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            <title><![CDATA[No Motivations for the Gettier Problem]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/no-motivations-for-the-gettier-problem-8fc8e713026b?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2025 17:58:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-13T17:58:57.791Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>No Motivations for the Gettier Problem — Do We Need Anything More Than A Justified Belief?</strong></h3><p><em>Analysis of Kaplan’s paper “It’s Not What You Know That Counts” for redefining knowledge</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pqCRZXR00e2p-kPu" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jasonwong23?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jason W</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Introduction</strong></h4><p>The consequence of Gettier’s two counterexamples, which show that there can be cases in which a person has justified true belief but cannot be said to have knowledge, led to numerous attempts by epistemologists to fix the analysis of propositional knowledge in order to make it Gettier-proof. Mark Kaplan, however, points out that very little work has been done in order to understand the importance (or lack thereof) of Gettier’s counterexamples.</p><p>This is the task that he undertakes from two angles:</p><p>1. He argues that the definition of knowledge that Gettier targeted is not of historical importance, while also arguing that appeal to history is not good grounds for epistemological importance.</p><p>2. He argues that the revision of this definition is not of contemporary importance, as progress in rational inquiry is what counts as progress in epistemology, and solving the Gettier problem does not contribute to this in any way.</p><p>The conclusion that he draws is that the act of knowledge attribution is of no significance, i.e., “ what you know does not matter”.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p><strong><em>1.1. Kaplan’s Main Argument</em></strong></p><p>Kaplan is against the trend of arguing over the revision of the conception of knowledge that has taken over epistemology post-Gettier’s publication. His main argument in the paper can be understood as follows:</p><p>Premise 1: Philosophical inquiry should not be motivated by historical appeal, and it appears as if the importance of Gettier’s counter-examples is rooted in their critique of Plato’s definition of knowledge.</p><p>Premise 2: The JTB account of knowledge and the revised, post-Gettier accounts are of no significance to epistemology because they do not help us progress in the central aim of epistemology, which is rational inquiry.</p><p>Conclusion: Epistemological efforts should not be wasted on the idealized notion of knowledge attribution, and, therefore, should stop trying to resolve the Gettier problem. Instead, these efforts should be directed to making progress in the method of inquiry itself.</p><p>The blog is divided into three sections. The first section elaborates upon the first premise mentioned above, and the second section elaborates upon the second premise, followed by a conclusion on the basis of the understanding of the text. The third section attempts a critical engagement of Kaplan’s paper with the work of Linda Zagzebski (<em>The Inescapability of Gettier)</em>, along with a brief mention of other texts (Plato and Alvin Goldman) that deal with the common theme of conception of knowledge and its method of inquiry.</p><h4><strong>2.</strong> <strong>No Historical Motivation: Premise 1</strong></h4><p>The first premise can be further broken down and understood through the following argument:</p><p>Premise 1.1: The JTB definition is not obviously Platonic.</p><p>Premise 1.2: Other traditional definitions of propositional knowledge, like that of Descartes, foreclose the possibility of Gettier cases.</p><p>Conclusion 1/ Premise 1: Gettier’s counterexamples cannot make any serious appeals to the traditional understanding of knowledge.</p><p><strong><em>2.1. Elaboration on Premise 1.1.</em></strong></p><p>Kaplan points out that one of the primary reasons for taking a philosophical problem seriously is its connection to a great philosopher. In the case of Gettier, this great philosopher was considered to be Plato. This view that Plato is the one who proposed the JTB definition of knowledge has been held by Gettier himself as well as by scholars like Roderick Chisholm and A.M. MacIver. Kaplan, however, believes that the tracing back of this definition to Plato is inaccurate as each of the attempts to arrive at a definition of knowledge (in <em>Theaetetus</em> or in <em>Meno</em>) had been criticized and rejected. Moreover, Kaplan argues that Plato’s attempts to define ‘knowledge’ seem to only have been concerned with the issue of non-propositional knowledge and not with propositional knowledge. This argument rests on the use of objects like ‘wagon’ and verbs like ‘tethered’ in Plato’s texts. However, even if Plato was talking about propositional knowledge, such a claim is not one that is obvious, and Gettier’s claim of critiquing the Platonic definition of knowledge requires to be ‘taken with a grain of salt’.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p><strong><em>2.2. Elaboration on Premise 1.2.</em></strong></p><p>If the claim is made that Gettier’s counterexamples gain their importance from their refutation of the traditional definition of knowledge, then it can be countered by reasoning that Descartes, who is unarguably a prominent member of the epistemological tradition, proposed an understanding of knowledge that is Gettier-proof. Kaplan explains Descartes’ conception of knowledge was restricted to ‘true and evident cognition’ and does not consider as a basis for knowledge what Gettier’s counterexamples were dealing with– “justified, yet false belief”, i.e., Descartes’ framework rejects the possibility of there being ‘fallible means of justification that can yield knowledge”.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> Therefore, Gettier’s counterexamples would not be applicable to such a conception of knowledge.</p><p>Even after providing strong grounds for demolishing the supposition that the Gettier problem is of significance because of its critique of a historically important understanding of knowledge, Kaplan emphasizes that “Philosophical problems need not be old to be urgent”, by which he points out that a number of epistemological issues that are of considerable importance in current debates were not the concerns of ‘great’ philosophers like Plato or Descartes, but this fact does not diminish their significance in any way.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> Therefore, the inverse of this fact, or the assignment of epistemological significance to concepts or issues solely because of their historical rootedness, should also be done away with.</p><h4><strong>3.</strong> <strong>No Contemporary Motivation: Premise 2</strong></h4><p>After demolishing the argument that the Gettier counter-examples derive their importance from their critique of a historically important conception of knowledge, Kaplan argues that they do not hold any relevance for contemporary epistemology either.</p><p>He explains how the problems that occupied a position of epistemological significance during the 20th century would not have found a place in the epistemology of historically important philosophers like Plato and Descartes. For instance, the force of the logical positivist pursuit of defining cognitive significance and eradicating metaphysics from the scope of philosophy does not rest on any historical basis, and neither does the search for the criteria for law-likeness as different from accidental generalizations. However, pursuits like the two mentioned above are of epistemological importance solely because their aim or motivation is to ‘define the proper conduct of inquiry’.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Kaplan argues that the same cannot be said for the Gettier problem. He argues that the motivation behind solving the Gettier problem cannot be that its solution will help make progress in the process of our inquiry. The elaboration of this premise seems to be the central focus of the paper. It can be further divided into the following five premises:</p><p>Premise 2.1. The Gettier problem does not affect the process of inquiry, which only deals with justified beliefs and does not require a definition of knowledge</p><p>Premise 2.2. So far, there has been no consensus or clear solution regarding the way to distinguish between knowledge and justified true belief from the point of view of the inquirer</p><p>Premise 2.3. Knowledge attribution is of no significance because we rely on justification (for decision making) and not the distinction between knowledge and belief</p><p>Premise 2.4. Even if we were to reach a solution (2.3.), our process of assessing beliefs through their justification (in practice) would be unaffected by this newfound precise (theoretical) definition of knowledge. As such, we are already conducting epistemological inquiry without a precise definition of knowledge.</p><p>Conclusion 2/ Premise 2: The efforts to address the Gettier problem and redefine knowledge are misguided and unimportant to the goal of furthering rational inquiry.</p><p><strong><em>3.1.Elaboration on Premise 2.1.</em></strong></p><p>Kaplan analyses the role of the JTB definition of knowledge in epistemological inquiry. For a subject undertaking inquiry, there seems to be no difference between a knowledge claim and a claim that is true and justified. What this implies is that once the subject has a justification for a claim that is true, there is nothing else they can do to determine whether they know that claim or do not know that claim. The question regarding what the subject knows from what the subject does not know becomes superfluous in this JTB analysis, but is, as Kaplan contends, a central concern of epistemological inquiry. Labelling a claim as ‘knowledge’ is reduced to an ‘honorific’ act when one gets tired of using the term ‘justified’.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Having put forth the previous argument, Kaplan argues that the efforts to address and resolve the Gettier problem are met with a similar fate, because once there is an amended condition of justification, or whatever criteria is taken for something to be good evidence for someone to know something, there is no difference between ‘knowing’ and having good reasons to believe something. Even if the Gettier problem was solved, and there was an agreement regarding what separates cases of knowledge from those that are not, such a solution would not be of any use to epistemology, which is only concerned with rational inquiry and not the refinement of the definition of knowledge.</p><p><strong><em>3.2. Elaboration of Premise 2.2.</em></strong></p><p>The above (Premise 2.1.) illustrates how the subject, once in belief of having fulfilled the set conditions, is incapable of doing anything else to distinguish cases of knowledge from those that are not. This becomes an issue because Kaplan argues that defining proper conduct of inquiry involves means of distinguishing between the following three:<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>1. Subject believes P with justification</p><p>2. Subject has a justified true belief</p><p>3. Subject has a justified true belief that is not grounded in any false premise</p><p>Even though the three cases mentioned above are different, they are not different for the subject themselves or the inquirer, as Kaplan asserts. Therefore, if one is to adhere to a particular analysis of knowledge, regardless of whether it is JTB or post-Gettier, one must admit that all three of the above are the same. Kaplan points out that it makes no difference which of the three (or other) analyses of knowledge a subject adheres to if there is nothing better they could have done in their epistemological inquiry. Therefore, if one is to reserve attribution of knowledge to claims that fulfil 3), and not merely 1) and 2), then only a third person would be in a position to claim that what is knowledge as per the analysis given in 1) or 2) is not knowledge as it fails the analysis given in 3). The shortcomings of the particular flawed route to the true belief that fails to be knowledge but yet is justified for the subject can be pointed out by a third person who is in a position to recognise where the flaw is by criticizing the route itself, and not the subject’s performance. This third person will be in a position to say, as Kaplan claims, “Even though your inferring that P is above criticism in the case under discussion, the inference itself is not.”<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> However, informing a subject (who is in no way to blame but instead is a victim of the occurrence of unlikely events) of the flaw in their reasoning, or of the reasons for withholding or attributing knowledge per a certain analysis holds no epistemological relevance to Kaplan.</p><p>Kaplan states that analyzing whether or not a claim passes critical scrutiny is an important aim of epistemology. He gives the following reasons for believing that solving the Gettier problem does not help in this aim. We are critically scrutinizing beliefs when we look for justifications for them and assess the fitness of these justifications. Any corroboration through this process is obscure at best because of the fallibility of inductive reasoning. Improvements can be made in the process of critical scrutiny through an improvement in this process used to assess arguments. However, in the case of Gettier’s counterexamples, one (who is external) is able to detect easily what cases of knowledge are and are not, and is not introduced to any new problem that improves the process of critical scrutiny. This is because the lesson that Gettier cases teach is–that a true conclusion is unconvincing if it is based on a false premise–is one that is obvious.</p><p>Kaplan argues that modern epistemology goes against Descartes in admitting that there are no “demonstrably infallible methods of justification” available to us.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> Therefore, we need to admit that the feature that separates ‘knowledge’ from fallible justified belief and ‘not knowledge’ from fallible justified belief is undetectable for us. This admission is necessary for there to even be the problem of determining which justified true beliefs do not constitute as knowledge, which is central to Gettier’s counter examples. Kaplan reasons that it is this admission of ‘undetectability’ that both gives rise to the Gettier’s problem and becomes the grounds for its irrelevance. There is no point in coming up with a problem that the subject cannot address and thereby cannot improve the process of rational inquiry in the process of solving it.</p><p><strong><em>3.3. Elaboration for Premise 2.3. and 2.4.</em></strong></p><p>In considering of importance the solutions to the Gettier problem, one is assuming that determining what the general account of the ascription of knowledge to a subject is something that helps in an epistemological inquiry, but this assumption is unfounded as there are no independent grounds for holding that knowledge attribution is of such important that we should look for ‘an adequate theory of rational inquiry’ that addresses Gettier’s problem. Kaplan notes that such a project might have found importance in the 17th century, when Descartes was creating an epistemological framework in which justification occupied a central place in the process of inquiry and helped in determining what we know as distinct from what we merely believe. However, Descartes assumed what has been disproved now, as there cannot be special psychological states of knowing.</p><p>As per our contemporary conception, the best we can do while aiming for knowledge is to aim for justified belief and hope that it meets the conditions that a justified belief needs to meet in order to be knowledge. Therefore, the process of rational inquiry comes down to determining what counts as justification and securing an account for justification is much more important than analyzing when it is justified to attribute knowledge to a subject for a particular justified claim. Through this line of thought, Kaplan argues that it does not matter is there is disagreement regarding what counts as knowledge, as long as there is agreement regarding what counts as justification. Therefore, knowledge as our conception becomes irrelevant in making progress in epistemological inquiry. Kaplan remarks, “It is not the concept of knowledge, but rather our conception of knowledge that is to blame.”<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><h4><em>3.4. Kaplan’s Conclusion</em></h4><p>As per Kaplan’s paper, Gettier’s problem does not respond to any problem that would have been found relevant by historical philosophers like Plato and Descartes, nor does it address any contemporary problem that epistemologists are dealing with in order to understand and improve the process of inquiry. The cases in which a claim fulfils the conditions of the analysis but fails to be ‘knowledge’ are those in which the subject themselves could not have done anything differently or better as an epistemic inquirer. What Kaplan seems to be advocating for is a more pragmatic focus of epistemology on methods of inquiry through an exposition of how solving the Gettier, if it is even possible to do so, would fail to make any meaningful difference. This leads Kaplan to his most decisive point in the paper: What we ‘know’ does not matter once we admit that the quest for providing a foolproof analysis of knowledge which helps us detect cases that do not count as knowledge is not possible if we are to use the only methods of rational inquiry that are currently available to us–which are fallible methods of rational inquiry. The idealized notion of knowledge attribution is of no concern to epistemology, and therefore epistemologists should not waste their efforts in figuring out what distinguished a justified true belief from knowledge.</p><h4><strong>4.</strong> <strong>Critical Engagement with Other Philosophers</strong></h4><p>In <em>Meno</em>, Plato can be interpreted as emphasizing that we should not restrict epistemological significance to only knowledge, but also consider the value true beliefs have for us. This was motivated by a practical concern post the realization that in most of our daily affairs, acting solely on the basis of knowledge would not be feasible, and most of the times, what we take to be true beliefs would have to suffice. The same sentiment is reflected in Kaplan’s paper through his appeal to epistemologists to reconsider the importance given to the conception of knowledge as a special and distinct epistemological state. It seems to be motivated by his realization of our practical and psychological constrains as epistemic subjects. Following from this reasoning, one common strand of reasoning between the three — Kaplan, Zagzebski and Goldman — is to separate truth and justification because they recognize that the epistemic subject has no idea what the truth, in itself, is. Accepting the fallibility of the subject, they admit that it is not guaranteed that evidence or justification will show the subject the path to the truth, as truth might lie elsewhere. Goldman alerts us to the possibility that a proposition may be true without being known. What is common between all these attempts is their challenge to the centrality of the notion of (certainly true) knowledge.</p><p>When it comes to their treatment of the Gettier problem, Kaplan and Zagzebski can be said to differ greatly. While Zagzebski argues that the Gettier problem is inescapable for any definition of knowledge, Kaplan’s concern is to challenge the very endeavor of coming up with a definition of knowledge, especially with the intention of making it Gettier-proof. For Zagzebski, the Gettier problem is inescapable because it arises from the very structure of any definition of knowledge that is of the JTB kind. This is because truth and justification are, and need to stay independent of each other, allowing for there to be cases of justified true beliefs that are not knowledge. This distinction, however, is of no importance to Kaplan, who argues that it is not relevance to the practice of rational inquiry, which only involves justification. While Zagzebski (and also Goldman) calls for a reconceptualization of knowledge, Kaplan calls for an evaluation of the (lack of) need for the reconceptualization of knowledge. Therefore, the key difference between them is in terms of their methodological approach to the Gettier problem: Zagzebski accepts the problem as a significant epistemological challenge and gives arguments for why it is inevitable given how we conceptualize knowledge. Kaplan, on the other hand, denies the belief that the Gettier problem holds any epistemological significance and argues that its importance is a result of our conceptualization of knowledge — of our obsession or over-intellectualization of the notion of knowledge which caused it to be completely divorced to how we attempt to pursue knowledge in (rational) practice. This stark difference between their treatment of the same problem gives rise to the question of whether addressing the inescapability of the Gettier problem by rethinking how we define knowledge is a worthy project if, as Kaplan argues, such a quest would fail to have any effect on our understanding or improving of the process of rational inquiry.</p><p>Therefore, in terms of their treatment of knowledge, Kaplan seems to be much more radical than Plato or Zagzebski. The latter two admit the difficulty and possible futility of defining (or redefining) knowledge, but still treat this quest to be of considerable epistemological importance. Kaplan, in contrast, argues that this difficulty is not a problem for epistemology at all, as for the purpose of rational inquiry, justified belief is sufficient.</p><h4><strong>References</strong></h4><p>Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” <em>Analysis</em>. Vol. 23. Oxford University Press, June 1963.</p><p>Goldman, Alvin I. “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>. Vol. 64. Journal of Philosophy, Inc., June 22, 1967. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024268.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024268.</a></p><p>— — — . “Epistemology and Cognition.” HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1986.</p><p>Kaplan, Mark. “It’s Not What You Know That Counts.” <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>. Vol. 82. Journal of Philosophy, Inc., July 1985. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026524.">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026524.</a></p><p>Zagzebski, Linda. “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.” <em>The Philosophical Quarterly</em>. Vol. 44. Blackwell Publishers, 1994. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/44/174/65/1563539.">https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/44/174/65/1563539.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Mark Kaplan, “It’s Not What You Know That Counts,” <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>, vol. 82 (Journal of Philosophy, Inc., July 1985), 362.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Kaplan, “It’s Not What You Know That Counts.”, 352.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Kaplan, 353.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Kaplan, 353.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Kaplan, 354.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Kaplan, 355.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Kaplan, 356.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Kaplan, 357.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Kaplan, 361.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Kaplan, 360.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fc8e713026b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Importance of Doubt in Cartesian Philosophical Method]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/importance-of-doubt-in-cartesian-philosophical-method-ef1a25772270?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-mind]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Dec 2024 18:32:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-12-24T18:32:24.010Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Doubt ‘clears the ground’ for an assumption/misbelief free study</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sTlvbga0tPfZ5lBs" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@julietfurst?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Juliet Furst</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The 17th-century French philosopher Rene Descartes had a radical approach to the philosopher’s quest for truth. He wanted to devise a method of scientific enquiry that would guarantee the truth of its conclusion. The prevalent methods of deduction and induction lacked this certainty. The former used certain unquestioned foundational premises and built systems of belief upon them, whereas the latter provided probable beliefs at best. He believed both of these to be unfit for scientific enquiry. In this sense, his project was pedagogical. He wanted to overhaul the current system of education and change what is taught, and how it is taught. Cartesian method should not be confused with deductive logic, or else Descartes would have had to begin with a set of given premises, and Descartes does not accept ‘givenness’. This is not the same as saying that the Cartesian method is not deductive; it is just that it cannot be reduced to it. Descartes is discarding everything, even logic and generally accepted laws unless they are found in intuition through one’s ‘natural light’.</p><h4><strong>Natural Light of Reason</strong></h4><p>One fundamental epistemic assumption that Descartes derives from the philosopher Augustine is that human minds have a ‘natural light’<strong>.</strong> He described ‘natural light’ as a distinguishing feature of human beings, and one that is equally distributed. This refers to our innate ability to gain knowledge. His project was to devise a method that would not hinder this natural light. Our essence or <em>eidos </em>is natural light. This natural light is our ‘good sense’ or our innate tendency, disposition and capacity to reason, which allows us to judge whether a proposition is true or false. He did not believe that everyone does not have equal natural light just because person A ascribes a different truth value to ‘X is Y’ as true, as opposed to person B, who believes it to be false. One could say that this is because either A or B lacks good sense in this case. However, Descartes was not in agreement with this line of thought. He believed that the reason for the difference in value judgements was that X and Y differ, so A and B are talking about different aspects. So, the error encountered is not because of a lack of reason, but a misuse or abuse of reason. One needs to break up the composite into simpler parts. One needs to go from the complex to the fundamental. All humans have good sense, but how do they work with it? A method is required to remedy this. A method is a set of rules for directing the mind. This is not the method of doubt, in which doubt is a necessary precondition.</p><h4><strong>Imagination is different from intellect</strong></h4><p>Descartes says that one cannot trust one’s imagination. People get confused between imagination and intellect. Everyone has the same intellect or natural light but have different imaginations as per our cultures, for example, differences in cuisine and fashion. Even things one believes and accepts as ‘truth’ because of intellect might actually have their basis in familiarity. Such judgements are temporal and custom specific. There is no basis for one culture to say that it is superior than the other. One’s notions of true and false are largely limited or dependent on familiarity, which is linked to one’s customs and cultures. So, the extent of one’s culture builds the foundation for one’s imagination. One who travels more would have a broader imagination than one who does not. Imagination cannot be the basis for discerning whether a belief is true or false because its scope is dependent on culture. A majority vote or a demographic profile is worthless for discerning the truth. This movement away from familiarity was the radical element in Cartesian thought, and the Church vehemently opposed him for it.</p><p>It seems like Descartes is moving towards a more puritarian epistemic framework. Senses are the primary sources of familiarity. If one wishes to move away from similarity one needs to move away from the senses. One should not accept anything on the basis of thinking it is from the intellect. One must develop a method first. There are three available methods. The first one is that of dialectics which is incorporated in the traditional logic and scholasticism. The second one is that of geometry and the third is algebra. The problem is that none of these enabled Descartes to discern what is true from what is false. Thus, he understood that he must first cultivate a method to help discern the truth value.</p><h4><strong>Doubt as a precondition for the method</strong></h4><p>Doubting is not a method of aiming at the truth — it is the cleaning of the ground for the quest. Descartes believes that once we are led away from the senses, we can demonstrate truth. Doubt helps us avoid sense-dependency on judgements and their truth value assumptions. It is important to note that doubt does not feature in any of the four rules and must not be conflated with the Cartesian method. The Cartesian method presupposes that you have donned the attitude of doubt. Until and unless the judgement in its entirety is subjected to intellect, it means one allows imagination to play a role in the discernment of its truth value. Then in the apparatus of discernment, if imagination is there, there will be variations in its truth value. The only modality in which you can ensure this does not happen is by not letting senses creep in — by donning the attitude of doubt.</p><p>So why should one doubt? For the intellect to perform its task. It can’t do that if the imagination impedes it. That is why one needs to do away with it by doubting. This is what he meant when he said that our ‘knowledge’ impeded our ‘good sense’. So, the greater one’s dependency on imagination, the lesser will be your ability to discern truth from falsity. What is needed is a modality in which one can discern that what one is actually taking as the truth is indeed the truth. It is for this reason that Descartes was the first to make the distinction between the faculty of imagination and the faculty of reason or intellect. Note that Descartes is not sayingFF that the source of judgements is intellect alone, it could be imagination also, but he is defining the modality for his method. This shows the subjectivity in his objectivity — does my intellect confirm the truth value of this judgement or not? It also shows a presence of agency. Why should one not rely on verbal testimony? Another’s intellect might say something, but one will have to rely on one’s own. Deduction is also a function of intellect, but it is useless without a set of true judgements or first principles. Where does one get first principles from? They are found through self-evident intuition and cannot be dependent on demonstration. The first principles are intuitively pure. Intuitions bring with them their own truth value. There is no agency regarding their truth value. This is why their quality or ‘truthness’ remains intact or is objectively true, even though the quantity or the number of such judgements is limited. To understand Descartes, it is important to understand that the objectivity of the first principles follows from the self-evidence nature of intuition, which is absent in deduction. This was Descartes’ radical attempt to make the epistemic system a-priori — through donning the attitude of doubt and using intuition to guarantee truth.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef1a25772270" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Regress of Reasons]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/the-regress-of-reasons-c8ce00e09503?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c8ce00e09503</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jul 2024 10:41:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-10T10:41:01.621Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A problematizing approach to the solutions to the epistemic regress problem</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hNoQZFnLcNn3VzZW" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@joelfilip?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Joel Filipe</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Human beings are believed to be rational creatures. When reflecting on what makes humans unique, Arindam Chakrabarti wrote, “One important way in which the adjective “rational” has been understood in the West is as standing for the differentiating feature distinguishing human beings from other animals.” This assertion does not imply that humans always act rationally but have the power to be rational. Rational behavior is what is expected of us by virtue of our having the capacity to be so. Any deviation from this state warrants the label of irrational. The same does not apply to inanimate objects like rocks and tables or creatures like frogs and fishes because they are arational and have no choice to be otherwise. Why must one think of rationality as a power? One possible answer is that the conscious attainment of knowledge, as knowledge seems to be possible only if one has the capacity of rationality, which allows one to give reasons for the beliefs one holds. This comes from the definition of knowledge as a true, justified belief, widely accepted in the philosophical tradition. It seems irrational to hold a belief that one has if one cannot provide any justification or reason for holding it. We are rational because we act on the basis of our knowledge, knowledge that we have been able to justify through reason.</p><p>At a cursory glance, this belief might seem justified. However, a closer look at the nature of justification, formally known as an epistemic warrant, reveals that there has not yet been an unproblematic account explaining its practice. Take, for example, one’s knowledge that coffee tastes bitter. What reason does one have to believe that? Experience. What reason does one have to believe in the legitimacy of experience? Coherence and unity, perhaps. What makes those good indicators of truth? The questions are never-ending as one can question every reason provided and ask for its basis or warrant. This is known as an epistemic regress. The epistemic regress problem is the problem of justifying a belief with another belief that itself requires justification, <em>ad infinitum</em>. As can be observed from this example, the demand for reason implies that one must have a reason for each subsequent belief, because, in the absence of it, holding a belief to be knowledge is unjustified. The book <em>Fading Foundations</em> emphasizes that the point made by the regress problem is<strong> not a practical but a principled one.</strong> This blog aims to reflect on the nature of epistemic regress and its possible solutions, and see if there is a way to come to an agreement between our principles and beliefs pertaining to justification.</p><p>There is a divide in opinion as to what course of action one should take after realizing the regress problem. One might take a skeptical stance and claim that knowledge cannot be attained as we can never justify that our beliefs are indeed true. Another might claim that knowledge is possible because justification is possible. Most thinkers in the history of philosophy have opted for the latter stance. Even here, one has to choose from two seemingly undesirable options. For a justificatory chain in which Y is a knowledge claim and R1, R2, R3, and so on are reasons, one must either believe that the chain continues if one is to know the proposition Y:</p><p>Y←R1←R2←R3←R4…….(1.1)</p><p>One can, alternatively, hold that the chain terminates at a certain point, but this would call into question one’s claim of knowledge since Y would not be justified.</p><p>Y←R1←R2←R3←R4 (1.2)</p><p>These two choices lead to three broad possible positions. The first position is <strong>foundationalism</strong> (1.2), which posits the existence of certain foundational beliefs that are self-justifying or free of the requirement of justification. This position has been supported by philosophers like Aristotle, Rene Descartes and Bertrand Russell. The second position is <strong>coherentism</strong> (a modification of 1.2), as per which justification has a ‘holistic’ nature, looks like entire belief systems with beliefs that justify each other and is not a linear, one-dimensional chain of reasons. Some influential coherentists are Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. The third position is <strong>infinitism</strong> (1.1), in which justification can take the form of an infinite chain of reasons. Historically, foundationalism and then coherentism have been popular positions supported by philosophers. Infinitism came to be considered as a serious possibility only recently with defenders like Peter Klein and Scott Aikin.</p><p>Aristotle, in his <em>Posterior</em> <em>Analytics</em>, seems to hold the belief that of the two stances — that one must give up on the possibility of acquiring knowledge, or that one must believe that obtaining a justification for every belief is possible, as the chain of justification terminates, the former is wrong, and the latter is correct. While one should not be a sceptic, one should also not expect to conceive of an infinite chain of justifications. The word that Aristotle uses for ‘justification’ is ‘demonstration’, for ‘knowledge’ is ‘understanding’, and for ‘principles’ is ‘primitive’. Following is the reasoning Aristotle gave in <em>Posterior</em> <em>Analytics</em>:</p><blockquote>Now some think that because one must understand the primitives there is no understanding at all; others that there is, but that there are demonstrations of everything. Neither of these views is either true or necessary….But we say that neither is all understanding demonstrative, but in the case of the immediates, it is non-demonstrable — and that this is necessary is evident; for if it is necessary to understand the things which are prior and on which the demonstration depends, and it comes to a stop at some time, it is necessary for these immediates to be demonstrable. So as to that we argue thus; and we also say that there is not only understanding, but also some principle by which we become familiar with the definitions.</blockquote><p>He believed that those who conceive of the infinite regress as a legitimate problem in acquiring knowledge misconstrue that the starting point for justification is justification. As per what he wrote in his <em>Metaphysics</em>, it is not. He claims that the starting point of knowledge is ‘primitives’ or principles, which are ‘prior’ to justification, and that justification depends on them. This position is known as foundationalism, as it involves being faithful to a foundation composed of certain basic beliefs, propositions or experiences that are beyond doubt. It is on the basis of these foundational beliefs that other beliefs come to form.</p><p>Another prominent foundationalist is Descartes.<strong> He replaced Aristotle’s demonstrative method with his intuitive one.</strong> As per him, Aristotle was wrong in believing that foundational principles could be arrived at through a process of demonstration, which is deductive, as deduction in itself requires a few premises whose truth value is given to start with. Such a ‘givenness’ is not permitted within the Cartesian system of doubt. This is why Descartes proposed that foundational principles gained through self-evident intuition necessarily have a univalent truth value, making any belief system that is built upon them have a strong and indubitable foundation. <em>But what does it mean for certain beliefs to be beyond doubt or ‘self-evident’? Could such a claim be rationally justified?</em> What if there is disagreement amongst people as to which principles are beyond doubt and which are not? For example, theist philosophers like Descartes would include the belief that God exists as a ‘necessary’ being in such a self-evident pool of beliefs, but an agnostic or atheist thinker may disagree. As may a theist thinker who doubts the legitimacy of foundationalism. In such cases, the claim of legitimacy of such a system weakens.</p><p>Despite its shortcomings, foundationalism has been a dominant position in epistemology. Even Immanuel Kant seems to understand the prevalence of such a system, though his support for the same is ambiguous. An analysis of The Critique of Pure Reason by the authors of <em>Fading</em> <em>Foundations</em> discusses this:</p><blockquote>In his Critique of Pure Reason, he emphasizes that from the fact that every event has a cause, it does not follow that there is a cause for everything. Similarly, from the fact that every proposition has a reason, it does not follow that there is a reason for the entire justificatory chain. Yet, says Kant, humans have a natural inclination to posit such a foundational cause or reason, and Kant’s text does not always make it very clear whether this inclination should be resisted or put to practical use.</blockquote><p>As dissatisfaction with the claim of self-evident nature of foundational beliefs arose, coherentism came to be a rising position for addressing the regress problem. Even so, foundationalism was still the position held by most major philosophers, like Rudolf Carnap. Carnap’s foundationalist mission was to construct a logical worldview that relies on certain ‘protocol sentences’, which is another term for foundational beliefs. <strong>Coherentism arose because of the lack of desirability of the idea that there exist certain foundational beliefs justify themselves.</strong> Coherentist Otto Neurath wrote, “No sentence enjoys the <em>noli me tangere</em> which Carnap ordains for the protocol sentences”. Instead, coherentists are of the opinion that beliefs are always justified in comparison to other beliefs and not restricted to certain foundational principles that have a ‘sovereign standing’. As per this position, the justification for a belief Y might look like:</p><p>R2←Y←R1←R2 (1.3)</p><p>At a cursory glance, it might appear that the coherentist position is to promote a belief that justifications take the form of one-dimensional loops. However, their system is considerably more intricate. Justification for them is a much more holistic process which involves a complete belief system and not just a few elements of those systems. <strong>Coherence of a system exists in degrees as opposed to the absolute nature of a foundationalist basis.</strong> One might ask what makes a system more or less coherent. Several coherentists have come up with different criteria to determine the coherence of systems. They lack a consensus as to which criterion is more legitimate. Even so, all of these criteria are called into question by the same criticism which Bertrand Russell put forward:</p><blockquote>Whatever the standards of coherence may be, it seems likely that alternative sets of propositions will meet them….although the highly respectable Bishop Stubbs died in his bed, the proposition “Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder” can readily be conjoined with a whole group of others to form a set which passes any plausible coherence test; and indeed, the same can be said of the propositions that make up any good work of realistic fiction.</blockquote><p>This is strong objection which suggests that a coherent system is not necessarily truth-conducive and that even an entirely fictional system with the highest level of coherence could be constructed.</p><p><strong>The third approach to the regress problem, infinitism, is significantly less favored by thinkers as compared to foundationalism and coherentism.</strong> Infinitists believe that it is not absurd for the justificatory chain to be endless. One could keep on providing reasons for a particular belief they hold. Until the beginning of the 21st century, this position was not talked about or was, at best, mentioned to be dismissed as being unfeasible. The system of epistemology was largely influenced by the foundationalism put forward by Aristotle and Descartes. The dominant foundationalist tradition used the counter-intuitiveness of infinitism as requiring one to ‘go through infinitely many things’ in order to justify something against it. Atkinson and Peijnenburg in their work <em>Fading Foundations</em>, while admitting the counter-intuitiveness of this position, point out factors that work in its favor:</p><blockquote>It cannot be denied that infinitism sits well with some modern ideas about the nature of knowledge, such as that knowledge is essentially fallible and that the human search for it is, indeed, without end. Despite many attempts to show the contrary, it is not at all clear how these ideas, which so many of us endorse, can be smoothly combined with foundationalism or even coherentism.</blockquote><p>Perhaps the most significant proponent of infinitism is Peter Klein. The reason he gives for supporting this position over the other two is that it is the only one that provides ‘an acceptable account of rational beliefs’. <strong>A good justificatory chain is necessarily non-repeating and infinite.</strong> He identifies what he calls the ‘two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning’, the Principle of Avoiding Circularity (PAC), as per which justificatory chains cannot reasonably be circular, and the Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA), as per which justificatory chains cannot reasonably do away with the requirement of reason at any step. Klein, in his work <em>Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons, </em>describes the two principles as follows:</p><blockquote>PAC: For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then for all y, if y is in the evidential ancestry of x for S, then x is not in the evidential ancestry of y for S.</blockquote><blockquote>PAA: For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, R1, available to S for x; and there is some reason, R2, available to S for R1; etc.</blockquote><p>Coherentism violates the former, as it appears to be ‘a thinly disguised form of begging the question’, says Klein, whereas foundationalism violates the latter, as it demands one to accept an arbitrary ‘base’ belief or many such beliefs. Infinitism adheres to both. One might question whether the imposition of such two principles is legitimate. Still, it seems to derive from a generally accepted understanding of knowledge as true justified belief, where justification makes all the difference in the ability of an agent to make a knowledge claim.</p><p>Infinitism has its fair share of objections. One of the strongest objections is the finite mind objection, which stems from the intuition that because the human mind is finite, it cannot house an infinite chain of reasons justifying a belief, let alone multiple such chains for multiple beliefs. Klein attempts to address this objection by pointing out that what exactly is understood to be or qualifies as a ‘belief’ is ambiguous. Two interpretations that he believes are acceptable are that it refers to a repository of already formed beliefs, or that it signifies a human’s ‘disposition to forms dispositions’. An infinitist, he believes, takes on the second meaning because that would allow for there to be an infinite possibility of beliefs. A second objection is that infinitism is akin to skepticism as it fails to ‘settle’ an issue. This, Klein points out, stems from a Cartesian foundationalist system of epistemology. It posits the existence of certain <em>a-priori</em> principles that need to be foundationally indubitable. Klein conceded that even though infinitism does not provide a ‘final guarantee’ of the truth of a belief or a system, foundationalism seems to do it only superficially and not genuinely as it claims. Descartes believes that the foundational ‘first principle’ should be accepted because they are ‘clear and distinction’, but what makes ‘clear and distinct’ an acceptable criterion? <strong>Without a reason, this criterion lacks legitimacy.</strong> Klein’s replies to these two objections seem convincing, even if they cause a sense of unease at losing the level of certainty we associate with knowledge, the level that foundationalism and coherentism claim to provide. One might question the motivation for coming up with a foundationalist or a coherentist system. Is it because it helps one ally one’s ‘principles’ and practices? Is that a good enough motivation? Would an introduction of a system to serve as a resolution of a problem and not on its own accord diminish its legitimacy? <strong>In other words, it seems that the construction of a system to improve its explanatory power or coherence by fitting the existing beliefs into it seems like a weak ground for creation.</strong> Rather, if one looks at the infinitist point of view, it is not doing any such thing. Infinitists do not seem to modify how we reason. Their counterintuitive belief that justification chains can be infinite seems like the only position that seems to do justice to how we generally understand knowledge — as a belief whose truth is proved through justification.</p><h4>Sources</h4><p>Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. Oxford University Press, USA, 1994.</p><p>Aristotle. The Metaphysics. Penguin UK, 2004.</p><p>Atkinson, Doug, and Jeanne Peijnenburg. Fading Foundations. Springer eBooks, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58295-5.">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58295-5.</a></p><p>Carnap, Rudolf. The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 1967. <a href="https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA65389346.">https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA65389346.</a></p><p>Descartes, René. Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies. Cambridge University Press, 1996.</p><p>Deutsch, Eliot, and Ronald Bontekoe. A Companion to World Philosophies. Wiley Blackwell, 1999.</p><p>Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1999.</p><p>Klein, Peter. “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.” Noûs 33, no. s13 (October 1, 1999): 297–325. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.14.">https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.14.</a></p><p>Nottelmann, Nikolaj. “Otto Neurath on the Structure of Protocol Sentences; a New Approach to an Interpretative Puzzle.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 165–86. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0484-2.">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-006-0484-2.</a></p><p>Plato. Theaetetus. Hackett Publishing, 2012.</p><p>Russell, Bertrand. “II. — On the Nature Of Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy 7, no. 1 (June 1, 1907): 28–49. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/7.1.28">https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/7.1.28</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c8ce00e09503" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Philosophical Contributions of Socrates]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/the-philosophical-contributions-of-socrates-fb1ef05cf7c7?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[truth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2024 09:39:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-10T09:39:28.442Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>From the Apology to Euthyphro, discussion on piety, reason and knowledge</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hs7o_2HDn73os7r4XLkAfQ.png" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@felipe_lamana?utm_content=creditCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=unsplash">Felipe Pérez Lamana</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/a-statue-of-a-man-holding-a-book-PheCXZqmtbI?utm_content=creditCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=unsplash">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Socrates was the first Athenian philosopher. The pre-Socratic philosophers, like Thales and Parmenides, were from the colonies of Athens. The pre-Socratics were the first people to point out what philosophical problems were (like the problem of change, the problem of origin and the problem of lack), and Plato’s Socrates and Plato were the first ones to attempt to settle these problems.</p><p>Because Socrates did not write anything himself, all we know about him is through the accounts of others. After his death, there was an industry that emerged around his accounts — the <em>Sokratikoi Logoi</em>. This points to his popularity. The most popular account is undoubtedly that of Plato, though that does not mean that it is also the most accurate one. Who the historical Socrates was is very hard to discern from the contrasting accounts that we have of him.</p><h3>Accounts of Plato, Xenophanes and Aristophanes</h3><p>Xenophanes was a close friend of Socrates. He and Plato were contemporaries.</p><p>It is usually the earlier works of Plato that are referred to for knowledge about Socrates. Socrates is famous for saying that the only thing he knows is that he knows nothing. Plato’s Socrates is one who says he does not know, and actually does not know. But Xenophanes’ Socrates is feigning his lack of knowledge. He says he does not know, but he actually knows.</p><p>To defend Socrates’ claim of not being wise, one who is wise has access to the <em>Eidos</em> (essence or true nature of a thing) and is able to provide a definition. But Socrates was not able to do this. But because our conception of wisdom or knowledge is much wider, we tend to think of Socrates as a wise person.</p><p>Understanding Socrates also helps make sense of Plato’s philosophy, since the former’s death had a significant impact on him. He resented the democratic government of Athens since it had put Socrates, the most virtuous man as per Plato, to death. It helps understand Plato’s inclinations and motivations for a philosopher king as the only ruler ‘fit’ to rule, as expressed in the Republic.</p><h3>Apology</h3><h4>Allegations Against Socrates</h4><p>The allegations against Socrates are indicative of the Greek mentality in that period. He was charged with impiety, which was a capital offense, with a punishment of death. This charge of ‘impiety’ stemmed from Socrates’ encouragement to the youth to not accept authority uncritically. (Socrates’ philosophy, and philosophy in general, is more individual-centric. But in that age, the concept of an ‘individual’ was not given. One’s identity was defined by one’s family, state and community. But here, we see a wish to establish one’s individual identity.)</p><p>At that time, the political structure of the state was deeply religious. In modern-day terms, their church was the legislative while their king was the executive. The government was composed of the <em>paterfamilias</em>, who were the eldest male members of a family. These <em>paterfamilias</em> had ‘divine insight’ as they were the ones who could understand the family hearth, which was representative of the family God. They were believed to be ‘rational’, which, at that time, had both political and epistemic implications. Their word was taken as rational and right without any justification-requirement, and obedience was a duty. Disrespecting or disobeying them meant disobeying their family god, and since each family hearth was ‘connected’ to the city hearth with a central city God, it would mean disrespecting them. <em>This is why ‘inventing new gods’ was seen as treason and an impious act — because it coupled the invention of new gods with the abandonment of old ones, making a person, in the eyes of the state, unpatriotic.</em></p><p>It is important to note that Socrates was not anti-authority. He did believe in depending on authority, but only the <em>right </em>kind. So there is a sense of authoritarianism in his philosophy through the imposition of the condition of justification. Justification is in the form of eidos and eidos is given. So every philosophy that has a foundation begins in authority (authority is not necessarily of a negative/fascist kind)</p><h4>The Trial of Socrates</h4><p>Socrates was about 70 years old when his trial took place in 399 BC. It is believed that there were around 500 people present during the trial of Socrates, which might have gone on for as long as six hours. These people were mostly citizens of Athens, aristocrats who voted in the democratic passing of judgment. At that time, there were approximately 139 <em>demes</em> or families/houses in Athens. These families or houses are lineages composed of a large number of people who were related to each other. The total population is believed to have been around 250,000 people, out of which an estimated 30-60k males/elder males had voting privileges. These males/elder males also composed the war assemblies.</p><h4>Defense</h4><p>Against the charge of impiety, Socrates asks the question — what is piety? This is discussed in detail in Euthyphro.</p><p>Socrates is not denying the intent or the motivation of the charge, but only its content. Socrates agreed that youth can be corrupted (and that that was obviously a bad thing), but failed to see how he was doing it by trying to teach them about virtue. To make sense of the accusation, the people who thought Socrates was guilty, thought in the following way: Who is being corrupted? The youth. Why? Because they now demand ‘justification’.</p><h3>Socratic Definition</h3><p>The Socratic definition is a definition of X that abstracts the <em>eidos</em> or the essence/ general characteristics from a set of things considered to be X to explain the nature of X in itself and without having to invoke instances or examples of X. This was a difficult task. For example, I cannot define what is good by pointing out instances of it. To reach a Socratic definition, I’d have to explain goodness (which is necessarily present in each instance of good). Thus, to know ‘X’, I need to grasp its general characteristics.</p><p>The Socratic method is what is used by Socrates to reach the ‘Socratic’ definition. It can be understood as the art of questioning used in the quest for <em>eidos</em>. The main question that Socrates asks can be expressed as — What makes X, X?</p><p>Socrates is famous for having said that he knows nothing. Plato’s Socrates is wise insofar as the process of arriving at knowledge is concerned, but not concerning the product (knowledge) itself. In most of the dialogues, they arrive, through discussion (in the Socratic method) at what is NOT knowledge, but not at what the <em>eidos </em>of knowledge is. This search for <em>Eidos </em>is common in all of Plato’s dialogues.</p><p>The concept of the Socratic definition was vital to the birth of essentialism, as per which there are certain characteristics present in things that make them what they are, and the goal of philosophy and the sciences is to discover and express what these are. This posits the existence of an essence prior to the existence of the thing itself, as opposed to the modern existentialist thought (which challenges Greek thought) that existence precedes essence.</p><p>Socrates was the first to believe there must be essences for the possibility of definitions to be there. These essences are not invented but discovered. <em>And though you may challenge the authority of God, you cannot challenge the authority of the essence or eidos as it is given</em>. It can only be discovered through reason. Hence, it follows that reason cannot be challenged. Only after one has discovered eidos can they generate a definition, and only after a definition has been generated can its implications be understood and implemented.</p><h3>Euthyphro</h3><p>In <em>Euthyphro</em>, the concept of piety is discussed. It is here that we get the first insight into the Socratic method, and the concern for a ‘definition’ arises. These have informed and governed epistemology for generations. The dialogue explores the concept of the ‘sanction of the act’. Is it the case that what is obeyed has the sanction of being just? Thus, the text Euthyphro symbolizes a demand for justification independent of ‘status’- it is against the acceptance of the word of authority without any justification. At that time, ‘just’ was taken to mean the dictums of the paterfamilias/male heads. But, by questioning this conception of ‘just’ and by asking for the heads to be accountable, the philosophers, here Socrates, particularly, were ‘guilty’ for the generation of demand for ‘justification’, because that is how revolts arose. It can be understood as a demand for eidos through the account.</p><p><strong>The main question asked here is — what is piety?</strong> Is something pious because it is loved by gods, or is it loved by gods because it is pious? In case the former is true, that makes the concept of piety arbitrary because God could love anything. And if the latter is true then the need for positing the god as authority disappears. Moreover, two or more gods could love different things or love and hate the same thing. Thus, as per Socrates, this definition of piety — that pious is what is loved by gods — fails, because it is not stable, and <em>Eidos </em>needs to be a stable standard of measure.</p><p>The invocation of god in attempting to make sense of the concept of piety shows that Socrates was authoritarian to some extent and that it was only a partial attempt at challenging authority. What was challenged was the prevalent idea of God, but not God per se. In the Republic, Plato emphasizes that <em>we must only allow the right kinds of gods</em>; poets must only write about the right kinds of god, not the ones who are angry, jealous, egotistical or lustful. Such gods were human in urges, and the difference was that they were much more powerful. This is why the question of piety is brought up in Euthyphro. Socrates believed that god loves pious things because they are pious.</p><p>The character Euthyphro is unique in the sense that he is perhaps the only person who appears to be sympathetic towards Socrates in the dialogues written by Plato. Not unlike Socrates’ day-to-day life, Euthyphro is challenging authority by not being blindly obedient and asking for account or justification. But Socrates is pushing Euthyphro even further by asking him to doubt, in addition to the state authority figures’ account, the account of god as well. And this is why Athenians blamed him for ‘corrupting’ the youth.</p><p>Socrates is perhaps one of the only philosophers who embodied what he preached to an absolute extent. He believed that there is no distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. He is often portrayed as a hero in literature because he died for the ideas he believed in.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb1ef05cf7c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Epistemological Side of Plato’s Republic]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/the-epistemological-side-of-platos-republic-2540895dbc78?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2540895dbc78</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[plato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 May 2024 06:48:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-03T06:48:53.402Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A detailed discussion of the the inception of epistemology in Plato, with a focus on his concept of ‘order’, ‘good’ and ‘episteme’</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eqbcRbFLnluqFhRIVzz3tw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by <a href="https://pixabay.com/users/moritz320-1260270/?utm_source=link-attribution&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=2168776">günter</a> from <a href="https://pixabay.com//?utm_source=link-attribution&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=2168776">Pixabay</a></figcaption></figure><p>The intent of my study of Plato is to see the inception of epistemology (and metaphysics) in his thought. Traditionally, the <em>Republic</em> was understood as an epistemological text, before its modern political interpretation. <em>(Interestingly, until the 16th century, it was not considered to be a main text by Plato. Timaeus was taken to be his most important text.)</em></p><h3>Role of Good in Intelligibility and Order</h3><p>The <em>givenness</em> of truth is the primary concern of philosophy and philosophers. We do not create the <em>eidos</em> (essence), it is given. This <em>giveness</em> implies an order. The pre-Socratics, who found the notion of order, found it in material things. Plato, on the other hand, found it in <em>eidos</em>.</p><p>The world of forms does not and can not accommodate negative things, as they indicate a lack (non-being). For example, there cannot be an eidos of the ugliest thing (as it lacks beauty). Plato’s <em>eidos</em> or form has almost the same characteristics as Parmenides’ being. By nature, our soul focuses on becoming, and becoming changes. If, instead of being, the soul focuses on becoming, the soul does not know, it only opines, and its opinions will be fickle. One will only be able to have knowledge when one focuses on the eidos or the being, which is unchanging.</p><p>‘Good’ makes all other <em>eidos</em> visible or intelligible to us. All objects have eidos because they can be characterized. But this eidos is given as the order of the world is predetermined. For example, if perceptible objects, like chairs, have certain characteristics, like <em>chairness</em>, these characteristics are already available to me. The moment one perceives through eidos, they categorize, like the category of chair. There is an affinity between good <em>(which is the principle arche for Plato) </em>and eidos, because eidos is the basis for order. Eidos of orderliness is called good. When we know eidos we categorize the world. This ability to categorize is called intelligibility. One has to accept the givenness of eidos, or its a-priori nature. Though ‘<em>good</em>’ is how we acquire eidos, it is itself an eidos too.</p><p><strong>Light analogy —</strong> Lack of light leads to unclear vision and lesser intelligibility. Similarly, lack of ‘<em>good</em>’ leads to lack of intelligibility. Conversely, more good leads to clearer knowledge.</p><p>The Platonic idea of love is that love for eidos is greater than love for something in the world of objects. The difference is between loving beautiful things versus loving the being of beauty itself.</p><p>‘<em>Love</em>’ is the force that makes one move to order. In the <em>Symposium</em>, it is the intermediate or the link of movement between the visible <em>(like loving beautiful things) </em>and the intelligible <em>(like loving beauty itself).</em> It is love as a lack which moves us towards definition. It pushes one to generate a state of stability.</p><h3>On the Nature of Self</h3><p>In an epistemological interpretation of <em>The</em> <em>Republic</em>, Plato attempts to show the nature of the epistemic self, which is chaotic and needs to be ordered, just like the state. Thus, he explicated the notion of an ordered state to explain the nature of an ordered self. Plato has already established a fundamental principle, that it is in order that each one does what is inherent in their nature. Certain people are meant to do certain things. People can only possess expertise for something if it is already in their nature. All individuals who make up a state must have an eidos to make them intelligible.</p><p>Plato divided the state into three distinct categories or natures:</p><ol><li>Guardians (<em>order</em>)</li><li>Warrior (<em>protect</em>)</li><li>Service providers (<em>provide</em>)</li></ol><p>This is how the <em>polis</em> should be structured. The state must be ‘good’ or ordered/just. But one has to be careful before charging Plato as a classicist. This division is based on birth <em>(as nature or essence is given)</em> and not family. The caste system, on the other hand, is based on ancestry, and sees ancestry and occupation as one. In Plato, this division is based on one’s nature. If it is ordered, then it is just. Good does not have any moral connotations here.</p><h3>Order or Good</h3><p>The pre-Socratic idea of logos is there in both Plato and Aristotle:</p><ol><li>In Plato, it is ‘good’</li><li>In Aristotle, it is ‘eudaimonia’ or wellbeing</li></ol><p>For the pre-Socratics, there is a given order which is arkhe. For Plato, ‘<em>good</em>’ is the principle of order <em>(like dike/justice).</em> Eidos allows us to order or categorize things. To have access to eidos is to understand the nature of the arche itself, as one has knowledge. Good is the highest essence that makes the other essences what they are. And even though all essences are independent, their utility comes about from a sense of order, which is brought about by <em>ousia</em> or good. Thus, Plato’s <em>arche</em> is dominated by ousia, which is good. Eidos enables order. ‘<em>Good</em>’ in its first invocation only means order. <em>(In aesthetics, it means ‘symmetry’, which is also order</em>.) ‘<em>Good</em>’ means being one with one’s nature. Note that there was no concept of existentialism, so this ‘<em>good</em>’ was only given and not created. Becoming is aimed towards being or good. In Book 6 of Republic, Plato says — From many good things, we have to move towards the being of the good.</p><h3>Tripartite Division</h3><p>Regarding the soul or the epistemic knower, there is a focus on two things:</p><ol><li>Epistemic: how epistemic knowledge came to be</li><li>Metaphysical: the nature of epistemic knowledge</li></ol><p>As the soul is equated with the state, it also has the same three parts. One individual can’t have 2 contradictory aspects at one time. This means if there are 2 contradictory things happening simultaneously, they must exist in 2 different things. Thus the soul has parts. For example, one can take ‘a’ to be the will to eat salad and ‘b’ the desire to eat pork. Thus, they have different natures, even though they co-exist in the same person.</p><p>X — — — — a, t (X is performing function ‘a’ at time ‘t’)</p><p>SOUL Y — — — — b, t (‘b’ is another function at time ‘t’)</p><p>Z — — — — c, t (‘a’ and ‘b’ contradict each other)</p><p><strong>Tripartite division of the soul:</strong></p><ol><li>Reason — rational — account of ‘good’ — goodness — force of reason</li><li>Spirited — <em>thumos</em> — provides assent or dissent — willing</li><li>Appetitive — desire — generates the experience of lack — grounded in body — desiring</li></ol><p>Passion provides force. The appetite must have specific objects. The spirit has passions that commit one to act. Will, for Plato, means the ability to assent or dissent. A lack has produced a disability which is desire. Desire does not entail action. An account is required, as per which one assents or dissents from action. One’s account is inconsequential to eidos, as one’s account can be wrong, but the ‘given’ eidos cannot.</p><p>Passions, when unhooked from reason, are dangerous, as they lack orderliness. Thus, if one wants ‘<em>goodness</em>’ or order, reason must be activated. The rational aspect of the brain is the only one that can order the soul. Without reason, one would just give in to desires and become an animal. The force of reason is ‘<em>goodness</em>’. In goodness, there is no desire or lack. Since goodness is the highest eidos, it is what we are moving towards. Irrationality only means that it is not a part of reason, so it must be a part of the body.</p><p>Based on the tripartite division, the three virtues are:</p><ol><li>Moderation (appetitive)</li><li>Courage (Spirited)</li><li>Wisdom (Rational)</li></ol><p>All three of these lead to the fourth cardinal virtue which is justice. When all aspects of one’s soul are in order, the soul functions according to its nature. Our souls are naturally ordered, but it is on the embodiment of our souls that the problem arises.</p><h3>Why ‘good’ is important</h3><p>Why is the ‘<em>given</em>’ good not the default? It is because of humans and our tripartite soul division. Aspects of the soul get imbalanced when the soul is embodied. The soul loses sight of its own ‘<em>nature</em>’. In such a deformed state, it is governed mostly by the spirited and the appetitive parts. We are not by default good/ordered/in a state of justice. Order has to be established. But how is it to be established?</p><p>The cosmos always has a principle of order. How does one exist in harmony with the cosmos? By trying to replicate the order of the cosmos, as the microcosm should reflect the macrocosm. For Plato, that order is ‘<em>good</em>’. To be ordered means to be with one’s nature. One’s nature is always given. One’s task is to discover the order or nature and act according to it.</p><p>When one is seeking knowledge, one is active. One is not passively waiting to be told what knowledge is. This is how the concept of the epistemic knower or the soul was developed. <em>Ousia</em> enables us to understand existence and explain why it is how it is (as <em>arkhe</em>). Once there is access to <em>ousia</em>, existence can be understood. In his posterior analysis, Plato talks about why arkhe is important, and why only being or <em>ousia</em> can qualify as <em>arkhe</em> and not any material elements. Because <em>eidos</em> is <em>arche</em>, <em>arche</em> is good. Note that <em>good</em> here means ordered, and does not have any moral connotations.</p><p>The exuberance of the joy of realizing <em>ousia</em> or good is so great that on having it, one feels the need to share it, as that would be similar to sharing the idea of emancipation or enlightenment. The person takes it to be their task and then becomes a martyr<em> (like Socrates and Jesus)</em> because of the reluctance of the others to accept the truth of <em>ousia</em>.</p><h3>We can be ordered only by good</h3><p>We are potentially rational human beings. Reason is an <em>eidos</em> equated with good. Until and unless one accepts the rational element, one cannot be good. Only the rational element can genuinely order the soul. For people like Plato and Parmenides, existence or experience is completely governed by reason.</p><p>In Plato’s philosophy, desires are not rejected. They are also necessary. They just need to be moderated by reason. So we are ‘potentially rational animals’. Reason should be in the driver’s seat. It should govern the appetitive will and the spirited desire. When reason takes a backseat, the appetitive part rules the spirited part, and there is unorderliness.</p><p>When he said “<em>Know</em> <em>thyself</em>”, Socrates meant that one’s nature must be in accordance with one’s reason. One should govern their appetites with moderation through reason. It is believed that the saying was initially said by Thales. He meant to convey that one should stay in one’s limits. This change of meaning is what is meant when one says that philosophy took an ‘ethical’ turn with Socrates.</p><h3>Requirements for knowledge</h3><p>The quest for knowledge is a cluster of eidos, knower and specific qualities in the knower. Each is a necessary condition. Collectively, they are sufficient.</p><p>There is a difference between necessary and sufficient cause. Necessary condition is a negative condition. Failing this condition, the effect will not be generated. But even if this condition is present, it does not guarantee that an effect will occur. On the other hand, sufficient conditions are positive. This means that it is enough to generate an effect.</p><h3>Why we can order</h3><p>Order can only occur if one has access to eidos. But how does one access eidos? The principle of good and eidos establishes and sustains order. But what makes us move towards good?</p><p><strong>The Sun Analogy —</strong> The sun is analogous to good as it not only provides the principle of order but also sustains order. It is a source of both power and sustenance.</p><p>The passion that makes us move towards order is love (love for knowledge). This is given by Plato in his <em>Symposium</em>. This love is that which is between ignorance and knowledge. Thus it is the spirted part that relates the two. The aim or function of love is to move towards the intelligible, which is good or orderly. The visible realm is thus necessary for a movement to the higher realm of intelligible.</p><h3>Analogy of the divided land</h3><h4>Division of objects on the basis of visibility and intelligibility</h4><p>Objects are of two types:</p><ol><li>Intelligible, which belong to the reason/rational part of the soul</li><li>Visible, which belong to the appetitive part of the soul</li></ol><p>Both of these are related or connected by the spirited part of the soul, which provides mediation through passions. The relationship of communion or koinonia between discrete entities suggests that Plato had an ontological commitment.</p><h4>Explanation of analogy</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/361/1*EpUR0NfkcMQ6OCB3zdXjKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://quizlet.com/268801378/flashcards">https://quizlet.com/268801378/flashcards</a></figcaption></figure><p>The reason for the unequal division of line is that Plato wished to express the unequal portion of reality each of these supposed objects of reality claim. This separation is important because it marks a line between being and becoming. The becoming is regulated by being and is moving towards being. The last three realms can never be being as that would imply the possibility of becoming, which is not possible. For Plato the changing realm is granted sensibility because of <em>eidos</em>. Note that Plato does not reject the last three realms. He accepts them. He believes they are unreal <em>(not to be conflated with non-existent) </em>as they are not episteme, but they are not false as they are dependent on and determined by episteme.</p><h3>Intelligible realm</h3><p>This realm contains:</p><ol><li><em>Dionia</em> — Thought (Hypothesis and conclusion with dependency of object)</li><li><em>Noesis</em> — Understanding (First Principle, Episteme and Eidos)</li></ol><p>The highest realm of existence, <em>noesis</em> (which contains episteme), is not related to the senses at all. <em>Dionia</em> is somewhat related to the senses.</p><h4>Estin or Essences as Forms or Eidos</h4><p>Plato puts forward the theory of <em>estin</em> as forms. The realm of <em>eidos</em> is constituted by essences or<em> toti estin.</em> They are considered as being the highest forms. An essence does not demand anything other than itself to be what it is. It is <em>kathaute</em> or self-dependent or autonomous. Like Parmenides’ being, it is what it is by virtue of itself. But unlike Parmenides, Plato accepts the lower three realms also. Parmenides accepts only the highest realm in which being is there. Anything else for him is <em>doxa</em> or false.</p><p>In Book 7 of <em>Republic</em>, Plato introduces the allegory of the cave. When they are living inside the cave, they are only aware of shadows and nothing else. It is when they go out that they have access to dionia. When they move further away, they grasp <em>ousia</em> or the primary being. Plato believes that the joy that we get from sense objects is fake. We need to move away from them, away from acquaintances, and towards the realm of intelligible. Immanuel Kant’s transcendental aesthetics/dialectics seems to be inspired from Plato’s world of forms or world of intelligible.</p><h3>Sensible realm — Pistis and Icasia</h3><p>This realm contains:</p><ol><li><em>Pistis</em> — Perception (all material objects which are there)</li><li><em>Icasia</em> — Shadows or reflections of material objects</li></ol><p><em>Pistis</em> and <em>icasia</em> are known by the senses. To make sense of these, <em>eidos</em> is needed. The material world participates in the world of <em>eidos</em>.</p><h3>Knowledge does not exist in all four realms</h3><p>To have knowledge is to be able to define. Access of <em>eidos</em> makes possible access to definition. Eidos only exists in the realm of episteme. In the visible realm of <em>pistis</em> and <em>icasia</em>, there is observation, which is perception but not knowledge. Today, formal sciences think of knowledge in terms of all four realms, like in math, grammar and logic. But these for Plato are thought (<em>dionia</em>) and not knowledge (<em>episteme</em>). He draws a distinction between knowledge as <em>dionia</em> and knowledge as episteme.</p><p>The intelligible realm of <em>dionia</em> is not knowledge as knowledge requires understanding, which <em>dionia</em> does not provide. All axioms are hypotheses or thoughts. They do not take one to eidos. They are postulates gained through induction. Knowing hypotheses is different from knowing eidos. Only the intelligible realm of noesis contains knowledge or <em>episteme</em>, as understanding, a prerequisite for knowledge, requires access to <em>eidos</em>. This understanding is grasped by the rational soul that advises the will which is governed by the appetites. For Plato, knowledge means the definition of knowledge and its <em>eidos</em>, and is only related with episteme. Math is <em>dionia</em> for Plato. What we call formula is for him hypothesis. A formula is general as opposed to a particular observation. The formal element (in the form of the formula) is not given in the senses. There is an element that does not hinder but enlightens in its presence. For example, I could speak a language without knowing its grammar. Thus, knowing a hypothesis is different from knowing <em>eidos</em>. It is for the acquisition of genuine knowledge that he is pushing us towards the realm of the intelligible. It is only in this realm that Parmenides moved.</p><p>When one asks you for a definition, one is asking you to move from the realm of senses to the realm of the intelligible. You are already operating with a definition, but the question is that is your definition a true definition? You will only know when you know the <em>eidos</em>. Socrates was hanged because he pointed out that people did not know this eidos. The problem is that we don’t know the <em>eidos</em> but we still think that we do. Only the one who has access to <em>eidos</em> can tell whether an account is good or bad.</p><p>To sum up:</p><ol><li>Noesis — ‘Being’ is episteme acquired</li><li>Dionia — Hypothesis is once removed from episteme</li><li>Pistis — Object is twice removed from episteme</li><li>Icasia — Image is furthest removed from episteme</li></ol><h3>Socratic dialogue</h3><p>Plato believed that it is by looking at a particular that one is able to postulate a hypothesis. Hypotheses have an abstract element of intelligible. One moves from visible to hypothesis to episteme. This movement from one hypothesis to another is the Socratic method or Socratic dialectic. The dialectic method is therefore the art of asking the right questions. Hypothesis uses bottom objects to reach conclusions or the first principle, which is noesis, but it does not reach it as it is mediated by objects. To elucidate, I have seen many triangles and then moved towards the idea of triangularity, but I am still dependent on objects for this idea. Things like music and math teach us how to make hypotheses.</p><p>Plato’s first principle is <em>eidos</em> or good. The existence of all objects is dependent on <em>eidos</em>. The trajectory of the Socratic dialogues going from the visible to hypothesis to episteme. For every genuine aspect of knowledge, Plato is pushing us towards <em>eidos</em>. The highest knowledge of <em>eidos</em>, episteme, is completely abstract. Hypothesis without understanding is possible. This is where the pre-Socratics stopped. But Plato took the pre-Socratic effort further. They were restricted to <em>dionia</em> or thought as their hypotheses lacked <em>eidos</em>. Plato believed that Parmenides was the only person to reach <em>eidos</em>. This move of knowledge is signified by a shift from change to being and from authority to account.</p><h3>Dependence or relation</h3><p>Plato makes a distinction between real and existent. He believes that Parmenides conflates existence with real. We must distinguish between reality and all that exists. All four realm exist, but not all of them are real. Everything exists, but of the things that exist, they can be divided into two, the real and the unreal (appearances). Every realm of existence has a (higher or lower) place in Plato’s epistemology. Plato accommodated everything and showed how they are related to each other. Parmenides accepted only the realm of being and called the other realm (of becoming or material things) false. Though he accepted that the last three realms do not have being, Plato, instead of discarding them, drew a relation of dependency.</p><p>Plato’s <em>estin</em> is translated as form. <em>Eidos</em> or <em>eide</em> is the name for the class of essences. This realm (<em>noesis</em>) has an autonomous existence (<em>kath hauta</em> — by virtue of itself). It has being and hence is stable, and does not demand anything else for its existence. All other realms are dependent on essences as they do not have being. They are not stable or complete. They are in motion as they are becoming. This is why Plato says that they are all appearances. The realm of appearance and the realm of being provide an alternative way of understanding the divided land. The realm of appearance is made sense of by thought (<em>dionia</em>), which is known through episteme (<em>noesis</em>).</p><p>To see something is to see something as, which, to Plato means that the thing is determinate. Remember that for Plato, being is given. There are as many essences as there are objects, therefore there are multiple essences. These essences are governed by good. <em>Eidos</em> are independent. They exist on their own accord, though they are governed by good.</p><p><em>Ousia</em> is granted only to <em>estin</em> for both Plato and Aristotle. But Plato’s formulation of <em>estin</em> as <em>eidos</em> is rejected by Aristotle.</p><h3>Acceptance of multiplicity</h3><p>The quest for understanding existence began with the pre-Socratic search for <em>arkhe</em>. It was reduced by Parmenides to a singular being (with multiplicity being false). Plato retained Parmenides’ being in <em>ousia</em> or good but at the same time, he does not discard multiplicity. For Plato, primary being or <em>ousia</em> is one but there are other essences which are <em>kathouta</em> or self-sufficient. Plato accused Parmenides of only looking at <em>ousia</em> and not <em>estin</em>. For Parmenides, <em>ousia</em> is being. But for Plato, there are entities or essences (<em>estin</em>) other than the primary being (<em>ousia</em>) which are self-sufficient essences regulated by <em>ousia</em>.</p><h3>Difference between doxa and episteme</h3><p>We make judgments everyday without having knowledge about the truth of our account. Having the truth of the account is the same as having access to eidos. But most of the time, we do not have access to <em>eidos</em>. For example, I wish for there to be equality, but I cannot define equality. Plato talks about <em>episteme</em> and <em>doxa</em> to explain this point. Plato’s <em>doxa</em> is different from Parmenides’ doxa as the former can be true, one just does not know if it is, but the latter is taken to be false. So, doxa for Plato is when one does not know the definition of a thing but still passes judgements about it. This is what was common in all of Socrates’ ‘victims’. Note that <em>doxa</em> is not necessarily false. It can be true, but that is not known.</p><h3>True judgment with understanding</h3><p>Knowledge, according to Plato, is true judgment with understanding or account. The true objects of knowledge are essences (<em>tote</em> <em>estin</em>) constituted by <em>ousia</em> (good). Within Platonic thought, knowledge is completely definitional. One who has knowledge is one who has definitions. That is the person who has <em>sofia</em> or wisdom, which is absent when there is <em>doxa</em>.</p><p>At the end of <em>Theaetetus</em>, the definition that knowledge is true judgment (something one assents or dissents with) with understanding is undisputed. But this is an incomplete account of knowledge as we do not yet have an object of knowledge. This object takes the form of ideas or essences or <em>eidos</em> and is explicated in <em>Republic</em>.</p><p>With the inception of the concept of <em>episteme</em> arose the need to provide justification for a thing that is qualified as knowledge. This point was emphasized by Plato’s Socrates and Plato. There is a difference between knowledge and episteme. In the former, one does not have access to <em>eidos</em>, in the latter, one does. Knowledge is necessarily definitional. Being and knowledge are the same in that they are both true and certain.</p><h3>Plato’s socio-political model is dependent entirely on truth</h3><p>Plato’s socio-political order is based on truth. He assumes that everyone is concerned with truth or order. What he did not conceive of is that people are concerned only with their own interests, and not the truth.</p><h4>Philosopher King</h4><p>One does not know if one’s understanding is correct or not. Who verifies? <em>The philosopher king.</em></p><p>In <em>Book 7</em>, Plato says that only a philosopher can be a genuine ruler because only philosophers know what an eidos is, and only they can replicate the order of the cosmos/eidos.</p><p>The only person who should lead or govern or rule, the <em>Philosopher King,</em> is one who has access to <em>eidos</em>. Wise has access to <em>eidos</em>. Only one who knows the eidos (which are necessarily good) can apply them to the world. Therefore, the wise should rule.</p><p>The political thought of Plato has to be authoritarian because not all people operate with wisdom. Thus democracy has the risk and possibility of failure. To prevent failure, it is required that only those who are wise be selected, but there is no certainty that the majority will make the right choice in that. Thus, as per Plato, democracy was not the best practice. People’s interests differ. They are not always geared towards what is right. Because existence is wisdom-based for Plato, it has to be autocratic.</p><h3>Aristotle’s Interpretation of Plato</h3><p>One question that philosophers have while interpreting the <em>Republic</em> is — In Plato’s realms and divided land analogy, is he making only an epistemic commitment, or an ontological commitment too?</p><p>One interpretation of Plato’s philosophy is that he is making only epistemological and not ontological commitments, as it is only possible to distinguish (and not separate) self from the other things based on the self. There is often a conflation between distinguishable and separable. We create things with language that do not have existence so if we look for an ontological commitment we might land into trouble. The continental thinkers like Frege opine that he is making only an epistemic commitment. This is a new understanding of Plato.</p><p>But the Western thinkers think that based on his choice of terms, he is making an ontological commitment. This is the traditional understanding based on Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato. Aristotle intercepts the Platonic system as having an ontological commitment (in addition to epistemological commitment). <em>Eidos</em> is separate or <em>choriston</em> from the world of appearance. There is a distinction between <em>para</em> and <em>choriston</em>. The former has no ontological commitment while the latter does. This gives grounds to Aristotle to present Plato as having an ontological commitment also, which he does in his Metaphysics. He accepts most of the epistemic framework proposed by Plato, but his major discomfort lies in his metaphysical orientation. Aristotle’s discomfort with Plato lies in his notion of arkhe. For Plato, <em>ousia</em> or good, which is the highest form of being or <em>eidos</em>, is the <em>arkhe</em>.</p><p>Aristotle says that Plato’s eidos is stable, but it is not the only thing that is. Plato did not realize that matter (<em>hule</em>) is also stable. Aristotle agrees with Plato that episteme begins with <em>estin</em> or definition. But Plato’s equation of <em>estin</em> with <em>eidos</em> makes him see them as being separate from the world of appearance/particulars.</p><p>Aristotle proposes an explanation for why Plato holds the position he does. Why did Plato have to come up with the idea of <em>eidos</em> itself? Because of necessity? Because of the question of the truth of things? Heraclitus put forward his doctrine of flux, as per which the material world is always changing, so it can never be determined. A thing is determinate when one can predicate characteristics to it, when it has an identity, or when it can be labeled as this/that/is. Plato accepts Heraclitus because to deny change would be to deny becoming. Unlike Parmenides, Plato does not do that. He accepts change and becoming. Note that this is just his projection of Heraclitus. But now the problem is to accommodate being or eidos. This is why Plato gives the divided land analogy.</p><p>Aristotle puts forward a response on Plato’s behalf. Knowledge demands a Platonic definition. Plato seeks to explain the nature of our linguistic determinacy. The world of appearances is in communion with the world of eidos. But, the usage of the word communion implies that the two are separate. So what does this communion mean? How is becoming in communion with being? Even though there are differences between Platonic <em>eidos</em> and Aristotelian <em>morphe</em>, there are similarities too. Both are required for a definition, and the journey of knowledge begins with a definition. They accounted for the existence of being and change in different ways. Their epistemic structure is similar but their ontological structure is very different.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2540895dbc78" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Plato’s Theaetetus]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/platos-theaetetus-82e43f91ca42?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/82e43f91ca42</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[plato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2024 10:27:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-30T10:27:36.389Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A very detailed blog on the text that brought about our current understanding of knowledge as requiring justification</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_zjUOQbgUl9TqZuC" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@priscilladupreez?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Priscilla Du Preez 🇨🇦</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>It is in the Theaetetus that the JTB (justified true belief) definition of knowledge emerges, and the first attempt to arrive at a definition is found.</p><h4>Protagoras</h4><p>The sophist Protagoras of Abdera (490–420 BC) is brought up and discussed in the dialogue. Philosophers and sophists were both concerned with wisdom and knowledge, but their methods and motivations were different. Also, a significant point of difference between sophists and philosophers was that the former charged people for teaching the art of rhetoric to sons of aristocrats to excel in their political careers. They learned how to be more persuasive rather than learning how to discover the ‘truth’. The sophists were driven by interests, and philosophers by truth. Thus, the focus of their arguments was more on being persuasive than on being rational. Protagoras was a disciple of the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus. Even though the later Greek philosophers have often not spoken very kindly about the pre-Socratics and the sophists, Plato talked about Democritus and Protagoras (and in some instances, Heraclitus) with respect. Protagoras is known to have written eight books. At that time, writing was an expensive activity. One had to be both rich and respected to write and be known for it. But for philosophers, respect was a tricky and fickle thing. In his work ‘On The God’, Protagoras says that he does not know if the gods were even there/existent. This made him unpopular amongst the Athenians, who called him <em>‘Atheoi’</em>, which means one without god and is the root of the word atheist.</p><h3>Attempts at Defining Knowledge</h3><p>When Socrates asked him what knowledge is, Theaetetus attempted to characterize knowledge in multiple ways. His initial response was that whatever Theodorus (his teacher) taught (which was Geometry) was knowledge. Socrates replied that that is not what he asked — he did not ask what one may have knowledge of, but what knowledge in itself is, which is assumed by Theaetetus when he gives instances of knowledge. This was the first time in Western thought that the question of the characteristics and objects of knowledge was raised.</p><h3>First Definition — Knowledge is Perception</h3><p>Protagoras famously said — “Man is the measure of all things.” (‘Homo mesura’) This can, in a way, be understood as a doctrine of relativism. Here, the locus of truth is the subject. It can be taken to mean that each thing is how it appears to me, and for you, each thing is how it appears to you. For subject A, x could appear to be ‘a’, and for subject B, x could appear to be ‘b’. Both of these would be true as per this doctrine because ‘a’ and ‘b’ have, as the locus of their truth, individual subjects, ‘a’ is inherent in A and ‘b’ is inherent in B, and not in X.</p><p>Protagoras’ ‘man is the measure of all things’ is equated with Theaetetus’s proposed definition of knowledge — ‘knowledge is perception’ by Plato’s Socrates. Why? Because of their relativist nature. Theaetetus puts forward this definition and it is evaluated by Socrates. Note that here, perception (<em>aesthesis</em> in Greek) includes all five senses but primarily refers to the eyes and ears.</p><h3>Relativism</h3><p>To support Protagoras’ doctrine of relativism, perception has to be unerring (since it is knowledge). And since everybody perceives, everybody’s perception must be right, or true. For Protagoras, truth and perception, both have as their locus the subject.</p><p>But Socrates believed that while perception’s locus is the subject, truth value’s locus has to be the object. Object here means object of knowledge or eidos (which is episteme), and not empirical object, as that is not in the realm of Episteme (like eidos are).</p><p>The position of relativism holds two contrast positions as true. But Socrates did not believe in the truth of relativism. Definition cannot be relative. Eidos is not relative but is absolute. Eidos is not relative or dependent as it is self-dependent. Socrates wished to deny the relativism of truth because it could pervade beyond merely material (which is seemingly unimportant to him as it holds no serious consequences) to social, ethical and political matters (which could, on the other hand, have serious consequences). And, by nature, we are averse to some things. The thought that justice could vary if truth could vary seemed absurd and dangerous to him. The moment one accepts relativism, one rejects universality, reason and truth. Protagoras went on to deny the concept of logos/order itself. He believed instead in ‘nomos’ or human-made laws, as he believed that humans were the measure of all truth.</p><p>Suppose there is a knowledge claim about a thing X. X can be looked at in two ways. The Parmenidean way is to look at it as a stable being. The Heraclitan way is to look at it as a static becoming — an entity that is not yet ‘is’. Here, the notion of fire is also explicitly invoked to talk about change and motion. For Heraclitus, the soul can be equated with fire (and death with cold). Learning and studying are motions through which our soul gains knowledge. So here, the knower is the soul or the psuche. This understanding suggests that the soul itself is in the process of becoming, and that motion is good for the soul while rest is bad. It is important, again, to note that motion is not limited to the materiality of the world.</p><p>But if motion is the underlying principle then there can be no object or subject as there is no ‘is’ — everything is changing. If both the object and the subject are impermanent, how do we have perception?</p><p>Projecting Heraclitus on Protagoras, Socrates explores this definition in three ways:</p><ol><li>The subject is in flux</li><li>The object is in flux</li><li>Both the subject and object are in flux</li></ol><h4>Perception is a relational product</h4><p>The Greeks upheld the corpuscular theory, which is what modern science works with. For them, it was the Effluvium theory proposed by Empedocles. As per this theory, if a person perceives the color white in an object, the white is neither there in the object nor the eye. It is the result of the interaction of the eye and the object which generates minute particles called effluvia which are imperceptible themselves but are the basis of perception. Thus, this theory posits that there is some change through which this effluvium is emitted. This makes perception a relational product.</p><p>Let’s accept for a moment that perception is a relational product. And if perception is knowledge, then knowledge must also be a relational product. But what is it a relational product of? Through a Heraclitan lens, it has already been established that there cannot be a stable subject or object, as both are constantly in a state of flux.</p><p>The problem that Socrates was trying to raise was that if we are to accept what Protagoras said, we must accept that perception can never be erroneous. If we are to accept the Heraclitan understanding of the Protagorean definition of knowledge as perception, we must also accept that perception is a dual relational product and that knowledge and eidos/characteristics are all relational products.</p><p>An object O at time T1 generates a perception P1 for subject S. About this, the subject S makes a claim CP1. The subject S and object O both have changed as time changed from T1 to T2. Now, object O2 at time T2 generates a perception P2 for subject S2. The claim that S made for O, CP1, will not be valid for P2, as there is no continuity. S2 cannot say anything about P1. But even S cannot make a claim about O because the claim would need to be made after perception P which took place at T, at a time after T. Furthermore, for CP1 to be there, P1 should have been completed or ended. So, S cannot make a claim CP1 because time progresses to T2 and perception P is never completed. So this perception can be false, or rather, it cannot be claimed to be true.</p><p>Another flaw in this understanding of the definition is that it is not possible to make a judgment, because to do so, the subject must at least remain constant. But it is changing. Socrates’ suggestion that the subject is constantly changing latches on the belief that the subject is also an object. He aims to make being and becoming make sense together. Thus, if the subject is the object, as Heraclitus believes, then the subject is in flux too, ruling out the possibility of making judgements. To escape this, one has to show that the subject is not the object. But by default, one is one’s body, which is an object. So it has to be shown that the subject is more than the body.</p><p>What we understand from Heraclitus is that the body, which is confined to the material world, is in flux, but I am not confined to my body. This can be shown by showing that knowledge is not limited to perception. In Plato, we find the genesis of a very peculiar knower. The subject is the soul which mediates with the world through the body. So, eyes are not that with which we see but that through which we see. In the former understanding, we are limiting the subject to the body. In the latter understanding, the eyes are just a channel to the soul. The soul is an epistemic entity here. It is something that is not the body. It exists for the sake of knowing. Greek thought is not reductionist in the sense of reducing the soul to the body. The body, through its different sense organs, is only a means to perception. Then how can perception be knowledge? Experience demands something more than the body. The realization that to understand the knower is to understand the body is what gave rise to epistemology. Philosophers like Kant, in his unity of perception, Husserl, in his transcendental self, and Ponty, in his unified and embodied experience took this concept further and adopted different positions.</p><h3>Objective and Subjective Relativism</h3><p>Socrates talked about ‘objective relativism’, as per which both statements — X is hot and X is cold, could be held to be true, but here, the ‘is’ does not denote X as a being but as a continuum, or becoming.</p><p>Saying a sentence like ‘Maybe it is like a bird’ implies that there is a universal form of bird. Interestingly, this can be taken to mean that Socrates already had the notion of forms, the abstract idea that there exist universals, in his mind. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, writes that Socrates can be credited with coming up with the concept of definition and universal, but did not separate them.</p><p>If, as per objective relativism, the object is always changing, then how can one make any meaningful claim about the nature of knowledge? Truth can only pertain to being or eidos, which is stable. Knowledge of a thing can be equated with knowledge of being, as it presupposes stability.</p><p>Since Heraclitus’ position is that of ‘objective relativism’, the characteristics of an object must not change until the object itself changes. But they do. For example, imagine a regular-sized glass full of water. It appears to have a lot of water until we place a very big glass of water next to it. Then, it appears to have a little. Another example could be that of beauty. One person might appear beautiful until an extremely beautiful person is standing next to them, making them look plain. In both cases, when the other object appears, the perception of the initial object changes even when it does not undergo any change itself. And both the judgements, before and after the other object’s appearance, seem to be true. This would mean that the characteristics of an object depend on the subject. But how can this be? It seems unacceptable, because if we accept it, we accept subjective relativism, as per which a subject can ascribe any characteristic to an object. Definition is not a predication. For an object that is stable at T1 and T2, characteristics cannot change, but we need to attribute change to claims about its characteristics. But we cannot violate reason, as we had earlier admitted. Even Theaetetus agreed that one who agrees with Protagoras’ position would have to accept this unacceptable theory, thus rejecting it himself. This is the demolition of the first defense of the definition that knowledge is perception.</p><p>The characteristics of more and less full, as in the case of the glass of water, are not given to us by perception. They come to use afterwards, when we perceive another object and compare. So, it cannot be a part of the object since it is not available to us when we perceive it. It is available when we think and compare. So perception is not knowledge.</p><p>Coming back to subjective relativism, characteristics must depend not only on the subject but the object. As per this, the subject-object dependency relation, if true, does not have the subject or the perceiver as the central entity, but the object. The perceiver is passive while the object is active. The subject only becomes active after receiving characteristics. So, during the production of characteristics, the object is active while the subject is passive. Though perception is a production, it is dependent on the object. The motion of the object is transferred to the subject. This is another understanding of the definition ‘knowledge is perception’, in which perception is dependent on and governed by the object and not the subject, making ‘objective perception’ knowledge, meaning that Protagoras did not mean that perception (in general) can never be erroneous. Socrates added that Protagoras taught this ‘truth’ only to his students.</p><p>But, to refute Protagoras’ claim that perception cannot be erroneous, Socrates put forward the following challenges:</p><ol><li>Cases of misperception may be present when we are dreaming or are diseased. If such conditions exist, false perceptions might arise.</li><li>We do not have any evidence to affirm that we are awake and are not dreaming.</li></ol><p>This seems like the anticipation of Descartes’ dream argument. One problem that lies in asking the question about which perception is objective perception is that it assumes that there is a perception that is not erroneous.</p><p>Even if one is able to save the ‘objective perception’ idea theoretically, how can one claim that <em>their </em>perception is objective? Additional questions arise — where one can place reality, in sleep or during wakefulness? Can truth be decided by the majority? Often, truth is determined by number and time, which seems absurd. This is why Plato did not defend democracy, because to make truth ‘true’, one cannot invoke number or time. In fact, that which is a true object of knowledge does not depend on whether one believes it or not. Objects of knowledge are independent of beliefs. Here, we can extend this understanding to Plato’s forms. Forms are eternal and are not mere assumptions.</p><p>The third problem with the first definition focuses on the subject — that the subject is also changing. The same object O can generate two perceptions for two different subjects, as perceptions are relational products. The knowing self is active. The same wine can be bitter to one while tasting sweet to another. This will mean that all perceptions are equally true/justified.</p><p>But a pig also has a body. If knowledge is perception which is limited to the body, then does the pig also have knowledge? It seems absurd to admit this. There is something peculiar to humans that is not there in animals.</p><p>Thus, there has to be something more to knowledge than the power of perception. But why is it that only man is the measure of all things and not any other creature? Also, if every person’s perception is equally legitimate, then why should one read Protagoras’ book? How does it contribute in any way? Therefore, there is something inherently wrong in Protagoras’ thesis. Aristotle talked about the bipolarity of perception. Perception is either true or false. It is not inherently legitimate, or else there would have been no need for learning. By believing that ‘man is the measure of all things’, one is removing the option of false by default, which defeats the purpose of teaching. So, the fault must lie within the subject as some subjects have faulty perceptions while others do not. The object must be stable.</p><p>The thesis ‘perception is knowledge’ changes to ‘seeing is knowing’. Socrates attempts to dismantle the relationship between knowledge and perception. This can be understood through an example. The first time that you perceived a pencil, did you know that it was a pencil? No, you needed to be taught that. Like Hume said — I don’t know when I perceive fire that it burns me. Thus, interpretation and understanding require insight or right thinking. This added element signals that there is more to knowledge than perception because insight is not a bodily function, it is the function of the soul. The soul is more than life principle, it is the knower.</p><p>Also, when you remember something you know, you are not perceiving it. Thus, knowledge is perception negates the possibility of gaining knowledge through memory. Giving up memory would be giving up temporality, which leads to denying the possibility of knowledge itself. We cannot confine knowledge to ‘now’. Thus, Socrates points out that we have to admit that perception is one thing while knowledge is another.</p><h4>End of critique of the first definition of knowledge</h4><p>The definition that knowledge is perception has been dismantled by showing that:</p><ol><li>Perception is not always right</li><li>Knowledge cannot be a relational product</li><li>Objective and subjective relativist doctrine of knowledge are problematic</li><li>Knowledge cannot be limited to perception; memory and insight are essential to it</li></ol><p>Through his critique of the first definition of knowledge, Socrates is highlighting the following two points:</p><ol><li>He is trying to generate the idea of the knower as an entity not limited by the body (and hence perception). Even though this was touched upon by the pre-Socratics, it is Socrates who first makes this point explicit.</li><li>He emphasizes how the objects of knowledge are not just material but can go beyond the senses, or the materiality of the world. Thus, it is possible for one to grasp more than what can be grasped by the hands. It is important to note that ‘beyond materiality of the world’ should not be conflated with ‘beyond the material world’. That’s what Aristotle said, that Socrates did not go beyond the material world, only the materiality of the world. He believed that Plato misunderstood Socrates by positing the realm of forms.</li></ol><h3>Accounting for Error</h3><p>In the epistemology of Western philosophy, theories of error are not seen. But most classical theorists are concerned with questions like — how do we account for error? Is the knower always in access to knowledge? What is peculiar to the knower? Is there a homogenous nature of the knower? Socrates’ main focus was to provide an account for the claim that perception can be erroneous.</p><p>‘Knowledge is perception’ can be taken as a relation of identity. Thus, if we have an account of how perception is possible, we should also be able to explain how knowledge is possible. As established, knowledge can be equated with Being, as both are stable and belong to the realm of episteme. Being is the highest form of eidos, which cannot be grasped by perception, as they are not material. Thus, perception and knowledge cannot have a relation of identity.</p><p>But establishing this is not enough as the error also needs to be explained. What is the source of the error? Is it the subject or the object? But the subject is also an object. As per Parmenides, what is, is. If the object ‘is’, then the error cannot be in the object and the material subject. So it must be in something abstract, something beyond. It must lie in the faulty insight or thinking of the subject. The process of thinking can be understood as ‘the soul talking to itself’. Thinking is that which mediates between the sense perceptions and the soul and leads one to become a knower. The product of this process is a judgment. Socrates then talks about the hierarchization of the epistemic subject. We already operate with this assumption, because if we did not, we would not have felt the need to read what thinkers like Socrates said. Thus, the question of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ men may arise if one believes the doctrine that man is the measure of all things. Passing a judgment is not a passive act but an active one. The subject is the one who does the thinking, so the error must also lie within the subject.<strong> Error can be accounted for if one recognizes the role played by the subject.</strong> Therefore, the possibility of being either true or false is inherent in the subject. In Euthyphro, Plato wrote that man becomes God when he becomes just and pious with understanding.</p><p>So, it has been established thus far that perception is inadequate for gaining knowledge, and that thinking or <strong>judging </strong>the object of perception for the evaluation of truth is required. What do you understand by thinking? Thinking is a conversation one has with oneself about one’s perceptions. The body is not responsible for the grasping of <em>being</em>, and thus has no share in grasping knowledge. This is the end of the demolition of the definition that knowledge is perception.</p><h3>Second Definition — Knowledge is True Judgment</h3><p>After the first definition fails, Theaetetus proposes a second definition. Knowledge is true judgment. But if one is to accept that knowledge is true judgment, how does one know when a judgment is true or false?</p><p>Since an object already ‘is’, there is no way to account for error through it. So the fault must lie in the subject. The subject’s mediation of the object through thinking (or judgment) must be wrong. If we are continuing with our Parmenidean notion of being and ‘is’, how can a false judgment give rise to something that ‘is not’. How can it not have an object? The resolution is that false judgements do have objects, but we judge them to be something else that is. This is why perception cannot account for error, because there is no difference between an erroneous judgment and non-erroneous judgment in terms of having an object.</p><p>Can perception’s locus be found in the body? Perceptions do seem to be limited to certain senses. But Socrates believed that confining oneself to perception will not account for even perception itself. What is one educating? It should not be limited to the body. Knowledge is found not in experience but in the process of reasoning about them. Parmenides said that quality must presuppose unity. Perception will never give one access to <em>being</em>, but only to particular bodily characters. Being is common to all perceptions but it cannot be known through perceptions. It requires one to go beyond. In modern philosophy, the distinction of substance and quality is similar to this. This was brought up by Descartes in the mind/body identity relation, in which the mind cannot be equated with the body as the body is essentially in space while the mind is not. Perception itself cannot be confined to the body because, without something else, you cannot have a synthetic unity of experience. To understand this, think about two different perceptions — the sound of a glass falling and the sight of it. Even though they are different in perception they make up the same experience.</p><p>The role of perception ends when one has to arrive at a judgment because perception is confined to its own different particulars and passing a judgment would involve something more. If asked to judge which glass has more water, I would need to compare the two individual particulars. This comparison is made possible through thinking, which is different from perception.</p><p>Knowledge is necessarily definitional. Perception can only give one knowledge of particular instances. But knowledge is not about particulars. It has to rise beyond. This can be understood as pointing towards the eidos. That is perhaps what Plato meant when he said that one should look through the eyes of the mind or the soul. The soul functions through a power that is peculiar to it. This is the ‘thinking function’ which is present in the thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides as well. Two aspects of it need to be understood:</p><ol><li>It cannot be located in perception</li><li>We cannot elaborate perception without it</li></ol><p>When we perceive a red crayon, do we perceive it <em>as </em>red? The idea of redness is necessary and we are only aware that the crayon is red, or that it even is a crayon, after we have mediated our perception through thinking. This signals a move towards the abstraction of forms.</p><p>Knowledge of categories is necessarily presupposed by any judgment that individuals experience. The most fundamental category is that of Being/is, as all <em>ness-es</em> but be. For perception to be possible, one needs to already have some form of knowledge/characterization. This knowledge is central as it makes decisiveness about other knowledge possible. Here arises another problem. How do we get this knowledge? One solution is to claim that this knowledge is innate. This is what Plato expresses in Meno, that the soul already knows. But there are problems with the innate knowledge doctrine. Why do we not know when we are born? Why do we not have homogenous cultures? These have been raised by philosophers like Russell and Locke. In Theaetetus, this problem remains unresolved.</p><p>Socrates believes that we must differentiate between ‘possessing’ and ‘having’. Socrates gives the famous aviary example here. You possess the birds in the aviary, but you do not have them, as you are not necessarily in control of them. Interaction should not be conflated with subjugation.</p><p>As discussed above, because an object already ‘is’, there is no way to account for error through it. So the error must lie in the subject. This gives rise to the paradigm of objectivity. As per this, the error lies within the subject. To judge is to make a statement to oneself. ‘Something I know’ can be equated with ‘eidos’. The fault cannot be in the object, or in the eidos that one already has. The only way to account for error is by examining the nature of the soul that is accessing the eidos. The judgment is false if one cannot access the eidos. Thus, account for error is essential in determining if the judgment made is true or false. So the second definition of knowledge is inadequate.</p><h3>Third Definition — Knowledge is True Judgment With An Account</h3><p>The chain of thought leads Socrates to the third definition of knowledge. Knowledge must be a judgment that is true, and we must be able to account for it. True judgment mediated by thinking (which requires the lens of eidos and is a function of the soul) and an account of having arrived at the judgment is needed if one is to claim to have knowledge. Since truth ‘is’, it can be equated with being (in the same way knowledge can be).</p><p>Eidos cannot be provided to us by perception. Our souls are already imprinted upon by eidos. You cannot be a creator of eidos and can only be a discoverer, as eidos is presupposed for there to be an epistemic knower and for there to be order in the cosmos. If there is to be knowledge, there must be eidos, which is ‘being’. On equating eidos and ‘being’, we can equate their characteristics also. Eidos is ‘given’ and is uncreated. Plato never makes Socrates explicitly talk about the Theory of Recollection, rather, he hints at the theory by making him say that he has heard so-and-so from ‘wise’ people. Meno provides us with the theory of recollection which is an attempted solution for the prior demand of eidos, as per which we have both active and passive memories. The soul possesses but does not have eidos. The moment it has eidos, it has knowledge. Plato claimed that when one does have access to eidos, it will be so self-evident that they would not require justification. Heidegger’s Alethea (self-evident truth) concept seems to be inspired by Plato. This understanding leads to one problem — one needs to have knowledge to create definitions but definitions require one to already have some eidos.</p><p>In Plato’s thought, what is open for argument is one’s clarity in accessing eidos. (The modern-day term for ‘eidos’ is ‘a-priori’.) But what is not open for argument is the presence of a-priori and innate knowledge. How does the soul already have eidos? We do not know. The theory of recollection is just one attempted solution to explain their innateness. It can be denied. But the prior demand for eidos in the soul cannot be denied. Even Descartes had to accept innate ideas because he realized that without them, the epistemic enterprise has no foundation. But we are still unable to provide an account for the innate knowledge of eidos. The role of the account is to show that the judgment is made in line with the eidos. In other words, this account would disclose that this judgment aptly grasps the eidos on which it is based.</p><p>Plato, through Socrates, points out the flaws in the JTB definition of knowledge. If knowledge is a true judgment with an account, that account itself needs to be true and have a justification, ad infinitum. This infinite regress arises because accounts require justification. Keeping this infinite regress aside, the third definition of knowledge is accepted, but what counts as an account is still not clear. For example, love is the greatest emotion, but how do I define love? But just because I cannot account for it, or define it, does not mean that I will discard my hypothesis or claim of knowledge. Thus, Socrates arrived at a definition of knowledge, but he was not able to give an account for its account. Aristotle, through his deductive syllogism, believed that he had solved this problem.</p><h3>Theaetetus — Takeaways</h3><p>The takeaways from Theaetetus are:</p><ol><li>If you want to define knowledge, you must accept that there are prior elements of knowledge that you possess</li><li>Perception can be erroneous</li><li>The soul is more than the body</li></ol><p>The Greek thinkers believed that the cosmos must have a principle of order. Most of the pre-Socratic found it in material elements. Plato found it in eidos. He believed that there is order in the world because of eidos. Plato emphasizes that we have to understand that we must have a soul and that there is a demand for eidos.</p><h3>Theaetetus — Additional Things</h3><p>For a change, Socrates’ interlocutors in Theaetetus do not readily agree with him, and he is required to put in more effort to prove the efficacy of the Socratic method.</p><p>Plato’s Socrates, in Theaetetus, proclaims, at a point, that gender is of no relevance to a philosopher. In Plato’s Republic, the possibility of females to be the Philosopher King is not ruled out. Labelling all of philosophy as being patriarchal would be an oversimplification. If we take the example of Plato, we can see both sides — a pull of the current, dominant (for him) patriarchal tradition and the older, matriarchal tradition. This (being more conscious of the context in which a philosopher thought) would help expose hidden nuances in their work.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82e43f91ca42" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Birth of Epistemology in Greek Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/birth-of-epistemology-in-greek-philosophy-811096d1326f?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/811096d1326f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jan 2024 18:08:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-07T18:08:22.347Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Socrates, Plato and Aristotle played a big role in the inception and systematisation of Epistemology, the theory of knowledge.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CWRtWUQ-NIPLqnEy" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mpikman?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Evangelos Mpikakis</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>What makes a study of Plato and Aristotle relevant even today is that it is here that we see the birth of knowledge in its most articulate form. For the first time in Western Philosophy, they sparked a debate on the question — what are the objects of knowledge? <em>Who</em> is it that is knowing, or is the subject of the act of knowing? Understanding their thought helps one understand the inception of Epistemology and its development, as this question is what Epistemology is concerned with.</p><h3>Quest for truth versus quest for interest</h3><p>In Theaetetus, Socrates speaks about the difference between philosophers and statesmen trained by sophists, people who charged a fee for teaching the art of rhetoric. The former’s quest is the quest for Eidos (essence) or the quest for truth. But for the latter, the quest is to master the art of persuasion. The quest had as its intentions the manifestation of their own interests. There is universality in Eidos but interests can be, and are, multiple. So, interests are not concerned with the truth. Socrates is anticipating here the post-truth world (the one in which we live now), in which there are two kinds of people — interest-driven and Eidos-driven. In a way, the intended takeaway that Socrates intends for one is that one must not (naively) assume that everyone is concerned with truth. Most people are concerned only with interest. Understanding this helps in evaluating intentions — which is especially relevant in the socio-political and economic sphere.</p><h3>Move Towards Abstraction</h3><p>In Plato’s Theaetetus, there is a sharp insistence that the body is not concerned with knowledge. The knower has a body, but it is inconsequential to the process and product of knowing. Hence, perception cannot be knowledge, as Socrates makes clear through dialogue. Plato, or Plato’s Socrates, made a subtle attack on Protagoras, by interpreting that he propagated his ‘false’ doctrine to others but spoke the ‘truth’ about his work to his own followers. For the uninitiated (ones not engaging with philosophy), the objects of knowledge are those that can be grasped with the hand and, hence, are material. But for philosophers, the object of knowledge is not merely material, but can also be abstract. In Plato’s Republic, this part attribution to the possibility of knowledge of material objects is completely eliminated and knowledge is only restricted to the abstract. The shift from material to abstract is also notable in the praise of Theaetetus for his mind rather than his appearance <em>(as it was described to be as unappealing as Socrates)</em>. It is also worth noting that it is this need for abstraction that manifested in the interest of the thinkers of that time in the domain of mathematics and later led to the birth of algebra.</p><h3>Development of the concept of an Epistemic Knower or Soul</h3><p>Socrates claims that he is a ‘midwife’ of the psuche/soul. By this, he means to say that even though he himself is barren <em>(does not possess knowledge),</em> he attempts to guide others to it, through the means of discussion. In saying so, he relates the notion of knowledge/wisdom with something that is not the body, just like Heraclitus and Parmenides did, before him. Here, an insistence on knowledge as something that cannot be confined or grounded in the body is seen. Knowledge, in its definition, does not include the body.</p><p>For Plato, reason is a faculty of the soul. It should be the apex governor in actualising the potentiality of knowledge and eidos (<em>essence</em>) which is within us. He believed that animals do not have a soul, entailing that they are not capable of governing themselves and do not have access to knowledge. Plato believed that the soul of God is perfect or just. Aristotle picks up the idea of the soul or the epistemic knower from Plato and takes forward his discovery. For Aristotle, the soul is nothing but the principle of movement or motion. Movement is the movement towards knowledge. The seat of knowledge in the epistemic knower is the soul. This principle of movement is the rational element in us or the essential property that gives access to Eidos.</p><h3>Acceptance of Parmenides</h3><p>Definition presupposes ‘<em>being</em>’ as when you ask ‘what is’,<em> it is stable</em>. Eidos implies <em>being</em>. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle <em>(and thinkers in general)</em> accepted the truth of Parmenides’s doctrine. The problem was of accommodating Heraclitus in their thought. For Parmenides, the material world is false, but for Plato, it is not false. It is based on <em>(or has a relation of dependency with)</em> the world of forms. The world of forms can be known; it is where eidos or episteme is. If one confines oneself to the material world, one will never arrive at knowledge.</p><p><strong><em>Read more about Parmenides in </em></strong><a href="https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/being-is-all-there-is-3de88d1bc9d5"><strong><em>‘Being’ is all there is.</em></strong></a></p><p>Plato’s epistemology tried to answer the question of how to accommodate desire when lack implies<em> non-being</em>, which, as shown by Parmenides, is impossible. The Parmenidian problem is that desire demands non-being, which is impossible as it is inconceivable. In the Parmenidean Being, differentiation and diversity are not possible, and lack necessarily implies an ‘another’. This called for a need to invoke the concept of ‘<em>void</em>’. <em>Void</em> is different from <em>non-being</em>. It is a Being devoid of characteristics. Aristotle also agreed that non-being is not acceptable. He came up with his own framework — the ‘schemata’ of truth, which had both logical and rational forms. Accepting Parmenides’ philosophy would mean admitting a loss of agency, so it is interesting how both Plato and Aristotle navigated around it and added their own theories and arguments to it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=811096d1326f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘Being’ is all there is]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/being-is-all-there-is-3de88d1bc9d5?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3de88d1bc9d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[thoughts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 16:55:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-15T16:55:26.103Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An explanation of the philosophical thought of the Greek thinker Parmenides.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GZf7S8xCgN1j_5X0" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@aihubov?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Yevhenii Aihubov</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Parmenides was born in the Greek city of Elea, on the southern coast of Italy. He is believed to have lived from the late 6th century to the mid 5th century BCE.</p><p>Following are the various titles that have been given to him:</p><ol><li><em>‘Father of Metaphysics’ </em>— as he was the first philosopher to inquire into the nature of existence. This title was attributed to him by Aristotle.</li><li><em>‘Father of Logic’ </em>— as he was the first to use deduction and the concept of a-priori truths to support his arguments, even before Aristotle.</li><li><em>‘Founder of Eleatic School’ </em>— which dealt with arguments about there being an unchanging singular reality.</li></ol><h4>Significance of Parmenides’ Philosophical Contributions</h4><p>Parmenides was perhaps the first philosopher to abjectly reject the senses. He believed that the previous (Ionian) philosophers’ physical cosmogony — their approach of thinking of the ‘archae’ in terms of material and change is wrong, as it is dependent on and is drawing from what is provided from the senses, which are deceptive. He believed that they operated with <em>doxa</em> (which means what is accepted at large), or the <em>way of false, </em>and this dependency (on doxa and the senses) is misplaced. It presents ‘change’ and ‘becoming’ as true, which they are not (as will be explained later in the blog). Parmenides’ philosophy is paradox in this sense — as it is counter to the doxa. His own system of thought is based on logic and metaphysics. It was further developed by Zeno of Elea (his student) and Melissus of Samos, and significantly influenced the later philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. <em>(For example — Plato’s Theory of Forms builds upon the Parmedian notion of change being an illusion — that only ‘appearances’ change and not their ‘essences’.)</em></p><h4>Writing Style</h4><p>Parmenides had a particularly interesting way of writing in a poetic format. His only surviving work, a poem that has been titled <em>On Nature</em>, is in the dactyl hexameter style.</p><p>One notable thing about his writing is his argumentation style. Unlike the philosophers who preceded him, Parmenides did not use allegorical argumentation. His was a more formal style of argumentation which employed, perhaps for the first time in the history of Western thought, the logical form of deduction. Such a form focuses only on the structure of the argument for judging its validity. It is independent of the senses. The theories proposed by him invoked a logical necessity, as opposed to invoking natural/empirical necessity. The former, unlike the latter, is always held — and hence has a perfectly legitimate claim at universality. Wisdom, as per him, is capable of being reached once the world of senses has been bracketed. Thus, in contrast with Heraclitan and other pre-Socratic thought, Parmenidean thought only depended on intelligibility, and not sensibility.</p><h3>Being and Non-Being as Described in ‘On Nature’</h3><p>The poem is divided into 3 parts — 1) Proem or the preface, 2) Alethea or the way of truth and 3) Doxa or the way of opinion. The Alethea portion <em>(the way of truth)</em> will be discussed in some detail.</p><p>Three paths of inquiry are described —</p><ol><li>That something is (path of being)</li><li>That something is not (path of non-being)</li><li>That something is and is not, both (path of being and non-being)</li></ol><h3>Alethea — Way of Truth</h3><h4>Central Tautology</h4><p>The main assertion made by Parmenides is that the tautology — <strong><em>“It is necessary to think and say that Being is and not being is not”</em></strong> needs to be realized and accepted (as it is an indubitable statement). This statement is necessary in the sense that it cannot be denied by a rational person. It is not a contingent statement as it does not depend upon anything else for its truth.</p><p>Parmenides’ ‘<strong><em>is’</em></strong> can be understood in any and all of the three ways — as existence, predicate and truth. The question of the nature of existence can only be answered by conducting an enquiry into the nature of the being. Parmenides believes for the second path — the path of non-being, to be nonsensical. He justifies this by saying that the non-being is inconceivable, and since it is inconceivable, it cannot exist. And since the second path is nonsensical, the third path is, consequently, also nonsensical as it depends on the truth of both the first and the second path, of which only the former is there. Thus, a journey on the second and the third path is a futile and a ‘backward’ one. It is the senses that mislead us into thinking that such paths are possible. The path of truth, or Alethea, is divorced from the senses and employs only <em>logos </em>or reason to evaluate the <em>truth</em> — that is the nature of being. He believes that since he is providing a deductive argument (which is independent of senses) to prove his conclusion, it does not matter where he begins, as tautologies are self evident. His argument therefore must be unalienable and necessary, as the premises are given by reason alone.</p><p><strong>Existence as Conceivability</strong> — There is an assumption that Parmenides makes, on which his philosophy rests. That which is existent is equated with that which is conceivable. And inversely, non-existence can be equated with inconceivability, which is in the case of non-being. This is the problem of negative facts — the world can only be understood in terms of what is, and never in terms of what is not. It is important to note that the word ‘conceivable’ is not replaceable with ‘conceived’ as only the potentiality of the property of conceivability is required for an object to be existent, and not an actuality of being conceived. Thus, existence is not limited by a finite subject. (This fundamental assumption has later received criticism as the acceptability of equating non-existence with the impossibility of existence has been questioned.)</p><p><strong>Why Non-Being is Nonsensical — </strong>Since one cannot think about or conceive of the non-being, its nature cannot be enquired about.</p><blockquote>Existence <strong>≡ </strong>Conceivability</blockquote><blockquote>Non-Existence <strong>≡ </strong>Non-Conceivability</blockquote><h3>Inference of Other Necessary Truths</h3><p>From the central tautology explained above, which is —<strong><em> Being is and not being is not,</em></strong> the following necessary truths can be logically inferred from the argument given below:</p><p>Parmenides invokes the form of Modus Tollens, which is — <em>If P, then Q. Not Q.</em> Therefore, not P.</p><blockquote>Premise 1 (P implies (not Q)) — If it becomes, then surely it must not have been before.</blockquote><blockquote>Premise 2 (Not (not Q)) — But it cannot not be before. (As non-being is an impossibility)</blockquote><blockquote>Conclusion (Not P) — Therefore, it never becomes.</blockquote><p>Thus, it follows from the above that being always has been (and will be) and that the question of becoming cannot arise.</p><p><strong>Being does not arise from Not-Being — </strong>Suppose X is being and Not-X is not-being. If, at T1, there is not-X, and if at T2, there is X, this means that between T1 and T2, something happened that caused X to come about from not-X, or nothing. But something cannot be generated from nothing. Even if we posit the existence of a creator, since X is not at a specific point of time, there is nothing for a creator to generate X from. Hence, whatever is not, cannot be. And whatever is, always has and will be. This shows that the being is not generated and was never <em>becoming</em>. Here, Parmenides has used the principle of <strong>‘Ex Nihilo, Nihil Fit’ — </strong>nothing can come from nothing.</p><p><strong>Denial of Temporality</strong> —That which does not exist cannot exist. And what is, or what exists, always has and always will exist. There is no origin or destruction. Thus, the being is beyond the concept of temporality. In stating that existence cannot depend on time, Parmenides asserts that the being is independent of finitude.</p><p><strong>Denial of Change</strong> — Since the notion of being does not invoke the notion of time, there can be no change, because change demands time (object 1 at T1 changing to object 2 at T2). Parmenides denies the reliability of the senses and believes that it is dissociated from the truth. It is senses that make us believe that there is change — which implies becoming and not-being — which is an impossibility.</p><p><strong>Denial of Motion/Being is Stable</strong>— From the denial of change, it follows that motion is impossible as if it were possible it would imply that being could change from here to there, from being to not-being. But this is inconceivable and thus impossible.</p><p><strong>Eternality and Infiniteness of Being</strong> — The above leads us to the eternality of being. Had the being not been infinite or complete within itself, it would have been bound by something else, the not-being. But there is no not-being. If whatever is not, cannot be, then what is, always is. All that is there must always have been there.</p><p><strong>Being as Singular and Complete— </strong>Parmenides was one of the earliest non-dualists. He rejected diversity as a deception of the senses and believed that all is one, and is complete. (It is important to not confuse monism with non-dualism). If a being, A, is incomplete — it indicates a lack. And lack indicates not-being, which is inconceivable. Being is marked by absolute completeness — it is devoid of any kind of lack.</p><p>He showed that the being is one by showing how diversity leads to infinite regress. (In the tradition of Philosophy, infinite regress is an indication of a determinatory problem as it does not allow one to assert anything about a thing).</p><p>For differentiation to come about — one would need to make sense of what is NOT (which, as per Parmenides has been established as inconceivable and hence non-existent.)</p><p>Suppose there are two beings, A and B. A is different from B. Then there must be a C that separates A and B. But this C must also be different from both A and B for it to be a point of difference between them. (C has to be a being too, as a non-being is inconceivable.) This would call for a need for D and E that would differentiate between A and C and C and B respectively, and so on, till infinity (leading to the infinite regress problem). Thus, the being is a whole without parts. It is indivisible.</p><h4>Parmenides’ Idea of Being</h4><ol><li><em>Being as Absolute</em> — Whatever is, is</li><li><em>Being as Eternal </em>— There is an absence of time for the being. It is beyond temporality. It is important to not confuse this <em>being </em>as being temporally eternal.</li><li><em>Being as Not Created</em> — What is, is. It cannot be generated or created as that would invoke temporality and change. Thus, it follows that one cannot construe of the non-being.</li><li><em>Being as Indestructible </em>— Being is eternal. If it were to be destroyed, then there would be non-being, which is inconceivable and hence impossible.</li><li><em>Being as Indivisible</em> — If the Being were to be divided into parts, the parts would have had to be different from each other. Only one part could be being and the other would have to be not-being. But there is no not-being, and only being ‘is’.</li><li><em>Being as governed by Logos</em> — The being is balanced by logos (reason). It operates in a structured manner. Non-being is not permitted by logos. He elevates the notion of balance to the structure of reason.</li></ol><p>Similar to the Ionian principle of <em>dike</em> that was invoked by earlier philosophers, Parmenides believes that there is a necessary reason for things to be how they are. The difference is in their approach of asserting this principle. The others’ premises were dependent on the senses and empirical understanding while Parmenides’ premises are independent of senses and empirical data, making the gravity of their truth even greater. He hints that laws/principles of nature cannot be violated. This is necessary for there to be order. From this the idea of the possibility of logical forms is arrived at. He introduced the concept of a-priori as principles that are universal and independent of experience, eternal and beyond time and space. Such principles sideline any scope for the contextuality of truth. This is the basis for Plato’s Theory of Recollection, as per which knowledge is already there — its conceivable. When we are conceiving it, we are gaining knowledge. Knowledge can never be originally new. Whatever can be known or conceived must already and always be.</p><h4>Doxa — Way of the False</h4><p>If one is to accept the above as preached by the goddess, one loses their agency in terms of materiality. We act to change or to prevent change. Action is thus necessarily related to change, and agency is invoked to counter or encounter it. What of everyday life, then? How do we address our pragmatic concerns?</p><p>But to cancel out Parmedian thought because of the above problem would be to assume that he did not himself realize that it is a problem. He did. Parmenides believed that doxa is needed to be functional. Doxa here means the way of senses — which has been established as being false by him. But it is, in this pragmatic sense, unavoidable. The choice is between different doxa. One needs to be selective — and choose that which is at least respectful of Alethea or truth/reason (as has been elaborated upon, above). But doxa can never become the truth. (In a way, one can only choose the best amongst the worst). The least wrong doxa leads to approximation of the form of the truth. (This form/structure is the idea of ‘being’ discussed above, the content cannot be approximated as the subjects being and not-being are opposed to each other — and doxa implies accepting the not-being). Thus, one needs to adopt what is closest to the logic and ontology of Alethea. The Goddess (in the poem) attempts to provide the best possible choice through her cosmogony — and this is where Parmenidean philosophy ends. But this account of the best possible doxa is still a doxa — it is not the truth and because of this, it loses its force.</p><p><em>(Plato expands upon this in problem in his Theory of Forms and Aristotle expands upon this form or ‘schemata’ through his Analytics)</em></p><p>The strength of Parmedian work lies in the fact that his work does not rely on the authority of ‘goddess’ who preaches Alethea or truth. It relies on rationality. Because his theses are tautologies, they are self-evident and can only be denied by a denial of reason. The general principle that the authority of truth is inviolable is invoked.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3de88d1bc9d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A rant on the pre-Socratics and Popper]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/a-rant-on-the-pre-socratics-and-popper-3ce7ec6d2045?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ce7ec6d2045</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 03:54:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-04T16:35:27.526Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Why should we value boldness and critical rational discussion?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LAl746DoyUhHgiuD" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@joshstyle?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">JOSHUA COLEMAN</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Google X Analogy</h3><p>‘X’ is Google’s top-secret moonshot factory. It makes huge investments in risky bold ideas or ‘moonshots’. If actualized, these risky bold ideas would be able to produce significant value. But because of the challenging and high-risk low-success nature of these endeavors, ‘X’ runs at a financial loss.</p><p>‘X’ here is a variable that can be replaced with any radical idea. Think of ‘X’ here in terms of Popper’s hypothesis. Once you have the hypothesis, you can go ahead and try to build it up, find a reasonable path that leads to it and turn it into a solution.</p><p>If you can’t, then you move on to the next hypothesis.</p><p>‘X’ projects include radical things like self-driving cars and electricity storing salt. While most of X’s radical ideas fail, some do actualize successfully. Google Search itself was once an X project.</p><p>Do we need Google X?</p><p>It seems like we do. It brings out the importance of bold and critical thinking. It’s okay to approximate at the beginning and approach a problem from different angles. In fact, it is a valuable methodology. Refutation and non-refutation, both point towards advancement and make possible future advancements.</p><h3>The Bold Pre-Socratics</h3><p>Pre-Socratic philosophy was the first rational enterprise away from mythology. These thinkers mostly lived in Ionia and Elea (present-day Turkey). They had a strong insistence on logic, coherence and reason.</p><p>But why are we talking about them?</p><p>Popper implores that we need to return to the ‘simple, straightforward rationality of the Pre-Socratics’. What he appreciates is the simplicity and boldness of the questions that they asked and the critical attitude that they ‘invented’ and encouraged.</p><p>They did not ‘zoom in’ and ask questions like “How can we know anything about this orange?” but asked big questions like “How can we know anything about this world?”. For Popper, all of philosophy is cosmology.</p><blockquote>Anaximander said, “The earth … is held up by nothing, but remains stationary owing to the fact that it is equally distant from all other things. Its shape is . .. like that of a drum . .. We walk on one of its flat surfaces, while the other is on the opposite side.”</blockquote><p>The reason he celebrates Anaximander’s thought is because of its boldness and revolutionariness. Popper believes that it is what made possible the theories proposed by Aristarchus and Copernicus, and even Newton (his conception of immaterial and invisible gravitational forces). Even though Anaximander was clearly wrong (we know that now), it is important that we recognize the value his theories hold and inspire. Right and wrong should not be taken as the only determinants of value, because in science, we see that theories which have been held as true are often shown to be wrong, but we still study them.</p><h3>Pythagorean vs Ionian Ideology</h3><p>Popper drew a contrast between the Pythagorean school, which was dogmatic and did not allow critical rational discussion that could go against the founder’s doctrine, and the other Greek philosophy schools like the Ionian school founded by Thales, which did the exact opposite. He emphasized upon the latter’s “astonishing freedom and creativeness”. In the system that Thales developed, critical attitude was actively encouraged. Thales’ own theory was refuted by his disciple Anaximander’s theory, and then his by his disciple Anaximenes. In sharp contrast, the dogmatic and authoritarian nature of the Pythagorean school, in which refuting the founder’s doctrine with proposals of new, contradicting theories was prohibited to the extent that Pythagoras (allegedly) drowned one of his pupils for doing so.</p><p>What we can learn from the pre-Socratics is the attitude of free critical discussion, creativity and boldness in conjectures. These are valuable traits that aid in advancement of science and thought.</p><p><em>(This rant is inspired by a reading of ‘The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Pre-Socratic Enlightenment’ and ‘Back to the Pre-Socratics: The Presidential Address’ by Karl Popper)</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ce7ec6d2045" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Heraclitus of Ephesus]]></title>
            <link>https://thethinkinglane.medium.com/heraclitus-of-ephesus-22cd89b9ecd?source=rss-6d2edcd3256f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/22cd89b9ecd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Thinking Lane]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:29:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-03T16:31:02.574Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Exploring the philosophical thought of Heraclitus and its critique by Aristotle</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*z4fcZpeH6JovxScF" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@nmgnetwork?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">NMG Network</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>About</h3><p>Heraclitus is considered to be one of the most important early Greek philosophers. He lived during the early 6th century to the late 5th century BC. There are around 150 fragments associated with Heraclitus, out of which only 57 are accepted as genuinely Heraclitan ‘<em>cosmic</em> <em>fragments’</em>. This is a significant increase as compared to the dearth of other pre-Socratics’ fragments.</p><h4>While reading Heraclitus…</h4><p>A few things must be kept in mind while reading Heraclitus’ work.</p><p>The neo-Platonists and Stoics claimed that Heraclitus was the forerunner of Stoicism. So it must be kept in mind that the lenses used by them to analyze Heraclitan thought were not completely impartial. They might have misrepresented him by virtue of emphasis on one aspect of his thought. The Stoics attributed to Heraclitus the idea of Ecpyrosis (<em>conflagration</em>) — as per which there would be destruction of the world by fire and then its rejuvenation from ashes. But it is unlikely that this idea actually came from Heraclitus.</p><p>The works of Plato and Aristotle, which are a major source of Heraclitan thought, did not do justice to it. They did not analyze it enough. Thus, reduction and misrepresentation of his work through the accounts of others must be realized.</p><h4>His writing style</h4><p>Heraclitus had a cryptic writing style which has been compared to that of oracles. He wrote philosophical riddles, most of them being one-liners. The 3rd century satirist Philus called him the Riddler, Cicero called him the obscurer, Theophrastus attributed the word ‘<em>melancholia</em>’ (<em>meaning</em> <em>impulsive</em>) to him — which is why later he came to be known as the ‘<em>weeping philosopher</em>’. The speculation behind the intent of such a style has led to numerous beliefs — did he do it to gain authority? Is it because access to his thought was not meant for everyone? A more likely explanation seems to be that he did it to encourage the reader’s epistemic agency, so that they are invested in the aspect of knowing.</p><h4>Major themes in his philosophy</h4><p>Following are the concepts Heraclitus wrote about:</p><ol><li><em>Change and unity</em> — primacy of change, play of opposites, unity of opposites</li><li><em>Logos</em> —cardinal principle, rational divine intelligence</li><li><em>Fire</em> —cosmogony with fire as arche, bound by the naturalist tradition</li></ol><p>It seems that Plato summarizes Heraclitus’ philosophy in one line — ‘<em>everything is in flux</em>’. He uses the phrase <em>‘panta chorei’</em> — which means everything moves/changes — to explain Heraclitus’ thoughts, which seems reductionist and dismissive of his other contributions.</p><p>Thus, it is important to note that Heraclitus focused on both change and stability, and not just on the former — which is what is emphasized upon by Plato, Aristotle and most of the others who wrote about him.</p><h3>Change and Logos</h3><p>Our senses provide us with a notion of change in the world. But this ‘<em>change</em>’ does not entail randomness. He believed that the cosmos was deeply regular. As per Heraclitus, underlying all change is a stable core — logos. As per its general usage, logos means <em>account</em>, but Heraclitus used it in a different sense. Logos can be understood to have several meanings — 1) the order underlying cosmos, and 2) the principle of balance (<em>measure/ratio</em>). For Heraclitus, causation (<em>which brings about change</em>) was equivalent to necessary relation. (<em>Note that Hume was born much later.</em>) He was looking for uniformity/regularity in things. The idea of uniformity is central to the idea of law (<em>logos is a law here</em>). Invoking the law of necessary reason, he believed that regularity/uniformity would not have been encountered had there not been a necessity. Logos ensures that all change takes place in a particular way. Therefore, to accept change is to accept the necessity of balance and order. In the absence of logos, there is chaos. Invoking the notion of change is the same as invoking the notion of necessity — in asking how/why, one is assuming a principle. An analysis of the seemingly commonsensical idea of ‘change’ is what enables us to get to the ‘underlying principle’ of necessity (<em>logos</em>).</p><p><em>Change — (implies) — necessity — (implies) — stability — (implies) — uniformity/regularity</em></p><p>Our understanding of Heraclitus operates at a level of abstraction. Thus, it becomes important to differentiate between principles of cosmos and their manifestation. Principles are arrived at when we analyze and practice abstract thinking. Logos is arrived at after an abstraction of the cosmos. This helps us appreciate the different planes of existence, as has been done by Plato through his distinction between the realms of forms and appearances. It is important to note that while the cosmos changes, Logos does not. Invocation of the concept of dike and logos (justice and reason) is the same as invocation of order — in which the latter is not fabricated, but discovered/is a given.</p><h4>Fire as the arche</h4><p>Change is also reflected in his <em>arche</em>. Heraclitus believed that fire (<em>aither/pyre</em>), was the arche or the first principle, governed by the logos — which is responsible for the creation of everything. The notion of fire as the arche suits the doxa (what is widely accepted). All living things are warm. All dead things are cold. The divine realm is (or is/was supposed as being) a fiery realm. It is though the regulation of fire by logos that all things are born. So, the material element of fire is not enough by itself. Again, as in the case of other pre-Socratics like Anaximenes, ‘<em>fire</em>’ as an arche is different from the regular fire. It is cosmic or ‘<em>pure</em>’ fire. The regular fire, along with the other things in the world, is just derived from it. Similar to Anaximenes’ explanation for air as an arche, fire produces things through rarefaction and condensation. Everything is made from it and returns to it (<em>to ensure balance</em>). The total remains unchanged so there is no destruction or ‘<em>birth</em>’ that adds/takes away from what is already there. This idea of retention can be compared to the principle of conservation of mass/energy in modern-day physics.</p><h4>River Fragments</h4><p>A river is always changing. So even though one cannot step into the same river twice, this myriad of changes — the flowing river water and the changing banks — is what is meant by a river. This understanding brings out the ‘changing’ dimension of a thing along with the invocation of the notion of unity as a changing unit.</p><h3>All is one</h3><blockquote>“Hearing not me, but the logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one.”</blockquote><blockquote>— Heraclitus</blockquote><p>Heraclitus anticipated Paremenides’ theory. Here, logos means the principle that binds together all things so that they become one. (<em>There is unity in multiplicity.</em>) The reason why we think there is multiplicity because our limited senses can only experience parts of the world at a time. In a way, Heraclitus’ Logos is a ‘<em>Theory of Everything</em>’ as it is a law which unifies all laws. He believed that one who understands logos understanding everything there is in the world. For Heraclitus, the concept of the sovereign individual is not there. Existence must be seen as holistic for unity to be there.</p><h4>Unity of opposites</h4><p>All diversity is tied down by the unitary ordered cosmos. When we see diversity, there is actually unity, and wisdom lies in recognizing this unity. Unity is not negated when the objects appear to be in strife or conflict.</p><p>The idea of ‘<em>play of opposites</em>’ is mediated by logos to bring about balance. For Heraclitus, in opposition to Anaximander, the conflict between opposites is essential to bring about unity and oneness. This notion of conflict is also apparent in his choice of fire as the arche.</p><blockquote>“We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away through strife.” — Heraclitus</blockquote><p><strong>But one might ask — how can opposites adhere together? </strong>Because of logos. Though there is a war of opposites, they actually constitute a unity because of logos. (This can be understood through the application of civic norms which manage/aim to unify a community in which opposites reside.)</p><blockquote>“Seawater poisons humans but fish need it to live.”</blockquote><blockquote>“The road up is the same as the road down.”</blockquote><blockquote>— Heraclitus</blockquote><p>Opposite properties can and do exist within the same thing. It is essential to note that for Heraclitus, opposite means different and not necessarily contradictory. He believed we would have had an incomplete picture of the world if opposites had not been there as we cannot make sense of ‘<em>one</em>’ without the ‘<em>other</em>’. Opposites are what constitutes a unit. They are not irreconcilable. There is no absolute division between them as ultimately, all divisions are unit.</p><p>Thus, what appears to be change/strife, when mediated by logos, reveals itself to be unity. This seems to be what Plato was talking about — how things appear to be versus how they actually are. Senses should not be trusted, because they show us that opposites can never be one, even though they are <em>(foreshadowing Parmenides’ beliefs).</em> Even though Heraclitus marks a difference between appearances and reality, he held that change is real and not an illusion.</p><p>It is important to note that contrary to popular interpretation, Heraclitus was not a subjective idealist/relativist. The subject experiencing the object is not providing it with qualities because the qualities are inherent to the object itself. Relativism is a misinterpretation of the concept of unity — because on what basis could a subject impose contrary properties to one object? The predication of attributes/qualities upon entities is limited by the nature (<em>Phusis</em>) of the entity itself. <em>(This is what Aristotle meant by natural — what’s inherent to the object.)</em></p><h3>Critique of Heraclitan Notion of Change</h3><p>For Heraclitus, change is a manifestation of logos in effort to strike balance. There has been a debate around what he might have meant when he said — <em>all is always changing.</em></p><p>Plato tried to express the ‘<em>absurdity</em>’ in Heraclitus’ thought in his work <em>Theaetetus</em>, by countering Heraclitus’ <em>“You cannot step into the same river twice”</em> with <em>“You cannot step into the same river even once.” </em>But this seems to be taking Heraclitus’ thought to a logical extreme, which is unfair and seems like an attempt to unjustly dismiss his thought by reducing it to one misunderstood principle.</p><p>Aristotle rejects Heraclitus’ thought on the basis of the violation of the law of contradiction.</p><p><strong>a.~a is impossible</strong></p><p>The above ‘<em>impossibility</em>’ is asserted by Heraclitus <em>(as Aristotle thought)</em> in the unity of opposites.</p><p>In Heraclitus’ defense, when he was talking about opposites, he was not talking about contradictories, he was just talking about <em>different or contraries</em>. Also, he was not operating with the law of contradiction, which only became apparent after Parmenides.</p><p>Heraclitus is not propounding a relation like <strong>a.~a,</strong> but that of <strong>a.b.</strong> <em>(contraries, not contradictories).</em> Thus, his notion of opposites does not invoke a relation of identity (<em>distinction</em>) but that of continuity/spectrum.</p><p>Thus, in<strong> a.b</strong>, what Heraclitus intended was <strong>b≠~a, </strong>but what Aristotle attributed to him was <strong>b≡~a. </strong>So, in Heraclitus’ philosophy, <strong>a.~a ≠ a.b </strong>(hot.not hot)≠(hot.cold). Hence the criticism does not stand.</p><p>Another criticism can be raised against Heraclitus, and this one stands. It is that Heraclitus commits the fallacy of equivocation <em>(he used the same term in different senses).</em> He uses ‘<em>one</em>’ to express unity and identity both. Why does he speak of ‘one’ when unity can accommodate all differences? Also, unity implies a continuum <em>(of more than one)</em>— it is not one. It is varying. Whereas, one is homogenous and not varying <em>(like when it is used to express the concept of identity).</em> ‘One’ does not invoke the notion of continuum at all.</p><h3>Logos as hidden</h3><p>Heraclitus invokes the Principle of Exclusivity <em>(which is how philosophy seems to have operated right from the beginning)</em> as per which a specific kind of soul is needed — an epistemic self, a knower — to understand philosophical thought <em>(most importantly, logos)</em>. He was perhaps the first person to come up with the concept of a ‘<em>knower</em>’. For Heraclitus, the soul was <em>thumos</em>, and not <em>pneuma</em>, as it propels one into action. Phusis (<em>nature</em>) and its inclination to hide itself was later interpreted by Plato to provide avenue for the realm of Episteme. The idea of nature (<em>phusis</em>), or what is inherent in an object also emerged for the first time.</p><p>As per Heraclitus, Logos has an inclination to hide itself. If ‘<em>thinking</em>’ (<em>right thinking</em>) was an actuality, then Logos would not have been hidden. But it is a potentiality. Thus, to reach from the flux provided to us by our senses to the unity or logos that underlies everything, we require insight. He takes Anaximander’s abstraction further by basing his thought in the belief that sense cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. We only enquire about things that are hidden, thus the movement towards ‘<em>right thinking</em>’ is a conscious effort.</p><p>If one emphasizes only upon what is provided by the senses (<em>like Thales and Anaximenes did</em>), one will be limited only to the elements. But logos is not provided to us by our senses. Heraclitan thought has the novelty of encouraging us to go beyond our senses. Thus, to understand the logos is to understand/discover the given/hidden. This ‘<em>going beyond</em>’ requires a method. Here, the importance of passivity in understanding the simple — reception through senses without agency, is not dismissed. Rather, it is realized that the very creation of complex ideas involves ‘<em>going beyond</em>’. He did not imply that the senses were illusionary — just that they only provide a part of the truth — and to obtain the whole truth one needs to realize the other part(s) as well.</p><p>Knowledge can only emerge when one goes beyond the senses--but as Hume emphasized, one’s beyond must be, in a sense, confined to the senses <em>(Ideas need to correspond with the senses).</em></p><p>Heraclitus believed that for Gods, right thinking is intrinsic to their being. This is because access to logos is an actuality for them. It is because God can see logos that they are able to see balance in diversity (<em>justice</em>/<em>dike</em>). Logos is not hidden for them.</p><h3>Endnote</h3><p>There is a danger in agreeing too much with Heraclitus — in accepting whatever ‘<em>change</em>’ that is happening as being ‘<em>necessary</em>’. This fatalism would be an extreme misinterpretation of Heraclitus. Thus, one must be cautious while interpreting a thinker’s thought — both to prevent misinterpretation and taking it to mean more than was actually meant by the thinker.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22cd89b9ecd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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