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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tex Detroyer on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tex Detroyer on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Morton Hears a Boo]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@texdetroyer/morton-hears-a-boo-967b345dd4cd?source=rss-d53620b31bc8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[charlie-morton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baltimore-orioles]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tex Detroyer]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Apr 2025 23:35:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-21T23:35:50.755Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/599/0*rZYtUmD4J5jpVqgU" /></figure><p>Did we see this coming? Maybe a little bit. A 4.19 ERA in 2024 is a far cry from Charlie Morton’s 10.89 ERA in his five starts in 2025, but it would be unfair to say that this was unpredictable. At the same time, the Orioles seemed like they knew there were some issues and attempted to mitigate them with some shape changes to the sinker and changeup. Despite this, the results have been unkind.</p><p>Based on some of his comments in his postgame interviews, Morton himself seems quite lost on what exactly the problem is, thus far. That’s okay, Charlie, let’s figure this out together.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jjYout-RS8XOHqP9HwyLpQ.png" /></figure><p>First of all, Morton is throwing everything down the middle right now. So, on his non-primary offerings, he’s putting himself in a bad spot with his locations. This is something he can work through, but it is also important to consider why this might be happening and work backward from there.</p><p>Charlie Morton is probably not suddenly getting lazy about his pitch locations. However, his walk rate this year is a bit higher than he is used to. His first pitch strike rate is also at a career low. It is probably safe to assume that Morton is trying and failing to get ahead of hitters right now. However, getting ahead of hitters is, as demonstrated by Morton, not as simple as just throwing pitches in the zone, especially when he relies so heavily on his curveball.</p><p>When the curveball stops getting chases, he suddenly finds himself in a peculiar position. Most of Charlie Morton’s pitches are not particularly strong stuff-wise. His four-seam fastball continues to rely more exclusively on his outlier release point, and the sinker becomes the offensive point of focus without properly optimized arsenal usage.</p><p>As these things tend to be, there are two simultaneous issues with left-handed hitters and right-handed hitters, respectively. This is only an issue because he has five starts and there is already going to be so much noise in the small sample data, but that’s the easy way out, and nothing worth doing is easy, right?</p><h3>Right-Handed Approach</h3><p>The anchor of the approach against right-handed hitters is the big sweeping curveball Morton throws. He has only thrown 54 so far, which means two things. One, almost all the results on contact are unreliable. Two, the data about swing decisions is somewhat reliable, though to a limited degree. The focus is largely on the direction of the change, rather than the magnitude.</p><p>Righties are giving up on the curveball. The swing rate has fallen sharply to its lowest level in a single month since it became his primary offering in 2019. The result is the lowest strike rate on the pitch in a month since April of 2016. Outside the actual walks that result from throwing fewer strikes, Morton becomes particularly disadvantaged pitcher when he’s behind in the count because he doesn’t dominate the strike zone as well as other pitchers do. Adding more pitches is probably out of the question here, but there is enough to suggest that Morton should be fine with just three pitches.</p><p>It’s time to pull back on the curveball. Primary breaking ball becomes less effective as teams adjust their approach to what the primary offering is going to be, as evidenced by the Boston Red Sox 2024 second-half collapse. His outlier release point combined with good command of two fastballs should be enough to keep the performance on to average. Even though the shape of the four-seam is extremely below average, discretionary utilization at the top of the strike zone, combined with a tunnel on the SSW sinker he’s recently developed, should mitigate the overall damage he suffers.</p><p>The curveball is slow, yes, but it spins very fast. Morton also has decreased his extension, so the curveball should still be effective in the zone because, to hitters, the change in movement as it approaches home plate is tough to follow. Depending on how crazy he is willing to get, a movement to an SSW Sweeper grip could have some incredible returns. The effects of the lower velocity and high spin rate, combined with movement against the spin direction, make for a pitch that is even more difficult to square up.</p><p>In terms of adding a new pitch, some variation of a bullet slider could be effective, but of course, there are issues with old dogs and new tricks.</p><h3>Left-Handed Approach</h3><p>Lefties have done the most damage, exposing the limits of Morton’s CB-heavy approach, realizing that they can split the plate down the middle, and go after the curveball on the outer half and four-seam on the inner half. The changeup has been really good on 15% usage, but almost all of Charlie Morton’s production against lefties has hinged on lefties being consistently out in front of the curveball to roll it over.</p><p>Once lefties started attacking the curveball, the floodgates broke open. In fact, the only thing holding his arsenal together is the disgusting changeup he added in (-1&quot;/15&quot; @ 87mph? That’s legit!). There are almost no pitchers who can reliably throw big sweeping breaking balls to opposite-handed hitters and have it not get hammered. The only one that comes to mind is Dustin May, who is the inspiration for considering the SSW Sweeper grip. May has devastated opposing hitters with his sweeper in the zone because the combination of velocity, spin, and SSW movement keeps hitters out in front and gets ground balls to the pull side.</p><p>Assuming a major shape change is not in the cards, there are a handful of band-aid fixes to the approach that can mitigate how often Charlie Morton finds himself in poorly leveraged spots. The first is to start using his sinker to the glove side against lefties, especially early in counts. When hitters are more passive early in counts, that sinker is at much lower risk. Additionally, even if they do swing at it, it will most likely generate a ground ball to the pull side, which is still a positive outcome for the pitcher. If he pairs the glove side sinker with the changeup below that, you can take a lot of pressure off the fastball to succeed.</p><p>Taking a page out of Logan Webb’s book, throwing the cutter above the sinker is actually advantageous here, because the IVB on the cutter is greater than the sinker. Some of what makes the entire approach for Webb against lefties so effective is his utilization of seam-shifted wake in the sweeper, so there is an additional layer of deception in the breaking balls.</p><p>Regardless, Morton has to find a way to get ahead of hitters more consistently using some aspects of a called-strike-based approach early in counts and absorb some more damage with the bases empty to limit baserunners.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The answer to the question “What’s wrong with Charlie Morton’s curveball?” is, unfortunately, kind of everything. It’s not a uniquely deceptive pitch that relies a lot on hitters being willing to chase after it and not sit on it as much. There are seldom occasions where a mid-season grip change to a pitcher’s favorite pitch is a good idea, but with an ERA approaching 11.00, and a division race to win, the time for comfort is well out the window.</p><p>Outside of that, the drop in velocity down to 93 from his prime of sitting 95–96 has had downstream effects on how much room for error there is on his fastballs. To stop the effects of aging, Morton needs to get creative about how he uses his pitches. Maybe being an ace is no longer an option, but with these adjustments, the ERA will likely return to normal.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=967b345dd4cd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Ace in Recovery]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@texdetroyer/an-ace-in-recovery-ba7022400062?source=rss-d53620b31bc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba7022400062</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[diamondbacks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[player-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corbin-burnes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tex Detroyer]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jan 2025 00:28:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-24T00:28:37.137Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xSX57IqwyDK2aCpv" /></figure><p>Corbin Burnes is just three seasons removed from a Cy Young win and finished his 2024 with 8 innings of 1 run baseball against the Royals in the playoffs. He’s been one of the best pitchers in baseball for the last four seasons and just signed a huge deal with the Arizona Diamondbacks. Why does it feel so underwhelming?</p><h3>Much ado about nothing?</h3><p>A bit of noise has been made of Corbin Burnes in the last couple of seasons, but has the decline in performance merited the concern—and if it does—are we directing it properly?</p><p>Corbin Burnes throws six above-average pitches in terms of stuff. Given the high floor of performance he sets for himself, a thorough analysis is going to leave no stone unturned.</p><h3>Part 1: Not last year’s model</h3><p>Corbin Burnes exploded onto the scene in 2021 after some flashes of solid performance in 2020—a dramatic turnaround from his abysmal 2019 in a small sample. From a bird’s eye view, Burnes established top-of-the-line strikeout rates and a unique ability to evade barrels, all while not awarding many free passes. Nearly all of this came on the back of his brand-new cutter. The specific measurements of his cutter do not matter for this analysis. It has not changed to a significant degree. It was hard and unique, and the results proved that. He had a 40% whiff rate on his cutter against right-handed hitters. Video game stuff.</p><p>In 2022, a weaker version of Corbin Burnes emerged—at least on the surface. 2022 is a tale of two halves. Prior to 7/22, Corbin Burnes posted a 32.6% strikeout rate, which is perfectly in line with a standard regression to the mean following his prior season. After that, particularly over the last two months of that season, the tune changed.</p><p>This drop off at the end of 2022 provides a launch point for the carryover changes in 2023 where the large sample makes the granular analysis much easier.</p><p>Note on methodology: Picking a split here is not an easy thing to do. Because of the peculiar case of how strong Corbin Burnes natural ability is (to be clear, he is a top-of-the-rung talent), it is hard to parse real changes from natural game-to-game variance. The split at the all-star break works here because it seems like the most likely natural point at which teams would stop to do an evaluation of their opponents, which is an important part of the next piece of this puzzle.</p><h3>Part 2: The Achilles Heel</h3><p>Despite Burnes’ immense talent and elite repertoire, his cutter-centric arsenal may be a limiting factor because it does not differentiate enough from his other pitches, allowing hitters to adjust effectively.</p><p><strong>Right-Handed Hitters’ Adjustments</strong></p><p>Right-handed hitters have started pulling the ball more on the curveball while hitting the cutter to the opposite field more frequently. Hitters sit between these two pitches, prioritizing timing the cutter later and sacrificing power for better slugging and fewer whiffs against the curveball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4MJK84BdCB5xgY96HCoH1Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J7Xgxznt6dqH7Le5SjgZhw.png" /></figure><p>Burnes’ swing-and-miss rate on sliders in the zone has declined noticeably against right-handed hitters. Some of the noise on the in zone swing and miss rate from 2022–2023 has to do with a shape change on the curve mid-season in 2023 moving from a slurvy -6.5/-9.8 @ 81.7 mph to a curvier -12.9/-10.0 @ 80.3 mph.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e8-e6KbqYDjfzpaIinlzWg.png" /></figure><p>Hitters no longer need to be ahead of the cutter, so the slider’s lack of separation from the cutter makes it easier to adjust when misreading the pitch initially. The curveball’s increased separation leading to more zone whiffs has slowed this regression for that pitch, but frequent shape adjustments are not a serious long term solution. It was fine as a mid-season fix, but over time leaves you vulnerable to whatever the hitter does not expect as they continue to adjust.</p><p>Because of the reliance on swing and miss outside the zone, it becomes difficult to control all levels of the zone. For guys with hard rising fastballs, controlling the top of the zone comes naturally. Guys with “less optimal” four seam shapes have to get a bit more creative in how they create swing and miss in the zone in order to stretch the zone vertically. An example of a pitcher who does this easily is Dylan Cease, who throws a hard rising fastball combined with a devastating hard bullet slider.</p><p>Guys like Tarik Skubal and Max Scherzer who don’t have “ideal” fastball shapes have other methods. The former uses a two fastball approach to create more levels in the strike zone while the latter uses more extreme release angles. Both have elite changeups and a slider that tunnels extremely effectively in the zone.</p><p>What remains important is that pitchers maintain the ability to control all quadrants of the zone, while also offering two secondaries to each handedness. Burnes has no trouble rattling off devastating secondary pitches, but it remains to be seen how he counters the offensive adjustments against him.</p><p><strong>Left-Handed Hitters’ Adjustments</strong></p><p>Corbin Burnes has overall had much more success against left handed hitters. Burnes unique ability to throw both the cutter as his primary with glove side break makes it incredibly difficult for hitters to use the early horizontal trajectory of a pitch to differentiate them from one other. This does work somewhat counter to his changeup, so the ability of the changeup to tunnel with the cutter can be limited by the horizontal difference making it harder to accrue swings out of the zone.</p><p>In 2022, the struggles for LHH were stacking up, and they needed to change their approach. Because Corbin doesn’t throw his cutter up and in to lefties, like a traditional RHP might, it grew difficult to find a way to successfully barrel the cutter without being woefully underprepared for anything soft. Thus, their attention shifted to the secondaries offerings which were easier to elevate to the pull side.</p><p>This approach worked largely for the first half of 2023 as hitters saw decrease in swing and miss rate on the changeup and curveball. Burnes also had a career low opposite field rate against the curveball in 2023; however, Burnes changed his curveball shape in the middle of that season, a decrease of ~6&quot; IVB, which left hitters dumbfounded for the second half as the whiff rate surged over 60%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_8J9AOfgXpH2my4XZgrN8g.png" /></figure><p>The gains in success in 2023 were unraveled in 2024 after an offseason to prepare. the whiff rate on the curveball dropped from 55% to 40% and the xSLG soared from .109 to .283. On the changeup, it jumped from .233 to .399! This might not seem bad, but this gains came against pitches with strong metrics and with almost no tradeoff to performance against the cutter. In fact, the tradeoff to damage is gained back almost in its entirety by the increase in batting average against the cutter because of the decreased whiff rate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zoccCYnntp0-_DUkU1vhMg.png" /></figure><p>Opponents observed that against left handed hitters, Corbin Burnes likes to aggressively backdoor the cutter away for called strikes. He is then able to throw the changeup away off of that. The curveball gets used for called strikes, as well as chases below the zone. After picking up on this, the adjustment necessary was looking for pitches with a high trajectory to be curveballs in the zone, just like righties learned how to do. That way, when the pitch starts low/away, you can treat that like the cutter/changeup combo. This led to further derision of the cutter’s CSW% success, while allowing damage against the changeup and curveball to surge.</p><h3>Future Changes</h3><p>Initially, the answer seems obvious: Burnes should bring back the four-seam fastball he once gave up. The shape most recently was about 16&quot;/5&quot; which is fine for a four-seam that has protection from both a cutter and a sinker. Additionally, Burnes would likely not throw it as consistently low in the zone as he did with the four seam previously because of the addition of both the sinker and cutter which would still likely be heavier usage. That pitch would give him an option of something to throw at the top of the zone to play off of Burnes downward bias arsenal.</p><p>Referring back to 2018 and 2019, this even offers a solution to the problem of in zone swing and miss for the slider—31% across those two seasons. Not only that, but the chase rate against it was almost 50% which would make it pretty much the best secondary offering in the league at the time.</p><p>While the chase rate has come down to a much more normal number hanging around the mid-forties, the four seam did establish a much better movement differential from his elite hybrid slider shape permitting more dominance within the strike zone. However, pitchers usually don’t like to bring back pitches they don’t have a good history with—even when the pitch was broken in a different context.</p><p>From this arises an opportunity for creative problem solving—if the four seam won’t make a return, how can Burnes re-establish the threat of a pitch at the top of the strike zone? In 2021, Burnes sinker against righties had a 38% chase rate and a 20% swing and miss rate in the zone. these are pretty much unheard of number for an inefficient sinkerballer from a high release. What gives?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m3s466Up74Umg2SpWaNjAw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5V8mVan5mRd_VTuPGDRfUg.png" /></figure><p>In 2020, Burnes had not yet established the cutter as the primary threat to RHB. As a result, the 13&quot; IVB/12&quot; HB sinker failed to sustain any level of effectiveness as the primary offering to righties and was left totally unprotected. Once Burnes established the cutter primary in 2021, the sinker now has something to keep hitters more disciplined about anticipating trajectory.</p><p>Once Burnes starts throwing the sinker lower than the cutter, you’re no longer setting up hitters to swing ahead the cutter as often. When the hitter can be ready for the sinker low, the cutter can work down to the barrel, rather than being ready for the cutter low, and the sinker winning over the top. Would it work? In 2020, Burnes threw the sinker primary and as previously established it was getting vaporized. Not included was the part where the cutter had a 49% whiff rate, and the sinker still had a 16% in zone swing and miss rate. All signs point to the sinker up being the answer.</p><h3>Why do whiffs matter?</h3><p>In many ways, they do not; however, a return to his 2021–22 whiff rates would likely bring back a version of Corbin Burnes that makes the massive contract the Diamondbacks signed that much more worthwhile. A 170 ERA+ is much more valuable than a 130 ERA+. Burnes could probably continue to just be a good starter, and let his existing talent carry him, but the Diamondbacks will likely see a much better return on investment by restoring him to his peak abilities. Additionally, it will help stave off age related regression as velocity falls and the stuff is not as independently dominant.</p><p>If you enjoyed this analysis, please consider following me @TexDetroyer on Twitter where I am most active and follow this medium page where I hope share higher level analysis more frequently.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba7022400062" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Pitcher of Tomorrow]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@texdetroyer/the-pitcher-of-tomorrow-c63e44c7cf0d?source=rss-d53620b31bc8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c63e44c7cf0d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[player-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitchers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[yoshinobu-yamamoto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tex Detroyer]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 21:11:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-10T21:13:44.261Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/0*WFHjQRw2A3Zw09oj" /><figcaption>h/t Sporting News</figcaption></figure><p>***Disclaimer: This article was originally written and edited in March of 2024. As such, the content and analysis are rooted in what was available then. It has since been updated for grammatical issues and etiquette.</p><p>Every so often there will be a pitcher that, in some small way or another, bucks conventional wisdom and succeeds seemingly despite themselves. Fifteen years ago, that pitcher was Tim Lincecum, who brought on baseball’s velocity revolution and changed how the sport understood pitchers. Apparent size, steadiness, and strike-throwing were no longer prerequisites to being a great pitcher thanks to the firecracker known as Big Time Timmy Jim.</p><p>Today that pitcher is Yoshinobu Yamamoto.</p><p>Yamamoto is a 25-year-old right-hander from Japan who just finished off his third consecutive season winning the Japanese pitching triple crown en route to a best pitcher and NPB Most Valuable Player award in each season. Thanks to MLB’s Hawkeye tracking technology during the World Baseball Classic, there is opportunity to learn what makes Yamamoto such a special talent. This statcast data — as well as some internet exploring and a little bit of video scouting — provide a blueprint for the machine.</p><h4>The Fastball</h4><p>The fastball is the anchor of the arsenal for any starting pitcher worth their salt. Yamamoto has one of the three best fastballs among starting pitchers in the entire world.</p><p>During the WBC he averaged 95.5 MPH on his fastball with an estimated 17&quot; IVB and 10.8&quot; HB from a 5.3&#39; release height. There were just three players in all of baseball who threw 10 pitches that hit those benchmarks as a starter (Freddy Peralta, Yusei Kikuchi, and Luis Castillo) and those are just Yamamoto’s averages!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pbEVu9YS9MG8gh7v7DrEuQ.png" /><figcaption>Thank you to Alex Chamberlain for this leaderboard!</figcaption></figure><p>Yusei Kikuchi is the only player whose averages come close to Yamamoto’s estimates though his movement averages are still a full inch lower both vertically and horizontally. His fastball is optimized to create significant swing-and-miss in the majors. There are some concerns over whether that swing and miss potential would translate to MLB, which are generally valid; however, there are some key distinctions that lead to underperformance on the fastball.</p><p>The NPB is a much less whiff-oriented league. The swing planes are generally flatter and hitters attack the top of the zone more. As a result, flat fastballs don’t play nearly as well in Japan as they would here in the United States of America. Additionally, because of the deadened baseballs, there are fewer benefits to hard aerial contact. Because of this, Yamamoto’s approach with regard to location was generally unconcerned with creating whiffs, mostly looking to keep the balls low and on the ground.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/1*0CrzWEvhHyMXgOXs0XdLBg.png" /><figcaption>Yamamoto fastball location heatmap against RHH</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*dzpAtpgdoZzTzwirZQNNgw.png" /><figcaption>Yamamoto fastball location heatmap against LHH</figcaption></figure><p>Yamamoto generally likes to work middle to down and away from hitters with his fastball. Knowing he’s less likely to generate a whiff, he instead adjusts his location to get seemingly impossible batted ball results. The result is he does exactly that.</p><p>Over his last 557.2 IP, he has given up 15 home runs. <em>Fifteen</em>. For some context: Logan Webb, who has 556.2 IP over the last three seasons has allowed 40 home runs. <em>Forty</em>. That’s Logan Webb, the San Francisco Giants starter known for his <em>incredibly heavy sinking fastball</em> who pitches his home games in Oracle Park, in one of the most pitcher-friendly run environments in the entire league.</p><p>Just two of Yamamoto’s home runs allowed came last season. Two home runs allowed in 171 IP this last season.</p><p>Which leads me to his next pitch.</p><h4>The Splitter</h4><p>The splitter has been somewhat frequently compared to the famous “ghost fork” from Kodai Senga. With 60% whiffs and a .185 xwOBA against, that pitch had an excellent campaign in its own right; however, a closer look at the usage illustrates the performance effect of using a pitch primarily when the pitcher already has count advantage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*EpUCWYRIff4cPaza1O39zA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Senga is reluctant to throw his ghost fork when he is not at a count advantage, but when the countis in his favor the usage skyrockets. As a result, the pitch’s performance results are going to be heavily skewed towards a pitcher’s overall 2-strike results which are generally favorable.</p><p>Yamamoto’s usage splits tell a different story.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S-rYOVE4_8gRVfFpnPWJWQ.png" /></figure><p>Even when Yamamoto gets ahead in the count he’s still throwing his fastball more than any other pitch except for 3–2 counts where he throws his splitter (read: “fork” in the image key) more than any of his other pitches. Not only does this type of usage require incredible confidence in the fastball, it also requires incredible command and incredible stuff to generate the results that Yamamoto has over the last 3+ seasons.</p><p>From a stuff perspective, the splitter is incredible. It averaged an estimated 90 MPH with 1.4&quot; IVB and 10.4&quot; HB during the WBC. The limited velocity differential from the fastball combined with the ability to kill over 15&quot; of IVB off the fastball lead to a pitch that is largely indistinguishable from the fastball early on in the ball flight. This tight spread between the two pitches creates a strong tunnel effect that makes it difficult for hitters to pick out and sit on one or the other. This effectively neutralizes a lot of the platoon splits that arise when it comes to offspeed pitches. Yamamoto can still throw his splitter effectively to same-handed hitters.</p><p>The concern with this pitch might be that it can’t be thrown as often to right-handed batters. Once again, Yamamoto breaks the scale.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*lUGD2FvUvOUtOgeqdUD-5g.png" /></figure><p>There is almost no visible drop-off in splitter usage against right-handed hitters. He is willing and able to throw the pitch to both sides of the plate and the unique combination of both a tight velocity spread and a large movement differential allow him to have this incredibly unique profile.</p><h4>The Curveball</h4><p>His curveball is a tough pitch to wrangle. It defies a few conventions about what makes a curveball a truly effective pitch, but the incredible shape of his curveball actually gives it a chance to be uniquely effective given the right role.</p><p>Here is his estimated curveball measurements from the WBC:</p><p>76.9 MPH</p><p>2808 RPM</p><p>-18.2” IVB</p><p>13.1” HB</p><p>The velocity is okay, but the induced movement is impressive. It’s a large velocity dropoff from his fastball, meaning it likely won’t be a great pitch at generating chases with frequent usage. However, the pitch moves so much that batters will frequently bail early on the pitch as it floats into the zone for a called strike. He uses this to his advantage in particular against left-handed hitters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/672/1*zm1IxaHs_5jkHEzklNtDvw.png" /></figure><p>His command of the pitch is strong enough to prevent mistakes and it can still consistently land in the zone for a strike. The curveball doesn’t make or break his arsenal but it’s without a doubt a fun tool in the toolbox.</p><h4>The Cutter</h4><p>Yamamoto is still working on developing a harder breaking ball to throw for chases against righties. The only data available onthis pitch is a small sample. It averaged an estimated 93 MPH with 3&quot; of glove-side movement and 13.1&quot; IVB. A fairly standard cutter shape that has the potential to become an effective piece against righties.</p><h4>The Data Summary</h4><p>The rare combination of low release height, high IVB, and above-average starter velocity on Yamamoto’s fastball is better optimized for MLB than NPB; thus, there is not much reason to expect any sort of performance drop-off without a total failure to adjust at all. Additionally, his unique splitter shape creates one of the most devastating fastball/off-speed tunnels in the entire sport which allows unbiased performance based on the opposing hitter’s handedness.</p><h4>The Mechanics</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//twitter.com/tanaka13ver2021/status/1668641615785922560%3Fs%3D20&amp;image=https%3A//i.embed.ly/1/image%3Furl%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fabs.twimg.com%252Ferrors%252Flogo46x38.png%26key%3Da19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e329eba5c9e2a9cf245611fdeaebea1e/href">https://medium.com/media/e329eba5c9e2a9cf245611fdeaebea1e/href</a></iframe><p>Yamamoto has almost completely removed a leg kick from his delivery entirely. A leg kick is one of the most important parts of the delivery in terms of generating velocity as the entire point of the leg kick is raising the center of mass to increase gravitational acceleration. Without that leg kick, a lot of the acceleration that gravity provides to help generate velocity is lost by not raising the center of mass. Yamamoto is still averaging close to 96 MPH <em>without</em> that leg kick.</p><h4>Conclusions</h4><p>The foundations of an elite starting pitcher are all there for Yamamoto.</p><ol><li>A strong fastball that will play in any count</li><li>A low-effort delivery with high velocity that minimizes health concerns</li><li>A secondary offering for both sides of the plate that creates a tight velocity tunnel with an effective movement differential</li></ol><p>Whoever signs Yamamoto this offseason is going to get a dependable ace who might just change the way we understand starting pitcher development as a whole.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c63e44c7cf0d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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