knowing their current password.To test if this vulnerability exists, I first entered the correct password and the new password to see if it was indeed vulnerable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/1*HePScZrToEj7chkJsLlMIg.png" /></figure><p>I then sent this request to the repeater tool and examined the response.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/604/1*UZcUR4QW8I_PTCZRQ6DbEQ.png" /></figure><p>Next, I attempted to change the password again, but this time I entered an incorrect password. The response I received was:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*erGrfMrHJT3hVF_dp4uvzQ.png" /></figure><p>I can see that it is possible to change the response.</p><p>So I again captured the request but this time with the wrong password</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*idhnE_LambrfkHgWyp4tqQ.png" /></figure><p>By performing this method, I was able to see the response which was of course an error message but I changed the whole response with the response of the correct password and yess, I can change the password without using the correct password. However, I encountered an issue when I tried to log in with the new password. It didn’t work.</p><p>To address this, I repeated the entire process with an additional step. I changed my password using the new password obtained through response manipulation as the current password and entered a new password in the “new password” field.</p><p>For example, I initially entered “pass@123” as the incorrect password and “Light0001@” as the new password. By manipulating the response, I obtained “Light0001@” as the current password. Then, without capturing any requests, I changed my password again. This time, I entered “Light0001@” as the current password and “giyu123@” as the new password.</p><p>By doing this, I was able to successfully log into the victim’s account, leading to an account takeover.</p><p>I hope you liked this blog and learned something new from this. Let’s meet in the next blog then. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db66c2f8830" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inside the Invite Function: Uncovering a Potential Vulnerability of Invite User]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/inside-the-invite-function-uncovering-a-potential-vulnerability-of-invite-user-3d613bcc145f?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d613bcc145f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Jun 2023 12:15:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:41:10.399Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/0*XA77HM2QGS0ZUCmw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hello everyone, I hope you are all doing well in your lives. In this blog, I will discuss a business logic flow I found in an invite function. So, without any further delay, let’s move on to today’s bug.</p><p>I found a website, let’s call it xyz.com. I tried to bypass the login functionality through response manipulation or by exploiting the lack of rate limits, but unfortunately, it didn’t work. Then I came across the invite function. I invited my other account, which did not have an account on xyz.com. It worked normally, and I received an invitation link in my second account. Now, I tried to create an account on xyz.com using my second account, and you won’t believe the response I got.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*a0FL9YKOozgtfMTEmAlmGA.png" /></figure><p>I immediately understood the logic behind it. The user was automatically added to the team without even clicking on the invitation link. However, there was one thing. If the victim resets the password and gains access to the account? But, what if the attacker gives the victim the lowest role in their team?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/564/1*sQ-rMmhfAlqNADCuVyWgLA.png" /></figure><p>Now, even if the victim accesses the account by resetting the password, there will be some restrictions. For example, they won’t be able to create any projects or teams or generate their own API key. There would be no way for the victim to exit from the team.</p><p>I tried to take over existing accounts on xyz.com by inviting them to my team, as I was capturing the password using Burp Suite during the invitation request. But sadly, it didn’t work.</p><p>I hope you liked this blog and learned something new from this. Let’s meet in the next blog then. Keep spreading knowledge.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d613bcc145f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unauthorized access to the Projects | Bug Bounty]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tanyago/unauthorized-access-to-the-projects-bug-bounty-31d88f8feb13?source=rss-1ff7693c752c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/31d88f8feb13</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanya Goyal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jun 2023 15:18:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-19T13:41:34.261Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MieW3J0gmUk13j0aAnEE8w.png" /></figure><p>So hello everyone, this is my first medium blog and first blog on bug <a href="http://hunting.so/">hun</a>ting . So,without any delay, let’s move to today’s blog.</p><p>I cannot disclose the domain name so let’s call it <a href="http://xyz.com/">xyz.com</a>. My first methodology is doing recon. I tried to fuzz the hidden directories and tried Google Dorks to find some juicy content. But at last, I didn’t found anything. Now comes one of my favorite tool waybackurls. If you don’t know anything about this tool you can search it on google. You can download this tool from here: <a href="https://github.com/tomnomnom/waybackurls">https://github.com/tomnomnom/waybackurls</a></p><p>After getting all the URLs, I searched for some hidden content for one hour. Suddenly, I came across one URL with some JWT tokens. I pasted the URL on my Chrome and guess what, I got added to the project of some organization. So it was the invitation link for editing the project. There were many such links in waybackurls. If an attacker gets access to those links, he could perform any action on the project.</p><p>I immediately prepared a report on my bug and after 2–3 days I got a reply from them that said your report is duplicate. Well, at least I learned something from this.</p><p>I hope you enjoyed my blog. I will be back with more such blogs on bug bounty.</p><p>You can also check some cybersecurity content here : <a href="https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/">https://www.instagram.com/cyber_sakhi/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31d88f8feb13" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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