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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Taukir Aziz on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[COVID-19, oil crash and impending havoc in global remittance economy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@taukir/covid-19-oil-crash-and-impending-havoc-in-global-remittance-economy-dcfdfccaca9c?source=rss-285d82a4ebe4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[remittances]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid-economic-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[emerging-market-economies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangladesh-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Taukir Aziz]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2020 16:36:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-27T17:15:48.056Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>COVID, oil price crash and impending havoc in remittance cushion of emerging economies- a case study</h3><p><strong><em>This article analyzes the effect of COVID-19 and oil price crash on remittance income of emerging countries. My most recent research involved the remittance forecasting of Bangladesh but it on a fundamental level this macro applies to Pakistan, Vietnam, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Philippine, Egypt, Jordan and other emerging economies as well. Bangladesh works as a good case study in this scenario because it in terms of dependence on remittance lies in the middle.</em></strong></p><p>2020, with all its eventfulness will be going down in history as the year when politics, business, diplomatic relations, human behavior all are positioned to undergo a major overhaul. The world has more complex geo-political relationships compared to in 2001, more intertwined business mechanism than in 2008 and facing a health crisis modern world has seen nothing alike. Now predicting the effect of all that would require a crystal ball but what we can surely say is that there will be change in almost all aspects of the world as we know it whether that change takes place over a couple of years or a decade. <em>Change is certain, direction and magnitude is not</em>.</p><p>Economies across the globe are visibly bearing the brunt and it seems no country will be spared. Emerging countries however are seemingly taking a bigger hit than their developed counterparts, which would intuitively make sense as these countries have less experience and capacity to withhold a fallout like this and not having enough resource buffer to offset a pandemic doesn’t help either.</p><h3><strong>Remittance and emerging countries</strong></h3><p>What makes emerging countries ‘emerging’ is their rapid economic growth usually fueled by cheap labor, causing capital to bring in high return. However because these countries have a massive underutilized labor pool, they figured its even better to export the excess labor to countries with higher labor cost. These labor usually works on a temporary basis and the labourers send their paycheck to their families in the native country. For the past 3–4 decades this has been on the rise and providing emerging countries with an useful cushion for their comparatively weaker currency and balance of payment. Let’s see the example of Bangladesh here. Remittance earning has been on the rise last few decades. Over the past decade it has reached $20B per year if we count remittance coming through both formal and informal channels.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RSPittFVuo1CpL_x9S09ZQ.png" /><figcaption>The trend of balance of payment and with remittance correlationfor Bangladesh</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*3CdS-53j1pYKFXgHgX67HA.png" /></figure><p>This is Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate over the last 10 years according to The World Bank. Much of this high growth has been a result of a thriving readymade garments sector and remittance from overseas workers.</p><p>Emerging countries usually have an underdeveloped service sector, which is why they have to rely on manufacturing and high export volume to keep the economy growing. In order to take on infrastructure and industrialization projects to make the country more competitive they need access to foreign currencies. One of the way to that is earnings from export, but remittance from expats have been playing a big role in this regard for decades now. Below is a chart that shows the amount of remittance Bangladesh received since 1991 and that as a part of its GDP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y7YE7aT42od5WJCH9Euk6A.png" /></figure><p>Luckily Bangladesh has been diversifying the economy in other sectors and as such although while growing, remittance has decreased as ratio of GDP.</p><p>Other countries in the region show similar relations with expat remittance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o2ROQ7phmnis4oebaSZAWg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Changing Landscape in the Gulf countries (GCC) and other labor importing countries</strong></h3><p>Price of oil decreased by almost 60% during the first 3 months of 2020. It is estimated that many OPEC countries won’t even be able to pay their public sector employees if low oil price continues. In Oman, public deficit could soar to 20% of GDP. In Bahrain, government debt is going to be the size that far exceeds the size of the economy.</p><p>Historically, the biggest destinations for migrant workers has been the oil-exporting countries or countries whose economies depend on petroleum heavily. These countries’ easy access to petro-dollars have enabled them to expand infrastructures and in order to procure construction and other blue-collar labor they have heavily dependent on migrant workforce. If we see the chart, crude oil price shows up as a leading factor for remittance forecasting in Bangladesh. And the oil price gives us a grim prediction on this matter. This is a phenomenon very common all around the world; given that historically</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6XVhPlGWm21amGdR-wGlHg.png" /><figcaption>Bangladesh Yearly Remittance data and it’s relation with oil price</figcaption></figure><p>a massive portion of remittance outflow occurs from the GCC, Russian Federation and other oil-exporting countries, oil price has always been a leading indicator for global remittance outflow.</p><p>And with COVID-19 wreaking havoc in global consumer demand, aviation, shipping and logistics industry, it is safe to say the global demand for oil will stay low for quite a while which has already been factored in the market’s pricing of oil futures. We expect KSA to suspend all the ambitious projects they had taken because of budgetary issues triggering low demand for migrant workers.</p><p>The Biggest market for Bangladeshi migrant workers in the world so far has been the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has been a destination of almost half the migrant workforce with almost 4 million Bangladeshis working there over the years. Every year, around 300,000–600,000 Bangladeshi nationals go to KSA for work. However, at least 24,281 Bangladeshi workers returned from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between January 1 and November 30, 2019, because of new Saudi Arabian policies. According to the KSA government officials and experts the number of migrants is way more than the number of jobs available. The recent Saudi nationalization scheme or ‘Nitaqat’ meant to increase the employment of Saudi nationals, has led to layoffs of Bangladeshi migrant workers. In all 55,335 workers have returned to Bangladesh in 2019. This will be a fast-shrinking opportunity for the vast unskilled and semi-skilled migrant employees and will cause these workers adding to the unemployed or underemployed domestic labor force.</p><p>The Malaysian government’s “Back for Good (B4G)” program that offered amnesty to illegal foreigners repatriated over 40,000 Bangladeshi workers in 2019.</p><p>Other GCC countries are already pressurizing the government to take back the Bangladeshi workers working there. We are yet to see how that unfolds, but it is safe to say the new workers permit won’t be as available as they were before.</p><p>Experts estimate, in total about 2 million workers will be deported following this slump. Already 700 thousand workers have returned in the first quarter of 2020. About 600 thousand workers will be stranded and unable to go back to their job. UAE hosts about a million workers , but further recruitment will be delayed because of this slump.</p><p>However this is not a case unique to Bangladesh, migrant workers from all countries are facing similar fate in these countries.</p><h3><strong>Effect on South Asian Countries</strong></h3><p>GCC countries leash on ambitious expenditure will be a blow to Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Philipines etc. Many significant occurrences are taking place in the world during this COVID-19 pandemic. And certainly, a lot of others will follow it. Just like the oil crash is transforming global economy, the chain effect will multiply them exponentially and affect areas in unimaginable ways. The World Bank has forecasted 22% decrease in remittance earning in South Asia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bFnFADgwXHr8TZZQMPQMBw.png" /></figure><p>Compared to similar economies, Bangladesh has lower dependence on remittance. For example, Nepal and Philippines has a Remittance to GDP ratio of almost 30% and 10% respectively. Whereas for Bangladesh’s it’s less than 6%. And unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh has a comparatively diversified and lower dependency on the GCC countries which will see the lowest outflow of remittance. India however is the strongest in this aspect, with less than 3% remittance to GDP ratio.</p><h3><strong>Non-Oil Exporting Countries in the Middle East are not well either</strong></h3><p>Iraq is expected to undergo 5% contraction in the economy this year. Iraqi government depends on oil for 90% of their annual expenditure, their budget requires $56/barrel oil.</p><p>IMF forecasts Jordan’s economy to shrink by 3.5% this year. Due to the drop in oil prices, Jordan will suffer in from lower remittances from the Gulf. On top of that a lot of financing that would have come from the Gulf countries would decrease as they have their own troubles.</p><p>For Lebanon and Egypt, the drop in remittances is particularly acute, with such remittance payments estimated at $7.3bn (12.5 percent of Lebanon’s GDP) and $25.2bn (8.4 percent of Egypt’s GDP) in 2019. The Lebanese Lira has already devalued about 50% against the USD. Remittances from the Gulf accounted for 43 percent of those coming into Lebanon during 2017. And all these would be a blow to the banking sector, import-oriented business and infrastructure development of these countries. For Egypt, tourism and trade volume decrease through major routes is going to be another fatal blow as Suez canal revenue at $5.7B consists of 2% of the GDP. They are already undergoing massive downturn in the tourism sector that is 4.2% of the GDP. However these are dwarfed by their remittance earning that is 8–9% of their GDP.</p><p>The World Bank already estimates a substantial dip in the global remittance flow that stands at about half a trillion dollar as of now. But the human cost of this is likely to be far reaching. Also compared to other capital this remittance capital tends to work much better as they provide sustenance to the people who need it the most and create jobs when used as capital. The chain of events that are likely to follow it won’t be pleasant for anyone involved. We are yet to see how this whole thing plays out. My assumption is that until accessible treatment to COVID is achieved, remittance economy is unlikely to go back to the old normal.</p><p>Sources:</p><ol><li><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/coronavirus-egypt-lebanon-jordan-remittance-economy">https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/coronavirus-egypt-lebanon-jordan-remittance-economy</a></li><li><a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-recent-history">https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-recent-history</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dcfdfccaca9c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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