<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tashi Rabgey on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tashi Rabgey on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:21:11 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Dalai Lama You Never Knew]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/the-dalai-lama-you-never-knew-3f039c545dd0?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3f039c545dd0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defamation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dalai-lama]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tibet]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 04:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-03T04:59:59.105Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6BF81mbBpRy9UF1rtthqKg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Until recent weeks, the thought of having to defend the moral character of the Dalai Lama would have seemed absurd. Ever since he led the Tibetan people through the shattering crisis of China’s invasion of Tibet, he has been one of the world’s most enduring symbols of moral leadership. He has lived his entire life in the public eye as a hardworking global champion of peace and nonviolence. Even now in his twilight years, he continues to spread his message of compassion and kindness every passing day.</p><p>Yet recently, along with Tibetans around the world, I felt an urgent need to speak up on the Dalai Lama’s behalf as the global media rushed to publish sensational headlines suggesting indecent behavior. With little heed to due diligence, media organizations pounced on an opportunity to cast an incriminating spotlight on an awkward public encounter with a young boy in India.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> The televised event took place on stage in Dharmasala on February 28th. A month and a half later, a selectively edited video surfaced online accompanied by salacious text that created the impression of sexual impropriety.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Overnight, defamatory headlines appeared in respected publications world-wide and public slander exploded online with allegations of sexual abuse.</p><p>The viral video was in fact a short clip from a much longer interaction that was extraordinary for very different reasons. With his mother and grandfather seated on stage beside the Dalai Lama, the young boy first receives an affectionate bump on the forehead for formally presenting gifts on behalf of the honorary guests assembled. The Dalai Lama then looks up and reflects out loud that this exchange brings to mind his early childhood with his late brother Lobsang Samten — his one designated friend and playmate during an otherwise isolated childhood as a spiritual leader-in-training that began at the age of four. He proceeds to demonstrate how he and his brother once tussled with their heads.</p><p>Later in the program, the young boy approaches the microphone once more and requests a hug from the Dalai Lama. While the mother feigns exasperation and the audience is amused, the Dalai Lama acquiesces with a warm embrace. Then the 87-year old awkwardly makes an attempt at a jocular display of affection. He first requests a peck on the lips and then — to the shock of the world — he blithely sticks out his tongue and says in his halting English, “suck my tongue.”</p><p>Seen through the norms of our hypersexualized global culture, the video of the interaction is uncomfortable to watch. Even though the boy and his mother have both given media interviews expressing joy in having had this encounter with the Dalai Lama,<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> the viral video depicts an imbalance in power that leads viewers to associations with well-known histories of child abuse in many religious contexts.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> There is also a slow-motion uncertainty as both the Dalai Lama and the boy seem not to know how to conclude this awkward performance of affection. Then by sticking out his tongue, the Dalai Lama reaches back to a gesture of play from his Tibetan traditional culture that can only be seen as bizarre for the rest of the world.</p><p>But for Tibetans from the Dalai Lama’s generation — those like my parents who had spent their formative years in an isolated Tibet — the episode was utterly free of any suspicion of abuse. In a traditional culture that does not sexualize the tongue, they could not discern what the world found offensive in this video. It was bewildering for them to learn that this innocuous encounter had turned the world’s opinion against the Dalai Lama. Many of the Tibetan elders who were asked to watch the video — from New York to Ladakh — did not hear a lewd request, but rather an kindhearted tease to a young boy. He was being asked to “<em>chele sa</em>” (eat my tongue) as was the way grandparents expressed to small children, “That’s it — all I have left to give you is my tongue.”</p><p>Taken out of both cultural and situational context, this tragic collision of norms points to a vast cultural gap. What looks disturbing through one cultural lens is seen as entirely innocent through another. Together with the information economy of the digital media and the herd mentality that comes with our short modern attention span, this presented a perfect storm for discrediting the symbol of the Tibetan movement.</p><p>The point of the viral video clip, it goes without saying, was to damage the image of someone China’s leaders have long publicly reviled and quietly feared. Since the Tibetan government was declared to continue in exile in India in 1959, an ongoing campaign has been conducted to malign the Dalai Lama as a respected public figure and the symbolic leader of Tibet.</p><p>This time, the attack on the Dalai Lama struck a chord. Within ten days of the public uproar, the BBC ran a breathless story on the Dalai Lama incident reigniting “Tibet’s ‘slave’ controversy.” While the term ‘slave’ appears in the sensational headline, the author buries inside the article an oblique acknowledgement of common knowledge that slavery did not exist in Tibet. Rather, Tibet’s society was comprised of people working on “estates owned by nobles, monasteries or the state” to whom taxes were paid. This desultory revelation, along with historian Tsering Shakya’s commentary on the absence of enslavement in Tibetan society, comes after a BBC shout-out to the Chinese government for recently creating ‘Tibetan Serf Emancipation Day.’ Chinese nationalist propaganda has now been dignified in mainstream media as “a long-running controversy over Tibetan history.”<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iraeeY4gOGkFTTFsZM8U9w.jpeg" /></figure><p>The startling uptick in anti-Tibet political sentiment converges with an underlying bias in the global public discourse that has contributed to the traction of the recent controversy surrounding the viral video. With the issue of Tibet stereotyped as a politically correct and hackneyed <em>cause célèbre</em> of global celebrities, and the Dalai Lama himself typecast as a globe-trotting religious figure carrying a message many see as naïve and underwhelming against the hard-nosed political challenge of the rising superpower of China, the real moral and political stakes of the question of Tibet have long been eviscerated by the chattering classes.</p><p>For Tibetans everywhere, this episode has felt like a collective near-death experience. Never before had it been so clear how little the Dalai Lama was understood. Over decades in exile as the world’s most famous refugee, he has often been depicted as a caricature: so much was projected onto him and so often his name was invoked and used for the interests of others — vast and small, institutional and geopolitical. And at the end of his astonishing life, the world seemed ready to abandon him without a second glance.</p><p>For Tibetans, the Dalai Lama was never the two-dimensional figure who appeared on magazine covers or who smiled back from billboards. We all grew accustomed to his buoyant manner of speech as he spoke to thousands in packed arenas in his lurching, disconnected English sentences, often punctuated by his laughter at his own linguistic limitations.</p><p>But in the world of his native Tibetan language, the Dalai Lama appeared as an entirely different person. In Tibet, he was legendary by his early 20s. No one could remember a rising intellectual star who shone so brightly and at the same time possessed the ineffable qualities to carry the weight of a nation on his shoulders. From my youth, I remember how he spoke with transcendent grace at lightning speed, in thrilling glass-cut paragraphs, with the kind of precise, incisive clarity that left no doubt that his was the sharpest mind in the room. Even today, when he speaks in Tibetan, the Dalai Lama’s voice drops several registers and his personality transforms. His lighthearted demeanor is gone. In its place is a gravitas and unyielding focus that shows us that the suffering of others is fiercely present in his heart. All through his lifetime, he has commanded authority not only because of his political and spiritual inheritance but also because of his ability to convince a tired and beleaguered people to join him on his personal moral journey.</p><p>It has been in the Tibetan language that the Dalai Lama has transmitted a set of instructions on finding a pathway through an indifferent world as a dispossessed people. Even under brutal and paralyzing oppression, he modeled a vision of forgiveness as a form of empowerment. It was a lesson that both defined the Tibetan movement and touched the struggles of dispossessed people in every forgotten corner of the world.</p><p>I have seen this in my fieldwork as a researcher of territorial autonomy and self-governance. I saw it in the eyes of the Kurdish community organizer I met in a tiny nonprofit office just over an hour away from Mosul, Iraq, during the height of the suicide bombings. He had been working in obscurity painstakingly translating the Dalai Lama’s works into the Kurdish language. “This,” he said, “is what our people need to know.” He proudly showed me his manuscript.</p><p>I also saw it in the Karen spiritual leader I met deep inside the war-torn Karen state, in what had been the world’s longest-running insurgency in modern times before a ceasefire was established in their armed conflict against the Myanmar government. After a day of sitting in meditation alongside a thousand meditators, he called me in so he could recount the importance of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause for his own reimagining the Karen fight for self-determination.</p><p>And I felt this in the intensity of the Sahrawi law student I met in the Moroccan-occupied territory of Western Sahara. He had been missing classes and was on track to drop out because he spent all of his time at bloody protests that went unnoticed by the world. As he pressed a book about the Sahrawi people into my hands, he said that knowing how the Dalai Lama had made the Tibetan struggle visible to the world gave him a reason to continue to fight for his people — through law instead of violence on the streets. He now felt less alone.</p><p>In other words, what the Dalai Lama passed on to Tibetans has spawned a movement of movements, teaching the dispossessed everywhere to see themselves not as victims, but as empowered by their own intrinsic seeds of potential in an interdependent reality that is in a constant state of motion and change. His model has shown a vision of how to inhabit this imperfect world, how to transcend the staggering injustices of global politics and the arbitrariness of history, and how to honor and remain committed to goals that cannot be completed in a lifetime.</p><p>Nowhere has this wisdom spread so far or flourished so deeply as in Tibet itself. In the three decades that I have been working inside Tibet, I have witnessed the bright faith of Tibetans grow only more self-assured and more determined. For every self-immolator who perishes calling for the long life of the Dalai Lama, there are countless other Tibetans who grow even more determined to choose a life-affirming path for remaking the Tibetan world.</p><p>They teach the Tibetan language at night when they are barred from teaching during the day. They travel as far as needed to provide decent healthcare to all remote Tibetan communities when the state apparatus has long called it quits. They convince their communities to join them in protecting the land and the wildlife even when it requires putting their lives on the line. Tibetans inside Tibet, in other words, are doing the hard work of preparing themselves to become the best stewards of their homeland when no one else seems to believe in their capacity to self-rule.</p><p>This Tibetan determination has been fueled by a resolute faith in the vision of the Dalai Lama. It was not surprising when Tibetans in Tibet reacted with joy when the decades-old ban on the Dalai Lama’s image was suddenly lifted so that the viral video and the international condemnation could circulate in the Chinese cybersphere.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> Overnight, the viral video garnered over 180 million views inside the PRC. But for Tibetans in Tibet, the storm of global moral censure simply underlined how little the Dalai Lama was understood, even internationally.</p><p>For Tibetans in exile as well as the peoples across the Himalayas, this global controversy has brought them closer not only to the Dalai Lama but also to each other as a struggle. For the first time, mass rallies and demonstrations in support of the Dalai Lama have spontaneously broken out from Ladakh to Sikkim to the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh. The global condemnation may have caused a collective near-death experience for many Tibetans. But it also created a new sense of time and space across all Tibetan and Himalayan communities — inside and outside Tibet — that is giving rise to a regeneration of the Tibetan political movement.</p><p>The question that remains is what the symbol of the Dalai Lama and his ideas will mean for the rest of the world. One of the tragedies of his defamation is that it grows out of a caricature that was manufactured by those who never understood him or had any sense of the true measure of his life. Will the Dalai Lama be seen through their cynical eyes and be projected as a declining global celebrity open for ridicule as media clickbait? Or will the world find the decency to rise above its worst impulses and honor a life that has been given entirely to the task of growing the best of ourselves as living beings on this planet?</p><p>After all, this global moral crisis in truth illuminates less about the character of the Dalai Lama than it does about ourselves and the kind of human community we are choosing to become.</p><p><em>Tashi Rabgey, Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University</em></p><p><em>April 2023</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Media organizations reacted instantaneously to a statement made by the Private Office of the Dalai Lama expressing regret for the incident. The apology was not an admission of wrongdoing but a regret that the meeting might have caused any hurt. This aligns with the Tibetan cultural practice of putting the needs and interests of others first and taking on the burden of negative sentiment, regardless of the circumstances.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> The edited video clip was uploaded with salacious text to the Twitter account YinSun@NiSiv4 on April 8th, 2023. The clip itself had first appeared days earlier on YouTube and on Change.org in a petition created by, among others, “Joseph R. Biden.” Within days, bots propelled the video clip to 7 millions views.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> The boy’s mother, Dr. Payal Kanodia, Trustee of the M3M Foundation, was a convener of the event <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZViETIhJ3Ek&amp;t=76s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZViETIhJ3Ek&amp;t=76s</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> For survivors of child sexual abuse, it is understandable that the optics of the viral video could trigger traumatic responses. However, many civic organizations have now condemned the allegations against the Dalai Lama of any such abusive intent, including from the RAHI Foundation, a nationally prominent and pioneering organization in India for survivors of child sexual abuse. Their statement on 22nd April states that there is no indication of sexual abuse, in intent or impact, in the encounter between the Dalai Lama and the boy on stage. <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/17wEL5ZtZRwFrtwkTVe_5qctjy44ClR4h/view?lt_utm_source=lt_admin_share_link">https://drive.google.com/file/d/17wEL5ZtZRwFrtwkTVe_5qctjy44ClR4h/view?lt_utm_source=lt_admin_share_link</a> See also Joshua Brallier Shelton, ‘Opinion: We need to think about the Dalai Lama’s actions very carefully,’ <em>Tricycle,</em> April 17, 2023.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Slavoj Žižek, ‘Suck my tongue, crush my balls,’ <em>Project Syndicate</em>, April 20, 2023 <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dalai-lama-tongue-controversy-cultural-confusions-by-slavoj-zizek-2023-04?barrier=accesspaylog">https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dalai-lama-tongue-controversy-cultural-confusions-by-slavoj-zizek-2023-04?barrier=accesspaylog</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Tessa Wong, ‘China: Dalai Lama furore reignites Tibet ‘slave’ controversy,’ BBC, April 20, 2023 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-65307709">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-65307709</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://www.phayul.com/2023/04/21/48244/">https://www.phayul.com/2023/04/21/48244/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3f039c545dd0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Long Quiet Journey: Reflections on the Life and Work of Dawa Norbu]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/a-long-quiet-journey-reflections-on-the-life-and-work-of-dawa-norbu-4ffe79a3f3d5?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ffe79a3f3d5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 04:25:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-05T04:26:27.775Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rScaJOzYcfYlj6EguVTqiw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Keynote Remarks</strong></p><p><em>JNU Tibet Forum, Delhi University, India</em></p><p><em>April 7, 2016</em></p><p>It is an honor for me to share some reflections on Professor Dawa Norbu, a defining scholar of contemporary Tibetan affairs and a deeply respected — and indeed, beloved — intellectual of Tibetan exiled society.</p><p>Let me start today by commending the JNU Tibet Forum organizers for convening this memorial symposium. For many reasons, I personally appreciate this opportunity to give these public remarks. As it happens, when I received the invitation to be here, I had just returned from two months in Chengdu as a visiting scholar at Sichuan University where I had the chance to work with Tibetan graduate students.</p><p>Still fresh in my mind was a memorable evening with a group of Tibetan Ph.D. students when I spoke late into the night about Dawa Norbu-la and his remarkable significance to our public discourse on contemporary Tibetan affairs. I was caught offguard when a particularly bright student said, “If Dawa Norbu’s work is so important, then why have we never heard of him before?”</p><p>There are of course many complex reasons why Dawa Norbu and his legacy is so little known among Tibetans inside Tibet. From my own study of social and political thought in Tibet, I knew there were other exiled Tibetan writers who were indeed well known and whose works manage to circulate under the radar in scholarly and writerly circles inside. But it is also clear that Dawa Norbu’s work has generally been neglected — an unfortunate fact that underlines one of the key themes I would like to sound for this symposium, which is the epistemic gap between Tibetan public thought inside and outside.</p><p>But there were also a few straightforward answers to the young man’s question as well — one being that we, collectively, have simply not said enough about Professor Dawa Norbu and his legacy. Like so many others, I privately mourned the untimely loss of this singular Tibetan scholar, but publicly said little about his astonishing contributions to the fabric and character of our Tibetan public life.</p><p>So, back in Chengdu last fall, I promised this young man that when I returned to America, I would write something about Dawa Norbu-la for him, and other budding young Tibetan thinkers like him who were struggling to make sense of where we are in the predicament of modern Tibet.</p><p>With this conversation in mind, I gladly accepted the serendipitous opportunity to be here with you at JNU today. I am particularly glad because this symposium provides an auspicious occasion to express a long held view on my part, which is that we often miss the true significance of Dawa Norbu’s work to our public discourse on contemporary Tibetan affairs.</p><p>So, for example, when we refer to Dawa Norbu, as we often do, as simply one of our Tibetan intellectuals, we tend to gloss over the distinctiveness of his astonishing body of work. We simplify the pioneering efforts that set him apart from his contemporaries. And we leave unsaid Dawa Norbu’s particular significance to — and the specific place he now holds in — the history of Tibetan social and political thought.</p><p>All the rest of us owe him such a debt — whether those of you here who had the good fortune to be his students here in New Delhi, or those of you, like me, who were his students through reading his work. As researchers of contemporary Tibet, we are all, in some way, in conversation with Dawa Norbu’s singular work.</p><p>When you look at his writing on Third World nationalism, when you read his journal publications in political science, when you see him on these pages working out his own individual approach to thinking about Tibet — and particularly when you consider the sum total of this prodigious effort in light of what else was being said and done by other contemporaries at the time, it is clear that Dawa Norbu simply broke the mold.</p><p>Through his personal effort, Dawa Norbu made himself into something brand new under the sun: the first modern Tibetan social scientist. In his long and quiet journey through the halls of academia, he demonstrated the will to be disciplined by a different tradition of knowledge — to speak in a brand new way — so that a Tibetan could appear in a discursive space in which Tibetans had not previously been present.</p><p>My own first personal impression of Dawa Norbu-la was not unlike that of most people. I met him when he came to give a lecture at Oxford while I was a law student there two decades ago. My first impression then — besides that he seemed, by temperament, a particularly agreeable person — was that he was also extraordinarily <em>reasonable</em>. As someone who was caught up in the fire and brimstone of other Tibetan prominent writers of the day, I found my first meeting with Prof Dawa Norbu to be an entirely different experience. Here was a strikingly rational and deliberate mind on display — a curiously imperturbable mind.</p><p>It took me many more years to discern what lay beneath that highly reasoned exterior he projected. It was not until I had shifted my own research inside Tibet that I could appreciate Dawa Norbu’s defining personal quality. It was <em>not</em>, as it seemed at first impression, his “extraordinary reasonableness” — that, it turned out, was just his mode of analysis. Over the course of my own research on contemporary Tibetan affairs from inside Tibet, I came to see that Dawa Norbu-la’s true defining quality was his personal courage.</p><p>Because in order to remain committed to that deliberate and rational mode of analysis at a time of political polarization, Dawa Norbu had to be willing to stare down an abyss and question the very order of things. As a Tibetan studying contemporary Tibetan affairs — and China’s Tibet policy in particular — that meant taking ideas, belief systems and cultural norms to which he himself surely had attachments, and throwing them into existential crisis — all in hopes of reaching sturdier political ground in our discussions of modern Tibet.</p><p>My respect for Dawa Norbu deepened as I came to understand this. And the insight I drew from studying his work was helpful as I myself became increasingly engaged in research inside contemporary Tibet.</p><p>I outlined my own epistemic concerns in a paper I wrote in 2004 about the first open forum on Tibetan public affairs inside Tibet. For six months, <em>NewTibet.com</em> provided an uncensored online discussion in Chinese cyberspace of Tibetan citizenship and political identity, religion and the need for secularization and even autonomy and political rights. The discussions on <em>NewTibet.com</em> electrified Tibetans inside Tibet. And yet the emergence of this unprecedented Tibetan public forum inside the PRC was not noticed anywhere outside of Tibet.</p><p>I drew on <em>NewTibet.com</em> to make a larger point about the fundamental gap in our sense of things, inside and outside Tibet. The online forum raised questions about the limits of what we can know as observers positioned outside the discursive space of Tibet. And as such, it challenged our existing structures of knowledge relating to contemporary Tibet. But the question of epistemic murk I raised in that paper was not simply a challenge to the prevailing global system of knowledge production about modern Tibet. It was also a challenge I set for myself in reaching for a sharper grasp and understanding of contemporary Tibet.</p><p>So, in the spirit of what Dawa Norbu called in <em>Red Star over Tibet</em> seeking out “what really went on in Tibet,” I stopped writing altogether and instead spent the next ten years quietly traveling to Tibet — seeking answers to those questions I could not, in good conscience, answer in 2004.</p><p>What I learned in that decade of conducting fieldwork changed how I saw the question of Tibet — and what I believed was possible for Tibet’s future prospects. My research on institutional politics on Tibet policy, in particular, overturned for me many of the key assumptions routinely and uncritically made by global scholarship about the prospects for the Tibet question in the PRC.</p><p>These included, for example, the assumption that Chinese researchers would refuse to participate in a formal discussion about Tibet that encompassed the so-called “Greater Tibet,” as it was considered a foregone conclusion that they would only ever countenance the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as under discussion in matters concerning the Tibet issue. It was also long assumed that PRC scholars would not be willing to discuss at international meetings issues of policy inside Tibet. For this reason, global academia long discouraged the pursuit of policy research in the study of contemporary Tibet.</p><p>But from my work on governance research in Tibet, I came to know that these and other cardinal assumptions made by global Tibet scholarship were simply untrue. My years of observation and exploration in Tibet — as well as in Beijing and elsewhere in the modern Chinese state — showed me that there was much we were not getting right, and that a serious rethinking was necessary in our basic framework in the study of contemporary Tibet politics.</p><p>While this work of shifting our discourse is still unfolding, I wish I had the opportunity to thank Dawa Norbu-la now and tell him the role his life’s work has played in my own search for new research frontiers in the study of contemporary Tibet. His example and unyielding spirit in exploring the edges of our known Tibetan discursive world had a great impact on me — as it has had on so many of us.</p><p>I believe it must have brought Dawa Norbu-la great satisfaction knowing the legacy he would leave behind in you all — a new generation of young Tibetan scholars taught and trained here at JNU.</p><p>Likewise, I wish he could have also known your counterparts in Tibet — a rising generation of young Tibetan thinkers who are seeking clarity in the slippery and uncertain Tibetan world inside. I believe their missing voices would have brought Dawa Norbu a refreshing sense of hope — just as I believe knowledge of his life and work will shine a new light of awareness in these young Tibetans’ search for their own understanding of our modern Tibetan predicament.</p><p>It is my hope that all of you who represent the next generation of Tibetan scholars, writers and public thinkers — inside and outside alike — will be inspired by Dawa Norbu’s life story as I have been. His achievement in forging new ground in contemporary Tibet scholarship was a remarkable feat not only of hard work and industry, but also of extraordinary imagination.</p><p>It is precisely that force of imagination, together with hard work, we will all need to call upon now to see past the many barriers that separate us. And it is only in transcending those boundaries that we can begin to write a new shared chapter in the unfinished story of modern Tibet.</p><p><em>Tashi Rabgey, Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University</em></p><p><a href="https://www.tibetanreview.net/opinion-a-long-quiet-journey-reflections-on-the-life-and-work-of-dawa-norbu/">A Long Quiet Journey: Reflections on the Life and Work of Dawa Norbu - Tibetan Review</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ffe79a3f3d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Syrian Kurds Governing in a Conflict Zone]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/syrian-kurds-governing-in-a-conflict-zone-cd23659eb15c?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd23659eb15c</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 03:03:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-06T05:31:15.849Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DpuIbPnyQvlPIBwDSsczGg.png" /></figure><p>As we lament the shortcomings of governments around the world in addressing sustainability challenges within their borders, we should also take note of the growing evidence of success in environmental governance at sub-state levels. Where we see paralysis and institutional inertia within national or federal governments, we often see dynamic energy fueled by social cohesion and a collective sense of shared stakes at more local and regional scales.</p><p>At the same time, it is also important to note that our studies of sub- state governance outcomes tend to focus on case studies of highly autonomous political communities nested within liberal democracies — cases such as the Basque Country, Quebec, Scotland, and the region of Åland in Finland. These cases present strong evidence of self-governing institutional mechanisms and regionalized policy dynamics that have proven to be remarkably effective in sustainability challenges.</p><p>Still, this also means we tend to overlook cases of regional governance and sustainability practices that do not easily fit within the scope of our framework for research on autonomous systems. That is, we pass over in silence those examples that do not fit liberal democratic models of statehood. And yet regionalization of governance and territorialized policy communities are in evidence in all forms of contemporary states — including those that are authoritarian or even war-torn.</p><p>An example of the latter is the case of Rojava, the Kurdish-led self-governing region in northeast Syria established in the wake of the outbreak of civil war. Despite being caught in the midst of a deadly conflict, Rojava managed to thrive and govern effectively against all odds. While leading the assault against ISIS in the Middle East, Rojava grew to an area larger than the size of Switzerland and declared itself the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, a multiethnic confederation within the state.</p><p>Remarkably — even in the midst of air strikes and armed conflict — this Kurdish-led regional autonomy also managed to pursue a broad-based ecological strategy to address its daunting sustainability challenges. Ecology is in fact one of the key pillars of the administration, and its approach to governance is grounded in a set of policies reversing the effects of environmental degradation wrought by decades of rule by the Assad regime.</p><p>As such, Rojava’s environmental policy agenda prioritizes the development of regenerative agriculture to address the effects of mono-culture mandated by the Syrian national government since 1971. The regional ecological strategy also includes adopting a plan for more sustainable infrastructure for electricity — including experimental wind power and solar stations — to reduce the region’s dependency on nationally centralized electricity grids and fossil fuels. The comprehensive program even includes the establishment of the Hayaka Nature Reserve to protect biodiversity, as well as the creation of cooperative tree nurseries to achieve wide-scale reforestation goals.</p><p>This framework for environmental governance developed by Syrian Kurds in Rojava presents a compelling case study of how regional policy management can lead to improved sustainability, even under the most brutal conditions of conflict. But given that Rojava does not easily fit within most existing research programs on self-governments and autonomies, it also demonstrates a gap in our current scholarship. There is in fact a need for new diagnostic tools and analytical vocabulary to examine more effectively patterns of governance across a diverse range of asymmetric states in our contemporary political world.</p><p>It was this insight that led to the development of the Research Initiative on Multination States, a program at George Washington University that explores new approaches to self-government and autonomy.</p><p>Given the urgency of the sustainability challenges endemic in all such politically contested regions, it is time we reassess our broader public conversations as well. We might well be missing promising potential for responsible governance on the path to global sustainability.</p><p><em>Reprinted with permission from </em>The Environmental Forum<em>, March/April 2020, Environmental Law Institute, Washington DC.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd23659eb15c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[In Memory of Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/in-memory-of-bapa-phuntsok-wangyak-a7cb4c3fecf1?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7cb4c3fecf1</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 02:57:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-05T05:41:48.789Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*an-g02n8kuOaHcE1sR6PXA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I first met Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal in 2004 when he was eighty-two. It had been six decades since he had founded the Tibetan Communist Party. Five decades since he had led the Chinese Communist Party to Lhasa. Four decades since he was imprisoned, despite being the most trusted Tibetan in the newly-founded People’s Republic. Two decades since his release from a grim eighteen years at the notorious Qingcheng prison. And a decade since his re-emergence as an adamant public voice for the rights and interests of the Tibetan people.</p><p>I knew the elderly man I would encounter that quiet afternoon in Beijing was responsible for some of the most significant moments in modern Tibetan history. As such, I was keenly aware of the range of emotional reactions provoked by Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal’s long and dramatic life. For many, he was a heroic figure for the Tibetan people. For others, his life was emblematic of the tragedy of the twentieth century. For others still, he was an object of disdain for his ideological views and political commitments.</p><p>As we sat down for tea, I was met by Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal’s direct and steady gaze. I realized at once that the questions I had carefully prepared for the meeting were unnecessary. This was a man with a clear and intense sense of purpose. In every historical event he recounted, in every political idea he described, and indeed in every detail of daily life that he shared — from his disciplined writing schedule to his vigorous daily exercise, Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal conveyed the sense that his life was animated by a constant and underlying concern for the fate of the Tibetan people. It was the context for all his endeavors and the point of every conversation we had then and in the years that followed.</p><p>In retrospect, this should not have come as a surprise. Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal had, after all, shown steely determination to change the course of Tibetan history since his humble beginnings in the town of Bathang. Drawn forth by a reformist vision of a modern and socialist Tibet, he was a precocious political organizer who spent the 1940s leading guerilla uprisings against the Guomindang forces. In the decades that followed, Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal brought his relentless drive and energy to spearhead ever more political campaigns, unlikely alliances and strategic initiatives. Not long after his release from eighteen years in prison — much of it spent in dehumanizing solitary confinement — he somehow found the pluck to leap back into the fray and make the case for the sovereign equality of all nationalities through constitutional reform. While his Leninist model of autonomous republics did not find political traction, he went on to become a singular voice on the national political scene, calling on the highest offices of government to make major policy changes on the question of Tibet.</p><p>I only knew Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal in the twilight of his life. But through our conversations in his final years, I saw that his life’s work provided a roadmap to a mind driven by a powerful sense of conviction and an unbending will. Even as he stood at the center of what the philosopher Walter Benjamin would call the wreckage of history, I found him to be unwavering in his commitments, unclouded by doubt and even untouched by a sense of regret. Whenever we spoke, I was aware of his preternatural calm and clarity. It brought to mind the words of Etty Hillesum, who, on her way to her death in Auschwitz, observed, “I have died a thousand times…There is no new information to trouble me.”</p><p>In the ten years that I had the chance to know him, I watched as Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal’s indefatigable efforts on behalf of Tibetan rights began to reach a whole new generation of Tibetans. Historians and intellectuals would of course carry on with the debate about historical legacy. But it struck me that, for this new generation, what was perhaps most significant was not so much an analytical assessment of his life’s work, but rather grasping the extraordinary sense of purpose and disciplined effort he was able to summon in seeking to realize that work — particularly in seeking to make a Tibetan voice be heard in the din of post-socialist China.</p><p>We met for the final time in his Muxudi flat in Beijing in the fall of 2013 — just months before his passing. Now 91 and fragile with age, Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal explained how he had surprised everyone during a recent hospitalization by tearing off his own oxygen mask and declaring himself “still not done yet.” The man with the iron will was unwilling to go peacefully into the night — not until he had completed his final testament and statement for the Tibetan people. He lived his last year vigorously and managed to complete his final work, 平等團結路漫漫 — 對我國民族關係的反. It was a fitting coda to a life lived with uncommon intention and purpose.</p><p>When news reached me of his passing, I wondered whether history would remember the human character that drove this extraordinary life. In his heart and in his own way, Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal carried the torch for the people of Tibet. And whatever historical judgments may come, it was a torch that burned brightly and fiercely for nearly a century. That light went out two years ago now — but not before he managed to pass on his unbending spirit to those who will write the next chapter of the history of the Tibetan people.</p><p><em>Tashi Rabgey, George Washington University</em></p><p><em>Eulogy published by the Bapa Phunstok Family on Weibo, March 2016</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7cb4c3fecf1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Kurdistan Regional Autonomy and the Twentieth Century State]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/kurdistan-regional-autonomy-and-the-twentieth-century-state-8c9e9f9da9c4?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c9e9f9da9c4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 02:55:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-05T06:45:13.795Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-JZM-gOVmWKXGBUf4FYB-g.png" /><figcaption>Photo credit: Felix Friebe</figcaption></figure><p>While traveling in Iraqi Kurdistan last week, I had the opportunity to give a talk at the University of Duhok on the problem of twentieth century statehood. The question of what will become of the project of rule we know of as the “nation-state” seemed particularly apt in the city of Duhok, given the raging civil war in neighboring Syria, mounting Turkish air strikes on the PKK along the Iraqi border and chilling developments in Iran to the east — all, rather disconcertingly, within easy driving distance of this ancient Kurdish town.</p><p>Yet even with Kurdish refugees from Syria streaming daily into Duhok as a reminder of the precariousness of contemporary statehood, the faculty and scholars I met with, both in the capital Erbil and in Duhok, were most animated by questions concerning the flip side of statehood — that is, the more humdrum business of governing and everyday practices of rule. How can the abundant natural resources of the region be best developed and their social benefits better distributed? In what ways can Kurdish language use in higher education be further advanced? What might be some prospects for global partnerships in cooperative research and strategic policy studies?</p><p>These questions pointed to an extraordinary achievement. With little fanfare, Iraqi Kurdistan has become a fully autonomous political entity within a reconfigured Iraqi state. Legally recognized as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since the revision of the Iraqi constitution in 2005, the autonomous region has proven its mettle over the past seven years, navigating the treacherous geopolitics of the region while attracting major foreign investment from neighboring Turkey, formerly the loudest detractor of even the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan region within the state of Iraq.</p><p>Turkey, of course, has its own unaddressed Kurdish question, with a good part of its southeastern territories being composed of Kurdish lands, and its population of 15 million Kurds having been resistant to Turkish rule throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, the remarkable success of the Kurdistan autonomous region in Iraq only underscores the larger Kurdish question that remains unanswered in Turkey, Iran and Syria. Not only have Kurdish areas been subsumed within these states, the Kurds themselves have long been locked in a bitter struggle for their right to exist as a people. Longer term regional stability will require a political commitment to address the issue far beyond Erbil and Baghdad.</p><p>But after a history of unspeakable tragedy, the very possibility of the Kurdistan Regional Government seems extraordinary. From its boomtown capital of Erbil to the shiny glass towers rising along the sun-burnt hills of Dohuk, it’s clear that the Kurdish authorities are pursuing their hard-won freedom to self-govern with a steely resolve and a determined will to rule. In the process, the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan has proven itself not only the most secure, functional and best governed part of the Iraqi state, but also something of a model for rational self-governance for the rest of the Middle East.</p><p><em>Originally posted to AnthropologyWorks, a project of the Institute of Global and International Studies at George Washington University. </em><a href="https://tibetgovernance.org/2012/10/02/kurdistan-regional-autonomy-and-the-twentieth-century-state-2/#more-842">https://tibetgovernance.org/2012/10/02/kurdistan-regional-autonomy-and-the-twentieth-century-state-2/#more-842</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c9e9f9da9c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Newtibet.com: Citizenship as Agency in a Virtual Tibetan Public]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/newtibet-com-citizenship-as-agency-in-a-virtual-tibetan-public-975afb11f6f9?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/975afb11f6f9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 02:35:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-03T10:22:32.919Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Eg5mhCapmcpH51Ys963LfQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://uvatibetcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/new-tibet1.pdf"><em>Tashi Rabgey, in Tibetan Modernities: Notes from the Field on Cultural and Social Change. </em>Robert Barnett and Ronald Schwartz, eds. Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 333–352.</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote>Did you think that cutting off my tongue would make me give up thinking?<br> People use their minds to think, not their tongues.</blockquote><blockquote>“Snowland Nomad”</blockquote><p>In the spring of 2003, an audacious website surfaced on the Chinese- language Internet. Created by Tibetans inside the PRC, newtibet.com provided a provocative new forum for the public discussion of Tibet’s contemporary predicament. While carefully declaring “the unity of China” as its first founding principle, newtibet also announced itself as supporting “the unity and autonomy of Tibet”. From Lhasa to Shanghai and from Taipei to New York, Tibetans sat up and took notice of the irreverent discussion of taboo topics ranging from the failures of the current Tibetan élite to the meaning of “Tibet” itself. Within weeks, newtibet established itself as the premier virtual Tibet forum in Chinese-language cyberspace.</p><p>For a time, it appeared that digital technology had cleared a new discursive terrain for a self-conscious Tibetan public. The rise of the Chinese language Internet had, from the onset, enabled the proliferation of an astonishing number of public venues for the discussion of social issues. But until the appearance of newtibet.com, none had specifically positioned itself as a forum for the social critique of contemporary Tibet. As a portal to the Tibetan social world, newtibet opened a window to a densely articulated and contested cultural field, fueling speculation about the democratic potential of digital communication for Tibetans. Less than six months after its debut, however, newtibet abruptly disappeared, only to return some weeks later conspicuously attenuated.</p><p>This paper examines the social use of the forum during newtibet’s first unfettered months of online existence. In particular, it points to the ways in which the online discussions provide a new map of social relations amongst a wired Tibetan community. I draw on this map to explore the rationality underlying the discursive tactics used to define the normative boundaries of this public space. Locating the use of citizenship as a strategy for “negotiating the state” (Saich 2000: 124- 141) on newtibet.com, this paper cautions against the invocation of a Habermasian public sphere in conceptualizing the new virtual Tibet arena in Chinese-language cyberspace. Instead, I consider the extent to which the model of civil society might provide a better diagnosis of the uncertain present. In light of this discussion, I conclude with some reflections on the challenges presented by this case study to the epistemic limits of our existing approaches toward the study of contemporary Tibet.</p><p>HABERMASOCHISM ONLINE: RETHINKING THE PUBLIC SPHERE</p><p>Yang Guobin has observed that the study of the Internet in China has been for the most part driven by an interest in issues of political control and political impact. While the bulk of the analytic attention in this growing literature has been given to the specific mechanisms of state control of the Internet, these studies have also pointed out that state control is far from absolute. Indeed, Yang suggests that Harwit and Clark’s description of the state’s ambivalence toward political controls signals a need for more scholarly attention to the question of the actual social uses of the Internet in China (2003a: 457). In his path breaking work on Chinese civil society and the Internet, Yang premises his studies on the insight that “the Chinese state is not an omnipotent entity, but has numerous permeable holes, not the least of which is the lack of interest or sincerity at the local level in implementing central policies” (2003a: 457). It is the expanding field of civic interaction engendered by the ‘ambivalence’ and ‘permeability’ of the state that Yang’s work begins the task of charting.</p><p>I locate this study of the nascent Tibetan online public in a similar context. While the Chinese state no doubt exerts a constant presence throughout the entirety of Tibetan social life, this does not preclude the existence of interstices within which a degree of agency can be realized. But how should these spaces be conceptualized? In what ways, and to what extent, do different conceptual models circumscribe or constrain our ability to envision the dynamics of social relations? What becomes visible and what drops from the picture as we shift analytic frames? Notwithstanding a retrenchment in recent China scholarship from value-laden concepts such as public sphere and civil society, Yang argues for the continuing significance and utility of the conceptual framework of Habermas’s normative theory. In a review of recent literature on civil society in China, Yang diagnoses a reticence among scholars toward the cross-cultural borrowing of concepts, but then concludes, “[w]hether the authors admit it or not, they are implicitly guided by the normative meanings of Habermas’ concept”.7 While he seeks to use the notion of the public sphere “in the broadest and most innocuous sense possible” by construing it as “an open space for communication” (Yang 2003b: 470), Yang nonetheless frames his own work on the Chinese Internet in terms that are “essentially Habermasian” (2003b: 471).</p><p>Yang’s invocation of this normative framework is part of a wider revival of interest in the notion of the public sphere that has accompanied the rise of the Internet. Much of the literature has been animated by a technological determinism that emphasizes the liberatory potential of computer-mediated information. In his critical reading of the optimism about the democratizing effects of virtual communication, Hubertus Buchstein notes that proponents such as Howard Rheingold find in Habermas “a normative justification” for their views because of the striking resemblance between his idealized theory of the public sphere and the modes of communication facilitated by the new digital medium.8 Thus, Buchstein remarks, “if one accepts the claims of the optimists, the new technology seems to match all basic requirements of Habermas’ normative theory of democratic public sphere: it is a universal, anti-hierarchical, complex and demanding mode of interaction. Because it offers universal access, uncoerced communication, freedom of expression, an unrestricted agenda, participation outside of traditional political institutions and generates public opinion through processes of discussion, the Internet looks like the most ideal speech situation” (1997: 251).</p><p>But in the rush to comment on the effects of the digital revolution, have we been too eager to arrive already equipped with the normative ground for our suppositions fully worked out? It is useful here to recall Judith Butler’s cautionary remark, “To set the ‘norms’ of political life in advance is to prefigure the kinds of practices which will qualify as the political and it is to seek to negotiate politics outside of a history which is always to a certain extent opaque to us in the moment of action” (Butler 1995: 129, as cited in Dean 2001: 249). This insight provides important impetus in Jodi Dean’s argument for jettisoning the notion of the public sphere altogether as the basis for conceptualizing networked interactions in cyberspace (2001: 247). As she explains, “to territorialize cyberia as the public sphere is to determine in advance what sort of engagements and identities are proper to the political and to use this determination to</p><p>homogenize political engagement, neutralize social space, and sanitize popular cultures” (Dean 1997: 265-6; Dean 2001: 247).</p><p>Dean’s argument begins with a critical reading of Habermas’ account of the emergence and decline of the bourgeois public sphere in modern Europe. She points out that the ideal-typical model of the public sphere portrayed by Habermas “carries with it a set of norms which enable it both to secure itself against the state and to function as a terrain for critical-rational debate” (1996: 223). She foregrounds in particular the ideals of equality, reflexivity/accessibility and inclusivity as key conditions in the formation of Habermas’ historically specific public sphere. These in turn serve as “the normative basis for his analysis of the infiltration of the public sphere by power” (1996: 224). At the center of Dean’s critique of the Habermasian public sphere is an objection to this conceptualization of power. Habermas conceives the public sphere as a domain free from power, one that must be safeguarded against the intrusion of the state and economy. As such, his analysis fails to acknowledge the “presence of power within ‘public’ discourses” and leads to the notion that “the fallible results of public deliberations should enjoy the presumption of rationality” (1996: 234).</p><p>While other critics have sought to expand Habermas’ initial formulation to encompass heterogeneous norms and competing rationalities by theorizing multiple spheres of differentiated publics,9 Dean maintains that simply “adding an ‘s’ to the public sphere” fails to account for the fact that exclusions will nonetheless always persist (1996: 233). Speaking in plural form thus fails to address the underlying problem that “the regulatory fiction of the public sphere privileges a theorization of political norms”. That is, the very notion of the public sphere requires an abstraction of norms in order to establish the boundaries of the domain. In contrast, civil society— more strongly a relational than a spatial concept—points to networks of interactions that take place throughout the social field. As such, power operates differently in these two models. The privileging of norms in the public sphere has the effect of theorizing power as external to the deliberative public (though potentially encroaching), while the privileging of interaction in civil society has the potential of conceptualizing power as diffuse and dispersed within and throughout relationships. Indeed, drawing on Cohen and Arato, Dean argues for a notion of civil society that is “always imbricated with power”, one that “acknowledges the inequalities, exclusions, and competing rationalities characteristic of networked societies” (2001: 250). Dean’s notion of civil society thus points to “the concrete institutions in which the subjects of politics come to practice, mediate, and represent their actions as political” (2001:247).</p><p>The argument put forth by Dean and Buchstein on the inadequacy of the concept of the public sphere stems largely from an interest in networked interactions taking place in largely democratic cultural contexts. In what follows, I consider this critique in light of the tensions and solidarities that arose when a digital public space for critical discussion was forged within a distinctly non-democratic cultural context.</p><p>ENTERING THE VIRTUAL TIBETAN PUBLIC</p><p>Late one Saturday morning, I accompanied Kesang10 as she left the crowded dormitory room she shares with five Chinese classmates and headed for the solitude of an Internet café. There she slipped on earphones and entered a chatroom known to be a favored haunt of Tibetan students. She began typing in Chinese.</p><blockquote>Kesang: Are there any Tibetans out there? [Five positive responses. Kesang selects “Jiu Jiu.”]</blockquote><blockquote>Kesang: Are you really Tibetan?<br>“Jiu Jiu”: Yes.</blockquote><blockquote>Kesang: Say something in Tibetan then.<br> Jia ba suo! [Tibetan for “Go eat shit!”, improvised in Chinese characters]</blockquote><p>Several rapid-fire exchanges later, Jiu Jiu established his nationality credentials to Kesang’s satisfaction and the two turned on their mikes to start chatting in Tibetan. They discovered they were both from the central Tibetan region and were now in college in distant Chinese cities. Through ‘QQ’ instant messaging, they called on other online acquaintances to join and soon they were a party of five virtual friends—disembodied Tibetans scattered across China—swapping news, music and accounts of collegiate angst late into the afternoon.</p><p>For those wired onto the Internet, digital technology has brought not only unprecedented access to information but also a new means of creating networks of relationships with those who would otherwise be strangers. For Tibetans, the significance of this technological innovation is particularly striking because of the limits that have been imposed over public communication and expression in Tibetan- speaking areas during the post-Mao era. Indeed, while there has been a rapid expansion of economic reforms in Tibet since the 1980s, the scope for public discussion and open exchange of ideas has in fact diminished markedly over time. Thus, for example, in the early 1980s, the revival of print media and the development of modern Tibetan literature11 generated a burst of intellectual energy and provided the impetus for the first critical discussion of questions concerning the problem of modernity and Tibetan cultural change. But as Tsering Shakya notes, political constraints on Tibetan writers heightened after 1994, undermining the innovation and originality that marked the first wave of iconoclastic writers led by the likes of Dondrub Gyal.</p><p>Likewise, the ‘sweet tea houses’ (<em>ja mngar mo</em>) of Lhasa had lost their role as spaces for public discussion and open debate by the early 1990s. Throughout the 1980s, sweet tea houses had served as important gathering places for Tibetans to exchange news, air opinions and discuss ideas. From late morning until early afternoon, these sites, dotted around the old town of Lhasa, would swell with animated talk as Tibetans crowded around various tables to participate in ongoing discussions. Certain establishments, and even certain tables, were known for the discussion of particular themes and topics, ranging from issues as broad as international affairs to those as narrow as the financial concerns of truck drivers. With the tightening of political controls in the early 1990s, however, this unusual space of lively, open debate was brought to an end through constant surveillance. The encroachment of the state into even these marginal spaces seemed to militate against the possibility of any form of meaningful public communication and the open expression of critical ideas.</p><p>By the late 1990s, however, the effects of the state’s longer-term economic and social strategies conspired to give rise to an entirely new form of Tibetan public space. First, the mandate to improve China’s long-term growth and international competitiveness provided the momentum for a massive expansion of network infrastructure between 1993 and 1996 (Hartford 2000: 255–6). The full-scale wiring of China was thus less a product of private sector considerations than of “a state-centric strategy” for comprehensively advancing information technology (Hartford 2000: 256). Since opening to the public in 1996, the number of Internet users has climbed exponentially, reaching 79.5 million in 2003. According to the January 2004 survey of the China Information Network Center (CNNIC), there were by then 86,000 Internet users in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and 195,000 in the province of Qinghai.15 These numbers indicate that there are substantial numbers of Tibetans who are now part of the networked community.</p><p>Second, the possibility of an alternative Tibetan public space has also been a function of China’s education policy. Among the new</p><p>Tibetan Internet users are a large group of young Tibetans who had been sent en masse to be educated in Chinese cities from middle school onward as part of a special program launched in 1985. Unlike the older generation of Tibetan élites, these young Tibetans (the oldest cohort is now in their early thirties) did not experience the trauma of Tibet’s annexation or the psychological devastation of the Cultural Revolution. Born after 1972, these Tibetans were brought up in a Chinese-ruled Tibet, but one in which there was a minor renaissance of Tibetan cultural identity and a new awareness of a political struggle being waged in their name. Immersed from the age of twelve in a Chinese-language environment, these Tibetans now demonstrate a facility in Chinese that, as a group, surpasses the abilities of previous generations. Since the program was initiated nearly two decades ago, many thousands of young Tibetans have been trained and educated under these circumstances. This new generation now constitutes the first critical mass of fully bilingual and bicultural Tibetans.</p><p>A NEW TIBET ONLINE</p><p>When newtibet first appeared online in spring 2003, it electrified the Chinese-reading online Tibetan world. Chatrooms buzzed with news of the forum and for weeks an engrossed Tibetan audience sat riveted before their computer screens following the daily discussions. Although other PRC-based online discussion groups on Tibet had surfaced in the past—some attracting lively debate and thoughtful discussions—none had been part of a website devoted entirely to the subject of Tibet and certainly none had been specially designed around the concept of a new vision for Tibet’s future. It was a concept that caught on quickly. The website gathered a devoted following with at least 460 readers formally registering as members in just its first few weeks of existence. At one point, the forum reached a peak of 230 posts onto the bulletin board in a single day and in mid-July, six thousand pieces of information were available on the site. It appeared that many Tibetans were actually beginning to jostle to have their say in public while many more were drawing in closer to listen.</p><p><em>The Ugly Tibetan: Online Social Critique</em></p><p>What attracted much of the online readership to newtibet was the trenchant social critique that appeared on its bulletin board. While many of the postings were short, disjointed comments reacting to ongoing discussions, some offered lengthy and provocative pieces, apparently written with some forethought and planning, that could be read as individual essays. As a lens into the social world of a younger generation of Tibetans educated in Chinese, this body of writing reveals a deep sense of malaise about the contemporary Tibetan predicament. In particular, many of the writers diagnose a cultural crisis in the decline of Tibetan language use among educated youth, their troubling sense of historical disorientation, the widening socio- economic inequalities among Tibetans in general, and a general sense of despondency at their own inability to address these social problems. Some look to structural explanations for the current conditions and to the problem of modernity in particular. One commentator went so far as to blame the fact that “…the so-called autonomous government hasn’t been democratically elected by the people”.</p><p>Others turn to the role of individuals. This was perhaps most memorably raised in a piece entitled The Ugly Tibetan. Following in the footsteps of Bo Yang (1992) and others before him, the writer launches an excoriating critique of the Tibetan intellectual élite (zhishi jingying), admonishing them for failing to rise up to their responsibilities at this critical juncture in Tibetan history. The piece begins by reviewing the role of key figures among the educated élite of other nations, such as Gandhi, in times of crisis. The writer then asks about the lack of leadership among Tibetans:</p><blockquote>What about Tibetans? I know the 13th Dalai Lama tried to carry out innovative reforms. But his title was twice taken away and today there are some authorities who believe him to have been “pro-British” and suspect him of “treachery”. I know Gendun Choephel founded the “Tibet Revolutionary Party” and that he sought the Tibetan people’s unification and prosperity. But having been sold by the British and India, he was destroyed by his own people’s system and bureaucrats. I also know there was an exceptional poet born in Amdo, Tibet (Xizang Anduo). He quietly hummed a sad song: “Zhong ren jie zui, wo du xing” (Everyone is drunk, only I am sober). In the end he tried to use his own life to awaken his nation still deep in sleep.16 There is still one other. In all the world, who doesn’t know you? There are so many people in this world. It is only because of him that they know there is a “Tibet” that exists. But as a Tibetan, I do not have the freedom to speak his name. Besides these people? Who can give a fifth example? No, give me an example of a contemporary intellectual. Is there one?</blockquote><p>In this polemic, the “Ugly Tibetan” is characterized as myopic, selfish and greedy, turning a blind-eye to social problems while enjoying a life of self-interested pursuits and entertainment. After being educated among the Chinese, the Ugly Tibetan returns to Tibet to join the official class, taking the largest share of income and benefits, and ignoring the needs and interests of the people. The educated élite are meant to be “Tibet’s soul, spokesperson (houshe), soldier (zhanshi) and leader”. Instead:</p><blockquote>The reality? The reality is that those monks and nuns who sit in ancient monasteries, high up in remote mountains, reading scriptures and practicing the dharma, they care more about our people than the educated élite. Those merchants from Ngaba who travel north and south, relying on selling Tibetan knives and fake medicine in order to make a living, they have a greater awareness of our people than this educated élite. Those nomads and farmers of Amdo, who live on the edge of Tibet and must carry the heaviest burden in resisting assimilation, they love our people more than the educated élite. Those in exile who have had to leave their country and whose view of their homeland is now blocked by the fierce Himalayas, they have more loyalty and faith in our people than the educated élite.</blockquote><p>The writer continues by saying that until this élite class of educated Tibetans begins to take responsibility for the interests of the Tibetan people and the needs of human freedom,</p><blockquote>…I am going to continue to call them Ugly Tibetans! They are people without ideas, people who do not seek to liberate their minds, an educated class who are forsaking their mission and striving only for their own self-interests, who toss away their responsibilities and throw the burden of our nation onto the poor and the uneducated, the nomads and the farmers, and keep all the glory and benefit of the nation for themselves. Now how ugly is this?</blockquote><p>These biting comments touched a nerve with the online readership. The Ugly Tibetan elicited an overwhelmingly positive response, with one admirer cutting and pasting favored excerpts and re-posting them back on to the bulletin board as a “best of” collection, and with “thank you!” appended to the end. Instead of seeking to explain or defend the interests of the Tibetan élite, the participants gave their resounding approval of this scathing critique and applauded the ethical standpoint of the writer. The reflexivity to which this piece gave rise is significant because the participants are themselves most likely to become part of the official élite the writer is taking to task. But is this social critique and critical reflection tantamount to reasoned discussion and debate? If not, where are the limits of reason and how are these boundaries maintained? What exactly does rationality look like in this new Tibetan public?</p><p><em>High Voltage Wires: Citizenship and the Limits of Rationality</em></p><p>After the first month of its online existence, newtibet’s webmaster sought feedback from readers about the appropriate nature and function of newtibet’s forum. In the stream of commentary that issued forth, some participants asserted the need to keep ‘the political’ at bay while others worried out loud about the public discussion of ‘sensitive’ issues. Many invoked the primacy of ‘rationality’. Weighing in on the matter, the webmaster himself emphasized that the discussions in newtibet should be governed by “reason” (lixing), that they should be “fair and impartial” (gongzheng) and be conducted through “reasoned argumentation”’ (shuoli). He elaborated, “If we use rational means of discussion and argumentation, then there is no such thing as a ‘sensitive’ issue and there is nothing we can’t discuss or investigate”.</p><p>While firmly appropriating a discourse of rationality and adopting a Habermasian conception of a public space that is ‘free from power’, the participants on newtibet nonetheless revealed an anxiety about inadvertently treading near the limits of that rationality. In the case of newtibet, the boundaries of acceptable public discourse lay at the threshold of Tibet’s political status. These boundaries are managed in part by filters that automatically delete certain characters and replace them with asterisks. At least in the first months of its existence, these included, for example, ‘Dalai’, and ‘Jiang Zemin’. In part, the boundaries are maintained by bulletin board moderators, called banzhu, who monitor the discussions and delete any messages deemed inappropriate. A third means of patrolling the boundaries is through self-censorship. In the wake of several arrests made on Internet use charges (unrelated to newtibet), an appeal was made to newtibet participants to remember the grave consequences of the national security laws: they were urged to use caution and not go near the two “high voltage wires” (gaoyaxian) of the crime of state subversion and the crime of undermining national unity.</p><p>The challenge for newtibet has been to carve out a public space for critical reflection and discussion that does not threaten to stray near those high voltage wires. For the newtibet forum, citizenship, as an acknowledgement of the legal—that is to say, legitimate— relationship of both the individual and the collective to the state, has been proffered as the guarantor of that rationality. This was established, for example, through the founding principles of the website, which included both a formal commitment to the unity of China and recognition of the central government’s authority.</p><p>Despite these proactive affirmations, however, the uncertainty surrounding precisely where the boundaries of reasonable discussion might materialize in actual practice has led to discursive struggles online. In one incident, ‘P’ appeared to approach a boundary of acceptable speech by posting a strongly worded nationalistic message (the actual meaning is unclear because a key word was filtered out). ‘A’ responded by stating, “You might have these thoughts in your heart, but don’t express them here”. In response to both of these, ‘B’ admonished Tibetans for “living in a fantasy” and, using asterisks and circumlocutions, stated that even the Dalai Lama was no longer speaking of independence, so they had better stop doing so as well. As the discussion threatened to become unruly, the webmaster stepped in and pointed out that no one had spoken of independence, and he asked that B “not put words into other people’s mouths”, lest others outside the discussion misinterpret the intent of newtibet. This incident underlines, first, that the managers of newtibet are committed to the principle of the unity of the state; and second, that the arbitrariness of the discursive boundaries in practice means that participants in public conversations—even those who are committed to the official discourse of citizenship and the state—might find themselves unwittingly engaged in political struggles over meaning and intent. That is to say, notwithstanding the appropriation of normative theory, the terrain of the public space is always already infiltrated by power.</p><p><em>Greater Tibet: Citizenship as Agency</em></p><p>In an autobiographical essay, a writer calling himself “Soul of Tibet” provides a set of reflections on his journey from rural Kham to urban China. His narrative recounts the changes in his political consciousness as he struggled to make sense of the shifting political landscape of his life. As a privileged child of Tibetan Party officials, he was oblivious to politics until he was sent to middle school, where he first encountered Tibetans from other Tibetan-speaking regions. There he first began to see himself as a Khampa. For high school, he was sent away to study among the Chinese and for the first time became conscious of being Tibetan. In his account, his journey of self-discovery took him from childhood naïveté to an angry, impassioned nationalism and, finally, to a thoughtful, rational adulthood. In the course of making peace with his complex political reality, he finds his own path to “Tibet”—one that is anchored in the Chinese state—and now sees it as his mission to articulate to the Chinese the Tibetan predicament and demand dignity (zunyan) for the Tibetan nation.</p><p>In this account, two dimensions of citizenship can be distinguished. First, in the story of how the writer reconciles his subordination to the Chinese state (and hence becomes a ‘good citizen’), citizenship manifests as a form of subjection—both in the sense of becoming a subject of, and of being subjected to, the state. Second, in the story of how the writer discovers a new political mission in the name of “Tibet”, citizenship manifests as a form of agency—that is to say, it emerges as a basis of political action. In this sense, the legitimation of the individual’s relationship to the state through the notion of citizenship gives rise to a formative, or productive, power. This double dimension of citizenship corresponds to what Judith Butler (1997) calls “the paradox of subjection”: the notion that the agency of the subject is an effect of its subordination. Thus, while as a form of subjection, citizenship situates the individual within a state-centric field of legal rationality, as a form of agency, citizenship becomes a tactic for “negotiating the state” (Saich 2000).</p><p>In the case of newtibet, the negotiation of the state within a discourse of citizenship materialized in the explorations of the meaning of the term Xizang (“Tibet”). In particular, one of the dominant themes that recurred in the online discussions was the need to expand the semantic range of Xizang to include all Tibetan- speaking peoples. The promotion of this idea was an act of political agency, because the norm within the existing official discourse is for Xizang to refer only to the Tibet Autonomous Region, a political entity that (according to the official population census) includes less than half of all the Tibetan-speaking people in the PRC. In the discussions on newtibet, an effort was made to return to what are conventionally regarded as traditional Tibetan political categories. Indeed, the traditional framework was built into the premise of the original website itself, as the specific topic forums corresponded to Tibetan conceptualizations of the provinces and regions. Thus, the four main forums were divided as follows:</p><ol><li>U-Tsang, Land of Dharma: Holy Land of Dark-Haired Tibetans— Lhasa!</li><li>Kham, Land of People: Descendants of the Great Ling Gesar of the Heroic Epic</li><li>Amdo, Land of Horses: In the Footsteps of Gendun Choephel, Using Wisdom and Courage to Awaken the Lakes of Snow Mountains</li><li>Gyalrong, Land of Fire: Calling from Mo’erdo Mountain and Jiuzhaigou</li></ol><p>It is a paradox of power that the logic of the state—through its bureaucratic classificatory notion of Zangzu (“Tibetan nationality”)—creates the possibility of positing an expanded field of meaning for the concept of Xizang itself, one to which all Zangzu can legitimately belong. For newtibet, citizenship therefore functions not only as a limit to rationality, but also as a site of political contestation. In so doing, it provides an account of power that illuminates the pervasiveness of its circulation while exposing its permeability in practice.</p><p>CONCLUSIONS</p><p>When I asked a young Tibetan friend in Beijing about the extraordinary buzz about newtibet, she explained, “It’s the first time we saw the truth written down”. Hers was a typical response. At the same time, however, others were considerably less impressed. “What’s so new about newtibet?” one interlocutor asked, “We talk about these things all the time in [literary] Tibetan”. His comment pointed to a linguistically generated cultural fault line: those who do not read Chinese comfortably might fail to recognize the significance of the new virtual forum, while those who do not read Tibetan might fail to appreciate that a tradition of social critique — albeit often veiled in allegorical terms — has been maintained in the pages of Tibetan literary journals and in an expanding body of independent self-published Tibetan-language literature.</p><p>But in contrast to the highbrow, cloistered air of much of the Tibetan-language social criticism, what distinguished newtibet as a novel development was its very heightened sense of publicity. Within the circumscribed boundaries of the digital divide, it made a transparent appeal for mass participation and readership. Rather than deliberately obscuring critique for a rarefied audience, the point of newtibet appeared to be to create “a space of sociability” — not unlike Arendt’s account of Varnhagen’s salon — in which the “desire for difference and distinctness could assume an intersubjective reality” (Benhabib 1995: 17). That is to say, newtibet had been formed with the specific intent to create a space of “visibility and self- expression”, one which individuals could enter in order to “be seen, heard, noticed by others” (1995:17). The fact that the forum was mediated onscreen through the Chinese language underlines this drive for visibility. Thus, what was new about newtibet was that it deliberately drew attention to itself — and in doing so, invited a new gaze. As one participant offered, “If we speak from a rational perspective, we can communicate our nation’s malaise to more people. By opening up to the public, it will allow more people to understand us”. The forum of newtibet thus offered a way to publicize a set of interests and differences in order to be better understood.</p><p>While users of the forum themselves appropriated the tropes of reason and impartiality in characterizing their discussions, this new drive for public expression and visibility was in fact narrowly circumscribed by the constraints of a stringent legal rationality. Delimited by ‘high voltage wires’, the online discussions maneuvered anxiously around that which might be construed as ‘political’—thereby ensuring that a particular politics was embedded within and throughout the conversations. This penetration of power throughout the discursive space of newtibet contradicts the Habermasian idealization of the public sphere and calls instead for a model of normativity that acknowledges, as does Dean’s notion of civil society, the reproduction of power along networks of relationships throughout the social order. What is significant about the new online public space, therefore, was not so much the particular form and framework of the deliberations taking place, but rather the fact that these public conversations were taking place at all. This self-conscious public expression of Tibetan social critique and commentary suggests that there could be more room for Tibetan political discussion and reflection than has largely been presumed until now.</p><p>Digital technology has been of paramount importance to this sudden new drive for visibility. Just as twenty years ago the advent of print media and literary journals created a new self-consciousness among Tibetans and triggered a burst of interest in self-expression and social critique, the recent arrival of the Internet has heightened the self-awareness and reflexivity of an entirely new generation of Tibetans. Indeed, this new cultural moment is potentially even more significant because of the speed and physical reach of computer- mediated information. The discussions on newtibet during its first months of existence revealed an acute dissatisfaction with the current Tibetan élite as well as a collective vision for Tibet that encompasses all Tibetan-speaking areas. The Internet accelerated the development of these positions by collapsing physical space and bringing Tibetans in Beijing, Lhasa and Labrang into a single conversation. The exchange of information and the articulation of new ideas facilitated by the new virtual forum foregrounded the incongruities in the normative standards across the Tibetan and Chinese social worlds and made possible a critique of these discrepant realities.</p><p>When newtibet returned back online in November 2003, it had become Zhongguo Xin Xizang (China’s New Tibet) and the forums were no longer freely open to the public. The bulletin board, in fact, was now open to readers by invitation only. The window of free space—at least for the time being—had come to a close.18 But the brief surge of impassioned public conversation and critique left Tibet scholars and commentators to reconsider established conventions and practices in the study of contemporary Tibet. It provoked reflection, for example, on the consequences of taking as an object of inquiry a society that is under constant surveillance—one in which public space is perpetually displaced. That is to say, how can the problem of representation be accounted for in the absence of a speaking public? To what extent, if at all, is it possible to transcend the uncertainties and silences engendered by political constraints? And, at the very least, in what ways can our research and writing be reoriented so that the epistemic limits of our scholarship can be adequately acknowledged?</p><p><em>Paper presented in 2004 for the University of British Columbia’s Institute of Asian Research conference, “Tibet and the Contemporary World”, April 18–20th, 2004. Published in Tibetan Modernities, Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies (IATS) (2008).</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=975afb11f6f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Charter for Engagement in the Future of Tibet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/charter-for-engagement-in-the-future-of-tibet-c4dab72dafda?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c4dab72dafda</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 02:07:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-05T05:01:37.100Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Written as a petition in the aftermath of the Tibetan uprising in 2008</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/838/1*yfNSDQH_GYHmvA6cb46IXw.png" /></figure><h3>THIS WE KNOW</h3><p>We live in uncertain times. As the new millennium unfolds, we find ourselves caught in the tired politics of the past while our Tibetan sisters and brothers on the plateau bear the burden of marginalization and dispossession. Yet in this moment of political exhaustion, something new is stirring. Guided by a social vision that places unyielding faith in the promise and decency of humanity, a collective desire to seek new pathways toward meaningful and transformative change is now awakening. The change we seek requires a new political and moral imagination — one that trusts in humanity’s potential to embrace a politics of love over a politics of fear.</p><h3>THIS WE BELIEVE</h3><p>In these uncertain times, there is an urgent need to redefine the collective task that lies ahead. Any meaningful change for Tibet will require a collective response from the heart — one that transcends differences of language, culture, region, ethnicity, religion, history and education. The challenges of our times can only be solved by working in solidarity and partnership across political, cultural and linguistic divides. Where there is mistrust and resentment, we must work to bring confidence and understanding. Where there is despair and desperation, we must work to inspire hope and empowerment. Where there is cynicism and hostility, we must build faith in the possibility of creating a shared stake in transformative change. And as we seek to breach the gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of our times, we must find the courage to cross uncharted terrain as we re-envision our broken world as one animated by an abiding human love.</p><h3>THIS WE RESOLVE</h3><ul><li><strong>Engagement.</strong> As Tibet approaches a new threshold, we commit ourselves to engaging directly with the challenges facing Tibetans on the plateau — challenges such as that of language and cultural loss, economic marginalization, resource distribution, land management and the delivery of quality education, healthcare and other social services.</li><li><strong>Solidarity.</strong> We commit ourselves to this direct engagement as an act of love and solidarity with Tibetans in Tibet. We know the wrongs of the past, but we choose to look to the future — the future of those who make their lives on the Tibetan plateau and the future their children will inherit.</li><li><strong>Nonviolence.</strong> Our commitment to engagement is firmly rooted in the principle of nonviolence. Knowing that all life is interdependent and that we are caught in a web of mutuality, we are determined to become the change we seek by finding pathways to social change that value and respect every human life.</li><li><strong>Building New Capacity.</strong> As we seek to engage directly in helping build the future of Tibet, our priority should be to invest in Tibetans themselves. By creating new opportunities for building capacity, knowledge and experience, we will empower a new generation of Tibetans to develop the skills and competence necessary to steward their communities into the future.</li><li><strong>Building a New Consensus.</strong> In embracing the principle of engagement, we commit ourselves to forging a new consensus on the future of Tibet. We will gather and form a new global community around this consensus — one that includes citizens of China as well as that of the world — and through these partnerships, synergies and new bonds of trust, we will find our best hope for meaningful, transformative change for Tibet.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c4dab72dafda" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Postcards from an Imaginary Tibet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tashirabgey/postcards-from-an-imaginary-tibet-470beb53a536?source=rss-745cbf6d9f15------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/470beb53a536</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tashi Rabgey]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 01:04:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-06T04:00:05.580Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4lE5BkYvjhs-8VAVwLk7kw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mendoza, Argentina — site of the film Seven Years in Tibet by Jean-Jacques Annaud</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Imagine history not as an accomplished fact or a formless tendency but as an occupied space of contingency and desire in which people roam.</blockquote><blockquote>Kathleen Stewart, <em>A Space on the Side of the Road</em></blockquote><p>Above the shifting clutter of my desk sits a perplexing image. An expanse of unearthly blue sky and a stretch of lofty peaks frame a high-altitude plateau. In the foreground, a shallow mountain pool projects pretensions to grandeur as a lonely dirt path winds its way into nowhere.</p><p>What is confounding about this particular image is not what it is, but rather what it aspires to be. On first glance, it appears to be a postcard from my childhood, a time when I was quite sure that such images could only signify Tibet. But in fact, it is a post card from the borderlands of Argentina, where my parents, an uncle and over a hundred other Tibetans from around the world have suddenly been transported for a three month sojourn. This is no ordinary reunion of a diaspora community in exile, however. What makes this gathering surreal is that it has been orchestrated by the engines of Hollywood. And its re-enactment of history will therefore surely reach the minds of untold millions in years to come.</p><p>There are in fact two big budget motion pictures and at least three smaller films currently in production. Gazing at my parents’ illicit snapshots of movie sets, I am struck by the curious implications of this fact. In the Andes mountains, in the deserts of Morocco, and in other rather unlikely corners of the globe, the magic of Hollywood has re-created a Tibet that now ceases to exist outside of personal memories. The cinematic reproductions of these private testimonies will therefore ensure not only that these remembrances will survive but that they will in fact become public memories, enabling countless viewers themselves to bear witness to this epic story. Given the seductive power of motion pictures, any competing account of this historical moment will, over time, simply fade into the background din. Any other story will surely be overwhelmed by the images played out in the darkened theatres of collective memory. This for Tibetans, I realize with some unease, is at once both a timely coup and an unwitting dilemma.</p><p>On a sweltering summer evening I hear my sister break out into laughter in the next room. Pala, our father, is explaining on the phone that casting people called from Hollywood earlier in the day, asking him to take part in an upcoming film about the adventures of an Austrian mountaineer who spent seven years living in Tibet before the Chinese occupation. This job would require relocating to some corner of South America for several months and functioning in some proximity to someone called “Ba-ra Pet.”</p><blockquote>Acha: You told them what?</blockquote><blockquote>Pala: That I won’t play an aristocrat or a soldier. I’ll only consider going if I can play a monk or an ordinary person.</blockquote><blockquote>Acha: And what did they say?</blockquote><blockquote>Pala: They said they’d think about it. I also told them I won’t go without your mother. Three months is a long time.</blockquote><p>Only someone familiar with Pala’s peculiar life story and even more peculiar personality can fully appreciate the comic element of this moment. Twenty-five years cloistered away as a Buddhist monk in the East and twenty-odd more spent as a small-town coffin-maker in the West have produced a self-possessed and self-appointed social critic, secretly proud of his local status as curmudgeonly voice of conscience and general crank at large. That his quiet existence has been disrupted by the beckoning of Tinseltown strikes me as decidedly humorous. I can’t recall the last time he has watched a rented movie in its entirety and the one and only time he ever graced a movie hall was to see <em>Gandhi </em>— and then less to be entertained than as an act of respect. After well over two decades in a land saturated by hype and fantasy, Pala remains not only disinterested, but in many ways serenely oblivious to the rising tide of interest in Tibet among the high-octane world of celebrity.</p><p>The matter is finally settled a few weeks later when the casting people call back and agree to take our mother on as an additional extra, but insist on Pala playing an aristocratic cabinet minister. I diplomatically point out to him that, this being a movie and all, his role does not in the least reflect upon his own values or personal politics, and that, besides, when all is said and done, this is a non-speaking part and, if truth be told, he really has rather dubious starpower. No one is surprised when his bravado dissipates and he finally agrees to participate in the film.</p><p>This movie, after all, is about a world he once knew of as his only home. The backdrop of towering snow-peaks, the sight of a thousand maroon robes flying in a thousand directions, the other-worldly drone of massive <em>dungchen</em>, the ubiquitous smells of rancid butter and burnt juniper leaves-these, for him, are not signs of the “exotic,” but rather sights, sounds and smells of the intensely familiar. The streets of Lhasa that the film seeks to depict are the streets into which he wandered when he first entered the holy city as a wide-eyed, penniless nineteen year-old monk from the wilds of Kham.</p><p>More pressing still is the fact that this film undertakes to recapture the fleeting moments before the most devastating event in modern Tibetan history. The Chinese annexation of Tibet marks the nation’s zero-hour as it violently tears away all time-honored moorings of the past. It leaves Tibetans with a painful legacy of loss and a profound sense of uncertainty about the future. And without a truly popular media or a vital practice creative artistic expression, the vast majority of Tibetans have lacked the cultural resources to deal with the shared trauma publicly and collectively. True, every March 10th, the failed 1959 uprising is dutifully commemorated and, in between those annual gatherings, every other possible pretext is used to stage public protests against the rulers in Beijing. But as these events have become increasingly stage-managed, ritualized and even mechanical, they have lost their power to move and to heal.</p><p>Whatever Pala’s initial misgivings about his assigned part in the film, it is clear from the onset that he intends to re-live and re-enact this dramatic period in order that this great human loss — -the fall of an ancient civilization — -might be known to, and shared with, the world at large. As my parents begin to reorganize their lives to prepare their stay abroad, I suspect that this experience will achieve not only this, but that it will also provide all Tibetans involved with a singular opportunity to revisit and collectively contemplate their own great private loss.</p><p>No bus in sight. As usual, Amala has arrived on foot well before the busloads of other Tibetans have been transported to the movie set. This morning, her companions are two strapping young men, both fixtures on the New York Tibet scene, who at the moment are looking somewhat weary after a good hour of trying to keep up with her. They have done well despite the intensity of the high-altitude sun. They are no more than a hundred yards behind her.</p><p>Turning on her heels, Amala switches off her Hindi pop music and settles onto a comfortable perch on the sidelines from where she can take in the improbable scene before her. Looming majestically above the streets of the make-believe Lhasa is an arresting replica of the Potala, the palace of the Dalai Lamas and the ancient seat of the Tibetan government. This is but one of dozens of spectacular sets that filmmakers have recreated in these dusty foothills of the Andes. Everywhere there is a constant buzz of activity, from the army of carpenters to the loud flocks of costume designers and hair specialists. Add to this an extended supporting cast of make-up artists, tailors, painters, hat-makers, cooks, drivers, clapper loaders, miscellaneous advisors, and a sea of assistants, all rushing in and out of squadrons of trailers, communicating in any one of sixteen languages at any given moment — -and there is no less than a cosmopolitan city in miniature operating here. And this is even <em>before</em> the flood of Bolivian extras are bused in en masse. The set also hosts a herd of imported yaks, each equipped with its own passport and enough heavily armed security personnel to make a bystander wonder if this miniature metropolis is under martial law. Amala begins this morning like many others by gazing in disbelief a the sheer enormity of this colossal endeavor.</p><p>“11 Toronto!”</p><p>Many hours have passed and dressing finally begins. Amala rises at the call of her number and makes her way to the appropriate jewellery unit. To her discomfort, the Tibetan women before her are leaving the unit wearing oddly mismatched jewellery. It is now her turn to be similarly adorned. The two handlers, busily chatting to each other in a foreign tongue, first fit Amala with a <em>khawu</em>, and enormous star-shaped pendant common across Tibet. They then attach a <em>thenda</em>, a piece of jewellery peculiar to Amala’s own region. The sole purpose of this long attachment is to secure yet another accessory, the heavier <em>onda</em>. Believing their task to be completed, and still deep in conversation with one another, the handlers motion Amala to leave.</p><p>Instead, she remains standing before them and asks, “What about my <em>onda</em>?”<br> I’m sorry?” They seem surprised at the interruption.</p><p>“My <em>onda</em>. I have my <em>thenda</em> but no <em>onda</em>. Why I should wear <em>thenda</em> without <em>onda</em>?”</p><p>The handlers now appear somewhat annoyed. One of them launches into a polite but firm speech about the appropriate manner in which to wear these particular pieces of traditional jewellery.</p><p>Amala is determined. “Reason why we wear <em>thenda</em> is to hold <em>onda</em>,” she continues, “If you don’t give me <em>onda</em>, then I don’t want wear <em>thenda</em>.”</p><p>All three are well aware of a nearby box containing a number of available <em>ondas</em>. But the handlers are also determined. This is clearly about something more than how a <em>thenda</em>-<em>onda</em> ensemble was properly worn in Tibet circa 1950. The relevant assistant-director is called in to resolve the issue.</p><p>“You see, Tsering, it was not always necessary to wear the <em>onda</em> together with the <em>thenda</em> in Tibet,” gently explains the tall woman, her eyes widening in apparent sincerity. “It could be done both ways, and my assistants are quite right about what they are saying.”</p><p><em>“Thenda</em> without <em>onda</em>? Who tell you this?” Amala is incredulous.</p><p>“We have cultural advisors-experts — -with whom we consult on every issue. In this case, Rakra Rinpoche.”</p><p>“Rakra Rincpoche?” Amala’s incredulity has just increased exponentially, “What he knows? Rinpoche was monk in Tibet. Rinpoche still monk. He never wear jewellery. I wore <em>onda</em> with <em>thenda</em> in Tibet. I still wear sometimes in Canada.”</p><p>Tenzin Chodrak, one of the Tibetan-speaking assistant directors, is called in. A nephew of the Dalai Lama and in his early twenties, this animated young man spends most of his time on the set translating and brokering tensions between the Tibetans and the crew.</p><p>“Amala! What seems to be the problem?”</p><p>Amala proceeds to explain the issue in Tibetan. Perhaps culturally predisposed to defer to age, Tenzin Chodrak nods his head solemnly in agreement and tells her that, nonetheless, it would be easier to resolve the tension with the crew members if the matter were settled with the head costume designer, a man of sufficient import as to be headquartered not in a tent or a trailer, but in the big building itself.</p><p>Although this strikes her as a bureaucratic waste of time, Amala is resigned to the inevitability of this peculiar ritual. The struggle over cultural representation begins in the dressing quarters under the tent and ends in the plush office in the big building. It has been this way since the first days on the set when Pala and an elderly monk friend from India discovered many hundreds of ill-made monks’ robes only days before shooting began. At first, indignant claims to authority were made all around. So-and-so had, after all, <em>been</em> to Tibet, and had read such-and-such, and moreover, had even studied Tibetan culture at some prestigious institution. But after the fifty-odd handpicked monks themselves politely made it known that they would not be seen in the eccentric robes, the appointed cultural authorities backed down. Mountains of robes were hastily re-sewn.</p><p>Perhaps the most illuminating incident to date was Dumkhang la’s stand-off on the set. Found to be wearing a watch during a routine inspection of extras just prior to shooting, the elderly man was abruptly told to remove it. Perhaps it was their tone of voice, or perhaps he was simply tired of taking orders of any kind on how to be a Tibetan. But whatever the reason, Kungo Dumkhang la would not take off his watch that day. Instead, he steadfastly declared that he had not only been a resident of Lhasa during Heinrich Harrer’s celebrated stay in the city, but that he had in fact owned, at that time, a watch far finer than the one he now wore. So no, thank you, he would not take off his watch today.</p><p>Bolstered by the knowledge of these and many other acts of everyday resistance, Amala follows the little band as they trudge resolutely towards the big building.</p><p>My parents’ stories are riddled with ambiguities. Everywhere there are indeterminacies in meaning and things are never quite as they seem. The stark Andean landscapes that recall the mountains of Tibet; the many hundreds of South American Indian extras who slip in and out of Tibetan identities on demand; the re-enactment of the traumatic historical moment itself: everywhere there are both deliberate and inadvertent gaps between signifier and referent. And it is in these gaps that things become, as Kathleen Stewart puts it, a “subject of remembrance and exchange in the constant fits and starts of the effort to unforget.” That is to say, it is in these spaces that meaning can finally overcome the brightly-lit, picture-perfect truths of the signs themselves.</p><p>I was at first swept away by the steady stream of dialectical images that kept appearing in these stories. Like for instance the sight of the Bolivian extra caught stealing on the set. It was no secret that the indigenous people brought into play Tibetans in the large epic scenes were making the most of the opportunity to take as much as they could from the set: cameras, sweaters, jackets, even sugar by the coffee machines. One misfortunate fellow had filled the ample pocket of his Tibetan robe with almost a dozen cans of soda. Unexpectedly told to join in the next scene, he waddled as best he could until — -in full view of many hundreds of crew members and onlookers — -his robe came undone and all the cans rattled noisily to the ground. “<em>Corte</em>!” came the angry director’s call. Both Amala and Pala, each in their own accounts, narrated this anecdote with a mixture of humor and sadness. What was appalling in this moment was not the conduct of the young man, but rather the gross disparities in wealth which gave rise to, perhaps even necessitated, this awkward moment. The disparity was not in itself something unexpected, but the fact that it was suddenly thrust into naked view forced immediate and collective acknowledgement of the abnormality of the apparently normal. Thus, while the Bolivian Indians hurriedly lined their pockets with a few extra tea bags, the director purchased yet another sixty-thousand dollars worth of barbed wire to make his Hollywood star — -already surrounded by a veritable garrison of bodyguards — -feel a little more secure against his enthusiastic Latin American female following.</p><p>Or take, for instance, the image of many hundreds of extras — -Tibetans, native Indians, Argentinian Vietnamese and Laotians — -swarming around a column of Chinese military vehicles as it enters the make-believe Lhasa. While they have been instructed to show only controlled hostility, they instead weep inconsolably, hurl obscenities in their respective tongues, seize and tear apart the Chinese flag. For the Tibetan participants, it might be reconciled that what is unfolding is not merely a dramatization of a historical moment, but at some psychic level the event itself. But what of the native Indians, the Vietnamese and the Laotians? Amala recalls with some wonder the Vietnamese woman beside her whose tears flowed as abundantly as her own. She remembers the peculiar experience of the two of them standing side by side, crying with equal passion but in their different languages.</p><p>In these and countless other disconcerting moments, there is something of the remembered past that collides with the present like a nervous shock. It is, as Adorno discerned, in the enigmatic form of the shock that these images set thinking in motion. In this sense, the incriminating soda cans constitute an instance of Taussig’s doubleness of social being, facilitating glimpses into alternative realities by disclosing “concealed or forgotten connections” through the juxtaposition of images. Just as the poverty of the indigenous peoples recalls the Tibetans’ own past as nameless refugees in a foreign country teeming with dispossession, the moment of impassioned solidarity with the woman from Vietnam remembers that what in essence seems to make the Tibetan story unique is in fact precisely what unites it with much of human experience. These images trouble us and necessarily give us pause. Perhaps our own deliverance from deprivation to material comfort is just as arbitrary as the specter of human oppression is at all times inevitable. By obstinately refusing to fit neatly into the story being grandly narrated, these dialectical images in fact cast doubt upon its very claims to truth.</p><p>Stories have since piled up against other stories, each inviting its own set of reflections and contributing to an increasingly disorderly and disorienting picture. Some are poignant, many are humorous, most are interesting for one reason or another. But underlying them all is a subtle but constant sense of unease. For the epic story being told is ultimately not about Tibet or Tibetans but rather about the West and its own utopic desire for redemption. And yet these handpicked Tibetans have traveled many thousands of miles to gather in this strange but familiar place to perform, on command, according to someone else’s imaginings of an “authentic” Tibetan. The daily squabbles over cultural representation therefore constitute merely a re-enactment at the most intimate level of a much larger, more invidious, phenomenon. The Tibetans have not only been instructed on their appropriate attire, conduct and cultural mannerisms, they have even been assigned, as an entire nation and civilization, a very specific role — albeit a rather hallowed one — in the familiar and cherished tale of the heroic quest for completeness.</p><p>The typecasting of Tibet as Shangri-La — the sacred space of wisdom and compassion — is nothing new. One of the more subtle, and therefore more instructive, cameo appearances it has made in recent years is in the <em>Star Wars</em> trilogy, a vast epic that single-handedly re-inscribed the story of redemption for an entirely new generation. There, unbeknownst to most of the audience, traces of Tibet are manifested in some of the more memorable characters of the series. The face of Yoda, for example, is modeled on that of Serkong Rinpoche, a highly-venerated and now deceased Tibetan lama. The role of this ancient and enlightened Jedi master clearly called for the face of an ocean of peace and wisdom. George Lucas’ answer to the imposing challenge was to send his artistic minions to the Himalayas where the lama was then residing. Measurements were made, photographs were taken, and — -back in California — -Yoda was born. Even more astonishing for the unsuspecting Tibetan viewer is the fact that the ewoks — -the diminutive furry and facile creatures in <em>Return of the Jedi</em>-speak a rapid-fire highland Tibetan. “<em>Gyokpo sho</em>! (Come quickly!),” they call to each other in their high-pitched voices. Scurrying across the screen with their bows and arrows slung over their shoulders, bravely dodging laser blades from diabolical enemies traveling at supersonic speed, these squatty, squeaking figures evoke at once both sympathy and scorn.</p><p>The two competing but interrelated caricatures that these represent are reproduced and developed more fully and directly in <em>Seven Years in Tibet</em>. The locals whom the protagonist encounters on his journey to Lhasa appear to be, by and large, foolish and eerily vacant. This then is set in contrast to the sharp mind and precocious wisdom of the appealing teen-aged Dalai Lama. The implications of these caricatures are disconcerting. The people of the roof of the world are exalted as the guardians of great human wisdom, but owing to their very simplicity, they are, like the brave people of Huxley’s <em>Island</em>, doomed to extinction. We reason that while our dysfunctional world may idealize the sanctity of such a society, by virtue of our very dysfunctionality, their continued existence cannot realistically be sustained. We further rationalize that since their timeless wisdom has now passed on to our own able hands, the demise of Tibetans as a people seems, in some obscene way, to <em>make sense</em>. In this cultural logic, Tibetans represent a true holocaust for the postmodern era — -a sacrificial offering that is preordained to end in complete destruction.</p><p>Absurdly, this nihilistic view finds some resonance in Tibetan lore itself. There is a well-known prophecy by the greatly revered seventh-century Tantric master, Guru Padmasambhava, that Tibetans are wont to quote: <em>When iron birds fly and horses run on wheels, the Tibetan people will scatter like ants and the dharma will spread to the land of the red man.</em> These uncanny words, passed down through the generations from the dawn of the Buddhist state, elicit even today a sense of both wonder and resignation. The flight of the Tibetan people from their homeland is taken to be a fatal signal of the civilization’s impending end. The collusion of the metaphysical with reason, then, appears to render this fate inexorable.</p><p>And what of the remains? In a sense, all Tibetans in the world today — -even those living on the Tibetan plateau — -are in exile: a homeland that is captured and occupied is no longer one’s own. Both the Tibetans who fled and those who remain behind live in a constant state of contingency, always strangers in a strange land. They occupy a precarious space between the truly living and the finally dead. Like those in the <em>bardo</em>, the intermediate stage between death and rebirth in the Tibetan interpretation of dying, those in exile can hear but cannot be heard, can see but cannot be seen. They are trapped in a silent existence where they are here but never really present because they have been stripped of the means to communicate. I am reminded of this by my father’s irritated comments about the cultural arrogance of the crew members on the movie set. So what if they had personally spent some time in Tibet? Despite his twenty-six years in Canada, he still did not have the audacity to make presumptuous pronouncements about “Canadian culture.” Certainly not in a tone of condescension and most definitely not over protestations to the contrary by “real” Canadians. Twenty-six years is a long time to be a stranger, I thought to myself, a long time to be invisible.</p><p>In Argentina, Tibet once again played Savior to the young white hero. But this time, Tibetans themselves were there to participate in the drama. In the process, ordinary Tibetans, like my parents, began to appreciate the appeal of their culture and philosophical traditions to the Western world. They witnessed first-hand the scale and extent of that force. And that, I believe, was a liminal experience that changed them indelibly. Nearly forty years after the fabric of Tibetan society had been violently torn apart, this historical re-enactment threw Tibetans back together in an out-of-the-way place under the most peculiar of circumstances. Time had created chasms between old friends and distant cousins. Arriving in Buenos Aires, my parents felt strangely as if they had returned to the India they had left behind twenty-six years ago, while Tibetans from India marveled at finally having made it to the much-vaunted “West.” Very quickly, however, through their common histories, their networks of friendships and kinships, their incessant gossiping, their nightly gathering over beer and song and, perhaps above all, through their shared trials in resisting the cultural dictates of strangers far more powerful than they, these Tibetans experienced a renewal of communal bonds. Indeed, in the intimacy of this intense experience, they managed not only to bridge some of the gaps to which time had given rise, they also began to create new histories, the contents of which might well in time contribute to the recovery of an unanticipated yet plausible future as a thriving people.</p><p>And so, while the cultural brokers of the entertainment industry were busily narrating an epic story that obliquely accepted the predestined fall of the Tibetan nation, a band of Tibetans were quietly staging everyday rebellions that enabled them to resist that very premise. For the movie-makers, history is apparently an accomplished fact, something that can be lifted from the yellowed pages of Alexandra David-Neel and reproduced faithfully by qualified costumers. It is something that can be captured on film and credibly rebuilt, inch by inch, in a radically different time and radically different space. By virtue of its very temporal and spatial alienation from our commonsensical present, the history of the Tibetan people is something that can be conveniently retrieved as a flattened story, something which can then, with considerable self-assurance, be projected onto the movie screen.</p><p>But what of the thousands of fragments from the past that fall by the wayside? The truth of these competing stories has a way of challenging our epistemological confidence, compelling us to reconsider our banal conceptions of the past. For Tibetans, history is a dynamic ongoing process: a constant and vital practice of remembering and re-telling. It must surely be alive and contingent because Tibetans <em>themselves</em> are alive and contingent. It is for this reason that just as every subversive act reinforces their integrity as a community, every obstinate voice that breaks the silence gives new life to the possibility of a return from exile.</p><p>It is late September when I watch an advanced screening of what ultimately turns out to be a disappointing cinematic production, even by Hollywood standards. But today is a special screening and director Jean Jacques-Annaud is explaining to an enraptured audience how he realized one day during the filming that <em>Seven Years in Tibet</em> was really the same film as his previous noted works, <em>The Lover</em>, <em>Quest for Fire</em>, and <em>The Bear</em>. Meaning of course that they all tell the same story: the story of how a troubled protagonist is transformed through the experience of contact with an alien Other.</p><p>I slip out into the darkened streets, haunted by the tune of an old step-dance featured in the screening. When I finally look up from my thoughts, I am taken aback by a pristine image of White Tara staring serenely back at me. It is a full-length silk <em>thangka</em>, a Tibetan scroll painting, hanging from a shop window. The shop is called the Himalayan Institute and it offers a “Holistic Health Program: Yoga, Meditation, Relaxation &amp; Breathing, Diet &amp; Nutrition.” Tibet as Lifestyle, as the books showcased in the window attest, promises “Freedom from Stress,” “The Path to Power,” and teachings in “The Art of Joyful Living.” While the paraphernalia in the window are cluttered with mystical Tibetan art and imagery, none of the books bear Tibetan authorship. Traces of Tibet are ubiquitous but the people are nowhere present.</p><p>As I continue down the empty street, I recall the prophetic words of the seventh century Tantric master. Resisting the urge to curse, I strain instead to hear a different ending.</p><p><em>Tashi Rabgey, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997</em></p><p><em>This essay was written in the weeks prior to the release<br>of the film </em>Seven Years in Tibet <em>in 1997. It appeared in mechakgallery.org.</em></p><p><em>*This scene was cut from the final version of the film.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=470beb53a536" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>