<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by thirdeye on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by thirdeye on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@thirdeyeopen?source=rss-a91d5494b2ad------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:40:46 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@thirdeyeopen/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hedge Fund Market Wizards]]></title>
            <link>https://thirdeyeopen.medium.com/hedge-fund-market-wizards-22c68c84102e?source=rss-a91d5494b2ad------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/22c68c84102e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[thirdeye]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 29 May 2022 20:00:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-29T20:00:24.717Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NEf0rpVHJxUt6fMjAsshpA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I recently read “Hedge Fund Market Wizards” by Jack D. Schwager and wanted to summarize some thoughts. The book is made up of many interviews with different Hedge Fund traders, and the following are not 1:1 Summaries of the Interviews, but rather my own takeaways and thoughts regarding specific concepts.</p><h3><strong>Colm O’Shea</strong></h3><p>He is putting great emphasis not only on the underlying ideas behind his macro trades, but rather focuses a lot on finding the most well suited ways of implementing his views on the markets. His view is that the execution and structure of trades is often a bigger contribution to the final outcome than the underlying idea playing out.</p><p>And example of this philosophy would be a long TED spread trade, which is the difference between the 3 month LIBOR rate (rate at which banks lend to each other) and 3 month treasury rate (assumed risk-free rate) which he implemented in 2007. The risk reward of this Trade is highly skewed to the upside, since it is very unlikely for the LIBOR rate to trade above the T-bill rate, since that would imply banks preferring to lend to each other over lending to the US government, while the reverse is certainly possible especially in times of liquidity concerns and growing mistrust between banks.</p><p>This results in limited downside and “unlimited” upside for a long TED spread trade. It is also a more direct way of implementing O’Shea’s underlying thesis of increased mistrust between banks following a spike in mortgage rates and LIBOR rate. His thesis wasn&#39;t predicated to result in a meltdown of global equity markets, so choosing to implement this trade via equity options would have been less ideal. Equity put options also tend to be very expensive since the market lacks a natural seller of these options. The whole world is long equities and people like owning insurance. That is why equity puts are generally structurally expensive. The TED spread widened from around 25bps in 2007 to 485bps during the Lehman collapse.</p><p>Colm O’Shea argues that most successful traders aren&#39;t necessary better in “forecasting” the future, but rather understanding that some key variables have changed faster than the broad market.</p><p>“Great trades don&#39;t require prediction. The Soros trade of going short the pound in 1992 was based on something that had already happened — an ongoing deep recession that made it inevitable that the UK would not maintain the high interest rates required by remaining in the ERM.”</p><h3><strong>Ray Dalio</strong></h3><p>People believe that correlation of assets is some mythical mathematical phenomenon, which is hard to explain or model and causes markets to move dependent of each other. The reality is that each market is behaving rational under the influence of fundamental outside factors. Correlations in markets, exists if they rely on the same fundamental factors, which can change and as the determinants change the correlation change. For example, if the market is expecting slowing economic growth expectation stocks and bonds will be negatively correlated, because if growth slows it will cause both stock prices and interest rates to decline. However, if the Market views inflation as persisting and rising, stocks and bonds will be negatively correlated because interest rates will go up with higher inflation, which is detrimental to both stocks and bonds.</p><p>As demonstrated in this example, it is dangerous to only look at correlations as static relationships and ignoring fundamental drivers which are causing correlation in certain Assets. Projecting past correlations forward have led to some spectacular blow-ups in financial Markets. Dalio puts great emphasis on understanding which cause and effect relationships influence correlations during different regimes in financial history, since correlations are highly variable and critically dependent on prevailing circumstances.</p><p>“The biggest mistake investors often make is to believe that what happened in the recent past is likely to persist in the future”</p><h3>Larry Benedict</h3><p>He is keen on reducing his positions size after losing since he found that after losing he is statistically more likely to lose again. This might be due to the impact losing has on the Psychology, or that he might not have as much of an Edge as previously assumed due to a change in Market conditions.</p><h3>Jaffray Woodriff</h3><p>The best way to avoid overfitting data when testing quantitive models is to start with a hypothesis based on some sort of structural thesis or quantitive understanding of the market, and then collect data to see if it supports the hypothesis in a logical way.</p><h3>Edward Thorp</h3><p>Thorp talks about the importance of getting comfortable with your strategies and focusing on learning and improving your strategies before trying to make money. You need to take your time until you feel comfortable with executing your strategy with the planned size and until you don’t feel comfortable in your edge, it is best to only bet small size.</p><p>“There are no risk-free trade and risk-free rates. There is always the possibility that there is some unknown factor.”</p><p>Similar to Larry Benedict, Edward Thorp also likes to reduce his allocation gradually when a strategy is losing money. This is particularly important for new strategies where your edge is less proven, while more time tested strategies can be given more room for drawdown before the allocation gets reduced.</p><h3>Jamie Mai</h3><p>Like previous traders, Jamie Mai often looks for unconventional ways of structuring trades in order to achieve asymmetric payouts (upside potential x probability exceeds downside risk x probability). This mispricing of risk can sometimes be found in the options market, where the implied pricing assigns normal probability distributions to situations that clearly have bimodal outcomes. These bimodal opportunities often arise by influence of external events. For Example, impactful litigation or bankruptcy concerns where outcomes are clearly distributed bimodal (either the company is bankrupt in a year or worth multiple of the current distressed price) can set up good play if the market is viewing the probability of returns as normally distributed (changes from the current level are equally likely in either direction)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OZnwvm-nNuQzAofUbdQLtQ.png" /><figcaption>Hypothetical Probability Distribution of Stock returns: Orange (normal distribution) Blue (bimodal distribution)</figcaption></figure><p>A good Example of his unconventional way of structuring trades is his usage of long-dated index equity options as a hedge against rising interest rates. This works because the risk-free rate which is assumed in the implied pricing of options obviously has to rise when interest rates rise (especially since assumed risk-free rate often == short term t-bills). This can lead to monumental changes in the pricing of long term options and in general the longer dated the option is the more impact does the risk-free rate have on its pricing. Jamie Mai used OTM 10 year calls on the Dow Jones Index as a way to cheaply hedge against rising interest rates.</p><p>Another interesting example, which stood out to me, was his usage of an exotic type of option in the Aftermath of 2008 called “worst of option”. After 2008 a clear risk-on and risk-off relationship established itself in many markets, most notably the FX Markets. Currencies which previously had no correlation now started to show strong positive or negative correlations. An Example for a risk on currency would be the Australian Dollar (because of heavy EM and Commodities exposure), which started to correlated negatively with the Swiss Franc (Risk off Currency). Jamie Mai wanted to go short EUR, but was looking for a cheap way of gaining short exposure. He also believed that if the EUR started crashing, it would fall strongly both against the AUD and CHF and stop the previously strong negative correlation between those currencies.</p><p>He concluded the most ideal way of A) betting on a falling EUR and B) betting on vanishing correlation between AUD/CHF would be a “worst of Option put”. This is an option which gives you exposure to a basket of option (in Mais case, puts on both EUR/AUD and EUR/CHF) for a single premium. The buyer will get the payout for the option, which performs the worst (from the buyers perspective) and he will lose the entire premium if one of the options in the basket expires in the money. Therefore, the correlation between the Assets in the basket is very important in determining the value of the option (the worst off options get more expensive the more correlated the assets are). He was able to purchase the “worst of option” for cheap because of the strong recent correlation, which allowed him to get the same short EUR exposure for a fracture of the costs. In mid-2009, the EUR then did break down against both AUD and CHF and the “worst of option” x6 in value, but the result is less relevant than the genial structuring of the trade idea.</p><p><em>Quote: “As a general observation, markets tend to overdiscount the uncertainty related to identified risks and conversely, markets tend to under discount the risks that have not yet been expressly identified. In general, once a market overdiscounts a risk it often ends up being less bad than the market expected, since the risk was already overdiscounted, and it is difficult to top the market’s expectations.”</em></p><h3>Michael Platt</h3><p>“In 2009, I was long 2-year notes and short 10-year notes one-year forwards, looking for the yield curve to widen, and a lot of news came out that I thought would hurt me. One news item after another, I saw the screen and thought, I am going to get screwed in this position. But I didn’t after a number of these instances, I thought, the yield curve just can’t get any flatter no matter what comes out. So I quadrupled my position. It was a great trade. The spread went from 25 basis points to 210, although I got out at 110.”</p><h3>Joe Vindich</h3><p>He is a big proponent of scaling in and out of position and reducing size gradually since it helps with avoiding mental biases and the greedy wish to be right 100% not only 80%. This lets him avoid seeing the world in black/white and adopt a more probabilistic mindset. (Don’t do all or nothing decisions.)</p><p>I think mental techniques like this are very interesting, since I think it is often incredible to see how much the mind can rationalize when confronted with various biases nurtured by the volatility and desire to be right. Something that has helped myself was to sell off Assets in my Portfolio before debating if I still wanted to hold it. Most of the time the answer was still yes, and I would simply buy back the Asset, but this helped me to reduce biases stemming from already holding the asset and wanting to be correct even as the facts might have changed. The small percentage lost by transaction fees and slippage are usually paid back by the expected value of making clearer decisions and gaining additional conviction.</p><p>Vindich argues that there are 2 Types of Sentiment:</p><p>Market Sentiment (reflected by prices) and Popular Sentiment (social) Media.</p><p>The key is looking for Opportunities where those two are diverging from each other, since popular sentiment usually follows Price. An example would be if a Market is only slowly and gradually making new lows which are always close to previous lows and seemingly is losing bearish momentum, while popular sentiment is getting radically more bearish as time goes on.</p><p><em>“If you buy a stock at 40 and plan to sell it at 80 it is better to sell it at 75 on the way down rather than at the first touch of 80 while up trending strongly. It’s usually worth giving up the 5 dollar downside for higher upside if the stock continues to trend in a reflexive manner.”</em></p><p>Always trade because of a perceived opportunity, not out of a desire to make money.</p><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22c68c84102e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Defi Option Vaults: Selling Volatility ?]]></title>
            <link>https://thirdeyeopen.medium.com/defi-option-vaults-selling-volatility-a3e60d70ee0a?source=rss-a91d5494b2ad------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3e60d70ee0a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[deribit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[options-trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[options-strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[thirdeye]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2022 18:57:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-06T07:34:30.883Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*Dgx7DZYYu3cxzO1VtbGZAQ.png" /></figure><p>Defi Option Vaults (DOVs) are a new form of structured Product, which utilize the advantages public blockchains provide to improve settlement and clearing, as well as making complex derivatives easier accessible for the everyday pleb.</p><p>In essence, DOVs work similar to traditional structured products, where a specific combination of derivatives are selected, packaged and sold to clients looking for custom non-traditional payout curves. Clients are strictly institutional / “accredited” investors and Banks function as Service Providers, charging a fee for their services. This leads to increased counterparty risk, since bank solvency can&#39;t be taken for granted (a la 2008), but also high capital efficiency since the Bank can net your positions, leading to lower margin requirements. In TradFi these structured product flows span trillions globally and dominate movements in both the underlying assets and the respective IV&#39;s.</p><p>In Defi, DOVs try to disrupt this model by utilizing smart contracts as service providers, which are accessible to everybody with an internet connection regardless of their accreditation. This disrupts the traditional model and opens the usage of structured products to a broader audience.</p><p><strong>OK, but how does it actually work?</strong></p><p>I&#39;ll be using <a href="https://www.ribbon.finance/">ribbon.finance</a> as an example for a simplified technical explanation.</p><p>Ribbon offers 2 basic types of strategies: Selling Covered-Calls and Selling Puts in order to earn yield on 8 different Crypto Assets.</p><p>Both of these are fairly basic options strategies. When selling covered calls, you are selling additional upside on an underlying asset (which you are also holding) by selling calls to harvest the options premium. This leads to an instant harvest of premium, but can cost you if the price of the underlying rises above the strike price, in which case you would lose out on potential profits achieved by simply holding the underlying. This can cause you to lose out on value if denominated in the underlying (e.g., BTC or ETH) but can never cause losses denominated in USD. Investors sell calls if they anticipate the Market to be choppy / bearish, basically anticipating the Market Price to stay below the Strike Price of the call (otherwise they would have done better just holding the underlying).</p><p>Selling Puts is even simpler since it doesn&#39;t include holding the underlying, but simply selling naked puts. This means if you expect an Asset to go up, you can sell downside protection via selling put options to harvest the options premium instantly. This however is more risky since it can lead to unlimited losses denominated in USD if the price of the Asset drops below the Put&#39;s strike price. (Limited reward: harvesting options premium; unlimited downside: if underlying drops unpredictable)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CBrHeAMfK2UNlrL2dwAjnQ.png" /><figcaption>Payout diagram for selling Covered Calls (left) and selling Puts (right)</figcaption></figure><p>Ribbon simplifies these strategies via the use of vaults, where users simply have to deposit the funds into a smart contract. The user funds are pooled and invested into the respective strategies at a fixed time once a week. (Friday, 9 am to 11:30 am UTC)</p><p>To perform the sale of Options on chain ribbon relies on Opyn oTokens (<a href="https://www.opyn.co/">https://www.opyn.co/</a>) which are ERC20 token representing a typical American options contract with a strike price and expiry date. The vault locks user collateral into Opyn (where it stays locked until the Option expires; since this collateral is needed to pay out Buyers of these Options if they were to expire in the Money) and mints the Options. However, since ribbon want to be short (selling) calls and short puts, they need to find a counterpart to sell the minted Options to.</p><p>This works via the use of Gnosis Batch Auctions where bidders compete for the right of being a Buyer of these newly minted Calls (10 minutes auction duration) and ribbon turn into seller now being short these call strikes. Ribbon also sets a minimum price for the Options. The Auction converges at the final price, which is the settlement price for all bidders, even if their bids were higher than the Final Price. (Bids priced in WETH).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*u66Y1FFq3zIgJmQ28DywYQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://gnosis-auction.eth.link/#/start">https://gnosis-auction.eth.link/#/start</a></figcaption></figure><p>The majority of flow is often won by Options Market Making firms like QCP Capital, which can provide the most competitive and tight pricing for these options and then hedge their gained exposure on Derribit (which is easy for stETH, ETH and WBTC since they have liquid Options Markets and harder for other Alts without) or net it out via existing exposure in their Options book to just profit of the spread. The Settlement of sold Options is conducted on chain as well via airswap (<a href="https://www.airswap.io/#/">https://www.airswap.io/#/</a>)</p><p><strong>Expiry and Strike Price Selection:</strong></p><p>Ribbon uses weekly calls for all strategies, which always expire Fridays at 8:00 am UTC, followed by the auctions for the next weekly calls from 10:20 am to 11:30 am. This time is chosen to coincide with the weekly options expiry on Deribit, since this makes hedging of won Call flow easier for Market Makers. With ribbon v2, the strike selection is now done algorithmically on chain. The strike selection process however is fairly basic: Spot Prices for the underlying are pulled via Chainlink oracle and ribbon team manually inputs values for Deribit DVOL index, which is a measure of the options implied Volatility. Then the closest strike with a Delta of 0.1 is selected. Delta 0.1 means the closest Strike, which is priced with a 10% probability of the Option expiring ITM.</p><p><strong>The Risks of selling Volatility:</strong></p><p>The Marketing of many Defi Option Vaults like ribbon often evolves around the Idea of “sustainable” yields.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Bnx9FTE_OHK-vdNy.png" /><figcaption>Applies to most DOVs</figcaption></figure><p>I believe this kind of marketing is pretty misleading. Selling Options to harvest the Premium doesn&#39;t inherently generate any yield or Alpha (excess returns above the market). The Option&#39;s Premium can simply be viewed as the Market&#39;s risk premium of the Option expiring in the Money and causing Holders losses denominated in the underlying.</p><p>Selling Volatility should be used like any other trading strategy: when you have evidence that Volatility is overpriced by the Option&#39;s implied pricing compared to what you believe, the actual Odds of the underlying reaching the strike price. Don&#39;t think that recurring selling weekly options in a vault like manner without any empirical evidence of said options being priced wrongly by the Market is the correct way to approach options trading. Just like, I wouldn&#39;t recommend anyone indiscriminately buying calls or puts without any thesis / evidence of them being underpriced. Otherwise, you can make yourself vulnerable to the one unexpected market event which wipes out months of short volatility gains “or yield”: The one hypothetical week in which Ethereum rallies 30% and wipes out Months of ETH denominated short vol gains or even causes heavy losses denominated in ETH.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*RH2WzAaDrnKKOR8L8YZ-yg.png" /></figure><p>In general my thoughts can be summarized best as I do believe that DOVs provide important and interesting infrastructure, which however is used in an unfavourable manner by most participants. This is reinforced by Marketing which equates selling calls with some kind of risk-free rate or Alpha, since a DOV customer that keeps his assets locked in the vaults 365d a year obviously generates more revenue for the protocol compared to a customer that understands the risk of selling calls and only enters the DOV vaults strategically to express his Market view as a Trade. (Ribbon takes 2/20 management / performance fee, similar to most traditional hedge funds and definitely very rich compared to the simplicity of strategy they are providing)</p><p>TLDR; I don&#39;t believe that shorting volatility is necessarily a bad idea, it&#39;s just that shorting volatility at a fixed time, weekly at any price and for 365d a year in a vault like manner is likely a bad idea. Selling volatility shouldn&#39;t be something that&#39;s done systematic without any concerns for current market conditions.</p><p>While this might not be applicable to most DOV User, there is probably a minority familiar with the tradeoffs and willing to sacrifice some upside on the underlying for consistent payoff. This could be applicable to many protocols token treasuries, who through the use of DOVs could for the first time get access to Volatility Markets for their Altcoin. Ribbon recently added vaults for: AAVE, AVAX and SOL and is probably looking to expand their offering further in the Altcoin Space. This is interesting since none of these token currently have liquid Options Markets on a Centralized Exchange, but rather Defi is leading the innovation in this area.</p><p>I also believe the instant settlement via the use of public immutable blockchains and the removal of centralized clearing houses is generally a very good thing, especially in times when exchanges like LME (London Metal Exchange) have set the precedent of reversing unfavorable trades if they feel like it.</p><p>DOVs play a key part in enabling this on chain trading of options by socializing gas costs among thousands of user via the vault model, where instead of thousands of user individually making on chain trades and paying for gas, the vault makes the options transactions for the entire vault.</p><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3e60d70ee0a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Misbehaviour of Markets]]></title>
            <link>https://thirdeyeopen.medium.com/the-misbehaviours-of-markets-31e3d5b4c09d?source=rss-a91d5494b2ad------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/31e3d5b4c09d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-taking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[randomness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mandelbrot]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[thirdeye]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Mar 2022 20:05:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-23T20:06:21.527Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/906/0*C3tqvC3-Oyq_Z5Sc.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://math.hws.edu/eck/js/mandelbrot/MB.html">https://math.hws.edu/eck/js/mandelbrot/MB.html</a></figcaption></figure><p>I recently read “The Misbehaviour of Markets” by Benoit B. Mandelbrot and wanted to summarize some thoughts on randomness in markets.</p><p>The 1980s and 90s saw many different financial crises, which forced many investors to rethink the concept of risks in financial markets.</p><blockquote>1982: Latin America Debt Crisis (Mexican Default)</blockquote><blockquote>1987: Black Monday (DOW drops 20%)</blockquote><blockquote>1997: Asian Economic Crisis</blockquote><blockquote>1998: Russian Default (LTCM)</blockquote><blockquote>2000: Dot-com Bubble bursts</blockquote><p>The popular practises to measure risks would have let you to believe that any single one of those events is improbable enough to be nearly impossible (and could therefore be ignored from risk calculations), let alone all those improbable events happening in a fairly short time period. But the seemingly impossible happens all the time in financial markets.</p><p>These flawed risk models that lead individual investors and institution to underestimate the tail risks of markets rely on these (wrong) assumptions:</p><ol><li>Prices are statistically independent</li><li>Prices are normally distributed</li></ol><p>However, these Assumptions that till today are used in economic modelling completely break down in real financial markets:</p><p>1_ Prices are not independent. Today does influence tomorrow. Changes in (perceived) fundamentals in Assets can create different reactions from holders. A short term focused investor might sell his stock at the first sign of bad news at the horizon, while an investor with a longer term horizon might only sell his stock after Months or Years of the “bad News” playing out and impacting the company&#39;s revenue. (or maybe investor 2 is just less skilled). The point being that different market participants have different time horizons when reacting to fundamental changes, so today&#39;s news will impact the market&#39;s future decisions.</p><p>After the impact of fundamental changes to the Asset&#39;s price where it starts to trend in either direction, the psychological effect of Reflexivity starts to kick in where the rising (or falling) Asset Prices make the fundamentals appear less or more appealing to investors, which leads to a feedback loop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/0*tJ6s22sjGILrg_Uc" /><figcaption>Theory of Reflexivity: George Soros</figcaption></figure><p>The Reflexivity of rising prices however is not only a psychological effect (/bias) which distorts the investors&#39; perception of companies fundamentals after rising or falling prices. But rising stock prices can also alter the underlying fundamentals of a company itself. A Company might for example gets more cash on hand by selling their now more valuable stock which can be reinvested to strengthen future cashflows, or a companies credit rating can be upgraded which allows cheaper access to credit.</p><p>Interestingly, the concept of dependency can also be observed in other aspects of psychology (other than markets) like Sports, where a Basketball player is statistically more likely to hit a third shot if he had hit the previous two shots.</p><p>2_Prices are not normally distributed. Economists assume a Gaussian bell shape for the distribution of price changes. This is also false. Price swings are way more extreme than a bell curve model, but rather have very fat tails in the extreme price changes. This hints at the existence of multiple fundamentally different types of randomness:</p><ol><li>Gaussian bell curves of “normally” distributed results. The outcomes of randomness are resulting from being restricted by Biology, Physics or other natural Sciences. For Example: Human Height distribution or global Temperature distribution.</li><li>Wild Randomness (Cauchy): variations are much more harsh and extreme and can&#39;t be fit into a bell curve shape. For Example: Unpredictable variation in a coastline or Daily Price changes (Volatility) in Financial Markets.</li></ol><p>Analogy: Blind Folded Archer</p><p>A blindfolded Archer shoots at a target, and we measure the distance by which he misses (or hits) his target. Most of the time he shoots within close proximity of his target, but once in a while he misses by a huge margin and the arrow travels miles (even close to infinite if the archer is strong enough). A bell curve distribution doesn’t fit this case of blindfolded archery. His biggest misses are thousands of times larger than his average shot. His shots never settle down to a nice, predictable average mean. The variance of outcome is too large, and his scores have infinite expectancy, hence also infinite variance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/852/0*XFwqVA8h0S26hvBx.jpg" /></figure><p>The two ways of looking at randomness (of Gauss and Cauchy) can also be found in other fields, and is more a way of looking at the world more broadly than just randomness.</p><p>Gauss views big changes as a result of small changes, which can be quantified and estimated, while Cauchy views big events as unpredictably large.</p><p>In history, modernists agree on a gauss view and view the world as shaped by millions of different trends and millions of different individuals which ultimately converge to the history of our world while traditionalists view the world as shaped by a few individuals which have had unpredictably large influence on the future of history (Caesar, Newton, Einstein, Hitler)</p><p>Market turbulence tends to cluster. Reflexivity at its best: falling asset prices create financial instability, which causes asset prices to fall more, which causes even more financial instability. It&#39;s like an avalanche, once started it becomes harder and harder to stop the further it advances.</p><p>These periods of clustering of Market turbulence are disproportionally important for the overall returns of an asset. In the 1980 40% of the positive returns oft the SPX500 came during 10 trading days (0.5% of total trading days).</p><p>Simply assuming these fat tails away paints a very distorted picture which doesn’t reflect the reality. Big Price changes are not caused by many small moves but rather few huge events, which don’t fit into any bell curve shapes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/392/1*QxlPTet4X7MnX_jSMtj4YA.png" /></figure><p>This graph illustrates these points:</p><p>Volatility clusters and the Standard Deviations display results more similar to the shoot of the blindfolded archer, with extremes, which are many multiples larger and impact the averages disproportionally.</p><p>Big price changes are far more common than the standard financial models allow, and almost all blow-ups and financial crisis are results of underestimating these tail risks and using wrong Gaussian mental models to think of these risks.</p><p>Thanks for reading!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31e3d5b4c09d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bridges in a Multichain Future]]></title>
            <link>https://thirdeyeopen.medium.com/bridges-in-a-multichain-future-61e06d467c04?source=rss-a91d5494b2ad------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61e06d467c04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum-blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[multichain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-bridges]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[thirdeye]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 07:59:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-08T07:59:47.622Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*d5uWrIyg4VcfdDhx.png" /></figure><p>The market of smart contract platforms today looks very different from how many market participants have depicted it in 2019 and 2020.</p><p>After the incredible price appreciation in 2017 and the following bubble pop, almost all alternative layer 1s (“Ethereum killer”) failed to achieve usage, which quickly reflected in price going down 95%.</p><p>However, while the ETH price didn’t hold up any better than its competitors, demand for Block space and innovation on the App layer was starting to pick up again. It was during that time in late 2018/19/20 where most of the app layer innovation originated, which until today serve as key building blocks in the Defi ecosystem (Uniswap, AAVE, Maker and more).</p><p>The sentiment was pro Ethereum (compared to Alt L1s) since that’s where builders went, and innovation occurred. Most people counted on Ethereum to solve its Scalability problems with ETH 2.0 at some point in 2019 or 2020. Even during the Defi Summer of 2020 when ETH fees starting to increase, all innovation was still happening on Ethereum.</p><p>The Market today however paints a very different picture and is clearly signalling a need for Alternative Layer 1 Chains, which can achieve Scalability faster than Ethereum (by making different trade off on the Scalability Trilemma)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/490/0*r2lrukTHuP2wp41J.png" /><figcaption>Total Value locked on all Smart Contract Chains (<a href="https://defillama.com/chains">https://defillama.com/chains</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Ethereum dominance in TVL reflects this clearly by declining from 97% in the beginning of 2021 to just above 60% in just 13 Months. Not only TVL, but also Innovation is starting to leave Ethereum, with many Projects using high TPS (Transactions per second) chains to innovate in new Areas. This is ultimately also reflected in prices, with almost every Alt L1 outperforming ETH over the course of the year.</p><p>(It is still important to keep in mind that TVL on ETH lost Market Share but still grew 530% in 2021)</p><p>In a Multichain world, different Smart Contract Platforms can coexist and fulfil different use cases based on how suitable their design tradeoffs are for certain use cases. For Example, Ethereum Layer 1 with its focus on Security and Immutability could be home to high dollar transactions and expensive NFTs, where Users are willing to pay a premium for the Service of Security Ethereum provides. While Solana or Avalanche are home to User which have priorities on fast and cheap transactions while sacrificing Security to an extent. Tezos could become the home of NTFs, or Applications could build on their own chains on Cosmos SDK.</p><p>These blockchains would not have to compete for users since their user profiles are vastly different, making is a very positive sum for the whole industry by improving the Smart Contract User Experience.</p><p>(Devil’s Advocate)</p><p>One could argue that much of the activity on other Layer 1 Chains can be credited to a year-long bull market, where people continue to venture out into different obscure alternative layer 1 ecosystems in the search of higher and higher returns. A phenomenon which is common to all markets, where participants venture out more and more on the risk curve the longer the cycle goes on. All while most projects on those obscure ecosystems are 1:1 forks of existing projects on Ethereum, basically only providing the User with a service of “being able to be early to an ecosystem” while using liquidity incentive programs to lure in more user and hackathons/grants to fund developer to copy and paste Ethereum projects onto the chain.</p><p>All while VCs and Exchanges lure Retail investor into believing in a “Multichain Future” since their Business Models are dependent on multiple different coins capturing mindshare. To A) earn exchange fees by people trading back and forth between different Assets and B) Buy their presale bags which have been acquired at 1/100 of the cost. Similar to how much of the Altcoin cycle in 2017 played out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/0*LglDvrpq3lyTRbP6.png" /></figure><p>Kyle Samani from Multicoin Capital on this topic (Solana investor from Seed onwards and early to EOS in 2017)</p><p>(I am not trying to villanize VCs, since that is simply their business model and their responsibility towards their LPs.)</p><p>However, while these are valid arguments, and I would agree that Ethereum could regain Market Share in TVL during a calmer (bear) market where less opportunity exist on different layer 1s. I still strongly believe that the transition from Mindshare and most importantly developer away from Ethereum is a strong trend, which will persist for the next years.</p><p>Ethereum’s vision of a Multichain Future:</p><p>Ethereums vision of the Future doesn’t look too different from the one described. The vision has shifted from that of a Monolithic Base Chain where all transactions are done and settled on Ethereum Layer 1 towards the vision of a modular rollup centric blockchain where Scalability is achieved without sacrificing the superior security and decentralization of the Ethereum base chain, by relying on Layer 2 chains like Arbitrum, Optimism, Starkware or ZkSync to facilitate Transactions away from the Ethereum base chain and then post proofs of these transactions to the main chain.</p><p>The Ethereum main chain as we know it today would become a “chain of chain” which doesn’t facilitate transactions for most people (since fees are astronomically high), but rather executes transactions separately from the main chain but then posts proof of these transactions to the main chain (herby inheriting the security from the main chain).</p><p>Whether you sympathize with an Ethereum centric rollup future or that of multiple Layer 1 Chains sharing market share, it seems inevitable for a Multichain future to become dominant since all players are working towards it</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*RLfB1aXHO5y2TWw6.png" /></figure><p>This increasing activity happening between chains is opening up a new market opportunity for a new set of Protocols: Bridges</p><p>In their simplest form, Bridges allow a transfer of information between multiple Blockchains.</p><p>This connectivity between blockchains is a very important function for many reasons:</p><p>Bridges fight a fragmentation of Liquidity. Assets can be bridges between chains within minutes, so the location of Assets becomes less relevant since capital can move quickly once a better use of capital is detected.</p><p>This increased connectivity between Blockchains is also very positive sums for all players.</p><p>Many new apps can utilize the existing bridge infrastructure (or build new innovation which leverages this technology) to create new creative products for customers. Existing apps can venture out to add new use cases, which are enabled by a flourishing multichain activity and the connectivity between chains.</p><p>This aggregates liquidity between chains and improves the User Experience, which is very positive Sum for the whole Space, similar to how global trade is positive sum for all participants.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/0*uYmPy53jByG5iWPh" /><figcaption>Twitter sneak peek from multichain development in AAVE <a href="https://twitter.com/tomuky/status/1488132115132731392">https://twitter.com/tomuky/status/1488132115132731392</a></figcaption></figure><p>Furthermore, Speculators can roam freely between chain and arbitragers can have an easier time keeping Asset prices in line between chains. Arbitrage Volumes between chains should become major parts of total bridge volumes, similar to how Market Makers are responsible for most CEX volume and most inter exchange transfer volume is done by Arbitrage firms.</p><p><strong>Categorizing the Bridging Landscape:</strong></p><p><strong>2 Way Chain Bridge:</strong></p><p>These are fairly simple constructed Bridges, which are used to connect maximum two blockchains. This allows users to send funds from the destination chain to the bridge and receive an equivalent amount of coins on the recipient chain. This mechanism works by locking the coins on the destination chain and minting an equal amount of new “wrapped” tokens on the recipient chain. If the user decides to bridge back to his destination chain, he sends his funds to the bridge, which burns them and unlocks his “original” funds on the chain. This redeeming process is smooth and takes a few minutes, which allows the wrapped tokens to hold their peg very well (if trust in the bridge protocol is high).</p><p>So technically bridges don’t transfer assets between chains, but rather lock them up on one chain and issue them on the other chain, but this is purely a technicality.</p><p>This type of Bridge is the most popular at the moment if measured by TVL and Transaction Volume with the most popular Bridges being: Avax Bridge ($5.1b TVL), Ronin (Axie Infinity) Bridge ($3.6b TVL), Polygon POS Bridge (3.2b TVL), Arbitrum Bridge ($1.3b TVL) and the Solana Bridge which is integrated in the Sollet Wallet ($0.5b TVL).</p><p>The relative simplicity these Bridges enjoy often allows them a fast time to Market. They are often created by the team behind the Layer 1 Protocol, which is connected with the Ethereum Network. For Example, the Avalanche Bridge was created by Ava Labs to allow easy connectivity between Avalanche and Ethereum (only allows ERC20 Transfers) which is a crucial property to allow for activity, especially in the early stages when Multichain Bridges have not integrated the Network yet.</p><p><strong>Asset Bridges:</strong></p><p>These Bridges serve the purpose of creating new Assets, from foreign chains, which can then be used to easily bridge to new chains and use the new Asset in the native Ecosystem of the new Chain. The best Example is BTC on Ethereum. Currently, over 333.768 (=$12b) wrapped versions of BTC exist on Ethereum, which are used in various different Defi Applications. These wrapped BTC are fully collateralized by BTC on the Bitcoin Chain and are held either in a custodial manner like wBTC which is held and issued by the centralized custodian BitGo.</p><blockquote><a href="https://wbtc.network/dashboard/audit"><em>https://wbtc.network/dashboard/audit</em></a></blockquote><p>or in a non-custodial manner like renBTC, where multiple validators execute transactions by coming to consensus using the multi-party computation algorithm RZL sMPC. These Validators each have to lock up 3x the BTC Value they secure in REN to disincentivize malicious behaviour. (Less trust Assumption with lower capital efficiency)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/658/0*v4VX-hzk76cfZrMM.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/btc-on-ethereum_1">https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/btc-on-ethereum_1</a></figcaption></figure><p>The custodial solution wBTC holds more than 80% Market Share. Since all different versions of wrapped BTC are different ERC-20 tokens, they are non-compatible and Defi protocols would have to set up individual Products (e.g., Lending Pools or AMM Pairs) for every wrapped BTC token. This normally doesn’t happen, but Defi Protocols rather default to the most liquid and commonly used version, which can lead to insanely strong MOATS (reflected in the 80% Market share Dominance).</p><p><strong>Application Layer Bridges:</strong></p><p>A bridge that connects multiple Blockchain, but only for a specific use within an application. A successful Example is the Thorchain Protocol, which has built a separate Blockchain on the Cosmos SDK, which focuses on being a Cross-Chain-Exchange. The Thorchain Protocols enables swapping between many Blockchains without the need for wrapped Tokens. Simplified, this works by User sending funds “Vaults” on the recipient Chain (e.g., Bitcoin) which are controlled by the Thorchain Nodes (they use TSS to come to consensus on the validity of inbound transactions to the “Vaults”). Once the transactions has been finalized, the Protocol initiates a withdrawal of (e.g., ETH) from the Output Vault on the Ethereum Chain to the recipient’s ETH wallet.</p><p>In general, Multi Chain Defi Protocol which either (like Thorchain) use their own Bridge Protocol or embed existing Bridging Solution into their protocol could enable many new and interesting use cases in the coming years.</p><p><strong>Centralized Bridges (CEX):</strong></p><p>By allowing withdrawals of Assets to different native chains, Centralized Exchanges also offer a bridging service. An Example is Binance which works as the main Bridge for BSC User (Binance Smart Chain) to the extent that Binance didn’t see a need to build out a 2Way Bridge to Ethereum but rather refers User directly to the Binance Exchange</p><blockquote><em>(https://www.binance.org/en/bridge)</em></blockquote><p>Binance also operates as custodian for many wrapped tokens on the BSC (e.g. BBTC, ETH, BUSD), meaning they are also operating an Asset bridge.</p><p>However, Centralized Exchanges are not really making any steps into fully developing their bridging service. Binance for Example only allows withdrawals of Stable coins (USDT/USDC) to the Binance Smart Chain, Ethereum and Tron, while many Multichain Bridges allow Stable coin bridging for more than 10 chains.</p><p>While CEXs as Bridges can be a good choice for less active user, the UX for people use bridges on a regular basis is definitely inferior.</p><p><strong>Bridge Aggregators:</strong></p><p>Bridge Aggregator find and bridge you through the fastest /cheapest available option. In general, this is an interesting concept for “power user” like arbitrage or trading firms which want to find the fastest bridge to get from chain x to chain y however for the average user it might not be a priority to save a minute in bridging time or save a few cents. The risk for Bridge Aggregators could be the Bridging Market playing out similar to the DEX Aggregator market, where many people actually prefer to use the underlying protocols, which have some Name brand recognition like Uniswap or Sushiswap rather than using DEX Aggregator even if this would save them a bit in fees and market impact (less slippage).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*cqByc5m3ReQfaDtR.png" /></figure><p><strong>Multichain Bridges:</strong></p><p>These bridges are protocols, which serve the purpose of transferring value between multiple different blockchains. There are many different designs to achieve this goal, however similar to the smart contract space there usually are tradeoffs in security/decentralization which have to be done to achieve scaling and high capital efficiency.</p><p>The basic building blocks for most bridges look relatively similar: Users send funds via a front end to a specific deposit contract on the source chain. This transaction is then confirmed, and the correct amount of funds gets minted on the recipient chain, which is sent to the user wallet.</p><p>However, who confirms that the transaction is sent correctly to the deposit address? This is the vulnerable part in the whole bridging process since malicious actors have to be hindered of confirming that assets have been sent to the deposit contract, which haven’t (allowing them to mint free wrapped token on the recipient chain).</p><p>This is where validators come into play. Validators monitor the deposit address and confirm transactions by coming to consensus. In more centralized bridges, there might only be one validator (wBTC) or multiple (Anyswap has 32). These validators are also in control of holding the private keys of the deposit address. In the case of multiple Validators, the private key is decided into multiple pieces, so we don’t have to trust a single node to hold the private keys to our funds.</p><p><strong>Economic Incentivizes:</strong></p><p>Trusted Validators: While having 32 different Validators sounds secure, there is in theory nothing holding them back from colluding and stealing user funds. In the case of wBTC we must trust the good reputation of the company (BitGo). Most projects relying on trusted Validators are relying on this more centralized model with higher trust assumptions to get to market faster, but are planning to transition to a more trustless model in the future.</p><p>Bonded Validators: This works similar to the slashing mechanism in Ethereum 2.0. Validators have to lock up a stake, which can be slashed (destroyed) if they behave wrongly. This means everyone can become a Validator. However, this collateral has to scale proportionally in value to the economic throughput or value at risk from funds, otherwise the game theoretical incentives from Validators to behave correctly breaks down.</p><p><strong>Insured Validators:</strong></p><p>This is an evolution of the bonded Validators where validators also have to lock up collateral, which doesn’t get slashed in the event of wrong doing but gets redistributed to the affected users. However, deepening on the collateral (often the coin of the bridge e.g. renvm validators look up REN) it could be significantly less valuable after a successful attack, making it hard to reimburse users.</p><p>After the Validators have confirmed (and come to consensus) on the validity of your transaction to the deposit address, the correct amount of funds will be minted on the destination chain and send to your wallet.</p><p>A different interesting design approach are Bridges which work with Liquidity pools similar to AMMs (Automated Market Makers) e.g., Connext or Celer cbridge. They work by Liquidity Provider depositing assets in locked pools on both source and destination chain. By providing Liquidity, they earn fees for the pair they have provided liquidity to. This yield changes, deepening how much Liquidity is needed in different swap pairs where it is needed. Similar to AMMs user request a quote for a swap. If user accepts their assets will be locked on the source chain and soon after the assets will be unlocked on the destination chain. If the transaction is not fulfilled correctly (by both parties) within a fixed amount of time, the transaction gets reverted, and both parties receive their assets. This bridge design reduces trust a bit however, at the expense of capital efficiency. Sometimes, certain swap pairs/ chains are unavailable since there is not enough liquidity on both chains to generate the swap, which could hinder user with bigger wallets from using these bridges.</p><p><strong>Market Opportunity:</strong></p><p>Multichain bridges will likely not be a winner take all market since similar to Layer 1 Blockchains many different Design approaches exist, which make different Tradeoffs and are suited well for different user. However, unlike Layer 1s bridge fees don’t scale with usage and are already relatively cheap even with lower trust assumption bridge design, so there likely won’t be a tradeoff between trust assumption and cost but rather a tradeoff between trust assumption and latency.</p><p>The total addressable Market of Bridges is hard to estimate since theoretically the TVL on all Smart Contract Chains ($225b), but since bridges take a fee from volume bridged it also depends on how quickly capital is rotating between chains.</p><p><strong>Investability:</strong></p><p>Bridges or Middleware Protocols more broadly could benefit from superior Investability, meaning they could become decent indexed bets for Market participants which seek exposure to the Multichain thesis but don’t have the time to keep up to date with innovation happening on different chains / apps enabled by multichain. (= “Selling Shovels Thesis.”) Bridges would become a decent bet from those participants, similar to how LINK as Oracle Middleware benefited from the same indexing approach by many investors during the first Defi Mania, e.g. (Fund XYZ (in 2020) wants exposure to Defi but doesn’t know which App to pick: Buys LINK; Fund XYZ (in 2022) want multichain exposure but doesn’t know which App/Chains to pick: Buys Bridge tokens.)</p><p><strong>Unsolved Issues:</strong></p><p>While Bridges are a key piece of infrastructure, there are still some unsolved problems and vulnerabilities which could pose serious threats to the underlying networks.</p><p>One of the biggest unsolved questions at the moment is how bridges would deal with blockchain rollbacks /block reorgs. Suppose a Chain get 51% Attacked successfully and the attacker can censor / revert transaction, he however cannot propose a block that takes away your Coins. So, if you have x ETH which you sold for y DAI after the Attack, you will either have x ETH or y DAI (depending on to which time the chain is reverted). Bridges however add a layer of added complexity in the case of a 51% attack.</p><p>Let’s say the attacker deposits ETH into a Solana bridge (get wETH on Solana) but reverts the deposit transaction after the wETH was minted to his Solana Address. Since wETH on Solana and ETH on Ethereum would not be fully backed, any more users holding wETH on Solana would lose Money. Since however not only 2 Chains exist (Solana and Ethereum) but rather hundreds which are all connected by bridges, an 51% attack on one chain could create a systemic contagion, which affects all chains which are connected through bridges with the attacked chain.</p><p>Vitalik has written an interesting Reddit post about this topic, which goes into much more detail:</p><blockquote><a href="https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/rwojtk/ama_we_are_the_efs_research_team_pt_7_07_january/hrngyk8/"><em>https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/rwojtk/ama_we_are_the_efs_research_team_pt_7_07_january/hrngyk8/</em></a></blockquote><p>Thanks for reading! ^_^</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61e06d467c04" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lido and Liquid Staking]]></title>
            <link>https://thirdeyeopen.medium.com/lido-and-liquid-staking-77ba55c56bf9?source=rss-a91d5494b2ad------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/77ba55c56bf9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum-blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stakingderivative]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eth]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[thirdeye]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Nov 2021 00:44:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-23T00:44:40.599Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/834/1*sM9QhXRb6WsFfl5DWeNqVg.png" /></figure><p><strong>ETH 2.0/ Proof of Stake explained:</strong></p><p>When looking into Lido and Liquid Staking ETH 2.0 and Proof of Stake are key Topics. The following are high level overviews.</p><p><strong>What is ETH 2.0?</strong></p><p>ETH 2.0 or (Serenity) is an Upgrade to the existing Ethereum Blockchain which aims to make the network more scalable, more secure and more sustainable. The Upgrade has been planned since the release of the Ethereum Whitepaper in 2013 and consists of three Parts:</p><p><strong>1. The Beacon Chain:</strong></p><p>The Beacon Chain is the Hearth of the ETH 2.0 upgrade. The Beacon chain is a Proof of Stake Blockchain which runs independently of the existing Proof of Work Ethereum Mainnet. The Beacon Chain is responsible for running the Proof of Stake consensus Algorithm for itself and all Shard Chains.</p><p><strong>2. The Merge:</strong></p><p>The Merge (or Docking) is the Upgrade, where the existing Ethereum Mainnet will merge will the Beacon Chain. This will mark the end of the Proof of Work Algorithms and mark the full transition to Proof of Stake. This will bring the Ability to run Smart Contracts on the Proof of Stake System plus the full history and current state of the Ethereum Chain to insure a smooth transition. The Upgrade is planned for Q1/Q2 2022.</p><p>Withdraws of staked ETH on the Beacon Chain will be enabled after the Merge.</p><p><strong>3. Shard Chains:</strong></p><p>Shard Chains are a multi-Phase Upgrade planned to improve Ethereum’s scalability and capacity. Shard Chains spread the Network load across 64 new Shard Chains. They make it easier to run a Node by keeping the hardware requirements low. Shards will be used to store and access data but wont be used for executing code. Shard Chains will likely also be implemented in 2022.</p><p><strong>Proof of Stake explained:</strong></p><p>Proof of Stake is a consensus mechanism by which decentralized systems can agree on a single source of truth, since unlike centralized systems, the truth isn’t decided by a single entity. This is achieved by the cooperation of large numbers of nodes, which come to agreement by using identical cryptographic algorithms.</p><p>Unlike in Proof of Work, Validators don’t need to use significant amounts of computational power, because they are selected at random and aren’t competing. They don’t need to mine blocks; they just need to create blocks and include transactions when they are chosen and validate those proposed blocks when they are not. They earn rewards for doing those two activities correctly.</p><p>Everybody can lock up a given amount of the Blockchains native currency to become a Validator (32 ETH). This locked up stake turns into an incentive to keep Validators honest, since they risk losing their Stake if the majority of total Validators reject their proposed block. (This is called “slashing”). Validators are can also be penalized partially if they aren’t following through with their responsibilities when it is their turn to do so (i.e., if they are offline). Penalties for being offline are relatively mild and equate to about the same as the expected rewards over time. So, if a validator is participating correctly over half the time, then the reward should be net positive.</p><p>Proof of Stake by itself does not improve scalability, however POS architecture allows the implementation of Layer 2 scaling Solutions like Sharding.</p><p>The Stake at Risk concept also to prevent 51% attacks on the Network, since an Attacker would need to own 51% of the total staked ETH (and a successful attack would make the value drop significantly).</p><p><strong>Why Proof of Stake &gt; Proof of Work?</strong></p><p>With the transition away from energy intensive GPU Mining on Ethereum, the energy consumption will be reduced drastically. The move away from Proof of Work removes many of the current Barriers to Entry / Economies of Scale which make it economically unfavourable for the everyday Person to become an Ethereum Miner and favours bigger players which can contribute lots of capital and can often choose more favourable geographic locations with cheaper electricity costs. Since the only requirements to becoming a Validators in a Proof of Stake system are ownership of 32ETH and a Laptop. This can help to make the whole Network more decentralized (more single individuals taking part) and help combat geographic centralization.</p><p>Another Advantage of PoS over PoW is a harder punishment towards attempted attacks on the networks. Via the slashing Mechanism even unsuccessful Attacks run the risk of getting their entire Stake “slashed” while attempted Attacks by PoW Miners only results in the monetary loss of energy costs used to acquire the necessary hash power. (The Slashing Mechanism in Proof of Work would be similar to burring down whole mining farms of malicious Miners).</p><p>Furthermore, many also argue that in a Proof of Stake System the Alignment of Consensus Agents (Validators) and Coin Holders (also Validators) can be beneficial for the price of the PoS Currency since compared to PoW a large often net selling third Entitty is left out (Miners). Miners often have to sell large Part of their earned Stake to cover expenses (like electricity bills or mining equipment), which can suppress the Price of the underlying Coin further. Compared to a PoS System where Holders and Validators are the same Entity (aligned interests), which only has to sell earned Stake to cover tax expenses.</p><p>Like mentioned previously POS also allows the implementation of Scaling Solutions.</p><p><strong>The Ethereum Staking Landscape:</strong></p><p>There are currently over 8.3 Million ETH staked in the ETH 2.0 deposit contract. There are different ways to stake your ETH and in the following I will look into Advantages/Disadvantages different Staking Solutions provide.</p><p><strong>Solo Staking:</strong></p><p>Solo Staking on Ethereum means running your own Validator Node/s and signing blocks when its your turn to do so. To become a full Validator you have to deposit 32ETH to the ETH 2.0 deposit contract per Validator you wish to run. You then have to download the ETH 2.0 client to your computer in Order to set up/run your Validator Node.</p><p>Returns for Stakers consist of two Parts:</p><ol><li>The inflation fee, which depends on the total Amount of ETH staked (APY inversely correlated with total staked ETH in the Network)</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RlaVXAyj2UEpecIEGlz94w.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://ethereum.org/">https://ethereum.org/</a></figcaption></figure><p>2. Transaction fees and (possibly) MEV: After the Merge when Smart Contracts are enabled on the Beacon Chain Transaction fees and MEV (if extracted by User) are part of the rewards for Stakers.</p><p>Since there are no Third Party / Service Provider involved in Solo Staking the Inflation fee earned should be the highest (since most service providor have to take a fee for their service). Regarding MEV running your own Validator can be an Advantage for savvy Individuals who know how to extract MEV and a Disadvantage for those who don’t.</p><p>A big Disadvantage regarding solo staking are Requirements needed to operate your Node.</p><p>Firstly ownership of 32ETH (that’s 131.000$ at todays ETH Prices). Secondly certain hardware requirements are needed in Order to run your own Validator Node and thirdly some technical knowledge about the set up/running of your Node.</p><p>Some other Factors to consider before deciding to Solo Stake are that Maintenance, the correct Security and Internet Connection in Order to ensure uptime are your Responsibility and can lead to serious slashing of your Stake if done incorrectly.</p><p>Lastly ETH staked on your own today will only be withdrawable after the Merge in 2022 so a momentary loss of Liquidity for your Stake has to be kept in Mind.</p><p><strong>Staking on Centralized Exchanges:</strong></p><p>Staking on Centralized Exchanges is very popular due to good user experience and being in a place where users already transact and store there assets. Staking on CEX accounts for about 30% of total ETH staked with the most popular being Kraken (12.6%), Binance (8.4%) and Coinbase (4%) of total ETH staked. Staking on Centralized Exchanges works via Staking Pools. This means users can deposit any Number of ETH, which then get pooled together to pairs of 32ETH. This is great because it allows Staker with smaller Balances to part taken in Staking. Exchanges often Partner with one or two Service Providers who spin up and operate the Nodes. The user doesn’t have to deal with running the Node and the Exchange gets a Percentage of the total Stake earned as Revenue. Until the Merge Users won’t be able to withdraw their ETH which is staked on the Exchange but after the Merge Users should also be able to staked and unstake their ETH on the Exchange. However, User definitely won’t be able to withdraw their ETH from the Exchange while it is being staked creating a lock of Capital. Furthermore, since keeping ETH on an exchange means not being in charge of your coins private keys a few security and private key management assumptions have to be made. Since Exchanges also only use a few centralized service providers for validator nodes Centralization Issues like a Single Point of Failure could occur e.g. if “slashing” of Stake occurs.</p><p><strong>Liquid Staking:</strong></p><p>Liquid Staking works similar to decentralized staking pools however with the addition of liquid tokens which represent your share of the staked ETH. From the user’s perspective it works very simple. They deposit ETH into a smart contract and receive a staked Derivative token back (in Lidos Case: stETH) this token can then be used in different Defi applications while still earning yield. This allows Users to stake any amount of ETH similar to CEX staking while being non-custodial and without having to trust any third parties. Furthermore, the staking derivative can easily be sold back to ETH via e.g. (stETH — ETH) pairs.</p><p>Liquid staking also supports the security mechanism of Proof of Stake and helps it not to get cannibalized by Defi Yields. Imagine Yield on staking ETH are 4% but Yields on lending ETH in Defi are 6.5% (Hypothetical Scenario). Users would be economically disincentivized to stake their ETH but rather lend it in Defi, which in the extreme case could massively harm the security of the whole chain (less total ETH staked -&gt; less security). By introducing Liquid staking users can earn yield on their staked ETH while also earning defi yields on it. (Increasing Capital Efficiency on PoS Assets within Defi)</p><p>More detailed explanation of this idea here:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/how-defi-cannibalizes-pos-security-84b146f00697">How DeFi cannibalizes PoS security</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nFT8rFYxYsNTZvpGQVJm2w.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/Eth2-Liquid-Staking">https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/Eth2-Liquid-Staking</a></figcaption></figure><p>Currently about 20% of staked ETH is staked via Liquid Staking, with Lido holding about 87.68% Market share making Lido the biggest Depositor to ETH 2.0 staking contract.</p><p><strong>Liquid Staking Market Dynamics:</strong></p><p>Even though Lido and many of its competitors are open-source projects there are some key market dynamics at play which have allowed Lido to capture a majority market share in the liquid staking market and making it look very much like a winner take most market. The two most important factors which provide Moats in this Market are Liquidity &amp; Integrations.</p><p>This can be closely compared to the Stable coin Market where Liquidity and Integrations are the main Moats as well, which has also lead to a winner takes most market (USDT and USDC currently hold over 76% Market share but USDT alone held over 90% Market Share in late 2019.</p><p><strong>Liquidity:</strong></p><p>For a Staking protocol to be liquid Market Participants have to be able to swap between the staking derivative token (stETH in Lidos case) and ETH seamlessly and with as much volume as desired. To achieve that a liquid swap pair has to exist &amp; be incentivized, which holds its peg as close as possible (1:1 from stETH and ETH in Lidos case). Unstaking your stETH is currently not possible but will be after transactions are enabled on the beacon chain. This helps the pool pairs (stETH-ETH) to hold its peg since Market participants know that if stETH trades at discount relative to ETH it can easily be bought with ETH and swapped back after unstaking is available, generating an arbitrage profit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nA6E_AtMi5NdEqmQwRXTrA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/Eth2-Liquid-Staking">https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/Eth2-Liquid-Staking</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Integrations:</strong></p><p>The utility of a liquid staking token is derived from the liquidity of the swap pairs as well as the amount of different integrations / use cases. These use case can span from being able to generate yield on your derivative token in Defi protocols to using the derivative token as collateral to trade on a CEX like FTX. In theory a Market winning derivative token could replace ETH in many use cases and be a better version staking yield earning version. (Gas still has to be paid in ETH).</p><p><strong>Total Addressable Market:</strong></p><p>The TAM of any one Liquid Staking Protocol is huge. Not only is it every ETH which could participate in liquid staking but also every native Currency of every Blockchain which uses Proof of Staking as Consensus algorithm (e.g. SOL, ADA, ALGO, XTZ etc.) In total there are over 100 projects using POS, these account for over 400b in Market Cap or 15% of the total Crypto Market Cap (not including Ethereum which will Transition to POS soon and currently has a 500b Market Cap.</p><p><strong>Liquid Staking with Lido DAO:</strong></p><p>Lido DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) is a community governed liquid staking provider. Lido currently offers their liquid staking Solutions for three Networks: Ethereum 2.0, Terra and Solana with 6.2b, 2.9b and 0.2 in TVL respectively.</p><p>Staking with Lido works simple. User send their funds to the Protocols Smart Contracts and receive a liquid staking derivative token (stETH (Ethereum 2.0); bLUNA (Terra); stSOL (Solana) which can be used in different Defi protocols / on certain centralized Exchanges (ftx.com)</p><p>The funds are then pooled and each time 32ETH are collected a Validator is selected from a governance-controlled registry. Every Validator has a maximum stake (maximum amount of Nodes), which is check by an Oracle, which then distributes bundles of 32ETH based on the availability of each validator slot. The deposit contract will be called and 32ETH will be assigned to the validators public key with the use of Lidos withdraw credentials (Validators can’t withdraw ETH).</p><p>Lido currently has 14 different Node Operators in the Registry which are centralized Companies like Certus One, Chorus One, p2p.org, StakeFish, Staking Facilities and many more.</p><blockquote><a href="https://dune.xyz/eliasimos/Eth2-Liquid-Staking">https://mainnet.lido.fi/#/lido_dao/0x55032650b14df07b85bf18a3a3ec8e0af2e028d5/</a></blockquote><p>They then spin up individual Validator Nodes per 32ETH.</p><p><strong>The stETH Token:</strong></p><p>stETH is native Lidos ETH liquid staking derivative token and a rebase token. This means to in order to pay staking rewards the total supply is expanded daily to reflect the staking yield earned after one day. This happens once a day at 12PM UTC. Because rewards are paid out via rebasing stakers of stETH won’t see transactions sent to their wallet (with high gas price this wouldn’t be very economical).</p><p>The rebasing effect also establishes a socializing of rewards. Every stETH holder will get the same daily rebase, it doesn’t matter if you staked your ETH with the Lido Smart Contract, bought stETH on the open Market or received it from a friend. This rebasing effect for stETH works across integrated Defi Platforms like Curve and Yearn (so you can earn your staking yield via the rebasing effect while also liquidity providing or farming)</p><p>Uniswap, 1inch and Sushiswap are not compatible with rebasing tokens like stETH, it could result in you missing your rebasing yield. To avoid this problem Defi users can wrap their stETH to wstETH (<a href="https://stake.lido.fi/wrap">https://stake.lido.fi/wrap</a>) wstETH will keep your balance constant and pay out your staking yield which was incurred during the period after unwrapping it back to stETH.</p><p><strong>But how does Lido make money?</strong></p><p><strong>Protocol Revenue</strong></p><p>The Lido Protocol takes a 10% fee of all staking rewards accrued which is then split between paying Node Operators, a slashing insurance fund (which can cover losses in case slashing of stake occurs) and Revenue for the Lido Dao (which is 50% of the fee; so 5% of total staking rewards)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/856/1*wj_iZsv82QnXimkpcaMcDQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.tokenterminal.com/terminal/projects/lido-finance">https://www.tokenterminal.com/terminal/projects/lido-finance</a></figcaption></figure><p>Since its launch in early 2021 Lido has generated a total revenue of about $100m (Supply-side revenue: $88.6M and Protocol Revenue: $9.8M) at current rates this would annualize to about $336.54M Annualized total Revenue and $33.65M Annualized Protocol Revenue (since 10% fee)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/710/1*OpZ_Xhk9aKmT0fN3dtNKLQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defillama.com/protocol/lido">https://defillama.com/protocol/lido</a></figcaption></figure><p>Since a 10% fee on all staking rewards is the revenue driver a close eye on TVL (Total Value Locked) is important. Lidos TVL is currently $9.65b ($6.45b in ETH, $2.98b in LUNA and $220.5M in SOL)</p><p><strong>Which Factors impact Lido Revenue?</strong></p><p>- The Value of the underlying staked Coins (ETH/LUNA/SOL). If they rise in Value Lido generates more dollar denominated Revenue.</p><p>- Growth in TVL: This can be achieved in two ways:</p><p>1. Achieving higher Market Share in already supported Assets (more ETH/LUNA/SOL gets deposited into Lido)</p><p>2. Inflow of TVL by Addition of new PoS Assets to Lido</p><p>- Extraction of higher APYs for Stakers by usage of MEV.</p><p><strong>MEV in PoS</strong></p><p>MEV (Miner Extractable Value) refers to the Value Miners can extract from a given Network by being able to sequence Transactions and deciding which unconfirmed Transaction from the Mempool get included into the next Block. Miner usually order Transaction by the Highest gas fee, which however is not a requirement of the network. Sometimes Opportunities arise where Miner can earn more from ordering/censoring Transactions favorably, which lets them take advantage of Arbitrage Opportunities (e.g. Large DEX trades get front ran by Arbitrage bots, which buy the Asset before the large DEX trade is confirmed and sell it back after its confirmed for a Profit)</p><p>MEV is an invisible tax on Ethereum user since they are the Victim of the Arbitrage and get filled for a worse Price.</p><p>Since the process of ordering transaction will still be the same after the Transition to Proof of Stake as the PoW Ethereum of today it is reasonable to expect the same MEV opportunities to exist as we know them today. However, the main difference is the change in block proposers from Miners to Validators in a PoS World.</p><p>There currently is no public statement from Lido regarding how they will handle MEV in the future however Lido team member have confirmed that the extraction of MEV in Lido is planned and for MEV Profits to be passed along to Stakers (and not kept as Protocol Revenue).</p><blockquote><a href="https://twitter.com/_vshapovalov/status/1453616505640345603?s=21">https://twitter.com/_vshapovalov/status/1453616505640345603?s=21</a></blockquote><p>Since MEV is a complex topic where rewards depend on the sophistication of execution it isn’t exactly clear how much MEV rewards will raise the APY for stETH staker however it is assumed for MEV Rewards to be up to 50% of the total staking rewards, which would bring a doubling of staking APY from 5% to double digit percent.</p><p><strong>The LDO Token:</strong></p><p>LDO is Lido DAOs Governance token. LDO was initially distributed as an Airdrop to early Stakers using the Protocol as well as Liquidity Mining rewards on the swap pairs (stETH-ETH) on Defi Platforms like Curve. The most important governance aspects of LDO are voting rights over the Node Operators Registry (adding/removal of Node Operator; setting limits of maximum Validator Stake) and Treasury fund decisions.</p><p>The are currently no direct value drivers between the protocol and the LDO token like Token Burns or a revenue share with token holder, however the team has mentioned to be open towards exploring a revenue share with token holders in the future. This would represent a model more similar to traditional growth equity model with a focus on growth first and revenue share later.</p><p>The current circulating Supply is low (6% of total supply is circulating) with the total supply of 1b LDO distributed among (DAO treasury 36.32%; Investors 22.18%; Validators and signature holders 6.5%; Initial Lido developers 20%; Founders 15%)</p><p>Which will be unlocked in a 1 year vesting period after 17 December 2021 in a linear block per block basis until the whole supply is circulating the year after (17 December 2022)</p><p>These heavy unlocks staring in December could lead to strong selling pressure of the LDO Token.</p><p><strong>Centralization Concerns:</strong></p><p>Lido currently relies on 14 Validator Node Operators which are whitelisted. This imposes certain centralization concerns since these 14 Operators are centralized Companies and mixing them together and distributing stake among them doesn’t exactly make for a fully decentralized system. However, it is still a more decentralized way than most staking services on centralized Exchanges which often only rely on 1 or 2 Node Operators. Creating a fully trustless staking experience is something the Lido team is currently working on.</p><blockquote><a href="https://blog.lido.fi/the-road-to-trustless-ethereum-staking/">https://blog.lido.fi/the-road-to-trustless-ethereum-staking/</a></blockquote><p>Some liquid staking Competitors have chosen a different way, with a higher focus on decentralization like Rocketpool, which requires Staker to lock up RPL (Rocket pool Token) to then managed individual Nodes (currently 381, consisting of 16 ETH each). This leads to more decentralization however at the cost of more complexity and a worse user experience which can also be observed in the staking Numbers (Total ETH staked in Rocket Pool: 6,880 VS Lido: 1,461,868)</p><p>Thanks for reading! (^_^)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=77ba55c56bf9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>