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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tony Martin-Vegue on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tony Martin-Vegue on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tony Martin-Vegue on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[I’ve Moved — Here’s Where to Find Me Now]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/ive-moved-here-s-where-to-find-me-now-9a7300bda97a?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jun 2025 19:52:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-16T19:52:24.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>I’ve Moved — Here’s Where to Find Me Now</strong></h3><p>Hi there,</p><p>I no longer write here on Medium, but I’m still sharing ideas and essays elsewhere. If you’ve followed me for my work on cyber risk, quantification, or decision-making, here’s where you can stay connected:</p><p>📘 <strong>Essays</strong> (posted about twice a month): <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/">https://www.tonym-v.com</a></p><p>📬 <strong>Monthly newsletter</strong>: <a href="https://heatmapstohistograms.substack.com/">Heatmaps to Histograms</a> — tactics, tools, and field notes on modern risk thinking</p><p>👋 <strong>LinkedIn</strong>: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/tonymartinvegue/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/tonymartinvegue/</a></p><p>Thanks for reading — hope to see you in one of those spots.</p><p>— Tony</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a7300bda97a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Most Basic Thanksgiving Turkey Recipe — with Metrics!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/the-most-basic-thanksgiving-turkey-recipe-with-metrics-f96982b9de01?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[food]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thanksgiving]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cooking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-26T23:45:03.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Most Basic Thanksgiving Turkey Recipe — with Metrics!</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*PYSES3JJXTBCDf5Y" /></figure><p>I love Thanksgiving. Most cultures have a day of gratitude or a harvest festival, and this is ours. I also love cooking. I’m moderately good at it, so when we host Thanksgiving, I tackle the turkey. It brings me great joy, not only because it tastes great, but because it’s <em>hard</em>. Anyone who knows me knows I love hard problems. Just cooking a turkey is easy, but cooking it right is hard.</p><p>I’ve gathered decades of empirical evidence on how to cook a turkey from my own attempts and from observing my mother and grandmother. I treat cooking turkey like a critical project, with risk factors, mitigants and — of course — metrics. Metrics are essential to me because I can measure the success of my current cooking effort and improve year over year.</p><h3>Turkey Cooking Objectives</h3><p>Let’s define what we want to achieve. A successful Thanksgiving turkey has the following attributes:</p><ul><li>The bird is thoroughly cooked and does not have any undercooked areas.</li><li>The reversal of a raw bird is an overcooked, dry one. It’s a careful balancing act between a raw and dry bird, with little margin for error.</li><li>Tastes good and is flavorful.</li><li>The bird is done cooking within a predictable timeframe (think side dishes. If your ETA is way off in either direction, you can end up with cold sides or a cold bird.)</li></ul><h3>Tony’s Turkey Golden Rules</h3><ul><li><strong>Brining is a personal choice.</strong> It’s controversial. Some people swear by a wet brine, a dry brine, or no brine. There’s no one right way — each has pros, cons, and different outcomes. Practice different methods on whole chickens throughout the year to find what works for you. I prefer a wet brine with salt, herbs, and spices.</li><li><strong>Nothing (or very little) in the cavity</strong>. It’s tempting to fill the cavity up with stuffing, apples, onions, lemons and garlic. It inhibits airflow and heat while cooking, significantly adding to total cooking time. Achieving a perfectly cooked turkey with a moist breast means you are cooking this thing as fast as possible.</li><li><strong>No basting</strong>. Yes, basting helps keep the breast moist, but you’re also opening the oven many times, letting heat out — increasing the cooking time. I posit basting gives the cook diminished returns and can have the unintended consequence of throwing the side dish timing out of whack.</li></ul><h3>The Most Basic Recipe</h3><h4>Required Tools</h4><ul><li>Turkey lacer kit (pins and string)</li><li>Roasting pan</li><li>Food thermometer (a real one, not the pop-up kind)</li></ul><h4>Ingredients</h4><ul><li>Turkey</li><li>Salt</li><li>Herb butter (this is just herbs, like thyme, mixed into butter. Make this in the morning)</li></ul><h4>Prep Work</h4><ul><li>If frozen, make sure the turkey is sufficiently thawed. The ratio is 24 hours in the refrigerator for every 5 pounds.</li><li>Preheat the oven to 325 degrees Fahrenheit.</li><li>Remove the turkey from the packaging or brine bag. Check the cavity and ensure it’s empty.</li><li>Rub salt on the whole turkey, including the cavity. Take it easy on this step if you brined.</li><li>Loosen the skin on the breast and shove herb butter between the skin and meat.</li><li>Melt some of your butter and brush it on.</li><li>Pin the wings under the bird and tie the legs together.</li><li>Determine your cooking time. It’s about 13–15 minutes per pound (at 325F) <a href="https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/poultry-preparation/lets-talk-turkey/CT_Index">per the USDA.</a></li><li><strong>Optional</strong>: You can put rosemary, thyme, sage, lemons or apples into the cavity, but take it easy. Just a little bit — you don’t want to inhibit airflow.</li><li><strong>Optional</strong>: <a href="https://www.finecooking.com/article/how-to-calibrate-your-oven">Calibrate your oven</a> and your <a href="https://www.foodrepublic.com/2011/04/04/how-to-calibrate-your-food-thermometer/">kitchen thermometer</a> for a more accurate cooking time range.</li></ul><h3>Cooking</h3><ul><li>Put the turkey in the oven</li><li>About halfway through the cooking time, cover the turkey breast with aluminum foil. This is the only time you will open the oven, other than taking temperature readings. This can be mitigated somewhat with the use of a digital remote thermometer.</li><li>About 10–15 minutes before the cooking time is up, take a temperature reading. I take two; the innermost part of the thigh and the thickest part of the breast. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fvKetNQC2hE">Watch this video for help</a>.</li><li>Take the turkey out when the temperature reads 165 degrees F. Let it rest for 15–20 minutes.</li><li>Carving is a special skill. Here’s <a href="https://www.realsimple.com/food-recipes/cooking-tips-techniques/carve-turkey">great guidance</a>.</li></ul><h3>Metrics</h3><p>Metrics are my favorite part. How do we know we met our objectives? Put another way — what would we directly observe that would tell us Thanksgiving was successful?</p><p>Here are some starting metrics:</p><ul><li><strong>Cooking time within the projected range</strong>: We want everything to be served warm or hot, so the turkey should be ready +/- 15 minutes within the projected total cooking time. Anything more, in either direction, is a risk factor. Think of the projected cooking time as your forecast. Was your forecast accurate? Were you under or overconfident?</li><li><strong>Raw</strong>: This is a binary metric; it either is, or it isn’t. If you cut into the turkey and there are pink areas, something went wrong. Your thermometer is broken, needs calibration, or you took the temperature wrong.</li><li><strong>Is the turkey moist, flavorful, and enjoyable to eat?</strong> This is a bit harder because it’s an intangible. <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2019/5/6/an-evening-with-doug-hubbard-the-failure-of-risk-management-why-its-still-broken-and-how-to-fix-it">We know that intangibles can be measured</a>, so let’s give it a shot. Imagine two families sitting down for Thanksgiving dinner: Family #1 has a dry, gross, overcooked turkey. Family #2 has a moist, perfectly cooked turkey. What differences are we observing between families?</li><li><strong>% of people that take a second helping</strong>. This has to be a range because some people will always get seconds, and others will never, regardless of how dry or moist it is. In my family, everyone is polite and won’t tell me it’s dry during the meal, but if the percentage of second helpings is less than prior observations (generally, equal to or less than 20%), there’s a problem. There’s my first KPI (key performance indicator).</li><li><strong>% of people that use too much gravy</strong>. This also has to be a range because some people drink gravy like its water, and others hate it. Gravy makes dry, tasteless turkey taste better. I know my extended family very well, and if the percentage of people overusing gravy exceeds 40%, it’s too dry. Keep in mind that “too much gravy” is subjective and should be rooted in prior observations.</li><li><strong>% of kids that won’t eat the food</strong>. Children under the age of 10 lack the manners and courteousness of their adult counterparts. It’s a general fact that most kids like poultry (McNuggets, chicken strips, chicken cheesy rice) and a good turkey should, at the very least, get picked at, if not devoured by a child 10 or under. If 50% or more of kids in my house won’t take a second bite, something is wrong.</li><li><strong>% of leftover turkey that gets turned into soup, or thrown out.</strong> Good turkey doesn’t last long. Bad turkey gets turned into soup or thrown out after a few days in the refrigerator. In my house, if 60% or more of leftovers don’t get directly eaten within four days, it wasn’t that good.</li><li><strong>Bonus</strong>: <strong>Predictive Key Risk Indicator.</strong> In late October, if 50% or more of your household is lobbying for you to “take it easy this year” and “just get Chinese takeout,” your Thanksgiving plan is at risk. In metrics and forecasting, past is prologue. Last year’s turkey didn’t turn out well!</li></ul><p>Adjust all of the above thresholds to control for your own familial peculiarities: picky eaters, never/always eat leftovers (regardless of factors), a bias for Chinese takeout, etc.</p><p>With these tips, you are more likely to enjoy a delicious and low-risk holiday. Happy Thanksgiving!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2019/11/26/the-most-basic-thanksgiving-turkey-recipe-with-metrics"><em>https://www.tonym-v.com</em></a><em> on November 26, 2019.</em></p><p><em>About the author:</em></p><p>Tony Martin-Vegue is a writer, speaker and risk expert with a passion for data driven decision making. He brings his expertise in economics, cyber risk quantification and information security to advise senior operational and security leaders on how to integrate evidence-based risk analysis into business strategy. He has led risk teams for several Bay Area financial institutions and in the words of his eight-year-old son, has spent much of the last 20 years “Fighting criminals on the internet.” Tony is also the chair of the San Francisco chapter of the FAIR Institute — a professional organization dedicated to advancing risk quantification. Please visit <a href="http://www.tonym-v.com/">www.tonym-v.com</a> for more.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f96982b9de01" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Should I buy mobile phone insurance? A Quantitative Risk Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/should-i-buy-mobile-phone-insurance-a-quantitative-risk-analysis-392aa0e2ff40?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[insurance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Dec 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-11T15:36:08.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/817/1*KIxANuGmbR4ItohwQi5ubg.png" /></figure><p>I am always losing or damaging my mobile phone. I have two small children, so my damage statistics would be familiar to parents and shocking to those without kids. Over the last 5 years I’ve lost my phone, cracked the screen several times, had it dunked in water (don’t ask me where), and several other mishaps. The costs definitely started to add up over time. When it was time to re-up my contract with my mobile phone provider, Verizon, I decided to consider an upgraded type of insurance called <strong>Total Mobile Protection. </strong>The insurance covers events such as lost/stolen devices, cracked screens, and out-of-warranty problems.</p><p>The insurance is $13 a month or $156 a year, as well as a replacement deductible that ranges from $19 to $199, depending on the model and age of the device. The best way to determine if insurance is worth the cost, in this instance, is to perform a quantitative risk analysis. A qualitative analysis using adjectives like “red” or “super high” does not provide the right information to make a useful comparison between the level of risk versus the additional cost of insurance. If a high/medium/low scale isn’t good enough to understand risk on a $600 iPhone, it shouldn’t be good enough for your company to make important decisions.</p><p>To get started, I need two analyses: one that ascertains the current risk exposure without insurance, and another that forecasts potential risk exposure through partial risk treatment via transference (e.g. insurance). I’ll use FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) to perform the risk analysis because it’s extensible, flexible and easy to use.</p><p>The power and flexibility of the FAIR methodology and ontology really shines when you step outside cyber risk analyses. In my day job, I’ve performed all sorts of analyses from regulatory risk to reputation risk caused by malicious insiders, and just about everything in between. However, I’ve also used FAIR to help make better decisions in my personal life when there was some degree of uncertainty. For example, I did an analysis a few years back on whether to sell my house, a 1879 Victorian home, or if I should sink money into a bevy of repairs and upgrades.</p><p>Insurance is also a favorite topic of mine: does my annualized risk exposure of a loss event justify the cost of an insurance policy? I’ve performed this type of analysis on extended auto insurance coverage, umbrella insurance, travel insurance and most recently, mobile phone insurance — the focus of this post. Quantitative risk analysis is a very useful tool to help decision makers understand the costs and the benefit of their decisions under uncertainty.</p><p>This particular risk analysis is comprised of the following steps:</p><ul><li>Articulate the decision we want to make</li><li>Scope the analysis</li><li>Gather data</li><li>Perform analysis #1: Risk without insurance</li><li>Perform analysis #2: Risk with insurance</li><li>Comparison and decision</li></ul><h3>Step 1: What’s the Decision?</h3><p>The first step of any focused and informative risk analysis is identifying the <em>decision</em>. Framing the analysis, in the form of reducing uncertainty, when making a decision eliminates several problems: analysis paralysis, over-decomposition, confusing probability and possibility, and more.</p><p><strong>Here’s my question:</strong></p><p>Should I buy Verizon’s Total Protection insurance plan that covers the following: lost and stolen iPhones, accidental damage, water damage, and cracked screens?</p><p>All subsequent work from here on out must support the decision that answers this question.</p><h3>Step 2: Scope the Analysis</h3><p>Failing to scope out a risk assessment thoroughly creates problems later on, such as over-decomposition and including portions of the ontology that are not needed. Failing to properly scope a risk analysis upfront often leads to doing more work than is necessary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*HQCCu34-SOh2HfKZ.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig. 1: Assessment scope</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Asset at risk: </strong>The asset I want to analyze is the physical mobile phone, which is an iPhone 8, 64GB presently.</p><p><strong>Threat community</strong>: Several threat communities can be scoped. From my kids, to myself, to thieves that may steal my phone, either by taking it from me directly or not returning my phone to me should I happen to leave it somewhere.</p><p>Go back to the decision we are trying to make and think about the insurance we are considering. The insurance policy doesn’t care how or why the phone was damaged, or if it was lost or stolen. Therefore, scoping in different threat communities into the assessment is over-decomposition.</p><p><strong>Threat effect</strong>: Good information security professionals would point out the treasure trove of data that’s on a typical phone, and in many cases, is more valuable than the price of the phone itself. They are right.</p><p>However, Verizon’s mobile phone insurance doesn’t cover the loss of data. It only covers the physical phone. Scoping in data loss or tampering (confidentiality and integrity threat effects) is not relevant in this case and is <em>over-scoping </em>the analysis.</p><h3>Step 3: Gather Data</h3><p>Let’s gather all the data we have. I have solid historical loss data, which fits to the Loss Event Frequency portion of the FAIR ontology. I know how much each incident cost me, which is in the Replacement cost category, as a Primary Loss.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*-vboaB5NvfPZaMWe.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 2: Loss and cost data from past incidents</em></figcaption></figure><p>After gathering our data and fitting it to the ontology, we can make several assertions about the scoping portion of the analysis:</p><ul><li>We don’t need to go further down the ontology to perform a meaningful analysis that aids the decision.</li><li>The data we have is sufficient — we don’t need to gather external data on the average occurrence of mobile device loss or damage. See the concept of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_information">value of information</a> for more on this.</li><li>Secondary loss is not relevant in this analysis.</li></ul><p>(I hope readers by now see the necessity in forming an analysis around a decision — every step of the pre-analysis has removed items from the scope, which reduces work and can improve accuracy.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*26--B6I7vbLqRt6z.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 3: Areas of the FAIR ontology scoped into this assessment, shown in green</em></figcaption></figure><p>Keep in mind that you do not need to use all portions of the FAIR ontology; only go as far down as you absolutely need to, and no further.</p><h3>Step 4: Perform analysis #1, Risk without insurance</h3><p>The first analysis we are going to perform is the current risk exposure, without mobile phone insurance. Data has been collected (Fig. 2) and we know where in the FAIR ontology it fits (Fig. 3); Loss Event Frequency and the Replacement portion of Primary Loss. To perform this analysis, I’m going to use the <a href="https://app.fairu.net/">free FAIR-U</a> application, available from RiskLens for non-commercial purposes.</p><h3>Loss Event Frequency</h3><p>Refer back to Fig 2. It’s possible that I could have a very good year, such 2018 with 0 loss events so far. On a bad year, I had 2 loss events. I don’t believe I would exceed 2 loss events per year. I will use these inputs for the Min, Most Likely, and Max and set the Confidence at High (this adjusts the curve shape aka <a href="http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Kurtosis.html">Kurtosis</a>) because I have good, historical loss data that only needed a slight adjustment from a Subject Matter Expert (me).</p><h3>Primary Loss</h3><p>Forecasting Primary Loss is a little trickier. One could take the minimum loss from a year, $0, the maximum loss, $600, then average everything out for the Most Likely number. However, this method does not accurately capture the full range of what could go wrong in any given year. To get a better forecast, we’ll take the objective loss data, give it to a Subject Matter Expert (me) and ask for adjustments.</p><p>The minimum loss cost is always going to be $0. The maximum, worst-case scenario is going to be two lost or stolen devices in one year. I reason that it’s entirely possible to have two loss events in one year, and it did happen in 2014. Loss events range from a cracked screen to a full device replacement. The worst-case scenario is $1,200 in replacement device costs in one year. The Most Likely scenario can be approached in a few different ways, but I’ll choose to take approximately five years of cost data and find the mean, which is $294.</p><p>Let’s take the data, plug it onto FAIR-U and run the analysis.</p><h3>Risk Analysis Results</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*oooWeg1A58FWiZf5.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 4. Risk analysis #1 results</em></figcaption></figure><p>FAIR-U uses the Monte Carlo technique to simulate hundreds of years’ worth of scenarios, based on the data we input and confidence levels, to provide the analysis below.</p><p>Here’s a <a href="https://www.cyentia.com/communicating-risk-loss-exceedance-curves/">Loss Exceedance curve</a>; one of many ways to visualize risk analysis results.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*KY1W_ji5vXczCe5u.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 5: Analysis #1 results in a Loss Exceedance Curve</em></figcaption></figure><p>The cost of insurance is $156 a year plus the deductible, ranging from $19 to $199, depending on the type, age of the device, and the level of damage. Note that Verizon’s $19 deductible is probably for an old-school flip-phone. The cheapest deductible is $29 for an iPhone 8 screen replacement. The worst-case scenario — two lost/stolen devices — is $554 ($156 for insurance plus $199 * 2 for deductible). Insurance plus the average cost of deductibles is $221 a year. Using the same data from the first analysis, I’ve constructed the table below which projects my costs with the same loss data, but with insurance. This lets me compare the two scenarios and decide the best course of action.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*i_hS30S3uJ0aQ544.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 6: Projected loss and cost data with insurance</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Loss Event Frequency</h3><p>I will use the same numbers as the previous analysis. Insurance, as a risk treatment or a mitigating control, influences the Loss Magnitude side of the equation but not Loss Event Frequency.</p><h3>Primary Loss</h3><p>To be consistent, I’ll use the same methodology to forecast losses as the previous analysis.</p><p>The minimum loss cost is always going to be $0. The maximum, worst-case scenario is going to be two lost or stolen devices in one year, at $554 ($156 insurance, plus $398 in deductibles.)</p><p>Most Likely cost is derived from the mean of five years of cost data, which is $221.</p><h3>Risk Analysis Results</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*nOptbQABPGnwXyEi.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 7: Risk analysis #2 results</em></figcaption></figure><p>The second analysis provides a clear picture of what my forecasted losses are.</p><p>Visualizing the analysis in a Loss Exceedance Curve:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*CbFMG4fJbN0hYh7t.png" /><figcaption><em>Fig 8: Analysis #2 results in a Loss Exceedance Curve</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Comparison</h3><p>Without insurance, my average risk exposure is $353, and with insurance, it’s $233. The analysis has provided me with useful information to make meaningful comparisons between risk treatment options.</p><h3>Decision</h3><p>I went ahead and purchased the insurance on my phone, knowing that I should rerun the analysis in a year. Insurance is <em>barely </em>a good deal for an average year, yet seems like a <em>great</em> value at protecting me during bad years. I also noted that my perceived “value” from insurance is heavily influenced by the fact that I experience a total loss of phones at a higher rate than most people. I may find that as my kids get older, I’ll experience fewer loss events.</p><p>I hope readers are able to get some ideas for their own quantitative analysis. The number one takeaway from this should be that some degree of decision analysis needs to be considered during the scoping phase.</p><h3>Further Analysis</h3><p>There many ways that this analysis can be extended by going deeper into the FAIR ontology to answer different questions, such as:</p><ul><li>Does the cost of upgrading to an iPhone XS reduce the loss event frequency? (The iPhone XS is more water resistant than the iPhone 8)</li><li>Can we forecast a reduction in Threat Capability as the kids get older?</li><li>Can we find the optimal set of controls that provide the best reduction in loss frequency? For example, screen protectors and cases of varying thickness and water resistance. (Note that I don’t actually <em>like </em>screen protectors or cases, so I would also want to measure the utility of such controls and weigh it with a reduction in loss exposure.)</li><li>If my average loss events per year continues to decrease, at what point does mobile phone insurance cease to be a good value?</li></ul><p>Any questions or feedback? Let’s continue the conversation in the comments below.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/12/14/should-i-buy-mobile-phone-insurance-a-quantitative-risk-analysis"><em>www.tonym-v.com</em></a><em> on December 14, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=392aa0e2ff40" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bring Uncertainty Back]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hackernoon/bring-uncertainty-back-e3777bc33c5d?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e3777bc33c5d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decisions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bring-uncertainty-back]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-measurement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Nov 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-03T11:20:46.137Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/596/1*cMW-u9MsMpQeBa8MlnSQdA.png" /></figure><p>We need to bring uncertainty back to risk measurements.</p><p>Suppose I ask you to measure the wingspan of a Boeing 747. Right now, wherever you may be, with the knowledge and tools you have on hand. You may say this isn’t possible, but Doug Hubbard <a href="https://www.howtomeasureanything.com/3rd-edition/">has taught us</a> that anything can be measured, once you understand what measurement is. With that mental hurdle out of the way, you can now measure the wingspan of a Boeing 747.</p><p>There are two different approaches to this in modern business.</p><h3>Option 1: Think about the size of a passenger jet and say, “Big.”</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*FaUj_s6xUH2bJ5QS.png" /></figure><p>Technically, this answers my question. There’s a problem with this answer, however — it’s neither <em>precise</em> nor <em>accurate</em>. In everyday language, the words <em>precise </em>and <em>accurate </em>are used interchangeably. In areas of science where measurements are frequently used, they mean different things. <em>Accurate </em>means the measure is correct while <em>precise </em>means the measure is consistent with other measurements.</p><p>The word “big” is an adjective to describe an attribute of something, but without context or a frame of reference to make a comparison, it’s virtually meaningless. Furthermore, using an adjective in place of a measurement is a little dishonest. It’s true that we don’t know the <em>exact </em>wingspan of a 747. Besides, wingspans vary by model. However, we chose a word, “big,” that conveys precision, accuracy, and exactness, but is not any of those. If that wasn’t bad enough, we’ve completely obfuscated our level of uncertainty about our ability to estimate the wingspan of a 747.</p><h3>Option 2: What Would Fermi Do?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*wNALbUXvpsW85Sle.png" /></figure><p>Thinkers like Enrico Fermi and Doug Hubbard approach the problem differently. They — just like us — probably don’t know the wingspan of a 747 off the top of their heads. Just like Fermi <a href="http://web.pdx.edu/~pmoeck/pdf/The%20classic%20Fermi%20problem.pdf">estimated the number of piano tuners in Chicago</a> simply by thinking through and decomposing the problem, we can do the same.</p><ul><li>I’ve seen a 747 and even flown on one several times, so I have some frame of reference.</li><li>I’m 6&#39;2,” and I know a 747 is larger than me</li><li>A football playing field is 100 yards (300 feet), and I’m sure a 747’s wingspan is smaller than a football field</li><li>My first estimate is between 6’2” and 300 feet — let’s improve this</li><li>I know what a Chevy Suburban looks like — they are 18 feet long. How many Suburbans, front to back, would equal a 747? Maybe…. 7 is a safe number. That’s 126 feet.</li><li>I’m going to say that the wingspan of a 747 is between 126’ and 300’.</li><li>Am I 90% sure that the actual number falls into this range (aka <a href="https://www.mathsisfun.com/data/confidence-interval.html">confidence interval</a>)? Let me think through my estimations again. Yes, I am sure.</li></ul><p>Let’s check our estimation against Google.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*lYgQoxQcFhmTHBqW.png" /></figure><p>It’s a good measurement.</p><p>Two remarkable things happened here. Using the same of data as “big” — but a different mental model — we made a measurement that is accurate. Second, we expressed our <em>uncertainty </em>about the measurement — mainly, we introduced error bars.</p><p>One missing data point is whether or not the level of <em>precision </em>is adequate. To answer this, we need to know <em>why</em> I asked for the measurement. Is it to win a pub trivia game or to build an airplane hangar to store a 747? Our minds are instruments of measurement. We may not be as accurate as a tape measure, which is not as accurate as a laser distance measurer, which is not as accurate as an interferometer. All instruments of measurement of have error bars. When determining the level of precision needed in a measurement, we always need to consider the cost of obtaining new information, if it’s relevant and if we need additional uncertainty reduction to make a decision.</p><p>If this seems like a nice story to you, but one that’s not too relevant — think again.</p><p>Using adjectives like “red” or “high” in the place of real measurements of risk components (e.g., probability, impact, control strength) are neither precise <em>nor</em>accurate. Even worse, uncertainty is obscured behind the curtain of an adjective <em>feels </em>exact, but is not. The reader has no idea if this was a precise measurement — using a mixture of historical data, internal data and many calibrated subject matter experts — or if it was made by a guy named Bob sitting in an office, pondering the question for a few seconds and then saying, “That feels High.”</p><p>Managing risk is one of the most important things a business can do to stay in business. It’s time to bring uncertainty back to risk measurements. It’s the honest thing to do.</p><p><em>About the author:</em></p><p>Tony Martin-Vegue is a writer, speaker and risk expert with a passion for data driven decision making. He brings his expertise in economics, cyber risk quantification and information security to advise senior operational and security leaders on how to integrate evidence-based risk analysis into business strategy. He has led risk teams for several Bay Area financial institutions and in the words of his eight-year-old son, has spent much of the last 20 years “Fighting criminals on the internet.” Tony is also the chair of the San Francisco chapter of the FAIR Institute — a professional organization dedicated to advancing risk quantification. Please visit <a href="http://www.tonym-v.com/">www.tonym-v.com</a> for more information.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3777bc33c5d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/bring-uncertainty-back-e3777bc33c5d">Bring Uncertainty Back</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon">HackerNoon.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What do paying cyber extortionists and dumping toxic sludge into the Chicago River have in common?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/what-do-paying-cyber-extortionists-and-dumping-toxic-sludge-into-the-chicago-river-have-in-common-fa5517672844?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa5517672844</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 2018 23:20:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-07T23:20:04.544Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/614/1*QtKbvavG295KeT8WpVMFtQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>What do paying cyber extortionists and dumping toxic sludge into the Chicago River have in common? A lot, actually! <a href="https://duo.com/decipher">Decipher</a> recently <a href="https://duo.com/decipher/pay-or-not-pay-ransom-its-not-that-simple">interviewed me</a> on some of the research I’ve published and talks I’ve given on ransomware, incentives, negative externalities and how we, the defenders, can influence decisions.</p><p>A negative externality is a term used in the field of economics that describes a situation in which a third party incurs a cost from an economic activity. In the case of pollution, it may be convenient or even cost-effective for a firm to dump waste into a public waterway, and while the action is harmful, the firm does not bear the full brunt of the cost. In the case of paying cyber extortionists, it may cost a few Bitcoin to get data back, but that action directly enriches, emboldens and encourages the cybercriminals, thereby creating an environment for more extortion attempts and more victims. We see negative externalities everywhere in society. This condition occurs when there is a misalignment between interests to the individual and interests to society.</p><p>City planners in Chicago reversed the flow of the Chicago River to solve the pollution problem, and it worked! A similar solution is needed in the case of cyber extortion, ransomware and malware in general. Focusing on changing victims’ behavior by constantly saying “Don’t ever pay the ransom!” isn’t working. We need to move upstream — further up in the decision tree — to affect real change.</p><p><a href="https://duo.com/decipher/pay-or-not-pay-ransom-its-not-that-simple">Read the article here</a>.</p><p>The cover image is a picture taken in 1911 of a man standing on slaughterhouse waste floating on Bubbly Creek, a fork of the Chicago River. Bubbly Creek was described in horrifying detail by Upton Sinclair in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jungle">The Jungle</a>. The drainage of many meat packing houses flowed into Bubble Creek and was made of sewage, hair, lard and chemicals. It periodically spontaneously combusted into flames and the Chicago Fire Department had to be dispatched regularly to put it out.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/11/7/what-do-paying-cyber-extortionists-and-dumping-toxic-sludge-into-the-chicago-river-have-in-common-1"><em>www.tonym-v.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa5517672844" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Improving Defender Decision Making]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/improving-defender-decision-making-e821583ec37f?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e821583ec37f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-29T20:08:37.323Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*Mr5x_DBTMz3wpQ_9-_myTg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image credit: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/mike-f/">Mike65444</a> | (CC BY-SA 2.0)</figcaption></figure><p>Improving defender decision making when responding to ransomware infections and other forms of cyber extortion has been a research topic of mine for several years now. It was sparked by the fairly common advice I heard, and continue to hear, from experts, law enforcement and security vendors: don’t ever pay the ransom.</p><p>This advice seems to be unanimous. If this is the “best” advice, why do so many people and companies pay the ransom? Take a moment and think about the problem: let’s assume that some victims will ignore the advice of “don’t ever pay.” Where can we influence the entire ransomware decision making cycle, from pre-infection to ransom negotiations?</p><p>The first talk I gave on this was at <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/speak/2018/4/22/security-bsides-seattle-wa-can-cyber-extortion-happen-to-you-practical-tools-for-assessing-the-threat">BSides Seattle in 2016</a>, describing cyber extortion in detail and ending in a demonstration on how to perform a quantitative risk analysis on extortion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*8TC1harv5-OlNwr5.jpg" /></figure><p>I gave two subsequent talks at <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/speak/2018/4/22/kgeu6vz308fnaci4tb0x96aehnxihz">NBTcon 3</a> in late 2016 and <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/speak/2018/4/22/kpqhwla8q4upe1kjogyvak4oc1jdi0">BSides San Francisco</a> in early 2017. These two talks were focused on analyzing the ransomware decision making process through the lens of game theory. Game theory is a favorite topic among strategists and economists because it breaks down complex interactions into steps in a decision tree that are relatively easy to understand and analyze. After additional study of game theory and decision making under uncertainty, I’ve reconsidered it’s use to analyze ransomware infections. One underlying assumption of game theory is that the actors are rational decision makers. Humans, in the face of uncertainty and risk, are anything but rational decision makers (see Kahneman, Thaler, Taleb, many others.) Humans are filled with all kinds of cognitive biases when making risk decisions and — even when aware of the biases — have to work very hard to control for them (see Hubbard, many others) and are still often unsuccessful.</p><p>My current thought on the topic is that we, as defenders, can still influence the ransomware problem, but it’s best analyzed with basic decision science, and not through game theory.</p><p>I summarized the problems and possible solutions in a rather lengthy ISACA Journal article I wrote on the topic, called “<a href="https://www.isaca.org/Journal/archives/2018/Volume-4/Pages/the-downstream-effects-of-cyberextortion.aspx">The Downstream Effects of Cyber Extortion</a>.” It’s behind a paywall — the article is summarized in a free blog post called “<a href="https://www.isaca.org/Journal/Blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=419">Decision Analysis of Ransomware Incidents</a>”.</p><p>I’m always happy to discuss further in email or comments below.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/10/29/improving-defender-decision-making"><em>www.tonym-v.com</em></a><em> on October 29, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e821583ec37f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Videos from Quantitative Cyber Risk Talks & Events: RSA Week 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/videos-from-quantitative-cyber-risk-talks-events-rsa-week-2018-12dc82d2c4bc?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/12dc82d2c4bc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conference]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Oct 2018 21:34:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-23T21:34:03.593Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1V00_wc_KwGzsXwtTYrbQw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here’s an <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/03/31/quantitative-cyber-risk-talks-events-rsa-week-2018">update of a previous post</a>. This is a list of all talk videos or slides on the subject of quantitative risk or by people active in that space talks during RSA week. Please let me know if I missed anyone!</p><h3>Monday, April 16th</h3><ul><li><a href="https://bsidessf2018.sched.com/event/E6jH/bring-in-the-moving-security-from-cost-center-to-revenue-generator?iframe=yes&amp;w=100%&amp;sidebar=yes&amp;bg=no#">Bring in the $$ : Moving Security from Cost Center to Revenue Generator</a> | <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=12&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwi05LHHvp3eAhWqIDQIHWGNCtUQFjALegQIBxAB&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fariannawillett&amp;usg=AOvVaw3AKFI4bHNGaQ9jMztsOheY">Arianna Willett</a> | BSidesSF | <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0APPpjWjuE&amp;t=0s&amp;list=PLbZzXF2qC3RuL2K7KQVHe0aqdXbZC9Lnz&amp;index=11">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://bsidessf2018.sched.com/event/E8m8/navigating-the-vast-ocean-of-browser-fingerprints?iframe=yes&amp;w=100%&amp;sidebar=yes&amp;bg=no#">Navigating the Vast Ocean of Browser Fingerprints</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/MrMeritology">Russell Thomas </a>| BSidesSF | <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VUsTdf8r_m4&amp;index=31&amp;list=PLbZzXF2qC3RuL2K7KQVHe0aqdXbZC9Lnz">Video</a></li></ul><h3>Tuesday, April 17th</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/10827-Super-Forecasting-Even-You-Can-Perform-High-Precision-Risk-Assessments">Super Forecasting: Even You Can Perform High-Precision Risk Assessments</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/RichardSeiersen">Richard Seiersen</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/raceBannon99">Rick Howard</a> | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/ZfSOow4g7Tg">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/10603-From-%E2%80%9CNo-Data%E2%80%9D-to-%E2%80%9CDrowning-in-Data%E2%80%9D%E2%80%94It%E2%80%99s-Time-for-a-Reality-Check">From “No Data” to “Drowning in Data” — It’s Time for a Reality Check</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/JonesFAIRiq">Jack Jones</a> | RSA | <a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/str-t10_from-no-data-to-drowning-in-data-its-time-for-a-reality-check.pdf">Slides</a></li></ul><h3>Wednesday, April 18th</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/9572-Implementing-a-Quantitative-Cyber-Risk-Framework-A-FinSrv-Case-Study">Implementing a Quantitative Cyber-Risk Framework: A FinSrv Case Study </a>| <a href="https://twitter.com/jackfreund3">Jack Freund</a> | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/j890UTSyGS8">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/9331-Predicting-Exploitability%E2%80%94Forecasts-for-Vulnerability-Management">Predicting Exploitability — Forecasts for Vulnerability Management</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/mroytman">Michael Roytman</a> | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/6fltnBomJ2o">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/11076-There%E2%80%99s-No-Such-Thing-as-a-Cyber-Risk">There’s No Such Thing as a Cyber-Risk</a> | <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Evan-Wheeler/e/B0052XN39A/ref=sr_ntt_srch_lnk_1?qid=1540329553&amp;sr=8-1">Evan Wheeler</a> | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/leEUQSs0Ozs">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/10641-Creating-Order-from-Chaos-Metrics-That-Matter">Creating Order from Chaos: Metrics That Matter</a> | James Lugabihl and Marta Palanques | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/94NqAMWgPpY">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/10763-Issues-of-Quantifying-Risk-around-Identity-and-Access-Management-IAM">Issues of Quantifying Risk around Identity and Access Management (IAM)</a> | Steve Kruse, <a href="https://twitter.com/JonesFAIRiq">Jack Jones</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/tdmv">Tony Martin-Vegue</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Evan-Wheeler/e/B0052XN39A/ref=sr_ntt_srch_lnk_1?qid=1540329553&amp;sr=8-1">Evan Wheeler</a> | <a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/videos/issues-of-quantifying-risk-around-identity-and-access-management-iam">Video</a></li></ul><h3>Thursday, April 19th</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/videos/abstractions-of-security-mining-a-decade-of-rsa-conference-abstracts">Abstractions of Security: Mining a Decade of RSA Conference Abstracts </a>| <a href="https://twitter.com/wadebaker">Wade Baker</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/jayjacobs">Jay Jacobs</a> | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/mUI8IbTEmsQ">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/9081-Building-a-Data-Driven-Security-Strategy">Building a Data-Driven Security Strategy</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/gdbassett">Gabriel Bassett </a>| RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/q7HXV7CAESo">Video</a></li><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/10566-Inside-Cyber-Balance-Sheets-A-Rare-Window-on-Digital-Risk-in-the-Boardroom">Inside Cyber-Balance Sheets: A Rare Window on Digital Risk in the Boardroom</a> | <a href="https://twitter.com/wadebaker">Wade Baker</a> | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/ocvRcwVtL5o">Video</a></li></ul><h3>Friday, April 20th</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/agenda/sessions/9609-Strategic-Cyber-Actions-and-How-They-Could-Affect-Your-Company">Strategic Cyber-Actions and How They Could Affect Your Company</a> | Scott Borg | RSA | <a href="https://youtu.be/IZ7oO4btQAA">Video</a></li></ul><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/8/1/quanttalks"><em>www.tonym-v.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=12dc82d2c4bc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Semi-Attached Figure: How to spot manipulative security advertising claims]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/the-semi-attached-figure-how-to-spot-manipulative-security-advertising-claims-7dfa259e2484?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7dfa259e2484</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-bias]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Oct 2018 18:18:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-23T18:18:54.042Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/754/1*f0C4X6AH-c59HE1EUprpTQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>If you can’t prove what you want to prove, demonstrate something else and pretend that they are the same thing. In the daze that follows the collision of statistics with the human mind, hardly anybody will notice the difference.<br>-Darrell Huff, “How to Lie with Statistics”</em></blockquote><p>Out of all the ways to lie with statistics and manipulate peoples’ perceptions, the <em>semi-attached figure </em>may be the most prevalent. It’s hard to spot unless you are really looking for it because it’s sneaky, subtle and takes a fair bit of concentrative analysis to identify. A semi-attached figure occurs when proof is given for a claim, but when the reader looks at it closely, the proof and the claim are not related. It’s called “semi-attached” because the proof <em>seems </em>to support a claim, but upon inspection, it doesn’t. Marketing and advertising professionals are absolute masters of the semi-attached figure.</p><p>The semi-attached figure is a hard concept to understand without tangible examples, so let’s start out with a few easy marketing claims outside of the security field.</p><h3>Example 1: Now, with Retsyn!</h3><p>This example was touched on by <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/user/david-lavenda">David Lavenda</a> in a <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/1822354/7-ways-lie-statistics-and-get-away-it">post</a> at FastCompany. It’s such a familiar advertising campaign that went on for decades, that most of us can recite parts of it from memory. It’s also one of the best examples of the semi-attached figure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*Dc0Pdb2SCnQ1fLUg.png" /></figure><p>In <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C6qCSxojRes">Certs commercials</a>, the narrator says “Want fresh, clean breath? Get the only mint with Retsyn,” or a similar slogan. Most viewers will hear this and unconsciously accept the “…with Retsyn” phrase as proof that Certs gives someone fresh, clean breath. It <em>sounds </em>good — it actually sounds great! It sounds like it will make stinky breath less stinky. Here’s where the <em>claim </em>and the <em>proof </em>are semi-attached: you the audience, have bad breath and need evidence as to why you should buy Certs. Here’s the proof — Certs has Retsyn.</p><p>What exactly is Retsyn? <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/life/shopping/2001/06/judge_mint_day.html">According to an article by Slate</a>, it’s “…natural flavoring, partially hydrogenated cottonseed oil, and a nutritional supplement called copper gluconate, none of which will kill bacteria.” The proof and the claim have nothing to do with each other, but it’s very effective as a marketing technique.</p><h3>Example 2: These cigarettes are fine for your health</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/733/1*rio80Y9_nDLO_dYulZEZkg.png" /></figure><p>Post-World War II to the early 1970’s was the golden age of tobacco marketing in the United States before advertising restrictions were put in place. Cigarette advertising downplayed the unhealthy effects of smoking — and in many cases, made the case that it was actually healthy, and cured various maladies even though a strong statistical <a href="https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/21/2/87">link between smoking and lung cancer was established</a> in the 1940’s.</p><p>People born in the 1980’s and after have probably never seen a cigarette ad or have a vague recollection of one, perhaps forgetting or not knowing how insidiously manipulative tobacco marketing used to be. Due to the overwhelming evidence that started to build in the 1950’s that cigarettes cause serious illnesses and death, advertising had to counteract this message with pushing the “cool factor,” downplaying health issues and touting benefits. To convince people to buy cigarettes, contrary to extensive evidence that they should not, marketing had to find new ways to be effective and directly play to human emotion. The semi-attached figure plays a vital role in achieving that.</p><p>This 1949 ad from Viceroy Cigarettes is a perfect application of the semi-attached figure. This came out at a time in which public health advocates started discussing the link between smoking and cancer, and this ad is an attempt to counter the message.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*0Ykm7u0ghhatxohs.png" /></figure><p>The claim here is implied: cigarettes are not harmful to your health. There are two pieces of proof provided: First, Viceroys filter the smoke. (The truth is irrelevant: research indicates filters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-lungcancer-cigarette-filters-idUSKBN18I2MT">may increase lung cancer risk</a>). The second proof is, <strong>your </strong>dentist recommends Viceroys, with a cartoon drawing of a dentist. The problem here is obvious. The dentist isn’t real — but the reader is led to think that either this man is their dentist, or whoever really is their dentist would surely also recommend Viceroys.</p><h3>Example #3: Exactly what is Unbreakable?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/995/1*3Tlj_tfV15W5WTjDCPJ5FA.png" /><figcaption><em>The Unbreakable Linux bus at the RSA conference</em></figcaption></figure><p>Starting around 2005, on the 101 freeway corridor between Palo Alto and San Francisco, Oracle advertising started to appear. It featured an armored Linux penguin mascot and the tagline “Unbreakable Linux.” The same ads showed up for years at RSA security conferences, emblazoned on the sides of busses that took trips between the Moscone convention center and area hotels. This claim refers to a product called Oracle Linux, which is based on Red Hat. Oracle has also used the word “unbreakable” to refer to other software products.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*owPaaCz36RuyOlXc.png" /></figure><p>This is a classic semi-attached figure — Oracle makes a statement, “unbreakable,” and leads the reader to associate the statement with a piece of software and pretends it’s the same thing. The claim and proof are taking advantage of the perception that Linux enjoys greater stability when compared to competitors. Of course, the software isn’t “unbreakable” (no software is), and Oracle Linux has been subject to many of the same vulnerabilities all flavors of Linux has had over the years.</p><p>Unbreakable. This Linux distro that cannot be… what? Hacked? Experience downtime? Patched without rebooting? Does this refer to high availability? It’s very reminiscent of “with Retsyn.” It sounds great, but when it’s really analyzed, the reader is left thinking, <em>what does that even mean?</em></p><p>Oracle still uses the term “Unbreakable,” but <a href="https://www.securityfocus.com/news/309">backtracked and admitted</a> that it’s a marketing tagline, describing Oracle’s commitment to product security and does not refer to any specific product, feature or attribute.</p><p>Oracle is no stranger to hyperbole. This is the same company who’s marketing slogan used to be “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=En_15We7fjUC&amp;pg=PA154&amp;lpg=PA154&amp;dq=%22Can%27t+break+it.+Can%27t+break+in.%22&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=PxaDfcz_lo&amp;sig=RcjXh-J9xX9fb5Fk3DDg3baUoOI&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjomdT3s5_cAhXVHTQIHQr8A_gQ6AEIWzAI#v=onepage&amp;q=%22Can%27t%20break%20it.%20Can%27t%20break%20in.%22&amp;f=false">Can’t break it. Can’t break in</a>.”</p><h3>Example #4: We won the Cyber!</h3><p>100% true story; only the names have been changed to protect the guilty.</p><p>Timeshare, used car and cyber security vendor sales people all have a special place in my heart. I was in a security vendor sales pitch many years back, and the salesman projected this graph of the number of cybersecurity incidents reported by federal agencies from 2006 to 2015 on the screen. The vendor was selling next generation firewall technology.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/841/0*4tDf5h1nLzJGOqvf.png" /></figure><p>The room fell silent to the stark reality on the chart before us as the vendor started their pitch:</p><p>“Look at this graph — from 2006 to today, cyberattacks have increased over 10-fold! We’re at war. This is proof that we’re at cyberwar and you must protect yourself. The current equipment you have cannot protect your company from these types of unrelenting, sophisticated, advanced AND persistent attacks…”</p><p>The salesman went on and on and on. I love stuff like this. I love it when vendors build their pitch around a house of cards: one tap and it all falls apart. Where’s the semi-attached figure here?</p><p>The vendor was trying to lead us to a path to believe that the sky is falling. Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t — I have plenty of reason to believe that there is some type of cyber-related doom on the horizon, but this graph has nothing to do with it. In order to find the semi-attached figure, let’s ask a few probing questions.</p><ul><li>It would appear that cyberattacks have increased from 2006 to 2015. Why? Are there more computers in 2015 than in 2006?</li><li>What is the ratio of attack targets and surface versus attacks?</li><li>Is detection of attacks better in 2015 than it was in 2006, meaning we have the ability to detect and measure a larger range of attacks?</li><li>What is being measured here?</li><li>What does the Federal government consider an attack?</li><li>What do attacks against the Federal government have to do with my company (a bank, at the time)</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/0*3ZEPE01aj3uSthNm.png" /></figure><p>The claim is: we’re going to get hacked unless we upgrade firewalls. The proof is this graph — from a different sector, provided without context, using an unknown method of measurement.</p><p>The graph above is from 2015. See 2016’s graph below — and I have great news! WE WON THE CYBER!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/745/0*clmKZQ96gU5nGZyc.png" /></figure><p>No, sorry, we didn’t. The federal government changed the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682756.pdf">definition and reporting requirements of a cyber-attack</a> in 2016. They no longer consider a simple port scan an attack. In other words, what was being measured and the unit of measurement was changed from 2015 to 2016. Not only was the vendor pitch a semi-attached figure, the salesman was also guilty of the <em>post hoc fallacy</em>, also known as correlation does not imply causation.</p><h3>How to spot the semi-attached figure</h3><p>While using the semi-attached figured is manipulative, it’s unlikely to end any time soon. It’s far too effective. Keep in mind that the most effective marketing plays on human nature’s greatest fears and aspirations. Here are a few tips to spot and resist the lure of the semi-attached figure.</p><p>Anyone can take a number, graph, data visualization, or statistic and shoehorn it into proof for a claim. Just because something has a number or seems “sciencey” it doesn’t mean it can be automatically trusted.</p><p>Spot the claim, such has “this product makes you hacker-proof” or “Unbreakable!” What’s the supporting proof? Ask yourself: does the proof support the claim, or is it semi-attached?</p><p>Last, be especially wary of authority figures: doctors, dentists, cybersecurity experts, a CEO or past or present government officials. It could be a legitimate opinion or endorsement, but also remember that nearly everyone will say nearly anything if they get paid enough.</p><p>Here’s a challenge for readers: after you read this post, think about the semi-attached figure next time you are at the Blackhat or RSA vendor expo halls. How many do you see?</p><p>This post is part of a series titled <a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/07/10/how-to-lie-with-statistics-information-security-edition"><em>How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition</em></a>– visit the link to read more.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.tonym-v.com/blog/2018/8/6/the-semi-attached-figure-how-to-spot-manipulative-security-advertising-claims"><em>www.tonym-v.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7dfa259e2484" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/the-semi-attached-figure-how-to-spot-manipulative-security-advertising-claims-7dfa259e2484">The Semi-Attached Figure: How to spot manipulative security advertising claims</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/">DataDrivenInvestor</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Many Lottery Tickets Should I Buy?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/how-many-lottery-tickets-should-i-buy-6d5653e023a9?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6d5653e023a9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decision-making]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lottery]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Oct 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-23T16:57:10.078Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/1*p_jvwEx7uMow9Qpwe07Kkg.jpeg" /></figure><p>When lottery jackpots are at record highs, as they are <a href="https://abc7chicago.com/finance/mega-millions-jackpot-at-record-$16-billion;-powerball-at-$620m/4534450/">this week at $1.6 billion</a>, I’m usually asked by friends, family, and colleagues for the same advice — should I buy a lottery ticket, and if yes, how many should I buy?</p><p>Being trained in economics and a risk manager by trade, one would expect me to say that lottery tickets are a waste of time, money — or, maybe a rant on how the lottery is a regressive tax on the poor. Not this economist/risk manager. I’ve spent a good deal of time studying odds at craps, horse races, and roulette tables in Vegas and the answer lies in understanding a little bit of probability theory.</p><p>First, look at this problem in terms of the expected value of buying a lottery ticket, which is based on the probability of winning and how much you could win. The <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/10/mega-millions-lottery-jackpot-ticket-odds.html">expected value</a> of the Mega Millions drawing on Tuesday, October 23rd, is $5.53, for a $2 ticket. It’s quite rare for the expected value of a game of chance to exceed the price of entry. Economically speaking, you should play <em>this</em> lottery on Tuesday.</p><p>The question remains, — how many tickets?</p><p>To answer this question, think of the problem this way: how much money do I need to spend to increase my odds? If you don’t play the lottery, the chance of winning is near-zero*. Buying one $2 ticket increases your odds from near-zero to 1 in 302 million. What a deal! You can increase your odds of winning by such a colossal amount for only $2, and the expected value exceeds the price of a ticket! Here’s the trick — the second, third, tenth, hundredth ticket barely increases your odds over 1 in 302 million. You could buy enough tickets to demonstrably increase your odds, but at that point, you would have to buy so many tickets, the expected value would be below $2.</p><p>The answer: one ticket. Just buy one. One is a good balance between risk and reward.</p><p>Not coincidentally, knowing how to calculate expected value is a superpower for risk managers when trying to optimize investments and expenditures.</p><p>(*Near zero, not zero because it’s possible you can find a winning lottery ticket on the ground, in a jacket at Goodwill, etc. <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/1m-new-york-lottery-winners-claim-prizes-article-1.1559637">It’s happened</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6d5653e023a9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Mad Men of Cyber Security Advertising]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tdmv/the-mad-men-of-cyber-security-advertising-e383ad82f79c?source=rss-5ea733b15993------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e383ad82f79c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Martin-Vegue]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Jul 2018 16:41:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-23T17:12:47.169Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*hIGqunkMlN6OGKKpi0aS-Q.png" /></figure><blockquote>“We can be blind to the obvious, and we are also blind to our blindness.” <br>― Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow</blockquote><p>There’s a famous line spoken by advertising executive Don Draper in AMC’s Mad Man: “If you don’t like what’s being said, change the conversation.”</p><p>This is a loaded quote and sums up how the ad men of Madison Avenue use words, emotion, a little bit of statistics and a whole lot of creativity to change minds and sell products. Consider this example: American Tobacco, parent company of Lucky Strike Cigarettes, was one of the first companies to use physicians in cigarette ads — <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiRpM6x7ZPcAhWLrlQKHfZdAhgQFggpMAA&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC1470496%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2QTlPDi5f8ChnV5AiCOTVU">a trend that disturbingly lasted until 1953</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*hAkPs-beSctbXscGA_XWqg.png" /></figure><p>There are several psychological sleight of hands tricks, all designed to elicit positive feelings from the reader and de-emphasize any negative ones. The smiling doctor, the phrases “less irritating,” and “It’s toasted” combined with a seemingly large number of endorsing doctors are examples of what is called the <em>framing effect</em>. The framing effect is a cognitive bias that describes a situation in which a person’s perception about something is influenced by the way it’s presented. Who wouldn’t want something that’s both endorsed by doctors <em>and </em>toasted? Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky explored the framing effect in great detail as they developed Prospect Theory, for which Kahneman would later win the Nobel Prize in Economics.</p><p>The framing effect is used in many places, intentionally and unintentionally, but is most present in advertising, as in the positive frame in Lucky Strike ad. It’s a very effective way to frame statistics or concepts to change the audience perception about a marketing claim. Once you’re aware of it, you’ll start to see it everywhere. Take the following Kaspersky infographic as another example of a negative frame:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/616/1*fk52mRz5OBhVjrNNqi-leQ.png" /><figcaption>Source:<strong>Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2016</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Kaspersky Lab is a Russia-based cybersecurity and anti-virus vendor. The above infographic is in reference to a study the firm conducted that shows that 1 in 5 small and medium sized business that paid a ransom in response to a ransomware infection did not get their files decrypted by the perpetrators.</p><p>There are several examples the framing effect in this infographic:</p><ul><li>Use of the word “never” immediately frames the perception negatively.</li><li>Usage of the statistic “One in five” also creates a negative frame.</li><li>Red highlighting of the phrase “never got their data back” shifts the conversation to urgency, needing immediate attention and high risk.</li><li>The one, single victim clipart that didn’t get their files back is as big as the combined clipart of the four victims that did get their files back. The data visualization used is disproportionate to the actual data.</li></ul><p>Just like the cigarette ad from the 1930’s, the use of graphics and data pull the reader’s perception in a very specific direction. In Kapersky’s case, the direction is very negative. The reader is left with the feeling that paying a ransom in response to ransomware infections is a very bad idea because, you may <strong>never get your files back.</strong> <em>(…and gee whiz, I sure wish I had some anti-virus software to protect me against this terrible thing…)</em></p><p>The same exact base statistic can be flipped and turned into a positive frame.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/535/1*_oMWYcj0AKRjyCoV8nWGoA.png" /></figure><p>Everything about the new infographic is the same, but flipped: “4 out of 5” of something positive as opposed to “1 out of 5” of something negative; flipped clipart, positive colors and words are framed positively.</p><p>Let’s take it one step further:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/545/1*NwgSDG4x-dEY6JxUp1AgZA.png" /></figure><p>80% seems quite good, and note that 80% is equivalent to 4 of out 5. The extra exclamation points are added to further reinforce the positive frame and add excitement around the statistic.</p><p>It should be no surprise to anyone that Kaspersky — a company that sells ransomware mitigation software — uses the framing effect, but they’re not the only one. It’s <em>everywhere</em>, and in fact, there are classes, blogs and instructional videos on how to <em>take advantage </em>of the framing effect specifically as a marketing tool. Overcoming these psychological tricks is not easy because they take advantage of a deep-rooted human trait: loss aversion. But awareness of these marketing tactics is a step forward in improving decision-making skills.</p><p>This post is part of a series titled <a href="https://medium.com/@tdmv/how-to-lie-with-statistics-information-security-edition-b0f373bdf5f"><em>How to Lie with Statistics, Information Security Edition</em></a>– visit the link to read more.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e383ad82f79c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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