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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tatyana Deryugina on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tatyana Deryugina on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tatyana-57116?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tatyana Deryugina on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tatyana-57116?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Russia Is Losing Ground, and Ukrainian Civilians Are Paying the Price]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/russia-is-losing-ground-and-ukrainian-civilians-are-paying-the-price-10b1662d8cf4?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/10b1662d8cf4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 21:45:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-07T21:46:17.031Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today, I bring you some good news. Russia actually <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026">lost ground on the battlefield</a> in October 2026. This is the second month in a row that Russia has not only failed to gain Ukrainian territory but has actually lost some.</p><p>Another piece of good news is that the Russian budget is coming increasingly under strain. The 2027–2029 budget increases military spending to a <a href="https://bearmarketbrief.substack.com/p/small-change">record level</a> while cutting civilian spending and increasing taxes. Russia is clearly finding it hard to wage this war. Its <a href="https://bearmarketbrief.substack.com/p/small-change">fiscal buffers are shrinking</a>, oil revenue has not been as high as Russia expected, and it would have a hard time borrowing to finance the war.</p><p>Russia will increasingly have to choose between continuing to wage the war and funding social spending. While Russians <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">approve of Putin</a> and the war, they are unlikely to keep doing so if there are significant cuts to their social budget. If there is high inflation or tax hikes that significantly hurt the economy, pressure to end the war will grow. (To be clear, I don’t think it will come directly from Russian people but rather elites in Putin’s inner circle.)</p><p>But it’s not all good news, unfortunately. Russia is dealing with losses on the battlefield by <a href="https://ukraine.un.org/en/324562-civilian-casualties-remain-record-levels-amid-intensifying-attacks-energy-winter-approaches">increasing its attacks</a> on civilians. This is being enabled by Trump’s failure to condemn Russia in any way, shape, or form, not even for waging the war in the first place. It is simply unacceptable that the Trump administration <a href="https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-209-the-growing-slaughter">has not condemned</a> Russia as it overtly targets civilians in daylight, killing dozens of them, and destroys energy infrastructure to make it as painful as possible for Ukrainians to survive the winter. Even sadder is that the rest of the world (including Europe, by the way) is mostly just standing by and watching. That is just shameful.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/russia-is-losing-ground-and-ukrainian?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on November 7, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=10b1662d8cf4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Russia Invaded Ukraine]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/why-russia-invaded-ukraine-815a6fc1a593?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/815a6fc1a593</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 13:52:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T14:51:49.656Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I periodically like to remind people why Russia invaded Ukraine.</p><p>After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine were initially going in broadly similar directions. Both had their struggles, their ups and downs, trying to figure out democracy. Then Vladimir Putin came to power, and Russia eventually moved (rather subtly, I would say) toward being an autocracy. It is now effectively Putin’s dictatorship. Ukraine, meanwhile, continued along the democratic path, with ups and downs for sure, and a good number of setbacks but also meaningful progress.</p><p>In the early 2010s, Ukraine was moving closer to Europe. The Eastern European countries that have joined the European Union, like Poland, have been <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/05/16/polands-eu-membership-20-years-in-20-charts/">quite successful</a>. So there was a possibility (and hope) that Ukraine would be part of the EU in the future.</p><p>That was unacceptable to Putin, because he’s a dictator. If people saw a successful, democratic Ukraine joining the European Union, Russians might want something like this for themselves. All Putin wants is personal power. He wants Ukraine to be his puppet state, not an independent democracy trading with Europe.</p><p>So Putin <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/ukraine-s-yanukovych-give-in-to-russian-pressures-on-eu-deal">meddled</a> in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement that Ukraine was making with Europe. Ukrainians saw through what was happening, and <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/euro-maidan-revolution/">they protested</a>. Putin failed to bring Ukraine under his control.</p><p>That was in 2013 and early 2014. That’s when Putin decided to take his “meddling” one step further: he <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/putin-signs-treaty-annex-crimea-russia">annexed Crimea</a> and <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/the-origins-of-the-2014-war-in-donbas/">invaded the Donbas</a>. Putin did not want to see Ukraine move toward Europe at any cost. If he couldn’t have a puppet state, he would settle for Ukraine being poor and unsuccessful, and the unrest in the Donbas served that purpose.</p><p>Eventually, he decided to go many more steps further and take more or less direct control of Ukraine, the way he has with Belarus, whose dictator is effectively Putin’s puppet. That’s what he <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022">thought he could achieve</a> with his 2022 full-scale invasion. But that clearly failed.</p><p>Now, what about the NATO enlargement issue you hear about? First, NATO is a defensive alliance, and there is no reason on earth that Putin should be able to decide who joins NATO and who doesn’t. Second, Ukraine was <a href="https://ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3403790-issue-of-ukraines-membership-in-nato-not-on-agenda-now-scholz.html">nowhere near joining</a> NATO. Finally, after Finland (another Russian neighbor) joined NATO, Putin <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-moved-almost-all-forces-from-finlands-vicinity-to-ukraine-media-report">didn’t really do anything</a>. He <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/finland-sweden-nato-russia-debate/31852819.html">made some loud noises</a> but ultimately left it alone.</p><p>So this war is not about NATO. It is about what Putin views as his “backyard”. He sees Ukraine as rightfully his to control. But obviously Ukraine is a sovereign country that should be able to decide its own fate, based on the votes of its citizens and not on what some Russian dictator wants. So, effectively, Putin invaded Ukraine to control it.</p><p>Some people may say: yes, Putin wants to control Ukraine, but he will just stop with Ukraine, so why should we care? I think that’s unlikely. Just like Ukraine is part of Putin’s perceived backyard, so is Poland, so is Moldova, so are <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608626440/estonia-summons-russian-ambassador-to-condemn-putin-s-comments">Estonia</a> and the other Baltic states. If Putin thinks he can take more states under his control, he absolutely will.</p><p>That’s why it’s important to stop Putin in Ukraine, kick him out, and not fall for his argument that this is somehow a justified war. There are reasons for this war, which I just outlined, but that does not mean it’s a “just war”, or that there is anything like “two sides” to this story. It is an imperial war of conquest. If we want to live in a peaceful, rules-based order, which I hope all of us do, we cannot allow these kinds of wars to happen, or to go unaddressed and unpunished.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/why-russia-invaded-ukraine?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on November 3, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=815a6fc1a593" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Tone It Down: Europe Should Keep Calling Putin What He Is]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/dont-tone-it-down-europe-should-keep-calling-putin-what-he-is-c81974f54cf4?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c81974f54cf4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 13:02:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-30T13:04:28.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are reports that Pentagon officials have been <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/10/30/pentagon-tells-europeans-to-cool-their-rhetoric-on-russia-sources-say/">telling European leaders</a> to “tone down their rhetoric regarding the threat posed by Russia,” on the theory that doing so actually <em>undermines</em> European security and could harm the chances for peace.</p><p>That might sound plausible, but it is another example of how the American administration is now on Putin’s side. I say “the administration”, not America because most Americans, Republicans and Democrats alike, <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/most-americans-favor-increasing-sanctions-russia">support more sanctions</a> on Russia. But the administration is now out to help Russia get what it wants. I don’t know why that is, or why Trump seems to like Putin so much. I am quite confident, though, that this administration does not have Ukraine’s best interests at heart, nor Europe’s.</p><p>There is nothing Putin would love more than not being demonized, because he uses everything positive that gets said about him for domestic propaganda. He has already managed to convince the majority of Russians that this is a war against the West and that he is fighting a righteous war. If Europe tones down its rhetoric and stops talking about how Putin is killing civilians and waging a hybrid war on Europe, then Putin gets to say: see, we were right all along, everything we are doing is good and we’re not a threat to the world.</p><p>That is unacceptable. Putin is committing war crimes. Just yesterday, two 15-year-old girls were <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russian-attacks-across-ukraine-kill-27-injure-128-over-past-day-as-horrific-attack-strikes-dnipro-train-station/">killed in Chernihiv</a> by a missile strike, and 27 Ukrainians died in total. We should not be living in a world where dictators get to commit war crimes while everybody whitewashes them and pretends this is an orderly conflict with a story on both sides.</p><p>There is no story on both sides here. Russia is invading Ukraine to expand its empire and its influence, and because Putin wants to preserve his rule at home. A democratic, successful Ukraine threatens that. The only threat Ukraine ever posed to Russia was showing Russians that there is another way to live, and that is unacceptable to Putin. He is not doing this for the Russian people. He is doing this for himself and his imperial ambitions. And he is absolutely a threat to Europe.</p><p>We all need to say what this is, because if we stop speaking the truth, we are not helping bring about peace. We are just making it easier for Russia to wage war.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/dont-tone-it-down-europe-should-keep?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on October 30, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c81974f54cf4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Be Misled by Russia’s Talk of Negotiations]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/dont-be-misled-by-russia-s-talk-of-negotiations-7de85aa36828?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7de85aa36828</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 16:31:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T16:31:25.929Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You may have seen headlines that Russia says it is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-hosts-trump-envoy-new-ukraine-peace-talks-frees-us-citizen-held-russia-2026-10-21/">ready to resume talks</a> with Ukraine and will do so in November. So should we think of this as the war finally heading toward peace, or at least a ceasefire? I think that is very unlikely.</p><p>To put things in context, what’s been happening in recent months is that the Trump administration has been coming out pretty overtly as pro-Russia. For years it’s been clear that President Trump likes President Putin and dislikes Zelensky, but he has made some attempts to hide that. Trump has threatened Putin a couple of times, although he never followed up with any real action. And in general, he seems to have been holding himself back from coming out fully pro-Putin.</p><p>Well, that’s really changed in the past couple of weeks. We’ve seen Ukraine’s use of Starlink get throttled. Ukraine <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6172405-zelensky-hegseth-ukraine-patriot-missile-approval/">isn’t getting</a> promised Patriot missile deliveries, even though these missiles are paid for by Europe. On top of that, President Trump is buying Russian diesel and <a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/president-trump-implements-and-waives-1976860/">has waived</a> all the new sanctions that were passed in the Graham Act.</p><p>So, if you’re Russia, is this the time when you’re going to say, OK, we’ll compromise on our demands? Absolutely not. The administration’s actions in the past year and a half, but especially in the past several weeks, have just been a gift to Russia. This is not sending Russia signals that now is the time to compromise. This is sending Russia signals that now is the time to potentially ask for even more.</p><p>Let’s also put in context what Russia has been asking for. Russia has maintained pretty much the same demands since it invaded. A lot of people think that Russia just wants the land. If it just wanted the land — the four oblasts of Ukraine, including areas that it does not control militarily, which is what it’s asking for — that would be a big compromise for Ukraine, but I could see Ukraine going for that.</p><p>But no, Russia is asking for not just the land. It also wants “demilitarization” of Ukraine, effectively denying Ukraine any real military. On top of that, it has pushed back against any meaningful security guarantees. For example, it insists on Russia being part of any security guarantees for Ukraine, which would just be insane for Ukraine to agree to. Russia has also said any NATO peacekeepers on Ukrainian territory would be an escalation, and has refused to consider a peace deal involving them. After the Budapest Memorandum, when Russia said it would respect and protect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, it turned around with an invasion 20 years later, and then an even bigger one eight years after that.</p><p>Russia has other demands, but hopefully it’s pretty clear why asking Ukraine to effectively have no military and denying it any meaningful security guarantees is just a non-starter. These demands effectively amount to Ukrainian capitulation. Even if Russia stops attacking for now, giving up your military and real security guarantees just invites Russia to rearm and invade you again later. So I don’t see these negotiations going anywhere, because there’s no reason for Russia to take these demands off the table now, and for Ukraine to accept them would be suicidal.</p><p>This doesn’t mean Ukraine is going to lose. Something to keep in mind is that there’s been very little movement on the front line. Ukraine is holding Russia back. Russian casualties run into the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-blood-and-treasure-ballooning-costs-putins-war">tens of thousands per month</a>, and it is not advancing meaningfully. This is one reason why Russia has doubled down on its <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/26/europe/un-report-russia-ukraine-intl">war crimes</a> “strategy” by targeting Ukrainian cities and civilians.</p><p>So Ukraine can indeed hold Russia back, and the Russian economy is not doing well. The only reason Russia is able to wage its war is the <a href="https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Chinas-Support-for-Russia-Final.pdf">support it’s getting from China</a>, both as an oil buyer and as a supplier of dual-use goods. With additional pressure on China and the United States, Ukraine could well win.</p><p>We should also not think of the United States as a lost cause, even if Trump and his inner circle are lost causes. Most Americans <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/most-americans-favor-increasing-sanctions-russia">support more sanctions</a> on Russia, whether they’re Republicans or Democrats. Same with most politicians: most Democrats and Republicans are not pro-Russia. And the administration does respond to pressure. Ukraine’s access to Starlink has been restored, which I I don’t think would have happened if it wasn’t for the negative public scrutiny.</p><p>So we need to keep up the pressure on the US administration and make it clear that it is unacceptable to support Russia. To do so would be to support a ruthless dictatorship and against American values.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/dont-be-misled-by-russias-talk-of?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on October 26, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7de85aa36828" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trump the Putin spokesperson]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/trump-the-putin-spokesperson-9b9c7eb60000?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b9c7eb60000</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 13:13:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-20T13:14:16.648Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Sunday, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-drone-st-petersburg-oil-facilites/">Trump claimed</a> Zelenskyy is not interested in ending the war. Just in case you or your friends/colleagues aren’t following developments too closely, I want to point out a few things, beyond the obvious fact that it is Russia that has crossed Ukraine’s borders and the war would be over tomorrow if Russia stopped attacking.</p><p>Russia’s “negotiating” stance has not changed since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. It effectively wants <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-06-03/meeting-istanbul-kremlins-maximalist-demands">full Ukrainian capitulation</a> <em>even to have a ceasefire</em>. Among other things, it wants Ukraine to give up four provinces, including parts that Russia does not control, and to “demilitarize”, which translates into not having a real army. At the same time, it has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-there-cant-be-security-guarantees-ukraine-without-its-involvement-2026-07-14/">rejected</a> the idea of any kind of real security guarantees for Ukraine, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-rejects-idea-nato-peacekeepers-ukraine-warning-uncontrollable-escalation-2025-01-23/">NATO peacekeepers</a>.</p><p>I hope it’s clear why this is a non-starter for Ukrainians. If it was a matter of land, one could hem and haw about fairness and justice but maybe ultimately conclude that the benefits of peace outweigh this cost. But for Ukraine to give up its military and to have no real security guarantees with Russia as its neighbor would be suicidal. Russia’s promises to not invade are worth absolutely nothing, and there is no doubt in my mind that if Ukraine agreed to such a “peace” deal, it would soon find itself invaded again. And Russia would almost surely get even more aggressive, perhaps setting its sights on some of the Baltic states.</p><p>It’s also not clear that Russia itself would ultimately agree to this peace. Remember, these are just its preconditions for a <em>ceasefire</em>. Even if Ukraine agreed to these (in some alternate universe where it lost good judgement), Russia would surely ask for more. For example, there is no way in hell that Russia would let Ukraine have free and fair elections without interfering and making sure that the winner is someone that Russia can control.</p><p>By contrast, Ukraine has been offering Russia an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_war_(2022%E2%80%93present)">unconditional ceasefire</a> <em>since May 2025</em>. Russia has refused. It is not Ukraine that’s not willing to compromise. It is Russia.</p><p>I don’t know if Trump really believes that Russia is the peaceful one here (after all, he <em>has</em> spent a ridiculous amount of time on the phone with Putin, and Putin is a master of BSing with a straight face). Or maybe Trump is just cynically pursuing self-serving ends. Maybe a bit of both. Regardless, it is wrong, and it is costing not only Ukrainian lives but current and future world security.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/trump-the-putin-spokesperson?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on October 20, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b9c7eb60000" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[War Crimes Shouldn’t Become Normal]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/war-crimes-shouldnt-become-normal-4184b0e6a412?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4184b0e6a412</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 15:09:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-07T15:10:27.106Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle.” — George Orwell</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vWIckXZfgYoEdtmk.jpeg" /></figure><p>When wars drag on, it’s not surprising that people get used to them to some extent. That may be a helpful coping strategy for Ukrainians living under constant Russian bombardment, but for the rest of us, habituation is a real problem. Because if we become complacent about targeting civilians and wars of aggression, we will certainly get more of both.</p><p>Today, Russia is targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure deliberately to make Ukrainians suffer and surrender. As Phillips O’Brien aptly <a href="https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-205-russias-strategy?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=email">put it</a>, Russia’s current strategy is “war crimes”, not least because it’s not winning on the battlefield. Attacks on civilians should not be something we learn to tolerate. This only suits Russia, and it ultimately makes the world a more dangerous place.</p><p>I’m not suggesting that we all try to imagine what people in Ukraine are going through and feel horrible each day more missiles and drones land on Ukrainian cities, not least because sitting around feeling sad, depressed, or guilty helps no one. Nor are words of sympathy and outrage helpful on their own. What we need is action.</p><p>What can you do? Here are some specific suggestions:</p><p>1. <strong>Talk about Ukraine with friends, colleagues, students, and family. </strong>Share high-quality information with them. Silence makes it easier for a prolonged war to fade from view.</p><p>2. <strong>Beware of disinformation</strong>. Take time to understand <a href="https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/RussianDisinformationFinal.pdf">how Russian disinformation operates</a>. Check claims before sharing them, rely on credible sources, and correct false claims when you encounter them.</p><p>3. <strong>Stay informed beyond skimming headlines.</strong> For example, a headline might say “Russia says it is ready to negotiate,” but the actual article might reveal that Russia’s “required pre-conditions” for negotiations amount to Ukraine effectively surrendering. (This specific example is an old trick that Russia keeps using.) <strong>Read credible sources</strong>, like <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/">Reuters</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine">Associated Press</a> for daily updates and the <a href="https://www.economist.com/topics/ukraine">Economist</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ukraine">Guardian</a>, and the <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/">Kyiv Independent</a> for more in-depth coverage. <strong>Subscribe to or donate to outlets and reporters</strong> doing serious reporting from Ukraine (like the Kyiv Independent). Good reporting is expensive, particularly during a long war.</p><p>4. <strong>Engage politically.</strong> Contact your elected representatives and tell them what policies toward Ukraine you want them to support. Vote with foreign policy in mind, and ask candidates specific questions about what they would do.</p><p>5. <strong>Support Ukrainians directly.</strong> Donate to reputable Ukrainian humanitarian organizations, medical charities, and reconstruction efforts. The <a href="https://foundation.kse.ua/en/donation/">Kyiv School of Economics</a>, <a href="https://www.razomforukraine.org/donate-to-ukraine/">Razom</a>, and <a href="https://novaukraine.org/?gad_source=1&amp;gad_campaignid=20466823841&amp;gclid=CjwKCAjw25fWBhAVEiwAMopNjqzWZU4MhsqylcW00wSuJ78gO9E2rKLD4tDXZ094hnV1qwX7iiMbQBoC3dkQAvD_BwE">Nova Ukraine</a> are my favorites, as is <a href="https://savelife.in.ua/en/">Come Back Alive</a>, although donations to CBA are not tax-deductible (but do you itemize anyway?). <strong>Set up a recurring contribution</strong> to guard against donor fatigue.</p><p>Of course, we all have limited time, attention, and money. You don’t have to follow every development, donate to every cause, or make Ukraine a central part of your life to be a good or caring person. But most of us can do something and the most important thing to do is resist the temptation to simply tune out. Pick a few things that make sense for you and keep doing them so that what is happening in Ukraine never becomes so familiar that we stop seeing it.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/war-crimes-shouldnt-become-normal?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on October 7, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4184b0e6a412" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Confronting China over its support for Russia]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/confronting-china-over-its-support-for-russia-d552db55b93c?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d552db55b93c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 19:26:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T19:28:53.682Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oleksandr Shepotylo and I have a new Economists for Ukraine <a href="https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Chinas-Support-for-Russia-Final.pdf">policy brief</a> on the role of China in Russia’s war on Ukraine, which I will summarize in this post.</p><p>China is THE reason Russia is able to continue waging this war today. China buys almost 40% of Russia’s exports, and almost 60% of everything Russia imports comes from China. No other Russian trading partner comes even close to being this important.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kW40UJ8bjexLYkGn32aj0g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Russia’s top trading partners</figcaption></figure><p>China also sells Russia much of the dual-use technology that Russia needs to build missiles and drones that terrorize Ukrainian civilians daily. If trade with China were to be meaningfully reduced, Russia would be in serious trouble.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F-GDXVSpjso89XAdVi12qg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2. China’s exports of dual-use goods to Russia</figcaption></figure><p>It is not infeasible to confront China over its support for Russia. Europe has a lot of leverage: in 2025, it bought USD 560 billion of Chinese goods. And thus far, it has failed to use it.</p><p>China has historically shown itself to be a practical country. Its support for Russia is more opportunistic than ideological, and by changing the cost-benefit calculus, Europe can put some real pressure where it can make a big difference</p><p>The most promising approach is likely to be a combination of carrots and sticks.</p><p>What are the carrots? More access to the EU market. The EU can promise a gradual lifting of trade barriers in exchange for verifiable reductions in supplying Russia with dual-use goods.</p><p>The sticks are the opposite policy: if China does <em>not</em> reduce its supply of dual-use goods and purchases of Russian oil, then trade barriers should increase.</p><p>Will China go for it? We argue that China’s support for Russia is ultimately driven by rational self-interest, not any ideological commitment. The economic value of the dual-use good trade is small, as is the discount that China gets on Russian oil. The EU market is much more valuable to China.</p><p>Failure to confront China over its role in enabling Russia’s war is dangerous, as it signals that support for aggressors carries minimal cost if one is powerful enough. And while there is risk of domestic discontent with lifting trade restrictions as well as of Chinese retaliation, these risks are manageable. For example, the EU should prepare for that possibility by diversifying its supply of critical minerals and setting up a compensation fund for any members who suffer disproportionate harm.</p><p>By turning a blind eye to China, Europe is gambling with its own future. If Ukraine falters and Chinese support for Russia isn’t stopped, Russia will almost certainly come for other European countries next.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ukraineinsights.substack.com/p/confronting-china-over-its-support?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em> on September 21, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d552db55b93c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Website to track the health of the US economy]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/website-to-track-the-health-of-the-us-economy-6de9818b17a7?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6de9818b17a7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-states]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 18:43:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-11T18:50:39.643Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The US economy has done better than I expected over the past 1.5 years. But I still feel like trouble is on the horizon, for three main reasons: the US administration is creating quite a bit of economic uncertainty with its policies, US debt is piling up, and the <a href="https://ruleoflawfail.com/">rule of law</a> — which I think is vital for strong economic growth — seems to be in decline.</p><p>Of course, the shorter-run robustness of the US economy is not inconsistent with the aforementioned factors being harmful to growth, especially because deficit spending provides a stimulus in the short run and AI activity is booming. In my view, the US economy is therefore still very much at risk of a downturn. But I can’t claim that I know <em>when</em> the downturn might begin because some key determinants, like consumer and investor confidence, are very hard (if not impossible) to forecast.</p><p>That said, just because something is hard doesn’t mean one shouldn’t try. So I built a <a href="https://usbarometer.com/index.html">website that tracks the health of the US economy</a> (GDP, inflation, unemployment, consumer sentiment, national debt, etc) and includes a forecast of where the economy is headed over the next year created using publicly available data and a fairly standard macro toolkit.</p><p>Here are the key prediction for June 2027 (the data are released with a lag, so we have to stop a bit short of a year): prices will go up by 3%, unemployment will be at 4.5%, GDP will grow by 2.5% and median real wages will be roughly unchanged, up 0.4%.</p><p>Pretty boring predictions, if you ask me. Of course, this is an average. The forecast also generates confidence intervals to illustrate the range of possibilities. For unemployment, shown in the graph below, there’s a 68% chance that unemployment will be between 3.8% and 4.7%. As you can see in the graph, there’s an asymmetry, and we’re much more likely to see unemployment decrease than increase over the next year in this confidence band. That said, if we want to be 90% confident, then an <em>increase</em> in unemployment becomes much more likely.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IfjMO7fwAxqNyeXC.jpg" /></figure><p>Check out the website for more forecasts! And even if you think data-driven forecasts are low-value because they can’t predict unexpected shocks (other than accounting for their existence with confidence bands), I think there’s still value in having easily accessible and objective measures of the US economy. For example, I’m tracking real wages of the bottom 10%, median, and top 10% worker so that it’s easy to see whose wages are growing and by how much.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tflU_pjLUAL2FX8D.jpg" /></figure><p>All feedback, including other statistics you would want to see and suggestions for the forecasting model (technical methodology <a href="https://usbarometer.com/methodology.pdf">here</a>), is welcome!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://mytwocentsandcounting.substack.com/p/website-to-track-the-health-of-the?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://mytwocentsandcounting.substack.com</em></a><em> on August 11, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6de9818b17a7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Website to track Trump administration’s problematic actions]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/website-to-track-trump-administrations-problematic-actions-1cc656ad4bb1?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1cc656ad4bb1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 21:04:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-22T21:05:48.432Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Trump administration has pursued many actions that are likely unconstitutional, illegal, or abuses of power. So many that it’s hard to keep track of. To help you and others do that, I built <a href="https://ruleoflawfail.com/">https://ruleoflawfail.com/</a>, which documents and organizes these by type and severity.</p><p>There are many first, fifth, and tenth amendment violations; federal spending and separation-of-powers violations; and your “run-of-the-mill” illegal actions, corruption, and abuse of power more generally.</p><p>I provide a credible source for each one, for documentation and in case you want to learn more. Court outcomes are also tracked. I decided to separate the most egregious violations from the less egregious ones to avoid overwhelming the reader. Which is kind of ridiculous if you think about it, but here we are.</p><p>I’m going to update the site monthly. Keep it on hand for the next time someone asks, “But what exactly have they done that’s illegal?”</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/mytwocentsandcounting/p/website-to-track-trump-administrations?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://mytwocentsandcounting.substack.com</em></a><em> on July 22, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1cc656ad4bb1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Turning the lights down, not off: a better way to ration electricity in Ukraine]]></title>
            <link>https://tatyana-57116.medium.com/turning-the-lights-down-not-off-a-better-way-to-ration-electricity-in-ukraine-aa85d2ba493a?source=rss-54381682e587------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa85d2ba493a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tatyana Deryugina]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 19:03:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-27T19:03:01.131Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since late 2022, Russia has been methodically destroying Ukraine’s power grid, and the default response has been rolling blackouts. Neighborhoods go completely dark for 12, 14, sometimes 16 hours, and then the power comes roaring back. It’s operationally simple and feels even-handed. But, from an economist’s point of view, it’s a very wasteful way to ration a scarce good.</p><p>In a terrific recent paper, <a href="https://mreguant.github.io/papers/Rationing_Submission.pdf">“Smart Power Limits: Designing Shortage Mechanisms for Extreme Events,”</a> Mar Reguant and Mayra Wagner work out the economics of <em>load limiting</em> — capping how much power a household can draw rather than cutting it off entirely. Recently, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Mar Reguant and I asked what their insight would mean for Ukraine; that’s the subject of a new Economists for Ukraine <a href="https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/PolicyBriefElectricity.pdf">policy brief</a>. Here are the key takeaways of Reguant and Wagner as well as our application of the idea for Ukraine.</p><p><strong>1. The first kilowatt-hour is worth far more than the last.</strong> The electricity that powers your lights, charges your phone, keeps your router on, and runs your refrigerator is extraordinarily valuable — losing it is genuinely painful. The electricity that runs your dishwasher, your hair dryer, or your electric water heater is nice, but you can be ok without it for a while. A blackout makes no distinction between the two.</p><p><strong>2. Blackouts ration in a very costly way.</strong> Beyond cutting the most valuable units of electricity, the all-or-nothing approach has three other bad features. First, when the power returns, everyone rushes to use their electric devices at once, producing demand spikes that strain an already-fragile grid. Second, blackouts don’t target the households driving peak demand, so a retiree running a fridge and a lamp loses everything when a scheduled blackout kicks on while a high-consumption household elsewhere faces no constraint at all. Third, blackouts are quietly regressive: families who can afford batteries, generators, and backup chargers can ride out the dark hours in relative comfort, while everyone else absorbs the full cost. So blackouts don’t just cut a lot of welfare, they cut it from the people least able to cope.</p><p><strong>3. There’s a better way, and it’s available in many places already.</strong> Instead of switching a household off entirely, many smart meters can cap how much power it can draw at any instant — a <em>load limit</em>. You keep continuous access up to some threshold, enough for the essentials, while the energy-hungry appliances are the ones that get squeezed. The reason this works so well, as Reguant and Wagner show with large-scale smart-meter data, is that electricity consumption is heavy-tailed: a small share of users and appliances accounts for a big share of peak demand. So even a limit that “binds” for many households does most of its work by throttling the heaviest draws, not by plunging entire neighborhoods into darkness. Their analysis also makes a striking point: under reasonable assumptions about risk aversion, load limiting can be a genuine Pareto improvement over blackouts, meaning almost everyone is better off and essentially no one is worse off.</p><p>In the brief we sketch a sample worst-case-scenario winter regime for Ukraine. Standard households get a round-the-clock cap of 0.25 kW — enough to run lights, a router (about 0.01 kW), phone charging, and a refrigerator (0.1–0.4 kW when the compressor kicks in) — plus a daily two-hour “boost” to 2 kW for cooking, laundry, and the like. Medically vulnerable households (capped at roughly 5% of customers) get a higher 0.6 kW base. Customers are split into 12 rotating groups so that only one group boosts at a time, which keeps the rebound peaks from coming back. Yes, that base limit is tight, but it’s a continuous, predictable trickle instead of a 14-hour void.</p><p>Currently, smart-meter penetration in Ukraine is only about 20%, and most of those meters can’t be remotely throttled. That’s a real constraint, but it’s an argument for phasing, not for giving up. You don’t need 100% penetration to start. We suggest deploying load limits now where capable meters already exist, even if just during peak-stress hours. Ukraine should treat accelerating the meter rollout as critical wartime resilience infrastructure and fund it with donor and reconstruction money. (Spain, France, and South Africa have rolled out millions of these meters in a few years when they decided to.) And partial deployment helps <em>everyone</em>, because shaving aggregate demand in the equipped areas shortens blackouts for the households that still don’t have smart meters at all.</p><p>We are not selling load limits as a cure-all; in particular, they are not appropriate for industrial users. Many industrial processes need a minimum continuous load to run safely; squeeze them below it and output can collapse or equipment can be damaged. That minimum varies hugely across firms and is nearly impossible to verify administratively, especially in an emergency. So for industrial users, the better instrument is price: scarcity-responsive pricing and interruptibility contracts that let firms who truly value the power keep running if they pay the real scarcity cost, and pay everyone else to power down when the system is stressed. Prices also push firms toward on-site generation and storage, which takes pressure off the public grid exactly when it’s most fragile.</p><p>Beyond the economics, load limiting is probably <em>more</em> publicly acceptable than blackouts, not less. It guarantees everyone some power, it visibly asks more of heavy users, and it avoids the crime, isolation, and economic paralysis that come with hours of darkness.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://open.substack.com/pub/ukraineinsights/p/turning-the-lights-down-not-off-a?r=p4fe8&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;showWelcomeOnShare=true"><em>https://ukraineinsights.substack.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa85d2ba493a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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