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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Wave Media on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pentagon’s 2025 China Military Report: Four Misleading Frameworks Examined]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/pentagons-2025-china-military-report-four-misleading-frameworks-examined-c3501df97926?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[taiwan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 03:20:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-26T03:20:42.830Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ft8YesYicegLttlKUASANw.jpeg" /></figure><p>On December 24, the Pentagon released its 2025 China Military Power Report, asserting that China’s “historic” military buildup is rendering the United States “increasingly vulnerable.” This assessment triggered renewed China threat narratives across major Western media outlets.</p><p>However, retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel and Chinese strategist Professor Wang Xiangsui argues that while the report shows greater willingness than in previous years to acknowledge China’s military development achievements, numerous internal contradictions expose what Professor Wang characterizes as four misleading frameworks designed to manipulate international perceptions.</p><p><strong>Misleading Framework One: Hyping China Threats Where America Leads</strong></p><p>The 2025 report does represent notable progress in evaluating China’s nuclear forces. While maintaining the estimate of approximately 600 warheads, which is consistent with the 2024 report, it emphasizes improvements in China’s early warning capabilities and operational readiness — a more direct acknowledgment of China’s ongoing defense modernization.</p><p>However, the report contains significant contradictions. It simultaneously assesses that China’s nuclear expansion has slowed, particularly regarding plutonium enrichment facility construction, while accusing Beijing of having “no appetite for arms control.” The report criticizes China for “refusing substantive engagement with the United States on measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war,” yet praises China’s September 2024 notification prior to test-firing an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific, acknowledging this as “a positive step to prevent misjudgment or miscalculation.”</p><p>These contradictions obscure two factual issues:</p><p>First, China’s Foreign Ministry explicitly<a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/jks_674633/zclc_674645/wkhdd_674655/200802/t20080229_7669109.shtml"> stated</a> in April 2025 its willingness to maintain contact and communication with member states of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and strengthen exchanges on missile non-proliferation. This directly contradicts claims of “no appetite for arms control.”</p><p>Second, China and Russia jointly issued a ” <a href="https://docs.un.org/zh/CD/2452">JOINT STATEMENT by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Global Strategic Stability</a>” on May 9, 2025, explicitly addressing initiatives for nuclear powers to avoid dangerous misjudgments. If the United States genuinely seeks to reduce nuclear war risks, why has it not joined this statement in the seven months since?</p><p>Such contradictions and selective interpretation are consistent with the Pentagon’s annual China military reports, which primarily serve White House diplomatic pressure and political messaging. Professor Wang notes a revealing example: the dramatic shift in nuclear capability assessments. Until 2020, Pentagon estimates remained stable at around 200 warheads — significantly lower than other think tank projections — expecting China to maintain its historical “minimum deterrence” posture. In 2021, the report suddenly projected China’s arsenal would reach approximately 700 warheads by 2027, a figure significantly higher than standard estimates, claiming China’s nuclear expansion rivals other major powers. This shift coincides notably with the transition from the Trump to Biden administrations. The 2025 report, while extensively emphasizing Chinese nuclear threats, accusing China of refusing high-level engagement, and alleging Chinese cyberattacks, simultaneously asserts that ” Under President Trump’s leadership, relations between the United States and China are stronger than they have been in many years. ”</p><p>This transcends logical inconsistency into outright contradiction. Professor Wang observes that the report’s purpose has never been objective assessment of China’s military development, but rather serving American diplomatic leverage.</p><p>The shift from underestimating China’s nuclear forces to threat inflation aims to draw China into U.S.-Russia nuclear negotiations. However, basic facts matter: the U.S. and Russia each possess over 6,000 nuclear warheads, while China has approximately 600 according to this report. With China’s nuclear capability representing less than one-tenth of U.S. or Russian arsenals, demanding China accept constraints calibrated for U.S.-Russian mutual balance appears coherent only if one ignores basic facts.</p><p><strong>Misleading Framework Two: The Deliberate Omission of Areas Where China Leads</strong></p><p>More significant than these contradictions is the report’s selective treatment of China’s conventional military advantages. This is particularly evident in space allocation: despite the U.S. possessing 100 times more nuclear warheads than China, the report devotes an entire chapter with 111 lines to Chinese “nuclear threats.” Meanwhile, China’s hypersonic weapons, laser weapons, and unmanned aerial systems receive no dedicated chapters, with only 6, 11, and 30 lines of discussion respectively — the greater China’s advantage, the less attention provided.</p><p>Professor Wang states bluntly that for equipment capable of transforming battlefield dynamics, including capabilities China possesses that the U.S. lacks, the selective omission serves a simple purpose: maintaining the narrative of ‘U.S. military and weapons superiority.’ This projection serves not merely to maintain appearances but to support a larger strategic misleading framework related to Taiwan Issue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZeBFZu3dGW-E79D3" /></figure><p><strong>Misleading Framework Three: “China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027”</strong></p><p>“China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.” This represents the report’s most definitive assertion, using no qualifying language such as “probably” or “may.” Yet this categorical statement constitutes the most questionable assessment of Chinese military capability in the entire report.</p><p>First, regarding Taiwan’s armed forces specifically, the PLA has long possessed decisive advantages. For example, the PHL-191 long-range rocket artillery system displayed at the 2025 China Victory Day Parade has a range exceeding 400 kilometers, enabling coverage of all Taiwan from Fujian coastal positions. With mainland rocket artillery systems capable of striking any target on Taiwan from coastal positions just 100 miles away.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5XYITI7xiZi2y9_h" /></figure><p>Between 2018 and early 2022, seven major US think tank <a href="https://cimsec.org/red-dragon-rising-insights-from-a-decade-of-wargames/">wargames</a> revealed China achieved outright victory in four scenarios, secured stalemate while retaining territorial gains in two scenarios, and the US coalition’s sole “victory” came at pyrrhic cost with devastating losses on both sides. Notably, even this singular favorable outcome reportedly hinged on the unrealistic assumption that PLA forces would conduct only three hours of preparatory bombardment before launching amphibious operations. In actual operations, China would necessarily neutralize all defensive capabilities before landing, leaving no counterattack capacity on enemy beaches. Therefore, the assertion that “China won’t be capable until 2027” represents a misleading framework.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/843/0*DrPEsczmXlATcUAm" /></figure><p>The studies table summarizes a range of twelve wargames across three distinct timeframes: three from pre-2018, seven from 2018 to February 2022, and two post-February 2022. Results are color-coded red when China can secure its objectives, yellow when objectives remain contested, and green when China cannot achieve its objectives against the United States</p><p>Second, this narrative rests on a false premise: simplifying the Taiwan Strait issue into PLA versus Taiwan armed forces confrontation. Despite explicitly stating “we do not seek to stifle, dominate, or humiliate China” and acknowledging that preventing Taiwan independence represents China’s core security interest, the report dedicates 338 lines to Taiwan Strait issues — approximately 11% of total content. The report’s own contradictions demonstrate that the U.S. has not abandoned the Taiwan card.</p><p>The opening rhetoric about “respecting China” and “more solid U.S.-China relations” maintains postural alignment with the Trump administration’s 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, constructing a misleading framework of global strategic retrenchment. This coordination extends to similar contradictions: while the November strategy document painted comprehensive retrenchment, its Asia strategy explicitly aims to “Lead Asia with Strength.” The Trump administration is not abandoning hegemony but shifting from global to “key regional” hegemony.</p><p>The 2025 China Military Power Report confirms this approach, stating “President Trump seeks stable peace, fair trade, and mutually respectful relations with China, and the Department of Defense will ensure he can achieve these goals with military strength.” What the U.S. terms “stable peace,” other nations typically call military coercion. Precisely because of consistent American duplicity and coercion toward China, the PLA has continuously built capabilities for reunification while preparing for potential U.S.-Japan intervention. The “war on Taiwan” framing is therefore totally misleading.</p><p><strong>Misleading framework Four: Forcing China Into Binary Choices</strong></p><p>The report’s most carefully constructed framework guides readers toward binary thinking on Taiwan issues: either peaceful reunification or military reunification.</p><p>However, this binary framework misses the fundamental reality: China is not preparing for reunification; reunification is actively in progress across military, economic, and political dimensions.</p><p>Military dimension: PLA naval circumnavigation of Taiwan island has become routine, with coast guard operations in surrounding waters establishing sovereign management of sea areas. Around Kinmen, mainland fishing vessels no longer face seizure risks from Taiwan authorities, with mainland coast guard patrols ensuring their security.</p><p>Political and cultural dimension: Establishment of “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration,” Fujian’s planning of supply channel to Kinmen and Matsu, the Quanzhou-Kinmen Expressway, and other infrastructure projects represent not future plans but current exercises of governance authority.</p><p>In this context, if the U.S. report continues analyzing issues through “peaceful versus military reunification” binary frameworks, it suggests either intelligence system failure in understanding 21st-century integrated strategic approaches, or deliberate construction of easily manipulated misleading frameworks for international information operations, inducing global perception into an “either peace or violence” false dichotomy.</p><p>Between peaceful and military reunification exists not a black-and-white boundary but a continuous spectrum of graduated options. If external forces insist on playing the Taiwan card, China retains additional mechanisms to accelerate the ongoing reunification.</p><p>First mechanism: Boarding inspections of Taiwan-bound transport vessels. The Anti-Secession Law grants Chinese law enforcement authority to conduct inspections related to “seeking independence through military means.” Recent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have reached record levels, including offensive weapons with ranges reaching Fujian province. China possesses clear legal basis for inspecting ships transporting Taiwan-bound weapons, further exercising sovereignty over Taiwan Province.</p><p>Moreover, the U.S. recently seized Venezuelan oil tankers without providing adequate legal justification to the international community. If such unilateral actions are permissible for the United States on the high seas, why would similar measures be impermissible for China in enforcing sovereignty over its own province?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TVN-XBBu-ApIUVtQ" /></figure><p>An image posted on US attorney general Pam Bondi’s X account, and partially redacted by the source, shows an oil tanker being seized by US forces off the coast of Venezuela.</p><p>Beyond consolidating governance authority, boarding inspections could neutralize U.S. benefits from the Taiwan card. The U.S. emphasizes military reunification urgency and projects military superiority to convince Taiwan and other Asian allies to purchase American weapons. If China conducts inspections or detentions of arms shipments, ensuring that weapons are purchased but never received, U.S. arms sales would significantly decrease. Such measures, based on the Anti-Secession Law and avoiding large-scale violence against external interference, would prove more precise than comprehensive blockades while better demonstrating governance authority.</p><p>Second mechanism: Initiating “peaceful reunification negotiations.” Chinese Mainland could extend clear invitations to all Taiwan sectors, negotiating not “whether to reunify” but “how to reunify.” Within a reunification-oriented negotiation framework, Taiwan’s various parties and social sectors could express demands and concerns. Invitees could include ruling party members, opposition representatives, local governments in Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu, enterprises like TSMC, and various social organizations.</p><p>Within this framework, topics could be highly specific. TSMC might propose wartime facility protection, while the mainland could demand strict prohibition of military asset deployment within facilities. This represents not empty political declaration but concrete interest coordination.</p><p>Such negotiations would carry multiple strategic values: Internally, they would divide Taiwan’s political forces. If opposition parties and local governments engage while the ruling party refuses, the latter faces isolation. Externally, public consultation would demonstrate to the international community that the mainland has exhausted all peaceful options. Whoever refuses negotiations essentially refuses peace. Should circumstances require force, the international community would clearly see: not that the mainland denied peaceful reunification opportunities, but that Taiwan separatist forces firmly rejected peace.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: Seeing Through the Binary Framework</strong></p><p>Returning to the U.S. report’s core issues, the “China threat theory” and “2027 timeline” essentially support the largest strategic misleading binary framework. Their common purpose is convincing allies to increase defense spending, sharing the burden of pressuring China on behalf of the U.S., and purchasing more American weapons for profit extraction.</p><p>However, regardless of how U.S. reports frame these issues for allies, one fundamental reality remains: China’s reunification is in progress. China’s approach has long transcended Western-imposed binary frameworks, combining civil and military elements in an integrated strategy.</p><p>This approach has historical precedent. In January 1949, Communist forces completely encircled Beijing, making Nationalist General Fu Zuoyi’s position militarily hopeless. Simultaneously, Communist negotiators conducted intensive political engagement, offering Fu personal safety guarantees and a role in the new government. This twin-track strategy — overwhelming military pressure combined with face-saving political options — led to the peaceful handover known as the ‘Peaceful Liberation of Beiping,’ sparing China’s ancient capital from the urban warfare. Today, with Chinese Mainland possessing stronger regional denial capabilities in the Taiwan Strait and greater global economic influence, any attempt to obstruct this ongoing process will only add fuel to the fire, accelerating the very reunification it seeks to prevent.</p><h3>Credits</h3><p>Wang Xiangsui | Deputy Secretary General, CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies</p><p>Charriot Zhai | Editor-in-Chief for Top Picks, Wave Media Correspondent</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3501df97926" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Real Lessons of China-US Rare Earth Competition]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/the-real-lessons-of-china-us-rare-earth-competition-d9dc33ba5ad8?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d9dc33ba5ad8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-china-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 03:17:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-01T03:17:36.162Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>America’s dependence on rare earths isn’t accidental. It’s a structural asymmetry resulting from deliberate choices: China planned and invested for decades, while U.S. neoliberal ideology outsourced the foundation of high-margin industries, creating a critical strategic vulnerability.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*nvG94_6x_8ypvnQ76mt_Ig.jpeg" /></figure><p>Why is America so dependent on Chinese rare earths? This question remains puzzling even in China. Americans have debated their rare-earth vulnerability for more than fifteen years, and yet it is shocking to see almost no progress made across half a generation. To borrow Mr. Trump’s phrasing, “China couldn’t believe its luck.”</p><p>The earliest warning came in 2010, when China leveraged rare-earth exports during a territorial dispute with Japan. American media erupted with coverage, highlighting a glaring strategic weakness: while the U.S. was capable of mining rare earths, China controlled nearly 90% of global processing capacity. Without China’s processing plants, EV production lines, precision guidance systems, and advanced fighter jets would be paralyzed overnight. The danger was so clear that House of Cards, the hit Netflix political drama, dramatized a scenario in which China threatens a rare-earth export ban. Yet despite this cultural wake-up call, Molycorp — the last U.S. company capable of processing rare earths — collapsed in 2015 after losing competition against China.</p><p>If Washington failed to absorb the lesson in the 2010s, the 2018–2020 trade war delivered an unmistakable warning. Beijing explicitly signaled that rare-earth exports could be cut off. From any rational perspective, this was a moment for decisive action.</p><p>There were indeed brief flashes of reversal. James Litinsky, the CEO of MP Materials, made repeated television appearances after 2019, confidently proclaiming that America would break China’s rare-earth monopoly. But these optimistic speeches masked an unspoken truth: more than half of the U.S. ore mined still had to be shipped to China for refining, while the remainder went to Australia to be processed by Lynas Corporation in Malaysia. America’s supposed “rare-earth independence” was built entirely on foreign processing infrastructure.</p><p>Ultimately, the rhetoric evaporated as China and America reached a trade truce in early 2020, removing the sense of urgency around rare earth shortage. As a consequence, Imports of rare earth continued and domestic processing capacity stagnated. During President Biden’s four years in office, despite promises to “build back better,” there was nearly zero investment in STEM talent or industrial R&amp;D necessary to revive domestic processing. No multi-agency coordination emerged, project-choking regulations remained untouched, and total government support amounted to only roughly $300 million — a trivial sum in industrial-policy terms.</p><p>This stands in sharp contrast to the semiconductor sector. The CHIPS Act, passed in 2022, authorized around $52.7 billion in subsidies and tax credits for chip manufacturing. By 2024, over $32 billion in grants and $29 billion in loans had already been allocated — more than 200 times the investment in rare earths. From an industrial-strategy perspective, this imbalance is irrational. While chips themselves contain almost no rare earth materials, the machinery used to produce them does: fabrication robots, servo motors, lithography chambers — all depend heavily on neodymium magnets and specialized rare-earth coatings. America’s massive investment in fabs thus created new dependencies by expanding its exposure to minerals it does not control.</p><p>The strategic incoherence becomes even clearer through the lens of the AI race. AI models require vast data centers filled with GPUs. Cooling those data centers requires thousands of high-RPM fans built with rare-earth magnets. And the U.S. military’s vision of AI-enhanced warfare — from satellite systems to radar arrays — rests heavily on rare-earth-dependent components. If China stops exporting rare earths, the U.S. loses not only EV motors but also the technological backbone of its AI-driven military systems.</p><p>This flawed industrial planning explains why China decisively played the rare-earth card. America is too dependent, too vulnerable. Ultimately, it had little choice but to compromise. But this raises the deeper question: why did the U.S. walk willingly into such a self-made trap?</p><p>The answer lies in its deep-rooted addiction to neoliberal economics. For four decades, neoliberalism taught American policymakers and corporate executives the same doctrine: specialize where margins are highest, outsource the low-margin messiness of production, and let global markets “optimize” the rest. That doctrine functions well in consumer technology but fails catastrophically when strategic bottlenecks determine national security.</p><p>Semiconductors sit at the glamorous, high-value end of the supply chain and fit perfectly into the neoliberal worldview. Chips are high-growth, high-margin, innovation-driven, easy to champion politically. Fabs create headline jobs. GPU production drives stock-market euphoria. With CEOs of the chip industry becoming demi-gods, buying the stocks of star chip companies has become the new gospel of prosperity, and investing in chips produces instant political mileage. The middle class cheered on the market rally while the rich placed bets on when the bubble would burst. Even the lower class could get jobs building the massive data centers. Rare-earth processing, by contrast, is dirty, low-margin, and heavily regulated. It offers no Wall Street narrative, no Silicon Valley stardust, no AI hype.</p><p>The result was a structural bias: subsidize the apex of the tech pyramid, ignore the foundation. America has since been trapped in its own propaganda loop: “chips are everything; chips are the future; chips define power.” That loop blinded policymakers to the underlying fragility: without rare earths, the entire chip ecosystem collapses. Neoliberal ideology has become so blinding that American leaders came to believe China would not use its chokehold on rare earths, assuming it was compelled to play by the rules of global capitalism. But why would China do that if America broke the rule first by seeking to isolate China from global chip supply chains?</p><p>China has in fact been planning to play a different game from the beginning. Since the 1980s, as China opened to the world, it began to hone its strategic masterstroke. Then the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping famously said that ‘the Middle East has oil, but China has rare earths. This is an early recognition that rare earths are not mere commodities — they are strategic chokepoints that can be leveraged just as OPEC engineered oil prices in 1973. This foresight shaped national industrial planning: rare earths were integrated into long-term economic and military strategies.</p><p>Learning from America’s chip ban, China executed coordinated industrial policy. Instead of fragmenting responsibility across private firms and competing agencies, China centralized decision-making. State banks financed infrastructure in mining regions. Provincial governments coordinated transport networks linking mines to processing plants. Smaller operators were consolidated into larger, more efficient state-backed conglomerates capable of achieving scale. China vertically integrated the entire supply chain — from extraction to separation to magnet manufacturing — ensuring that value accumulation happened domestically. By 2025, China’s rare earth supply chain is internally transparent to China’s government, with all segments of the supply chain documented and a comprehensive monitoring system in place. In a national emergency, no industrial actor can act independently as every trace of refined rare earth can be tracked with harsh punishment for any operator that violates the export control.</p><p>Crucially, China invested heavily in STEM talent and technical expertise. Universities trained more than 120,000 chemical engineers and material scientists who mastered separation chemistry and magnet design annually, with over 2,000 of them specialized in rare earth production. State labs worked alongside industry on process optimization and environmental control. An entire ecosystem of talent emerged — scientists, technicians, engineers — capable of maintaining, expanding, and modernizing rare-earth processing capacity. Such a STEM workforce would take America decades to match even as China’s population ages.</p><p>This is the structural asymmetry at the heart of the rare-earth crisis: China planned, invested, coordinated, and trained its way into a position of dominance. America outsourced, deregulated, and financialized its way into dependence. And now, in the age of AI, that dependence has become a strategic liability that even trillions dollar investments in chips cannot compensate for.</p><p><strong>Credits</strong></p><p><a href="https://thechinaacademy.org/column_peter-yang-2/">Peter Yang</a> | Chinese Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Commentator</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d9dc33ba5ad8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China Issues Japan Travel Alert After Citizens Assaulted in Tokyo]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/china-issues-japan-travel-alert-after-citizens-assaulted-in-tokyo-25b9819cc03a?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25b9819cc03a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[japan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Nov 2025 09:40:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-27T09:40:06.514Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/554/1*9B35i0dBuMohGsr8xatVwg.png" /></figure><p>November 26 — Reports of a Chinese citizen being <a href="https://news.ifeng.com/c/8oSum6YdYz4">attacked</a> in Japan have once again drawn significant attention from the Chinese government.</p><p>The incident dates back to July 31, 2025, when two Chinese nationals from Taiwan were assaulted by a group of five individuals in Tokyo. The attackers used tear gas, struck the victims with iron pipes, and attempted to steal a suitcase worth ¥20,000. The suspects were only apprehended on November 21.</p><p>In response, Peng Qing’en, spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, <a href="https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1025340">stated</a> at a regular press briefing on the 26th that “the recent rise in right-wing sentiment and extreme anti-China behavior in Japanese society has posed serious risks to the safety of tourists.” He suggests Chinese travelers to Japan to remain vigilant.</p><p>While Japanese media have classified the incident as “強盗傷害(robbery and injury),” the Chinese government’s specific warning about right-wing extremism may be linked to two key details:</p><p>1. According to the <a href="https://mainichi.jp/articles/20251121/k00/00m/040/308000c">Mainichi Shimbun</a>, although the crime occurred in Tokyo, the primary suspect, 宮下佳樹(Yoshiki Miyashita), is a resident of Osaka. The Tokyo police confirmed that the suspects traveled from Osaka specifically for the incident. They are also believed to have spray-painted two surveillance cameras near the scene to avoid detection. The premeditated nature of the attack — involving long-distance travel and deliberate planning — raises questions about whether it was merely a random robbery.</p><p>2. The date of the incident, July 31, coincides with the numerical designation of the notorious Imperial Japanese Army Unit 731. During World War II, this unit conducted lethal human experimentation and developed biological weapons in Northeast China, leading to the deaths of over 3,000 people and countless others through contaminated water sources. To this day, abandoned chemical weapons left by the unit continue to be discovered in the region, occasionally causing civilian injuries.</p><p>On August 12, 2024, a former Unit 731 soldier, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240812/81de9aaaa8214deba1215713dc16dfdf/c.html">Hideo Shimizu</a>, traveled to Harbin to visit the unit’s former site and publicly express remorse. Despite extensive historical evidence, right-wing groups in Japan have repeatedly denied these crimes. Given the suspects’ coordinated methods and the symbolic timing of the attack, both the Chinese government and public are treating the case with heightened concern, even as Japanese authorities label it a random robbery.</p><p>Spokesperson Peng Qing’en further emphasized that “compatriots in Taiwan are our flesh-and-blood kin,” and strongly condemned the violence. He called on Japan to swiftly bring the perpetrators to justice.</p><p>Separately, China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a travel advisory on Sunday, urging Chinese citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Japan.</p><p>Those already in the country were advised to stay alert, take safety precautions, and contact both local police and the Chinese embassy or consulates in emergencies. Chinese citizens in Japan requiring assistance may contact the embassy’s overseas Chinese affairs desk at: <a href="https://jp.china-embassy.gov.cn/lsfw_0/lxfs/202405/t20240507_11300512.htm">03–6450–2195</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25b9819cc03a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Gamble: The Spark of Asia’s Next Nuclear Arms Race]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/south-koreas-nuclear-submarine-gamble-the-spark-of-asia-s-next-nuclear-arms-race-660cfeece9eb?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/660cfeece9eb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[south-korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 02:56:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-26T02:56:04.719Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ooNqKHifrtYRZNnrKzq4Mw.jpeg" /></figure><p>South Korea and the United States recently entered into a deal to produce nuclear submarines, with America supplying the technology and South Korea providing the production facilities. On paper, this looks like a major upgrade of South Korea’s military capabilities. But in reality, it may be something far more consequential: the early spark of a nuclear arms race in Asia.</p><p>There are clear reasons why South Korea is turning to American assistance. At first glance, it seems like a textbook win-win arrangement. For Washington, the benefits are obvious.</p><p>America’s own shipbuilding capacity is stretched thin and aging. Submarine programs have been hit by delays, cost overruns, and production bottlenecks. And one incident in 2021 symbolized this decline more vividly than any report could: the USS Connecticut, a Seawolf-class nuclear submarine, once hailaed as one of the most advanced and secretive vessels in the U.S. fleet, collided with an undersea object in the South China Sea. The U.S. will need nearly five years to get it operational again. And this wasn’t just about a navigational mistake. It showed that America’s submarine fleet is aging, replacement cycles are slow, and the industrial base simply cannot keep up with strategic demand.</p><p>This structural problem is tied to decades of industrial erosion. Despite constant political promises from both parties, U.S. shipyards remain constrained by underinvestment. China’s shipbuilding capacity today stands at 230 times of the United States. One major obstacle for America is the Jones Act of 1920, a protectionist law named after a Senator from Washington State. The Jones Act requires that all goods transported between U.S. ports be carried on ships constructed in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens, and crewed by U.S. citizens. The law has made American shipbuilders inefficient, since America’s civilian shipyards are guaranteed of market monopoly, they have no incentives to construct ships fast and with high quality; Since sea based transportation has became inefficient, the demands for American made ships also declined as transportation shifted to land and aerial routes. US navy today can only rely on few of the military shipyards and cannot leverage a robust civilian sector like during WW2. It’s unlikely to be repealed because the industry has powerful vested interests. Meanwhile, America faces a persistent shortage of STEM workers, undermining its ability to revive the construction and repair capabilities it once had during the Cold War. In a renewed era of great-power competition, the U.S. can’t magically rebuild twenty years of lost shipbuilding capacity.</p><p>So rather than relying solely on American shipyards, Washington is increasingly turning to “friendshoring”, moving critical production to trusted allies. South Korea, with an extensive shipbuilding industry ranked №2 in the world, fits perfectly into this strategy. It’s a central pillar in America’s new vision of a so-called “arsenal of democracy,” distributed across the industrial bases of its allies.</p><p>But America’s motivation isn’t just industrial. It’s strategic. Washington is determined to preserve its last major military advantage over China: nuclear-powered attack submarines. China is catching up rapidly in surface warfare. It’s churning out the 12,000-ton Type 055 destroyers, which surpasses America’s Aegis destroyers；Its aircraft-carrier program is maturing at remarkable speed. The Fujian carrier has already demonstrated its operational capacity to launche fifth-generation fighters using Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, which America still struggles with on the Ford-class carriers. And China’s next nuclear-powered carrier, known as Type 004, is expected to reach peer level capacity with a Ford-class carrier, with only 70% of the price.</p><p>The U.S. cannot ignore this shift. Naval surface combatants are becoming a contested domain, and America needs to rebalance urgently. But under the ocean, the story is very different. Nuclear-powered attack submarines remain a field where the U.S. still holds a commanding lead. Quieting technologies, reactor miniaturization, long-endurance propulsion, and advanced sonar systems — these are areas where China still needs to play catch up. Washington wants to prolong this advantage as long as possible. And one way to do that is by helping South Korea build or operate nuclear submarines, integrating Seoul into the U.S. undersea warfare ecosystem, and forcing South Korean military into America’s supply chains.</p><p>From South Korea’s perspective, the appeal is clear. The strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula has shifted dramatically. Despite decades of sanctions, North Korea is now a de facto nuclear state. It possesses effective warheads and delivery platforms necessary to threaten the U.S. homeland. Its submarine-launched ballistic missile program continues to advance, and Kim Jong-un has codified nuclear deterrence into North Korean law. Internationally, North Korea’s nuclear status is becoming normalized. Russia has stopped enforcing sanctions. China has allowed the reality. Even Vietnam and Laos are expanding economic ties with Pyongyang.</p><p>And this change is influencing South Korea’s internal stability. In December 2024, South Korea’s then-president Yoon Suk Yeol attempted a bizarre and short-lived coup, citing the threat from North Korea as justification for martial law. The fact that such a challenge to South Korean democracy even occurred shows how profoundly the peninsula’s tensions are destabilizing its domestic politics. Washington understands that faith in the American security umbrella has weakened, and supporting a nuclear-submarine initiative — symbolic or not — is a way to restore public confidence in the alliance.</p><p>And symbolic is the key word. Because the U.S. has strict limits on what it is willing to transfer. AUKUS proves this. When Australia sought nuclear submarines under the AUKUS pact, Washington agreed — but the project has since run into massive bureaucratic resistance, export-control complications, and congressional pushback. What was supposed to arrive in the early 2030s is now projected to slip into the 2040s. The promised construction of nuclear submarine which supposedly share technology and design with Virginia-class has been watered down significantly. And this is happening within the Five Eyes — the tightest intelligence-sharing alliance in the world. If America hesitates to share its crown-jewel technologies with Australia, South Korea should be even more cautious. The AUKUS delays have already damaged trust; Australia broke a binding contract with France to pursue the deal, yet the reliability of the program is still uncertain.</p><p>South Korea, as a non-Five Eyes nation, should expect even more uncertainty as the credibility of Five Eyes is in serious question. The eventual arrangement will likely be a political show. The product will be technically constrained — tight American oversight, limited technology transfer, and maximum U.S. control. The real purpose may simply be to encourage Seoul to invest billions into U.S. defense supply chains, giving Washington both economic benefits and diplomatic talking points to reassure the South Korean public.</p><p>But even talking about nuclear submarines has consequences. Because once South Korea steps onto this path, the push for nuclear deterrence becomes easier and more politically acceptable. And the country that will react most dramatically is Japan.</p><p>Japan has quietly harbored nuclear ambitions for decades. It is already a latent nuclear state. It possesses one of the world’s largest plutonium stockpiles outside nuclear-weapon states, advanced civilian nuclear technologies, and missile systems that could quickly be repurposed. In an emergency, Japan could assemble a nuclear weapon in under two weeks. In recent years, Japanese leaders have become increasingly open about revising Japan’s long-standing anti-nuclear posture — changes that will accelerate rapidly if South Korea gains nuclear-related capabilities.</p><p>The moment Japan crosses that line, even symbolically, the entire region shifts. A nuclear-armed Japan could try to reclaim aspects of its militarist past. It might aim to free itself from American military dominance. North Korea would intensify its nuclear posture. Russia might expand its nuclear presence in the Far East. And China’s nuclear buildup would almost certainly accelerate. Beijing would expand its nuclear-submarine production, enlarge its strategic bomber fleet, and increase missile deployment. China already views AUKUS as part of an encirclement strategy, and South Korean nuclear-submarine ambitions would reinforce that perception.</p><p>This is how the logic of escalation takes hold. South Korea feels threatened by North Korea’s maturing nuclear capability and decides to race for a nuclear deterrence on its own. This will incentivise Japan to do the same. And the regional nuclearization will compel China to expand its capabilities further. The United States, in turn, feels compelled to reinforce its primacy. Once this cycle begins, it becomes self-fulfilling.</p><p>In the end, U.S. assistance to South Korea’s nuclear-submarine program may not actually result in a fully functioning fleet in South Korean waters anytime soon. But the geopolitical implications are real. A full-scale and dangerous nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia is no longer hypothetical. It is now on the horizon.</p><h3>Credits</h3><p><a href="https://thechinaacademy.org/column_peter-yang-2/">Peter Yang</a> | Chinese Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Commentator</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=660cfeece9eb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Takaichi’s Taiwan Misstep Undermines Japan’s Value to the US]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/takaichis-taiwan-misstep-undermines-japan-s-value-to-the-us-812b30022010?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/812b30022010</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[world-war-3]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taiwan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[japan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 09:50:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-25T09:50:24.417Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XKHysZeBGwIByHRPPfXEyw.jpeg" /></figure><p>After Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted that “a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan,” her remarks drew widespread condemnation from China and the international community. However, Professor Wang, a retired PLA Senior Colonel and prominent Chinese strategic scholar, argued that Takaichi’s position on the Taiwan Question extends far beyond mere “misstatements.” It reflects a calculated pattern of erroneous words and actions that could plunge Japan into catastrophe.</p><p>According to reports from Japanese outlets including <a href="https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA0510E0V01C25A1000000/">Nikkei</a> and <a href="https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/local/kyushu/news/20251106-OYS1T50007/">Yomiuri Shimbun</a>, on October 27, just one week after Takaichi became Prime Minister, the Japan Self-Defense Forces carried out a large-scale air-sea “island seizure” exercise in the Southwest Islands, involving as many as 52,000 personnel. This demonstrates that Japan’s threat of force against China extends far beyond irresponsible rhetoric; Tokyo is showing real military agitation. Such actions should never be dismissed as “misstatements” — they are dangerous moves warranting global attention.</p><p>Yet, Professor Wang also points out that the Takaichi administration’s appetite for military adventurism is built on two major misjudgments. These reveal not only a lack of basic military understanding, but also a fundamental misperception of Japan’s own position within the U.S.–Japan alliance.</p><p><strong>Misjudgment #1: Overestimating its ability to challenge the PLA</strong></p><p>According to the <a href="https://military.cnr.cn/gj/20251124/t20251124_527439524.shtml">Tokyo Shimbun</a>, the JSDF had already drawn up three contingency plans for island seizures in the event of a Taiwan crisis as early as 2021:</p><p>1. Launch a rapid amphibious assault using approximately 3,000 personnel from the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), supported by transport vessels, helicopter carriers, and light carriers.</p><p>2. Conduct a large-scale amphibious operation, deploying follow-on forces to the southwest with sustained transport and logistics support.</p><p>3. Employ missile strikes and maritime blockades — primarily using the extended-range Type 12 anti-ship cruise missile — to shield amphibious operations.</p><p>China’s state media <a href="https://military.cnr.cn/gj/20251124/t20251124_527439524.shtml">CCTV</a> bluntly assessed: <strong>none of these plans would succeed.</strong></p><p>A basic military principle holds that amphibious operations require air superiority. Attempting a landing without it is essentially walking into certain death. Yet Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force stands no chance against the PLA Air Force.</p><p>Japan has only about 40 operational F-35s. Conservative estimates from The National Interest suggest China’s J-20 fleet exceeded 200 by 2024. As a single-engine multirole stealth fighter, the F-35 is inherently disadvantaged in range, radar aperture, and payload compared to the twin-engine J-20, let alone Japan is also massively outnumbered. The ASDF would struggle just to defend itself, let alone cover an amphibious operation.</p><p>Japan’s long-standing security alliance with the United States may have encouraged Tokyo to assume it could rely on U.S. air-superiority coverage while integrating its own fighters into the broader data-link network. However, when Washington provided the F-15J, it withheld a critical component for beyond-visual-range combat: the U.S.-standard Tactical Electronic Warfare System — including the AN/ALQ-135 internal ECM suite as well as the AN/ALR-56C and AN/ALR-128 elements of the American TEWS architecture.</p><p>This radar warning receiver alerts pilots to missile locks and targeting while providing limited electronic countermeasures. The risks of operating without such capabilities against the PLA’s modern air power have been demonstrated in recent conflicts — most notably through the performance of India’s Rafales.</p><p>Although Japan has developed an external electronic warfare (EW) pod, it occupies weapon stations on the F-15J, increases aerodynamic drag and fuel consumption, reduces combat radius, and simultaneously enlarges the aircraft’s radar cross-section — making it an even more vulnerable target within China’s integrated kill chain, which leverages early-warning aircraft, stealth fighters, and stealth loyal-wingman UAVs.</p><p>Moreover, any Japanese amphibious forces attempting to assemble or maneuver would be exposed to China’s rocket artillery, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons — potentially in saturation strikes.</p><p>Historical precedent illustrates the consequences: On August 19, 1942, Allied forces attempted to land at Dieppe without air superiority. Of the 6,086 troops, 3,623 were killed, wounded, or captured. The eastern landing force lost around 500 in just two minutes, and the entire operation failed in six hours. That disaster was caused merely by WWII-era bombs, artillery, and machine guns. What would happen under today’s precision-guided weapons and drone-directed fires? Takaichi should confront this reality.</p><p><strong>Misjudgment #2: Trying to rope America into fighting its battles.</strong></p><p>Weak but belligerent, Japan’s right wing clings to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, hoping to drag America into its fights — a self-deluding fantasy that betrays a complete misunderstanding of the underlying dynamics of great-power competition.</p><p>First, the U.S. has always regarded Japan as a subordinate force — a convenient frontline asset. The logic is simple: If the U.S. initiates a conflict with China, Japan must share the costs. However, if Japan provokes China and tries to pull the U.S. in, Washington has no obligation to bail out Tokyo’s reckless adventurism.</p><p>A clear warning has already appeared: after Takaichi’s provocative statements, the U.S. promptly <a href="https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASTCK3QG9TCKTZNB006M.html">withdrew</a> its Typhon mid-range missile system from Japan. This move was a clear signal: Washington drawing a line.</p><p>Furthermore, during a phone call on November 24 with President Xi, Trump explicitly <a href="http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20251124/9c9191096e0547a9a3f26e903fc6995e/c.html">said</a> that the U.S. “understands the importance of the Taiwan issue to China.”</p><p>Both U.S. leadership statements and military actions reflect the same reality: Takaichi’s misguided remarks and actions on the Taiwan question, is not welcomed by the White House.</p><p>Professor Wang notes that the root cause is a structural shift in the geopolitical logic underpinning the U.S.–Japan alliance.</p><p>Japan’s past strategic value to the U.S. lay in its role as a key node in the “First Island Chain.” Within a WWII-era naval deployment framework, it served as a secure logistical hub beyond China’s strike range. However, since the Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear-powered vessels has drastically reduced reliance on fixed fuel supply bases. Meanwhile, China’s monumental progress in missile technology has placed the entire First Island Chain, even Guam, within its Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD) Zone.</p><p>To court a head-on clash with the PLA inside China’s defensive perimeter isn’t just risky — it’s strategically catastrophic. CSIS’s 2023 war game <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan">reveals</a> why: “In three weeks, the United States will suffer about half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan,” As the report warns with chilling understatement: “Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years.”</p><p>This is precisely why “pulling back from the first island chain” has long been a realistic option on the table for U.S. decision-makers. Air &amp; Space Forces Magazine <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/dispersed-but-resilient-air-force-new-basing-strategy-ace/">reported</a> that since 2023, the U.S. Air Force has practiced dispersed deployment across the Indo-Pacific due to pessimism about the survivability of bases like Okinawa and even Guam in wartime.</p><p>Thus, Takaichi’s remarks are not only militarily unfeasible — they actively complicate U.S. strategy. In trying to present herself as loyal to Washington by playing the Taiwan card, she is in fact challenging Washington’s strategic framework and attempting to entrap America into serving Japan’s agenda. Such overreach will only end up diminishing Japan’s value to the United States.</p><p><strong>Irreversible Consequences: China Has Begun Reassessing Its Strategy Toward Japan</strong></p><p>Sanae Takaichi’s provocative words and actions cannot be undone by any personal apology. China has sent an unequivocal message through its multi-pronged response: it is now fundamentally re-evaluating and redefining its relationship with Japan.</p><p>Diplomatically, the term “fengshi” (<a href="http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/2025-11/17/content_118182593.html">奉示</a>) has appeared for the first time in China’s warnings, indicating that the protest now reflects the stance of the highest level of Chinese leadership — elevating the issue from departmental concern to one of national strategic will. Economically, militarily, and through media channels, a coordinated multi-agency response demonstrates that China views this as a comprehensive contest warranting nationwide mobilization.</p><p>Critically, as a sitting cabinet minister, Takaichi has openly asserted the erroneous claim that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency,” framing it as Japan’s “consistent position.” This must be seen in light of the post-WWII peace commitments between China and Japan, including the four foundational political documents — starting with the China-Japan Joint Statement — that explicitly recognize the One-China principle as the cornerstone of bilateral relations. Even a far-right figure like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe only made such provocative remarks after leaving office and in his personal capacity, never daring to challenge this foundation as Japan’s top leader.</p><p>Now, Takaichi has not only crossed that line but also denied historical truths, issuing military threats against China. This has compelled Beijing to invoke a long-dormant yet legally potent red line in the United Nations Charter — the “<a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-11-21/Chinese-embassy-in-Japan-cites-UN-Enemy-State-Clauses-in-X-post-1Iudh15MtJS/p.html">Enemy State Clauses</a>.”</p><p>These clauses authorize UN Security Council permanent members to take direct punitive measures should any World War II Axis power show signs of renewed aggression.</p><p>As victors of WWII and architects of the current international order, China, the U.S., and Russia are its guardians. By threatening China with force, Japan’s right-wing forces are challenging not only China but also all nations that cherish peace and uphold the outcomes of the anti-fascist war.</p><p>Thus, as Japan once again bares its fangs toward China, the very foundation of postwar stability is shaking. China is now compelled to ask in earnest: Is Japan — a nation that its top leader shows no remorse for its history of aggression — still a neighbor capable of turning toward peace, or must it once again be defined as an “enemy state”?</p><p>This crisis — sparked by Takaichi Sanae — exposes once again the strategic shortsightedness of Japan’s right wing. Their ingrained tendency to “respect power but not virtue” has blinded them to the most fundamental realities of geopolitics.</p><p>China’s warnings are anything but empty rhetoric. A Japan attempting to revive militarism poses a threat not only to regional stability but to the entire world. As nations within the East Asian cultural sphere, both China and Japan should well understand the principle: “Benevolence is the way of a great power; wisdom, that of a small state.” Should Japan collectively abandon this wisdom, the cost of relearning it may prove extremely costly.</p><h3>Credits</h3><p>Wang Xiangsui | Deputy Secretary General, CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies</p><p>Charriot Zhai | Editor-in-Chief for Top Picks, Wave Media Correspondent</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=812b30022010" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China’s Nuclear Breakthrough Could Power It for 1,000 Years]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/chinas-nuclear-breakthrough-could-power-it-for-1-000-years-9cd66fe28aeb?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9cd66fe28aeb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Nov 2025 02:33:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-14T02:33:12.786Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A research team from the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics under the Chinese Academy of Sciences has achieved thorium-to-uranium fuel conversion in an experimental reactor in the Gobi Desert.</p><p>This breakthrough means that China’s 2-megawatt thorium molten salt reactor (TMSR) is now the world’s only operating system successfully loaded with and using thorium fuel — bringing humanity one step closer to the next generation of safer, greener nuclear power.</p><p>The concept of the thorium molten salt reactor was first proposed by American scientists during the Cold War. It was later “sentenced to death” due to its complex reaction conditions and its unsuitability for quick conversion into nuclear weapons.</p><p>China, however, spent 14 years overcoming the technical barriers.</p><p>Given China’s abundant thorium reserves — just the deposits in Inner Mongolia alone could power the country for a thousand years — the nation’s clean energy map has gained a powerful new player.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eaUghO0DURk809a0" /></figure><p>The experimental thorium molten salt reactor in Wuwei, Gansu</p><h3>How It Works</h3><p>Thorium was discovered in 1828 by Swedish chemist Jöns Jakob Berzelius. Because it emits a silvery-white glow when heated, he named it after Thor, the Norse god of thunder.</p><p>In the mid-20th century, after the University of Chicago built the world’s first nuclear reactor — the “Chicago Pile-1” — in 1942, humanity harnessed the power of nuclear fission for the first time. Both thorium and uranium became focal points of nuclear energy research.</p><p>Uranium-235 can undergo fission directly and is a natural “nuclear fuel,” while thorium-232 must absorb a neutron to become uranium-233 — a fissile isotope capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction.</p><p>This transformation occurs through a series of precise nuclear reactions: thorium-232 absorbs a neutron to become thorium-233, which decays into protactinium-233, and finally into uranium-233 — a powerful nuclear fuel.</p><p>Since thorium is three times more abundant than uranium on Earth, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union attempted to explore its potential for weaponization during the Cold War.</p><p>However, the process from theory to practice proved too complex, and both nations eventually abandoned it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Dt-6QngHxC9bk5X7" /></figure><h3>China’s Thorium Reactor Journey</h3><p>China’s connection with thorium dates back to the 1970s energy crisis. When Western countries cut off uranium imports, the shortage of uranium became a major bottleneck for China’s nuclear development.</p><p>That was when Chinese scientists began exploring thorium-based molten salt reactors.</p><p>However, just as today, China then faced embargoes on key components and standards from the West. The lack of suitable pipes and instruments ultimately led to the termination of the molten salt reactor project in 1987. Two decades later, China tried to revive thorium research, but progress again stalled due to funding shortages.</p><p>In 2011, the Fukushima nuclear disaster prompted the world to reexamine nuclear safety — and China was no exception. But rather than dismantle nuclear plants, China focused on developing safer nuclear energy — by shifting from uranium-fueled fission reactors to thorium-based molten salt reactors.</p><p>Current mainstream pressurized water reactors must be periodically shut down to replace fuel rods, operate under high pressure (150 atmospheres), and produce large amounts of nuclear waste.</p><p>In contrast, thorium molten salt reactors (TMSRs) can operate continuously without shutdown for refueling, work under normal pressure, and solidify upon leakage — making them inherently safer.</p><p>Another major advantage of TMSRs is that they require no water, unlike conventional nuclear power plants that must be built near coastlines due to immense cooling needs. This makes TMSRs viable for deployment in arid or inland regions.</p><p>Their low-pressure operation also opens up the possibility for nuclear energy use in large ships and other mobile platforms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0Mulx9UcRXuu92uC" /></figure><p>Researchers from the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics are working on a thorium-based molten salt reactor that could transform nuclear energy in the Gobi Desert.</p><p>China’s thorium reactor program formally began in 2011 when the Chinese Academy of Sciences launched the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor Nuclear Energy System Project.</p><p>With a total investment of 22 billion yuan, the project is led by the Institute of Modern Physics and involves nearly a hundred research institutions and enterprises. Baosteel developed corrosion-resistant alloys; the China National Nuclear Corporation created an online molten salt sampling system 20% more precise than imported versions; and CAS independently built a proton accelerator generating a stable thermal neutron flow with a neutron flux 100 times greater than that of the 1990s.</p><p>Construction of the thorium reactor site in Minqin, Gansu Province, officially began in 2017.</p><h3>Safety</h3><p>Safety is always the top priority in any nuclear technology.</p><p>According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the TMSR operates under normal pressure, eliminating the risk of high-pressure explosions. The reactor is built underground with full radiation shielding, while the chemically stable molten salt effectively captures radioactive materials.</p><p>To handle extreme emergencies, the system includes passive safety features such as a “freeze valve.” When the temperature rises excessively, the valve melts automatically, allowing the molten salt to drain into a pre-set safety tank, where it solidifies and becomes immobile.</p><p>In 2016, MIT Technology Review named this system an “inherently fail-safe” nuclear technology — meaning that even in an accident, the reactor would naturally shut down without releasing radioactive materials.</p><p>According to China’s official roadmap, a 100-megawatt thorium molten salt reactor demonstration plant will be completed by 2035, with commercial operations targeted for 2040.</p><p>By 2050, China plans to have 50 thorium reactor power plants nationwide, with a total installed capacity of 50 million kilowatts — equivalent to three Three Gorges Dams — capable of meeting 10% of China’s electricity demand.</p><p>If half of China’s current coal-fired power were replaced with thorium reactors, the country could cut oil imports by 300 million tons annually — achieving both greener energy and true energy independence and security.</p><h3>Credits</h3><p>Xiaowen Zhong | Chinese Technology Commentator, Wave Media Correspondent</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9cd66fe28aeb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What’s New in China’s New Five-Year Plan?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/whats-new-in-china-s-new-five-year-plan-802de462d70d?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/802de462d70d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2025 09:09:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-07T09:09:34.585Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qCWgRbkSXP8UmH7ZTOkJKQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>On October 23, the Chinese government released the Proposal for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development. As stated by Xie Feng, China’s Ambassador to the United States, this new “15th Five-Year Plan” journey will forge a new, groundbreaking phase for Chinese-style modernization.</p><p>So, where exactly does this “new” character lie? Professor Wang Xiangsui, Secretary-General of the China CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies, offers a straightforward perspective: the “14th Five-Year Plan” emphasized quantitative growth, whereas the “15th Five-Year Plan” pivots towards an all-around enhancement of development quality.</p><p>If the “14th Five-Year Plan” solved the scaling-up challenge from “1 to 10,” then the “15th Five-Year Plan” is dedicated to achieving the qualitative leap from “10 to 100,” focusing squarely on addressing the remaining weak links in economic development and social construction. A case in point is the frequent Western commentary on China’s per capita GDP. The “15th Five-Year Plan” explicitly sets the goal for China to reach the level of a moderately developed country by 2035.</p><p>By World Bank standards, moderately developed countries typically have a per capita GDP ranging from $20,000 to $30,000. As of 2024, China’s per capita GDP stands at approximately $13,000. This means China has set itself a target of essentially “doubling” its development quality, a goal perceived by many Western media outlets as remarkably bold.</p><p>Yet, as Professor Wang points out, while this target appears formidable, China possesses both full confidence and solid foundational strength to achieve it.</p><p>This confidence stems from China’s performance during the “14th Five-Year Plan” period. Despite complex internal and external challenges, including the global pandemic and trade wars, China still achieved an average annual economic growth rate exceeding 5%. At a time when economic growth in the US and Europe stagnated or even regressed, China cemented its role as the primary engine of global economic growth.</p><p>Furthermore, this momentum is expected to continue, because the four fundamental conditions enabling China’s development amidst adversity remain robust, and are in fact being reinforced:</p><p><strong>1. The Super-Sized Market Advantage</strong></p><p>China possesses the world’s largest domestic market, comprising 1.4 billion people. In 2024, the country’s total retail sales of consumer goods surpassed 48.3 trillion yuan, consistently maintaining its position as the world’s second-largest for many years. Furthermore, China is deeply integrated into the global economic system, serving as the major trading partner for over 150 countries and regions. Beyond this, the construction of Chancay Port in Peru is projected to boost logistics efficiency for South American trade with China by 50%; meanwhile, the China-Europe Railway Express has cumulatively made over 65,000 trips. This economic resilience and diversity are being continuously strengthened through the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative.</p><p><strong>2. A Complete Industrial System</strong></p><p>China is the only country worldwide that possesses all industrial categories listed in the UN industrial classification. Its manufacturing value-added accounts for approximately 30% of the global total.</p><p>More significantly, China’s focus isn’t solely on high value-added segments; it equally emphasizes building comprehensive supporting supply chains and industrial clusters. For instance, the Shenzhen-Dongguan electronics cluster achieves a 95% local procurement rate for mobile phone components, slashing new product development cycles by 30%.</p><p>This systematic industrial ecosystem explains why, despite Apple moving some assembly lines to India, it still relies on imports of core components from China. It is also the fundamental reason why China can sustain growth and maintain its irreplaceable role in the global supply chains for sectors like EVs, semiconductors, and renewable energy.</p><p><strong>3. Ample Talent Reserves and an Equitable Education System</strong></p><p>China boasts the world’s largest higher education system. In 2024, the number of university graduates reached 12.046 million, an increase of 300,000 compared to the 2023 figure. Among these graduates, the proportion from STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields consistently exceeds 40%, and the annual number of engineers China produces surpasses the combined total of the United States, Japan, and Germany.</p><p>This talent advantage manifests not only in quantity but also in quality. At the 2024 WorldSkills Competition, the Chinese delegation claimed the top spot in both the gold medal and overall medal tally. This highly skilled industrial workforce constitutes the most solid pillar supporting China’s transition from the “World’s Factory” to an “Innovation Workshop.”</p><p><strong>4. China’s “Long-Termism” Philosophy, The Most Overlooked Factor</strong></p><p>China’s substantial talent reserves, industrial clusters, and economic scale are inseparable from institutional designs like the Five-Year Plans and the 15-Year Science and Technology Development Plan. This interlocking system of short, medium, and long-term planning ensures greater policy continuity and stability compared to Western systems, enabling China to execute projects that may offer low short-term returns but deliver substantial long-term benefits.</p><p>Virtually every competitive industry in China today is a seed cultivated through this long-termism. For example, the development planning for the photovoltaic industry, where the US now finds it difficult to compete with China, can be traced back to the “11th Five-Year Plan” in 2006. Similarly, the industrial policies for the rare earth refining sector where the US remains critically dependent on China, were initially formulated and implemented as far back as the 1970s. Simply put, the stronger a Chinese industry is today, the deeper its roots in long-term strategic planning.</p><p>The United States once partially possessed this kind of “farsighted” capability. Bell Labs, for instance, could invest in basic research without the pressure for immediate returns, leading to transformative inventions like the transistor. However, this ability to take the long view wasn’t fundamentally rooted in a national or societal-level long-termism; rather, it was underpinned by AT&amp;T’s monopoly. Consequently, when AT&amp;T was broken up in 1984, its R&amp;D orientation was forced to shift towards short-term profitability, causing it to lose its exceptional, pioneering status. <a href="https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity">Reports</a> from Harvard Business School indicates that U.S. listed companies now allocate over 50% of their profits to stock buybacks, not R&amp;D investment. Thus, even though Nvidia’s current monopoly in AI hardware ecosystems is arguably no less significant than AT&amp;T’s past dominance, the emergence of a next-generation Bell Labs in the United States appears to be a distant prospect.</p><p>In summary, the success of China’s “14th Five-Year Plan” and the confidence underpinning the “15th Five-Year Plan” do not rely on the exceptional performance of any single technology, industry, or factor. Instead, they stem from a systemic advantage composed of market scale, industrial completeness, talent resources, and institutional design.<br>Therefore, the goals of elevating economic development quality and becoming a medium-developed country by 2035 represent merely the phase destinations of the “15th Five-Year Plan.” But for China, the steadfast commitment to and practice of pragmatism and long-termism is a journey without end.</p><h4>Credits</h4><p>Wang Xiangsui | Deputy Secretary General, CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies</p><p>Charriot Zhai | Editor-in-Chief for Top Picks, Wave Media Correspondent</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=802de462d70d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Trump Stayed Silent on Taiwan at the Busan Summit?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/why-trump-stayed-silent-on-taiwan-at-the-busan-summit-142756a2e4bc?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/142756a2e4bc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taiwan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 02:29:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-03T02:29:01.532Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f7LtdQqM0qYjCLEBboW87w.jpeg" /></figure><p>When the leaders of China and the United States met in Busan, South Korea, on October 30, most headlines from outlets focused on their agreements over tariffs, rare earth exports, and agricultural trade. Yet one detail stood out: <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3330958/what-does-xi-trump-summits-silence-taiwan-mean-contentious-issue">Donald Trump did not mention Taiwan</a>, not even once.</p><p>For decades, the Taiwan question has served as a recurring pressure point in Washington’s relationship with China. Its sudden absence from the agenda was therefore striking. Western media noted the omission, but few offered a clear explanation.</p><p>According to Professor Wang Xiangsui, a Chinese strategist and former PLA senior colonel, argues that this silence reflects a decision more grounded in reality, and more aligned with U.S. national interests, than those of any previous American president. From the perspective of military balance in the Asia-Pacific, the “Taiwan card” has shifted from a strategic asset into a political liability for the United States.</p><p>Historically, Washington wielded the Taiwan question as leverage because it possessed the credible military means to intervene. During the 1950s through the 1970s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air Force were underdeveloped in scale, equipment, and training, lagging behind not only U.S., and even struggled to gain a clear edge over the armed forces on Taiwan island itself.</p><p>Moreover, the U.S. demonstrated a real willingness to use force. During the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958, the Eisenhower administration dispatched the Seventh Fleet into the Strait, supplied Taipei with advanced weaponry like the AIM-9B Sidewinder missile, and even issued nuclear threats.</p><p>In short, America’s overwhelming military superiority, and its demonstrated readiness to deploy it, was the bedrock of its confidence in playing the “Taiwan card.” A modest investment of military resources could yield outsized political dividends.</p><p>But today, the fulcrum of that leverage has decisively shifted toward the Chinese mainland.</p><p>The traditional U.S. intervention playbook relied on four interlocking steps: deploying carrier strike groups, seizing air superiority, conducting land strikes, and, if necessary, providing amphibious or airborne support. Now, however, China’s rapidly maturing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities have thrown the first two steps into serious doubt.</p><p>First, the PLA’s situational awareness around the Taiwan Strait and across the Western Pacific has dramatically improved. A layered reconnaissance network, featuring stealthy UAVs like the WZ-10 and high-altitude, long-endurance platforms such as the WZ-7, integrated with satellite and maritime surveillance systems, now provides near real-time tracking of U.S. carrier groups. This enables precise targeting and rapid engagement by anti-ship missiles.</p><p>Second, the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles like the DF-21D and DF-26 has given China the ability to strike moving naval targets at ranges of 1,500 to 4,000 kilometers. Their high speed and long reach, combined with robust battlefield awareness, pose a severe threat to U.S. aircraft carriers, forcing them to operate far from the action and significantly degrading the effectiveness of their air wings in contesting air superiority.</p><p>Third, as of 2024, conservative estimates from outlets like The National Interest <a href="https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/chinas-j-20-mighty-dragon-stealth-fighter-the-secret-is-out/">suggest</a> that China has produced over 200 J-20 stealth fighters, making it the operator of the world’s largest fleet of heavy fifth-generation fighters.</p><p>Compared to the F-22s and F-35s the U.S. has forward-deployed in the region, the J-20 operates from home bases with shorter logistics chains and more resilient command structures. Backed by over 1,000 fourth-generation fighters and long-range PL-series air-to-air missiles that out-range their American counterparts, the PLA Air Force now holds a decisive home-field advantage in any contest for control of the skies near Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, platforms like the H-6 bomber, armed with advanced missiles such as the YJ-21, further extend China’s anti-carrier reach.</p><p>In sum, the PLA’s rapid A2/AD buildup has transformed the U.S. calculus: blocking China’s reunification has gone from a low-risk, high-reward option to a near-certain path to defeat in any hot conflict.</p><p>These developments have prompted reassessments within U.S. defense circles. Consider the evolution of RAND Corporation reports: in 2000, its study Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy focused on the mechanics of military intervention. But on October 14, 2025, RAND published Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry, which pivots to exploring how the two powers might coexist amid deep-seated differences — a telling shift in analytical priorities.</p><p>For a businessman like Trump, facing such unfavorable odds, the instinct to cut losses and walk away is only natural. Viewed through the lens of historical precedent, his silence may seem like an anomaly. But seen in the context of shifting power dynamics, it’s the inevitable outcome of China’s decades-long, resolute investment in national defense and its persistent “positioning” around the Taiwan Strait.</p><p>Professor Wang adds, however, that Trump’s silence also reveals a kind of wisdom of embracing a give-and-take approach in dealings between major powers. While military intervention is no longer viable, stoking tensions over Taiwan still serves the interests of America’s powerful defense-industrial complex by generating more arms contracts. Thus, Trump’s attempt to sideline the issue, to remove a major obstacle from U.S.-China trade talks, must contend with fierce domestic political headwinds and the “historical baggage” accumulated by past administrations.</p><p>His current approach may therefore be a calculated balancing act: signaling goodwill for immediate negotiations while sidestepping entrenched domestic opposition. In this sense, his silence speaks volumes, not as a grand strategy, but as a shrewd, if constrained, form of realpolitik.</p><p>Yet one question remains: how long can such “pragmatic silence” endure, both in Trump’s own resolve and within America’s political climate? That, for now, remains an open question.</p><h4><strong>Credits</strong></h4><p>Wang Xiangsui | Deputy Secretary General, CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies</p><p>Charriot Zhai | Editor-in-Chief for Top Picks, Wave Media Correspondent</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=142756a2e4bc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who is China’s SpaceX?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/who-is-chinas-spacex-4ccaa8fb4bd0?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4ccaa8fb4bd0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space-exploration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spacex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 02:25:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-03T02:25:25.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8jMnqohZEOMFhK62nU_eRg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Who is China’s SpaceX?</h4><p>This question might have too many answers, as currently six private Chinese aerospace companies are developing reusable rocket technology. Yet it might also have no answer at all, because China’s private space sector follows technological paths and development models fundamentally different from SpaceX’s. Perhaps the better question is: What does a Chinese-style SpaceX look like?</p><h4><strong>But first, let’s explore who comes closest.</strong></h4><p>As of October 2025, if we’re measuring purely by reusable rocket maturity, Jianyuan Technology leads the pack. On May 29, the company’s Yuanxingzhe-1 verification rocket completed its first sea-based flight and recovery test at the Oriental Space Port in Shandong Province.</p><p>The test successfully completed eight operational phases and achieved a soft landing on the sea surface. The rocket executed the vertical takeoff and landing maneuver that has become SpaceX’s Falcon 9 signature — going straight up and down like a helicopter.</p><p>However, there’s a crucial caveat. In payload capacity, the Yuanxingzhe-1 remains a medium-lift rocket, with a significant gap compared to large medium-lift rockets like the Falcon 9. To complete the same satellite constellation deployment, the Yuanxingzhe-1 would require far more launches than the Falcon 9, substantially driving up costs. From a commercial standpoint, another leading contender — LandSpace’s Zhuque-3 — presents a more competitive match.</p><p>The Falcon 9 can deliver 22.8 tons to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in expendable mode. According to LandSpace’s <a href="https://www.landspace.com/product.html?mao=2">official specifications</a>, the Zhuque-3 can carry 21.3 tons in the same configuration. The designs are remarkably similar — both employ nine-engine layouts and share the goal of first-stage reusability. If successfully deployed, the Zhuque-3 stands poised to compete directly with the Falcon 9 on commercial terms.</p><p>According to a <a href="https://news.cctv.com/2025/10/21/ARTIO3aGhgmtEHyoUXD5PxK6251021.shtml">report</a> from China’s official media CCTV, on October 20, the Zhuque-3 successfully completed its fueling rehearsal and static fire test — essentially a dress rehearsal before maiden flight. The inaugural launch is scheduled for sometime in 2025.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C7W390-dvnhcQmUmsAYqYQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Elon Musk’s reaction was telling. Shortly after the Zhuque-3’s static fire test, he<a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1981839942730096710"> posted</a> on X: “If they are lucky, it might outperform Falcon in 5 years, by which time SpaceX will be launching Starship”</p><p>The subtext was clear: By the time you catch up to my Falcon 9, I’ll already be flying something better. But if the maiden flight proceeds smoothly this year, the Zhuque-3 may actually achieve a technological leapfrog over SpaceX.</p><p>This is because, although the Falcon 9 currently demonstrates mature recovery capabilities, its liquid oxygen/kerosene propulsion faces a critical reusability challenge — coking. RP-1 kerosene produces carbon residue during combustion that adheres to precision components like turbopumps, injectors, and cooling channels, forming coke deposits. After each recovery, SpaceX must thoroughly clean and inspect the engines. This not only increases maintenance costs but lengthens the refurbishment cycle, limiting launch frequency.</p><p>Liquid oxygen/methane combustion, by contrast, burns much cleaner, significantly reducing coking and theoretically enabling rapid “land and refly” turnarounds. This is precisely why SpaceX abandoned kerosene for methane when developing its next-generation Starship. LandSpace’s Zhuque-3 chose this technical path — better suited for high-frequency reuse — from the beginning.</p><p>Furthermore, as early as July 12, 2023, LandSpace’s Zhuque-2 Yao-2 rocket <a href="https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758968/n6758973/c10070202/content.html">successfully launched</a>, becoming the world’s first liquid oxygen/methane rocket to deliver a payload to its intended orbit — earlier than Starship’s first successful orbital flight. In the engineering application of methane rockets, LandSpace already leads globally.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Uy5WIqhDrNiLxLrI1gy2xg.jpeg" /></figure><h3><strong>So, can we say “LandSpace is China’s SpaceX”?</strong></h3><p>From a business model perspective, the answer is more complicated. Besides reusable rockets, SpaceX has another crucial business: Starlink. The vertical integration of rockets and satellites is core to SpaceX’s business model.</p><p>China’s answer to Starlink — the Qianfan Constellation — takes a markedly different approach. It follows a “government-led, market-participating” model spearheaded by Shanghai’s Songjiang District. LandSpace doesn’t own the constellation; instead, it’s positioned as an essential contractor, providing critical launch services.</p><p>This raises a fundamental question: Since the Qianfan Constellation has such clear government backing, why not simply use the more mature “national team” Long March series rockets for deployment?</p><p>The answer lies in an objective “structural capacity gap” within China’s aerospace sector. This gap doesn’t stem from inability but from a fundamental timing conflict: The Qianfan Constellation’s deployment needs are urgent, but the national team’s pre-existing commitments make it impossible to fully meet Qianfan’s demands in both volume and pace.<br>To understand this conflict, we need to grasp just how urgent the situation is, and why.</p><p>According to the deployment plan, Phase 1 aims to place 648 satellites for regional network coverage, Phase 2 will deploy 1,296 for global coverage, and Phase 3 will expand the constellation to over 15,000 satellites — a global low-orbit communication network rivaling Starlink in scale.</p><p>But the reality is, as of March 2025, only 90 Qianfan satellites were in orbit. Even to complete Phase 1, over 500 satellites remain. At least 30 more launch missions must be completed in short order.</p><p>There’s an old Chinese saying: haste makes waste. So why the rush this time? Because this is a race against time on the international stage.</p><p>For low-orbit communication satellites, orbital capacity and communication frequency bands are precious, finite resources. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordinates satellite communication frequency bands based on a “first-come, first-served” principle — whichever country’s satellite network completes filing, coordination, and actual launch first secures priority rights to those frequencies.</p><p>The frequency application process itself is marathon-length. According to information from the 2024 National People’s Congress, even for frequency bands commonly used by Earth observation satellites, over 180 applications from more than 60 institutions within China alone required coordination — a process typically taking one to two years.</p><p>In other words, if Qianfan cannot complete its deployment on schedule, the consequence isn’t merely project delay; it could mean losing orbital and frequency resources to other countries. The entire project would face profound uncertainty.</p><h4>So why can’t the national team simply accelerate?</h4><p>This is because, China’s national aerospace program is simultaneously advancing multiple strategic projects critical for long-term development. These missions are not only technically complex but carry extremely high political and strategic priority. Their launch schedules are meticulously planned and inflexible. For example:</p><p>The Tiangong space station requires regular launches of crewed and cargo spacecraft to ensure continuous astronaut presence and scientific experimentation, with potential expansion tasks ahead.</p><p>The Lunar Exploration and Planetary Exploration programs are advancing steadily. From Chang’e-6 to the planned lunar research station construction, and onward to the Tianwen series’ Mars and deep space exploration missions, each requires dedicated launch windows for heavy-lift rockets.</p><p>Quantum communication satellites, gravity measurement satellites, and orbital supercomputers — missions aimed at securing technological high ground — also require the high reliability that national team rockets guarantee.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J4oMJu5st5P3lxiv86PYuQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Therefore, the issue isn’t that the national team doesn’t want to help. Facing this multi-front landscape of crewed spaceflight, deep space exploration, and cutting-edge scientific experiments running concurrently, the production capacity and launch facilities for the Long March series must prioritize these long-cycle, high-difficulty national projects. Against this backdrop, Qianfan’s high-frequency, batch-launch demands — deploying tens of thousands of satellites in compressed timeframes — naturally struggle to find full accommodation within the national team’s fixed schedule. Arguing about first-come, first-served makes it even less justifiable, as these national projects were planned decades ago.</p><h4>Even more critical is cost.</h4><p>The Qianfan Constellation ultimately aims to be a profitable, sustainable commercial project. The Long March rockets, prioritizing the successful orbit insertion of strategic payloads, primarily employ traditional designs emphasizing high reliability and redundancy — pursuing advanced performance and safety rather than economies of reuse. While the national team is developing reusable rockets, their technological maturity and commercial application still require time.</p><p>Currently, if all 15,000 satellites of the Qianfan Constellation were deployed using the national team’s expendable rockets, the launch costs would be astronomical. Even if the network were successfully deployed, it would be a successful spectacle rather than a truly commercially viable project.</p><p>Therefore, at this moment when mega-constellations like Qianfan urgently need high-frequency, low-cost launches, relying entirely on the national team’s primary rockets cannot fully meet deployment needs in terms of launch windows, frequency, or cost. Against this backdrop, private companies like LandSpace have found their irreplaceable historical mission — they’re not competitors to the national team but an indispensable piece of China’s space strategy puzzle.</p><p>Reusable rockets like the Zhuque-3 have payload capacities ideally suited for large-scale satellite deployment. Their liquid oxygen/methane reusable technology theoretically enables rapid “land and refly” turnarounds — crucial for the time-pressed Qianfan Constellation.</p><p>Let’s do a simple calculation: The Qianfan Constellation’s Phase 1 requires deploying 648 satellites. In the Zhuque-3’s reusable mode with an 18-ton payload, assuming each Qianfan satellite weighs about 300 kg, it could launch approximately 60 satellites per mission. Theoretically, only 10–11 successful launches would complete Phase 1 deployment.</p><p>And if the Zhuque-3 achieves its design target of 10–20 reuses per rocket, as LandSpace projects, then just 1–2 rocket cores could meet all Phase 1 launch requirements. This is the foundation for LandSpace’s commercial viability.</p><h4>Thus, from a technological standpoint, LandSpace indeed appears the most likely candidate to become “China’s SpaceX.”</h4><p>But according to analysis by Wang Qiang, a retired Senior Colonel of the PLA and specially appointed expert at Fudan University, considering business model, corporate ethos, and historical mission, <strong>LandSpace might better be called “Chinese-style SpaceX” — or perhaps not compared to SpaceX at all.</strong></p><p>America’s SpaceX leveraged NASA’s mature technology to serve its own Starlink. Its corporate narrative is driven by Elon Musk’s personal ambition to colonize Mars.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*Zl7EqYlnx88dRxKNiAUSIg.jpeg" /></figure><p>China’s LandSpace, and other private aerospace companies, follow a path of complementing and cooperating with the national team, providing launch capacity for national satellite constellations and the commercial market.</p><p>Their mission isn’t a Mars expedition but the more pragmatic goal of bringing satellite internet coverage to Earth as quickly as possible, making space services benefit more people. This is a story rooted in present realities, serving practical needs. Their most pressing task is helping complete deployment of another Starlink-scale constellation, ensuring that free competition remains vigorous beyond the Kármán line.</p><p>Thus, the fundamental difference between American and Chinese private space models is this: One vertically integrates all space businesses within a single company. The other has the national team safeguarding strategic tasks while private enterprises focus on commercial markets, then advancing key projects through government-enterprise cooperation — it’s an industrial division of labor based on “specialization.”</p><p>SpaceX’s vertical integration brings extremely high iteration efficiency but also means putting all eggs in one basket; China’s division of labor model can accommodate more technological paths and allow more teams to contribute, but requires more complex coordination mechanisms.</p><p>Which model is superior? Analyses from different nationalities, standpoints, and knowledge frameworks will likely have their own answers. Time will be the ultimate test.</p><p>But one thing is certain: When the Zhuque-3 makes its maiden flight, when the Qianfan Constellation gradually takes shape, and when people on the high seas and in remote areas have more choices for getting online, we will find that China’s private space sector has already carved out its own path — not a copy of SpaceX, but an innovative solution adapted to China’s context.</p><p>This, perhaps, is the real answer to the question, “What is the Chinese-style SpaceX?”</p><h4><strong>Credits</strong></h4><p>Wang Qiang | Retired Senior Colonel, PLA; Specially Appointed Expert, Fudan University</p><p>Charriot Zhai | Editor-in-Chief for Top Picks, Wave Media Correspondent (Reporting and Analysis)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ccaa8fb4bd0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can Australia Truly Shield the US from China’s Rare Earth Controls?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thechinaacademy/can-australia-truly-shield-the-us-from-chinas-rare-earth-controls-cda85f060af3?source=rss-41ee1b35bba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cda85f060af3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rare-earths]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rare-earth-element]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wave Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 09:08:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-22T09:08:33.958Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f9UN7n7BCX-c3SrThB5oRA.jpeg" /></figure><p>On October 20, the United States and Australia signed an $8.5 billion deal aimed at building new rare earth supply chains to circumvent Chinese sanctions. Donald Trump even<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australias-albanese-discuss-rare-earths-security-first-trump-summit-2025-10-20/"> claimed</a>, “In about a year from now, we’ll have so much critical mineral and rare earths that you won’t know what to do with them,”</p><p>However, Prof. Wang Xiangsui, Deputy Secretary General of the CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies, points out three fundamental reasons why anyone with a basic understanding of the rare earth industry and the Sino-US economy would find such optimism misplaced.</p><p><strong>First,</strong> “rare earths” is an umbrella term for 17 elements. Australia’s economically viable rare earth reserves account for only about 6% of the global total and are predominantly light rare earths, whereas over<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/concerned-carmakers-race-beat-chinas-rare-earths-deadline-2025-10-21/"> 70%</a> of the heavy rare earths essential for US defense manufacturing are concentrated in China. This natural endowment makes Australia incapable of being a full substitute for China.</p><p><strong>Secondly,</strong> while rare earth <a href="https://northernminerals.com.au/browns-range-hre-project/">mines in Western Australia</a> do contain some heavy rare earth elements, such as dysprosium and terbium, their refining still depends on Chinese patented technology and equipment.</p><p>China currently holds <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-rare-earths-trump-card-in-trumps-trade-war-by-angela-huyue-zhang-2025-08">85%</a> of global patents for rare earth refining. Furthermore, on October 9, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued Notification №61/2025, imposing comprehensive controls on technologies covering the entire rare earth lifecycle: mining, smelting, separation, magnet manufacturing, and even recycling. Considering China spent at least 30 years developing its rare earth technology and industry, Trump’s belief that the US and Australia can make up this ground in a single year seems like a pipe dream.</p><p><strong>The third and most crucial point,</strong> which Trump appears to miss entirely, is that the US economy is in the grip of an unprecedented AI bubble, and China’s dominance in rare earths is like a pinprick poised to deflate it.</p><p>Recent <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/harvard-economists-dire-warning-without-data-centers-us-gdp-grew-only-0-1-in-h1-2025/articleshow/124396579.cms?from=mdr">analysis by Harvard economist Prof. Jason Furman</a> shows that investment in information-processing equipment and software made up only 4% of total US GDP in the first half of 2025 but accounted for 92% of the country’s GDP growth during that period. Excluding it, the annualized GDP growth rate was a mere 0.1%. Thus, AI-related investment has effectively become the sole engine of US economic growth.</p><p>Within this AI-driven boom, wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of the “Magnificent Seven,” led by NVIDIA. These seven tech giants now make up over 34% of the S&amp;P 500’s total market value, with NVIDIA’s own valuation soaring to a staggering $4.5 trillion, largely fueling the AI-index surge.</p><p>NVIDIA attracts such massive investment because its advanced GPUs are the indispensable core hardware for training and running AI models, holding over 90% market share. Yet, this very strength exposes the US AI bubble’s vulnerability to China’s rare earth controls.</p><p>This is because, despite its near-monopoly on advanced GPU design and software, NVIDIA relies entirely on foundries for chip manufacturing. Today, virtually all of the world’s advanced chips are produced by TSMC, mainly located on Taiwan island, and TSMC’s ability to manufacture these chips depends heavily on rare earth supplies authorized by the Chinese mainland.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*F6LY1p3wtjdzwJwxZXx4vA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The computing power of NVIDIA’s GPUs is heavily reliant on TSMC’s 4N advanced manufacturing process, which requires specific rare earth elements from the Chinese mainland. For instance, cerium oxide in wafer polishing. Lanthanum-based glass is also critical in the optical systems of advanced lithography equipment, particularly for deep ultraviolet (DUV) lens elements. The global refining capacity for these elements is also overwhelmingly concentrated in China.</p><p>Therefore, strict enforcement of these rare earth content rules on chips exported by TSMC by Beijing would be highly detrimental to NVIDIA, inevitably setting off a chain reaction across the US economic landscape.</p><p>Professor Wang further notes that, even under the most optimistic scenarios, it would take the West 5 to 10 years to rebuild a complete rare earth refining industry. Some US investors might think they can wait that long, but that would only be catching up to the present. Moreover, the key to the future of AI — energy — also lies firmly in China’s hands.</p><p>In the AI narrative championed by NVIDIA, more GPU chips inevitably lead to more powerful AI, implying a perpetually bright future for the company. However, this story overlooks a critical corollary: more GPU chips demand a correspondingly vast increase in electrical power, a challenge for which the US’s aging energy infrastructure has no ready solution.</p><p>To meet intensive AI computing demands, the US has embarked on a massive data center building spree. Some early-stage 50,000-acre data center campuses could consume up to <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/power-and-utilities/data-center-infrastructure-artificial-intelligence.html">5 GW</a>, enough power for five million homes, exceeding the capacity of the largest existing nuclear or gas plants in the United States, placing unprecedented strain on the US power grid.</p><p>How severe is this pressure on the US’s largely 20th-century, aging grid? A stark example comes from the PJM Interconnection, the nation’s largest grid serving 13 states from Washington to Chicago. Its capacity auction prices have skyrocketed, with costs for capacity from June 2026 onwards surging from $28.92 per megawatt-day to <a href="https://ieefa.org/resources/projected-data-center-growth-spurs-pjm-capacity-prices-factor-10">$269.92</a>, an 833% increase, seriously jeopardizing power security for other industries and households.</p><p>Joe Bowring, the Independent Market Monitor for PJM, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-21/large-us-grid-lacks-capacity-for-new-data-centers-watchdog-says">stated</a> bluntly, “There is simply no new capacity to meet new loads.” He suggested that data centers should bring their own generation facilities, positioning this as a critical solution.</p><p>However, China holds the keys to the two most critical technologies needed for this very solution.</p><p><strong>The first is efficient distributed power generation technology.</strong></p><p>Here, small modular reactors (SMRs) represent the ultimate distributed power solution for data centers, providing exceptionally stable, abundant, and zero-carbon electricity perfectly suited for high-energy AI compute centers.</p><p>On October 17, the world’s first commercial onshore modular small pressurized water reactor, “玲龙一号” (ACP100), in China’s Hainan province, completed cold testing, a global first for this type of reactor. It is also the world’s first commercial onshore SMR to pass the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safety review.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YyxU5n17I3DTcP4p_XFNpQ.png" /><figcaption>玲龙一号(ACP100), the multi-purpose modular small reactor S&amp;T demonstration project of CNNC in Changjiang, Hainan Province.</figcaption></figure><p>Some investors may worry about reactor safety. Looking ahead, the thorium-based molten salt reactor (TMSR) stands out as the most promising technology. Its fundamental design prevents core meltdown accidents and it doesn’t require water for cooling, offering superior safety and the deployment flexibility needed for data centers located near populous areas to reduce latency.</p><p>In this field, China’s thorium-based molten salt reactor TMSR-LF1 is the only operational reactor of its kind in the world. It has successfully achieved a series of critical milestones, including the world’s first full-power operation, and the first-ever refueling experiment in a molten salt reactor. Thus, the ultimate distributed power solution for data centers is already firmly within China’s grasp.</p><p>Interestingly, one of the most common potential sources of fuel for thorium-based reactors is the mineral monazite — a rare earth phosphate that typically contains several to over ten percent thorium. During rare earth mining, thorium is often co-extracted as a byproduct. Historically, this thorium was separated and treated as radioactive waste, creating an economic and environmental burden.</p><p>Now, with the advancement of thorium molten salt reactor (TMSR) technology, this former “waste” is being transformed into a valuable nuclear fuel resource. For China, with its comprehensive rare earth refining industry, this offers a natural advantage and potentially lower operating costs. For other countries, however, developing a similar supply chain presents yet another formidable challenge.</p><p><strong>The second is advanced energy storage and peak-shaving technology.</strong></p><p>While nuclear reactors provide stable baseload power, data centers have two specific needs: handling instantaneous power fluctuations and guaranteeing absolute power supply security. Nuclear plants aren’t suited for frequent power adjustments, and even seconds of grid failure can cause massive data center losses. Only lithium batteries, with their millisecond-level response, can meet this need — instantly discharging to cover power spikes and instantly charging to absorb dips. This rapid, precise regulation is currently unmatched by other technologies.</p><p>Additionally, lithium batteries offer high energy density, mature technology, and compact size, providing deployment flexibility that hydrogen storage, lead-acid batteries, and compressed air storage cannot match.</p><p>In the global energy storage battery supply chain, Chinese companies dominate. In the first half of 2025, all top ten companies in global storage battery shipments were from China, collectively holding a <a href="https://www.infolink-group.com/energy-article/energy-storage-topic-global-battery-shipment-ranking-1H25">91.2%</a> market share.</p><p>Critically, in lithium battery manufacturing, the electrode is the ‘heart,’ determining capacity, voltage, charge rate, lifespan, and safety. Cutting-edge <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-018-0180-6">research</a> from top institutions like MIT and published in Nature Energy has demonstrated that rare earth elements, particularly lanthanum, can dramatically enhance battery performance.</p><p>By coating high-nickel cathode materials with trace amounts of lanthanum compounds, researchers have achieved remarkable improvements: capacity increases up to 15%, cycle life extensions of over 25%, and enhanced safety at high voltages. Thus, rare earth elements are becoming indispensable for next-generation energy storage technologies.</p><p>It is clear that both now and in the foreseeable future, the rare earth supply chain, where China holds absolute dominance, will dictate the fate of the US AI bubble economy. The longevity of this bubble depends heavily on China’s strategic decisions, guided by goodwill.</p><p>Since the start of the trade war, Chinese officials have repeatedly stated: The Earth is large enough to accommodate the respective development and common prosperity of both China and the United States. Faced with the rare earth dilemma, why does the US choose confrontation over cooperation, forcing China to defend its legitimate rights to survival and development?</p><p>Should this self-defeating approach continue, the U.S. risks not only severely impacting its AI-driven economic foundation but also plunging its future into profound uncertainty.</p><p><strong>Credits</strong></p><p>Wang Xiangsui | Deputy Secretary General, CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development Studies</p><p>Charriot Zhai | Editor-in-Chief for Top Picks, Wave Media Correspondent (Reporting and Analysis)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cda85f060af3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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