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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Richard Palmer on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Richard Palmer on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@theStrategyCode?source=rss-86ad4fc5b39a------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Richard Palmer on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@theStrategyCode?source=rss-86ad4fc5b39a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is it time to rethink our obsession with financial objectives?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@theStrategyCode/is-it-time-to-rethink-our-obsession-with-financial-objectives-14d99d2e039?source=rss-86ad4fc5b39a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing-objectives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[purpose]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-metrics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[profit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard Palmer]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 2023 15:40:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-18T15:40:40.393Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The rise and triumph of shareholder primacy</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gfke9ZTKdbQ_Mkali2-JAA.png" /></figure><p>If you’ve been in the workforce for a while, it’s easy to forget this is the first recession many people have experienced as working adults. And — given the last recession ended in 2009 — that’s quite a lot of people. Without first hand experience, it can be somewhat daunting, especially when you sense what those of us who have worked through such times before have come to expect: the all too familiar scent of panic. In marketing, that usually equates to a reduction in spend, a temporary halt on new product innovations, and a sharper focus on short term financial goals.</p><p>I’m sure many would simply call that responsive and responsible stewardship of a business, but no matter your perspective, the one thing we can all probably agree on is that <em>most</em> businesses have a tendency to ‘tighten their belts’ during a recession.</p><p>Now, if you’re expecting the, ‘why reducing marketing spend is counterproductive in a recession’ moment, I’m sorry to disappoint. I think most of us are tired of the somewhat unsurprising rhetoric, particularly when it comes from agency leaders. While nothing less than wise counsel, it has the tendency to come across as a bit desperate: perhaps a last ditch effort to hit overly optimistic revenue forecasts. It’s not that the evidence isn’t there to support such a warning — in fact it’s there in abundance (Steidl, 2016) — it’s that I believe the behaviour points to an underlying and far more concerning trend.</p><p>In today’s business landscape, the majority of companies are run ‘by the numbers’. Nor will that come as a surprise. Yours probably is too. But what might surprise you is that our obsession with financial metrics is still relatively new; it’s just that few of us have been working quite long enough to remember anything different.</p><p>You see, it wasn’t until the 1970s and 1980s that a concept began to emerge placing an emphasis on shareholder value and thus financial performance. Championed by the likes of Nobel laureates Milton Friedman and Eugene Fama, ‘shareholder primacy’ not only gained in popularity, it shaped what was taught to and learned by the next generation of business leaders.</p><p>If the term is new to you, what it infers certainly won’t be: that the primary goal of a company should be to <em>maximise shareholder value</em> (Friedman, 1970). What it laid the foundations for was wholesale change in how companies operate: the introduction of the CFO (Chief Financial Officer), their unprecedented influence in decision making, and a growing dependence on financial metrics in order to make those decisions. EPS (earnings per share) and ROI (return on investment) became more than buzzwords — they had become the very purpose of capitalist enterprise (Jensen &amp; Fama, 1980).</p><p>Of course, since then, we’ve seen financial objectives filter down to every facet of the modern organisation. That includes marketing. And that’s not necessarily a bad thing, but we do need to be aware of <em>why</em> this change occurred and whether or not there are any unintended consequences for us as marketers. It’s important to be accountable for the effectiveness of our work, but that extends to doing the right thing for everyone, not just what makes us look ‘all growed up’ in the moment.</p><p>My hope is to ask one simple question: have we gone too far? In order to do that, I will walk through three (hopefully helpful) things, so you can come to your own informed decision:</p><ol><li>What financial measures were <em>originally</em> intended as</li><li>Why financial measures were elevated to a place of corporate primacy</li><li>The unintended consequences of that elevation</li></ol><h3>1. A test of validity</h3><p>While we may have Simon Sinek to thank for its popularity, perhaps even its clarity, the <em>idea</em> that a business should exist for more than financial gain is far from new. Take Collins &amp; Porras. Their argument — that every company should exist to solve a problem in the world and, in doing so, contribute to society (1991) — was immortalised in the management masterpiece, ‘Built to Last’ as early as 1994.</p><p>And, while it could be tempting to dismiss their ideas on core ideology and ‘big hairy audacious goals’ as soppy sentiment, it’s worth reminding ourselves of the evidence they collected through the rigour of repeatable academic study. The culmination of 6 years of research, the book documents a credible connection between what they call ‘visionary companies’ — such as General Electric, 3M, Johnson &amp; Johnson, and Walt Disney — and long-term, sustainable commercial success.</p><p>It is perhaps, at least in part, why we have seen a shift in recent decades towards a more hopeful future: a growing recognition of the role of environmental sustainability and social impact in the long-term success of corporate enterprise. And yet, for reasons we will come to explore shortly, the two are often positioned as at odds with each other. That somehow it’s impossible to please both financial shareholders and societal stakeholders at the same time: a perception the recession only serves to exacerbate.</p><p>The solution, ironically, is far <em>more</em> simple than the problem would suggest. It’s just about putting profit in its appropriate place. To understand what that is, let’s go even further back to the 1950s and the brilliant Peter Drucker.</p><p>While often referred to as ‘the father of management thinking’ — and despite a wealth of (almost accurate) quotes attributed to him online — we otherwise seem to have forgotten his wisdom. Take his ideas around profit. He argued profit is, for a company, what oxygen is for a person. You need it, and ideally in abundance, but if you think life is about breathing, you’ve really missed the point of living (2004).</p><p>Herein lies our answer. To stop profit competing with purpose, we simply need to recognise that it isn’t… a company’s purpose that is. A company’s purpose is… well… their purpose. Profit is something entirely different. According to Drucker:</p><blockquote>Profit is not the explanation, cause or rationale of business behavior and business decisions, but rather the <strong><em>test of their validity</em></strong>. (Drucker, 1954, p. 63, emphasis added)</blockquote><p>In other words, profit is a helpful yardstick — a measure of how well a business is operating. But a <em>measure</em> is far from a primary objective,<em> </em>and even further from a company’s core <em>purpose</em>.</p><p>And don’t hear what Drucker <em>wasn’t</em> saying. Profit is <em>not</em> bad, undesirable, or unimportant. Far from it. For very sensible reasons, he argued that profit is <em>essential</em> to the survival and success of a business. Without it, a business can’t operate, grow, or innovate. His argument, which I believe is as relevant, insightful, and even potent today as when it was first published back in 1954, is that profit shouldn’t dictate our decisions, but it does prove the<em> merit</em> of them.</p><blockquote>Profit shouldn’t dictate our decisions, but it does prove the<em> merit</em> of our decisions. (Me, just now)</blockquote><p>So why did things change?</p><h3>2. From Treasurer to CFO: a brief history of shareholder primacy</h3><p>Much of the cultural change we witness today (but are fairly oblivious to) is driven by three things: the social elite, money, and power (Parenti, 2006). Shareholder primacy is arguably no different. As I’ve already introduced the academic narrative of Friedman and Fama, let me start with the social elite.</p><p>In 1970, Milton Friedman published what would become a seminal article on the topic in The New York Times Magazine. Entitled, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, it contended (as the title might suggest) that the <em>primary</em> responsibility of any business is to maximise profits on behalf of its shareholders. In contrast, any business taking on broader social concerns — something Friedman argued should remain within the domain of government — would distract from that core responsibility and, in effect, impose an unfair ‘tax’ on its shareholders.</p><p>It wasn’t a bad argument and there’s no doubt plenty of truth to it, but what matters is his motive for publishing the article to begin with. Simply put, Friedman disagreed with the emerging idea that businesses <em>should</em> take on a greater responsibility within society, particularly in the area of environmental sustainability. Perhaps he saw it as an attack on capitalism, a conclusion made by Fama (1995), or perhaps he genuinely held to Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, a belief that society ultimately benefits from the accumulated self-interest of individuals (Smith, 1776). Either way, it positioned profit as the equal and opposite of any other kind of corporate purpose and, in so doing, dismissed them as idealistic and naive.</p><p>Of course, Friedman was simply publishing an idea. This was a battle of philosophies: smart people arguing against other smart people. Why did this particular line of academic thought gain such traction? Well, this is where money comes in. Money was no <em>less</em> important before the advent of shareholder primacy, but there was a real difference in where that money could be made and — more importantly — how much of it.</p><p>In 1971, a year after Friedman’s article, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations opened its floors in the US. You probably know it, more simply, as the Nasdaq. Unlike other exchanges which were physical, the Nasdaq allowed investors to buy and sell stocks on a network of computers. No longer limited to one exchange or another, they could buy and sell stocks on many (Hwang, 2023).</p><p>This coincided with the rise of high-growth industries such as technology, biotech, and telecommunications. This potent mix of ease and quick returns attracted institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, that had large pools of capital to invest. The focus quickly became more about a companies’ future earnings <em>potential</em>, rather than its current earnings.</p><p>A greater emphasis on transparency and accountability was necessary to predict which businesses would grow the most, and most quickly, which in turn demanded financial visibility. Price-to-earnings ratios, revenue growth rates, and ROI became more than just a measure of a company’s performance, they became a measure of its value.</p><p>These changes brought with them complexity, not least through the regulatory environment. Treasurers, once the highest-ranking financial executive in a company, suddenly found themselves responsible for far more than had traditionally been the case. Companies responded in kind, creating a new position — the Chief Financial Officer — responsible for overseeing not just the company’s cash and investments, but its capital structure management, risk management, financial reporting, tax planning, and strategic financial decision-making. The power to determine the future had all but been given over on a platter.</p><p>So, what can we conclude from this little history lesson?</p><p>Firstly, that financial metrics were deliberately positioned as the antithesis of company, and purpose purely to combat the idea of corporate social responsibility. Secondly, that financial reporting gained traction — not for the direct benefit of the business or customer — but for investors. Finally, even if they didn’t already think ‘by the numbers’, CFOs (to whom these decisions were now entrusted) suddenly had a lot to lose should anything change.</p><p>That said, regardless of the cause of our financial obsession, the real question is does it matter? Well, I believe it does.</p><p>Over the years I’ve witnessed profit masquerade as both the purpose and primary objective of a company (sometimes in the same organisation). As the former, it can lead to decision paralysis. As the latter, it can corrupt corporate culture to the point of reactive, short-term survivalism. In either case, what it really leads to is compromise. Typically, that compromise is one of quality. But what we might call compromise (which almost sounds like a strategic choice) is in reality mere neglect: intentional ignorance to the needs and desires of customers and employees in favour of wealth creation for investors and shareholders. Of course, these are fairly bold allegations, so let me unpack them (briefly) before settling on a proposed solution.</p><h3>3. Culture may eat strategy for breakfast, but profit destroys both</h3><p>A good strategist will often describe a strategy as ‘systems of activities’ that fit and reinforce one another (Porter, 1985).</p><blockquote>Fit has to do with the connections, relationships, and interactions among activities and the way they combine to create unique and sustainable value. (Porter, 1980, p. 40)</blockquote><p>The greater the fit, the harder these ‘systems’ are to imitate, and the more differentiated and sustainable the customer value you can create (Porter, 1980). It’s why strategy is really all about <em>choices</em>. While there is always more than one way to achieve an outcome, it is about choosing the path that will <em>most</em> develop and compound your competitive advantage (Henderson, 1989).</p><p>The stronger and more sustainable the advantage, the more customers you are likely to attract and, perhaps more importantly, the more customers you will be able to <em>satisfy </em>(Drucker, 1954), the higher the prices you can command, and the more your business can grow… <strong><em>profitability</em></strong>.</p><p>If you ask your organisation to pursue profit as its <em>primary</em> objective, your people will. And no doubt diligently, if their individual KPIs align to it. There will be a buzz of activity and new innovations as your people try and find what works for them — individually — in pursuit of their own bonuses. Some will succeed, some may even get a promotion for their efforts. But at what cost?</p><p>Where is the consistency? Where are the systems of activities that fit and reinforce one another? As individual activities start to compete directly against each other, entire systems will begin to fall apart. Inevitably, it will destroy any competitive advantage you may have, exacerbate pressures on pricing and — in the long term — reduce profit (Porter, 1985). Sure, things may be exciting for a time, but as new initiatives fail as quickly as they begin, nothing will seem to gain traction.</p><p>Ironically, chasing profit can prove counterproductive.</p><p>I believe the underlying cause <em>could</em> be the lack of restraint financial measures afford. They do not ‘bound’ creativity — which is when it’s most effective — because they offer no guardrails for <em>how</em> you achieve them. At least, none people pay any attention to.</p><p>Of course, corporate strategy <em>should</em> dictate the how, but then why do we see so many sales people selling things a company doesn’t really offer (particularly in my industry). While I’d love to believe this is the exception, experience tells me it’s far too often the norm. And frankly, why <em>should</em> they care if it helps them hit their numbers, make their bonus, or gain a promotion?</p><p>Strategy fails when the various systems and activities it depends on start working against each other. Those systems can’t help themselves because — as we all know — culture eats strategy for breakfast. And when culture is shaped by financial objectives? It destroys both.</p><p><em>‘But that’s why we have corporate values’</em>, I hear you cry. Sure, but when an individual’s personal prosperity is tied to the outcome of reaching financial goals, just see how many actually stick to them.</p><blockquote>Culture, by definition, is the behavior that people do when no one is looking. (The Wall Street Journal, 2006)</blockquote><p>You see, financial measures also create<em> internal conflict with corporate values</em>. ‘Put the customer first’ is a lovely sentiment, but how can you genuinely achieve that if your primary objective doesn’t align with it? Of course, I’ll be quick to admit, for many companies it does. But if you observe what’s reported on, if you see the cadence of financial meetings, if you watch how individual KPIs are set, is it in <em>reality</em>? I’m not convinced.</p><p>Everything <em>must</em> centre around your purpose so that the systems of activities that develop your advantage must work together. That includes individual targets and marketing slogans. The truth is, financial objectives can lead to <strong><em>a neglect of customers and employees. </em></strong>They don’t mean to, and they certainly don’t want to (its ironically counterproductive to their health). They just… do.</p><h3>A more hopeful future</h3><p>So, what’s the solution? Thankfully, Drucker had the solution back in 1954. And it’s pretty straightforward: stop pitting profit and purpose against one another. If financial measures are treated, not as the cause of our decisions, but as proof of the validity of them, then they will remain just that. The company can get back to doing what it should, developing its competitive advantage and compounding it, and, ironically, turn a greater and more sustainable profit.</p><p><strong>References:</strong></p><p>Bannister, A. (2022, December 15). CFOs make good CEOs, study finds. CFO Dive. <a href="https://www.cfodive.com/news/cfos-turned-ceos-growth-study/630028/">https://www.cfodive.com/news/cfos-turned-ceos-growth-study/630028/</a></p><p>Collins, J. C., &amp; Porras, J. I. (1991). Building your company’s vision. Harvard Business Review, 69(5), 65–77.</p><p>Collins, J. C., &amp; Porras, J. I. (1994). Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. HarperBusiness.</p><p>Drucker, P. F. (1954). The practice of management. HarperCollins.</p><p>Drucker, P. F. (2004). The daily Drucker: 366 days of insight and motivation for getting the right things done. HarperBusiness.</p><p>Fama, E. F. (1995). Agency problems and the fate of capitalism. Journal of Finance, 50(3), 889–919.</p><p>Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine, 33–36, 122, 124, 126.</p><p>Henderson, B. D. (1989). The origin of strategy. Harvard Business Review, 67(6), 139–143.</p><p>Hinchliffe, E. (2023, March 24). CFOs are becoming CEOs more often than ever. Fortune. <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/03/24/cfos-becoming-ceos-research-data-succession-planning/">https://fortune.com/2023/03/24/cfos-becoming-ceos-research-data-succession-planning/</a></p><p>Hwang, I. (2023, March 15). A Brief History of the Stock Market <a href="https://www.sofi.com/learn/content/history-of-the-stock-market/">https://www.sofi.com/learn/content/history-of-the-stock-market/</a></p><p>Jensen, M. C., &amp; Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–307.</p><p>Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. Free Press.</p><p>Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. Free Press.</p><p>Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. W. Strahan and T. Cadell.</p><p>Steidl, P. (2016). Survive, Exploit, Disrupt: Action Guidelines for Marketing in a Recession. World Scientific Publishing Company.</p><p>The Wall Street Journal. (2006, June 7). Ford CEO Fields on culture change. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114964037931543783">https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114964037931543783</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=14d99d2e039" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Wookiees, Ewoks, and lightsabers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@theStrategyCode/wookiees-ewoks-and-lightsabers-5016047a38bb?source=rss-86ad4fc5b39a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[value-creation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[differentiation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[competitive-advantage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operational-effectiveness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[customer-value]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Richard Palmer]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2023 10:55:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-28T11:43:29.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Beyond best practice: unlocking the formula for sustainable advantage and lasting growth</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f8rQt61AuELbXuqAuqNw5A.png" /></figure><h3>Operational effectiveness is not a competitive advantage</h3><p>In 1996, Michael E. Porter published his article, “What is Strategy?” in Harvard Business Review. To say it was profoundly insightful would barely begin to scratch the surface. It was a line in the sand, a flag on the hill, a stake in the ground for what strategy is and — perhaps more importantly — what it isn’t. By the time I came to read it more than a decade later, I was surprised to find its influence was not more… shall we say… visible. ‘Operational effectiveness’, as Porter describes it, was still more prevalent than any other excuse for strategy I had witnessed and have continued to witness over the last 20 years.</p><p>To perhaps dangerously summarise Porter’s brilliant piece: operational effectiveness is about performing the many activities that go into creating, producing, selling, and delivering products and services, better. Or, to be more specific, making these activities faster, with less inputs, minimal defects, and therefore less need for intervention. The problem with operational effectiveness is that its practices — total quality management, continuous improvement, best practice — lead to activities that are easily emulated. The result? Competitive convergence — an inability to distinguish oneself from the competition — and ultimately, not to put too fine a point on it:</p><blockquote>“Zero-sum competition, static or declining prices, and pressures on costs that compromise companies’ ability to invest in the business for the long term.” (Porter, 1996, p. 67)</blockquote><p>As a strategist, I remain fairly critical of operational effectiveness when it supplants what Porter argues is its antithesis: strategic positioning. That’s not to say operational effectiveness isn’t valuable — every company <em>should</em> invest in it — but when the seductive lure of tangible and measurable performance improvements diminishes the perceived value of long term strategic positioning and what it helps to define — competitive advantage — I wonder if our culture of immediate gratification has finally eroded any sense of long term <em>anything</em>, even in the business world.</p><p>Then, one day, it dawned on me. The marketing industry I have served for almost 20 years has not only been seduced by operational effectiveness, it’s become utterly obsessed with it. Blissfully unaware, I had become as culpable as those I had once criticised.</p><h3>Wookiees, Ewoks, and lightsabers</h3><p>So, what is competitive advantage? In short, competitive advantage grows out of the differentiated value a company can create for its customers (Porter, 1985). Which, for those who love a formula, sounds pretty simple.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/0*TNlKAM8knShWaOgF" /></figure><p>But actually, that doesn’t go far enough. Let’s take a look at an example most of us will be familiar with.</p><p>As a content streaming service, Disney + has an obvious advantage: its original content from the much loved movie franchises Star Wars, Marvel, Pixar, and — of course — Disney itself. And this advantage is <em>vast</em>. Just look at the numbers.</p><p>When it announced its plan to enter the streaming market in 2019, Disney projected it would overtake Netflix in global subscriptions by 2025 (Q.ai, 2022). At the time, many (myself included) believed this was mere commercial hype, perhaps an attempt to drive up their share price. After all, Netflix <em>is</em> the functional category builder, a pioneer in online streaming since 2007 (Newsbeat, 2018). In 2022 — just three years after its announcement (and three years earlier than it predicted!) — Disney + had reached its goal. How? Simple really. It had a more potent and sustainable advantage. An <em>inimitable</em> one — something so good or unique it is impossible for others to copy.</p><p>In contrast, Netflix’s <em>initial</em> advantage was one of immediacy and variety. Movie rentals and traditional TV couldn’t compete. But as competitors entered the market, that advantage began to slip away. It was just too easy to imitate. Of course, Netflix — ever the pioneer — began to shift its advantage to something more unique and inimitable through its ‘original series’. While they continue to develop and compound that advantage, it is one they have had to develop from the ground up. Few original series come with the existing and fanatical fan base that the likes of Star Wars can boast. As it turns out, Wookiees, Ewoks, and lightsabers are all you need to turn a streaming service into a global leader.</p><p>Netflix has had to promote the merits of each new series in order to attract and retain customers. In usual Netflix style, it pioneered new advertising formats on digital channels to do just. It even crashed Twitter’s servers due to high traffic… twice. But it’s still an uphill battle.</p><p>Disney + faces no such challenge. New movies and series benefit from their respective brand reputation or franchise fame creating a ready audience before the first YouTube preroll is ever seen. Neither do they stand still and rest on their advantage. Star Wars didn’t end with (spoiler alert), “I am your father”, and I somehow doubt we’ve seen the last of Obi-Wan Kenobi, Boba Fett, or Cassian Andor.</p><p>Disney’s advantage might be potent because of the power of its franchises. But it is <em>sustainable</em> because it continues to develop and compound an advantage that is <em>impossible </em>for others to copy (unless they sell the rights).</p><p>The lesson is simple: brands must <em>continue</em> to create <em>new customer value</em> that is <em>differentiated</em> and <em>hard to imitate</em> if it is to deliver <em>sustainable</em> <em>advantage </em>and<em> lasting growth</em>. Or, to adjust our formula:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/0*XGACAfhqDJU11m34" /></figure><h3>Even the pros get it wrong</h3><p>In the digital agency world, we’ve been getting this increasingly wrong for years. And we don’t even realise it! Heck, I didn’t even realise it until a few years ago! And it’s getting worse.</p><p>There really isn’t a shorthand way to explain why, but here are a few examples to illustrate the point:</p><ul><li>Our (understandable) desire to produce reassuring results has led us to an obsession with performance optimisation over <em>new</em> <em>value creation</em>.</li><li>Our (sensible) pursuit of speed and agility has led to minimum viability over maximum <em>differentiation</em>.</li><li>And our (noble) quest for empathetic user-centred experiences has led to a frictionless, seamless, and integrated ‘landscape of same’ as look-alike brands adopt best practices on the same technologies rather than investing in <em>inimitable</em> advantage.</li></ul><p>Which… kinda breaks the formula:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/0*eNZwpGC4KadvWKCu" /></figure><p>Suffice to say, the processes, methodologies, and practices we employ in pursuit of our craft are typically derived from a philosophy of — yep, you’ve guessed it — operational effectiveness. As a category, it seems we’ve not only ignored Porter’s warnings, we’ve taken steps to exacerbate the issue.</p><p>This awakening led to what has become <em>our</em> advantage here at 1980 Something — a new mode of marketing thinking. At the heart of that thinking is what we call the Strategy Code: a philosophy, approach, and thinking framework that condenses 70 years of business and marketing theory (and 20 years of experience) into one simple model. It was engineered to ensure that <em>every</em> interaction with a brand serves a greater cause: value creation that develops and compounds sustainable advantage. It makes enviable growth a repeatable, and dare I say predictable, outcome. That’s something best practice will never do.</p><p>But we face challenges of our own. Much like Netflix, our advantage is known to few besides us. We don’t have a long line of ready made fans waiting outside dressed as Stormtroopers. We have to <em>prove</em> its merit.</p><p>While the Strategy Code is differentiated, it’s also fairly easy to copy. Afterall, a model is just a model. Once it’s out in the public domain (and it’s on our website) anyone can use it.</p><p>And, while I’ve personally been using previous iterations of the model for years to help clients grow, 1980 Something as a business is young. Its ‘unique’ value is fairly intangible. In fact, it’s tied up in knowledge and experience that as a brand is difficult to boast about.</p><p>Thankfully, according to Porter &amp; Kramer (2006), “the most important sources of sustainable competitive advantage <em>are</em> intangible: human capital, intellectual capital, and corporate culture.” Emphasis added.</p><p>But that doesn’t make our task any easier.</p><h3>Turning theory into practice</h3><p>To overcome these challenges, we’re working hard to compound our advantage and make it hard to copy. We’ve had to be realistic about what we do have and where our sustainable value is. Many businesses fall at this first hurdle: they believe their own hype. However much we might believe in something, if it doesn’t fulfil the criteria for <em>sustainable</em> competitive advantage, it won’t offer one. Perhaps it’s worth taking a small detour to land the point.</p><p>Love it or hate it, Starbucks is often commended for its competitive advantage. What many mistake is where that advantage comes from: an atmosphere designed to be as relaxed as your lounge, the distinct taste of double roasted coffee beans, the convenience of pre-orders, even the signature moment of your name on your cup. These are all brilliant <em>brand</em> moments — the unmistakable Starbucks experience — but they are <em>not</em> its advantage. Why? Because it would be easy to imitate and even improve on any of these things. Many independents already do. The real advantage that Starbucks has is far less exciting, but far more potent: proximity. With 35,711 stores worldwide (and counting), there’s literally a Starbucks around every corner. That’s an advantage that’s hard for <em>any</em> brand to replicate, no matter how much money you could throw at the problem.</p><p>The point is this: it’s easy to get caught up in the wrong things because they appeal to us. Starbucks has a great story and a great brand experience. The Strategy Code started as a passion project and I’ve personally invested years into its development. And yet, however emotionally attached I may be, I need to be realistic: it’s just a model. And, at least in that regard, it’s nothing particularly special. It may offer value to our clients, it may even be differentiated from the usual strategic framework, but it’s not inimitable.</p><p>As a team, we made the early decision to expose it, offer it up for free, and even guide people through its use. We knew we needed to focus elsewhere on a more significant and sustainable point of difference, something that could make our new mode of marketing thinking more ownable.</p><p>We realised that what makes the Strategy Code hard to copy is actually buried away in a collection of proprietary tools that turn its theory into practice. Each was developed over many years and fulfils a highly specific and unique task. One, for example, conducts meta analysis on a body of research to find the most consistent and reputable evidence in a given industry. Another predicts how customers may change in the future by combining industry trends, academic study, and (believe it or not) science fiction. One even uncovers the subconscious, often emotional motivations behind purchase intent, in essence turning mushy feelings into quantifiable, empirical data. This, at least to our knowledge, is something <em>none</em> of our competitors can do.</p><p>And in this lies our advantage.</p><p>Admittedly, some of our tools are more developed than others, but that doesn’t matter. It forces focus and contains future investment. It avoids time wasting on things that won’t offer <em>unique</em> and <em>inimitable</em> <em>value</em> to our clients. Our plan is to develop more tools with the specific intent of developing and compounding our advantage: a new mode of marketing thinking that unlocks insight no one else has, exposes opportunities no one else can see, and creates value no one else can copy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/0*GceTBY9PelpPSUuz" /></figure><p><strong>References:</strong></p><p>Newsbeat. (2018, January 23). Netflix’s history: From DVD rentals to streaming success. BBC. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-42787047">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-42787047</a></p><p>Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance. Free Press.</p><p>Porter, M. E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(6), 61–78.</p><p>Porter, M. E., &amp; Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy and society: The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 84(12), 78–92.</p><p>Porter, M. E., &amp; Kramer, M. R. (2011). Creating shared value. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2), 62–77.</p><p>Q.ai. (2022, September 27). Disney Surpasses Netflix Subscriber Count: What Does That Mean For Investors? Forbes. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/qai/2022/09/27/disney-surpasses-netflix-subscriber-count-what-does-that-means-for-investors/?sh=28c1ed6e5e0b">https://www.forbes.com/sites/qai/2022/09/27/disney-surpasses-netflix-subscriber-count-what-does-that-means-for-investors/?sh=28c1ed6e5e0b</a></p><p>Statista Research Department. (2022, November 28). Number of Starbucks stores worldwide from 2003 to 2022. Statistica. <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/266465/number-of-starbucks-stores-worldwide/">https://www.statista.com/statistics/266465/number-of-starbucks-stores-worldwide/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5016047a38bb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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