<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by The Sentry on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by The Sentry on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@thesentry?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 03:05:54 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@thesentry/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[An Ever-Watchful Sentry]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/an-ever-watchful-sentry-345161eb857f?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/345161eb857f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investigative-journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 May 2025 20:35:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-30T20:36:38.801Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9rdGbOJS6iBnFhs7YtL3lA.png" /></figure><h4><strong><em>From exposure toward impact: What happens after publication?</em></strong></h4><p>When The Sentry publishes an investigative report, it’s rarely the end of the story. Often, it’s the very beginning. The multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy don’t typically stop their activities with the publication of one report: Often, they begin to reorganize, redistribute assets, change company names, and find new business partners.</p><p>And if they aren’t stopping, then neither should we.</p><p>Behind the scenes, The Sentry pushes for impact — whether that’s providing information to government officials and prosecutors, data sharing with the private sector and financial institutions, or collaborating with civil society and media outlets.</p><p>This engagement is often less visible, but it can entail significant public and private follow-up over months, and even years. Depending on the case, we may continue to investigate and share updates based on new findings, advocate for policy recommendations, or support legal proceedings. This proactive approach is particularly important during critical periods, such as elections, or in response to recent events like renewed conflict or natural disasters.</p><p>And while that work is intensive, our approach has seen some notable success.</p><p><strong>The Taking of South Sudan</strong></p><p>In 2019, The Sentry published <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/taking-south-sudan/">The Taking of South Sudan</a>, in which we reported on the involvement of British national David Greenhalgh in a 2009 multimillion-dollar scandal. A company owned by a high-ranking South Sudanese general received $65 million from the government, ostensibly earmarked for a mobile radar system. The company sent the bulk of those funds — $55 million — to Greenhalgh, but the purchased goods reportedly never reached South Sudan. The funds transited through bank accounts in multiple jurisdictions before Macedonian authorities eventually flagged them as suspicious and temporarily froze them, only to release them later.</p><p>No party faced punitive measures, despite the problematic deal being investigated by anti-corruption authorities.</p><figure><a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/taking-south-sudan/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/232/1*Jtxq7z--ROcMnAddCY61DA.jpeg" /></a></figure><p>Throughout our investigation, The Sentry gathered additional evidence of Greenhalgh’s connections to the arms industry and his international businesses spanning three continents. In the months following publication, we drafted a 65-page memo and evidentiary package for the United Kingdom’s HM Revenue &amp; Customs authority, which is in charge of export controls. The memo detailed Greenhalgh’s possible violations in the 2000s and 2010s of the UK’s <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:188:0020:0023:EN:PDF">arms embargoes</a> imposed on Sudan and South Sudan.</p><p>In May 2024, more than four years after we submitted our evidence and 15 years after the initial activities, and following a seven-year investigation by HM Revenue &amp; Customs, Greenhalgh was indeed <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/british-aviation-expert-charged-with-arms-dealing-zq5zjjxsb">charged</a> with breaching the arms embargos, brokering the sales of military equipment, and being a broker in illegal international arms sales between 2009 and 2015.</p><p><strong>Cultivating Atrocities</strong></p><p>In 2021, The Sentry published <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/cultivating-atrocities/">Cultivating Atrocities</a>, which detailed how a subsidiary of Castel Group had conducted business with violent armed groups responsible for mass atrocities in order to protect its operations in CAR. A year later, French prosecutors <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/french-prosecutors-open-war-crime-probe-linked-groupe-castel-unit-central-2022-07-02/">opened an investigation</a> into the Castel Group’s operations in CAR for alleged complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity. While criminal cases like these can be a massive win in holding actors accountable for their crimes, they require close collaboration to ensure that prosecutors have what they need to go from opening a case to securing a final conviction. The French prosecutors’ investigation is ongoing.</p><p><strong>Overt Affairs and Artful Dodgers</strong></p><p>In August 2020, The Sentry published <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/overt-affairs/">Overt Affairs</a>, detailing how two North Korean businessmen formed a construction company in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and engaged in activities that appeared to violate sanctions adopted by the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States. The Sentry published a follow-up alert, <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/artful-dodgers/">Artful Dodgers</a>, five months later that exposed new evidence related to activities in the DRC and included new revelations that affiliate companies operated throughout West and Central Africa, demonstrating how North Korean actors exploited jurisdictions with high levels of corruption. The Sentry shared information on the businessmen and the wider network with sanctions authorities at the UN, US, and EU following publication. The businessmen were sanctioned by the EU in 2022 and the US in 2023.</p><p><strong>Embezzled Empire</strong></p><p>In 2021, The Sentry worked alongside the Congo Hold-up consortium — the international group of nonprofit organizations and media outlets that collaboratively investigated millions of leaked bank records — to investigate the former ruling family of the DRC, the Kabila family.</p><p>The Sentry’s resulting report, <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/embezzled-empire/">Embezzled Empire</a>, revealed that Francis Selemani, the then-president’s brother, and associated companies acquired 17 properties valued at $6.6 million in upscale neighborhoods of Washington, DC, and Johannesburg, South Africa, it appears at least in part using funds diverted from the Congolese government. The report detailed how the family used a network of companies and the bank they controlled to misappropriate public funds, transferring millions abroad and purchasing millions of dollars in foreign real estate.</p><figure><a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/embezzled-empire/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/232/1*IQ1e_ekxcBJea8NdmyxjUw.jpeg" /></a></figure><p>At the time, our main policy recommendation was for authorities in South Africa and the US to investigate the purchase of the properties and, if they determined that the real estate had been purchased with the proceeds of embezzlement or other illicit activity, seize the homes. Since the report’s publication, we have continued to monitor the properties as part of our ongoing efforts to flag any continued activity by Selemani and his network. In the years since our initial report, Selemani has sold six of his South African properties and redeveloped a plot of land into four new homes.</p><p>To update the public on Selemani’s activities and urge governmental action, The Sentry published an alert in November 2024: <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/selemani-selling-south-african-properties/">Francis Selemani Selling South African Properties Likely Purchased With Embezzled Funds</a>. This report reinforced the position taken by civil society groups in South Africa, the DRC, and Senegal, who had submitted a complaint to the South African National Prosecuting Authority in 2023. We continue to urge South African authorities to commence enforcement actions against Selemani while there’s still an opportunity to act.</p><p><strong>The Sentry’s Ongoing Effort</strong></p><p>In our work to follow the dirty money and identify predatory networks profiting from conflict and repression, impact can take years to come to fruition. Networks will go dormant only to reappear in new ways. Subjects from one report may crop up unexpectedly in a new country. These developments present new opportunities and openings for impact — but we can only take action if we’ve been paying attention.</p><p>How do we keep these cases from going cold? To stay up-to-date on previously investigated subjects, The Sentry has created an index of all the individuals and entities listed in our reports. After eight years and more than 65 reports, the list spans more than 2,500 entries. Mapped in our internal graph database, this information provides a foundation of knowledge that can be a continual point of reference and a hub for updates, no matter how much time has passed since a report’s publication.</p><p>Any impact The Sentry has is only possible due to a willingness to engage, a persistent awareness of ongoing activities, a discipline to check for updates on a regular basis, and a keen eye for changes. These routines, combined with insights shared by our partners, by like-minded NGOs and journalists, and through our whistleblowing platform, mean that our team never takes the heat off predatory networks that we’ve exposed in the past.</p><p><em>Dig deeper into The Sentry’s reports at: </em><a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/"><em>https://thesentry.org/reports/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=345161eb857f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/an-ever-watchful-sentry-345161eb857f">An Ever-Watchful Sentry</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar">The Sentry Sidebar</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Russian Diamonds Are No Longer Forever, but the Blockchain Is]]></title>
            <link>https://thesentry.medium.com/russian-diamonds-are-no-longer-forever-but-the-blockchain-is-f45420317f7d?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f45420317f7d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diamonds]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jan 2025 15:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-30T16:03:26.220Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ps6j1WPKlcN4LyJMEBD5CQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>By Denisse Rudich, The Sentry</em></p><p>On March 1, 2025, the G7 Certification Scheme, which introduces traceability measures targeted at Russian-origin diamonds — even those polished in third countries, is expected to become mandatory.<a href="#4644">[i]</a> Aimed at ramping up measures in the diamond market to clamp down on Russia’s ability to finance its war machine, the scheme introduces a blockchain-based ledger for traceability-based verification and certification to track rough diamonds from “‘the mine to the finger,’”<a href="#f5a7">[ii]</a>, <a href="#f5d1">[iii]</a>, <a href="#ff15">[iv]</a>, <a href="#c51d">[v]</a> thereby supporting sanctions monitoring, import bans, and transparency.<a href="#b6f2">[vi]</a></p><p>While it may seem like an innovative way to improve diamond traceability, blockchain technology should not be seen as a silver bullet. Human intervention is still required, as individuals need to validate information before a certificate of origin is issued and a “digital twin” — effectively a virtual representation — of a diamond is created and added to the blockchain.<a href="#c434">[vii]</a> This dependence on human-generated records offers a path for illicit actors to compromise the blockchain by inputting false origin information. The risk of fraudulent certification and poor data being uploaded onto an immutable blockchain is high. For the implementation of the diamond ban to be effective, producing countries will need proper tools and training to ensure that the right information is captured and loaded onto the blockchain from the start.</p><p>As the G7 looks to the successful implementation of a blockchain solution for diamonds, it must ensure that adequate safeguards are added to address risks. Any traceability solutions, including those using blockchain technology, must have controls to guard against abuse at the source and throughout the supply chain; they must promote data governance and data quality standards and ensure that solutions remain fit for purpose and are adopted by the industry. If properly implemented and resourced, blockchain technology could limit opportunities for the diamond trade to be used to launder illicit funds and evade sanctions. It could mean that, as former European Council President Charles Michel presciently said, “Russian diamonds are not forever.”<a href="#4341">[viii]</a></p><p><strong>Diamonds Under Pressure</strong></p><p>Although Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has triggered an international coordinated response, Russia has long been a destabilizing force across the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Over the past few years, in particular, the presence of Russian private military companies has expanded across Africa, exacerbating already fragile political situations, fueling violence, and encroaching on local mining sites. In the Central African Republic, for example, Russia’s Wagner Group carried out “a campaign of terror,” committing systematic human rights violations including mass killings, torture, and rape and conducting violent military campaigns to remove persons living near diamond mines.<a href="#3017">[ix]</a>, <a href="#2dbb">[x]</a> Meanwhile, at home, the Russian diamond industry is estimated to generate revenue worth $4 billion per year,<a href="#d44e">[xi]</a>, <a href="#618d">[xii]</a> making it an increasingly obvious point of focus for the international community looking to curtail Russia’s ability to finance its war efforts.</p><p>To this end, the G7 remains uniquely placed to disrupt Russia’s diamond revenue and thereby protect democracy, human rights, and the rules-based international order against Russian aggression. G7 members — which include Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union — make up 70% of the world’s consumer market for diamonds.<a href="#a208">[xiii]</a> The US alone is said to be responsible for 55% of global demand in the market.<a href="#f0c1">[xiv]</a> This level of consumption — as well as the shared values and aligned interests of the G7 members — creates the potential for real impact.</p><p>The G7 has taken action on Russian diamonds, both rough and polished,<a href="#f098">[xv]</a>, <a href="#3cad">[xvi]</a> including through import bans on “non-industrial diamonds, mined, processed, or produced in Russia,” beginning in January 2024,<a href="#b028">[xvii]</a> and on Russian diamonds “processed in third countries,” beginning on March 1, 2024.<a href="#9b3e">[xviii]</a> A crucial element of these bans has been the development of “a robust traceability-based verification and certification mechanism for rough diamonds within the G7” by September 1, 2024, to allow countries to comply with sanctions and trade restrictions.<a href="#4a21">[xix]</a> To that end, the first EU certification node became operational on March 1, 2024, enabling the issuance of G7 certificates following the verification of the origin of rough diamonds.<a href="#a169">[xx]</a></p><p>Before these actions, members of the G7 had previously taken a piecemeal approach by issuing autonomous sanctions targeting the Russian diamond industry. The US and the UK sanctioned the world’s largest diamond producer, Russian state-owned Alrosa, soon after the conflict in Ukraine began on February 24, 2024, with its then-CEO sanctioned by the US on the first day of the conflict.<a href="#b8d7">[xxi]</a>, <a href="#8729">[xxii]</a>, <a href="#424e">[xxiii]</a> At the time, Alrosa generated 90% of Russian diamonds.<a href="#1640">[xxiv]</a>, <a href="#b435">[xxv]</a> In March 2022, the US imposed a diamond import ban that did not cover diamonds transformed in third countries.<a href="#2188">[xxvi]</a> Canada also introduced restrictions on the diamond trade in May 2022.<a href="#e5c2">[xxvii]</a> In December 2023, the US introduced an Executive Order expanding an import ban on Russian-origin diamonds to “diamonds mined, processed, or produced in Russia,”<a href="#65c0">[xxviii]</a> with Canada, Japan, and the UK also issuing or updating laws and regulations introducing import bans on Russian diamonds following the latest G7 announcement.<a href="#2227">[xxix]</a>, <a href="#4364">[xxx]</a>, <a href="#67f7">[xxxi]</a> In the EU, despite diamond imports from Russia being valued at almost 1.5 billion euro ($1.05 billion), action was significantly delayed and reportedly held up by concerns from Belgium — the world’s largest diamond trading hub.<a href="#8698">[xxxii]</a>, <a href="#d88c">[xxxiii]</a> The EU eventually introduced sanctions against Alrosa and a separate diamond ban via its twelfth sanctions package in late 2023.<a href="#9d71">[xxxiv]</a>, <a href="#4606">[xxxv]</a> This package also reflects the G7’s efforts to introduce a blockchain traceability solution to help address sanctions circumvention and segregate Russian diamonds from the global supply chain.<a href="#75f9">[xxxvi]</a></p><p><strong>The Blockchain, Traceability, and Sanctions</strong></p><p>The introduction of a diamond ban underpinned by blockchain technology presents a potentially novel solution to a complex problem.<a href="#ad0d">[xxxvii]</a> The blockchain is a decentralized ledger that holds immutable records — records that cannot be altered or deleted — that can be accessed by different nodes or computers operating within the system.<a href="#1c80">[xxxviii]</a> It can securely hold large amounts of data — including details of the previous transaction, dates, and timestamps — in so-called “blocks.”<a href="#f5a3">[xxxix]</a> Once this data has been independently verified, validated, and uploaded onto the blockchain, it cannot subsequently be altered, making it a useful way to track assets. It allows users to see a diamond’s provenance, quality level, and chain of custody throughout the supply chain,<a href="#c6de">[xl]</a> information that can be checked independently by others in the supply chain.</p><p>With regards to how this can support sanctions implementation, and in particular the G7’s diamond ban, any data held on the blockchain can hypothetically be screened against sanctions lists if the data is unencrypted and held in the correct format. Blockchain monitoring solutions support the identification of sanctions risk by assessing country risk exposure and screening wallet addresses against designations. For example, when diamonds are transferred from one person or entity to another, originator and beneficiary data — when that becomes more widely available — could be checked against designated persons on sanctions lists. Screening can also help identify beneficial owners subject to sanctions who may be hidden in the layers of complex structures.<a href="#dd75">[xli]</a></p><p>If sanctions authorities are engaged in the early development of this system, they could contribute to the development of smart contracts — digital contracts that automatically trigger an action when certain conditions are met — and help shape the inclusion of requirements to only allow for transfer of ownership of a diamond once certificates, digital twins, and other data have been screened and found to be clear of sanctions matches. In order for blockchain to have greater impact, work must be done to identify the effectiveness of such solutions for trade sanctions compliance as related to asset tracking.<a href="#fce9">[xlii]</a> Additional research and development is needed to enhance blockchain analytical and screening tools to allow them to carry out screening of asset tracking solutions and to monitor supply chain of custody information for sanctions violations.</p><p>With regard to import bans, holding certificates of provenance and transit and custody data on the blockchain helps filter out banned Russian diamonds, preventing them from being traded across markets. It also allows firms, customs officials, and industry hubs to independently check certificates of origin to identity Russian-origin diamonds and take appropriate steps.</p><p>While blockchain technology promotes transparency and could be seen to support the implementation of sanctions, it is only a vehicle for recording data and therefore relies on several external factors. Challenges include the strength of diamond identification and traceability efforts at the source, both of which are likely driven by the local procurement standards of diamond miners and their partners. In countries where there is limited access to the internet or to digital twin generation technology, adoption of blockchain traceability solutions will be limited. Alternative forms of data capture that can be streamed onto the blockchain at a later stage of the supply chain are required, but these could be exploited by sanctioned and criminal actors to add fraudulent or incorrect data.</p><p>As with other sanctions compliance efforts, the weak points in the implementation of this initiative will remain the accuracy of human checks and the verification of data before it is added onto the blockchain, regardless of whichever traceability solution is applied. Given the immutable nature of the blockchain, the G7 must ensure that effective measures are taken in-country and throughout the supply chain to ensure the validity of source data. Asset traceability solutions must be effective, and there is a need for identification and traceability efforts to be standardized. Industry players must also be given the right tools and knowledge on how to use information included in traceability solutions to comply with sanctions.</p><p><strong>An Unpolished Plan</strong></p><p>Diamond traceability solutions are still being developed. In particular, the Belgian government, working with the Antwerp World Diamond Centre (AWDC), is developing blockchain technology to help safeguard the diamond trade from financing Russia’s war. The solution includes generating and transferring G7 certificates from existing traceability solutions — including Tracr, the GIA’s Diamond Origin Report, Sarine Diamond Journey, and Everledger — on a single immutable blockchain ledger supported by physical checks on rough diamonds and traceability data.<a href="#263f">[xliii]</a>, <a href="#ef03">[xliv]</a>, <a href="#5d5a">[xlv]</a> India’s Gem &amp; Jewellery Export Promotion Council (GJEPC); France’s Union Française De La Bijouterie, Joaillerie, Orfèvrerie, Des Pierres &amp; Des Perles; and the World Diamond Council (WDC) also put forward proposals, but it is uncertain whether elements of these will exist in parallel to or feed into the blockchain solution being developed by Belgium.<a href="#6e09">[xlvi]</a> As it is, the G7 appears to have adopted the solution proposed by Belgium, setting Antwerp up as a “clean diamond” hub.<a href="#1cdd">[xlvii]</a>, <a href="#fb42">[xlviii]</a> <a href="#1f0e">[xlix]</a>, <a href="#c685">[l]</a></p><p>The adoption of Belgium’s solution has not necessarily been welcomed by African producing countries or by the diamond industry, while other industry partners have expressed reservations.<a href="#ab55">[li]</a>, <a href="#c8ea">[lii]</a>, <a href="#191e">[liii]</a> India’s GJEPC released a statement citing “reservations on the timelines announced for the implementation of restrictions,” calling for increased flexibility, and emphasizing the need to protect the “interests of SMEs [small medium-sized enterprises] and marginal diamond units” that employ millions of people.<a href="#5ead">[liv]</a> Given that India is responsible for cutting and polishing 90% of the world’s diamonds — employing an estimated 1.5 million people in the industry — India’s buy-in is seen as vital to cutting off the supply of Russian diamonds and significantly reducing Russia’s ability to continue financing its war.<a href="#a09c">[lv]</a>, <a href="#a3a5">[lvi]</a> The WDC also released a statement welcoming the G7’s intent and indicating that it would engage with the G7 on “providing African producing countries the freedom and independence to verify and certify the origin of rough diamonds mined in their territories”; ensuring that any traceability technological solution is accessible to all industry participants, including artisanal and small-scale miners; and making sure that “responsibly sourced natural diamonds” have greater access to G7 markets.<a href="#51d3">[lvii]</a></p><p>As these statements suggest, many questions remain around implementation:</p><p>► Will countries that have not adopted G7-style sanctions against Russia — such as India and African countries — be able to verify and certify non-origin status?</p><p>► How and where will checks be carried out on the country of origin of a diamond?</p><p>► Who will bear the costs of additional resourcing to carry out certification requirements?</p><p>► Will this result in increased barriers to access to the G7 market for African producing nations?</p><p>► What will be the impact on artisanal miners?</p><p>► Will a bottleneck be created if only Antwerp is selected as the city carrying out checks?<a href="#bcad">[lviii]</a></p><p>It is essential that the G7 continues to work with producing countries to give them the right tools and training. Doing so will ensure that use of the blockchain does not create additional barriers to entry and that the right information is captured and loaded onto the blockchain to guarantee effective implementation of the diamond ban.</p><p><strong>Recommendations</strong></p><p>The introduction of blockchain by the G7 is in many ways an innovative solution to an intricate problem. However, the G7 and its allies should continue to work with key partners to make diamond traceability more effective. G7 countries must also take ongoing measures to coordinate sanctions and diamond bans in order to curb sanctions evasion and tackle a significant source of funding for Russia’s war chest. For sanctions and the ban to be effective on Russian-origin diamonds, both rough and polished, the G7 and international partners must take additional steps.</p><p><strong><em>G7 and international partners</em></strong></p><p><strong>Explore mobile only or non-technological traceability mechanisms for use by small mining companies and artisanal miners and make solutions and accompanying training widely available.</strong> Limited access to the internet at the source will limit blockchain’s effectiveness, meaning that a no- or low-technology solution must be explored. Training materials and step-by-step guides in local languages are needed, including on how to separate Russian from non-Russian rough diamonds and on how to access and use any tools that are rolled out. The G7 should also explore working with partner countries to place independent monitors from industry and civil society at key points of the supply chain to monitor compliance, particularly in major trading hubs for Russian diamonds.</p><p><strong>Issue guidance on how information contained on asset tracking blockchain solutions can be used for sanctions compliance. </strong>This should include how parties can access data, as well as technology standards and formats to use to simplify screening against sanctions lists of origin, transit and destination countries, and the names of parties that have held custody over a diamond.</p><p><strong>Work with blockchain monitoring providers to explore how to apply technology to supply chain traceability to identify sanctions breaches.</strong> Governments should engage with blockchain monitoring providers to identify the strengths and limitations of current solutions and to further enhance solutions to support sanctions screening of assets tracked in the blockchain that do not have non-fungible tokens (NFTs). NFTs are digital tokens that are held on the blockchain to represent ownership of an asset.</p><p><strong>Adopt an aligned set of principles and develop data standards and data schemas to make diamond traceability effective.</strong> G7 countries should adopt a cohesive and aligned set of principles to improve traceability measures, regardless of which industry solution is adopted. Such principles would aid in identifying and segregating Russian-origin diamonds and Russian-sourced diamonds and provide the industry with tools to help prevent the circumvention of sanctions.</p><p><strong>Continue to adopt coordinated sanctions related to Russian diamonds and enablers in third countries.</strong> The G7 and its allies should continue to coordinate targeted sanctions related to Russia affiliated diamond companies, including majority-owned companies and new front companies established to take over the business of sanctioned entities, and their networks around the globe.<a href="#7a11">[lix]</a> Consideration should also be given to sanctioning third country enablers that continue to support Russian attempts to evade strengthened sanctions. Adopting coordinated multilateral targeted designations will improve the ability to effectively disrupt this billion-dollar revenue stream for Russia.</p><p><strong>Issue guidance to the private sector on enhanced due diligence to identify Russian-origin and Russian-sourced diamonds. </strong>G7 countries should issue national advisories to allow firms either purchasing or financing diamonds to carry out enhanced due diligence, including supply chain due diligence. Advisories should also include guidance on how to identify genuine certificates, if they do not have access to the blockchain traceability solutions being put forward.</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> European Union, “Questions and Answers on the 14th package of restrictive measures against Russia,” June 24, 2024, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_3425">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_3425</a></p><p><a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a> European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Twelfth Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> Reuters, “Options for G7 Discussion for a Ban on Russian Diamonds,” October 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/options-g7-discussion-ban-russian-diamonds-2023-10-18/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/options-g7-discussion-ban-russian-diamonds-2023-10-18/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> Financial Times, “G7 Governments to Announce Bans on Russian Diamond Imports,” September 15, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dc5b7c52-0f51-4ad8-a33a-db446a0454ef">https://www.ft.com/content/dc5b7c52-0f51-4ad8-a33a-db446a0454ef</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref5">[v]</a> IPIS, “G7 Targets Russian Diamonds — Q&amp;A,” October 28, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/g7-targets-russian-diamonds-qa/">https://ipisresearch.be/g7-targets-russian-diamonds-qa/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref6">[vi]</a> European Union, “Restrictions on Diamonds: Frequently Asked Questions as of 1 March2024,” March 1, 2024, available at: <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/faqs-sanctions-russia-diamonds_en.pdf">https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/faqs-sanctions-russia-diamonds_en.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref7">[vii]</a> European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Twelfth Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref8">[viii]</a> Council of Europe, “President Michel: ‘Russian Diamonds Are Not Forever,’” May 19, 2023, available at: <a href="https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20230519-eu-g7-summit-2023/139936-president-michel-russian-diamonds-are-not-forever-20230519">https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20230519-eu-g7-summit-2023/139936-president-michel-russian-diamonds-are-not-forever-20230519</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref9">[ix]</a> The Sentry, “Architects of Terror: The Wagner Group’s Blueprint for State Capture in the Central African Republic,” June 2023, available at: <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/">https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref10">[x]</a> Africa Defense Forum Magazine, “With New Name, Same Russian Mercenaries Plague Africa,” January 16, 2024, available at: <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref11">[xi]</a> UK Government, “New Sanctions Demonstrate G7 Resolve on Russia,” May 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-sanctions-demonstrate-g7-resolve-on-russia">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-sanctions-demonstrate-g7-resolve-on-russia</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref12">[xii]</a> European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Twelfth Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref13">[xiii]</a> Julia Payne and Polina Devitt, “G7 to Launch Russian Diamond Ban in Bid to Curb Revenues,” Reuters, September 15, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/g7-launch-russian-diamond-ban-bid-curb-revenues-belgian-officials-2023-09-15/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/g7-launch-russian-diamond-ban-bid-curb-revenues-belgian-officials-2023-09-15/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref14">[xiv]</a> Polina Devitt, Clara Denina and Mimosa Spencer, “G7 Plan to Ban Russian Diamonds to Further Dim Industry Sparkle,” Reuters, October 31, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/g7-plan-ban-russian-diamonds-further-dim-industry-sparkle-2023-10-30/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/g7-plan-ban-russian-diamonds-further-dim-industry-sparkle-2023-10-30/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref15">[xv]</a> The Group of 7, “G7 Leaders’ Statement<em>,</em>” February 24, 2023, available at: <a href="http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/000123439.pdf">http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/sworking ummit/2023hiroshima/000123439.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref16">[xvi]</a> The Group of 7, “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine,” May 19, 2023, available at: <a href="http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/G7+Leaders+Statement+on+Ukraine(20230519).pdf">http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/G7+Leaders+Statement+on+Ukraine(20230519).pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref17">[xvii]</a> Government of Canada, “Sanctions — Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” available at: <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/ukraine-sanctions.aspx?lang=eng">https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/ukraine-sanctions.aspx?lang=eng</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref18">[xviii]</a> UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Department for Business and Trade, “Joint Statement on G7 Diamond Sanctions,” November 27, 2024, available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-g7-diamond-sanctions#:~:text=On%201%20March%202024%2C%20Russian,became%20operational%20in%20the%20EU">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-g7-diamond-sanctions#:~:text=On%201%20March%202024%2C%20Russian,became%20operational%20in%20the%20EU</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref19">[xix]</a> UK Government, “G7 Leaders’ Statement,” December 6, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-leaders-statement-6-december-2023">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-leaders-statement-6-december-2023</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref20">[xx]</a> UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Department for Business and Trade, “Joint Statement on G7 Diamond Sanctions,” November 27, 2024, available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-g7-diamond-sanctions#:~:text=On%201%20March%202024%2C%20Russian,became%20operational%20in%20the%20EU">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-g7-diamond-sanctions#:~:text=On%201%20March%202024%2C%20Russian,became%20operational%20in%20the%20EU</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref21">[xxi]</a> US Department of the Treasury, “The United States Sanctions Major Russian State-Owned Enterprises,” Press Release, April 7, 2022, available at: <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0707">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0707</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref22">[xxii]</a> US Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented &amp; Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs,” Press Release, February 24, 2022, available at: <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref23">[xxiii]</a> UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and The RT Hon Elizabeth Truss, “Foreign Secretary Announces 65 New Russian Sanctions to Cut Off Vital Industries Fuelling Putin’s War Machine,” Press Release, May 24, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-65-new-russian-sanctions-to-cut-off-vital-industries-fuelling-putins-war-machine">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-65-new-russian-sanctions-to-cut-off-vital-industries-fuelling-putins-war-machine</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref24">[xxiv]</a> US Department of the Treasury, “The United States Sanctions Major Russian State-Owned Enterprises,” Press Release, April 7, 2022, available at: <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0707">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0707</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref25">[xxv]</a> US Department of the Treasure, “U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented &amp; Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs,” Press Release, February 24, 2022, available at: <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref26">[xxvi]</a> US President (Joseph R. Biden), Executive Order 14068, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” March 11, 2022, available at: <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/919281/download?inline">https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/919281/download?inline</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref27">[xxvii]</a> Government of Canada, “Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations: SOR/2022–102,” May 18, 2022, available at: <a href="https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-06-08/html/sor-dors102-eng.html">https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-06-08/html/sor-dors102-eng.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref28">[xxviii]</a> United States White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Expands U.S. Sanctions Authorities to Target Financial Facilitators of Russia’s War Machine,” December 22, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/22/fact-sheet-biden-administration-expands-u-s-sanctions-authorities-to-target-financial-facilitators-of-russias-war-machine/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/22/fact-sheet-biden-administration-expands-u-s-sanctions-authorities-to-target-financial-facilitators-of-russias-war-machine/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref29">[xxix]</a> The United Kingdom, The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment)(№5) Regulations 2023,<em> </em>December 14, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2023/1367/made">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2023/1367/made</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref30">[xxx]</a> Government of Canada, “Minister Joly Announces Ban on Direct Import of Russian Diamonds and Related Products,” December 6, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/12/minister-joly-announces-ban-on-direct-import-of-russian-diamonds-and-related-products.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/12/minister-joly-announces-ban-on-direct-import-of-russian-diamonds-and-related-products.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref31">[xxxi]</a> Al Jazeera, “Japan Expands Sanctions Over Russia’s War in Ukraine,” December 15, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/12/15/japan-expands-sanctions-over-russias-war-in-ukraine">https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/12/15/japan-expands-sanctions-over-russias-war-in-ukraine</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref32">[xxxii]</a> European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Twelfth Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref33">[xxxiii]</a> Bloomberg, “Russia’s Secret Gem Sales Are Dividing the Diamond World,” September 17, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-17/russia-s-secret-gem-sales-are-dividing-the-diamond-world#xj4y7vzkg">https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-17/russia-s-secret-gem-sales-are-dividing-the-diamond-world#xj4y7vzkg</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref34">[xxxiv]</a> On January 3, 2024, the EU followed up by sanctioning both Alrosa and its CEO, Pavel Alekseevich Marinychev. See:</p><p>European Union, “Russian War of Aggression Against Ukraine: Council Adds 1 Person and 1 Entity to EU Sanctions List,” January 3, 2024, available at: <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/03/russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-adds-1-person-and-1-entity-to-eu-sanctions-list/">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/03/russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-adds-1-person-and-1-entity-to-eu-sanctions-list/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref35">[xxxv]</a> Council of Europe, “EU Adopts 12th Package of Sanctions Against Russia for Its Continued Illegal War Against Ukraine,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6566">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6566</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref36">[xxxvi]</a> European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Twelfth Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref37">[xxxvii]</a> European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Twelfth Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6642</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref38">[xxxviii]</a> World Bank, “Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and Blockchain,” 2017, available at: <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/177911513714062215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Blockchain-Fintech-Notes.pdf">https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/177911513714062215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Blockchain-Fintech-Notes.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref39">[xxxix]</a> Synopsis, “Blockchain,” available at: <a href="https://www.synopsys.com/glossary/what-is-blockchain.html#:~:text=A%20blockchain%20is%20%E2%80%9Ca%20distributed,a%20timestamp%2C%20and%20transaction%20data.">https://www.synopsys.com/glossary/what-is-blockchain.html#:~:text=A%20blockchain%20is%20%E2%80%9Ca%20distributed,a%20timestamp%2C%20and%20transaction%20data.</a> (last accessed February 18, 2024).</p><p><a href="#_ednref40">[xl]</a> Everledger, “Symphony of Tech,” available at: <a href="https://everledger.io/technology/">https://everledger.io/technology/</a> (last accessed December 13, 2024).</p><p><a href="#_ednref41">[xli]</a> Angelica Garcia and Camille Erickson, “Miners Hope Blockchain Can Safeguard a Clean Image, but Tech Has Limits,” S&amp;P Global, June 27, 2022, available at: <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/miners-hope-blockchain-can-safeguard-a-clean-image-but-tech-has-limits-70669897">https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/miners-hope-blockchain-can-safeguard-a-clean-image-but-tech-has-limits-70669897</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref42">[xlii]</a> Elliptic, “Crypto Wallet Screening,” available at: <a href="https://www.elliptic.co/solutions/crypto-wallet-screening">https://www.elliptic.co/solutions/crypto-wallet-screening</a> (last accessed February 18, 2024).</p><p><a href="#_ednref43">[xliii]</a> Rob Bates, “G7 Russian Diamond Ban Unlikely to Start in January,” JCK Online, October 20, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.jckonline.com/editorial-article/g-7-russian-diamond-ban-january/">https://www.jckonline.com/editorial-article/g-7-russian-diamond-ban-january/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref44">[xliv]</a> Rob Bates, “Diamond Industry Gears Up for G7 Russia Ban,” JCK Online, September 20, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.jckonline.com/editorial-article/diamond-industry-russia-ban/">https://www.jckonline.com/editorial-article/diamond-industry-russia-ban/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref45">[xlv]</a> Sarine, “High Speed Automated Rough Diamond Registration: The Latest Traceability Innovation You Should Know,” December 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://blog.sarine.com/easily-track-every-diamond-in-the-world">https://blog.sarine.com/easily-track-every-diamond-in-the-world</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref46">[xlvi]</a> Reuters, “Options for G7 Discussion for a Ban on Russian Diamonds,” October 18, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/options-g7-discussion-ban-russian-diamonds-2023-10-18/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/options-g7-discussion-ban-russian-diamonds-2023-10-18/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref47">[xlvii]</a> Belga News Agency, “G7 Agrees on Russian Diamond Import Ban and Tracing System,” December 7, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.belganewsagency.eu/g7-agrees-on-russian-diamond-import-ban-and-tracing-system">https://www.belganewsagency.eu/g7-agrees-on-russian-diamond-import-ban-and-tracing-system</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref48">[xlviii]</a> Julia Payne and Dmitry Zhdannikov, “US Lukewarm on G7 Russian Diamond Ban After Industry Backlash,” Reuters, May 20, 2024, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-lukewarm-g7-russian-diamond-ban-after-industry-backlash-2024-05-17/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-lukewarm-g7-russian-diamond-ban-after-industry-backlash-2024-05-17/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref49">[xlix]</a> Belga News Agency, “G7 Agrees on Russian Diamond Import Ban and Tracing System,” December 7, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.belganewsagency.eu/g7-agrees-on-russian-diamond-import-ban-and-tracing-system">https://www.belganewsagency.eu/g7-agrees-on-russian-diamond-import-ban-and-tracing-system</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref50">[l]</a> Financial Times, “G7 to Ban Russian Diamond Imports From January,” December 6, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cc636fc6-607c-41ce-8fd4-ade2337f24ba">https://www.ft.com/content/cc636fc6-607c-41ce-8fd4-ade2337f24ba</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref51">[li]</a> Belga News Agency, “G7 Agrees on Russian Diamond Import Ban and Tracing System,” December 7, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.belganewsagency.eu/g7-agrees-on-russian-diamond-import-ban-and-tracing-system">https://www.belganewsagency.eu/g7-agrees-on-russian-diamond-import-ban-and-tracing-system</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref52">[lii]</a> Financial Times, “G7 to Ban Russian Diamond Imports From January,” December 6, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cc636fc6-607c-41ce-8fd4-ade2337f24ba">https://www.ft.com/content/cc636fc6-607c-41ce-8fd4-ade2337f24ba</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref53">[liii]</a> Julia Payne and Dmitry Zhdannikov, “US Lukewarm on G7 Russian Diamond Ban After Industry Backlash,” Reuters, May 20, 2024, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-lukewarm-g7-russian-diamond-ban-after-industry-backlash-2024-05-17/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-lukewarm-g7-russian-diamond-ban-after-industry-backlash-2024-05-17/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref54">[liv]</a> Gem &amp; Jewellery Export Promotion Council, “G7 Ban on Russian Diamond Imports from January — Statement by GJEPC Chairman Vipul Shah,” Solitaire, December 8, 2023, available at: <a href="https://gjepc.org/solitaire/g7-ban-on-russian-diamond-imports-from-january-statement-by-gjepc-chairman-vipul-shah/">https://gjepc.org/solitaire/g7-ban-on-russian-diamond-imports-from-january-statement-by-gjepc-chairman-vipul-shah/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref55">[lv]</a> Julia Payne and Polina Devitt, “G7 to Launch Russian Diamond Ban in Bid to Curb Revenues,” Reuters, September 15, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/g7-launch-russian-diamond-ban-bid-curb-revenues-belgian-officials-2023-09-15/">https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/g7-launch-russian-diamond-ban-bid-curb-revenues-belgian-officials-2023-09-15/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref56">[lvi]</a> Oreanda News, “G7 Will Not Force Indian Diamond Cutters to Give Up Diamonds From the Russian Federation,” October 3, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.oreanda-news.com/en/gosudarstvo/g7-will-not-force-indian-diamond-cutters-to-give-up-diamonds-from-the-russian-/article1490565/">https://www.oreanda-news.com/en/gosudarstvo/g7-will-not-force-indian-diamond-cutters-to-give-up-diamonds-from-the-russian-/article1490565/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref57">[lvii]</a> Gem &amp; Jewellery Export Promotion Council, “WDC Replies to G7 Leaders’ Statement on Russia Diamond Ban,” Solitaire, December 13, 2023, available at: <a href="https://gjepc.org/solitaire/wdc-replies-to-g7-leaders-statement-on-russia-diamond-ban/">https://gjepc.org/solitaire/wdc-replies-to-g7-leaders-statement-on-russia-diamond-ban/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref58">[lviii]</a> Rajendra Jadhav, Polina Devitt, and Clara Denina, “India, De Beers Seek Clarity, flexibility on G7’s Russian Diamond Ban,” Reuters, December 7, 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-trade-body-seeks-flexibility-g7s-phased-in-russian-gems-ban-2023-12-07/">https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-trade-body-seeks-flexibility-g7s-phased-in-russian-gems-ban-2023-12-07/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref59">[lix]</a> The Wall Street Journal, “The Elusive Figure Running Wagner’s Embattled Empire of Gold and Diamonds,” 21 September 2023, available at: <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/wagner-africa-sytii-prigozhin-gold-12a45769">https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/wagner-africa-sytii-prigozhin-gold-12a45769</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f45420317f7d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Too Wealthy to Hide]]></title>
            <link>https://thesentry.medium.com/too-wealthy-to-hide-b52a5c1b2541?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b52a5c1b2541</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Nov 2024 20:56:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-04T20:56:15.611Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="A large office building, sitting in the darkness and illuminated from within, has money spilling out of its doors and windows. Image by Gemini." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FPPSU_87hJiH3pqg3S2rDw.png" /></figure><p><em>Exposing the businesses and assets of politicians is only the first step</em></p><p>In 2016, the Panama Papers brought to light an ugly reality that most knew to be true, but just didn’t have the evidence to prove: Many politicians have business interests, and they don’t want you to know about them. In the years since, one exposé after another has continued to reveal politicians’ massive accumulation of wealth in countries ranging from Vladimir Putin’s Russia to Bashir al-Assad’s Syria, and involving leaders from Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea to Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. The amount of wealth accumulated is staggering, sometimes in the billions of dollars, and assessments often underestimate total values, as parts of the networks remain undiscovered.</p><p>More and more, however, the mechanisms that the political elite use to hide their wealth are starting to break at the seams. Tactics and loopholes historically created for tax and privacy purposes are slowly being revealed to the public as leaks to investigative journalists unlock windows into this murky world. Yet these leaks often beg more questions than they answer. A leak may reveal the true beneficial owner of a major company, or it may only provide tiny bits of information about a company in a secrecy jurisdiction. While files may show that a particular company is linked to political elites, there may be no indication of what it does or what it owns. These revelations show that perhaps the bigger blind spot is not the corporate network itself, but whether and how a politician’s family may be using it nefariously. And when politicians write the rules, it can be next to impossible to figure it out if they are playing fairly.</p><p><strong>The Aliyev Empire</strong></p><p>Take, for example, the holdings of the two daughters of the president and vice president of Azerbaijan, published recently by The Sentry in <a href="https://atlas.thesentry.org/azerbaijan-aliyev-empire/">Aliyev Empire</a>. Leyla and Arzu Aliyeva’s $13 billion corporate empire spans over 100 companies and subsidiaries in 12 countries — and that is only what has been identified so far. The Aliyev family holds stakes in a vast range of industries including mining, banking, hospitality, construction, and more. Their truly global empire brings the family not only wealth, but power; it positions them politically and economically so that they can both shape and take advantage of the game — for instance, by winning government tenders for their own companies. It’s these tactics that require probing.</p><p>Even seemingly straightforward companies still require a closer look. The Aliyevs hold interests in restaurants, film production companies, and news outlets. And while all these companies may be engaging in legal business activities, they are also tools that the Aliyevs have used to soften their image and quiet criticism. It’s always worth asking, “Who’s funding this?,” and the public should know the answer when it’s a presidential family.</p><p>Then there are holdings in specific industries, such as banking, that can be dangerous when left unchecked. The Aliyev family own stakes in five banks in their native Azerbaijan, accounting for almost half the country’s banking assets. Investigators have seen what can happen when a presidential family maintains control over financial institutions. The Kabila family, in power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2001 to 2019, owned and managed the Congolese branch of the bank Banque Gabonaise et Francaise Internationale (BGFI). Control of a bank gave the Kabilas access to a financial institution where they could have oversight of its compliance and anti-money laundering activities. The Kabilas then <a href="https://congoholdup.com/en/">used the bank</a> to launder and embezzle money from the government and send those funds abroad to purchase real estate. These activities continued even after the family’s stake in the bank was publicly revealed when whistleblower Jean-Jacques Lumumba <a href="https://www.lumumbapapers.info/">exposed</a> suspicious activities at the bank.</p><p>The political elite also can also take advantage of banks that they do not directly own but that have few anti-money laundering checks. The Aliyeva sisters were clients of a bank in Malta, Pilatus Bank, that was used to manage the money of politically connected clients. The bank transferred millions of dollars on behalf of the Aliyev family before it was shuttered over systematic failures to comply with anti-money laundering regulations.</p><p><strong>Unchecked Risk</strong></p><p>The issue is not that politicians own businesses, per se; it’s how far they go to hide their involvement, making it challenging for the public to ensure that they aren’t taking advantage of their positions of power to profit personally. Hiding assets erodes the foundation of trust the public deserves to have in their leaders. But there are standards designed to ensure public oversight and transparency. If they fail to do so, financial institutions should and must continue pressing.</p><p>First, there are checks for illicit activity. Financial institutions are required to conduct enhanced due diligence on transactions involving the political elite and their families, due to their unique risk factors for corruption and other illicit financial activities. When opening a bank account, this may come in the form of a literal check box exercise: Is this account linked to a politically exposed person? Time and time again, this box isn’t checked when it should have been, and banks cannot simply take self-disclosure at face value. To ensure that companies with accounts are not politically linked, financial institutions must insist on beneficial ownership information, conduct their own research beyond their customers’ self-disclosures, and request better data from governments and data providers on politically exposed persons and their families. By insisting on proper enhanced due diligence, banks can serve as a solid defensive line, catching and preventing illicit activity by the political elite.</p><p>Beyond financial checks, there must also be checks and balances against abuse of power, corruption, and influence peddling. Politicians need to be more transparent about their corporate holdings and assets, and civil society should push hard for this transparency. When self-disclosures fail, beneficial ownership registries can offer the public transparency. Major jurisdictions such as the United States and the European Union, along with dozens of other countries, are starting to implement these registries, but they must ensure that the registries are accurate, publicly accessible, and frequently updated if they are to be used as accountability tools.</p><p>Until these practices are standard — and even beyond — protection should be put in place for journalists, civil society members, and whistleblowers. It is often only due to their hard work identifying and unpacking illicit activity that the public is made aware, and a free press and open discourse are vital to holding our politicians to account.</p><p>Some political families have become so wealthy that it will be a challenge to counteract the advantages their wealth brings in the fight against corruption. But their vast empires also make them too wealthy to hide from public view, and by tugging on the exposed parts of their networks, it is possible to lift the veil of secrecy. The Sentry and others will continue to reveal these networks and won’t let them hide in the shadows. If a politician wants to be in the limelight, they need to expose their financial dealings to the sunlight.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b52a5c1b2541" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Harnessing the Power of the Open Data Age]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/harnessing-the-power-of-the-open-data-age-abebf5c99f5e?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/abebf5c99f5e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kleptocracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-data]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Nov 2024 13:59:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-04T13:59:18.944Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KStisTbQqWxBaX5q-2i5Ew.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>How technology and open data can be leveraged to collectively depict and expose the kleptocratic machine</em></p><p>Wealthy elites take advantage of a global network of enablers, favorable regulations, and low transparency jurisdictions to hide assets, move cash, and maintain a veneer of legitimacy. As civil society and investigative journalism have raised the alarm, governments and the public are becoming increasingly aware of the tactics and mechanisms used by kleptocrats to loot, embezzle, launder, and stash the proceeds of their corrupt acts. To stay ahead, the kleptocratic machine has become more complex and involves more players, making it harder to expose.</p><p>If the looting machine used to be a puzzle containing a few large pieces, it’s now a 1,000-piece puzzle of tiny, seemingly unrelated components with unique connections that must be put together carefully to see the full picture. This is no longer a one-person job.</p><p>In this new context, investigators have been shaking off the old tendencies to hoard information and instead are rapidly embracing a more collaborative style, recognizing that each investigator has a few pieces or sections of the puzzle that will only form a picture when placed together. Open data initiatives, technology, and collaborative partnerships have become essential tools for civil society and investigative journalists combating increasingly complex corruption.</p><p>By combining open data with collaborative efforts, investigators can explore and visualize corrupt networks. And by exposing the inner workings of corrupt systems through public investigations and data sharing, investigators contribute to a growing body of open information. This information then empowers a new set of investigators to delve deeper into the network, fostering a continuous cycle of discovery. For this reason, promoting open data accessibility and usability is crucial for maximizing the impact of this collaborative puzzle-solving process.</p><p><strong>Step 1: Building off current resources</strong></p><p>Regardless of where you are starting within a kleptocrat’s vast network, there are open-source resources that can be searched to begin exposing layers of the network. Many open data initiatives include data that has yet to be exploited — data that is just waiting for the right investigator with the right background and context to make sense of it. Transparency and open data power the work of investigators and researchers, increasing their chances of successfully connecting the dots.</p><p>A natural starting point is often corporate data. Paid corporate databases and other data providers may have valuable information for understanding parts of the corporate side of the kleptocratic machine. Given their focus on more transparent jurisdictions, however, these databases may only reveal the more well-known parts of the network. Relying only on these resources will provide a limited view. Invaluable insights come from lifting the lid on the underbelly of the kleptocratic machine, by looking in jurisdictions that lack transparency, for instance, or by identifying secretive company formations agencies.</p><p>This is where the international open data community plays a critical role in laying the groundwork for understanding the enablers and networks utilized by corrupt actors all over the world. Unique open data sets expose complex connections not easy to decipher at first glance. Some prominent examples to consider as part of any standard investigative process include:</p><p>· <a href="https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/">ICIJ Offshore Leaks</a> is a database — created by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists — that contains information on more than 810,000 offshore entities that are part of the Pandora Papers, Paradise Papers, Bahamas Leaks, Panama Papers, and Offshore Leaks investigations.</p><p>· <a href="https://aleph.occrp.org/">OCCRP Aleph</a> is a global archive of research material for investigative reporting created by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.</p><p>· <a href="https://www.opensanctions.org/">OpenSanctions</a> combines sanctions lists, databases of politically exposed persons, and other information about persons of public interest into a single, easy-to-use dataset.</p><p>· <a href="https://opencorporates.com/">OpenCorporates</a> is a searchable database of fresh, standardized, auditable information direct from official primary sources across 140+ jurisdictions.</p><p>Many of these data hubs include API access, which allows users to directly connect and retrieve data or download it in various formats, as well as other direct data download options to ingest the data into local systems. For example, The Sentry’s neo4j database includes data ingested from OpenSanctions and ICIJ so that it is always within reach when we are working on investigations.</p><p><strong>Step 2: Depicting the network and contributing to open data</strong></p><p>To tackle the immense complexity of modern corruption networks, investigators are increasingly relying on graph databases to track relationships and visualize connections. When shared publicly, graph databases provide a new perspective on the data and allow audiences to interact with it. In a way, it’s like publishing a part of the puzzle — people can see how the pieces fit together, identify missing parts, and spot potential areas for further investigation or policy changes.</p><p>In order to join this effort, The Sentry recently launched its own online tool, using <a href="https://linkurious.com/">Linkurious’</a> tool Ogma, to share its network mapping with the world. <a href="https://atlas.thesentry.org/">The Sentry’s Atlas</a> allows users to explore in depth the various individuals and entities at the heart of The Sentry’s investigations and their relationships. Atlas provides users with multiple views of the same data and information with the aim that each view may provide new insights or spark leads. It can be navigated through an interactive tool, explored through detailed profiles with links to related content, and downloaded to combine with other data sets or ingested into local systems.</p><p>Sentry reports have featured hundreds of individuals and entities, and we’ve turned many of these findings into actionable data through our <a href="https://thesentry.medium.com/staying-a-step-ahead-177b9b07e89d">data sharing</a> initiatives. Now, Atlas makes that data publicly accessible to help hold corrupt actors accountable and to give the public an opportunity to scrutinize information that should have been public to begin with. The data available in Atlas will expand in the coming months and years, but the platform launched with a particularly large and complex network.</p><p>Atlas’ first project, “<a href="https://atlas.thesentry.org/azerbaijan-aliyev-empire/">Aliyev Empire</a>,” looks at the network of the daughters of the president and vice president of Azerbaijan. It builds off findings available in public reporting and open data sets and includes updates to past reporting, as well as new findings and revelations. Given the vastness of the network and the secretive techniques used to obscure the sisters’ relationships to parts of the multibillion-dollar network, The Sentry recognizes that this map only represents a portion of the sister’s comprehensive holdings. And we’ve seen how, over time, the sisters have cut the network into smaller and smaller pieces, making mapping their holdings more and more challenging. Their network highlights the importance of developing a publicly available interactive and visual database that can be updated over time to reflect any changes and new findings.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q62-vBv4qFyQ24M05q8weA.png" /><figcaption>The network map from The Sentry’s first Atlas project, Aliyev Empire.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Step 3: Making space for future collaboration</strong></p><p>Open data not only offers space for investigators to explore the data within their own context, it also opens doors to collaborative efforts that combine knowledge and expertise. The world of kleptocracy is deeply interconnected and international, meaning that it requires a joint global effort to understand the ever-changing complexities and new adaptive tactics. In addition to data, investigators will need to take advantage of technology in order to best sift through and understand complex networks. Using technology to improve collaboration and then sharing knowledge and technical expertise will advance everyone’s ability to investigate effectively and take advantage of open data opportunities.</p><p>The Sentry intends for Atlas to be an ever-growing open data initiative, and this will require collaboration and information sharing. Atlas directs users willing to share information to The Sentry’s <a href="https://thesentry.org/shareinfo/">whistleblower platform</a>, which provides several secure methods to share information with The Sentry’s investigative team. We hope that those with the missing puzzle pieces will consider sharing information with us to continue to build our collective understanding of the kleptocratic machine. It is only by putting all the pieces on the table that we can put them together to reveal the full and comprehensive inner workings of kleptocracy, and only then can we find the right tools to combat it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=abebf5c99f5e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/harnessing-the-power-of-the-open-data-age-abebf5c99f5e">Harnessing the Power of the Open Data Age</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar">The Sentry Sidebar</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Deadly Skies of Myanmar]]></title>
            <link>https://thesentry.medium.com/the-deadly-skies-of-myanmar-2ec241971607?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ec241971607</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[myanmar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jet-fuel]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Oct 2024 13:07:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-09T13:07:48.574Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Enforcement of US sanctions is needed to cut off jet fuel powering the junta’s war on civilians</em></p><p><strong>By Oliver Windridge and Yadanar Maung</strong></p><p>As resistance to the junta in Myanmar expands and intensifies, the response has been to unleash its air force in a bloody and indiscriminate terror campaign from the skies. Last August, the US expanded its Burma (Myanmar) sanctions program to allow for sanctions on any individual or entity involved with the supply of jet fuel to the junta. A year later, the bloodbath continues, due to a lack of enforcement of those sanctions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3_xVQYCxSmRW-6g0hCmAWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A man looks on at homes destroyed after air and artillery strikes in Mung Lai Hkyet displacement camp, in Laiza, Myanmar, Tuesday Oct. 10, 2023. AP Photo.</figcaption></figure><p>To effectively curtail the Myanmar military’s ability to conduct these airstrikes, the US must now enforce jet fuel sanctions all along the supply chain of international enablers, while its likeminded partners need to adopt and enforce similar jet fuel sanctions. Immediate targets should include a Chinese-flagged oil tanker, HUITONG78, that has made repeated jet fuel deliveries to Myanmar, as well as the Vietnamese company Hai Linh Co. Ltd., which operates a large petroleum terminal in Southern Vietnam that has been used to tranship jet fuel and obscure its real destination.</p><p>Adding these and other junta enablers to the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list would expose every bank, insurance firm, and port that transacts with these parties to legal and reputational risks, as well as potential civil and criminal penalties. Sanctions targeting the linchpin operators in the transnational supply chain would signal US resolve to mobilize even more administrative resources and political capital, further upping the risk for those profiteers. The chilling effect of serious enforcement across the entire logistical and financial bloodstained jet fuel supply would be rapid and devastating to the junta’s ability to continue the aerial bombardment of schools, medical centers, and whole communities.</p><p>The players in this deadly pipeline are not a mystery, and enforcement can begin without delay. Amnesty International, in collaboration with Justice For Myanmar, has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/11/myanmar-the-supply-chain-fueling-war-crimes/">documented</a> numerous war crimes carried out from the air since the coup that are enabled by a global jet fuel supply chain.</p><p>The necessary sanctions regimes are multilateral, far-reaching, and already in the books. <a href="https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-12-21/html/sor-dors263-eng.html">Canada</a>, the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63d90f76d3bf7f251fcbae59/Notice_Myanmar_310123.pdf">United Kingdom</a>, the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/20/myanmar-burma-eu-imposes-sixth-round-of-sanctions-against-9-individuals-and-7-entities/">European Union</a>, the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1364?_gl=1*5289mr*_gcl_au*MTQ3MzQxODUzOC4xNzEzMTYyNTQ3">United States</a>, and <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/further-sanctions-myanmar-military-regime">Australia</a> have all adopted sanctions against key Myanmar individuals and companies identified as junta facilitators. Sanctions by the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1701?_gl=1*19vvc5x*_gcl_au*MTQ3MzQxODUzOC4xNzEzMTYyNTQ3">US</a> and the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64215c5432a8e0000cfa94ee/Notice_Myanmar_270323.pdf">UK</a> have also listed entities in Singapore that were part of the junta’s jet fuel network.</p><p>In August 2023, OFAC issued a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1701?_gl=1*19vvc5x*_gcl_au*MTQ3MzQxODUzOC4xNzEzMTYyNTQ3">determination</a> that “allows sanctions to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity that operates in the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy,” targeting “activities related to the importation, exportation, reexportation, sale, supply, or transport, directly or indirectly, of jet fuel in or involving Burma.” In short, OFAC can sanction anyone, from anywhere, playing any role in enabling the junta’s access to jet fuel.</p><p>Decisive enforcement now on the known enablers and profiteers will dismantle the pipeline of jet fuel to the junta, halt the widening air war that is indiscriminately targeting civilians, enhance the US’s regional credibility, and demonstrate clearly and immediately a strong multinational stand against the forces of corruption, oppression, and mass murder.</p><p><strong><em>Oliver Windridge </em></strong><em>is Director of Illicit Finance Policy at </em><a href="http://www.thesentry.org/"><em>The Sentry</em></a><em>; </em><strong><em>Yadanar Maung </em></strong><em>is Spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ec241971607" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Keeping a Watchful Eye: Using Network Analysis to Generate Leads Related to Sanctions Evasion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/keeping-a-watchful-eye-using-network-analysis-to-generate-leads-related-to-sanctions-evasion-147daf1c1e2b?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/147daf1c1e2b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Sep 2024 14:22:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-11T18:57:47.528Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Russia to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to North Korea, the tactics that individuals and entities use to evade sanctions have continuously evolved as sanctions have become an increasingly popular foreign policy tool. When actors successfully evade sanctions and adapt and amend illicit networks, it undermines the foreign policy goals of the sanctions and introduces new risks into the financial sector.</p><p>To ensure that sanctions continue to have maximum impact, up-to-date intelligence is key. That’s where network analysis comes in.</p><p>Network analysis is a powerful intelligence gathering tool to identify emerging sanctions evasion networks. By keeping an eye on wider networks even after a part of the network has been designated and utilizing this network approach, civil society, the private sector, and governments can monitor the situation and publish new findings, exchange valuable information, mitigate risk to the financial sector, and continue to counter these illicit networks. The cat-and-mouse game of identifying new sanctions evasion tactics can be exhausting, yet network analysis and related tools provide a clearer roadmap for anticipating the next evasion maneuver.</p><p>In June 2021, The Sentry, incorporating and expanding upon the work of <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/undermining-sanctions/">Global Witness and Platform for the Protection of Whistleblowers in Africa (PPLAAF</a>), submitted information on 15 companies and one key individual to the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), responsible for US sanctions administration and enforcement. The information contained details on a new network of companies incorporated or redomiciled by Dan Gertler and his network that may have been used to evade US sanctions. In December 2017, the US had imposed sanctions on Gertler for “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0515">his involvement in corruption in the DRC</a>,” which included amassing a fortune through mining and oil deals to the detriment of the Congolese people. Using network analysis of DRC corporate data, The Sentry identified possible companies and individuals of interest based on previous designations and investigative reporting — such as Global Witness and PPLAAF’s report <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/undermining-sanctions/">Undermining Sanctions</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/745/1*Agyotqs-rK4Q_EFtCEJZ8w.png" /><figcaption>A visual mapping of companies incorporated or redomiciled by Dan Gertler and his network, based on Democratic Republic of Congo corporate data. Image: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>Six months after The Sentry submitted this information, OFAC <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0515">sanctioned</a> one of Gertler’s key enablers, along with 12 companies, in an effort to ensure “that Gertler is not able to corruptly profit from continued access and influence in the DRC and globally.” Although we cannot state with certainty the relationship between The Sentry’s submission and OFAC’s designation decisions, 11 of the 12 companies had been named in The Sentry’s submission to OFAC. In its press release, the Treasury Department <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0515">acknowledged</a>:</p><blockquote>“Civil society organizations around the world are often eyewitnesses to corruption and human rights abuses and can shine a light on activities that corrupt actors and authoritarian regimes try to keep hidden. In determining whether to impose sanctions, Treasury considers credible information obtained by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) that monitor violations of human rights. Treasury highly values the information shared by NGOs all over the globe to expose corruption and human rights abuse, which can be used to support and develop cases like Treasury’s action today.”</blockquote><p>The Treasury Department’s statement highlights the value of NGO vigilance and information sharing and publication in exposing these networks. The Sentry understands how vital vigilance is in observing the ever-adapting networks of sanctioned individuals looking to continue operations.</p><p><strong>Starting with data</strong></p><p>In-depth network analysis requires rich data sources, such as corporate registries. Finding corporate data sets with valuable associated data points for each company that go beyond the company name and number allows for more rigorous analysis, but these are also the hardest to find and properly organize. Useful data points for companies include shareholders (especially details such as dates of birth and ID numbers), directors or managers, legal representatives, addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. Shared data points, such as shared addresses or directors, can be merged to build a more complete map of interconnected companies.</p><p>In order to visualize complex networks such as these, The Sentry maps corporate data in a neo4j graph database and visualizes it with Linkurious. This giant corporate data web is the backbone of The Sentry’s network analysis, as it allows investigators to traverse through millions of data points and identify patterns and clusters of interest.</p><p><strong>The spider’s web</strong></p><p>Once corporate data is organized, an investigator can navigate between interconnected companies to assess the network and quickly identify leads and names of entities or individuals of interest in network clusters. In a graph database, using software like Linkurious, it takes minimal time and effort to expand elements of an interconnected network, glean possible insights, and export the associated names. However, these efforts can quickly get out of hand, and a valuable spider’s web can easily turn into mangled chaos or overwhelming data overload.</p><p>Take the Gertler network. Just starting with the eight Gertler-linked companies incorporated in the DRC and sanctioned prior to 2021 quickly opened up hundreds of nodes within Linkurious. One address was connected to 24 companies and individuals, while a phone number was linked to 26 companies and individuals. In both cases, these contact details linked sanctioned companies to companies that were later found to be part of Gertler’s network and were subsequently sanctioned in 2021. It was a valuable exercise to sift through these connections and extract the truly valuable data from the noise.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/711/1*Vzg9PsQN87BlcmrVeDgYLQ.png" /><figcaption>Linkurious visualization of DRC corporate data related to Dan Gertler’s network. Image: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>The Sentry uses network analysis to identify sanctions evasion leads across many of its programs; as the Gertler example demonstrates, it’s a valuable tool to generate investigative leads. Following the publication of our 2023 report “<a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/">Architects of Terror</a>,” The Sentry has been using this method to monitor the possible evolution of companies linked to the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), given that several of the companies named in the report have now been sanctioned. While this analysis was at first overwhelming and is not enough on its own to substantiate a connection to Wagner, The Sentry was nevertheless able to prioritize leads for further investigation and monitoring by using a number of key indicators and connection types. This analysis identified 20 companies of interest.</p><p><strong>Finding only the trusted few</strong></p><p>In a web of data points and possibilities, there are a few key points to consider, especially when it comes to sanctions evasion. Since sanctioned actors often exploit a few loopholes and conceal their involvement using nominees, investigators can use clues and breadcrumbs left behind in corporate data to reveal a wider network. Identifying these trusted proxies is core to this analysis.</p><p><strong>Corporate ownership</strong>: This is the most obvious pathway to follow. Sanctioned entities may simply incorporate new subsidiaries as a method of sanctions evasion. When the US Treasury Department sanctions an individual or company, financial institutions are also required to end relationships with and freeze the assets of companies owned 50% or more by that individual or company, in what are known as “shadow designations.” Although banks are always responsible for treating shadow designations with the same rigor as individuals and entities explicitly named, in practice, shadow designations are not always publicly known, and research may be challenging to financial institutions unfamiliar with countries like the DRC or CAR. To give financial institutions the best chance of fully implementing sanctions, NGOs should publish previously non-disclosed shadow designations and shifts in ownership where new shadow designations are created, and they should also share information with the US Treasury Department, which may be able to swiftly add those shadow designations to sanctions lists.</p><p>In the Gertler case, the Gertler network had reorganized the parent companies of sanctioned entities, rather than their subsidiaries. Identifying these required first checking if the beneficial owners of the new parent companies included sanctioned actors such as Gertler and would therefore be shadow designations. In the Wagner case, The Sentry has identified 12 companies owned by Wagner-linked individuals named in the report and continues to monitor these companies.</p><p><strong>Key individuals:</strong> Sanctioned individuals often rely on close associates as proxies on official incorporation documents. While the beneficial owner may remain sanctioned, close associates can easily facilitate sanctions evasion with little detection. By identifying individuals linked to sanctioned companies, whether managers, shareholders, or representatives — especially new individuals linked to the companies after the sanctions are imposed — investigators may expose new elements of the network.</p><p>Gertler relied on close associates to manage his business empire. His close associate Pieter Albert Deboutte, linked to several of his companies, was sanctioned alongside Gertler himself in December 2017. The Sentry’s later analysis of the Gertler network identified Alain Mukonda Mayandu as the manager, representative, or shareholder for 17 companies. He was later sanctioned in December 2021. For the Wagner case, The Sentry uncovered previously unknown individuals in corporate records associated with Wagner-affiliated companies. These individuals may be acting as proxies and are linked to eight additional companies. Given the potential for future sanctions evasion, these companies warrant close scrutiny.</p><p><strong>Family members:</strong> Using family members as proxies is a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/88369/baby-on-board-how-kleptocrats-and-associates-use-family-members-to-evade-sanctions/">common tactic</a> used by kleptocrats and corrupt officials to control assets without being tied directly to them. This is particularly true for sanctioned individuals, as it’s less common for family members, especially minors, to be sanctioned for the actions of their parents or family members. This tactic is easier to visualize when family connections, particularly of political elites and sanctioned actors, are added to any network analysis or graph database of corporate data. Graph databases can also store time-relevant data, to monitor changes pre- and post-designation and shifts in ownership to family members.</p><p>For its South Sudan program, The Sentry has integrated corporate data with a mapping of family networks to visualize how family members might be used as proxies by political elites. In its 2021 alert, <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/south-sudanese-skirting-sanctions/">Sanctioned South Sudanese Businessmen Are Skirting US Sanctions</a>, The Sentry exposed how several companies that have received billions in US dollar-denominated contracts from the government of South Sudan were owned by relatives of two sanctioned individuals. Kur Ajing Ater and Benjamin Bol Mel Kuol, two influential South Sudanese businessmen sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Act, were potentially skirting sanctions.</p><p><strong>Contact details:</strong> While sanctioned individuals may replace their name with those of proxies, they may still use their own contact details if they retain control over the company. Corporate records may also use the address, phone number, or email of legal representatives or a law firm, rather than one connected to the company itself. Investigators may catch a lucky break by using contact details to connect various companies in a network or to identify the beneficial owner of a company. Phone numbers, email addresses, and addresses on official documents should always be verified. Thousands of records in the DRC corporate data, for example, included email addresses that did not exist but were instead based on a formula (<a href="/service/mailto:companyname@gmail.com">companyname@gmail.com</a>).</p><p>The Sentry’s South Sudan and DRC corporate data contains phone numbers. Corporate records have contained the phone numbers of the political elite, such as military generals and politicians, which can then be verified using open-source databases, such as TrueCaller and Pipl, and source-provided information. This is true even when an individual’s name is not on the corporate record itself. Addresses and phone numbers in The Sentry’s DRC corporate data helped narrow the list of possible companies into subsets of overlapping contact details to segment Gertler-linked companies from other companies incorporated by the same law firm.</p><p><strong>Law firms:</strong> Once they identify a law firm that is willing to do business with them, sanctioned individuals may choose to use the same firm to incorporate their companies, especially as high-risk individuals. Identifying these law firms and staying vigilant about their activities may reveal newly incorporated companies within the same network. However, law firms may have more than one client, and though having a legal firm in common may be an indicator that two companies are connected, it is far from certain. As a result, this data must be combined with other information and context to distinguish whether or not a firm is facilitating sanctions evasion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vFsG5MwwojcvU2-adeV9WQ.png" /><figcaption>Linkurious visualization of CAR corporate data related to the Wagner network. Image: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>Wagner-linked companies used several law firms to incorporate their companies. The Sentry identified over 150 companies using the same law firms as Wagner-linked companies.</p><p><strong>Don’t let it sit on the shelf</strong></p><p>This exercise is only lead generating, but when combined with new data sources or context, leads may turn into findings. Compiled lists of companies and individuals of interest are potential resources when other data sets become available. Investigators can then compare new data sources — such as lists of government tenders, import and export records, domain data, and LinkedIn data — against these lists, which may reveal whether a company is actually connected to a sanctions evasion network.</p><p>To tackle dynamic sanctions evasion networks, information sharing among NGOs and government authorities may help everyone connect the dots. For example, The Sentry identified a network of North Korean sanctions busters in its 2020 and 2021 reports <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/overt-affairs/">Overt Affairs</a> and <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/artful-dodgers/">Artful Dodgers</a> originally via DRC corporate data expanded through phone numbers and social media analysis. The Sentry worked closely with the UN Panel of Experts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, combining leads and intelligence with contextual expertise to expose a network with consequences for international peace and security — a collaboration that later led to sanctions.</p><p>Network analysis is a powerful tool for generating leads and uncovering sanctions evasion networks. While it requires an initial time investment to identify leads and monitor for new developments, its effectiveness is undeniable. As evasion tactics become more sophisticated, network analysis will become even more crucial in this ongoing fight.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=147daf1c1e2b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/keeping-a-watchful-eye-using-network-analysis-to-generate-leads-related-to-sanctions-evasion-147daf1c1e2b">Keeping a Watchful Eye: Using Network Analysis to Generate Leads Related to Sanctions Evasion</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar">The Sentry Sidebar</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Partners against crime: Harnessing the power of technology with budget in mind]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/partners-against-crime-harnessing-the-power-of-technology-with-budget-in-mind-0a9461ac94c8?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0a9461ac94c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nonprofit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigative-journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2024 17:04:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-12T17:04:41.259Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Technology firms have the tools to revolutionize investigative journalism, and while some are building higher barriers to access, others are opening their doors. Here’s The Sentry’s advice on how to pivot from old resources and engage new opportunities.</p><p><strong>The Golden Age of Social Media OSINT</strong></p><p>When The Sentry published “<a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/warcrimesshouldntpay/">War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay</a>” in 2016, the team took advantage of the free and open world of social media to expose the lavish lifestyle and luxury real estate of top officials responsible for mass atrocities in South Sudan. Back then, it was relatively simple to build an anonymous profile and take advantage of the troves of data published to social media platforms, all without exposing the investigation in a way that might spook the bad guys.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/682/1*DIe7uv3oHwVNrHLVsSlLoQ.png" /><figcaption>Image from The Sentry’s 2016 report, “War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay.”</figcaption></figure><p>Now years later, revelations about the use of social media to manipulate elections, the increase in bot accounts, and concerns about privacy have changed the ease with which someone can open an account, as well as the amount of data they can access. A temporary, non-attributable phone number no longer works to prove you’re a real person, and it’s been a challenge to balance the desire for access to information with the necessity of protecting an investigation.</p><p>In the wake of these challenges, the open-source intelligence (OSINT) community has continuously made valiant efforts to offer free tools for investigators, meaning that there are fewer hoops to jump through in order to securely access valuable intelligence. These tools take advantage of open application programming interface (API), which fewer and fewer social media platforms are making public. Even X, formerly known as Twitter, long one of the last social media companies whose data was free to access, has now created a paywall.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7DgqoFVBn-uSL7Gm7WQOLA.png" /><figcaption>API access levels on X. Photo: June 2024.</figcaption></figure><p>With an open API, you can use free online tools to visualize the trends of how fake news is shared and spread, compare followers to construct social networks and relationships between accounts, and archive account details and history, all with only a few clicks. Without it, not only has it become harder and harder to do social media-based investigations, but it also takes longer, especially as the platforms are making less information available and making it more difficult to protect your anonymity while investigating. This trend has meant that what once was a rich and free data source now is less powerful and more costly, in both time and money.</p><p><strong>Finding New Alternatives</strong></p><p>The shift away from easy access social media data through open APIs has meant an investigative rethink. Beyond social media, civil society and journalists can benefit from a wide range of technologies and databases. Corporate shareholdings and <a href="https://grid.rdc.com/wss/security/login.html">databases of politicians</a> are essential puzzle pieces in exposing wrongdoing — from the individuals profiting from arms trafficked to a war zone to the politicians winning lucrative government contracts and cashing in without completing the work. The opportunity to use <a href="https://linkurious.com/">data visualization</a> software can empower an investigator to see the missing link in a network and fill a gap in the story. <a href="https://www.maxar.com/">Satellite imagery</a> can expose changes on the ground over time. And <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/">cyber security tools</a> can be the difference between keeping a whistleblower safe and seeing them exposed.</p><p>Unfortunately, while these technologies are vital, they are often expensive, and the distance between a nonprofit budget and the market price can be challenging to overcome. Nevertheless, given our experience of how important technology can be to investigative success, The Sentry is frequently emailing technology companies to see if there’s space to work together.</p><p>Thankfully, doors are opening. Several organizations have paved the way in establishing partnerships with private companies that offer invaluable tools, resources, expertise, and data — access that journalists can usually only dream about. These partnerships can include data providers giving access to their product for free or at heavily reduced rates, which works especially well when onboarding a single customer is a marginal cost for the firm.</p><p><strong>Developing Partnerships</strong></p><p>From The Sentry’s experience, here are a few tips to keep in mind when negotiating for partnerships.</p><p><strong>It’s always worth asking.</strong> You can never exactly predict how a company will respond to your request. If they can’t offer you the product for free, ask if they have a nonprofit rate. Encourage them to start a reduced fee or free non-profit program if they don’t already have one. Sometimes it takes time to come to an agreement, but it’s often worth the wait. Be creative about where you might find savings. Can you use only one login instead of getting multiple profiles? Can you limit access to the full data set and only focus on the data you need for a lower price?</p><p><strong>Remember, you bring something to the table too</strong>. Companies are often looking for feedback to improve their product and customer experience. We are able to provide creative insights into their technologies, given that our use case may be different than that of a typical client. Additionally, nonprofits bring a wealth of knowledge and expertise that can be leveraged as payment in kind through webinars, joint events, and educational content for the company and its clients. The Sentry’s successful collaboration with <a href="https://thesentry.org/2022/02/09/6769/collaboration-sentry-moodys-analytics-fight-illicit-financial-flows/">Moody’s</a>, <a href="https://thesentry.org/2021/01/21/5232/refinitiv-joins-forces-sentry-prevent-war-criminals-abusing-financial-system/">Refinitiv</a>, and <a href="https://thesentry.org/2022/11/17/7472/sentry-partners-castellum-ai-expand-compliance-screening-impact/">Castellum.ai</a> are modelled as two-way data, expertise, and information sharing partnerships that improve financial transparency and support the fight against illicit financial flows. We’ve found a new audience in these partnerships and welcomed exposure.</p><p><strong>Provide insight into how their product might change the world, and how they’ll be recognized for it.</strong> As investigators and journalists, we never want to give away details of an upcoming story or investigation. This is a challenge when the story itself may encourage a private company to partner with you, especially if it will mean their company being cited alongside impressive findings. Practice pitching the impact of your work without giving away the work itself. How can you sell a ticket for joining the journey you’re on without sharing the details? Describe how the product or tool will contribute to the final report, how the company will be acknowledged, and how they’ll be able to share this with their clients and funders. Laying this out ahead of time preemptively answers questions from marketing and legal departments, and your answers may squash any lingering reservations that could prevent a partnership.</p><p><strong>If you find an open door, see if you can hold it open for someone else.</strong> When possible, The Sentry shares the opportunities we’ve uncovered with partner organizations and civil society groups. Nonprofit pricing and programs are not always well advertised, and this information should be shared widely so that others can take advantage of these programs. Many companies have a specific point person who acts as an account manager for nonprofits and who is familiar with the intricacies of working with a nonprofit, from unique payment plans to security concerns to discount opportunities. When sharing opportunities, make direct introductions to their account manager, if you can.</p><p>The Sentry is immensely grateful for the partnerships we’ve formed and discounts we’ve received. Hopefully more companies will follow suit and see that the benefits of close collaboration can be more valuable than the sticker price of a subscription or product license. It all starts with opening the door to a conversation and entering with an open mind.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0a9461ac94c8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/partners-against-crime-harnessing-the-power-of-technology-with-budget-in-mind-0a9461ac94c8">Partners against crime: Harnessing the power of technology with budget in mind</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar">The Sentry Sidebar</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Staying a step ahead]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/staying-a-step-ahead-177b9b07e89d?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/177b9b07e89d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Feb 2024 20:13:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-15T15:05:00.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>How data sharing collaboration between civil society and the private sector can cut corrupt networks off from the international financial system</em></p><p><strong>The never-ending need for data</strong></p><p>It always feels like illicit actors are two steps ahead. Their companies are designed to operate under the radar. They form new companies faster than governments can issue sanctions designations. And if they are designated or have received a little negative press coverage, they adapt, moving their corporate networks into their family members’ names, shuffling ownership structures, or replacing their names on documents with those of proxies.</p><p>For financial institutions that are required to end relationships and freeze the assets of those on sanctions lists, these evasion tactics can make it challenging to uphold their obligations. If financial institutions and private companies were to only end relationships when required by government authorities, they’d constantly be behind the curve of real risks to their business. They’d risk being entangled in relationships that might be complicated to end; they’d risk their reputations and the possibility of having to explain to their shareholders why they were engaged in business with now-sanctioned actors.</p><p>To identify companies and individuals that might be linked to corrupt officials, war profiteers, or terrorist financiers — and thus be inherently risky — financial institutions and private companies need deep, rich data. Data on the networks facilitating corrupt actors’ activities, the patterns they use to evade detection, and the context in which they are operating is vital to understanding the related money laundering and corruption typologies at play. It is in the best interests of financial institutions and businesses around the world to proactively consider these risks in their decision making, and it’s why so many of them rely on third-party data providers as part of their screening process.</p><p>Given the global coverage of these data providers, their databases often only scratch the surface, lacking depth. For instance, they may have a profile for a major politician involved in a corruption scandal, but they may be missing key details such as a list of his companies, family members he’s used as proxies, or identifying details — phone numbers, emails, and ID numbers — that might be used when opening an account.</p><p>This is where The Sentry comes in.</p><p><strong>Sharing for the common good</strong></p><p>Civil society is often the first to reveal acts of corruption and expose the corporate networks of elites. But because it can take years for investigative findings or the work of an advocacy organization to turn into government action, we need a faster mechanism to make these findings actionable.</p><p>Sharing deep data from investigations with data providers can be highly impactful, as it bridges possible information gaps, increases the likelihood of more confident screening matches with more data points, and provides more context for risk-related decision making. In most cases, this deep data goes beyond what The Sentry publicly reports. There are meaningful data points that don’t make it onto the page, often to avoid information overload, center a story around key characters, or eliminate extraneous details from narrative storytelling.</p><blockquote>Because it can take years for investigative findings or the work of an advocacy organization to turn into government action, we need a faster mechanism to make these findings actionable.</blockquote><p>For example, in our reports <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/overt-affairs/">Overt Affairs</a> and <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/artful-dodgers/">Artful Dodgers</a>, The Sentry exposed a network of North Korean companies operating throughout West and Central Africa that were involved in sanctions evasion and sanctions busting, undertaking public works projects to earn US dollars. These activities undermined international efforts to disrupt the North Korean government’s access to the international financial system, enacted because of the danger that revenue generated overseas could ultimately be used to fund the country’s nuclear weapons program.</p><p>After publication in 2020, The Sentry shared with data providers deep data on the 4 companies and 8 individuals involved, including individuals connected to the companies not explicitly named in The Sentry’s reporting. This data, obtained from primary documents reviewed by The Sentry, included identifiers such as dates of birth; ID numbers; company numbers; contact details including email addresses, phone numbers, and addresses; and the names of other linked entities not contained in the reports. Given that we already had evidence these companies and individuals were able to use the international financial system, it was vitally important for banks to proactively look out for these known sanctions busters. Our detailed information allowed banks to be ahead of the curve by almost three years; the entities and individuals named in our reports were sanctioned by the US in <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230301">March 2023</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5DxrEbjkrv1auA_gG_jwYA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Example of the data compiled and shared by The Sentry. Source: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>By taking proactive action in this way, companies can mitigate not only against sanctions risks, but also against other risks — such as corruption and wildlife trafficking — that are meaningful to their shareholders and their reputations. And when sanctions do come through, there’s less mess to clean up, fewer PR challenges to address, and fewer remediation costs and fines when the shop has been kept tidy from the start.</p><p><strong>Data doesn’t need to be complicated</strong></p><p>With some simple infrastructure and the right preparation in place, a data sharing partnership can be a low-lift, high-reward activity for investigative outfits and non-profit organizations. What’s more, it doesn’t require highly experienced data talent — the data pipeline can be incredibly simple. The Sentry uses a standardized Excel spreadsheet. No need for a fancy database or complex integrated data system; there are data experts on the other side, and they’ll want to customize and reconfigure the data anyway. The simplicity of a standardized Excel spreadsheet results in easier creation, fewer errors, and a quicker review process that doesn’t require onboarding onto a new technology.</p><p>At The Sentry, our process starts by thinking through our investigations with a data mindset. Knowing that we will be sharing data at the end of the investigation lets us not only proactively store data points as we come across them, but also take the extra effort to search for them when they’re nearby. While looking into one company, we might check to see whether the same shareholders have other companies in the same jurisdiction. Or we may stop to look at the identification page for corporate shareholdings to make note of the date of birth of a shareholder.</p><p>Establishing an uncomplicated standard workflow makes storing, exporting, and sharing data simple. Oftentimes, investigations involve analyzing primary pieces of evidence that are filled with data points such as contact details, legal personnel, identifiers, and aliases. Storing these data points enables data sharing later on, but it also levels up your own investigation. At The Sentry, we use a neo4j graph database to pivot off these data points to find new connections and identify clusters that might provide insight into new networks. The data is also handy when it comes time to write request for comment letters, providing an opportunity to verify the accuracy of contact details. Our neo4j database then exports neatly into an Excel spreadsheet, and with a few tweaks, we’re ready to share.</p><p>By translating our data into an actionable format, it can be added to filters used millions of times a day to make decisions. It’s an extra step that can make a big difference in disabling the multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=177b9b07e89d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/staying-a-step-ahead-177b9b07e89d">Staying a step ahead</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar">The Sentry Sidebar</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A brief history of our data visualization: From word documents to interactive graph databases]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/a-brief-history-of-our-data-visualization-from-word-documents-to-interactive-graph-databases-004994b12c54?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/004994b12c54</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jan 2024 17:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-02T14:40:51.426Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Sentry’s hard-hitting investigations require immense attention to detail and deep analysis of complex relationships and storylines. The subjects of our investigations often attempt to obscure the truth, hide their involvement, and distance themselves from the allegations using a suite of tricks and tools. Our investigators face the challenge of exposing wrongdoing every day, and they need the right tools and data to make sense of the twists and turns as they dig into their stories. They also need resources to serendipitously stumble upon findings that expose a new layer, add a new character, or reveal a completely new storyline.</p><p>Arriving at the right resources to enable this kind of discovery has been an ongoing and iterative process. The Sentry’s current database — a neo4j graph database visualized using the platform Linkurious — contains over 150 million pieces of data and has proven to be an invaluable resource. But we didn’t start there, and the journey to our Linkurious database exemplifies both the importance of voluminous data collection and exploration in investigative reporting and the ways in which embracing new technologies and visualizations can accelerate and enhance analysis.</p><p><strong>The dossier</strong></p><p>The Sentry’s investigators evaluate scams and scandals involving dozens — sometimes hundreds — of companies and individuals. In the early days of the organization, to keep track of all the data and connections, The Sentry used dossiers — text documents that contained every last detail of each network. Meticulously created and updated, these dossiers spanned hundreds of pages and contained thousands of data points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AnzyrLbIHLYFECAghGjxIg.png" /><figcaption>An example of a dossier. Photo: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>A dossier contained entries for individuals, entities, and assets. Within each dossier entry were connections to other entries within the same document. For instance, if someone was a shareholder in a company, that company also had a profile in the dossier that listed that person as a shareholder. The connections were there, but it wasn’t always easy to wrap your head around them. It was even trickier to keep track of the less obvious connections, such as shared phone numbers or addresses, family or familiar relationships, and contracts between businesses. These details filled the notes sections, but there was always the concern that we were missing key connections or that we had forgotten to update a data point across the various listings to ensure comprehensive inclusion in every relevant entry.</p><p><strong>The network visual</strong></p><p>Dossiers gave us information, but they didn’t let us see it from another angle clearly. Given the level of complexity of The Sentry’s investigations, investigators needed some way of visualizing the networks they understood so deeply, especially if they wanted an audience to follow along with their stories. To help the reader understand how everyone was connected, The Sentry turned to network visuals produced using Omnigraffle — what we like to call “omnis.” While our reports dug into the evidence and laid out the details in depth, omnis quickly became a sharable hit. After all, seeing is believing.</p><p>For The Sentry, omnis became important complements to the dossiers. We added omnis to information and sanctions packages we submitted to our government partners, highlighting the critical connections that can sometimes get lost in the data and exposing the key enablers pinning networks together. We incorporated omnis into more and more of our reports: we featured 12 in “<a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/making-a-killing/">Making a Killing</a>” in May 2020.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PxJrBFeklftGJvPvYoxpWQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>An omni graphic from The Sentry’s 2020 report, “Making a Killing.” Photo: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>While omnis offered a visual representation critical to conveying our findings, our knowledge management capacities were still missing an upgrade. The kleptocracy networks at the core of The Sentry’s investigations often feature recurring characters, and sometimes these networks are connected to one another across borders. Dossiers with omnis stored information well for a single investigation, but collaboration was challenging. We needed a tool that would allow us to store our knowledge base, connect data points, and visualize networks in a more dynamic manner.</p><p><strong>The graph database</strong></p><p>Enter <a href="https://linkurious.com/">Linkurious</a>, a visualization tool for graph databases. The software had been successfully used by the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) for years, including as part of their work exploring the Panama Papers. Graph databases were born for this purpose. They could capture the depth of data we were storing in dossiers, while also visually representing relationships. The hundreds of pages of dossiers would turn into hundreds of nodes, connected with hundreds of edges, storing thousands of properties on both the nodes and the edges. Plus, with export capabilities from Linkurious to Excel, we always had the option to recreate dossiers when we needed them.</p><p>And so The Sentry’s neo4j database visualized within Linkurious was born. The early days were focused on creating a knowledge base for ongoing investigations. Our data team converted dossiers into spreadsheets based on the data schema and produced the corresponding nodes and edges within neo4j. Investigators then had access to the networks from their current work within Linkurious, and they could add nodes and edges manually as they continued investigating.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8lrDHYncS1ultjHUYU7JvQ.png" /><figcaption>Sample simple graph model. Photo: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p>We had made omnis come to life. It was possible to edit and revise them in real time and to capture even the tiniest details within the many available properties for each node and edge.</p><p>This was cool. And it was starting to really pay off. Ever-changing networks, such as those used by war profiteers and sanctions evaders, were challenging to keep up to date, as they shift to avoid detection. With Linkurious, it was easier to see the connective tissue — phone numbers, addresses, enablers — that exposed new companies and members of the network. We could submit valuable intelligence to governments on these new suspected front companies and accomplices.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9OxVoF1HC-EYSoQXBwfPmQ.png" /><figcaption>Example of a complex network graphic. Photo: The Sentry.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>More data</strong></p><p>With Linkurious, we were maximizing our ability to take advantage of the knowledge we already possessed and giving investigators new ways to analyze and make sense of their data. But the ultimate mission was still to reveal findings that investigators didn’t already know — findings that they hadn’t even considered. That was going to take data. Lots and lots of data.</p><p>We started importing the obvious: corporate registries. We’d never worked with such large data sets and crashed the system immediately, but it was worth the pain of sorting out our mistakes. The networks we had painstakingly added to the database manually now simply existed within it, ready to be explored. In less than a year, our database had gone from hundreds of nodes to data sets featuring millions of nodes.</p><p>Next, we began combining data sets, using POSSIBLE_MATCH edges to ease navigation. We wanted investigators to learn as much about a person or company as they could within the platform. We added lists of politicians, sanctioned actors, and military personnel. We layered in social media data that provided work experience and contact details. We used the custom actions feature to enable investigators to search names in other databases, such as OpenCorporates, in an adjoining tab. We couldn’t fit everything into our database, but we could make it accessible with the click of a button.</p><p>Today, our Linkurious database is not only a knowledge base storing networks exposed in over 50 Sentry reports, but also an investigative playground for finding new connections, discovering new insights, and analyzing data in new ways. Over 150 million nodes later, who knows what we will find next. As more journalism outfits and NGOs turn to graph databases, collaboration within the platform becomes easier, not only within our own organization, but with our partners, as well. The journey was long, but the results are magic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=004994b12c54" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar/a-brief-history-of-our-data-visualization-from-word-documents-to-interactive-graph-databases-004994b12c54">A brief history of our data visualization: From word documents to interactive graph databases</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-sentry-sidebar">The Sentry Sidebar</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Four Years Since the Pope’s “Shocking” Kiss: Papal Visit Underscores Delays in Peace Deal and…]]></title>
            <link>https://thesentry.medium.com/four-years-since-the-popes-shocking-kiss-papal-visit-underscores-delays-in-peace-deal-and-d6316bdef67e?source=rss-8f543b98448------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6316bdef67e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[salva-kiir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pope-francis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south-sudan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Sentry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Feb 2023 22:26:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-03T22:26:49.787Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Four Years Since the Pope’s “Shocking” Kiss: Papal Visit Underscores Delays in Peace Deal and Suffering in South Sudan</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xbtu7vu1zJn3q-9gK7jESA.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Brian Adeba</p><p>In a gesture that shocked his guests, Pope Francis went down on his knees and kissed the feet of South Sudan’s warring leaders at the Vatican in April of 2019. The pope then counseled President Salva Kiir and his former vice president, Riek Machar, to put aside their differences and actively pursue implementation of the national peace agreement that the two men had signed eight months before.</p><p>The South Sudanese people, Pope Francis said, were watching their leaders with an “ardent desire for justice, reconciliation, and peace.”</p><p>As Pope Francis visits South Sudan on February 4, almost four years later, the situation is still dire in many parts of the country. Despite President Kiir and reinstated Vice President Machar forming a government of national unity and merging their armies as stipulated in the peace agreement, peace remains elusive to the vast majority of South Sudanese. Communal violence between government forces, militia groups, and rebels continues to tear the country apart in the states of Warrap, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Jonglei.</p><p>Rebels who have not signed the peace agreement continue to wage war against the government in a conflict that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan says has seen all parties complicit in instigating attacks against civilians. In Upper Nile State alone, an uptick in violence at the end of last year displaced 20,000 people, prompting Kenyan President William Ruto to order an airlift of food assistance to the displaced. So far, talks to bridge differences and advance peace talks with the hold-out rebels have stalled.</p><p>Meanwhile, key stipulations in the agreement to address rampant corruption in the country and ensure transitional justice have yet to be implemented. In the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, South Sudan ranks as the world’s most corrupt country. This corruption causes government salaries to be delayed, dampening the morale of the civil service, including the military, and reducing their ability to deliver services and control the widespread violence.</p><p>Further, corruption has led to the missed deadlines in implementing the peace agreement that are a major hurdle to realizing holistic peace. At their most basic, missed deadlines mean power-sharing arrangements are pushed back, creating unnecessary tension between all parties to the conflict and the absence of political authority to mitigate crises at the state level. At this moment, most predictions about South Sudan’s future paint a grim picture of war, displacement, and disease.</p><p>During his visit, the pope will talk about peace and reconciliation in the country. He will meet internally displaced people and preside over an ecumenical prayer. This visit offers an opportunity for South Sudanese politicians to act on the unimplemented sections of the agreement like the institutional reforms that are vital to combating corruption to ensure the effectiveness of government. As well, action needs to be taken on the transitional justice mechanisms in the agreement to unite the divided communities of South Sudan for the purposes of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.</p><p>More broadly, Pope Francis’ visit shines a global spotlight on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. The countries in the region that are guarantors to the peace agreement must use this visit as an opportunity to put pressure on politicians in Juba to implement the peace agreement in its entirety.</p><p>Recalling his encounter with the pope at the feet-kissing event at the Vatican in 2019, President Kiir told the South Sudanese Parliament, “I was shocked and trembled when His Holiness the Pope kissed our feet. It was a blessing and can be a curse if we play games with the lives of our people.”</p><p>The pope’s visit is the opportune time to remind South Sudan’s leaders of President Kiir’s words and the urgent task to break the curse that has been unfolding in the country.</p><p><strong><em>Brian Adeba</em></strong><em> is Deputy Director of Policy at </em><a href="http://www.thesentry.org/"><em>The Sentry</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6316bdef67e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>