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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tessera on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tessera on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Tessera on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Travels With the Token]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/what-travels-with-the-token-1404f81061ee?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[solana-blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 04:43:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T04:43:49.488Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OdDeN-NmMgTsr0kR7WVp-g.png" /></figure><p><em>12 November 2026. Figures and sources are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 12 November 2026 none has been. Tessera’s published terms also provide for a loan series providing economic exposure linked to Databricks’ pre-IPO valuation, T-Databricks, through its own issuing subsidiary, and they describe the investment of each issuer, for SpaceX, Kalshi, OpenAI and Databricks, as “intended to be made”. This piece discusses Databricks. The private-market access gap this piece describes is Tessera’s business, and providing tokenized economic exposure linked to private companies’ valuations is what Tessera does, so Tessera has a commercial interest in the case for it. T-Tokens provide economic exposure, not shareholder rights, and on the ownership comparison below they sit with the tokens that carry no rights. The companies T-Tokens are linked to are not party to them and have not consented to them. Robinhood’s OpenAI tokens of 2025, Kraken’s SpaceX xStock and Crypto.com’s pre-IPO perpetuals on OpenAI, SpaceX and Anthropic give or gave exposure linked to the same companies as T-OpenAI and T-SpaceX; their forms are described below. Tessera issues no product referencing Anthropic, which this piece quotes, Galaxy, or any of the sixteen companies named below as objecting to OKXICE by 19 October, and none is planned; Anthropic competes with OpenAI, so Tessera’s interest in how Anthropic’s statement reads runs both ways. SpaceX, to which T-SpaceX is linked, is among the companies that had objected to OKXICE by 5 November. Tessera has no arrangement with OKXICE, OKX, ICE, Kraken, Backed, Superstate, Robinhood, BlackRock, Securitize, Franklin Templeton, Apollo, Janus Henderson, Anemoy, Galaxy, Crypto.com, Forge, Broadridge, Maple, Anthropic or Goldman Sachs. Tessera’s founder previously worked at Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Credit Suisse, now part of UBS. T-Tokens have public token pages on OKX’s Web3 DEX (read 12 November), a separate OKX product from the OKXICE venue discussed below; Tessera has no commercial, integration or incentive arrangement with OKX. Tessera also appears as a quote-asset category on StonkFun (stonkfun.xyz, read 6 November), a launchpad Tessera’s founder has written about; Tessera has no commercial, integration or incentive arrangement with StonkFun or Raydium. Tessera, and entities under its control, hold related exposures. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>Tessera CEO, Chan Ahn, wrote in July that tokenization would blur, and in the end merge, private and public markets. Convergence, in that sense, means private assets gaining what public ones already have: a wider base of holders, a secondary market that works and, eventually, a price that someone outside the room can use. We think that is under way and that tokenization can do much of the work. The case is stronger, though, when it is honest about what a token does not carry on its own.</p><p>A token can carry an asset’s rules, its record and its settlement. With those, a private asset can be held in smaller pieces by more people, and, where the company writes its transfer rules into the token, it can change hands without the administrative part of a process that now takes weeks. Four things do not come with the token by default: disclosure, the issuer’s consent, a reference price, and a clear answer to what the holder can claim if the token’s issuer fails. Much of investor protection lives in those four. The benefits reach investors safely only when they travel with the token as well.</p><h3>How US Private Markets Opened in Steps</h3><p>The US route from private placement toward something closer to a market was built a piece at a time, and most of the pieces were for institutions and wealthy individuals. Rule 144A, in 1990, let large institutions trade privately placed securities among themselves (SEC Release 33–6862, April 1990). The JOBS Act of 2012 raised the number of holders of record a company with more than $10 million of assets can have before it must register, to 2,000, or 500 who are not accredited (Pub. L. 112–106, 5 April 2012). Rule 506(c) let issuers advertise a private offering from 23 September 2013, on condition that every buyer is a verified accredited investor (78 Fed. Reg. 44771). In 2020 the SEC widened the accredited-investor definition to take in holders of certain professional certifications (SEC press release 2020–191, adopted 26 August; 85 Fed. Reg. 64234, effective 8 December 2020).</p><p>The most recent steps are still proposals. An executive order of 7 August 2025 directed the Labor Department and the SEC to look again at alternative assets in 401(k) plans (Executive Order 14330). The Labor Department proposed a rule on 31 March 2026 (91 Fed. Reg. 16088), and as of 6 November we could find no final rule in the Federal Register. On 30 September 2026 the SEC proposed changes that it described as expanding “responsible retailization of private markets” (press release 2026–96). Neither is yet a rule.</p><p>Europe and the UK took a different route to the same end, through fund wrappers: the UK’s Long-Term Asset Fund, in force from 15 November 2021 (FCA PS21/14), and the revised European Long-Term Investment Fund, applying from 10 January 2024 (Regulation (EU) 2023/606).</p><p>Meanwhile companies have been listing later. The median US company going public was eight years old in the 1980s and nine between 1990 and 1998, fell to five in the 1999–2000 bubble, and was eleven across 2001 to 2025, with a median of twelve in 2025 alone (Jay R. Ritter, University of Florida, IPO data updated December 2025). Domestic companies listed in the US fell from 8,090 in 1996 to 3,908 in 2025 (World Bank, from World Federation of Exchanges data). Mergers and delistings account for part of that decline, so it does not measure companies staying private alone. Chan Ahn put the consequence in July: “The larger access gap sits before the listing.”</p><p>The pool of private capital grew over the same years. Private-markets assets under management reached $13.1 trillion at 30 June 2023, having grown “nearly 20 percent per annum since 2018” (McKinsey, Global Private Markets Review 2024, on Preqin data). For private credit alone the figure depends on the definition. The Financial Stability Board’s narrow measure put direct lending at $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion at the end of 2024 (report of 6 May 2026), while a broad one put assets under management at $3.5 trillion (AIMA and ACC with Houlihan Lokey, 9 December 2025). We give both because the gap between them is a matter of definition.</p><h3>Access for Individuals, Liquidity for Institutions</h3><p>Institutions have been raising their allocations for decades. The target allocation of US public pension plans to alternatives went from about 10% in 2001 to about 30% in 2021 (Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, issue brief 26–18, September 2026). US college and university endowments, dollar-weighted, held 54.1% in alternative and other strategies at 30 June 2025 (NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments, public summary tables). Individuals are a long way behind. McKinsey put the average allocation to private markets at 27% for institutional investors and 6% for non-institutional ones (Global Private Markets Review 2024, March 2024; the institutional figure from CEM Benchmarking), and Bain estimated that individuals hold about half of global assets under management but 16% of alternative-fund assets (27 February 2023).</p><p>The two groups face different problems. Chan Ahn wrote in August that the constraint actually breaking is access and that its beneficiary is retail, “not because retail is more deserving, but because institutions never had an access problem to solve.” Institutions already have access. Their problem is liquidity: capital committed for the life of a fund to assets that take longer to sell. Individuals face an access problem first, and a liquidity problem the moment they solve it.</p><h3>Slow Exits and the Secondary Market</h3><p>Institutional illiquidity has produced a market of its own, and Jefferies traces the recent selling by limited partners to exits. “LACK OF DISTRIBUTIONS CONTINUES TO DRIVE SUPPLY,” it wrote in July, explaining that the annual distribution yield from limited partners’ portfolios “stayed near 10% in H1 2026 and has remained below 20% since the beginning of 2023 (as compared to a historical average of 25% since 2001).” Global secondary volume on Evercore’s series was $37 billion in 2016 and $134 billion in 2021. For 2025 the two firms put it at $226 billion to $240 billion, and for the first half of 2026 at $118 billion to $121 billion, a first-half record, with GP-led deals the majority (Evercore and Jefferies, July 2026). They count differently, so both figures are given. Semi-liquid evergreen funds, one of the main routes for retail money, hold about $500 billion (Evercore, July 2026).</p><p>Secondary liquidity also makes staying private easier to choose. Chan Ahn wrote in July that “A private company with access to secondary liquidity and continuation capital has no forcing function to go public.” The chief executive of Databricks, interviewed on Bloomberg Television in June, treated his company’s timing as a question of which year, and said he still wants a listing to “create a market transaction mechanism for our employees”: “We will be a public company. I just think this is a terrible year to go public.” (Bloomberg News, 4 June 2026.) For Databricks, secondary liquidity has bought time without replacing a market.</p><p>Trading in the shares of individual private companies remains slow and gated. Forge reported that transactions on its platform in 2024 took an average of 42 days to close, with a standard minimum of $100,000 (Forge Global 10-K, filed 6 March 2025). Forge does not break the 42 days down, but permissions can account for much of them. The model right-of-first-refusal agreement published by the US venture industry gives the company 15 days to decide whether to buy the shares itself and its investors a further 10 days (NVCA model agreement, updated April 2026); actual terms vary by company.</p><p>Prices are also hard to read. Forge’s median trade in August 2026 was 3% below the last funding round, while its 10th percentile was 87% below, and Forge explains: “Several of the companies in the 10th percentile have not raised since 2021, leading to stale primary round valuations” (Forge, Private Market Update, 22 September 2026). In September the median was 9% below and the 10th percentile 51% below, a shift at the tails that Forge says can reflect which companies happened to trade that month (Forge, Private Market Update, 26 October 2026). A funding round five years old is not a reference price, yet for some private companies it is the only one available.</p><h3>What Tokenization Can Do</h3><p>Speed is not the main benefit. Chan Ahn wrote on LinkedIn on 29 July, in Going Public by Degrees, that “Settlement speed is the most-cited benefit and the least important one.” For the person holding a private asset, Chan still thinks so. As a statement about the system it was too broad, as Tessera’s Time Equals Risk, first published on 9 November (republished here on 11 November), set out: in a stress week, time spent unsettled is exposure. Speed also costs something. Instant settlement, run on a gross basis as current token arrangements tend to run it (BIS and CPMI, October 2024), gives up netting, and netting cuts the US equity clearing house’s daily settlement payment obligations by an average of 98% (SEC, Release 34–96930, February 2023, citing DTCC).</p><p>The benefits that matter for private assets lie elsewhere, and most of the working examples so far are listed assets or funds. For a private company, every one of them depends on the company taking part, which is why issuer consent comes up again below, among the things that have to travel with the token.</p><p>The first is that a token can be held and moved in any size, so a minimum becomes a choice rather than a cost of administration. Franklin Templeton’s tokenized money-market fund BENJI, a US-registered fund, sets a minimum initial purchase of $20 for most accounts (summary prospectus, 1 August 2026) and has 1,141 holders. Janus Henderson Anemoy’s tokenized Treasury fund JTRSY, open to non-US professional investors, has 31. BlackRock’s tokenized fund BUIDL has 101, and ACRED, Securitize’s tokenized feeder into an Apollo credit fund, has 45 (RWA.xyz asset pages, displayed values, read 6–7 November 2026). The eligibility gate, more than the token, sets those counts. Chan Ahn wrote on 28 October about a tokenized credit fund whose token carried a private-placement gate that the fund’s own registered share class does not have, and called that gate “a choice of legal route, not a property of tokens.” What the token changes is the cost of recording and moving a small holding, and that matters most where the gate has opened.</p><p>Where there is no gate at all, the holder base is large. RWA.xyz shows about 4.75 million addresses holding tokenized stocks (read 6 November 2026). Addresses are not people, and many of those tokens are custodial wrappers offered outside the US, among them Kraken’s xStocks, whose pages say they convey no shareholder rights. Chan Ahn wrote on 21 October that the count had stopped rising and that monthly active addresses had fallen by more than half in thirty days, though they rose 31% in the week to 20 October. The count has since grown again, by 8.22% over thirty days on the page at the time of writing, while monthly active addresses are down 81.44% over the same thirty days, to 442,399. In that market access has arrived before the protections. T-Tokens do not appear on RWA.xyz, so none of these counts includes them (checked 6 November).</p><p>The second is that a token can carry the rules for who may hold it and who may receive it, and check them at the moment of transfer instead of through a manual approval before each trade. A venue can already require this. OKXICE, whose notice of 5 November is the latest we have read and still describes the trading it “will make available”, says that “Only wallets holding a valid soulbound token (‘SBT’) issued by OKXICE TSV … may trade in or provide liquidity to an AMM Liquidity Pool …” A token contract could go further, if the company takes part, and carry the company’s transfer restrictions, a right of first refusal or a holding period wherever the token goes. T-Tokens do not. They belong to the second of the two camps described below and carry no company’s transfer rules.</p><p>The third is a single record that settles when the asset moves. When Galaxy put its own shares on-chain, its transfer agent, Superstate, “records legal ownership onchain in real time as tokens are transferred” (Galaxy 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 3 September 2025), so the register and the trade become one event. Institutions already run funding on distributed ledgers at scale. Broadridge says its Distributed Ledger Repo “processed an average of $345 billion in daily repo transactions during October, with volumes totaling $7.6 trillion” (Broadridge, 6 November 2026), on Canton, which it calls “a privacy-enabled blockchain network connecting financial institutions” (Broadridge, Distributed Ledger Repo product page, read 9 November 2026). That improves the plumbing for institutions that already hold the asset. It does not widen access.</p><p>The fourth is trading that need not wait on a back office. OKXICE says its venue “will operate 24 hours per day, seven days per week.” For an asset whose secondary trade now takes weeks, the hours matter less than what happens when the company has written its transfer rules into the token: a buyer and a seller who meet those rules can complete when they agree, without a separate process afterwards. A token that carries a right of first refusal also carries its waiting period, unless the company chooses to shorten it.</p><p>The fifth is a possible route to a price, and on its own trading does not supply one. Chan Ahn wrote in July: “On-chain markets had been forming prices around SpaceX exposure for months before the opening bell.” By September Chan had put it more carefully, answering crypto.news: “An AMM with no external reference is not discovering a price; it is reflecting the flows of whoever happens to be trading it that day.” A market that many more people can reach is one route to a price that someone outside the room can use, but only if information travels with the token. Without it, the same problem simply grows. Chan also separated liquidity from price in July: “Tokenisation can replicate the liquidity functions; that is precisely what the blurring is.” The holder counts so far, mostly on funds and listed stock, show that capability more than they show a market.</p><h3>The Forms Tokenization Takes</h3><p>Five forms are common, and they differ in what the holder actually has. Three are the forms of tokenized stock Chan Ahn described to crypto.news on 11 September; the other two matter for private assets.</p><p>In the first, a fund issues its units as tokens. BUIDL launched with Securitize on 20 March 2024; BENJI is a US-registered money-market fund; JTRSY is a British Virgin Islands professional fund; and ACRED, launched on 30 January 2025, is a feeder into an Apollo credit fund (RWA.xyz asset pages, read 6–7 November 2026). In the second, the holder owns part of a special purpose vehicle that holds a private company’s shares. The holder does not own the company, and the vehicle’s own holding is only as good as the company’s transfer rules allow.</p><p>The third is a custodial wrapper of listed shares, where a custodian holds the shares and the token tracks them. Kraken’s xStock pages say each token is “backed 1–1 by real … shares, held by a third-party custodian”, and that “holding tokenized equities does not convey any shareholder rights.” (read 6 November 2026). The fourth puts the share itself on-chain. Galaxy’s tokenized shares “are not derivatives or representations; they are Galaxy Digital Class A Common Stock, with all the rights that confers.” (Galaxy 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 3 September 2025).</p><p>The fifth is a contract, or synthetic exposure, that pays on a price without the holder owning the asset. A Robinhood spokesperson told TechCrunch that Robinhood’s EU tokens of OpenAI gave exposure “through Robinhood’s ownership stake in a special purpose vehicle (SPV)”, which TechCrunch read as Robinhood owning part of a vehicle that held OpenAI shares. Robinhood’s help center, as TechCrunch reported, describes its stock tokens as “tokenized contracts that follow their price, recorded on a blockchain.” OpenAI’s newsroom account responded: “These ‘OpenAI tokens’ are not OpenAI equity. We did not partner with Robinhood, were not involved in this, and do not endorse it.” It added that any transfer of OpenAI equity requires OpenAI’s approval and that it had approved none (TechCrunch, 2 July 2025). T-OpenAI, too, is linked to OpenAI’s valuation without OpenAI’s consent, as the disclosure above states, and its holders have no claim against OpenAI. Crypto.com describes its pre-IPO perpetuals as “synthetic derivatives that reference valuations of real world private companies; they do not grant equity interest, voting rights, dividends, direct claims to the shares or any other economic ownership of the underlying private companies.” (Crypto.com product news, 12 May 2026).</p><p>T-Tokens should be described by what their holder has. Under Tessera’s terms, a holder makes a stablecoin loan to an issuing subsidiary, with recourse limited to the proceeds of a Liquidity Event that the issuer actually receives and no proprietary interest in the underlying investment. Tessera’s documentation says the loan is unsecured and has “no fixed maturity date and no guaranteed timeline”, and that “Total loss of principal is possible” (Tessera Terms, revised 29 October 2026; docs.tessera.pe, read 6 November 2026). The companies T-Tokens are linked to are not party to them and have not consented to them. T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure; they do not provide equity ownership, voting rights or direct shareholder status. Tessera’s terms exclude persons in the US and other Excluded Jurisdictions, as well as U.S. persons as those terms define them, and T-Tokens are not available to them on any venue.</p><p>On ownership the industry is divided. Chan Ahn described the split on LinkedIn on 28 September, in Something That Moves: “The tokenisation industry split two ways. One camp put the registered share itself on-chain: verified rights, holders checked in advance, transfers restricted to approved wallets. The other built tokens that give economic exposure and that eligible holders can keep in any wallet and move freely. Tessera is in the second camp.” The custodial form sits between the two and can carry the rights if the custodian passes them through. The SEC’s exemption of 17 September covers both the issuer’s own token and that custodial middle, provided holders receive the same rights, and it excludes synthetic tokens (Release №34–106402). Chan Ahn wrote of T-Tokens on 19 October: “As I read the order, which covers tokenised NMS stock, neither this exemption nor its veto reaches them.” The point cuts both ways, since the order gives them no permission either.</p><p>The SEC staff’s statement of 28 January 2026 draws its line elsewhere, between issuer-sponsored tokens and third-party ones, and divides the third-party side into custodial and synthetic. On that line a custodial token counts as third-party but can still carry the rights. Whether the rights reach the holder settles what the holder has when something goes wrong, or, as Chan’s 28 September piece put it, “Rights are what you have when something goes wrong.”</p><p>That piece also argued a separate point about adoption: “I think retail adoption of tokenised assets is coming through convenience, not through rights-first design.” Chan Ahn still thinks that holds for adoption, although on 21 October Chan scored that test and called it “unproven” whether these holders amount to adoption “rather than balances left behind”. This piece concerns what protects a holder once in, and both answers can be true at once.</p><h3>Listed Stock Went First on the New Venues</h3><p>Size does not explain it. On RWA.xyz’s distributed figures (read 6 November 2026, the pages’ charts dated that day), tokenized US Treasuries stand at $14.24 billion, tokenized credit at $8.21 billion and tokenized stocks at $3.69 billion, with private equity and venture capital together at $2.21 billion. Listed stock is nonetheless the first asset the SEC has exempted for trading on the tokenized securities venues created by its 17 September order. Our reading is that the hard parts already exist for listed stock. A listed share has a public price, quarterly disclosure, a transfer agent and a central depository, and a token of it needs new rails plus, as the SEC’s conditions show, a way to preserve the holder’s rights and the company’s say. Another reading is just as available: listed stock is where exchange rules bind hardest, so it needed the exemption first. Chan Ahn’s July version was shorter: “A tokenised IPO changes the rails, not the rules.”</p><p>The regulatory sequence began with stablecoins, through Congress: the GENIUS Act was signed on 18 July 2025 (White House fact sheet). At the SEC, a Crypto Task Force was formed on 21 January 2025 (press release 2025–30), and the chairman launched “Project Crypto” on 31 July 2025 (speech of that date). On 11 December 2025 staff gave the Depository Trust Company no-action relief for a tokenization pilot limited to Russell 1000 stocks, Treasuries and index ETFs (no-action letter of that date). Three divisions issued a statement on tokenized securities on 28 January 2026. On 17 September 2026 the Commission exempted trading in tokenized listed stock on new venues, which the order calls tokenized securities venues, or TSVs (Release №34–106402). The chairman described it this way: “The Innovation Exemption, while temporary, would allow TSVs to trade tokenized NMS stock in a permissioned environment today while the Commission considers the need for additional action to facilitate onchain trading.” (press release 2026–90).</p><p>The company keeps a say even there, because under the exemption a company can stop a venue from trading a third party’s token of its shares. OKXICE is the first venue we have found to have named the stocks it intended to trade, in a notice of 4 October, and Chan Ahn wrote on 19 October about the nine companies that had objected by its notice of 15 October. Its notice of 19 October named sixteen, adding Goldman Sachs, Microsoft, Qualcomm, Caterpillar, McDonald’s, Western Digital and Alphabet, and its statement of what it will make available for trading now includes tokens made by the issuer itself, which earlier notices had listed only as a possibility. Its notice of 5 November, which we read on 6 November, names sixty-seven, SpaceX among them.</p><p>Tokenized credit has grown in the meantime without a public price or quarterly disclosure. That growth shows demand for on-chain yield, much of it from lending pools rather than direct lending. It argues for building those missing parts. It does not show that they are unnecessary.</p><h3>What Has to Travel With the Token</h3><p>Issuer consent comes first. Private companies control who may hold their shares. Anthropic, which has filed to list but has not yet listed, tells investors that “Any sale or transfer of Anthropic stock, or any interest in Anthropic stock, that has not been approved by our Board of Directors is void and will not be recognized on our books and records”. It says it does not permit special purpose vehicles to acquire its stock, and warns that a third party claiming to sell Anthropic shares to the general public, whether through direct sales, forward contracts, tokenized securities or other mechanisms, “is likely offering an investment that may have no value due to our transfer restrictions.” (Anthropic support article, first published 11 February 2026, updated 29 June 2026). Of closely held companies that keep their own registers, Chan Ahn told crypto.news on 11 September: “A token cannot move what the register will not record.” T-Tokens do not pass through any company’s register. That is the trade-off the second camp makes, and it is why issuers in the loop appear on the list of missing pieces below.</p><p>Eligibility and resale rules stay in force. A private placement can be sold only to the buyers its exemption allows and resold only through another exemption, and restricted securities carry holding periods of six months or a year before public resale, depending on whether the issuer reports (Rule 144(d)). A token can enforce those rules but cannot remove them. Nor does it lift the threshold the JOBS Act set for a private company’s own shares: beyond 2,000 holders of record, or 500 who are not accredited, a company generally has to register. That is one reason the forms that reach many holders place a vehicle, a contract or a loan in between, and one reason their holders’ claims are weaker.</p><p>Disclosure, in our view, matters most. Writing in September about Databricks’ Form D, Chan Ahn said: “Here is what it does not collect: the price. The valuation. The identity of a single buyer.” The same piece went on: “That is not an oversight and it is not evasion. The form is a notice that an exempt offering has happened, filed so the Commission knows it happened. It was never designed to tell anyone what a private company is worth.” That view stands. Tokenization raises the question of what has to accompany an instrument once it is held more widely than the accredited buyers the form was built around. As Chan wrote in July: “What tokenisation cannot replicate is disclosure. There is no 10-Q for a private company, and no token structure manufactures one.”</p><p>A reference price depends on disclosure. Without it there is only the last round, a fund’s own mark or the flows in a pool, and Forge’s stale 2021 rounds show how far those can drift.</p><p>So does the holder’s claim. A third party’s token adds a counterparty, and SEC staff described the consequence: “holders of the crypto asset may be exposed to risks with respect to the third party, such as bankruptcy, to which a holder of the underlying security would not necessarily be exposed.” (Statement on Tokenized Securities, 28 January 2026). That applies to the third-party forms above, meaning the vehicle, the custodial wrapper and the contract, and, on our reading, to T-Tokens, whose holders depend on the issuing subsidiary.</p><p>Liquidity does not follow from the ability to trade. One study of tokenized real-world assets found that “most RWA tokens exhibit low trading volumes, long holding periods, and limited investor participation” (Mafrur, arXiv preprint, August 2025; arXiv now gives a journal reference, FinTech, 2026, which we have not read). The retail wrappers that do exist are being tested in both directions. Jefferies reports “net inflows from retail evergreen vehicles” in the first half of 2026, but also “elevated redemptions across the evergreen capital pool”, that “several managers activated standard 5% NAV gating mechanisms to manage outflows”, and “widespread BDC and private credit redemptions” (July 2026). The Financial Stability Board has warned that the “retailisation” of private credit “could increase potential vulnerabilities related to liquidity mismatches” (6 May 2026).</p><h3>What Exists and What Is Missing</h3><p>Much of the infrastructure is already in place. There are public blockchains that settle, regulated stablecoins to settle in, and tokenized money-market and Treasury funds. Some of the largest managers offer fund tokens to accredited and qualified buyers. Wrappers and contracts on listed and pre-IPO names are offered outside the US. A few companies have chosen to put the share itself on-chain through registered transfer agents. The US has an exemption for tokenized listed stock, permissioned and limited in how much each token can trade, that runs to 17 September 2031 (Release №34–106402). Outside the US there are the EU’s DLT Pilot Regime, applying since 23 March 2023, the UK’s Digital Securities Sandbox, due to run to 8 January 2029, and Singapore’s Project Guardian.</p><p>Five pieces are missing, and each needs help from someone other than token platforms. The first is a disclosure standard that travels with the token. Of the SEC’s “same rights and privileges” test, Chan Ahn wrote on 28 September: “I would rather see it offered as a disclosure standard any venue can display. I should say plainly that a disclosure standard is easier for products like Tessera’s to meet than a gate would be.” Chan still holds that view, and the admission still applies. The second is issuers in the loop: a way for a private company to consent to, or sponsor, a token of its own securities, to write its transfer rules into it, and to send information to its holders. That needs companies and transfer agents as well as platforms. The third is a plain statement of the holder’s claim, saying what the holder has, against whom, and what happens if the token’s issuer fails, shown in the same place as the price. The fourth is reference prices, meaning independent valuation, with prices labeled as indicative where that is what they are.</p><p>The fifth is a retail route for private securities. Tokenized private securities are already sold to accredited investors under the private-placement exemptions and trade among them on broker-dealer alternative trading systems. ACRED’s qualifying investors can participate “exclusively via Securitize Markets, LLC”, which “also operates Securitize Markets ATS, an alternative trading system.” (Apollo and Securitize announcement, 30 January 2025, read 7 November 2026). The 17 September order, which lets on-chain venues operate without registering as exchanges, covers tokenized listed stock. It admits stablecoins and tokenized money-market funds only as the other side of a trade in that stock, and private securities not at all, though its comment questions ask: “Should the TSV Exemption be modified to permit a TSV to trade securities other than Tokenized NMS Stock?” The chairman’s statement on the SEC’s private-markets proposals of 30 September does not mention tokens. So far the two tracks have not met.</p><h3>Our Reading of What Comes Next</h3><p>What follows is a reading, not a forecast, and nothing the SEC has published commits it to this order. The chairman’s statement on the 2026 agenda said it “includes a proposal to better facilitate retail investor participation in private markets while preserving their protection with appropriate safeguards” (7 July 2026), and the proposals followed on 30 September. The 17 September order asks whether its own scope should widen. If the two tracks meet, we think private credit comes before private equity, for three reasons.</p><p>Tokenized credit is already more than three times the size of tokenized private equity and venture capital on RWA.xyz’s figures. Much of it is lending by on-chain pools rather than the direct lending the Financial Stability Board measures: the largest manager of tokenized credit by distributed value is Maple Protocol Pool Operations, which RWA.xyz describes as running institutional lending pools, at $1.19 billion. The private-equity figure is concentrated too, with its three largest assets making up about 72% of the $2.21 billion. Credit’s cash flows are contractual rather than dependent on an exit. And regulators are already scrutinizing private credit, which could slow it as easily as speed it. Private equity would come later because issuer consent bites hardest there. On that distinction between contractual cash flows and dependence on an exit, T-Tokens, tokenized loan participation rights paid only from a Liquidity Event’s proceeds, if any, sit with the exit-dependent assets, although they are not equity.</p><p>None of this makes private credit the easy case. Writing on 16 October about AI-chip loans moving into insurers’ portfolios, Chan Ahn said: “Every new holder makes the market look deeper. It does not make the risk smaller.” Tokenizing private credit widens the holder base for exactly that kind of risk, so disclosure matters more there.</p><h3>What Would Show This Reading Wrong</h3><p>The strongest point against the argument is that the secondary market reached a record without tokens, and the evergreen fund was built without them. The SEC’s own private-markets package of 30 September works through interval funds, performance fees and accredited-investor credentials, with no role for tokens. Access may converge through fund wrappers and rule changes, with blockchains as a detail.</p><p>The access case will have been answered against us if, a year from now, tokenized private-company and private-fund products open to non-institutional holders still count their holders in the hundreds per product on RWA.xyz’s measures, or show holders without activity. The current figure is 6,889 holders across its 44 private-equity and venture-capital assets, about 157 each (read 6 November), and a single large product can move it. RWA.xyz does not track T-Tokens, so the test leaves out Tessera’s own products. The sequence is wrong if the SEC widens its exemption to private-company stock before credit, or if tokenized credit stalls while private-equity tokens grow.</p><h3>Where Tessera Sits</h3><p>A token can carry an asset’s rules, its record and its settlement. For listed assets and funds that is already working, and private markets can have the same advance once issuers take part. Whether it reaches investors safely depends on what travels with it: what investors are told, what they can claim, who has agreed to let them hold it, and whether they can get out on the terms they were shown. On that test T-Tokens offer one of the four, a stated claim in the form of a limited-recourse loan to the issuing subsidiary. The companies they are linked to have not agreed to them and do not inform their holders. T-Tokens are also not available in the US or other restricted territories, so the wider access this piece describes is not something Tessera’s own products offer there. The case for carrying disclosure, consent, a reference price and a clear claim with the token stands regardless of any single issuer’s eligibility map.</p><p><em>Sources: SEC Release 33–6862 (Rule 144A), April 1990; SEC, Release №34–96930 (T+1), 15 February 2023; BIS and CPMI, Tokenisation in the context of money and other assets: concepts and implications for central banks, October 2024; Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112–106, 5 April 2012; SEC, Rule 506(c) adopting release, 78 Fed. Reg. 44771, effective 23 September 2013; SEC press release 2020–191, 26 August 2020, and 85 Fed. Reg. 64234, 9 October 2020; Executive Order 14330, 7 August 2025, 90 Fed. Reg. 38921; Department of Labor, proposed rule, 91 Fed. Reg. 16088, 31 March 2026 (Federal Register searched 6 November 2026); SEC press release 2026–96, 30 September 2026; FCA PS21/14, October 2021; Regulation (EU) 2023/606; 17 CFR 230.144(d). Jay R. Ritter, “Initial Public Offerings: Median Age of IPOs Through 2025”, University of Florida, December 2025; World Bank, World Development Indicators, listed domestic companies (WFE data), updated 8 October 2026. McKinsey, Global Private Markets Review 2024, March 2024; Financial Stability Board, Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, 6 May 2026; AIMA and ACC, press release, 9 December 2025; Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, issue brief 26–18, September 2026; NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments FY2025, public summary tables (allocations at 30 June 2025); Bain &amp; Company, Global Private Equity Report 2023, 27 February 2023. Jefferies, Global Secondary Market Review, July 2026; Evercore, H1 2026 Secondary Market Review, July 2026; Forge Global Holdings, Form 10-K for 2024, filed 6 March 2025; Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund, summary prospectus, 1 August 2026; Broadridge, press release of 6 November 2026, and Distributed Ledger Repo product page, read 9 November 2026; Forge, Private Market Updates, 22 September and 26 October 2026; NVCA model Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement, updated April 2026. Bloomberg News (Caroline Hyde, Ed Ludlow and Dina Bass), “Databricks CEO Plans to Avoid IPO During Year of Huge Offerings”, 4 June 2026. RWA.xyz, app.rwa.xyz, home, treasuries, credit, stocks, private equity and venture capital, and asset managers pages, and asset pages for BENJI and JTRSY, displayed values, read 6 November 2026, charts dated 6 November 2026 (RWA.xyz gives no time zone); OKXICE TSV public notices of 4, 8, 15 and 19 October and 5 November 2026, okx.com/en-us/okxicetsv, the last read 6 November 2026; OKX Web3 DEX token pages for the three T-Token mints, read 12 November 2026; Galaxy Digital, Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 3 September 2025; Kraken xStocks pages, read 6 November 2026; TechCrunch (Maxwell Zeff), “OpenAI condemns Robinhood’s ‘OpenAI tokens’”, 2 July 2025, read 21 October 2026; Crypto.com product news, 12 May 2026, read 6 November 2026; StonkFun homepage, stonkfun.xyz, read 6 November 2026; Tessera Terms and Conditions, terms.tessera.pe, Date Last Revised 29 October 2026, and “How do T-Tokens Work?”, docs.tessera.pe, read 6 November 2026. White House fact sheet on the GENIUS Act, 18 July 2025; SEC press release 2025–30, 21 January 2025; SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins, speech of 31 July 2025, statement on the 2026 regulatory agenda, 7 July 2026, and statement at the open meeting of 30 September 2026; SEC Division of Trading and Markets, no-action letter to The Depository Trust Company, 11 December 2025; SEC Division of Corporation Finance and others, Statement on Tokenized Securities, 28 January 2026; SEC Release №34–106402, 17 September 2026, and press release 2026–90; ESMA, DLT Pilot Regime; Bank of England, Digital Securities Sandbox; Monetary Authority of Singapore, Project Guardian. Anthropic, support article 13704655, first published 11 February 2026, updated 29 June 2026, read 12 November 2026; Anthropic, PBC, Form S-1/A (Amendment №2), filed 10 November 2026, and SEC EDGAR submissions list, checked 12 November 2026. Mafrur, arXiv 2508.11651, August 2025 (preprint; arXiv, read 6 November 2026, lists a journal reference, FinTech 2026, 5(3), 62, which we have not read). Chan Ahn, LinkedIn, quoted from those originals: “Record on the Headline, Thin Underneath”, 27 July 2026; “Going Public by Degrees”, 29 July 2026; “Count Holders, Not Dollars”, 12 August 2026; “The Form Does Not Ask”, 23 September 2026; “Something That Moves”, 28 September 2026; “Spread, Not Shed”, 16 October 2026; “Nine Said No”, 19 October 2026; “Scoring My Own Test”, 21 October 2026; and “The Token Chose the Gate”, 28 October 2026. Tessera, “Time Equals Risk” (first published 9 November 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 11 November 2026). Chan Ahn’s answers to crypto.news, 11 September 2026, as published by crypto.news.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/what-travels-with-the-token"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1404f81061ee" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/what-travels-with-the-token-1404f81061ee">What Travels With the Token</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Time Equals Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/time-equals-risk-4b62ebf191b8?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b62ebf191b8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 04:42:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T04:42:56.229Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W9B2v92lhM3xHiV2k3Z9HA.png" /></figure><p><em>10 November 2026. Figures and sources are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 10 November 2026 none has been. T-Tokens settle on a public blockchain, and the argument here favors settlement on shared ledgers, so Tessera has a commercial interest in it being right, although the measured evidence comes from conventional settlement reforms, and the ledger evidence from systems built for and run among institutions, not open public chains. Tessera has no arrangement with DTCC, Broadridge, BNY, JPMorgan or the Canton Network, issues no product referencing any of them, and none is planned. It has no arrangement with CLS, LCH, UBS or Citibank. Tessera’s founder worked at JPMorgan and Credit Suisse earlier in his career, and this piece discusses both. Tessera, and entities under its control, hold related exposures. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>The market did not know, in the week Lehman Brothers failed, how much of the firm’s reported liquidity was actually available. Over 2008 Lehman had handed its clearing banks approximately $15 billion to $21 billion of collateral, in cash and securities, and had gone on counting it in its reported liquidity pool. The bankruptcy examiner’s account of September is direct: “much of Lehman’s reported liquidity was locked up with its clearing banks, and yet this fact remained undisclosed to the market prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy.” He then tied that to the outcome: “The inadequacy of Lehman’s liquidity pool is directly connected to Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.” (Examiner’s Report, Anton Valukas, March 2010.)</p><p>The clearing banks had reasons of their own. In tri-party repo they lent to dealers during the day, and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission described what that exposed them to: “A risk that was little appreciated before 2007 was that JP Morgan and BNY Mellon could face large losses if a counterparty such as Bear defaulted during the day.” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, January 2011.) Their demands still drained the pool. “The demands for collateral by Lehman’s Lenders had direct impact on Lehman’s liquidity pool; Lehman’s available liquidity is central to the question of why Lehman failed,” the examiner wrote. He concluded that there may be a colorable common-law claim against one clearing bank, JPMorgan, arising from those demands, and that there were a limited number of colorable claims for avoidance actions against JPMorgan and Citibank. On whether JPMorgan’s September 2008 collateral requests were excessive, he found evidence that may support a colorable, but not a strong, claim; a trier of fact would also have to weigh evidence that the requests were reasonable and that Lehman waived any claim by complying.</p><p>The collateral was not the examiner’s explanation of the collapse. “Lehman failed because it was unable to retain the confidence of its lenders and counterparties and because it did not have sufficient liquidity to meet its current obligations,” he wrote, and he traced the lost confidence to business decisions that had left the firm with heavy concentrations of illiquid assets whose values were falling, such as residential and commercial real estate. This piece concerns that difference, between what starts a crisis and what decides how fast it spreads.</p><h3>Plumbing in the Episodes We Reviewed</h3><p>Settlement and collateral plumbing was rarely the first cause in the episodes we looked at. It was, repeatedly, where a loss became a run, either because exposure sat unsettled for too long or because nobody could see who owed what. The selection has a bias that should be stated plainly: we chose these episodes because plumbing featured in them, so they show how it behaves when it matters and cannot show how often it matters.</p><p>Back offices could not keep pace with trading volume in the late 1960s. Fails to deliver at New York Stock Exchange member firms went from about $850 million at the end of 1966 to $4.1 billion at the end of 1968, and the SEC later recorded the result: “Operational conditions deteriorated so severely that securities markets were required to cease trading one day each week at one point, and later to limit daily trading hours.” (SEC, Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Brokers and Dealers, December 1971.) This was one episode in which plumbing was also a cause, since, in the study’s words, “a number of brokerage firm failures are directly attributable to conversions to A.D.P. systems which were not properly planned or implemented.”</p><p>Herstatt supplied the textbook case of settlement risk. German regulators closed Bankhaus Herstatt during the banking day on 26 June 1974, after several of its counterparties had paid Deutsche Mark through the German payments system. The dollars they were waiting for in New York never came. The risk outlived the bank: two decades later the BIS reported that most banks did not measure their FX settlement exposure properly, if at all (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, BIS, March 1996).</p><p>The 1987 crash followed warnings that the market had become overvalued, as Mark Carlson’s history records, and Carlson adds: “There were two program trading strategies that have often been tied to the stock market crash.” Portfolio insurance was the first of them (Mark Carlson, Federal Reserve Board staff paper, 2007). Settlement mostly held up. SEC staff found that most equity trades settled within the normal cycle and that clearing agencies handled potential member defaults well, though the strain showed the need for better trade processing and default safeguards (SEC staff report on clearing agencies, October 2020, describing the staff’s 1988 report). Margin and payments carried the sharpest danger: “The withdrawal of liquidity was the single greatest risk on October 20, 1987.” (Bachmann Task Force, report to the SEC, May 1992.)</p><p>Leverage is the word the official post-mortem on Long-Term Capital Management chose in 1999: “The principal policy issue arising out of the events surrounding the near collapse of LTCM is how to constrain excessive leverage.” The same report found that LTCM’s counterparties were not necessarily aware of the depth of its liquidity problems and that the financial statements it gave them said little about its risk profile. It also said that, had LTCM defaulted, losses could have been more severe without closeout, netting and collateral provisions (President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, April 1999).</p><p>Mortgage losses, leverage and short-term funding started the crisis of 2008. Plumbing then helped to spread it. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that millions of derivatives contracts between systemically important financial institutions, hidden from view in an unregulated market, “added to uncertainty and escalated panic, helping to precipitate government assistance to those institutions.”</p><h3>Why the Tail Is Hard to Price</h3><p>The difficulty, in our view, is structural. Risk models draw mostly on history, and even hypothetical stress scenarios are chosen by people who have seen only history. In a crisis correlations jump, hedges move together, and the tail proves far fatter than history suggested. That conditional non-normality is very hard to model in advance. The President’s Working Group concluded of LTCM that “it is clear that LTCM’s models underestimated the risk they were taking and the effect of their own positions in markets.” (President’s Working Group, April 1999.) The Bank of England said much the same of the UK gilt market in September 2022: “the scale and speed of repricing leading up to Wednesday 28 September far exceeded historical moves, and therefore exceeded price moves that are likely to have been part of risk management practices or regulatory stress tests.” (Bank of England, letter to the Treasury Committee, 5 October 2022.)</p><p>Time enters at this point. In moving US equities to T+1, the SEC described a clearing house’s risk as rising with the value of trades not yet settled, their volatility and the time to settlement (Release 34–96930, February 2023). The underlying point needs no model. The SEC has argued since 1993 that “reducing the total volume and value of outstanding obligations in the settlement pipeline at any point in time will better insulate the financial sector from the potential systemic consequences of serious market disruptions.” (SEC, T+2 release, March 2017, restating its 1993 rationale.) A shorter cycle shrinks the stock of unsettled trades whatever shape the tail takes. How much risk that removes is the part a model has to guess.</p><p>This piece therefore makes no claim that settlement risk can be priced better. The tail cannot be priced reliably, and one dependable defense, alongside capital, limits on leverage and a lender of last resort, is to be exposed to it for less time, with a clearer view of where everything is. That defense has two forms. Trades waiting to settle can settle sooner. Exposures that last beyond settlement, such as swaps and the life of a repo, where LTCM, much of Lehman’s book and Archegos sat, call for margining. Tokenized settlement reaches only the first.</p><h3>What the Measured Reforms Delivered</h3><p>Where this defense has been measured, it has cut exposure, and the largest market move modeled in these sources was the worst in a three-year sample, which falls short of the tail itself. The Bachmann task force put its own slogan to the test: “The concept that ‘time equals risk’, or ‘shorter is safer’, appears to be a logical, perhaps intuitive, assumption.” Its clearing-house model showed one component of market risk falling by 58% on the move from T+5 to T+3 “in the event of the failure of an average large member in a normal market …”, and by 55% in the worst market move in its sample. The task force attached a warning: “While these figures in themselves are significant, it is important to emphasize that the actual worst-case scenario could involve far greater exposures.” T+3 took effect in 1995 and T+2 in 2017 (SEC, release of March 2017).</p><p>Design did more than speed to reduce Herstatt’s risk. CLS, launched in 2002, “provides a payment-versus-payment (PVP) service that virtually eliminates the principal risk associated with settling FX trades.” The share of surveyed FX obligations settled in the old, risky way fell from an estimated 85% in 1997 to 32%, or $1.2 trillion, in 2006, a reduction that “primarily reflects the increasing use of CLS.” Those exposures “remain significant.” (CPSS, BIS, July 2007.)</p><p>Tri-party repo changed after 2008. Clearing banks’ intraday credit to dealers fell from 100% of volume as recently as 2012 to an average of 3 to 5% (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 24 June 2015). The same statement recorded what was still missing: “But as yet, no mechanism exists to address the challenge of coordinating sales of collateral by the creditors of a defaulted dealer in an orderly manner.”</p><p>Central clearing showed what margin and default management are worth. Lehman’s interest rate swaps cleared in London, “66,390 trades, $9 trillion notional”, were unwound using “about a third of the margin held, so that neither the CCP nor its members sustained any losses”. The same review goes on: “Yet 10 years later, a single trader with a much smaller portfolio presented a CCP with a much greater challenge.” (BIS Quarterly Review, December 2018.)</p><p>The most recent measurement comes from T+1. After the move in May 2024, the collateral that the model of the National Securities Clearing Corporation required of its members fell by $2.4 billion to $3.0 billion, or 20% to 23% depending on the baseline, in a before-and-after comparison that does not adjust for market conditions (SIFMA, ICI and DTCC, which led the move, September 2024).</p><p>None of these sources measured volatility. According to the SEC, reduced liquidity risk from a shorter cycle “may also reduce the volatility of securities markets by reducing liquidity demands in times of adverse market conditions …” (Release 34–96930). It may. We found no study that shows it.</p><h3>Where Earlier Writing Was Too Broad</h3><p>Writing on LinkedIn on 29 July, in Going Public by Degrees, Chan Ahn said: “Settlement speed is the most-cited benefit and the least important one. Nobody’s life changes because a trade clears in seconds instead of days.” For the person holding the asset, he still thinks that is right. As a statement about the system it was too broad, because the day that changes nothing for a holder is, for a clearing house in a stress week, a day of exposure to the move the models understated.</p><p>The same article said: “Institutions already have allocation access and settlement infrastructure; for them, tokenisation is incrementally better plumbing.” That holds for daily operations. In a stress week, increments of that kind (less time unsettled, less intraday credit, payment versus payment) are where the measured gains in this record sit, though those gains came from earlier reforms rather than from tokenization.</p><p>Count Holders, Not Dollars, first published on 12 August (republished here on 5 September), and Re-Plumbed, first published on 26 October (republished here on 27 October), each named the beneficiary of re-plumbing as the institution that already held the asset. The system is a beneficiary too, and both pieces left it out. That does not change who tokenization newly reaches, and we still think that is where its largest gain lies. The system’s gain is of a different kind.</p><h3>What Tokenized Settlement Could Add</h3><p>Tokenized atomic settlement carries the same logic to its limit. When the asset and the payment settle as one indivisible event, the gap Herstatt fell into closes: “Such atomic settlement can significantly speed up settlement and mitigate counterparty risk.” (BIS, Annual Economic Report, June 2022.) It could also reach trades that payment-versus-payment does not, since “existing PvP arrangements are at times unavailable, unsuitable for some trades or deemed too costly by market participants.” (BIS, Annual Economic Report, June 2023.)</p><p>A shared ledger can record whether collateral is pledged as well as where it sits, and can give supervisors a seat on it. At Lehman, however, the parties such a ledger would have informed already knew. To one JPMorgan executive, the examiner wrote, “Lehman’s pledged assets seemed like encumbered assets.” The New York Fed, with analysts on site, discounted Lehman’s liquidity pool for the collateral at its clearing banks but did not ask Lehman to stop counting it (Examiner’s Report, Vol 4). Whether participants see more than their own positions is a design choice. Whether the market learns any of it still depends on disclosure, and disclosure was Lehman’s failure.</p><p>Ledger-based repo, not necessarily atomic, already runs at scale. Broadridge says its repo ledger “processed an average of $345 billion in daily repo transactions during October …” (Broadridge, 6 November 2026), on Canton, which its product page calls “a privacy-enabled blockchain network connecting financial institutions …” (read 9 November 2026). The same page lists “Cross-border atomic settlement” among its features, but Broadridge does not say how much of that volume settles atomically, and a ledger that settles a repo’s two legs does not shorten the exposure in between.</p><h3>What Atomic Settlement Costs</h3><p>Every reform in this record kept netting. Instant atomic settlement gives it up, as current token arrangements “tend to” run it on “a gross basis” (BIS and CPMI, October 2024). A New York Fed post explains why: “For a trade to be instantly settled, all legs of the transaction must be “settle-able” at the moment the trade is executed, which makes netting of settlement obligations impossible.” (Michael Lee, Antoine Martin and Benjamin Müller, Liberty Street Economics, New York Fed, November 2022.)</p><p>Netting saves a great deal. It cuts the US equity clearing house’s daily settlement payment obligations by an average of 98%, from about $2.19 trillion cleared a day in the second quarter of 2022 to an implied $44 billion or so net (SEC, Release 34–96930, citing DTCC). Giving it up raises the liquidity demands through which, the SEC suggests, a shorter cycle might calm markets. Gross settlement has precedents, since some existing settlement systems run on real-time gross settlement, some with liquidity-saving mechanisms on top (BIS and CPMI, October 2024). The Financial Stability Board raises a further concern: “Liquidity pressures could also spread faster and wider through programmability and automation.” (Financial Stability Board, October 2024.)</p><p>Lehman is a warning on this point too. Its liquidity pool included accounts its clearing bank emptied almost entirely every morning: the examiner found that “JPMorgan required almost all of the funds in those accounts each morning to unwind the previous day’s triparty-repo trades.” In effect Lehman was prefunding its clearing bank. Atomic settlement would not have spared it that demand, and would make such a demand the rule.</p><p>Margining, the other way to shorten exposure, is where recent spirals ran, because for some participants the calls in a tail move came larger and sooner than they had planned for. In March 2020 “some market participants may not have anticipated the size or timing of the increase in margin requirements …” (Financial Stability Board, November 2020.) Collateral spirals have also persisted where settlement already happens on public chains: “The automatic liquidation of collateral in smart contracts, which can be applied unevenly among participants depending on the protocol design, is a primary reason why deleveraging dynamics in DeFi can be especially disruptive.” (Financial Stability Board, February 2023.) The evidence we found on settlement on public chains under stress is mostly of this kind.</p><h3>The Case Against This Reading</h3><p>No reform we found has been shown to reduce volatility, and we did not review the academic studies of markets that moved to shorter cycles. The measured cuts from shortening the cycle come from models of the kind this piece distrusts, while the observed gains, in FX and tri-party repo, came from changes of design. Visibility is insufficient on its own, though it was also missing. Credit Suisse’s own inquiry found it likely that Archegos deceived the bank and obscured the true extent of its positions, but that the business and risk teams had ample information well before the week of 22 March 2021 that should have prompted them to at least partly mitigate the risk (report of the Credit Suisse Group Special Committee, prepared with Paul, Weiss, July 2021).</p><p>Central clearing concentrated risk as well as reducing it; the FSB’s 2017 review describes steps “designed to help prevent CCPs from becoming a new, concentrated source of too-big-to-fail risk”. And in 1987, 2020 and 2022, credit and central-bank action stopped the spiral, where shorter settlement did not (Carlson; FSB, November 2020; Bank of England, October 2022).</p><h3>What Tokenized Settlement Would Leave Open</h3><p>We would not say that tokenized settlement makes settlement-driven panics a thing of the past. Where it is built to, it can remove one recurring amplifier, the doubt over whether trades have settled. A ledger can also record where collateral sits, but at Lehman the clearing bank and the supervisor already knew, and the market would have learned only through disclosure, which a ledger does not supply. The measured gains against that amplifier were real. They came from fixes that kept netting, and the markets that do settle atomically under stress, in decentralized finance, have not yet shown comparable gains. What it leaves is liquidity: when everything settles at once, someone has to have the cash at once. Whether the system ends up calmer depends on who provides it.</p><h3>Where Tessera Sits</h3><p>Tessera has an interest in this argument. T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure, settled on a public chain. They do not provide equity ownership, voting rights or direct shareholder status, they are not part of the institutional systems described here, and settling a T-Token transfer on-chain does not shorten a holder’s exposure to the issuer. T-Tokens are not redeemable before a Liquidity Event. After one, a holder can redeem only during a 90-day Redemption Period that starts on a Redemption Start Date announced by Tessera Works Foundation; if tokens are not redeemed by its end, the issuer is discharged and the holder has no further claim. A holder’s recourse is limited to the proceeds of the issuer’s investment that the issuer actually receives (Tessera Terms and Conditions, revised 29 October 2026). Tessera’s terms exclude persons in the US and other Excluded Jurisdictions, as well as U.S. persons as those terms define them, and T-Tokens are not available to them on any venue.</p><p><em>Sources: SEC, Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Brokers and Dealers, H. Doc. 92–231, December 1971; SEC Division of Trading and Markets and Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Staff Report on the Regulation of Clearing Agencies, 1 October 2020; Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Settlement risk in foreign exchange transactions, BIS, March 1996, and Progress in reducing foreign exchange settlement risk, consultative report, BIS, July 2007; M. Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the Federal Reserve Response, Federal Reserve Board FEDS 2007–13; Report of the Bachmann Task Force on Clearance and Settlement Reform in U.S. Securities Markets, 26 May 1992; SEC, Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, Release №34–80295, 82 FR 15564, 29 March 2017; President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, April 1999; Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., March 2010, Volumes 1 and 4; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report, January 2011; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, statement on tri-party repo reform, 24 June 2015; BIS Quarterly Review, December 2018; Financial Stability Board, Review of OTC derivatives market reforms, 29 June 2017, Holistic Review of the March Market Turmoil, 17 November 2020, The Financial Stability Risks of Decentralised Finance, 16 February 2023, and The Financial Stability Implications of Tokenisation, 22 October 2024; Bank of England, letter from Sir Jon Cunliffe to the Treasury Committee, 5 October 2022; Credit Suisse Group Special Committee of the Board of Directors, Report on Archegos Capital Management (prepared with Paul, Weiss), 29 July 2021; SEC, Release №34–96930, 15 February 2023; SIFMA, ICI and DTCC, T+1 After Action Report, September 2024; BIS, Annual Economic Report, June 2022 and June 2023, chapter III; BIS and CPMI, Tokenisation in the context of money and other assets: concepts and implications for central banks, October 2024; M. Lee, A. Martin and B. Müller, “What Is Atomic Settlement?”, Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 7 November 2022; Broadridge, press release, 6 November 2026, and Distributed Ledger Repo product page, read 9 November 2026; Tessera Terms and Conditions, terms.tessera.pe, Date Last Revised 29 October 2026, read 6 November 2026. Chan Ahn, “Going Public by Degrees,” LinkedIn, 29 July 2026, quoted from that original (the Tessera version republished at blog.tessera.pe on 30 July 2026 is worded differently). Tessera, “Count Holders, Not Dollars” (first published 12 August 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 5 September 2026) and “Re-Plumbed” (first published 26 October 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 27 October 2026).</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/time-equals-risk"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b62ebf191b8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/time-equals-risk-4b62ebf191b8">Time Equals Risk</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Where the Gate Sits]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/where-the-gate-sits-bcf62cb99e89?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bcf62cb99e89</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-ecosystem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:25:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-16T23:25:56.233Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tZ6mCBvmkmeLRnu0a1Wk_g.png" /></figure><p><em>5 November 2026. Figures and platform data are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 5 November 2026 none has been. Tessera is exploring a structure of the kind this piece discusses, a permissionless token that references a permissioned fund, and is in early discussions with RWA platforms and DeFi protocols about it; none of them is named here. So Tessera has a commercial interest in the case for it. Tessera has no arrangement with Sky, Grove, Janus Henderson, Anemoy or Centrifuge. Tessera, and entities under its control, hold related exposures. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>The Token Chose the Gate examined a tokenized credit fund whose token came with a private-placement gate. In his LinkedIn version of that piece, on 28 October, Chan Ahn called the gate “a choice of legal route, not a property of tokens”, and he set a limit on what any wrapper could do: “A wrapper can promise a faster exit than the fund only by putting a buffer or a buyer between holder and fund, which moves the mismatch rather than removing it.” We still think that holds. The wrapper in question here is a different one. It is issued around a fund’s token, and anyone can hold it. This piece asks what such a wrapper can do, what it costs, and when it is worth having, and our answer is narrower than we expected.</p><h3>Allow-Lists Confine Direct Holding</h3><p>Tokenized money-market funds rely on allow-listing of wallets to keep peer-to-peer trading of their tokens within the rules, according to the authors of a BIS Bulletin, whose views are not necessarily the BIS’s. They continue: “However, such allow lists only constrain direct holding of TMMFs.” (BIS Bulletin No 115, 26 November 2025.)</p><p>An allow-list has two jobs. Through the AML/CFT checks the Bulletin describes, it tells a fund who its holders are, and it enforces the fund’s eligibility rules. Its reach stops at direct holding. The Bulletin describes these funds’ tokens used as collateral on DeFi platforms, held by funds that invest in other such funds, and packaged “as reserve assets to back stablecoins, which are more widely accessible.” Some of those intermediaries have gates of their own. Stablecoin holders have none, but they typically hold a claim at par, and the fund’s return and losses stay on the issuer’s balance sheet. The Bulletin counts wrapping into stablecoins as one way investors can “bypass allow-lists in practice”.</p><p>Re-Plumbed, published on 27 October, put tokens like these on the side of tokenization where tokens can move. They can, within the allow-list: RWA.xyz’s framework counts tokens that move between whitelisted wallets as distributed (21 November 2025). The harder case is a token that passes the fund’s own return and losses to whoever holds it, with no gate behind it at all.</p><h3>What a Wrapper Is and What Exists</h3><p>A wrapper of this kind leaves the fund’s token where it is. A holder the fund has onboarded keeps that token and issues a separate one linked to it, which can be transferred freely.</p><p>Something close to this exists, though it stops short. Grove, a Sky Prime Agent (Grove documentation, read 28 October 2026), said in July 2025 that a wholly owned subsidiary would subscribe to the Janus Henderson Anemoy AAA CLO Fund, JAAA (Sky forum, 16 July 2025). Its legal overview says: “Transfers are permitted only between whitelisted wallets.” That leaves a gated token sitting inside another protocol.</p><p>Two direct wrappers of these funds do exist, one of JAAA and one of the Treasury fund JTRSY, within a family of at least five tokens on the same note series. RWA.xyz lists deJTRSY and deJAAA as offered by Centrifuge, which also offers the fund tokens. It labels them “Issuer-Sponsored”, a field it defines by whether a security is tokenized by or on behalf of its issuer or by an unaffiliated third party. That is the split Going Public by Degrees, first published on 29 July (republished here on 30 July), drew for a company’s own shares. Here the label appears to treat the note’s issuer as the issuer of its own token, so it says nothing about the fund’s sponsor and is no evidence of approval. RWA.xyz describes deJTRSY as “a freely transferable, fully onchain wrapper of JTRSY, composable across DeFi use cases such as trading on DEXes and integrating with lending markets.”</p><p>JTRSY stands at $114.0 million across 32 holder addresses and deJTRSY at $22.1 million across 300. JAAA stands at $569.9 million across 33 and deJAAA at $18.7 million across 356 (RWA.xyz asset pages, displayed values, read 4 November 2026, data dated 3 or 4 November). Those wrapper totals appear to count much of the supply twice. RWA.xyz adds supply on Stellar to supply on Ethereum, and most of the Ethereum supply sits in addresses Centrifuge labels as Stellar escrows. On Centrifuge’s own issuance figures the wrappers are about $11.1 million and $9.6 million (read 4 November 2026), or about 10% and 2% of their funds, with about ten times the holder addresses. That is a snapshot of something moving quickly. JTRSY showed $294.7 million in data of 28 October, and its page now shows it down 67% in 30 days while its value per token rose, so the fall came from tokens outstanding rather than from price. deJTRSY’s holder addresses are down 32% over the same 30 days. These figures also say little about reach. Addresses are not holders, and in tokenized money-market funds generally the Bulletin found “a high concentration of holdings by a small number of investors and limited trading activity”.</p><p>RWA.xyz tags both wrappers “Non-U.S. Professional Investor”, the group the funds are open to (for JAAA, Grove’s legal overview). Centrifuge’s own metadata is wider, giving eligibility for both wrappers as “Non-US Persons and Entities”. We have not read the wrappers’ own terms. Whatever those terms say, a token built to trade on DEXes is bound by any such rule after the first sale, if at all, only through terms.</p><p>Centrifuge’s metadata names Open Market Factory Limited as the issuer of both wrappers and describes each as a debt product linked to its fund, issued as tokenized notes. So the holder’s claim appears to be on a note. The metadata lists no note documents, and we could not establish from public documents where Open Market Factory is registered or whether the fund’s manager approved the wrappers. We have not found a wrapper we can show is issued by an unaffiliated onboarded holder with the sponsor’s approval. In that form the structure is untested. There is no record of it under stress, and that absence should not be read as an opening.</p><h3>What a Wrapper Could Buy</h3><p>The first benefit is transfer with no gate behind it. The Bulletin says the current allow-listing approach “is impractical for funds with a large investor base and restricts TMMF liquidity, limiting their wider use for margining.” It argues that peer-to-peer trading could promote these funds’ use for margin calls and reduce the need for investors to redeem, and a wrapper could carry that use to wallets and venues no fund has onboarded. The only figures we have found for how much of either wrapper is posted as collateral are tiny: Morpho’s API shows two deJAAA/USDC markets on Base with about $15 of collateral between them and none for deJTRSY, and we did not check other venues (read 4 November 2026). We can describe this only as something a wrapper could do.</p><p>The Bulletin’s own answer is a different one: “Trusted wallet ID systems, shared across funds and supported by sound AML/CFT checks and ongoing compliance monitoring (eg Aldasoro et al (2025c)) could mitigate associated risks.” That widens the gate, where a wrapper would step around it, and where such a system exists we think it is the better route. We have not found one in use across funds today, so this condition rules out little for now.</p><p>This sits uneasily with something Tessera has said before. Something That Moves, first published on 28 September (republished here on 10 October), said: “The remedy is a label where the holder already is, rather than a gate they will not walk through.” That passage concerned labels. The question here is who may hold at all, and on that question we think a shared gate is better than none, though less convenient. If holders will not walk through it, that counts against this piece. If they do, it counts against the earlier one.</p><p>The second benefit is smaller holdings. Where a fund’s minimum keeps a holder out, and its eligibility rule does not, a wrapper can be bought in smaller amounts. In Centrifuge’s pool metadata (read 4 November 2026), both funds show a $500,000 minimum subscription and the wrappers 10,000 USD, and those are subscription minimums, which we would not expect to apply to a purchase on a DEX. Where the bar is eligibility, as it is for a professional fund, this benefit becomes one of the risks the FSB lists, discussed below.</p><p>The third is that the sponsor keeps its register. The shares behind the wrapper sit with an intermediary the sponsor has onboarded, so the sponsor still decides who holds them. The register now shows the intermediary, however, and the people with the exposure do not appear on it; knowing the holder passes to the wrapper’s own checks. With approval, the sponsor can also confirm on its register what the intermediary holds, which lets the backing be checked. Approval leaves the category where it was. SEC staff separate securities tokenized by or on behalf of their issuers from those tokenized by unaffiliated third parties (Statement on Tokenized Securities, 28 January 2026), and on our reading a wrapper issued by an onboarded holder is the second kind, approved or not. Approval also says nothing about who should bear the exposure, and it is not one of the conditions set out below.</p><h3>What a Wrapper Costs</h3><p>The liquidity mismatch moves to a new place and stays in force. A wrapper that trades around the clock sits on a fund that redeems on its own cycle. For JAAA, Grove’s 2025 overview says proceeds are “typically delivered to the investor’s designated wallet within three Business Days, though the Fund may extend this timeline in the event of market disruptions or other exceptional conditions.” Centrifuge’s current fund metadata describes faster settlement, T+0 or T+1 depending on the cutoff, which still falls short of a market that never closes. Whoever makes the wrapper liquid in between, by holding inventory or making a market, carries that gap until the buffer runs out, and after that the holders carry it as a discount or a wait. In the Bulletin’s words: “At the heart of these risks lies the liquidity mismatch between the daily redemption capabilities of the tokenised shares and the underlying assets, which remain subject to traditional settlement cycles.” That passage concerns tokenized money-market funds, and JAAA is a credit fund, so applying it here is our extension. The Bulletin adds that because redemptions are immediately visible to all market participants, the risk of runs may grow as confidence wanes, and that repackaging these funds’ shares into other tokens can carry stress from one fund to others. A wrapper is that kind of repackaging. Its issuer is also one more large holder, and in stress its redemption arrives as a single tender.</p><p>The wrapper also adds a counterparty. Where it evidences an interest in fund shares held in custody, that interest may still run through the third party; where it does not, the holder’s claim is against the wrapper’s issuer. SEC staff distinguish a third party’s token that “evidences the holder’s ownership interest (whether direct or indirect) in the underlying security being held in custody” from one “representing its own security that provides synthetic exposure to the underlying security …” Holders of a third party’s token, they note, may face risks such as its bankruptcy that a holder of the underlying would not necessarily face. Under the synthetic model, depending on the facts, the third party may be deemed an investment company, and under certain circumstances a token may be a security-based swap, which may not be offered or sold to persons who are not eligible contract participants unless it is registered and traded on a national securities exchange. The statement “has no legal force or effect …” In the US, at least, the wrapper’s issuer may have a gate of its own to pass.</p><p>A token anyone can hold is also a token anyone can take. In the Binance theft of 29 October, the assets that could be stopped were almost all stablecoins, frozen by their issuers, while about $2.4 billion the attacker held in ether and bitcoin was “beyond any issuer’s reach” (TRM Labs, figures as of 30 October 2026). Whether a wrapper’s issuer can freeze, cancel and reissue, and who holds those keys, has to travel with the token.</p><p>Leverage and pricing deserve the same sober treatment. The Bulletin warns: “Leveraged borrowing strategies (so-called looping), where TMMFs are pledged as collateral to borrow stablecoins to buy more TMMFs, could worsen market dislocations by triggering deleveraging spirals.” A wrapper used as collateral is priced off a fund value struck off-chain, and the FSB warns that an accurate picture of the price and quality of tokens “may be hindered by reliance on unregulated or non-compliant oracles for pricing and valuation.” A wrapper makes leverage easier, and nothing about it makes leverage safer.</p><h3>The Eligibility Question</h3><p>Eligibility is the hardest cost, and it is the Bulletin’s bypass point again. The FSB wrote: “Fractionalisation, lack of transparency, and resulting challenges in asset valuation could also lead to excessive risk taking by investors that are not qualified to assess and hold exposure to risks stemming from some tokenised assets.” (22 October 2024.) The smaller holdings listed above as a benefit come first on that list. Commissioner Peirce has said that a token which “does not provide the holder with legal and beneficial ownership of the underlying security could be a ‘security-based swap’ that cannot be traded off exchange by retail persons.” (9 July 2025.) On that reading, a wrapper of this kind could be off limits to US retail off exchange, though she notes a token could instead, depending on the facts, be a receipt for a security, which is itself a security.</p><p>Chan Ahn’s LinkedIn version of The Token Chose the Gate said of the private route: “What it generally buys is a lighter regime; what it costs is the gate.” Where a fund’s lighter regime depends on its gate, we think passing the exposure around the gate is arbitrage, with or without the sponsor, and the honest route is a registered share class. JTRSY and JAAA are BVI professional funds, open to non-US professional investors (RWA.xyz for JTRSY; Grove’s legal overview and Centrifuge for JAAA), so a freely transferable wrapper of them is the case this test exists for. Centrifuge has described the wrappers’ audience more widely: a capture of its deRWA page from May 2026 speaks of “delivering institutional-grade yields to retail users without minimums or onboarding friction.” Whether deJTRSY or deJAAA passes turns on three things. We could not find in public whether the professional-fund regime depends on who ends up with the exposure, or what the wrappers’ terms say about later holders. The third is whether any check runs on transfer. Centrifuge’s public FreelyTransferable hook, which Yearn’s report on JAAA and a Centrifuge governance post name for these tokens, “Allows any non-frozen account to receive tokens and transfer tokens”, which would leave a freeze list as the only check, though we have not confirmed the deployed contracts or who holds the freeze role. Until a wrapper publishes its terms, the test cannot be passed from outside, and that counts against it.</p><p>If the sponsor agrees, the cleaner answer is usually for the sponsor to issue the open class itself. An intermediary earns its place only by doing something the fund does not: holding a liquidity buffer the fund does not hold, of a size it publishes, or being permitted to offer the exposure in a place where the fund, whose own regime does not depend on its gate, is simply not registered. Even then, the law of each place the wrapper is sold must allow it, the fund’s regime must not depend on who ends up with the exposure, and the checks must reach every holder beyond the first. A token that moves freely meets that last condition only through its terms, which leaves the decision with the issuer. We do not think terms alone answer it. That condition is the hard one, and it may mean the answer is usually no. The issuer profits from the answer, so it should not be the only judge; the regulator of each place the wrapper is sold, or a published legal opinion, should be. “Permissionless” describes the token. Who may lawfully hold it is a separate question.</p><h3>The Case Against This Reading</h3><p>The two direct wrappers are small and come from the platform side. They show that a wrapper can be built and run in calm conditions. They do not show that the structure discussed here works under stress or that anyone wants it at scale, and we have not seen either go through a redemption run. The FSB’s reassurance also cuts both ways. In 2024 it wrote that tokenization “does not currently pose a material risk to financial stability, mostly due to its small scale”, and among the additional factors limiting concern it named “the current focus on permissioned (rather than permissionless) platforms …” (22 October 2024). A permissionless wrapper moves away from that second factor, at the level of the token if not the chain, and growth would remove the first.</p><p>The claim here is therefore narrow. A wrapper buys reach beyond the gate at the costs above, and it is worth having only where the intermediary does something the fund does not, no shared wallet-identity system is available instead, the fund’s regime does not depend on the gate, the law of each place it is sold allows it, and the checks reach every holder. Sponsor approval is not one of these conditions. Where those conditions are not met, we think it is arbitrage, and a registered class is the honest route.</p><h3>Where Tessera Sits</h3><p>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure, issued under their own terms; they do not provide equity ownership, voting rights or direct shareholder status. They are not made with the approval of OpenAI, Kalshi or SpaceX, T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi provide economic exposure linked to the valuations of companies whose own shares are gated, and T-SpaceX provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX, whose shares have since listed, so a reader may ask whether the arbitrage point applies to them. They are not tokens of those companies’ shares. Tessera’s terms exclude persons in the US and other excluded jurisdictions, and T-Tokens are not available to them on any venue, but that exclusion sits in the terms and not in the code, and by the test above terms alone do not settle whether every holder is eligible. Whether either answer is enough is not Tessera’s to judge.</p><p>T-Tokens are not redeemable before a Liquidity Event. After one, a holder can redeem only during a 90-day Redemption Period that starts on a Redemption Start Date announced by Tessera Works Foundation; if tokens are not redeemed by the end of that period, the issuer is discharged and the holder has no further claim. A holder’s recourse is limited to the proceeds of the issuer’s investment that the issuer actually receives (Tessera Terms and Conditions, tessera.pe/terms, last revised 29 October 2026). No Tessera product is in any of the figures above. Tessera is exploring a structure of the same kind as the two wrappers discussed here, so Tessera is not a neutral judge of them or of this argument, and this piece should be weighed accordingly.</p><p><em>Sources: BIS Bulletin No 115, “The rise of tokenised money market funds”, 26 November 2025 (the authors’ views); RWA.xyz (Bryan Choe), “A New Framework for Tokenized Assets: Distributed &amp; Represented”, 21 November 2025; RWA.xyz, Treasuries page and the asset pages for JTRSY, JAAA, deJTRSY and deJAAA, app.rwa.xyz, read 28 October and 4 November 2026, displayed values, data dated 28 October and 3–4 November 2026 (RWA.xyz gives no time zone); TRM Labs, “North Korea Steals USD 6.36 Billion From Binance in the Largest Hack in History”, 29 October 2026, figures as of 30 October 2026; Grove documentation, docs.grove.finance, read 28 October 2026; Grove, “Grove — Legal Overview of JAAA”, Sky forum, 16 July 2025; Centrifuge pool metadata and issuance API for deJTRSY and deJAAA, read 4 November 2026; Ethereum balances of the two Stellar escrow addresses, read 4 November 2026; Centrifuge, deRWA tokens page, Internet Archive capture of 11 May 2026; Centrifuge, FreelyTransferable.sol, protocol repository, read 4 November 2026; Yearn, report on Centrifuge JAAA, updated 20 August 2026; Centrifuge governance forum, community research post on JTRSY holder distribution and deRWA adoption; Morpho API, read 4 November 2026; SEC Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and Trading and Markets, “Statement on Tokenized Securities”, 28 January 2026; Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, “Enchanting, but Not Magical: A Statement on the Tokenization of Securities”, 9 July 2025; Financial Stability Board, The Financial Stability Implications of Tokenisation, 22 October 2024; Tessera Terms and Conditions, tessera.pe/terms, Date Last Revised 29 October 2026, read 4 November 2026. Chan Ahn, “The Token Chose the Gate”, LinkedIn, 28 October 2026. Tessera, “Going Public by Degrees” (first published 29 July 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 30 July 2026), “Something That Moves” (first published 28 September 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 10 October 2026), “Nine Said No” (first published 19 October 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 20 October 2026) and “Re-Plumbed” (dated 26 October 2026, published 27 October 2026).</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/where-the-gate-sits"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bcf62cb99e89" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/where-the-gate-sits-bcf62cb99e89">Where the Gate Sits</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fixed Against Floating]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/fixed-against-floating-1e3c221042dd?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e3c221042dd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-news]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:24:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-16T23:24:42.483Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jJLd_ralsCFdPPyBLLlmqA.png" /></figure><p><em>4 November 2026. Figures are from Anthropic’s amended registration statement of 2 November 2026 unless the text names another source.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 4 November 2026 none has been. This piece reviews Anthropic’s registration statement, and Tessera’s interest in how that listing is received runs in two directions. OpenAI competes with Anthropic. SpaceX sits on the other side as a supplier: Anthropic’s filing records compute agreements of up to $120.5 billion with SpaceXAI, a SpaceX subsidiary, and those agreements depend on Anthropic paying. SpaceX’s own prospectus also names Anthropic among its competitors, and on 14 August 2026 SpaceX acquired Anysphere, the company behind the coding tool Cursor. Tessera has no arrangement with Anthropic, issues no product referencing it, and plans none. It has no arrangement with Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Broadcom, Nscale or Lambda. Tessera’s founder, Chan Ahn, worked earlier in his career at Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Credit Suisse, now part of UBS. Goldman Sachs is a representative of the underwriters of this offering, and JPMorgan and UBS are among the underwriters; Tessera has no arrangement with any of the three. Tessera, and entities under its control, hold related exposures. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>Anthropic filed its S-1 on 26 October and, on 2 November, an amendment that adds the third quarter of 2026. The price range, the number of shares and the size of the offering are all still blank, so there is no valuation in the document to test, and this piece does not attempt one. What the filing does contain is the first set of results Anthropic has published under its own name, now covering nine months. That is enough to score claims made before any of those numbers were public.</p><p>In August, Benzinga asked Chan Ahn, Tessera’s founder, what it would take for Anthropic to justify a $2 trillion valuation. Its article of 24 August reported his answer as roughly $725 billion of revenue by 2036, assuming a 10% cost of equity, a 25% free cash flow margin and a 25x terminal multiple, or about $950 billion at a 13% cost of equity. The longest passage it quoted was: “You can underwrite the growth or you can underwrite the margin. Underwriting both at once is the leap being asked of public investors.” Below, those claims, and the fuller written workings he sent Benzinga in mid-August, are set against the amended filing. Several of them come out against him.</p><h3>Revenue Ran Ahead of the August Figures</h3><p>Anthropic reports $33.2 billion of revenue for the first nine months of 2026, against $2.5 billion a year earlier. By quarter it was $4.7 billion, $11.6 billion and $17.0 billion (S-1/A, quarterly results of operations). Writing on 28 August from Wall Street Journal reporting, Chan used $4.8 billion for the first quarter and a projected $10.9 billion for the second, the same figures that went into his workings for Benzinga. The first quarter came in slightly below that and the second above it.</p><p>His workings put the full year at $50 billion to $55 billion. Reaching that range needs a fourth quarter of roughly $16.8 billion to $21.8 billion (our arithmetic), and the third quarter alone was $17.0 billion, so the range looks more likely to prove low than high. It cannot be scored until the year is reported, and the filing warns of lower usage around holiday periods in summer and winter: total customer spend fell about 20% in the two weeks to 2 January 2026, against the two weeks before.</p><p>Benzinga also reported his view that “Model leadership is temporary and must be repeatedly regained …” Two disclosures bear on it. The filing states that “model versions released in the six months ended September 30, 2026 accounted for over 80% of our revenue for the three months ended September 30, 2026.” That figure records customers moving to Anthropic’s own newest models, so it is no evidence of leadership being lost. What it does measure is how much of one quarter’s revenue rests on the latest releases, which is the exposure Chan was pointing to. The second disclosure touches the product Benzinga quoted him on as a moat, Claude Code, “where the customer is buying completed work rather than tokens”. Claude Code is not broken out. The filing does report that over half of its customers paying $100,000 or more a year used both its developer platform and at least one of its own applications in the third quarter, up from about 30% in the fourth quarter of 2025. That fits the workflow position he described. It says nothing about how large the moat is.</p><h3>The Second Quarter Beat the August Margin, and the Third Did Not</h3><p>The margin figure Benzinga printed was “Anthropic’s projected Q2 operating margin is just 5.1% …” In Chan’s workings that was $559 million of operating income on $10.9 billion of revenue, before stock-based compensation. The filing’s Adjusted Operating Income excludes stock-based compensation too, and shows a margin of 19% ($2.2 billion) in the second quarter and 15% ($2.5 billion) in the third. It also excludes non-cash charitable contributions and a copyright settlement, so it is not quite his measure. Adding back stock-based compensation alone, as his figure did, gives about 19% for the second quarter, which beats the 5.1% he used and counts against him. The same calculation gives about 3% for the third quarter, below his figure; the third quarter reaches 15% only once its $1.96 billion donation-matching charge is excluded as well (our arithmetic, from the filing’s quarterly reconciliation).</p><p>GAAP results, after stock-based compensation, are thinner. The second quarter shows operating income of $974 million on $11.6 billion of revenue, a margin of 8%. The third shows an operating loss of $567 million on $17.0 billion, a margin of minus 3%. Of the seven quarters the amended filing presents, the second quarter of 2026 is the only one with an operating profit.</p><p>Anthropic gives two reasons for the third-quarter loss: “$5.0 billion of compute under short-term commitments, which currently costs significantly more than comparable compute procured under our multi-year commitments, and $2.0 billion of non-cash charges related to our donation matching program.” Compute and infrastructure, a line that covers research and model development as well as serving customers, took 58% of revenue in the third quarter against 48% in the second (S-1/A). The first reason sits awkwardly with the simple form of Chan’s argument, because the expensive compute in the third quarter came from too little capacity under long-term contract rather than too much. The filing says its margins for the nine months “have expanded significantly year over year”, and also that as new compute comes online, “we expect operating margin and Adjusted Operating Margin may compress in those periods.”</p><p>Chan had conceded the point before the filing. On 28 August he set Anthropic’s 2024 cash burn beside the projected 2026 figures, a first operating profit of $559 million among them, and called the distance between the two in eighteen months “the strongest evidence against the case I have made this week.” The claim Benzinga printed looked out to 2036 on a 25% free cash flow margin, and his workings paired that margin with close to 30% compound annual growth for a decade. Two quarters settle that in neither direction.</p><p>The profit figures carry one more caveat, and the filing supplies it. Anthropic has granted employees restricted stock units whose performance condition is met when the registration statement becomes effective. “As of September 30, 2026, no stock-based compensation expense had been recognized for such RSUs …” Had the offering completed on 30 September, the amended filing says, Anthropic would have recorded “$8.2 billion of cumulative stock-based compensation expense …” at once, and a further “$24.1 billion of unrecognized …” expense over about 2.0 years. Its other awards carry about $2.1 billion not yet recognized, and grants of about 47 million further RSUs approved since 30 September add an amount the filing leaves blank. The nine-month results already include $3.3 billion of stock-based compensation on those other awards. Chan’s workings for Benzinga said the gap between the profit figure and GAAP would be “large and durable”, and the filing now puts a size on it. The expense itself is non-cash. It lands on reported profit, and on holders through dilution, rather than on the free cash flow his August arithmetic used, although Anthropic intends to use part of the offering proceeds to pay the tax withholding due when the RSUs settle, at an amount the filing leaves blank.</p><h3>The Split the August Workings Asked For</h3><p>One part of Chan’s workings never appeared in the Benzinga article: the one number he wanted from the S-1, which he said was not revenue. He asked for “the split between committed-spend enterprise agreements and pure on-demand usage. If a meaningful share of that run-rate sits under annual commitments, the mismatch largely closes and most of what I have said here softens considerably.” The closest the article came was his objection to comparing Anthropic’s multiple with Palantir’s and Nebius’s, because “annualized consumption revenue lacks the certainty of contracted revenue.”</p><p>The filing gives no such split as a number, and its account of enterprise contracts shows why the two categories overlap: “A growing number of enterprise customers agree to non-cancelable annual or multi-year contracts with minimum spend commitments in exchange for a committed price list. These contracts result primarily in consumption-based revenue.” Its own figure for consumption-based revenue, 79% of the nine months’ total, therefore does not answer the question either. The nearest figure is remaining performance obligations, the part of customers’ non-cancelable commitments not yet recognized as revenue: $13.8 billion at 30 September, about three-quarters of it due to be recognized within a year. That is a floor. It leaves out what committed customers have already used and anything they spend above their minimums. Even so, it is smaller than the third quarter’s revenue, and the risk factors describe the revenue in terms close to Chan’s: it “is primarily consumption-based, and much of it is not subject to long-term contractual commitments, while our compute and infrastructure commitments generally extend over multiple years.” On the evidence the filing gives, the mismatch does not close.</p><h3>The Commitments Now Have a Total</h3><p>The amendment totals Anthropic’s commitments, and the total is larger than the reporting Chan worked from in August. Counting the contractual obligations table, leases signed but not yet commenced, short-term contracts and agreements signed after 30 September, the filing gives “approximately $895.4 billion”, substantially all of it for compute and infrastructure. About $447.5 billion is expected to fall due before the end of 2030, and most of the rest between 2031 and 2045. Arrangements with no fixed dollar amount sit outside that total; the filing estimates them at a further $150 billion to $175 billion. Three agreements carry minimums payable “regardless of actual usage”: at least about $121.3 billion to Google, at least $110.0 billion to Amazon and at least $44.9 billion to Microsoft. Part of the total is conditional. About $213.8 billion relates to arrangements subject to termination rights, or to conditions that must be met before they start, such as the counterparty securing financing.</p><p>The SpaceX arrangement is the exception, and it is where Chan’s August workings need a correction. They treated the SpaceX compute deal as a fixed commitment of $1.25 billion a month through May 2029, the figure in SpaceX’s prospectus dated 11 June. That prospectus also said that after an initial three-month period “the agreements may be terminated by either party upon 90 days’ notice”, and on 17 August Chan had himself written that a run rate resting on cancelable agreements “is a contract, not an annuity …” The amended filing puts the arrangement at up to $120.5 billion, about $3.1 billion a month once all capacity is delivered, which Anthropic expects in December 2026. It stays cancelable: after initial periods ending in January and March 2027, either party may end each agreement on 90 days’ notice.</p><p>The original S-1 left blank the figure that puts both sides over the same period. The amendment fills it in: about $69.8 billion of obligations falls due in the 12 months after 30 September, of which about $4.3 billion is conditional or terminable. Over the same 12 months, about $10.4 billion of remaining performance obligations is expected to be recognized (our arithmetic, on the filing’s 75%). Third-quarter revenue at an annual rate comes to about $67.8 billion (our arithmetic), roughly the size of that year of commitments, while the contracted backlog covers a fraction of them. The filing does not say how much of the rest is firm, or how the cancelable SpaceXAI agreements are counted; its total also includes about $17.4 billion of minimum payments under contracts cancelable without penalty within a year or with a year or less to run. At 30 September Anthropic held $95.6 billion of cash and $36.3 billion of short-term investments. In August, Chan’s workings said the mismatch would show up as margin compression and a derating rather than as insolvency.</p><p>The counterparties could finance part of the fixed side themselves. At 30 September Anthropic had $77 billion of undrawn, conditional capacity to issue notes to Google, Amazon and Broadcom, or, for Google and Amazon, non-voting stock. Amazon’s capacity opens as compute-capacity milestones are met, and Google’s on compute conditions and revenue targets. Broadcom’s $42 billion of notes may be issued, if needed, “solely to finance quarterly rent obligations under the 2026 Lease Arrangement”, Anthropic’s lease of Broadcom equipment, part of which Broadcom assigned in October to a newly formed special purpose financing entity. On 12 October Chan wrote that he could not find Anthropic’s filing on EDGAR, and that Broadcom’s report did not name the customer whose notes it described; the S-1 now shows a $42 billion note agreement between Anthropic and Broadcom. Those notes would let part of the rent be paid in paper rather than cash. The conditions are set below current results: the filing says Google’s revenue targets are ones “which we have historically surpassed”, and Broadcom’s notes depend on revenue growth conditions “significantly below our actual revenue growth rates”, on a minimum liquidity requirement and on continued performance under the leases. Google’s facility can also be reduced by up to $10.0 billion if Google exercises its option to buy shares in a private placement alongside the offering. If revenue fell short for long enough, though, the conditional facilities are the ones that may not open.</p><h3>The Lock-Up Follows the Earnings Calendar, as SpaceX’s Did</h3><p>The SpaceX half of the Benzinga article reported Chan’s view that the fall in SpaceX shares “was driven more by earnings scrutiny and disclosure than by the August insider-share unlock”, and that the main risk for later IPOs is the “first earnings report” rather than the lock-up expiry. SpaceX’s lock-up released its first large tranche on the second trading day after its first earnings report, as Chan set out on 2 September. Anthropic’s is drafted on the same calendar. Apart from releases from the first trading day and on four further dates, shares under the 180-day lock-up, and under an extended 365-day lock-up, are released on “the second full trading day on Nasdaq immediately following the public release of our annual financial results for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2026 …”, and on five dates counted from it. The share counts are blank, but the percentages are filed. For one group of stockholders under the 180-day lock-up, the earnings trigger releases up to 12.5% of their locked-up shares and each of the five later dates up to 9.5%, so up to 60% in that window; for non-founder directors, officers and certain employees, up to 10% is released on the first trading day and up to a further 35% after the earnings release. On Chan’s reading of SpaceX, the decline came with the earnings and not on the day the shares became free to sell. Anthropic’s schedule sets up the same test, with the two events two full trading days apart.</p><h3>What the Filing Settles and What It Does Not</h3><p>This piece does not value Anthropic, and it takes no view on whether the listing will go well or badly. The filing contains no price, and the valuation figures and 2028 forecast now circulating are reported, not filed. Nothing here is a forecast of failure.</p><p>What the filing settles is narrower. Revenue is running ahead of the figures Chan used in August, and the second quarter’s margin before stock-based compensation beat his, which counts against the way he put it; the third quarter’s fell short of it on the same basis. Under GAAP, the second quarter of 2026 is still the only one of seven with an operating profit, and it precedes a stock-based compensation expense on the performance-condition RSUs that the filing puts at about $32.3 billion on 30 September figures, $8.2 billion of it at once. He called the SpaceX contract fixed, and it was not. On the test he set in August, the filing gives a floor in place of the split, and the floor does not close the mismatch: about $69.8 billion of commitments falls due in the next 12 months, against about $10.4 billion of contracted backlog. Much of the revenue floats, and most of the commitments are fixed. If the 2026 annual results are the first Anthropic reports as a public company, as the lock-up’s drafting implies, they will be the first time that gap is priced by investors who owe the company nothing.</p><p><em>Sources: Anthropic, PBC, Form S-1, SEC EDGAR accession 0001628280–26–067168, filed 26 October 2026, and Amendment №1 (Form S-1/A), accession 0001628280–26–068676, filed 2 November 2026: quarterly results of operations; MD&amp;A, including Adjusted Operating Income, contractual obligations, infrastructure service arrangements and note purchase agreements; risk factors on stock-based compensation, revenue and compute commitments; Notes 13 and 17 and the lease note; lock-up table; read 28 October to 3 November 2026. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., prospectus (Form 424B4) dated 11 June 2026 and filed 12 June 2026, and Form 8-K filed 14 August 2026. Benzinga, Namrata Sen, “Anthropic Wants Investors to Buy Into a $2 Trillion Dream — But a Wall Street Veteran Says SpaceX’s IPO Offers a Warning for AI Investors (UPDATED)”, 24 August 2026. Chan Ahn, written answers to Benzinga, prepared 15 August 2026 and sent 16 August 2026 (unpublished). Chan Ahn, “Who Counts the Capex”, 17 August 2026, “The Money Goes Round”, 28 August 2026, “The Announcement Outlasts the Holder”, 2 September 2026, and “In Exchange for the Guarantees”, 12 October 2026, LinkedIn, as published.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, or to take or avoid exposure to any company mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/fixed-against-floating"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e3c221042dd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/fixed-against-floating-1e3c221042dd">Fixed Against Floating</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Token Chose the Gate]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/the-token-chose-the-gate-27fa25d5ce87?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/27fa25d5ce87</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-ecosystem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 03:22:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T03:22:25.670Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*znOdL11dk3tQ7CTGy66XMQ.png" /></figure><p><em>28 October 2026. Figures and platform data are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 28 October 2026 none has been. Tokenizing exposure to private assets is what Tessera does, so Tessera has a commercial interest in how tokenized private-market products are judged. Tessera has no arrangement with Apollo, Securitize, Franklin Templeton or Morpho, issues no product referencing Apollo or Athene, and plans none. Tessera, and entities under its control, hold related exposures. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>Apollo Diversified Credit Fund is an interval fund registered with the SEC, and it sells two classes of shares with very different entry points. Class A carries a “$2,500 minimum purchase for regular accounts” and a sales load of up to 5.75%; Class I, the institutional class, has a $1,000,000 minimum (prospectus, 1 May 2026). The fund also has a tokenized feeder, ACRED, run by Securitize, which holds Class I shares. RWA.xyz lists ACRED’s minimum as $50,000 and limits it to US accredited investors and non-US professional investors (data of 28 October 2026). The feeder’s own Form D filings report no minimum investment.</p><p>Measured against the class it holds, the token lowered the bar: $50,000 against a stated $1 million, although the prospectus says the fund may permit an intermediary to waive the Class I minimum for clients in “broker-sponsored discretionary fee-based advisory programs”. Measured against what a US buyer can already get, it raised one. A US investor who can buy Class A from $2,500 cannot hold ACRED without being accredited.</p><h3>The Gate Comes From the Feeder’s Legal Route</h3><p>ACRED’s feeder is a private fund. Its SEC filings claim Rule 506(c), the exemption for private placements that may be advertised, and section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act, the exclusion for private funds with no more than 100 beneficial owners. They report no investors who are not accredited, and the latest records $110.9 million sold to 26 investors (Form D amendment, 12 February 2026). The master fund is registered, and registration is what allows it to offer Class A shares to the public from $2,500, plus the sales load.</p><p>The gate, in other words, follows from the route the sponsors chose. Tokens can represent shares in a registered fund: Franklin Templeton’s tokenized money-market fund takes $20 (RWA.xyz, data of 28 October 2026). That fund holds a different asset and offers daily liquidity, so it shows a registered wrapper is possible without showing that one would be as simple for private credit. We have not seen the sponsors explain why they chose the private route. That route generally comes with a lighter regulatory regime, and the accredited gate is part of its cost. We have not found a tokenized share class of a registered private-credit fund that is open to retail investors on the master fund’s terms.</p><h3>Redemptions Run on the Fund’s Quarterly Schedule</h3><p>The exit matters more than the entry. ACRED’s launch announcement spoke of “native redemptions at a daily net asset value” (Securitize and Apollo, 30 January 2025). The master fund calculates its net asset value daily and repurchases shares quarterly (prospectus, 1 May 2026), so we read the launch line as describing the price at which redemptions are made, and not how often they can be made. RWA.xyz describes ACRED’s subscriptions and redemptions as quarterly (data of 28 October 2026). Read on its own, the launch line could suggest the opposite.</p><p>Each quarter the fund offers to buy back “no less than 5% and no more than 25% of the total number of shares outstanding”. It may take up to 2% more at its discretion, and beyond that it buys pro rata (prospectus, 1 May 2026). In the offer that closed on 3 February 2026, requests were “honored in their full amounts”. The offer that closed on 5 May went differently: requests “exceeded the number of shares subject to the repurchase offer”, and the fund “repurchased approximately 35% of the 10,814,698 shares tendered for repurchase” (semi-annual report to 30 June 2026, filed 2 September 2026). The offer that closed on 4 August was oversubscribed too: the fund “repurchased approximately 27% of the 13,720,453 shares tendered for repurchase by the Repurchase Request Deadline” (same report, note on subsequent events).</p><p>The prospectus names feeder vehicles as part of that risk. Withdrawal requests by feeder investors “may result in tenders by the feeder vehicle in a repurchase offer by the Fund and could contribute to an over-subscription of a particular repurchase offer” (prospectus, 1 May 2026). The Securitize feeder is such a vehicle. At 31 March 2026 it held 8.7% of the fund’s Class I shares of record (statement of additional information, 1 May 2026, filed with the prospectus). We have found nothing saying whether it tendered in May.</p><p>None of this is unusual for private credit this year. Apollo’s own non-traded business development company, Apollo Debt Solutions, is a different structure with a 5% tender limit, and in the offer reported on 6 August, 101,541,297 shares were tendered and 30,224,152 accepted, pro rata (Schedule TO amendment, 6 August 2026). Jefferies reported “widespread BDC and private credit redemptions” in the first half (July 2026). For scale, the fund had $1.64 billion of net assets at 30 June 2026, with investments equal to 135.8% of them (semi-annual report), and Class A’s expenses include borrowing costs of about 1.5% a year (prospectus).</p><h3>What ACRED Changed and What It Left Alone</h3><p>The wrapper and the wallet are new. ACRED is on seven chains (RWA.xyz, data of 28 October 2026), and it came with a feeder incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (Form D) that non-US professional investors can hold, which, like the gate, reflects a choice of route. Those are real gains. The same plumbing could carry a registered share class to smaller holders if a sponsor decided to build one.</p><p>Redemption liquidity is unchanged. It belongs to the fund’s quarterly repurchase program, set within the band the interval-fund rule allows, for a portfolio that includes loans that do not repay on demand. A token holder relies on the same quarterly offer as a shareholder, reached through the feeder, which tenders in the fund’s repurchase offers. We have not seen how the feeder allocates a pro-rated fill among token holders. A wrapper could promise a faster exit than the fund offers only by placing a buffer or a buyer between holder and fund, and that would relocate the mismatch without removing it. Going Public by Degrees, first published on 29 July (republished here on 30 July), said that “Tokenization can reproduce much of the liquidity of a listing.” We still think that holds for a listing. A fund that redeems at net asset value is a different case: a market in the token would itself be the buyer standing between holder and fund, and the exit described here would still be the fund’s.</p><h3>Borrowing Against the Token</h3><p>The token does offer one thing the share does not. On some lending protocols it can be pledged as collateral to borrow stablecoins. Morpho, one of them, says ACRED, in one or more of its tokenized variants, is used this way on Ethereum, Polygon and OP Mainnet (Morpho, Apollo customer page, read 23 October 2026). A holder who does this takes a loan from someone else against the holding and carries the risk of liquidation if the token’s value or the loan’s terms move. The fund’s quarterly buyback is untouched, and the holder has still not left the fund.</p><p>The Financial Stability Board’s warning concerns retail buyers, whom ACRED excludes and the fund’s Class A does not. The growth of retail participation in private credit, it wrote, “may be associated with more flexible redemption terms and could increase potential vulnerabilities related to liquidity mismatches” (Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, 6 May 2026). A token can make a holding easier to buy and to move between wallets, while the loans beneath it repay on their own schedule.</p><p>Spread, Not Shed, first published on 16 October (republished here on 17 October), made a related point about AI-chip loans moving into insurers’ portfolios: “Every new holder makes the market look deeper without making the risk smaller.” It applies here too. What matters is whether holders are told how the exit works before they need it.</p><h3>Three Ways the Exit Could Be Made Clearer</h3><p>Two are open to sponsors now. The first is a plain statement, wherever the token is sold, of how often holders can redeem, through what mechanism, and what happens when the fund pro-rates. The second is a registered share class on-chain, so the token does not have to bring the accredited gate with it. The third is a rule still at the proposal stage: on 30 September the SEC proposed changes for interval funds that would allow repurchases as often as monthly and simplify the treatment of oversubscribed offers (SEC fact sheet, 30 September 2026). If the proposal is adopted and this fund uses it, the exit could come more often. Whether more frequent exits are safer is the question the FSB raised, and the rule does not answer it.</p><h3>The Case Against This Reading</h3><p>ACRED is small. RWA.xyz shows $95.2 million across 53 addresses (data of 28 October 2026), against a $1.64 billion fund. Addresses are not holders, and the Form D’s $110.9 million and 26 investors are cumulative totals sold to February. At that size ACRED says more about the design than about the market.</p><p>The pro-rating in May and August was the fund’s. Had the feeder tendered, it would have been pro-rated like every other shareholder, and we have not seen how it would pass that result on to token holders. Quarterly repurchases with a cap are also what interval funds are built for, and the cap protects the holders who stay. The argument here is narrower than a verdict on the product. The token did not change what the fund will buy back each quarter, and we think the launch materials, which spoke of “native redemptions at a daily net asset value”, should have said so plainly. We could not read Securitize’s current offering page, which may say so.</p><h3>Where Tessera Sits</h3><p>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure; they do not provide equity ownership, voting rights or direct shareholder status. They are not redeemable before a Liquidity Event. After one, a holder can redeem only during a 90-day Redemption Period that starts on a Redemption Start Date announced by Tessera Works Foundation; if tokens are not redeemed by the end of that period, the issuer is discharged and the holder has no further claim. A holder’s recourse is limited to the proceeds of the issuer’s investment that the issuer actually receives, and there is no fixed maturity (Tessera Terms and Conditions, tessera.pe/terms, last revised 1 October 2026; “How do T-Tokens Work?”, docs.tessera.pe). Whether that suits a holder better or worse than a quarterly, pro-rated exit is not Tessera’s to judge. Tessera’s terms exclude persons in the US and other excluded jurisdictions, and T-Tokens are not available to them on any venue, which is a gate of its own; the point about ACRED’s gate stands whatever any single issuer’s eligibility map says. T-Tokens sit in the same broad market as ACRED, so Tessera is not a neutral judge of another firm’s tokenized product, and this piece should be weighed accordingly.</p><p><em>Sources: Apollo Diversified Credit Fund, prospectus and statement of additional information dated 1 May 2026 (Form 486BPOS, filed 29 April 2026), and semi-annual report for the period to 30 June 2026 (Form N-CSRS, filed 2 September 2026); Securitize Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund, Ltd., Form D, 12 February 2025, and amendment, 12 February 2026; Securitize and Apollo, announcement of ACRED, 30 January 2025; Morpho, Apollo customer page, read 23 October 2026; Apollo Diversified Credit Fund, Form N-23C3A for the repurchase offer with a deadline of 4 August 2026; Apollo Debt Solutions BDC, Schedule TO-I amendments, 6 May and 6 August 2026; RWA.xyz, ACRED asset page, app.rwa.xyz, read 28 October 2026, data timestamped 28 October 2026 (RWA.xyz gives no time zone), and BENJI listing, read 28 October 2026, data timestamped 28 October 2026; SEC press release 2026–96 and fact sheet, 30 September 2026; Financial Stability Board, Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, 6 May 2026; Jefferies, Global Secondary Market Review, July 2026; Tessera Terms and Conditions, tessera.pe/terms, Date Last Revised 1 October 2026, and “How do T-Tokens Work?”, docs.tessera.pe. Tessera, “Going Public by Degrees” (first published 29 July 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 30 July 2026) and “Spread, Not Shed” (first published 16 October 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 17 October 2026).</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/the-token-chose-the-gate"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=27fa25d5ce87" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/the-token-chose-the-gate-27fa25d5ce87">The Token Chose the Gate</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Re-Plumbed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/re-plumbed-263cb8db532c?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/263cb8db532c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pre-ipo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 03:19:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T03:19:28.873Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PfmK-uQamfP3SGKVc5-82A.png" /></figure><p><em>26 October 2026. Figures and platform data are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 26 October 2026 none has been. T-Tokens settle on Solana, a public chain, and can move between wallets, which places them on one side of the divide this piece describes. The argument here favors that side, and Tessera has a commercial interest in it being right. T-Tokens are not in any of the figures below (RWA.xyz, checked 26 October 2026). Tessera has no arrangement with BNY, Broadridge, Citadel Securities, DTCC, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Nasdaq or the Canton Network, issues no product referencing any of them, and plans none. Tessera’s founder worked at JPMorgan earlier in his career, and this piece discusses JPMorgan. Tessera, and entities under its control, hold related exposures. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>Set stablecoins aside, since they are a different product, and this month’s largest tokenization numbers came from places no retail holder can reach: a repo ledger and a bank’s payment network. A first came from the same kind of place, a custodian working on its own private ledger.</p><p>Broadridge reported that its Distributed Ledger Repo “processed an average of $359 billion in daily repo transactions during September, with volumes totaling $7.5 trillion” (Broadridge, 8 October 2026). Five days later BNY said it had “completed a triparty repo workflow with Citadel Securities using a tokenized representation of a U.S. Treasury, marking the first use of tokenized assets on a major triparty repo platform” (BNY, 13 October 2026). On 19 October JPMorgan gave Kinexys “over $4 trillion in cumulative transactions since inception, with an average daily transaction volume of $7 billion” (JPMorgan, 19 October 2026), a figure that covers the whole platform, payments included. DTCC, for its part, has said since May that it “plans to launch the service in October 2026” (DTCC, 4 May 2026). As of 26 October we have found no announcement from DTCC that it has.</p><p>The Broadridge and JPMorgan figures measure activity: a day’s volume, a month’s, a running total. The other side of tokenization, where tokens can move between wallets, is usually measured as a balance, and the two are different kinds of number. That difference is part of the story. On RWA.xyz, tokenized US Treasuries that can move to wallets outside the platform that issued them were worth $14.65 billion in data of 25 October 2026, and the site counted 85,924 addresses holding tokenized Treasuries. Addresses are not the same as holders.</p><p>That side is not retail at the top either. None of its five largest Treasury products, ranked by value, is open to US retail buyers. Three are sold only to qualified or institutional buyers, and one of those is JPMorgan’s own OnChain Liquidity-Token Money Market Fund, which takes a minimum of $1 million from qualified institutional buyers and non-US institutions. The other two are sold only to non-US investors (RWA.xyz, same data). JPMorgan therefore sits on both sides of the divide. What the wallet side has, and the repo ledgers lack, is tokens that move.</p><h3>Most of the Larger Total Is a Daily Repo Figure</h3><p>RWA.xyz divides tokenized assets into two groups. “Distributed” assets “can be moved to wallets outside the issuing platform and transferred between wallets.” “Represented” assets “cannot,” and for them the blockchain “primarily serves as a recordkeeping and reconciliation layer” (RWA.xyz, framework post of 21 November 2025). The same post describes the represented model this way: “Rather than expanding investor access, this model serves institutional participants seeking improvements to enhance their operational workflows.”</p><p>The split itself is sound. The difficulty is what sits in the larger half. RWA.xyz’s home page put distributed assets at $39.00 billion and represented assets at $389.25 billion (data of 25 October 2026). Broadridge’s repo ledger accounts for $343.02 billion of the represented figure, or 88.1% (our arithmetic), and RWA.xyz’s own page for that platform labels the series “Daily Repo Turnover.” The represented total therefore adds one day’s repo activity to standing token balances.</p><p>How far that overstates what is outstanding depends on the trades. For overnight repo, a day’s volume is close to the amount outstanding; for intraday repo, it overstates it. Nothing we have read from Broadridge or RWA.xyz gives the split. Whichever way it falls, most of the distance between $389 billion and $39 billion is one platform’s daily repo figure.</p><h3>Where the Activity Ran</h3><p>All of this ran on ledgers built for institutions. In BNY’s trade, “a tokenized representation of the security was recorded on BNY’s private digital ledger and settled within minutes,” the bank said, “settling near-instantly rather than on the standard T+1 settlement cycle” (BNY, 13 October 2026). Broadridge’s repo ledger runs on Canton, which Broadridge describes as “a privacy-enabled blockchain network connecting financial institutions” (Broadridge product page, read 23 October 2026). Kinexys has been described as permissioned (CoinDesk, 29 June 2026), although JPMorgan’s 19 October release concerned putting JPM Coin on Ethereum.</p><p>The boundary between private and public rails is less clean than that list suggests. DTCC’s first production trades in July, ahead of the full launch of its service, ran on its own private network and on Canton, which DTCC called “a public network” (DTCC, 15 July 2026).</p><p>Products are moving more slowly than the rails. According to The Block, Morgan Stanley has pushed its plan to trade tokenized equities on its alternative trading system back to the first quarter of 2027, and Amy Oldenburg, its head of digital asset strategy, said: “And the client demand really isn’t there because the product doesn’t exist.” (The Block, 12 October 2026). Her point is about sequence, with the product coming before the demand, and it does not sit comfortably with this piece’s argument. The test, once the product exists, is whether it reaches anyone Morgan Stanley could not already serve.</p><h3>The Largest Numbers Are Plumbing</h3><p>Tessera’s piece Count Holders, Not Dollars, first published on 12 August (republished here on 5 September), put it this way: “Most of the tokenized dollars in existence are institutional balance-sheet items that have been re-plumbed: the asset moved onto a better ledger without becoming available to anyone new.” This month’s figures show the same process running on busier rails. A Treasury that settles in minutes rather than a day can be cheaper to fund against, which matters to a funding desk, and the same piece named the beneficiary of that work as “the institution that already held the asset and now settles it faster and reconciles it more cheaply.”</p><p>Going Public by Degrees, first published on 29 July (republished here on 30 July), drew a different line, between the institutions building the rails and the people the rails could reach. “Institutions already have IPO allocation channels and settlement infrastructure,” it said, while “Retail starts elsewhere.” On that line, every one of this month’s largest numbers falls on the institutional side, and none reaches retail.</p><p>That is no criticism of the work. Faster and cheaper collateral is a real gain, and some of it may reach end investors as lower costs. It is still a separate thing from adoption by new holders. Count Holders, Not Dollars also said that the industry consensus that tokenization is “institution-first” “describes the first process and mistakes it for a description of the whole.” We still think that line holds, though, as Scoring Our Own Test, first published on 21 October (republished here on 22 October), said, whether the holders on the other side amount to adoption is unproven.</p><h3>Where DTC’s Pilot Could Join the Two</h3><p>DTCC is the place to watch. The SEC staff’s no-action letter of 11 December 2025 limits the pilot to “(i) securities in the Russell 1000 Index … (ii) U.S. Treasury securities (i.e., bills, bonds, and notes), and (iii) ETFs that track major indices, such as the S&amp;P 500 index and Nasdaq-100 index,” and the relief is “withdrawn without further action three years from the date DTC launches operation of the Preliminary Base Version.” Separately, the SEC has approved Nasdaq trading securities “in tokenized form during the pendency of” the DTC pilot, once DTC’s infrastructure is in place and with at least 30 calendar days’ notice to Nasdaq members (Release №34–105047, 18 March 2026).</p><p>If DTC’s service launches, a first set of securities will gain tokenized entitlements inside the depository that already holds them. DTCC’s scope document puts the number at 25 at launch, starting with select large-cap shares, ETFs and Treasuries, on the Canton Network and DTCC’s private network, with more networks to follow (DTCC, “Tokenization Service: Scope at Launch and What’s Next,” undated, file created 16 October 2026). That would bring the institutional rail to assets retail investors already own.</p><h3>Two Gates on Who Holds</h3><p>Whether the tokens can move and whether the service changes who can hold them are separate questions. DTC would give participants a list of “public and private distributed ledgers” on which they could register wallets, and the SEC staff’s letter sets the limit: “Only DTC Participants would be permitted to register wallets, and the relevant DTC Participant would be fully responsible for the activity in the Registered Wallet(s). The tokens would only be transferable to Registered Wallets.” (no-action letter, 11 December 2025).</p><p>DTC’s own request, attached to the letter, goes a step further: “Participants would be able to establish an unlimited number of Registered Wallets, including Registered Wallets for the benefit of their customers. Access to and use of Registered Wallets by a Participant’s customers would be at the discretion of, and agreement between, the Participant and its customers.” The same request is plain about who holds: “While a Participant may register a wallet for the benefit of its customer and even provide that customer with the keys to the wallet, during the operation of the Preliminary Base Version, DTC would only recognize the Participant as the entitlement holder and the Participant would be fully responsible for the activity in the Registered Wallet.” DTCC’s summary of the service at launch keeps that shape, listing “24/7 peer-to-peer transfers between registered wallets” and “Compliance-enabled tokens with transfer restrictions” (same document).</p><p>During the pilot, then, there are two gates. DTC decides which participants, chains and wallets are admitted, and recognizes only the participant as the holder. The participant decides whether a customer gets a wallet at all, and a retail customer who is given one would hold the keys without holding the entitlement.</p><p>RWA.xyz’s framework counts tokens that move between whitelisted wallets as distributed (21 November 2025), so DTC’s tokens could count as distributed whether or not anyone new holds them. Two things are worth watching: whether participants open these wallets to retail customers, and whether DTC ever recognizes anyone other than the participant as the holder. We have found nothing from DTCC or any participant saying that either will happen. Even if both did, who may hold a security would still be set by the rules rather than the rails, the point Going Public by Degrees made under the heading “The rails change before the rules.”</p><p>The wallet limit also corrects an earlier description. Writing for Fintech Bloom on 8 July, Chan Ahn said: “The regulatory approval allows Nasdaq to test a system where investors can hold tokenized securities in digital wallets.” For the pilot, that was too broad. At most, an investor could hold the keys to a wallet that a DTC participant registers for them, if the participant chooses to, and DTC would still recognize only the participant as the holder.</p><h3>The Case Against This Reading</h3><p>Daily repo volume can recycle the same collateral many times over, so $7.5 trillion in a month says more about how heavily the ledger is used than about how much sits on it. Broadridge has not named its participants in anything we have read, so we cannot say how concentrated that use is.</p><p>The institution-first path may also turn out to be the right description. If participants open DTC’s registered wallets to their retail customers, the plumbing will have come first and access after it, which is close to the consensus Count Holders, Not Dollars disagreed with in August. Registered wallets with transfer restrictions are also close to the rights-first design that Something That Moves, first published on 28 September (republished here on 10 October), argued retail would not prefer. If retail arrives that way, it counts against that piece as well.</p><h3>Where Tessera Sits</h3><p>Tessera sits on the side where tokens can move between wallets. T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure, settled on a public chain; they do not provide equity ownership, voting rights or direct shareholder status, and none of the institutional figures above includes them. Under Tessera’s terms they are not available to persons in the US or other restricted territories, on any venue, and the point about who can hold DTC’s tokens stands whatever any single issuer’s eligibility map says. Tessera has a commercial interest in the wallet side mattering. The figures and quotations here are those of Broadridge, BNY, JPMorgan, DTCC, the SEC and RWA.xyz; the framing is Tessera’s, and should be weighed accordingly.</p><p><em>Sources: Broadridge Financial Solutions, press release, 8 October 2026, and Distributed Ledger Repo product page, read 23 October 2026. BNY, press release, 13 October 2026. JPMorgan, Kinexys release on JPM Coin on Ethereum, 19 October 2026. DTCC, releases of 4 May 2026 and 15 July 2026, and “Tokenization Service: Scope at Launch and What’s Next,” undated PDF (file created 16 October 2026), read 24 October 2026. SEC Division of Trading and Markets, no-action letter to The Depository Trust Company, 11 December 2025, and DTC’s request attached to it. SEC Release №34–105047 (Nasdaq), 18 March 2026. CoinDesk, 29 June 2026. The Block, 12 October 2026. RWA.xyz, app.rwa.xyz home, Treasuries and Broadridge DLR pages, read 26 October 2026, data timestamped 25 October 2026 at 06:04 (RWA.xyz gives no time zone). RWA.xyz (Bryan Choe), “A New Framework for Tokenized Assets: Distributed &amp; Represented,” 21 November 2025. Chan Ahn, “Balancing Innovation and Compliance,” Fintech Bloom, 8 July 2026. Tessera, “Going Public by Degrees” (first published 29 July 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 30 July 2026), “Count Holders, Not Dollars” (first published 12 August 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 5 September 2026), “Something That Moves” (first published 28 September 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 10 October 2026) and “Scoring Our Own Test” (first published 21 October 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 22 October 2026), quoted as published at blog.tessera.pe.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/re-plumbed"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=263cb8db532c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/re-plumbed-263cb8db532c">Re-Plumbed</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Scoring Our Own Test]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/scoring-our-own-test-a5570c3ba140?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a5570c3ba140</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pre-ipo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:26:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T00:26:25.551Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rkkJiuWBWMKVw3M43PtfZA.png" /></figure><p><em>21 October 2026. Figures and platform data are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 21 October 2026 none has been. The argument this piece scores is one Tessera was built on, and Tessera has a commercial interest in it being right. Tessera also appears as a quote-asset category on StonkFun, which this piece discusses; Tessera has no commercial, integration or incentive arrangement with StonkFun or Raydium. Tessera has no arrangement with Kraken, Backed, Binance, Ondo, Superstate or Robinhood. Tessera’s founder, and entities he controls, hold related exposure. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>Tessera’s piece Something That Moves, first published on 28 September (republished here on 10 October), argued that “retail adoption of tokenized assets is arriving through convenience rather than through rights-first design.” It ended with the evidence that would show it wrong. One of its two tests was this: “if RWA.xyz’s holder count falls back as launchpad activity quiets, then it was a trade rather than adoption.”</p><p>Three weeks of data later, the same sources give a first answer. It is not the one we would like to claim, and it says as much about the test as about the argument.</p><h3>The Launchpad Went Quiet</h3><p>StonkFun, the Solana launchpad that lets coins trade against tokenized stocks, was the part of the story we had not expected. DefiLlama counts every buy and sell on its launchpad’s bonding curves, whatever they are priced in, so its figures cover more than the tokenized-stock pairs. Something That Moves called the same series all of StonkFun’s trading; we have not established whether it counts trading in a coin after the coin leaves its curve.</p><p>DefiLlama’s daily figures trace the decline:</p><ul><li><strong>Peak:</strong> $63.0 million on 21 September, a week before the test was set.</li><li><strong>When the test was set:</strong> $24.6 million on 28 September.</li><li><strong>After it:</strong> the series did not quiet down straight away. It rose to $36.0 million on 29 September, and it has stayed below its level of 26 September, the last day the earlier piece reported, only since 7 October.</li><li><strong>Latest:</strong> $1.7 million on 20 October, about 93% below 28 September and 97% below the peak.</li><li><strong>By week:</strong> the seven days to 20 October came to $11.6 million, against $37.8 million in the seven days before and $148.9 million in the seven before that (our arithmetic from DefiLlama’s daily figures).</li></ul><p>That half of the test has been met, but for two weeks rather than the whole period.</p><h3>The Holder Count Has Not Fallen Back</h3><p>RWA.xyz counted 4,375,492 addresses holding tokenized stocks in its data of 20 October, against 4,010,763 on 28 September: 364,729 more, up 9.1% (our arithmetic). These are addresses rather than people, and an address can be a pool, a contract or a wallet an app created for its user. Every platform page cited on 28 September shows more holders now except one, on counts that cover all of each platform’s products:</p><ul><li><strong>bStocks:</strong> 1,548,922, up from 1,402,291.</li><li><strong>xStocks:</strong> 761,818, up from 666,831.</li><li><strong>Superstate Opening Bell:</strong> 83, down from 84.</li><li><strong>Robinhood and Ondo:</strong> 1,629,534, up from 1,525,585, and 557,640, up from 505,751. As on 28 September, this piece does not lean on them: Robinhood’s count spans two products RWA.xyz classes differently, and Ondo’s spans all its products, most of them Treasury funds.</li></ul><p>Not every platform in the count is one StonkFun lists as a pairing. Of those listed here, xStocks, which StonkFun does list, has grown fastest since 28 September, by 14%, and it is also the only one whose count fell in the past week: from 842,888 on 14 October, down about 10% (our arithmetic). Nothing public says how many of its holders came through StonkFun.</p><p>So far, on the test as written, the argument survives. But that comparison starts before the quiet did. The fairer one starts inside it: from 14 October to RWA.xyz’s data of 20 October, holders went from 4,387,867 to 4,375,492, down 0.3% (our arithmetic). That is less than the 2% set below as the smallest change this piece will count, so it does not count as a falling-back. But the count is no longer rising.</p><h3>What the Test Could Not Tell Us</h3><p>The argument survives a test that could hardly have failed this way, and that should be said.</p><p>A holder count is a net number. It can rise while every address that arrived in September leaves, if more arrive behind them, and it cannot tell a holder who is waiting from a balance nobody will touch again. RWA.xyz’s thirty-day growth in holders fell from 67% on 28 September to 19% on 14 October, but that was mostly August’s surge leaving the window. Per day, the count rose at about the same pace, roughly 23,000 addresses, in the fortnight before the test and in the sixteen days after it (our arithmetic from RWA.xyz’s figures and rounded percentages). Then it stopped. It was 4,418,469 on 16 October and 4,375,492 four days later, down about 1%. That is inside the band set below for no change, so this piece does not read much into it. It is, though, what the start of a falling-back would look like, and it came in the second week of the quiet.</p><p>The launchpad is also small against what it was scored on. DefiLlama’s all-time StonkFun total, about $0.9 billion across every quote asset, is less than a tenth of one month’s tokenized-stock transfer volume on RWA.xyz. The two measures differ, but the gap is telling. Holders rose at much the same daily pace through the launchpad’s busiest weeks and the first week of its quiet, and stopped rising only in the second. A launchpad this size could hardly move the count much either way, so the stall should not be read as its doing either. That is the main reason the test was easy to pass.</p><p>On RWA.xyz’s tokenized-stocks summary, the page the 28 September holder figure came from, holders rose 15% in the thirty days to 20 October while monthly active addresses fell 53%, to 1,643,275, and monthly transfer volume fell 74%, to $10.28 billion. More addresses are holding, and far fewer are moving. Those thirty-day changes reach back before the test, and for transfer volume most of the fall came before it: Something That Moves reported it, from the 28 September reading, already “down 71% in thirty days, to $12.29 billion, while holders rose 67%.” Since then it has fallen about 16% (our arithmetic, on thirty-day windows that overlap). And as the same piece said, “Transfer volume is not trading volume, and more holders with less money moving is consistent with small positions, but it is not proof of them.” Small positions would explain less money moving. They would not explain fewer addresses moving. Active addresses have turned up in the past week, from 1,257,641 on 14 October to 1,643,275, up 31% (our arithmetic) on a rolling thirty-day count. A week does not undo a fall of more than half, but it is the first reading we have that points the other way.</p><p>RWA.xyz’s platform pages do not show a fall on the same scale. On their figures for the tokenized-stock class, transfer volume on bStocks, xStocks, Robinhood and Ondo together came to about $38 billion in the data of 20 October, up about 4% in thirty days, and their active addresses together fell about 18% (our arithmetic; adding them up double-counts any address active on more than one, and it includes Robinhood and Ondo, which this piece does not lean on for holders). Those changes also reach back before the test. Four platforms alone come to more than three times the summary’s total, and when we checked on 16 and 21 October, the bStocks page’s own headline volume did not match its stock-class figure, though bStocks lists only stocks. We cannot reconcile the two views, so this piece does not lean on the platform pages for activity. The same doubt applies, more loosely, to their holder figures; the summary’s are used because that is the page the test’s figure came from.</p><p>On that view, then, over thirty days holding rose and movement fell, and in the past week holding stalled and movement picked up.</p><h3>What Tessera Said Adoption Was</h3><p>Tessera’s piece Count Holders, Not Dollars, first published on 12 August (republished here on 5 September), said that demand-side adoption “shows up in holder count, and only in holder count.” Something That Moves said: “So the case rests on holders rather than on volume.” On that measure the count held, though it has stopped rising. We now think holder count alone is not enough, which is why the next test reports active addresses alongside it.</p><p>Something That Moves also gave its reading “that many holders with small positions value a token they can keep in the wallet they already use, and move at three in the morning, more in daily practice than rights they may rarely exercise.” It offered StonkFun as “one of the places holders have taken it …”. With the summary’s active addresses down by more than half over thirty days, the evidence that holders move these tokens is weaker than the evidence that they hold them, and that part of the case has less behind it than it did.</p><p>If these addresses are mostly retail, which we believe they are, the number holding did not fall in the first week the launchpad was quiet, and dipped only slightly in the second. Whether the same addresses stayed, this count cannot say. That fits the convenience argument better than the simplest version of “it was a trade”, in which people arrive and then go. A trade that left balances behind would look much like this too.</p><h3>The Other Side of the Ledger</h3><p>Superstate’s Opening Bell, the registered shares on-chain that Something That Moves used as the rights-first case, had 83 holders in RWA.xyz’s data of 20 October and $49.8 million of value distributed through it, across three assets. As then, the comparison is not like-for-like.</p><p>The first of the two tests, whether rights-first venues draw holders at scale once they are live under the SEC’s exemption, has not started. Tessera’s piece Nine Said No, first published on 19 October (republished here on 20 October), was about the first venue we have found to have named, in a notice of 4 October, the stocks it intended to trade under that exemption. As of 21 October it is not yet trading: its page still says “OKXICE TSV is coming”.</p><h3>The Next Test</h3><p>On the one test that can be scored yet, the argument survives. On the stronger question, whether these holders amount to adoption or to balances left behind, it is unproven. The test we set was easy to pass, so here is a harder one, fixed before the next look. On 21 November Tessera will score it again, on RWA.xyz’s tokenized-stocks summary page only, against the readings in this piece, read on 21 October from RWA.xyz’s data of 20 October: 4,375,492 holders and 1,643,275 monthly active addresses.</p><ul><li><strong>Holders below that reading:</strong> it was a trade rather than adoption.</li><li><strong>Holders up, active addresses down:</strong> it fails on the stronger question, with balances left behind rather than use.</li><li><strong>Both up:</strong> it passes on both.</li><li><strong>No change:</strong> a change of less than 2% in holders, or less than 10% in monthly active addresses, will be reported as no change. Monthly active addresses is a rolling thirty-day count that moved about 10% in two days in October, and 31% in six, so a single reading is a noisy test.</li></ul><p>This piece scores a test of an argument Tessera was built on, so Tessera is the least neutral party to mark it. That is why the figures are RWA.xyz’s and DefiLlama’s, and why this piece has said where they let the argument off lightly.</p><p>T-Tokens are not in RWA.xyz’s tokenized-stock figures (checked 21 October). They are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure, in the category next to tokenized stocks, so this is evidence about the category next to Tessera’s rather than about Tessera’s own. DefiLlama’s StonkFun count covers every quote-asset category on the launchpad’s menu and does not split them, so it is not a tokenized-stock figure, and this piece makes no claim about what it contains. The convenience argument is an argument for permissionless access, and “permissionless” describes the technology, not who may lawfully use it. Under Tessera’s terms, T-Tokens are not available to persons in the US or other restricted territories, on any venue.</p><p><em>Sources: RWA.xyz tokenized stocks summary and platform pages for bStocks, xStocks, Robinhood, Ondo and Superstate Opening Bell, app.rwa.xyz, read 21 October 2026, data timestamped 20 October 2026 at 06:36 and 06:39 (RWA.xyz gives no time zone; the “UTC” given in Something That Moves was an assumption), including each platform’s figures for the tokenized-stock class; the same pages read 14 October 2026 (data timestamped 14 October at 08:31 and 08:34) and 16 October 2026; the same pages as read on 28 September 2026 for Something That Moves (Opening Bell data of 27 September). DefiLlama StonkFun daily volume series and methodology, api.llama.fi, read 21 October 2026. StonkFun homepage, stonkfun.xyz, read 21 October 2026. OKXICE TSV page, okx.com/en-us/okxicetsv, read 21 October 2026. Tessera terms, tessera.pe/terms, read 21 October 2026. Tessera, “Count Holders, Not Dollars” (first published 12 August 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 5 September 2026), “Something That Moves” (first published 28 September 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 10 October 2026) and “Nine Said No” (first published 19 October 2026, republished at blog.tessera.pe on 20 October 2026), quoted as published at blog.tessera.pe.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/scoring-our-own-test"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a5570c3ba140" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/scoring-our-own-test-a5570c3ba140">Scoring Our Own Test</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nine Said No]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/nine-said-no-f6a46129be23?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6a46129be23</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:25:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-06T00:25:39.881Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j-PMh6nwBnef4cjRQLxn2g.png" /></figure><p><em>19 October 2026. Notices, listings and filings are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 19 October 2026 none has been. SpaceX was on OKXICE’s 4 October list, discussed below; Kraken offers a SpaceX xStock, and OKX’s public instruments lists show a perpetual swap, a future and spot pairs referencing SpaceX (19 October), all offering exposure linked to the same company as T-SpaceX. T-Tokens provide economic exposure, not shareholder rights. They are not tokenized stocks, but on the comparison in this piece they sit on the same side as the tokens without the rights, and Tessera has a commercial interest in how that comparison comes out. Tessera appears as a quote-asset category on StonkFun, beside xStocks (stonkfun.xyz, 19 October), a launchpad Tessera has written about; Tessera has no commercial, integration or incentive arrangement with StonkFun or Raydium. OKX’s public instruments lists also show perpetual swaps and futures referencing OpenAI and Anthropic (19 October), which compete for the same interest T-OpenAI serves. Tessera has no integration or arrangement with OKX, ICE, OKXICE, Uniswap, Kraken (including Payward Digital Solutions) or Backed, and no T-Token appears on OKX’s or Kraken’s exchange instrument lists (19 October). Tokens issued by Tessera appear in the token search of OKX’s Web3 DEX (19 October); Tessera has no commercial, integration or incentive arrangement with OKX. No Tessera product references Anthropic, Cerebras, AppLovin, Applied Digital, Rocket Lab, CoreWeave, Verizon, Applied Optoelectronics, Broadcom, UnitedHealth, Alphabet, OKX, ICE or Kraken; none is planned. Tessera’s founder, and entities he controls, hold related exposure. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>In a revised notice dated 8 October, a tokenized-stock venue that is not yet trading published a short list of companies that had told it no. OKXICE is run by OKXICE LLC, a 50–50 joint venture between Intercontinental Exchange Holdings and OKC USA Holding; its notice describes OKX Inc. as an affiliate of OKXICE LLC through OKC USA. The venue said it “has received a Notice of Issuer Objection from the following issuers”: Cerebras Systems, AppLovin, Applied Digital and Rocket Lab. A week later, in a notice dated 15 October, the list had nine names. CoreWeave, Verizon, Applied Optoelectronics, Broadcom and UnitedHealth had joined it. OKXICE’s page also lists a further notice dated 19 October, which could not be opened on that date.</p><p>OKXICE’s notices of 4, 8 and 15 October are the first public record we have found of companies using the veto in the SEC’s exemption of 17 September, which the SEC’s press release called the Innovation Exemption. All nine stocks are already offered offshore as tokens without shareholder rights, as are others on OKXICE’s 4 October list that had not been named as objecting. The veto reached the version that comes with those rights, on one venue. Over the offshore tokens, as we read the order, the companies have no say at all.</p><h3>What OKXICE Is</h3><p>As its notices of 8 and 15 October describe it, the venue will run on Uniswap v4 liquidity pools on XLayer, where “Only wallets holding a valid soulbound token (‘SBT’) issued by OKXICE TSV … may trade in or provide liquidity to an AMM Liquidity Pool”. OKX Inc. will run the venue’s customer checks and, under a services agreement, its market surveillance; OKX Technology builds its software under another. Each token, the notices say, “represents a security entitlement to one share of the underlying NMS stock”. It will be made by a tokenizer unaffiliated with the company, which holds the shares through a registered broker-dealer, with on-chain records “reconciled with the Tokenizer’s books and records”. Of the three forms Chan Ahn described to crypto.news on 11 September, that is the custodial one rather than the share itself: the holder has a security entitlement, and the rights reach the holder through the intermediary. OKXICE says it is “not subject to Regulation NMS” and is not registered with the SEC “in any capacity” for this activity. None of the notices gives a launch date.</p><p>The exemption is the SEC’s order of 17 September (Release №34–106402), which calls itself the TSV Exemption. It lets a venue trade a company’s stock in token form, including tokens made without the company’s involvement, but only if the token “provides holders the same rights and privileges” as the ordinary share. OKXICE’s own eligibility test spells out what that excludes: the token must represent the share rather than be “a tokenized linked security, security-based swap or other instrument providing only synthetic exposure to the underlying NMS stock”. Its notice also requires holders to receive the same dividends and voting rights, and requires “proxy materials and other issuer communications” to be made available to them “at no cost to the issuer or to the holders”.</p><p>For a token made by a third party, the company must be told first. Trading “may not commence until at least 30 calendar days” after it receives the notice, and if it objects “on or prior to the 30th calendar day following receipt”, then “the TSV cannot make such Tokenized NMS Stock available for trading on the TSV”. The venue must say so publicly “Within five business days”. The notice requirement covers only tokens made by a third party unaffiliated with the company, so a token the company makes, or has made on its behalf, needs none. The order’s text stops that venue. We have found nothing in it that stops the token being made, or another venue sending its own notice.</p><p>The SEC gave its own example of why a company might object: it “may be concerned about the risk of maintaining its shareholder register related to onchain transfers or the potential price dislocation or adverse effects on the price of the underlying NMS stock, particularly given that prices disseminated by an AMM Liquidity Pool are most likely based only on the ratio of the quantities of assets in that liquidity pool.”</p><h3>Three Notices in Eleven Days</h3><p>OKXICE’s first notice, dated 4 October, listed 63 symbols: 62 companies, with Alphabet’s two share classes counted separately (our count from the notice). SpaceX was on it, and so were AppLovin, Applied Digital and Rocket Lab, and the five that objected later: CoreWeave, Verizon, Applied Optoelectronics, Broadcom and UnitedHealth. The 4 October notice allows for tokens made by or for the company, but the only model it describes in detail is an unaffiliated tokenizer’s, and the 8 October notice says that is what it will trade. If the listed tokens are of that kind, listing them is the venue’s representation that it has sent each company a notice (Release №34–106402, footnote 101). Cerebras was not on the list, but the same notice already named it as having objected, to trading OKXICE had not proposed in public. Having objected already may be why it was left off.</p><p>The revised notice of 8 October adds AppLovin, Applied Digital and Rocket Lab to the objectors. Separately, it drops the list. Where the first notice said OKXICE “will make the following Tokenized NMS Stocks available for trading”, the second says only that it “will make available for trading Tokenized NMS Stocks that are tokenized by a third party unaffiliated with the issuer.” The order asks a notice to identify the tokens the venue “makes available for trading”, and nothing is trading yet, which may be why. The notice does not say.</p><p>On our comparison of the two texts, the notice of 15 October changes two things from the 8 October one: the date, and five more objectors, all of them on the 4 October list. It still names no stocks for trading.</p><p>An objection may not be a final no. As far as we can find, the order gives a company no way to take back its silence once its 30 days pass, and says nothing either way about withdrawing an objection. A company that objects also stays free to tokenize its own shares, which needs no notice. Objecting may therefore be the cautious answer rather than a final one, though the order does not say an objection can be undone. None of the nine has said why it objected in any filing we found: an EDGAR full-text search for “Notice of Issuer Objection” or “OKXICE” returned nothing between 17 September and 19 October. One has given reasons to the press. Crowdfund Insider reported on 18 October that a spokeswoman for Applied Optoelectronics told The Wall Street Journal the company was uncertain how tokenization would affect its share price, liquidity and volatility, was concerned that investors might think it had sponsored or endorsed an offering it did not initiate, and saw no clear benefit to the company or its shareholders. CoinCentral reported the same reasons that day. We have not read the Journal’s article. This piece does not supply a motive for the other eight. The SEC’s example is a reasonable one, and a company can have reasons nobody outside it can see.</p><h3>The Same Stocks, Without the Rights</h3><p>The same nine companies are already available in token form elsewhere (all pages and lists read 19 October):</p><ul><li><strong>Kraken:</strong> offers all nine as xStocks: RKLBx, APPx, APLDx, CBRSx, CRWVx, VZx, AAOIx, AVGOx and UNHx. Each page says “holding tokenized equities does not convey any shareholder rights”, and so do Kraken’s pages for other names on the 4 October list that had not been named as objecting, SpaceX’s among them. The pages also say the tokens are backed by shares held by a third-party custodian, so on that description one difference from OKXICE’s token is the holder’s claim rather than the collateral. Kraken’s legal page says xStocks are “not accessible in the US, Canada, UK, or Australia”, are issued by Backed Assets (JE) Limited, a Jersey company, and are offered to certain Kraken clients by Payward Digital Solutions, a Bermuda company.</li><li><strong>OKX, for the first four objectors:</strong> spot pairs named XCBRS, XRKLB, XAPP and XAPLD and perpetual swaps on all four stocks, every one listed between May and 8 September, before the SEC’s order and before any objection.</li><li><strong>OKX, for the five later objectors:</strong> spot pairs named XCRWV, XAVGO, XAAOI and XUNH and perpetual swaps on CoreWeave, Broadcom, Applied Optoelectronics and UnitedHealth, listed between April and 8 September.</li><li><strong>OKX futures:</strong> contracts expiring in 2031 on Cerebras, Rocket Lab and AppLovin, the AppLovin one listed on 2 October, after the order, and on CoreWeave, Broadcom and Applied Optoelectronics, listed between 9 July and 27 August.</li><li><strong>Verizon:</strong> nothing on any of OKX’s three lists.</li></ul><p>The OKX brand is run by several companies: its terms name OKX Inc., a Delaware company, for US users, and others, including a Seychelles company, for users elsewhere. We have not established which of them offers these instruments, what the X tokens carry, or whether US users can trade them. This piece makes no claim about how much of any of this trades; a listing says nothing about volume.</p><p>So the veto falls where the exemption applies, and the exemption admits only the version required to carry the rights. On a venue under this order, a third party’s token that is a security entitlement to a share needs the company not to object, and a token without the rights cannot come onto the venue at all. Offshore, tokens that Kraken’s pages say convey no shareholder rights are already offered on these companies and on others; OKX’s lists also carry derivatives on them, from an OKX entity we have not identified; and we have found nothing in the order that gives the companies a say over either. Of the things that differ between the two, two decide whether the veto applies, the rights and the jurisdiction, and we cannot separate them.</p><p>As we read the notice, OKXICE’s tokens would not put holders on the company’s register. They would sit on the tokenizer’s books, and the tokenizer runs the pass-through. The company’s exposure is its dividends, votes and communications reaching holders through a tokenizer, on a venue whose prices come from a pool. Of the SEC’s two examples, then, the price one fits this token’s design more directly than the register one. That by itself says nothing about why the other eight objected, though the reasons reported for Applied Optoelectronics are closer to the price example. On 11 September, about closely held companies that keep their own registers, Chan Ahn told crypto.news: “A token cannot move what the register will not record.” A listed company has no lever of that kind. The lever this order gives it is the objection, and it reaches only the token that promises holders a shareholder’s rights.</p><p>The custodial token this order admits also corrects something Chan Ahn wrote in July. In an article for Fintech Bloom on 8 July, describing the SEC staff’s statement of January, he wrote that “unaffiliated third parties without issuer involvement offer synthetic exposure.” That was too broad even then, and the same article said so two paragraphs later, where it said the regulator had described third-party tokenized securities that “can be custodial, with intermediaries holding shares, or synthetic instruments like linked securities and swaps”. The staff statement itself describes the custodial model, “such as a tokenized security entitlement”. On 29 July, in Going Public by Degrees as published under his byline, Chan Ahn called the line between issuer-sponsored tokens and third-party wrappers “the whole game”; on 11 September, as on 8 July, he split the third-party side in two. What the September order changes is that one kind of third-party wrapper, the custodial one, now has a route onto a US venue that the synthetic kind lacks, provided it carries the rights and the company does not object.</p><h3>What Cuts Against This</h3><p>It is still a minority of the 4 October list, and an early count. The count more than doubled in the week to 15 October, and Cerebras shows that objections are not confined to that list, so how many companies OKXICE has notified in all is not public. Eight of the 62 companies on the 4 October list have objected, plus Cerebras, which was not on it. As of the 15 October notice, 54 of the 62 had not been named as objecting. But no company’s 30 days could have run out by 15 October: the order is dated 17 September, and the clock starts when the company receives its notice, which the documents do not date. The venue then has five business days to publish an objection. If the listed tokens are of the third-party kind, the 4 October list is OKXICE’s representation that those companies had been sent notices, so every window on it should close by early November, allowing for delivery, and some may already have closed. The count is an early one, and may have moved.</p><p>The venue is also not live. On 28 September, Tessera’s piece Something That Moves set two tests for its argument that retail adoption of tokenized assets is arriving through convenience rather than through rights-first design. The first was: “If rights-first venues draw holders at scale once they are live under the SEC’s exemption, the preference described here is weaker than it looks.” OKXICE is not the first venue to publish a notice under the exemption. TSV LLC, a Puerto Rico company, published one dated 23 September, listing no stocks and reporting no objections (tokenizedstockvenue.com). Perpetuals.com, a Nasdaq-listed company, announced on 14 October that it was publishing a notice of its intent to rely on the exemption; as of 19 October we have not found the notice itself. OKXICE is the first we have found to have named, in its 4 October notice, the stocks it intended to trade.</p><p>It is not quite the rights-first venue the 28 September piece described, which put the registered share itself on-chain: OKXICE’s tokens are entitlements held through a tokenizer that must pass the rights through. Under the exemption’s terms, this piece counts it. That test has not started, and when it does it will not be a clean one:</p><ul><li><strong>The veto removes names</strong> from what the venue can offer.</li><li><strong>The order caps trading</strong> in each token at 0.25% or 2.5% of the stock’s average daily volume in the prior month, depending on its tier. The caps limit trading rather than holders, so they bear on the test less directly than the veto does, but a venue that cannot trade much may not attract many holders either, so a small following would be weaker evidence for the view than it looks.</li><li><strong>The two versions are not offered to the same people:</strong> Kraken’s legal page says xStocks are not accessible in the US, Canada, the UK or Australia, so a large US following for OKXICE would not show a choice between them.</li></ul><p>But the test as set was whether rights-first venues draw holders at scale, and if OKXICE does, Tessera will count it against the view. Tessera will score the second test on Wednesday 21 October.</p><p>Tessera’s own position should also be stated plainly. On both things that differ here, rights and jurisdiction, T-Tokens are on the same side as the xStocks: they carry no shareholder rights, and under Tessera’s terms they are not available to persons in the US or other restricted territories, on any venue. They differ in being tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure, rather than tokenized stocks. As we read the order, which covers tokenized NMS stock, neither this exemption nor its veto reaches them. The 28 September piece called the SEC’s “same rights and privileges” test a good one, said its better use would be as a disclosure standard any venue can display, and added that “a disclosure standard is easier for products like Tessera’s to meet than a gate would be.” An issuer veto that reaches only rights-bearing tokens is, as we read this order, a condition products like Tessera’s are not subject to, because under Tessera’s terms they are not for US persons and could not use this exemption at all. Whether that counts as an advantage depends on where holders want to be, and Tessera is not the neutral party to judge it. Weigh this reading accordingly.</p><h3>What to Watch</h3><ul><li><strong>The list:</strong> whether OKXICE’s list of stocks comes back, and in what form.</li><li><strong>More objections:</strong> whether more companies object before OKXICE starts trading.</li><li><strong>Reasons:</strong> whether the other eight explain themselves, in a filing or anywhere else.</li><li><strong>Holders:</strong> once the venue is live, whether it draws holders at scale.</li></ul><p><em>Sources: OKXICE TSV, public notices dated 4, 8 and 15 October 2026, re-read 19 October 2026, okx.com/en-us/okxicetsv; the same page’s listing of a notice dated 19 October 2026, not openable on 19 October. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Release №34–106402, order of 17 September 2026 (91 Fed. Reg. 60168, 22 September 2026), and press release 2026–90, 17 September 2026, re-read 19 October 2026; SEC Division of Corporation Finance and others, Statement on Tokenized Securities, 28 January 2026, re-read 19 October 2026. TSV LLC, public notice, version 1.0, 23 September 2026, tokenizedstockvenue.com, read 19 October 2026. Perpetuals.com Ltd, press release, 14 October 2026, perpetuals.com, read 19 October 2026. Kraken, xStocks pages for the nine and for others on the 4 October list, and the xStocks legal page, kraken.com, read 19 October 2026. OKX public instruments lists (spot, perpetual swaps and futures), okx.com, terms of service and Web3 DEX token search, read 19 October 2026. Kraken public assets list, read 19 October 2026. StonkFun homepage, stonkfun.xyz, read 19 October 2026. SEC EDGAR full-text search, 17 September to 19 October 2026. Crowdfund Insider (Omar Faridi) and CoinCentral, 18 October 2026, read 19 October 2026, Crowdfund Insider reporting Applied Optoelectronics’ statement to The Wall Street Journal. Chan Ahn’s answers to crypto.news, 11 September 2026; his Fintech Bloom article of 8 July 2026; and “Going Public by Degrees”, 29 July 2026, as published under his byline. Tessera, “Something That Moves” (28 September 2026), as published at blog.tessera.pe.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, to use any platform mentioned, or to take or avoid exposure to any asset mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/nine-said-no"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6a46129be23" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/nine-said-no-f6a46129be23">Nine Said No</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Spread, Not Shed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/spread-not-shed-a73588d6f34e?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a73588d6f34e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-ecosystem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solana-blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 02:42:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T02:42:05.007Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ukGHpkV1Mag_VzFMfWPhSA.png" /></figure><p><em>16 October 2026. Filings, ratings and reporting are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-OpenAI and T-Kalshi are tokenized loan participation rights providing economic exposure linked to those companies’ pre-IPO valuations, each issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 16 October 2026 none has been. This piece discusses CoreWeave, whose filed customer contracts include OpenAI, and which recorded in its IPO prospectus of March 2025 that it would issue $350 million of its shares to OpenAI under their contract; we have not established whether OpenAI still holds them. It also discusses a CoreWeave facility for what the company calls non-investment-grade customers, which its chief financial officer said was priced to finance contracts with OpenAI and Cohere, and an earlier facility financing CoreWeave’s contract with OpenAI, so how lenders treat credit backed by OpenAI’s contracts bears on the company T-OpenAI is linked to. It also discusses AI labs as customers of the borrowers, including Anthropic, which competes with OpenAI, so Tessera’s interest in how Anthropic’s credit is received does not run in one direction: a competitor’s valuation sits on one side, and on the other sits SpaceX, which its prospectus records as supplying compute to Anthropic. SpaceX’s quarterly report also records AI hardware it leases, so how lenders treat chip-backed credit bears on it too. Tessera has no product, listing or arrangement linked to CoreWeave, Nebius, IREN, Nscale, Lambda, Crusoe or Fluidstack, and no Tessera product references Nvidia, Broadcom, AMD, Meta, Anthropic or Cohere; none is planned. Tessera’s founder, and entities he controls, hold related exposure. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>This week a CoreWeave co-founder told the Financial Times where the next round of AI-chip financing could come from. Brannin McBee, who leads CoreWeave’s financing, said that winning investment-grade ratings for more of its chip-backed debt, and eventually for the company itself, would let it borrow from insurers whose capital “is unlimited. Like, that’s all the money in the world that sits in the insurance tranche.” The next step, the FT wrote, is getting insurers to buy loans backed by lower-rated customers such as AI labs, and McBee said that step is not there yet: “I don’t think that non-investment-grade offtakes from us are ready to go into the insurance tranche yet. I do think it’ll get there.” He added, by the FT’s account, that the big AI labs’ coming stock market listings would help. We have read the interview only as excerpted by Naked Capitalism and relayed by Seeking Alpha on 14 October, and not in the FT itself.</p><p>The FT’s insurance correspondent, Lee Harris, had already supplied the other half. Many large traditional insurers are already at their limit for exposure to AI companies, he said on the FT News Briefing podcast, as The Next Web reported on 29 September. As we read The Next Web’s account, he meant insurers taking on risk as underwriters, which differs from buying loans; we return to that difference below.</p><p>Both can be true at once, and that is the subject of this piece. Insurance money is already in this market, in investment-grade paper and below it. What is new is the scale being discussed, and the ratings it would take.</p><h3>Insurers Are Already In</h3><p>The filings name them:</p><ul><li><strong>IREN:</strong> the commitments schedule (Schedule B) to the note purchase agreement for IREN’s $2.1 billion of 5.96% notes due 2031, agreed in May and funded in tranches ($525 million by 30 June), was filed with IREN’s annual report on 27 August. It names 58 purchasers, more than half of them US life and annuity insurers, among them MetLife, Prudential, MassMutual, New York Life, Pacific Life, Equitable, American General Life, Genworth, Guardian, Lincoln, Brighthouse, Symetra, Securian and USAA Life. IREN’s annual report ties the financing to GPUs and a Microsoft contract, and describes the wider GPU financing the notes belong to as investment-grade rated.</li><li><strong>CoreWeave’s first two GPU facilities:</strong> Liberty Mutual and Peerless Insurance appear among the lenders consenting to a December 2025 amendment on the first; American General Life, Fidelity &amp; Guaranty Life and Security Life of Denver appear among the lenders consenting to amendments on the second (exhibits to CoreWeave’s 2025 annual report).</li><li><strong>CoreWeave’s OpenAI facility:</strong> a facility under a credit agreement of 28 July 2025 finances CoreWeave’s contract with OpenAI, and its signature pages name insurers among the lenders, among them Protective Life, Midland National and USAA Casualty (8-K, 31 July 2025).</li><li><strong>CoreWeave’s March facility:</strong> the $8.5 billion facility was “anchored by Blackstone Credit &amp; Insurance and included participation from a diverse group of global financial institutions, asset managers, and insurance investors” (8-K, 31 March 2026). Its insurers are not named.</li></ul><p>Where insurers are named, the amounts are redacted (IREN) or not given (CoreWeave’s amendments). The filings for CoreWeave’s May and August facilities name no insurers.</p><p>For scale, the NAIC’s Capital Markets Bureau estimates US insurers’ exposure to all private credit at “$1.2 trillion as of year-end 2025, representing approximately 13% of cash and invested assets …” (private-credit analysis, released in September 2026). It does not break out data centers or AI, and no official figure we have found does.</p><h3>So Far, the Investment-Grade Rating Has Followed the Customer</h3><p>Tessera’s piece of 28 August, The Money Goes Round, said of CoreWeave’s facilities: “The structure is not what earns the rating. The customer is.” Its piece of 26 August, What Is the Collateral Actually Worth?, put it more broadly: the ratings were “tracking the customer”. At the investment-grade line both were closer to right, because the one investment-grade facility rests on a customer CoreWeave describes as investment grade. Below that line both overstated things, as the facilities show:</p><ul><li><strong>March facility:</strong> backed by a single contract with a customer CoreWeave describes as investment grade (investor presentation, 8-K, 17 September) and, as CoreWeave describes its facilities before August, by a contract “extending through the maturity of the debt …” (8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 10 August). It advances 90% of capital spending and is rated A3 by Moody’s and A (low) by DBRS (8-K and credit agreement, 31 March).</li><li><strong>May facility:</strong> for what CoreWeave calls “two large, non-investment grade customers”, it advances 71.42%, and is rated Ba2 by Moody’s and BB+ by Fitch (8-K, 18 May).</li><li><strong>August facility:</strong> its contracts average about three years against a maturity of about five, and it advances 70%. It is also rated Ba2 and BB+ (8-K, 10 August).</li></ul><p>Below investment grade, structure and security do some of the work. CoreWeave says the August facility’s ratings reflect “the strength of the collateral and structural protections supporting the transaction” (8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 10 August). The step into investment grade is different. On CoreWeave’s own account, investment-grade ratings have come “when the underlying customers are investment grade” (investor presentation, 8-K, 17 September 2026).</p><p>That matters more for an insurer than for most lenders, because insurers’ capital rules run on ratings. Under the NAIC’s risk-based capital factors for life insurers (adopted June 2021), the base charge on a bond rated A3, where the March facility sits, is 1.016% of its value. At the lowest investment-grade designation it is 2.168%, and at the designation corresponding to Ba2 it is 4.537%. That is a curve rather than a cliff, but every notch costs capital. Whether loans like CoreWeave’s are held as bonds, where those factors apply, is something we have not been able to establish. The IMF, discussing the growth in pension funds’ and insurers’ illiquid investments, names private credit as one of its main drivers, and adds: “The investment-grade status of many of these exposures supports favorable capital treatment. However, a deterioration in credit quality could trigger forced sales, amplifying losses and market stress” (Global Financial Stability Report, October 2026). The Financial Stability Board warned in May that private credit ratings “may be used to attract insurers who rely on ratings for regulatory purposes”. The ratings on CoreWeave’s facilities come from Moody’s, DBRS and Fitch, and CoreWeave has announced them in its filings, so that warning concerns the wider market rather than this paper.</p><p>So the two parts of the interview are the ones to watch together. Lending against contracts with customers below investment grade is already happening: the May facility does it, at Ba2 and BB+. CoreWeave’s chief financial officer described it, the day after pricing, as “the first to be syndicated in the public loan market to finance contracts with OpenAI and Cohere” (first-quarter call, 7 May 2026). What McBee said is not ready yet is putting paper like that into the insurance tranche. If, as we read it, getting there means an investment-grade rating on paper backed by lower-rated labs, and if an investment-grade customer is what has taken a rating across the line so far, that rating has to come from somewhere else: more structure, a guarantor, or CoreWeave’s own credit, which it says it is working to migrate “toward investment grade” (8-K, 17 September). None of those is independent of how the labs fare.</p><h3>A Precedent from 2008</h3><p>The financial guarantors, the monoline insurers, are the useful precedent. Today’s market differs from theirs. What carries over is how theirs failed.</p><p>Their core business was guaranteeing municipal bonds. New York’s insurance regulator later wrote that “both the market and the NRSROs viewed FGIs as having a near ‘zero underwriting loss’ business model …” (Circular Letter 19, September 2008). On that reputation they wrote more, and riskier, structured finance. At the end of 2007 MBIA’s collateralized debt obligations were $130.6 billion of $678.7 billion insured, and Ambac’s were $66.9 billion of $524.0 billion (10-Ks). MBIA’s book did not look concentrated by name: its ten largest structured-finance credits were “$24.2 billion, representing 3.6%” of net par (10-K 2007).</p><p>The concentration lay in what those names had in common. New York’s regulator wrote that guaranteeing pools of asset-backed securities had “made possible additional concentration risks”, among them the original lender, the servicer and the year of origination, so that a focus on the “nominal issuer” had “proven inadequate”, and that strict adherence to bright-line requirements was “a poor substitute for diversification …”. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission put it more simply: the mortgage securities inside those CDOs “were less like coins than like slices of bread.”</p><p>The losses also arrived before the claims did. “Claim payments in 2007 were negative $2 million and we paid no claims related to our CDO of ABS portfolio,” Ambac’s interim chief executive said in January 2008, in a results release that booked mark-to-market losses on credit derivatives of $5,211.0 million for the fourth quarter (8-K, 22 January 2008). Fitch, S&amp;P and Moody’s cut both firms from AAA in the first half of 2008: Fitch cut Ambac on 18 January and MBIA on 4 April, S&amp;P cut both on 5 June, and Moody’s cut both on 19 June (the firms’ 8-Ks; for Fitch’s MBIA action, MBIA’s 10-Q for the second quarter of 2008). MBIA’s response was that “This is an issue of ratings and not solvency” (press release of 19 June 2008, furnished on Form 8-K, 25 June 2008). For a business whose product was its rating, that was the problem. The banks that had bought protection took the losses. Merrill Lynch recorded credit valuation adjustments on hedges with financial guarantors of $3.1 billion for 2007, $2.6 billion of it on hedges of US super-senior CDOs of asset-backed securities, and $10.4 billion in 2008. Citigroup recorded credit valuation adjustments on its exposure to the monolines of $967 million for 2007 and $5.7 billion for 2008 (Merrill 10-Ks for 2007 and 2008; Citigroup 10-K for 2008).</p><p>The municipal book was not what failed. In February 2009 MBIA moved about $537 billion of US public-finance par, as of 30 September 2008 and including business reinsured from FGIC, into a separate insurer (8-K, 20 February 2009). What failed was a slice of the book large enough, with leverage on top of it, to take down the rating of everything else.</p><p>The line worth carrying forward comes from the Basel Joint Forum, in July 2008: it “would seem prudent to ask whether there is any counterparty whose creditworthiness would be unaffected by the stress events that impose losses on super-senior tranches.”</p><h3>Where the Analogy Breaks</h3><p>It breaks in an important place. The monolines wrote unfunded guarantees: at the end of 2007 Ambac had $524.0 billion insured against what it called claims-paying ability of $14.5 billion (10-K; 8-K, 22 January 2008). In the filed record today, insurers mostly buy GPU-backed debt. A buyer can lose what it lent, but it owes nothing to anyone else when the borrower defaults. For insurers that buy, the nearer 2008 precedent is the buyers of rated CDO paper, whose capital also ran on ratings. The monolines are the template for what follows if insurers start writing protection, which is one of the three conditions below.</p><p>The one insurer guarantee we have found in the filings is contingent and limited. Athene, Apollo’s insurer, has guaranteed 15% of an Apollo fund’s outstanding obligation to buy compute infrastructure under the $35 billion Broadcom arrangement that facilitates Anthropic’s build-out. It will be reimbursed by a third party for 35% of anything it pays, and it records no liability because it judges payment not probable (Apollo and Athene 10-Qs, second quarter 2026). That guarantee covers a purchase rather than GPU-backed paper, and we have seen no GPU-backed paper whose rating rests on an insurer’s guarantee.</p><p>Nvidia has reportedly talked to insurers about taking on some of the risk of loans backed by its chips, working with the broker Howden Re on one possible structure, but the talks were described as early, and “may not result in any deals” (Investing.com, 29 September, reporting the FT; The Next Web reported the same). On the same FT podcast, as The Next Web reported, Harris said start-ups are now selling residual value insurance, which protects big chip buyers against their chips losing value faster than expected. That protects the hardware rather than the loans, and we have not found how much has been written, but the unfunded side of this market already exists. We have found nothing filed that shows an insurer writing protection on the loans at scale.</p><p>The monolines are therefore a warning about what this market would become if three things happened together:</p><ul><li><strong>Ratings that cross into investment grade without the customer:</strong> ratings that reach investment grade on the structure, or on a guarantor exposed to the same downturn, when the customer is below it and the collateral is hardware likely to be worth least when that customer fails: one or two labs, one kind of hardware. That is the step from an investment-grade rating on a single strong contract to one on debt backed by a lower-rated lab. US insurance regulators have a tool aimed at part of this. Under a process the NAIC’s manual makes effective from 1 January 2026, its Investment Analysis Office can propose removing a rating it judges three or more notches out of line from the exemption that lets insurers rely on it (Purposes and Procedures Manual, December 2025). We have found no published case of its use; the manual says anonymized summaries of any removals are to be published on an insurer-accessible web location (Purposes and Procedures Manual, December 2025).</li><li><strong>Insurers writing protection at scale:</strong> a guarantee on chip-backed loans pays out when the borrowers fail, and if what broke them was the market rather than their own mistakes, that is when the hardware is worth least. That is the correlation Tessera’s 12 October piece, In Exchange for the Guarantees, described for suppliers’ guarantees, moved onto an insurer’s balance sheet. Harris’s remark cuts against this one for now: if large traditional insurers are already at their limit as underwriters of AI risk, protection at scale would have to come from elsewhere, such as the start-ups he described or reinsurers.</li><li><strong>Limits set by name while the common factor goes unlimited:</strong> the neoclouds are many names, but they share collateral, supplier support and, in places, customers. Anthropic has signed with Fluidstack (company announcement, November 2025) and Nscale (S-1), and reportedly with Lambda (Reuters, 31 August). Nvidia had $36 billion of commitments to buy cloud capacity from AI clouds at 26 July. The clouds can sell that capacity to others instead, and “if AI clouds do not successfully sell committed capacity to third-party customers, we have agreed to purchase that capacity” (10-Q). Inside a single borrower the concentration is plainer: CoreWeave’s three largest customers were 36%, 26% and 10% of its second-quarter revenue (10-Q). A portfolio of ten neocloud loans can pass every test set by borrower name and still behave much more like one position than ten. Size is what turned the monolines’ slice into the whole firm, and nothing we have found shows that for any insurer today. If the money McBee calls “unlimited” arrives at the scale he implies, that could change.</li></ul><h3>Syndication Spreads the Risk Without Shedding It</h3><p>Every new holder makes the market look deeper without making the risk smaller. Arrangers may keep a share, and the rest sits with whoever bought it. Spreading it from banks to insurers that are not levered on it the way the monolines were is, taken alone, safer than leaving it on bank balance sheets. The catch is that for the insurers among the holders, capital keys off the same ratings that sold the loan, at least where the paper is held as a rated bond, so a downgrade would raise the cost of holding it for all of them at once. The holders also overlap. American General Life appears among the lenders on CoreWeave’s second GPU facility and on IREN’s commitments schedule. Neither filing gives its amount, so this shows the same name across borrowers rather than how much it holds. OpenAI’s contracts stand behind at least two of CoreWeave’s facilities, July 2025’s and May’s. Where ratings rest on the same few customers, one customer’s downgrade, or its decision to terminate or not renew, would reach several facilities, and the same insurers, together.</p><p>Demand for the secured paper has been strong. CoreWeave’s May facility tightened by 50 basis points from initial discussions, to SOFR + 4.50% (8-K, 18 May). Reuters reported on 1 October, of Nvidia’s chip-backed deals and citing banking sources: “Despite the concerns over guarantees, there remains high demand to finance the deals, the sources said.” The same story reported that some lenders want higher guarantees from Nvidia than it had first outlined. If that demand is pro-cyclical, it will be thinnest when it is needed most. This week gave a glimpse of that cycle in CoreWeave’s own unsecured debt: the yield on its bonds maturing in 2031 hit 15.78%, the ABC reported on 16 October. Those bonds are separate from the GPU-backed facilities, and we have found no announced rating action on the facilities this week, but it is the same company’s credit.</p><p>The August facility carries a maturity of about five years against contracts averaging about three (8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 10 August). Tessera’s 26 August piece called those extra two years “a bet on what a fleet of accelerators is worth in 2029 …”. The facility’s terms put that bet on CoreWeave first. If the projected value of the contracts behind the loan falls below 2.40 times the amount outstanding for three monthly payment dates in a row, the cash in its collateral accounts goes to prepaying the loan, and if an expiring contract is not renewed or replaced by its renewal deadline, CoreWeave must prepay enough to restore its coverage ratios within five business days (credit agreement). Much of the last two years therefore rests on CoreWeave’s ability to re-contract in whatever compute market exists then, or to find the cash if it cannot.</p><p>The 26 August piece also said that the exposure that matters “sits in private credit, which nobody is required to report.” For insurers that needs narrowing: they report their holdings to their regulators line by line. What no official source we have found does is add up how much of it is GPU-backed or data-center debt. The best public evidence we have read is still a list of names on a commitments schedule.</p><h3>The Next Question</h3><p>This piece does not predict a loss, and it does not say that any of these loans is badly underwritten or that any insurer named here has taken too much. The March facility is close to the opposite of a monoline risk in the sense that matters here: its rating rests on one contract, running to maturity, with a customer CoreWeave describes as investment grade, rather than on a guarantor or on assumed diversification.</p><p>Insurance money is long-dated, rating-driven and large. It is the natural buyer of investment-grade paper, and that is exactly the pressure: to produce investment-grade ratings for the part of this market that is hardest to price, lower-rated customers and contracts shorter than the debt. The monolines are what happens when ratings rest on an assumption of diversification, a guarantor levered on the same assumption stands behind them, and the holders discover that what looked like many risks was one. The test for insurers adapts the Joint Forum’s, asked of the whole book rather than of one counterparty: which of these exposures would be unaffected by the stress that hurts the others?</p><p><em>Sources: Financial Times, interview with Brannin McBee, as excerpted by Naked Capitalism (14 October 2026) and relayed by Seeking Alpha (14 October 2026); The Next Web, 29 September 2026, citing the Financial Times and its FT News Briefing podcast; Investing.com, 29 September 2026, citing the Financial Times (as republished by Yahoo Finance UK); Reuters, 1 October 2026 (republished by The Star, 1 October, and Gulf Times, 3 October) and 31 August 2026 (republished by The Star); ABC, 16 October 2026. IREN Limited, Form 10-K for the year ended 30 June 2026, filed 27 August 2026, and the note purchase agreement filed with it (Exhibit 10.36, Schedule B). CoreWeave, Inc., IPO prospectus (Form 424B4), March 2025; Form 8-K and credit agreement of 31 July 2025; Form 10-K for 2025 and its exhibits; Forms 8-K and credit agreements of 31 March, 18 May and 10 August 2026; Form 8-K and investor presentation of 17 September 2026; Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, filed 12 August 2026; first-quarter 2026 earnings call, 7 May 2026 (FactSet corrected transcript, as hosted by CoreWeave). Nscale Ltd, Form S-1, filed 18 September 2026; Fluidstack, announcement of 12 November 2025. Apollo Global Management and Athene Holding, Forms 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, filed 10 August 2026. NVIDIA Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 July 2026. SpaceX, prospectus and Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June 2026. NAIC Capital Markets Bureau, private-credit analysis of the US insurance industry, September 2026; NAIC life risk-based capital proposal 2021–11-L, adopted 30 June 2021, and Purposes and Procedures Manual of the NAIC Investment Analysis Office, December 2025; IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2026; Financial Stability Board, Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, 6 May 2026. MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group, Forms 10-K for 2007 and 2008 and 8-Ks of 2008 recording the rating actions, and MBIA’s Form 10-Q for the second quarter of 2008; Ambac’s 8-K of 22 January 2008 (results release); MBIA’s 8-K of 20 February 2009; MBIA’s press release of 19 June 2008, furnished on Form 8-K; Merrill Lynch, Forms 10-K for 2007 and 2008; Citigroup, Form 10-K for 2008; New York State Insurance Department, Circular Letter №19, 22 September 2008; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report, January 2011; Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer: Developments from 2005 to 2007, July 2008. Tessera, “What Is the Collateral Actually Worth?” (26 August 2026), “The Money Goes Round” (28 August 2026) and “In Exchange for the Guarantees” (12 October 2026), as published at blog.tessera.pe.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, or to take or avoid exposure to any company mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/spread-not-shed"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a73588d6f34e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/spread-not-shed-a73588d6f34e">Spread, Not Shed</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Deadline Was Thursday]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.tessera.pe/the-deadline-was-thursday-022907f75227?source=rss-92e92fbf6892------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/022907f75227</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rwa-tokenization-platform]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tessera]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 02:41:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T02:41:08.921Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8C54KzOGZOR_Th_z8tWDDw.png" /></figure><p><em>14 October 2026. Dockets, filings and deadlines are as of the dates stated in the text.</em></p><p><em>Interest disclosure: T-Kalshi is a tokenized loan participation right providing economic exposure linked to Kalshi’s pre-IPO valuation, issued through a dedicated issuing subsidiary. T-OpenAI is issued on the same basis. T-SpaceX, issued through its own dedicated issuing subsidiary, provides economic exposure linked to SpaceX; following the SpaceX listing, the investment underlying T-SpaceX is being divested. Redemption opens only once a Redemption Start Date is announced, and as of 14 October 2026 none has been. Tessera’s founder, and entities he controls, hold related exposure. This piece is about Kalshi, the respondent to New Jersey’s petition, and about two firms that have petitioned on the same legal question: Robinhood, which says it “facilitated trades on KalshiEX” when it brought its case, and North American Derivatives Exchange, which trades as OG.com Prediction Markets and as Crypto.com | Derivatives North America. Tessera has no product, listing or arrangement linked to Robinhood or to North American Derivatives Exchange. Tessera has a commercial interest in Kalshi being interesting, and in how this question comes out for it. Read what follows with that in mind.</em></p><p>Tessera’s piece of 21 September, Seventy-Eight, was about the Senate’s vote on the CLARITY Act, and its last section opened with a date from the docket of New Jersey’s Supreme Court petition against Kalshi, №26–299: “8 October, unless the motion filed on 18 September moves it. And then nothing scheduled.” The motion did move Kalshi’s response, to 9 November. It could not move a second deadline that fell on the same day. That one is set by the Court’s rules rather than shown on the docket, and the 21 September piece did not mention it.</p><p>Under the Court’s Rule 37.2, a brief supporting a petitioner at this stage “shall be filed within 30 days after the case is placed on the docket or a response is called for by the Court, whichever is later, and that time will not be extended.” The petition was placed on the docket on 8 September. Counting under Rule 30.1, thirty days on is Thursday 8 October.</p><p>Tessera’s piece of 30 September noted one amicus brief, from the National Council of Legislators from Gaming States. There are now eleven on the docket, and the cover of every one says it is “in support of petitioners”. The other ten were entered between 2 and 8 October. As of 14 October, the American Gaming Association’s was still marked “submitted” rather than “filed”. Besides the legislators’ brief, they come from:</p><ul><li><strong>Gaming regulators:</strong> the International Association of Gaming Regulators and the North American Gaming Regulators Association.</li><li><strong>Tribes:</strong> the Cabazon Band of Cahuilla Indians, and separately 145 Indian tribes and tribal organizations.</li><li><strong>States:</strong> Ohio, 38 other states and the District of Columbia.</li><li><strong>Opponents of gambling expansion:</strong> Stop Predatory Gambling, the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons and Texans Against Gambling.</li><li><strong>A sports league:</strong> the National Football League.</li><li><strong>The gaming industry:</strong> the American Gaming Association, and the Casino Association of New Jersey.</li><li><strong>Former officials:</strong> former CFTC chairman Gary Gensler, and former Senator Christopher Dodd.</li></ul><p>Eleven to none looks like a verdict. Part of it is a calendar.</p><h3>What the Calendar Explains, and What It Does Not</h3><p>The same rule sets a different clock for the other side. A brief supporting a respondent “shall be submitted within the time allowed for filing a brief in opposition or a motion to dismiss or affirm.” Kalshi’s response is currently due on 9 November, so anyone who wants to stand beside Kalshi on New Jersey’s petition files on Kalshi’s timetable rather than New Jersey’s.</p><p>The two sides may also be asking for different things. The eleven ask the Court to take the case. Kalshi’s response, which the Rules call a brief in opposition whatever it argues, is due on 9 November, and a brief alongside Kalshi at this stage would usually argue against review.</p><p>Kalshi is more than a respondent, though. It won in the Third Circuit and lost in the Ninth (28 August) and the Sixth (25 September), all at the preliminary-injunction stage, as Tessera’s 30 September piece set out. It may have reasons of its own to want a national answer, and if it petitions from either of those rulings, its supporters get a petitioner’s window too.</p><p>The industry has an early window of its own. Two firms have petitioned against the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Nevada: Robinhood (№26–338) and North American Derivatives Exchange (№26–344). Those petitions were docketed on 14 and 15 September, so on the same arithmetic, briefs supporting them are due on 14 and 15 October. As of the morning of 14 October, neither docket showed one. Nevada asked for more time to respond in both cases and got it, on 8 and 9 October: to 16 November on North American Derivatives Exchange’s petition and to 13 November on Robinhood’s.</p><p>Those two petitions do not mirror New Jersey’s. North American Derivatives Exchange asks the Court to take the question. Robinhood says that “granting certiorari now would be premature” while the CFTC writes a rule, and asks the Court to grant its petition only if it grants New Jersey’s or another petition on the question. Silence on Robinhood’s docket this week would therefore say little. North American Derivatives Exchange’s petition, which asks for review outright, is the closer comparison with New Jersey’s. On New Jersey’s petition itself, anyone who backed Kalshi below, including the amici named further down, can file by 9 November.</p><p>One thing the calendar does not explain away. At this stage an amicus brief is also how outsiders tell the Court that a question matters, and eleven of them say this one does, whoever is right about the answer.</p><h3>Read the Interest Section First</h3><p>Every amicus brief says who the filer is and why it cares. We read those sections as disclosure, which is how we would want this piece read, and the arguments stand or fall on their own.</p><p>Some of the interests are sovereign. The states’ summary of argument gives four reasons for the Court to act: the prediction markets’ theory “infringes state sovereignty by preempting the States’ traditional authority”, “invokes the major questions doctrine by handing over immense power to a federal regulatory agency”, “endangers citizens who will lose protection from important state gambling laws”, and “has splintered the circuits and lower courts with no resolution on the horizon.” The brief for 145 tribes and tribal organizations says “there is another set of constitutionally recognized sovereigns for whom the question presented is all but existential: Indian tribes”, and grounds that in a tribal sovereignty which, it says, “Federal law has long recognized”, including through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.</p><p>Some interests are commercial, and say so. The American Gaming Association’s members “have built their businesses around a framework in which state and tribal governments regulate sports betting”. The brief says the scheme the Third Circuit’s decision allows, prediction markets offering sports betting nationwide without complying with state and tribal gaming laws, “is inflicting serious competitive harm on state- and tribal-licensed gaming operators.” The NFL’s interest is its product: “The NFL’s highest priority is preserving the integrity of its games.”</p><p>Others are neither. Texans Against Gambling describes itself as “devoted to preventing the expansion of gambling”.</p><p>That makes a coalition of states, legislators, tribes, regulators, casinos, a sports league and groups opposed to the expansion of gambling. They want different things from gambling policy. What they share, on their covers, is support for New Jersey’s petition. The briefs we read argue that Congress did not take sports wagering away from the states, and most say the same of tribal governments on their own lands. None of that makes them right or wrong. It is what an interest section is for.</p><h3>Who Was There, on Both Sides</h3><p>Two of the briefs come from people who held office when the law was made. Senator Dodd, by his brief’s account, chaired the Senate Banking Committee from 2007 to 2011, and the brief says that “As the Senator who sponsored the legislation, amicus is uniquely qualified to address the meaning and scope of the provisions at issue.” His interest section also cites his “longstanding work on issues affecting Connecticut’s federally recognized tribes”. Gary Gensler, by his brief’s account, chaired the CFTC from 2009 to 2014. Both say the Third Circuit misread the statute when it found, at the preliminary-injunction stage, that Kalshi was, in Gensler’s words, “likely to prevail”. Every appellate ruling described in Tessera’s 30 September piece was at that stage.</p><p>They are not the only people from 2010 in this case. In the Third Circuit, the opinion lists counsel for amici on Kalshi’s side for Max Baucus, Blanche L. Lincoln, Saxby Chambliss, K. Michael Conaway, Collin Peterson, Cheri Bustos and Cindy Axne. The first five voted on the Dodd-Frank conference report in 2010, according to the Senate and House roll calls; Bustos and Axne were not in Congress then. We have not read that brief, so this piece does not characterize it. It does mean the people who were there are on both sides.</p><p>The two briefs on New Jersey’s side use their authors’ presence differently. Dodd’s argues first from the statute’s text: a sports wager is not a swap, it says, because the definition requires a contingency “associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence”. The record made in 2010 comes in as confirmation. Gensler’s leans more on having been there. “The answer — from Amicus as someone who was there — is that Congress did not transfer jurisdiction over sports betting from the States to the CFTC.” It says that Harry Reid, the Senate Majority Leader of the day, “would never have consented to legislation displacing an activity so critical to his state’s economy and politics by permitting sports betting only under CFTC auspices.” And it says Gensler, as chairman, “provided technical assistance in drafting the Special Rule and recalls discussions with Senate Majority Leader Reid’s office regarding the inclusion of ‘gaming’ within the list of activities under the rule.”</p><p>The Special Rule is part of section 745 of the 2010 Act, and gives the CFTC authority to prevent trading in certain contracts it finds contrary to the public interest, including those involving gaming. Separately, Gensler’s brief argues from the text, and from Rule 40.11, which the CFTC finalized in July 2011 and which on Gensler’s reading prohibits listing contracts involving gaming. The Commission reads that rule differently: according to North American Derivatives Exchange’s petition, the CFTC’s June 2026 proposal says the Commission “has consistently applied § 40.11 to operate a discretionary framework rather than a self-executing per se prohibition.”</p><p>The Court has addressed legislative history written after a law is passed, in a passage answering reliance on a committee report by a later Congress: “Post-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.” (Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 2011.) Of the record made before a vote, the same passage says it is “persuasive to some because it is thought to shed light on what legislators understood an ambiguous statutory text to mean when they voted to enact it into law.” Whether the text here is ambiguous is part of what is in dispute. On our reading, the first statement would apply, if at all, to later recollections from either side.</p><p>The pre-enactment record the two briefs draw on is a colloquy on the Senate floor on 15 July 2010. Senator Feinstein thanked “Chairman LINCOLN and Chairman DODD” for maintaining section 745 in the conference report, and Senator Lincoln replied: “Chairman DODD and I maintained this provision in the conference report to assure that the Commission has the power to prevent the creation of futures and swaps markets that would allow citizens to profit from devastating events and also prevent gambling through futures markets.” Gensler’s brief quotes that sentence, with one phrase omitted; Dodd’s quotes parts of it. Both briefs also draw on her remark that contracts around sporting events such as “the Super Bowl, the Kentucky Derby, and Masters Golf Tournament” would “not serve any real commercial purpose. Rather, they would be used solely for gambling.” New Jersey’s side reads that as Congress keeping sports gambling off these markets. The industry’s petitions do not cite the floor record in their arguments. They read the provision itself as a power given to the CFTC, and North American Derivatives Exchange argues that reading Rule 40.11 as a categorical bar “only proves that sports-event contracts are swaps.”</p><h3>What Is Not on the Docket</h3><p>As of 14 October, no amicus brief supporting Kalshi, Robinhood or North American Derivatives Exchange was on any of the three dockets, and there was no filing from the United States. Tessera’s 30 September piece concluded that “A national answer has to come from the Supreme Court or from Congress.” That is still where it sits. How much weight anyone’s later recollection carries is for the Court to decide, and the passage quoted above is the nearest statement from it that we found. A new statute would be a different route.</p><h3>Where That Leaves the Question</h3><p>This piece holds no view on who should win, and we are still not qualified to have one. It does not predict that the Court takes the case, and a signal that a question matters is a reason to grant review without being a guarantee of it. The Court’s own rules say review “is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion”, and that a petition “will be granted only for compelling reasons.”</p><p>What changed last week was the docket. The law is where it was. One side’s deadline came first, and it brought a coalition broad enough to be worth reading closely. The industry’s own first window closes this week. On New Jersey’s petition, the other side’s window currently runs to 9 November, unless Kalshi petitions itself.</p><p>A count of briefs says nothing about a count of votes. It is a list of who has an interest, published in advance by the people who have it, and a signal that the question matters. We find that more useful than the count.</p><p><em>Sources: Supreme Court of the United States, docket №26–299, Flaherty v. KalshiEX, LLC, for the docketing date, the extension of Kalshi’s response to 9 November 2026, Kalshi’s letter of 18 September 2026 requesting it, and the eleven amicus entries, read 10 to 14 October 2026; the cover page of each brief for the party supported. Briefs quoted: Ohio, 38 other states and the District of Columbia (summary of argument); 145 Indian Tribes and Tribal Organizations, the American Gaming Association and the National Football League (interest sections); Stop Predatory Gambling et al.; former Senator Christopher J. Dodd; former CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler. KalshiEX, LLC v. Flaherty, №25–1922 (3d Cir. 6 April 2026), as filed on docket 26–299, for the listing of counsel for amici. Dockets №26–338, Robinhood Derivatives, LLC v. Dreitzer, and №26–344, North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc. v. Nevada, for docketing dates and the extensions granted on 8 and 9 October 2026, read 10 to 14 October 2026; the two petitions for Robinhood’s account of its role and its request, and for North American Derivatives Exchange’s reading of the provision and its quotation of the CFTC’s proposed rule. Congressional Record, 156 Cong. Rec. S5906–07 (daily ed. 15 July 2010). United States Senate roll call vote 208 (15 July 2010) and House of Representatives roll call 413 (30 June 2010), on the conference report on H.R. 4173, for who was in Congress. North American Derivatives Exchange’s petition, corporate disclosure statement, for its trading names. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (effective 16 March 2026), Rules 10, 30.1 and 37.2; the 8, 14 and 15 October deadlines are our arithmetic from the docketing dates. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 241–242 (2011). Tessera, “Seventy-Eight” (21 September 2026) and “Where the Answer Lives” (30 September 2026), as published at blog.tessera.pe, including for Kalshi’s Ninth and Sixth Circuit rulings.</em></p><p><em>This is market commentary, not investment advice or legal advice. It is not a recommendation to acquire, hold or redeem any Tessera product, or to take or avoid exposure to any company mentioned.</em></p><p><em>T-Tokens are tokenized loan participation rights, not equity. High risk. DYOR. Not financial advice. Not available in the US or other restricted territories. </em><a href="http://tessera.pe/terms"><em>tessera.pe/terms</em></a></p><p><a href="https://blog.tessera.pe/posts/the-deadline-was-thursday"><em>Republished on the Tessera Blog</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=022907f75227" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/the-deadline-was-thursday-022907f75227">The Deadline Was Thursday</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.tessera.pe/">Tessera</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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