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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Thomas Thielemans on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Thomas Thielemans on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Thomas Thielemans on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Crisis in Syria: a view from Russia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/stories-on-mena/crisis-in-syria-a-view-from-russia-4075b696a6ef?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2015 09:36:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-20T09:36:45.154Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Until recently, Russia, in conjunction with China, prevented any attempts at the UN to condemn the Assad regime in Syria, ensuring that no motion could proceed even if there was the will from others states. Even when the deadlock was eventually broken on chemical weapons in summer 2013, Moscow ensured a favourable outcome for Damascus. However, by the beginning of September 2015, Russia has been initiating a significant escalation in its military role in Syria. It has done so conspicuously, in a manner that appears aimed to maximise political impact as Washington’s hapless Syria policy hit a new low.</p><p>Despite claiming to target IS in Syria, recent Russian bombs have peppered central and north-western Syria, regions that are crucially important to the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad`s government in Damascus and his power base close to the Mediterranean coast.</p><p>This increased Russian willingness to act in the region can be illustrated by its latest military activity in Syria, sending military advisers, technicians and security guards with the main goal of setting up a military air base near the coastal town of Latakia, a stronghold of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.</p><p><em>With a Little Help from My Friends</em></p><p>On Wednesday 7 October 2015, Russia and the Syrian government unleashed a coordinated assault by land, air and sea on Wednesday, seeking to reverse recent gains by rebel groups that were beginning to encroach on the Syrian coast, a critical bastion of power for Mr Assad. Although in its early stages, the coordinated attack has revealed the outline of a newly deepened and operationally coordinated alliance among Syria, Iran, Russia and the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hizbollah.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*Ww_t2-m3ljplrKCa.jpg" /></figure><p>According to pro-government officials, Russia has focused its earliest operations on the insurgent coalition known as the Army of Conquest, or Jaish al-Fatah, rather than on IS, as it is the Army of Conquest’s positions that most urgently threaten the crucial government-held coastal province of Latakia, while IS forces are farther to the east and can later be isolated and hit.</p><p>The evolution of the revolt into a mostly-Sunni insurgency battling a regime dominated by the minority Alawite community, an offshoot of Shia Islam has turned Syria into a battlefield for regional score settling, sectarian bloodletting and international rivalry, <em>Financial Times </em>reported.</p><h4><strong>Kremlin`s motives</strong></h4><p>It is important to understand the view of Syria from Moscow. At the beginning of the crisis, Western analysts mistakenly believed Mr Putin’s support was about preserving Russia’s interests in Syria: a tiny naval base in Tartus and a modest arms market. Yet such material interests are, in reality, marginal. Instead, many aspects of the Russian-Syrian alliance are in fact more symbolic than material. Moreover, it has given Moscow a foothold in the Middle East — a region it partly dominated during the Cold War. Giving this up would be a serious geostrategic error, particularly as US influence seems to be waning in this region.</p><p>Russia also felt betrayed for endorsing (by abstention) the 2011 humanitarian UN resolution on Libya that was then used by NATO to topple Gaddafi, and now believes the US has the same goal in Syria. The ‘humiliation’ over Libya is strongly felt, and Putin is determined to draw a line to prevent any more Western-led regime changes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*h41YemnOlYlsX0JM.png" /></figure><p>While geostrategic factors have led Russian Syria policy, regional and domestic factors have also been a concern. Fourteen per cent of Russia’s population is Muslim and Moscow has long been worried about the potential for radicals within the Syrian opposition to inspire domestic Islamist violence, particularly in the troubled spots of the north Caucasus. The rise of IS confirms what Moscow has long said to the West: backing Assad’s opponents will lead to state collapse and <em>jihadism</em>.</p><p>Other US officials believe Mr Putin is partially motivated by a desire to make a success of his 2015 visit to the UN, shifting the conversation of the Ukraine crisis and potentially weakening support for sanctions on Russia`s economy.</p><h4><strong>Putin vs Obama</strong></h4><p>Years of war in Syria have killed thousands of people, displaced millions from their homes and contributed to the rise of IS. It was the central focus of the opening day at the UN General Assembly. On the sidelines, Mr Putin emerged from a rare US-Russian meeting with Barack Obama, saying Russia and the US could find a way to work together on Syria, despite deep differences over the country’s leadership.</p><p>Mr Putin, making his first appearance at the UNGA for a decade, was not in the chamber during Obama’s address. He arrived at the UN headquarters in midtown Manhattan just after the US president had left the podium.</p><p>Likewise, when Putin was speaking, the US presence was reduced to relatively junior officials. And Ukrainian officials walked out during the Russian address.</p><p>At the core of the US-Russian power struggle was the fate of Bashar al-Assad and whether he is the root of the problem or part of the solution.</p><p>The US president indicated that he was ready to work with any nation, including Russia and Iran, in seeking common ground on the issue, but equally clearly laid out US red lines, the most important of which was transition away from Assad.</p><p>Alternative approach is for the Obama administration to respond to Russia`s build up with an increased intervention of its own — to call Putin`s bluff. A US military $500m effort to train Syrian forces against the Islamic State, however, has resulted in only a handful of fighters actively battling the <em>jihadi</em> army.</p><p>Mr Putin’s address was different in tone. While Mr Obama had repeatedly paused for dramatic effect, the Russian leader galloped through his lines, defending his country`s support of the Syrian government.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/549/0*bNW6KNWSJddw5oPk.jpg" /></figure><p>In his speech Mr Putin showed no sign of willingness to compromise on Assad’s fate, not even conceding that Damascus might be ripe for “reform” after Isis was defeated. “Now do you realise what you have done?” he asked. Mr Putin also called on UN member states to take part in a ministerial meeting, which would lead to a new UN resolution on combating IS, presumably built around support for the Damascus regime.</p><p>The Russian position is effectively that once IS is defeated, there can then be a conversation about a political transition while the US believes that Mr Assad`s departure is necessary to defeat IS.</p><h4><strong>Israel</strong></h4><p>For Israel, the presence of Russian troops and ground-to-air missiles makes it much riskier to conduct air strikes on Syrian territory to prevent weapons transfers to the Lebanon-based Hizbollah without first coordinating with Moscow. These missiles also complicate plans for a no-fly zone in northern Syria that Turkey is keen to establish with US help.</p><p>During an urgent visit to Moscow on Sept. 21, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to persuade Mr Putin to prevent any direct friction with the Israeli air force in the Syrian skies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*nCIdkDxDRL_XBF5n.jpg" /></figure><p>The best scenario for Mr Netanyahu would be an ongoing war of attrition, which keeps Israel’s enemies busy fighting each other instead of uniting against it. After more than four years of terrible internal war and devastating losses, the Syrian army is no longer any kind of match for Israeli forces.</p><p>The Iranian nuclear deal, and the intense disagreements it sparked between Israeli and U.S. leaders, looms large over this new challenge in Syria.</p><h4><strong>NATO</strong></h4><p>Days after Moscow began its raids to support Syria’s government, NATO urged Russia to end air strikes “on the Syrian opposition and civilians”. Earlier, on the 3rdof October, Turkish F-16 fighter jets were scrambled after a Russian plane entered Turkey’s airspace. Russia said the violation was for just a few seconds and due to poor weather. Ambassadors from the 28 NATO member states soon after held an emergency meeting in Brussels to respond to what the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, called “unacceptable violations of Turkish airspace” by a Russian jet.</p><p>Turkey has been vehemently opposed to Russia`s intervention in Syria. Earlier this year Turkish jets shot down a Syrian helicopter that had crossed into their country`s airspace.</p><p>Although the option was considered, diplomats at NATO said Turkey had not invoked an “article 4” emergency meeting, a more serious trigger to discuss a threat to its territorial integrity or stability.</p><p>At the time of writing, US-coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Syria include the United States, Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.</p><h4><strong>Iran</strong></h4><p>Even more than Russia, Iran has long been Mr Assad’s main backer, providing him with financial and military lifelines as he has battled rebel groups and Islamic State, the Sunni Muslim extremist group. During the first week of October, Iran continued to expand its already sizable role in Syria’s multisided war in the wake of Russia’s airstrikes, despite the risk of antagonizing the US and its Persian Gulf allies who want to push aside Mr Assad.</p><p>Iran`s leader Hassan Rouhani blamed US military action for giving rise to terrorist groups in the Middle East.</p><h4><strong>Jordan</strong></h4><p>Meanwhile, in Jordan, Syrian refugees make up more than fifteen per cent of country`s population. Abdullah II Ibn AL Hussein, King of Jordan, urged protecting the purity of the Muslim faith from worldly contamination. “<em>As Muslims, this is our fight and our duty</em>,” he stressed. Moderation did not mean accepting those who trampled on others. Today’s global fight is not between peoples, communities or religions; it is between moderates of all faiths against all extremists in all religions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*1kDLI6v7ToyrQz6E.jpg" /></figure><h4><strong>Gulf countries</strong></h4><p>In a statement the ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council urged a political solution to the Syrian crisis “without any foreign intervention” — a clear swipe at Russia and Iran. The GCC comprises the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar.</p><p>Saudi Arabia and Qatar are already embroiled in an expensive and bloody war in Yemen that may limit both their military and financial resources. Saudi officials are particularly worried that the Americans might retreat from their strategy of containing Iran, following the landmark deal struck in July to curb Tehran’s nuclear programme in return for lifting international sanctions.</p><p>The Syrian conflict has also been a major concern for many Gulf Arab states since the outbreak of the uprising against the Baathist dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad over four years ago. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait, among others, have been some of Assad’s leading regional opponents and strong proponents of regime change in Damascus. They have therefore reacted strongly to Russia’s escalation in Syria and are among the harshest critics of Moscow’s direct intervention into the conflict by conducting airstrikes against rebel groups and building up Russian ground forces. These developments will likely encourage a deeper engagement by Gulf Arab countries in the Syrian conflict in the coming months.</p><p>It remains unclear whether Gulf Arab states would want the Syrian rebels they fund to engage Russian forces in battle — a prospect that would further upset the regional balance of power.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>In 2015, a weaker economy and the domestic threat of IS may limit some of the tools available, but are unlikely to alter Moscow’s overall view and strategy in Syria. In that sense, the latest developments simply mean that Russia is finally joining the other states involved in the Syria crisis: pursuing a costly policy, yet still unwilling to compromise.</p><p><em>Thomas Thielemans</em></p><p><em>This article was previously published on </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/10/06/crisis-in-syria-a-view-from-russia/"><em>his personal blog</em></a></p><h3><strong>Bibliography</strong></h3><p>Barnard, A. &amp; Kramer, A. (07.10.2015). <em>Russian Cruise Missiles Help Syrians Go on the Offensive, </em>(Financial Times: <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/middleeast/russia-syria-conflict.html?_r=0%29.">http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/middleeast/russia-syria-conflict.html?_r=0).</a></p><p>Dagher, S. &amp; Fitch, S. (02.10.2015). <em>Iran Expands Role in Syria in Conjunction With Russia’s Airstrikes</em>, (Wall Street Journal: <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-expands-role-in-syria-in-conjunction-with-russias-airstrikes-1443811030">http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-expands-role-in-syria-in-conjunction-with-russias-airstrikes-1443811030</a>).</p><p>Harel, A. (06.10.2015). <em>Israel`s Vanishing Red Lines in Syria, (</em>Foreign Policy: <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/israels-vanishing-red-lines-in-syria/%29."><em>http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/israels-vanishing-red-lines-in-syria/).</em></a></p><p>Khalaf, R. (06.10.2015). <em>The many sides of the Syrian conflict. </em>Financial Times: p.4. Maclean, W. (22.09.2015). <em>Gulf Arabs oppose Russia role in Syria, still bent on Assad’s ouster</em>, (Reuters: <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/22/us-mideast-crisis-gulf-russia-idUSKCN0RM1JX20150922">http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/22/us-mideast-crisis-gulf-russia-idUSKCN0RM1JX20150922</a>).</p><p>Turner, M., Kühn, F. P. (2015). <em>The Politics of International Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace. </em>Routledge.</p><p>Zalewi, P. &amp; Barker, A. (06.10.2015). <em>Ankara warns Moscow to stay out of Turkish airspace. </em>Financial Times: p. 4.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4075b696a6ef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/stories-on-mena/crisis-in-syria-a-view-from-russia-4075b696a6ef">Crisis in Syria: a view from Russia</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/stories-on-mena">Stories On MENA</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[#Intifada?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/stories-on-mena/intifada-db460e22d5e?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2015 14:48:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-17T14:48:54.948Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/420/0*Hgq_7OzYGSoZ1WmP.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Violence in Israel has been rising for months, with attacks spreading beyond East Jerusalem and the West Bank. At the time of writing seven Israelis and around 32 Palestinians, including eight children, have died in more than two weeks of bloodshed, fueled in part by Muslim anger over increasing Jewish visits to the al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem. Israel has tightened security and clashed with rioting Palestinians, leading to deaths on the Palestinian side. The violence has also spread to the border with Gaza. Neither side appears fully in control amid “lone wolf” stabbing attacks by Palestinians and attempted lynchings by Israelis — including an incident in the seaside town of Netanya when a mob set on three Palestinians.</em></p><p>Once again the Holy Esplanade — known to Jews as the Temple Mount (har habayit) and to Muslims as the Noble Sanctuary (al-haram al-sharif) — is again the epicentre of a violent escalation. A small plaza (59sq. km) in Jerusalem`s Old City, the Holy Esplanade is Judaism`s holiest site and of great significance in Islam. There is no coincidence that the escalation occurred during the Jewish high holidays — religious festivals in which the ancient Temple, and so today the Esplanade, figure prominently.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/364/0*QFBzLZI4VSbFkhLI.jpg" /></figure><p>Managed by an Israeli-Jordanian condominium, the site exemplifies political exclusion of Palestinians from what they consider their capital and the inability of their fractured national movement to defend it meaningfully.</p><p>Ofer Zalzberg, senior analyst with the Middle East And North Africa program at International Crisis Group: “Since the Jewish ‘high holidays’ began in mid-September, Palestinian youth have been throwing stones and firecrackers at the Israeli police to prevent the entry of groups of religious Jews, who have been ascending the Esplanade with the intention of changing the current arrangements at the compound. The Palestinians, who have suffered the desecration of many mosques and holy sites since 1948, feel like they have seen this movie before and fear where it ends.”</p><p>The recent tensions have also eroded the status quo arrangement that has mostly kept the peace since Israel captured East Jerusalem in 1967.</p><p>Benyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, blamed the recent attacks on “incitement” by the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, it is more likely that the Palestinian resentment has been stoked by a growing frustration over continuing Israeli settlement-building in the West Bank and, even more so, over the lack of any prospect for a peace deal and the creation of a Palestinian State.</p><p>According to Mr Netanyahu the number of West Bank settlers has grown by about 120,000 since he took office in 2009. Under international pressure, the Israeli Prime Minister decided to withdraw his plan to build 538 housing units in the northern West Bank settlement of Itamar, sources said last week. Instead, he will promote a master plan for Itamar that retroactively approves existing buildings, but does not allow for the construction of new buildings.</p><p>The deteriorating landscape presented intense political challenges for both Mr Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Neither is ready to make a dramatic diplomatic move that could ease the conflict, yet the spiraling situation tests their ability to maintain control of restive constituencies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*UZ8sDDugW2gERHG9.jpg" /></figure><p>For Mr Abbas, who has preached nonviolence for his entire tenure, the escalating unrest undermines his credibility with international supporters and benefits his more militant rivals, like the Hamas Islamists, who have egged on the attackers. A recent report by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research found that two thirds of the Palestinian public want the ageing Palestinian leader to resign, while a growing amount of Palestinians also said they supported ‘armed resistance’ against Israel.</p><p>For Mr Netanyahu, who has made fighting terrorism the centerpiece of his political life and is still reeling from his failure to stop the Iran nuclear deal, the crisis has exacerbated tensions in his narrow, conservative coalition and left many Israelis asking why he cannot keep their streets safe. He also told parliament that the knife attackers would fail just as suicide bombers had failed a decade ago.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/408/0*UOlgAqno847iPMp2.jpg" /></figure><p>Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader in Gaza, urged people to join in the expanding confrontation with Israel during his sermon Friday 9 October. “Gaza is ready to fight in the battle of Jerusalem,” he said. “The battle of Jerusalem is our battle, and we will not relent to always be in the right place.” Haniyeh was referring to a wave of protests and violence over the previous week across both Israeli and Palestinian-controlled territory.</p><p>Hamas fought a 50-day war with Israel in the Gaza Strip last year. More than 2,000 Palestinians and 66 Israeli soldiers died in the conflict. The Gaza war turned 2014 into the bloodiest year of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p><p>There is concern among diplomats and analysts in the region that the recent escalating violence could turn into a new intifada, or uprising. At the time of writing around 32 Palestinians have been killed and hundreds more injured since 1 October 2015. During the same period at least seven Israelis have been killed by attacks launched by Palestinians.</p><p>By mid-October Israel’s cabinet authorised police to seal off “parts of Jerusalem”, in an attempt to halt a wave of deadly attacks. After an emergency meeting, the cabinet said soldiers would also be deployed to help police in some areas. In a measure apparently aimed at Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who hold Israeli IDs, attackers will also loose their residence rights.</p><p>Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat encouraged all Israelis with a gun license to carry a weapon with them at all times in order to counter a recent wave of Palestinian attacks. “I have a licensed gun,” Barkat said in an interview on 8 October. “Every time there is tension, I instruct people who are allowed to carry weapons and are experienced in using them to carry their guns with them. If you check, you’ll see that in many cases, those who neutralised terrorists were citizens who aren’t necessarily police officers, like former soldiers.”</p><p>U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated he is planning to travel soon to the Middle East to try to calm violence between Palestinians and Israelis and move the situation “away from this precipice.” The trip would mark Kerry’s most direct efforts to broker peace between the two sides since talks led by the United States failed in 2014. Work is also underway to arrange a meeting with US, Israel, Arab and Palestinian representatives to quell the wave of the recent violence. The United Nations Security Council also held a special meeting Friday 16 October to discuss the recent spate of violence between Israel and the Palestinians. The meeting was called at the request of council member Jordan.</p><h3>#intifada</h3><p>Meanwhile Hamas’s leader Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza, amongst others, declared the current unrest in Jerusalem and the West Bank an intifada, as six Palestinians were shot dead protesting at the border fence, further raising the stakes after a week of escalating violence. In a sermon for Friday prayers at a mosque in Gaza City, Haniyeh said: “We are calling for the strengthening and increasing of the intifada. It is the only path that will lead to liberation. Gaza will fulfil its role in the Jerusalem intifada and it is more than ready for confrontation.” These comments resulted in an increasingly widespread use of the hashtag #intifada on Palestinian social media.</p><p>Also Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbollah’s secretary general, declared his unwavering support to all forms of Palestinian resistance.</p><p>Historically, an intifada occurs when a Palestinian leader openly endorses and coordinates widespread resistance, as the local committees (and later the Palestine Liberation Organization) did during the first intifada of the late 1980s and early 1990s and as Abbas’ predecessor, Yasir Arafat, did during the second intifada of the last decade<em>.</em></p><p>Israeli media, columnists have now started to ask whether the latest events fitted the pattern of the two previous intifadas. However, unlike the first intifada, which began in 1987, no political decision has been made to fund what is happening as it has emerged. Secondly, the attacks on Israeli that have occurred in recent weeks have been limited to low-tech assaults using ordinary kitchen knives and screwdrivers, and assaults involving cars, most often in what Israel`s security forces call “lone-wolf attacks”.</p><p>The current casualty count does not yet compare with either of the intifadas, but the frequency of the attacks has been intense. Tuesday 13 October alone saw five in which three Israelis died.</p><p>Both Israeli and Palestinian commentators note that what is happening is a reflection of deeper shifts in both Palestinian and Israeli society. Also, the individually motivated nature of the recent attacks have both blindsided Israel`s domestic intelligence agency Mossad and police, and left politicians with no obvious enemy to pursue.</p><p><em>Thomas Thielemans</em></p><p><em>This article was previously published on </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/"><em>his personal blog</em></a><em>.</em></p><h4><strong>Bibliography</strong></h4><p>Beaumont, P. (10.10.2015). <em>Palestine clashes: Netanyahu and Abbas are losing their grip. </em>(The Guardian: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/israel-palestinians-violence-fears">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/israel-palestinians-violence-fears</a>).</p><p>Gaza Emergency Situation Report (04.09.2014). UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — Occupied Palestinian Territory.</p><p>International Crisis Group (30.06.2015). <em>The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem`s Holy Esplanade. </em>Middle East Report N°159.</p><p>Rudoren, J. (09.10.2015). <em>Israeli Soldiers Kill 6 Palestinians in Gaza as West Bank Unrest Grows. </em>(New York Times: <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/israeli-soldiers-kill-6-palestinians-in-gaza-as-west-bank-unrest-grows.html?_r=1">http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/israeli-soldiers-kill-6-palestinians-in-gaza-as-west-bank-unrest-grows.html?_r=1</a>).</p><p>The Economist (07.10.2015). <em>Killing in Jerusalem raise fears of a new cycle of violence.</em></p><p>Thrall, N. (29.09.2015). <em>Abbas’ Bum bombshell. </em>Foreign Affairs.</p><p>Times of Israel Staff (08.10.2015). <em>Jerusalem mayor calls on residents to carry guns. </em>(Times of Israel: <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/jerusalem-mayor-calls-on-residents-to-carry-guns/">http://www.timesofisrael.com/jerusalem-mayor-calls-on-residents-to-carry-guns/</a>).</p><p>Zalzberg, O. (07.10.2015). <em>The Crumbling Status Quo at Jerusalem`s Holy Esplanade. </em>(International Crisis Group Blog: <a href="http://blog.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/2015/10/07/the-crumbling-status-quo-at-jerusalems-holy-esplanade/">http://blog.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/2015/10/07/the-crumbling-status-quo-at-jerusalems-holy-esplanade/</a>).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db460e22d5e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/stories-on-mena/intifada-db460e22d5e">#Intifada?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/stories-on-mena">Stories On MENA</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BRIC Countries: Naval Military Power]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thomasthielemans/bric-countries-naval-military-power-80e597ba75ea?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80e597ba75ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aircraft-carrier]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 14:55:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T14:55:54.322Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Offshore from the Syrian coast, the Russian navy (Военно-морской Флот Российской Федерации) is conducting probably its largest naval deployment outside its own territorial waters since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Chinese navy (People’s Liberation Army Navy) is in another potential confrontation today with Japan in the East China Sea. But the BRIC countries as a whole — a force in the global economic conversation since the acronym in 2001 was mentioned by Goldman Sachs to refer to the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China — are becoming an increasing naval presence on the high seas. These countries, due to the potential of their maritime territories, can be considered to be emerging maritime powers capable of displacing some of the historical maritime powers. One reason is simple nature: when nations become wealthier, they tend to build up their fighting capabilities. Another is natural resources — all four states either want to buy or sell oil and natural gas, and they are venturing further and further to do so…</em></p><p>With the emergence of new powers in the form of the BRIC states, a new phenomenon has taken place: for the first time in modern history Asian states are spending more money on military defense than their European counterparts. The four powers are modernizing and expanding their naval capacities at a rapid pace. In the Asia-Pacific region, China’s military spending has led a strong rise in total military spending for some time. In recent years this has been accompanied by increasing tensions due to territorial disputes in the South and East China seas. At the same time, the US ‘pivot’ to Asia has drawn attention to the region’s strategic importance, while China’s rise continues to reshape the security environment. Although concerns over China’s rise are a key driver of military spending for some countries with which China has maritime territorial disputes, maritime issues remain a key factor for other countries that enjoy better relations with China (SIPRI, 2014).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*1tI5k8uoJhrJX8fO.png" /></figure><p>In September 2012, for example, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the <em>Liaoning</em>. Two months later, the first landing was successfully conducted. According to Michael <strong>McDevitt</strong>, China is now the world’s largest shipbuilder (Martin Sieff, 20.11.2014). Also India is building its own vessels. The lead vessel of the class, the INS Vikrant, was launched on 12 August 2013.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*AXmfNzJNsgx5MDBq.jpg" /></figure><p>As these emerging economies are all coastal states, the constants of geography endow them with enormous economic muscle. The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) provide them with enormous quantities of living and non-living resources and the long coastlines are dotted with major ports. They have invested enormous capital to build maritime infrastructure and some of them are keen to support global projects such as the Maritime Silk Route mooted by China and the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) through the Arctic by Russia. In essence, the BRICS countries are highly dependent on the seas and are connected with each other through the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian and the Arctic Oceans over which more than 90 per cent of global trade by volume is transported (Sakhuja, 2014).</p><p>Among the countries in the region of the Indo-Pacific a sense of vulnerability had started to rise. The region faces challenges like climate change and extremist policies. Indo-Pacific is the most militarized area in the world with seven of the world’s ten largest standing armies, the world’s largest and most sophisticated navy and five of the world’s declared nuclear nations (Yoshihara 2013: 91). This rat race can be illustrated by the struggle for power between China and India. Both countries look seaward and are likely to jostle for influence and advantage across the entire Indo Pacific maritime theatre. As mentioned earlier, China plans to develop its first island chain and green water navy for 2010–2020 by focusing on surface navy ships, nuclear submarines and fighter aircraft. Between 2020 and 2050 Beijing will finalize its fighter jet program and enhance the enlargement of the blue water navy, which will give the country the capacity to operate in second island chains that contains Japanese-held Bonin Islands and the US-held Northern Marianas, Guam, Palau and the Carolines (Bakrie 2013). The Australian Defence White Paper of 2013 has even officially termed ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a new region: a strategic arc connecting the Indian and the Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia.</p><p>Throughout history, a nation’s global power has been measured in part by the size of its navy. The ability to project power across the oceans is considered critical for economic viability, national defence, and as a expression of national culture. Particularly aircraft carrier battle groups project substantial proportions of power and influence whenever and wherever they are needed. These naval forces can also be used to influence regional conflicts. For example, in the summer of 2014, the U.S. has sent an aircraft carrier, the USS George HW Bush and two guided missile ships into the Persian Gulf, a day after President Barack Obama indicated he would launch air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis). This 103,000-tonne warship and its air wing had been patrolling the North Arabian Sea and earlier in 2014 was navigating in the Mediterranean following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Ackerman, 14.06.2014).</p><p>As such, a developed aircraft carrier can constitute a statement of how a state could see itself, and how it wishes to be dealt with in the realm of international politics. This factor can be combined with an increasing interest in maritime affairs. These naval power ambitions of the BRIC countries will be the main focus of this analytical paper.</p><h4>Chapter I: Theoretical framework</h4><p>Several theories have been developed to offer an answer to the evolution of emerging powers. This article will deal mainly with <em>offensive/defensive</em> <em>realism</em> and the<em> theory of securitization.</em></p><p>Realist<em>s </em>see world politics as balance of power politics, a place of polarity change. The latter has been discussed by Kenneth (1993), who argues that at the moment a multipolar international world is in order (Waltz, 1993). Within the current of <em>post-neorealism</em><strong> Jørgensen</strong> (2010) makes the difference between defensive and offensive realism. Both sides stress the importance of state security. <em>Offensive realists</em> such as <strong>Mearsheimer</strong> argue that states seek to maximize their power relative to other states as they are bound to be insecure. Offensive realism also holds that anarchy — the absence of a worldwide government or universal sovereign — provides strong incentives for expansion. These states pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. <em>Defensive realists</em> such as <strong>Mastanduno, </strong>however, believe that states are looking to minimize power losses relative to their adversaries (Jørgensen, 2010, p. 86). Situations occur in which measures meant to create security, including aggression, increase the insecurity of other states, thereby creating a more dangerous situation that encourages other states to balance against one and to contemplate first strikes. To gain security in many instances, states are best served by signaling restraint rather than aggression, though aggression may be necessary in some instances.</p><h4>Power transition theory</h4><p><em>Power transition theory</em> predicts that future shifts in global power configurations might produce systemic instability. <strong>Bussmann</strong> and <strong>Oneal</strong> (2007: 90) formulate power transition theory as ‘<em>constructed on three fundamental claims: the international growth of nations influences international politics, world politics is characterized by hierarchy rather than anarchy, and relative power and evaluations of the international status quo are important determinants of interstate wars</em>’. Bussmann and Oneal argue that stability is secured if the satisfied great powers align themselves with the dominant power. On the contrary, instability occurs if a dissatisfied challenger great power reaches rough parity with the dominant power ( Bussmann &amp; Oneal, 2007, 88–111).</p><h4>The International Society Tradition</h4><p>In recent years, Barry <strong>Buzan, </strong>among others, has done a lot of research on regions. <em>Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security</em> (2003) deals with this matter. This 2003 book develops the idea that since decolonisation, regional patterns of security have become more prominent in international politics. The authors combine an operational theory of regional security with an empirical application across the whole of the international system. Barry Buzan is a man with many faces as he can be situated in the <em>English School</em> and in the <em>Copenhagen School. </em>With the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, theorists had problems, according to Buzan, how to define the post-Cold War polarity. On the one hand clearly the U.S. was still a superpower. On the other hand there were substantial numbers of regional powers such as India, Brazil, and Pakistan. In between were significant global players, which clearly surpassed the status of regional or middle power status. These included China, Japan and Russia. Superpowers and great powers define the global level of polarity, and the line between them and regional powers is the one that defines the difference between global and regional security dynamics.</p><p>Buzan proposes in <em>Regions and Powers </em>a definitional criterion for a three-tiered scheme: superpowers and great powers at the system level, and regional powers at the regional level.</p><p>Superpowers must possess first-class military-political capabilities, and the economies to support such capabilities. Superpowers must be active players in processes of <em>securitisation</em> and <em>desecuritisation</em> in all, or nearly all, of the regions in the system. Their legitimacy as superpowers will depend substantially on their success in establishing the legitimacy of values. After the Second World War the title of superpower was held by the USA and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War it was only held by the USA.</p><p>Great powers can be distinguished from regional powers is that they are responded by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power. They generally think of themselves as more than regional powers, and even as future superpowers. Another perspective is the form of countries declining from acquired superpower status. During the Cold War it was held by China, Germany and Japan. After the Cold War Britain, France, Germany-EU, Japan, China and Russia had great power rank. India, however, lacked the capability to acquire the rank. It is questionable whether China already achieved the status of a superpower. But its challenge is troubled by internal problems and by the fact that a rise in its power could trigger a counter coalition in the Asian continent (Buzan &amp; Wæver, 2003).</p><p>As for claims that China and India are great powers, John <strong>McCormick</strong> (2011) argues that these states face several troubling facts: neither state has the ability to commit its military forces all over the globe. Secondly, their political influence is mainly regional rather than global. Another argument is the fact that both countries don’t possess a world-class currency. For McCormick, its human rights records and the lack of economic transparency hinder the global influence of China. Whereas India, it must deal with massive poverty and pressing domestic social and religious divisions (McCormick, 2011, p. 411).</p><p>High-levels powers respond to regional powers as if their influence and capability were mainly relevant to the <em>securitisation</em> processes of a particular region</p><p>On this subject José Miguel Alonso Trabanco (Global Research, 2009) states that Brazil is committed to solidify its role as a regional power, which would be a decisive step toward great power status. Thus, Brasil will put a lot of economic, military, diplomatic and geopolitical resources into such efforts. So far, Brazil does not seek to challenge any other major power but it has made it clear that South America is its ‘Near Abroad’ so its main goal is to consolidate its primacy in the region (Trabanco, (5.02.2009). In an interview for <a href="http://www.theory-talks.org/"><em>Theory Talks</em></a><em>, </em>an interactive forum for discussion of debates in International Relations, Buzan (Theory Talks, 2009) describes how a map of the world in international political terms in his vision would look like. This map is given with an English School framing. <em>“International society, on this map, would be more decentred, with a variety of distinctive regional societies emerging in different colours. These regional societies would not be competing with each other as a Cold War map might show you, in terms of regional blocs trying to take over the whole system. They would rather be more defensive than universalist in their aspirations.” </em>(Theory Talks, 2009).</p><h4>Chapter II: Aircraft carriers</h4><p>This section will provide a brief description of the use and the activities of aircraft carrier battle groups. In the case of the U.S., aircraft carriers have been essential to the exercise of their naval power since 1942. With the largest navy in the world, the United States is the dominant maritime nation. Whenever the U.S. has been involved in hostile operations, these vessels have been asked upon as the initial policy instrument. From the Second World War to today’s Global War on Terrorism — playing key roles in four major wars, in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in numerous other hostile and non hostile missions far and wide — aircraft carriers have been used to make a show of force, deter adversaries, engage friends and allies, provide humanitarian assistance (Boraz, S., Birkler, J., Gordon IV, J., Lee, G.,T. &amp; Wilson, P. A., 2006).</p><h4>100,000 tons of diplomacy</h4><p>Modern aircraft carriers such as the <em>USS George Washington</em> are about 330 meters long and can accommodate approximately 80 jet fighters. During combat and non-combat missions similar super carriers displace more than 100,000 tons and can accommodate 6,250 crew members. 18,000 meals are served per day. The military advantages of aircraft carriers are obvious: these vessels can quickly move tactical fighter jets and their support to distant theaters of war; respond rapidly with tremendous firepower to changing tactical situations; support several missions at once, with a great number of flights per day; deploy in international waters without having to engage in negotiations with other nations; and remain on assignment for months (US Navy, 2014).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*Jr4uFqekJwPEea4J.png" /></figure><h4>Vital Humanitarian Platforms</h4><p>Iskander Rehman, Visiting International Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), has written about the humanitarian aspect of aircraft carriers. These vessels can prove to be extremely valuable assets when responding to humanitarian emergencies or engaging in NEOs (non-combatant evacuation operations). “<em>An aircraft carrier can provide self-generating supply of fresh water, medical support or engineering expertise to populations in dire need, and have revealed themselves time and time again to be vital humanitarian platforms</em>.”</p><p>The participation of the Indian carrier <em>INS Viraat</em> in the 2004 tsunami relief effort comes to mind. A second example is the recent action of the <em>USS Carl Vinson </em>after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, providing medical assistance and water to Haiti’s population (Rehman, 2010). Another recent example in 2013 (New York Times, 2013) is the <em>USS George Washington</em> that headed to the Philippines on an emergency mission to help victims of Typhoon Haiyan as the situation on the islands became increasingly desperate, with food and water supplies running low and bodies lying uncollected in the streets of at least one devastated city. Much can be done, according to Rehman, to further bolster a carrier’s humanitarian response skills. Secondly he argues, medical modular facilities can be installed on board in order to enhance the carrier’s medical responsiveness. Finally, a command centre can be set up so that key government personnel and civil response teams can coordinate their efforts via the carrier’s communication systems. This could be extremely useful, for example, in the event of disruption of landlines or the destruction of government offices.</p><h4>Chapter 3: Emergence of the BRIC countries</h4><p>In this chapter the theory of Barry Buzan will be tested and analyzed on the BRIC countries, i.e.: Brazil, Russia, India and China. The first section provides a brief introduction to the term BRIC in order to understand the magnitude of these countries. The second section provides an overview of how each country approaches maritime power.</p><h4>Introduction</h4><p>After the break-up of the Soviet Union, analysts argued that the world welcomed a new unipolar era in which the United States was the only superpower, unchallenged on the military front but also perhaps even on economic and political fronts. So there was talk of the emergence of new global powers in the form of the BRIC states. McCormick (2011) mentions the fact that some authors were replacing the unipolar system by a multipolar system: the U.S. would remain pre-eminent but would face new competition from China and India. McCormick considers a multipolar system, “a<em>n arrangement in international relations in which power is divided, shared and controlled by more than two dominant actors.</em>”</p><h4>BRIC, what’s in a name?</h4><p>More than a decade ago, Jim <strong>O’Neil</strong>, chief economist for Goldman Sachs, decided to group, Brazil, Russia, India and China by giving the four countries the acronym BRIC. South Africa became part of the BRIC nations in 2010, turning BRIC into BRICS. In his 2001 paper entitled, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”, he argued that since the four BRIC countries were developing rapidly, by 2050 their combined economies could eclipse all the economies of the richest countries in the world (O’Neill, 2001). In 2011, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the total population of all BRIC states amounted to an estimated 2.9 billion inhabitants. The IMF estimated in 2012 that the GDP of all BRIC states amounted to approximately 14,521.7 billion U.S. dollars. The World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates that in 2011, the BRIC countries exported goods worth approximately three trillion U.S. dollars and imported goods worth approximately 2.8 trillion U.S. dollars.</p><h4>China</h4><p>To understand China’s maritime strategy, it is best to look back at its history. In the period of the Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty several successful maritime expeditions to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean gave China the opportunity to become the strongest sea power in Asia. In the 19thand 20thcenturies, China was frequently attacked from the sea. The neglect of sea power resulted in China losing its territory and sovereignty to Western powers. As Sun Yat-sen noted: “<em>since the great changes in world forces, national might often depends on the navy, not the army”. </em>After the Chinese revolution in 1949, maritime infrastructure was developed with Soviet aid, though limited in outlook due to the continental mindset of the Chinese leaders in that period. Later on, Chinese academics advocated that China must develop a capable navy to defend her maritime interest (Sakhuja, 2011, pp. 14–15).</p><p>By 2020 the <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/navy.htm">PLAN</a> wants a flotilla of four carriers. It’s still a long way from approaching the size of the U.S. Navy, which has ten <em>Nimitz</em>-class carriers and is building two new <em>Ford</em>-class vessels. China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, entered into service in September 2012. Although it is considered to be largely a training carrier, it is a significant pointer as to the direction China’s sea-power is heading. China bought the vessel from Ukraine in 1998 and has spent 10 years refitting it.</p><p>Tunsjø sums up several drivers behind China’s naval developments. In the mid-1980’s China shifted its grand strategy from a continental to a maritime orientation and began its development of a near-seas active defense. This included protection of Chinese sovereignty in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and defending Chinese interests in disputed maritime areas (Tunsjø, 2012).</p><p>One of the main driving factors in China’s naval modernization is the Taiwan issue. As Tunsjø notes, the core objective of the anti-access strategy has been to develop the capabilities to keep US Forces from getting close enough to attack the Chinese mainland, or to intervene in a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack on Taiwan. Secondly, authors have argued that the insecurity of seaborne petroleum imports have influenced China’s naval nationalists to justify a carrier-based blue water navy. A final aspect of his conclusion is the more recent build-up of a modern surface fleet. <em>“China’s re-emergence as a great power with global interests and responsibilities has fuelled the development of this naval ambition.” </em>According to Tunsjø China will have difficulties with developing a first class modern navy, and conducting worldwide peacetime missions to safeguard its global interests.</p><p>Toshi Yoshihara writes in <em>The Diplomat,</em> “<em>China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant sea power that can keep the United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod over Southeast Asian states</em>” (Yoshihara, 2012).</p><p>In this regard, Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia for the CSIS, can affirm that China is decades away from having such a capability. According to her, “<em>It sounds more like a bad movie script…”</em></p><h4>Russia</h4><p>The history of Russia reflects the importance and relevance to Russian sea power. The Russian Navy tradition has to be linked with the historical figure of <strong>Peter the Great</strong> (or in Russian Пётр I) (Mikhail Tsypkin, 2012). To improve his nation’s position on the seas, Peter sought to gain more maritime outlets. Peter attempted to acquire control of the Black Sea; to do so he would have to expel the Tartars from the surrounding areas. In 1695 Peter began building a large navy. He launched about thirty ships against the Ottomans in 1696, capturing Azov in July of that year. On 12 September 1698, Peter officially founded the first Russian Navy base, Taganrog.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*M6pR1JA_F_0KrBzk.jpg" /></figure><p>Yet Russia is also known for its dilemma between the political image of a great sea power and the reality of Russia as a great land power. The victory during the Northern Wars (1700–21) provided Russia the access to the Baltic Sea resulting in direct relationships with European countries. In 1904, however, the Russian Fleet was obliterated by the emerging Japanese maritime power. As Vijay Sakhuja (2011) points out: “<em>For the Soviet Union, the main goal was to build communism, and sea power was one of the important factors in strengthening its economy and consolidating links with countries friendly to it.”</em> During the Cold War, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov understood the importance of a strong navy as its force was considered as the guarantor of security. His definition of sea power was: ‘<em>the ability of a state to study (explore) the oceans and harness its wealth; (…) and their ability to meet the needs of the state and a navy matching the interest of the state.”</em></p><p>When Vladimir <strong>Putin</strong> came into power in 2000, the Russian Navy saw a new, though contradictory era. There was an increase of political attention as the new president signed several major documents such as the <em>Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation until the Year 2020. </em>However, at the same time, the Russian Navy suffered disasters such as the sinking of the <em>Kursk </em>nuclear attack submarine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*UerzDMfxOLc2Q7bl.jpg" /></figure><p>These documents, such as the <em>Maritime Doctrine,</em> would be in the Soviet era a good instrument to predict maritime developments as the Soviets had a well-established worldview. The Russian Federation, however, seems to struggle to find its position in the world politics.</p><p>Additional aspects to understand the Russian Navy is the difficulty to analyse the Russian industry whether it is capable of replacing the aging ships. Until 2005, the idea of building new aircraft carriers was not mentioned. That same year, Russian enthusiasts of aircraft carriers argued that these vessels were needed in case of a missile attack (by the U.S. Navy). One year later Admiral Masorin said that until 2015 the main task would be to maintain the existing vessels. Yet in that same period the Russian economy witnessed a rapid growth, which influenced Russian policy-makers. One has to keep in mind that in the end no such plan had ever been approved by the authorities.</p><p>In 2008 there were rumours of Russia negotiating with a French company concerning the purchase of an aircraft carrier, thus showing that Russia is no longer an autarkic defence industrial power (Mikhail Tsypkin, 2012). According to Wein present-day Russia is a much-diminished force. In diplomatic terms, he argues, Moscow retains a UN Security Council veto, and control over much of Europe’s gas. On paper, this reduced global influence is only partially reflected in Russia’s military power. The Russian armed forces reportedly have a little over a million active duty personnel, and a budget of $56 billion, making them the fifth largest power by both expenditure and troop numbers. The Russian navy is thought to have around 200 active combat ships, and to be the world’s second largest by tonnage (Wein, 2011).</p><p>Tsypkin suggests that “<em>the Russian Navy will be an instrument for gaining influence vis-à-vis Russia’s smaller and weaker neighbours and for defending the maritime approaches to Russia proper.” </em>Furthermore he argues that the Russian Navy will pay greater attention to the Far East as this region is of great importance with its energy reserves (Tsypkin, 2012). This can be illustrated by the fact that Russia has flexed its military muscle recently, with NATO reporting more incursions by Russian fighters and long-range bombers. The Russian maneuvers followed months of tension over Ukraine, where Moscow has annexed the Crimean Peninsula and has supported armed separatists opposed to the Kiev government.</p><p>At the beginning of 2015, the Russian Navy deploys only one aircraft carrier, the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov. The only other ship in the class, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_aircraft_carrier_Liaoning"><em>Varyag</em></a>, had not yet been commissioned when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. Ukraine sold the unfinished hull to China, where it was completed and commissioned as the Liaoning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*DrH8FXr2fc57hJ2-.jpg" /></figure><p>The Russians have the world’s second most powerful nuclear arsenal, with an estimated 1,900 warheads. Assorted military upgrade programmes are in the pipeline. At present, Russia is certainly a global power, if not quite a superpower. Yet it differs from the other BRICs in that it is moving in the other direction. Where China, India and Brazil are all rising powers, Russia has embarked on a downward spiral. High gas prices, sturdy equipment and residual power will allow it to play a global role for several decades to come. Sheer size and willingness to use its power mean it will always be a regional giant capable of affecting the destinies of its smaller neighbours. But without a major change in Russia’s governance, demography and economy, it will not be a superpower again anytime soon.</p><p>By the end of 2014 the rouble lost almost forty per cent of its value over three weeks, making it the biggest crisis of Mr Putin’s reign. Critics argue that Putin has failed to reform Russia’s economy, leaving it dependent on the energy industry. Russia still has reserves of $370 billion, but it also has foreign-currency debts of more than $600 billion. It seems that Moscow is reeling from the effects of the tumbling oil price and Western-imposed sanctions. An example of a Western-imposed sanction was the announcement of the French government halting the delivery of the first of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships planned for delivery to the Russian Navy, as IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly reported in September 2014.</p><h4>Brazil</h4><p>Brazil, as Wein (2011) points out, is currently, of all the BRIC countries, the smallest. IMF figures show that China, India and Russia all have larger gross domestic products, calculated by purchasing power parity. Also China and India have far larger populations, as well as markedly higher GDP growth rates. Furthermore Mein argues that Brazil is also the only one of the four to lack nuclear weapons, and both Russia and China wield a UN Security Council veto. This relatively lesser power is reflected in Brazil’s armed forces.</p><p>When Brazil became independent from Portugal in 1822, many of the Portuguese Navy’s ships stationed in the country transferred their allegiance to the newly independent state, forming the Brazilian (in Portuguese <em>Marinha do Brasil — MdB</em>). Currently it operates one aircraft carrier, the <em>São Paulo</em>, formerly the <em>Foch </em>of the French Navy, which entered service in 2003. In December 2014 it was announced that the <em>São Paulo</em> will be expected to continue active service until 2039, at which time the vessel will be nearly 80 years old! Also worth mentioning is the choice of fighter jets: the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, a.k.a. the “Scooter”; the “Kiddiecar”; the “Bantam Bomber”; the “Tinker Toy Bomber”; and, on account of its nimble performance, the “Heinemann’s Hot-Rod”. As of 2014, Brazil was the latest Skyhawk customer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*zW0fyo1NZZO_C0QV.jpg" /></figure><p>The Brazilian Navy is the largest navy in South America, and the second largest navy in the Americas, after the United States Navy. Currently it has almost 60, 000 personnel in service. At $28 billion, military expenditure is not so very much less than India, but trails well behind Russia and China although additional funds are available for upgrade programmes. And while Embraer and other Brazilian defence firms are economic successes, none are in the top 100 global defence manufacturers. Brazil argues that it is looking to expand its military power. In 2008, a National Defence Strategy was published, with an emphasis on technology transfer to lift Brazil’s power. A number of modernisation programmes are under way. Under the PEAMB programme, naval modernisation will eventually encompass two aircraft carriers, four helicopter carriers, 30 escort ships, 15 submarines, five nuclear submarines and 62 patrol ships.</p><p>On 12 December 2014 Brazilian Navy commander Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto reaffirmed long-term plans to boost the country’s naval power to eventually include 15 conventional and six nuclear-powered submarines. “<em>Our aim is to propel Brazil forward into the 21st century with a more well-equipped navy supported by a stronger defence industry</em>,” Adm de Moura Neto told <em>IHS Jane’s</em>. “<em>PROSUB is the most ambitious contemporary development of the Brazilian Navy, representing a substantial investment in the country through technology transfer, professional training, and regional growth through the generation of income</em>,” he said. President Dilma Rousseff, who presided over the inauguration, stressed the importance of modernising the MdB to ensure the country’s sovereignty (Janet Tappin Coelho<strong>, </strong>2014).</p><p>The Brazilian navy sees its mission as driven by blue-water operations — not brown. Yet this is not reflected in actions, or budgets. In February 2011, $2.4 billion of cuts to the defence budget were announced. The left-of-centre Worker’s Party, in power since 2002, has prioritised domestic poverty relief over expansive military expenditure. Though the previous president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, had global ambitions, Brazil’s forays onto the global stage were mostly as diplomatic mediator. Two prime examples were his intervention with Turkey to head off Iranian nuclear ambitions, and leading the global South in arguments over food subsidies at the Doha round of global trade negotiations. In terms of hard power, it remains to be seen whether the enormous proposed naval upgrade programme survives intact.</p><h4>India</h4><p>For centuries India and the Indian Ocean emerged as the centres of maritime activity. However, during the colonial era, the British strategy for India resulted in a total lack of indigenous maritime thought. For India, the geospatial location in the Southern Asian-Indian Ocean regions confers its ‘maritimeness’. Sea power in Indian writings is described as “<em>the ability of a state to use the sea”, </em>also, “<em>as that part of the maritime strategy with which a nation attempts to achieve predetermined economic and political goals.”</em> (Sakhuja, 2011).</p><p>Currently the Indian Navy is generally far behind China’s in overall size and capability, but it is actually ahead when it comes to operating carriers. Its ambition to be a serious blue-water force still burns brightly. The launch of the country’s first domestically built aircraft carrier, the <em>Vikrant</em> is expected to enter service in 2018.</p><p>However, in 2013 the INS Vikramaditya, a modified <em>Kiev</em>-class aircraft carrier, entered into service with the Indian Navy. The vessel has been renamed in honour of Vikramaditya, a legendary 1st century BC emperor of Ujjain, India. In May 2014, the carrier was declared operationally deployed along with its embarked air group comprising MiG-29Ks and had taken part in a war game conducted by the Western Naval Command. On 14 June 2014, Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi dedicated the carrier to the country.</p><p>The Indian Navy has encountered struggles and travails pursuing the goal of a three carrier fleet comprised of one carrier battle group stationed on each seaboard, and a third carrier held in reserve. Iskander Rehman expected in 2010 that the Indian Navy would boast three operational carrier groups by 2020 at the latest. This can be seen as a quantum leap in India’s naval capabilities. In the past, a mixture of political indecisiveness and inappropriate threat assessments has frequently stunted Indian aircraft carriers’ tactical flexibility in times of conflict. According to Rehman, the most recent existential threat to India’s carrier force takes the form of China’s newly inducted anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21, which can reportedly hit a moving target while travelling at a speed of Mach 10.</p><p>In May 2007, India spelt out its maritime strategy in the document <em>Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy.</em> In times of war the role of the Indian Navy is expected to perform operations ranging from “<em>distant credible sea denial over large areas of the Indian Ocean</em>” to “<em>distant sea control in selected areas of the Indian Ocean to protect economic interests and mercantile traffic,</em>” to conducting “phased operations”.</p><p>In <em>The Diplomat, </em>James Hardy (2013) points out the numbers of the navy’s annual spending. In 1988 the navy’s annual spend was INR10 billion ($181 million), in 2012 it was INR373.14 billion ($6.78 billion). Hardy sums up a number of possible reasons why New Delhi’s naval manoeuvres are not raising alarm bells. First of all, the U.S. has decided India is a friend, a country it wants to partner with in the Pacific, with then Defence Secretary Leon Panetta describing Delhi in 2012 as an “anchor” around which a stable Indian Ocean Region could be constructed. Also, the United States likes to sell materiel to India. U.S. defence sales to India since 2001 are worth about USD13 billion and rising.</p><p>Secondly, Hardy sees India’s naval forces as underperforming. Its current carrier, <em>INS Viraat</em> (the former <em>HMS Hermes</em>), is drifting towards obsolescence. So while India is spending big money, its recapitalization is as much about maintaining existing levels as it is about building new capabilities. Meanwhile, many of these expensive projects are running behind schedule and over budget. This leads to the third argument, which Hardy mentions: the naval modernization and procurement is chaotic, late and over budget.</p><p>Hardy’s last argument is the fact that India’s maritime forces are expanding into a (relative) vacuum. <em>“Although India has used its navy in contingencies involving Pakistan, the Indian Ocean is big enough — and empty enough — for it to expand its role without generating too much friction with its neighbours</em>.“ The above quotation emphasises that unlike Beijing, Delhi is not planning to use its navy or coast guard to enforce nine-dashed line-shaped claims that undercut its neighbours’ mineral, fishing or territorial interests. It can be more seen as a valid and much-needed response to terrorist — and territorial — threats such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks. For Hardy it is clear that India is thinking big — and thinking long term.</p><p>Saira Basit (2012), research fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), describes in the study of <em>Emerging naval powers in Asia. China’s and India’s quest for sea power</em>, the main drivers behind India’s modernisation of its navy. These are a genuine need to protect the nation against non-traditional threats but also a desire to take grater responsibility as an emerging power. Secondly Basit questions India’s future relationship with Pakistan and China and how much potential future conflicts take out of the defence budget. Furthermore it also depends on India’s future rate of economic growth and budgetary military limitations. Another factor is national pride. India is on a quest for a more assertive role in the Indian Ocean. Basit concludes that “<em>with a long coastline and both real and perceived large-scale maritime threats, India will most likely keep on upgrading its navy. A strong Indian navy could greatly contribute to enhancing security at sea.”</em></p><h4>Chapter 4: Naval power</h4><h4>Introduction</h4><p>The assessment of power can be a complex empirical problem as former Indian Navy officer Vijay Sakhuja (2011) suggests in his second book: ‘<em>Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions -China, India and Southeast Asia’ </em>. He argues that maritime power is a mix of the geographical, economic, political and technological strengths and weaknesses of a state. Another factor is the military component.</p><h4>Empirical evaluation of maritime power</h4><p>In an attempt to determine an empirical evaluation of maritime power Sakhuja adapts Ray S. Cline’s calculus to undertake an analysis of sea power. For this paper only the BRIC countries will be analysed. The formula Sakhuja uses reads as follows:</p><p>Pmp = Perceived maritime power</p><p>G = Geographical factors</p><p>E = Economic capability</p><p>M = Military capability</p><p>T = Technological capability</p><p>P = Stategic purpose of maritime power (S) and a will to pursue maritime strategy (W)</p><p>The first factor, geography, is based on the length of the coastline, island territories, number of harbours, etc. The first approximation, as Sakhuja points out, is:</p><p>Pmp = G</p><p>With this formula we could describe China, Brazil, India and Russia as major maritime powers. Yet, this seems for Sakhuja as an oversimplification of a complex issue. Therefor Sakhuja adds a second factor, namely economic capability:</p><p>Pmp = G + E</p><p>To quantify the economic strength of a state, one can measure the availability of natural resources, production of goods, services, GDP, maritime trade. So if the perception of maritime power were based on geographical and economic factors, then Russia would hold one of the top ranks. India, China and Brazil can be counted as well as maritime powers due to their good geographic location and impressive economic indicators.</p><p>At this stage Sakhuja expands the equation with the military factor:</p><p>Pmp = (G + E + M)</p><p>The perceived maritime power of a nation is enhanced if it possesses nuclear weapon-capable naval forces that can act as a deterrent. With this idea in mind, Russia and China can be assigned a higher maritime power weight than India and Brazil.</p><p>Another aspect in maritime affairs is technology: computers, satnav, and digital warfare. This mean the formula has to be changed into:</p><p>Pmp = (G + E + M + T)</p><p>Here we can say that the four countries are behind the top ranked United States. As noted in the previous chapter, Russia has fallen behind in computer technology. China for example has to depend on Russian technology as the Americans have terminated military technology transfers with the Chinese in 1989. In India submarines are under construction under a transfer of technology agreement with the French. However, the Indian Navy can also be seen as a technologically advanced force. An example is the bilateral agreement between India and Mozambique, including the transfer of knowhow and technology (see Ross and Sakhuja, 2012).</p><p>Finally Sakhuja adds two other, critical factors in the assessment of sea power: national maritime strategy and maritimeness. These are the political factors in the equation. Maritimeness is the foundation on which national strategy is formulated. The final equation is:</p><p>Pmp = (G + E + M + T) (S + W).</p><p>The ‘S’ factor is based on a clear-cut strategy, whereas the ‘W’ stands for national leadership.</p><p>In the case of China there is a new awareness of the importance of maritime power among the national leaders. This maritimeness has turned China into a major maritime power. This vision is also shared by the national leaders of Russia and India. Brazilian leaders, on the contrary, lack a certain amount of political will.</p><p>One has to keep in mind, as Sakhuja warns, that many factors in the equitation are subjective and have to be dealt with using numerical coefficients based on the viewpoint of decision-makers.</p><h4>Naval conflicts in the future</h4><p>The likelihood of a conflict seems uncertain. As Saira Basit and Øystein Tunsjø (2012) argues, a naval confrontation between India and China is in the short term unlikely and will remain so in the long term. Although both countries are increasingly active in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the expansion of their respective navies is unlikely to shift the balance of power to an alarming degree.</p><p>Murray Scot <strong>Tanner,</strong> Asia analyst in CNA’s China Strategic Issues Group imagines that however the appearance of Chinese naval vessels near the Indian coastline would certainly upset New Delhi, China and India are coordinating, nonetheless, their patrols against piracy with other maritime partners such as the United States. In his opinion it is not a major source of concern, though it is interesting to follow the developments of these countries.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2014/12/23/naval-military-power-in-the-bric-countries/#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><h4>Conclusions</h4><p>The Russians have the ambition to be a super power — and while presently it possesses these capabilities, these capabilities are degrading. Russia is no longer an autarkic defence industrial power. Brazil, meanwhile, does not have the capabilities — not for lack of financial means, but because its political leaders lack the ‘maritimeness’. Brazil does not seek to challenge any other major power but it has made it clear that South America is its ‘Near Abroad’ so its main goal is to consolidate its primacy in the region. China and India, on the contrary, are the most ambitious of the BRIC countries. Beijing has all the necessary resources to compete with the Americans, by building up their naval forces and they are intending to do so. India, is threatened by an ambitious Pakistan and by an emerging China. The more the BRIC states seek to influence first their immediate regions, and then the world, the more their defence investment will begin to mirror the hi-tech industries of the US defence complex.</p><h4>Endnotes</h4><pre><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2014/12/23/naval-military-power-in-the-bric-countries/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> The opinions expressed are solely those to M. S. Tanner and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA.</pre><h4>References</h4><p>Ackerman, S. (14.06.2014). <em>US sends aircraft carrier to Persian Gulf as Obama considers air strikes in Iraq,</em> (The Guardian, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/14/aircraft-carrier-iraq-isis-strike-persian-gulf">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/14/aircraft-carrier-iraq-isis-strike-persian-gulf</a>).</p><p>Bakrie. Connie Rahakundini (2013). <em>US pivot: The future of Indo-Pacific region (Part 1 of 2)</em>. The Jakarta Post. <a href="http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/12/us-pivot-the-future-indo-pacific-region-part-1-2.html">http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/12/us-pivot-the-future-indo-pacific-region-part-1-2.html</a>.</p><p>Boraz, S., Birkler, J., Gordon IV, J., Lee, G.,T. &amp; Wilson, P. A. (2006). <em>Leveraging America’s Aircraft carrier capabilities. Exploring New Combat and Noncombat roles and Missions for the U.S. Carrier Fleet</em>. Rand National Defense Research Institute<em>,</em>(<a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG448.pdf">http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG448.pdf</a>).</p><p>Bussmann, M. &amp; Oneal, J.R. (2007,). <em>Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? A Test of Power-Transition Theory, </em>Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51: 88–111.</p><p>Buzan, B., &amp; Wæver, O. (2003). <em>Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Glaser, B.S. (2013). Discussion on China’s motives for naval power. [email] (Personal communication, 10 November 2013).</p><p>Janet Tappin Coelho (16.12.2014). <em>Brazil plans to expand submarine fleet.</em> IHS Jane’s Navy International.</p><p>Jørgensen, K.E. (2010) <em>International Relations Theory: A New Introduction. </em>Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 85–95.</p><p>O’Neill, J. (2001) <em>Building Better Global Economic BRICs</em>, Global Economics, Paper No.66.</p><p>Rehman, I. (01.06.2010). <em>India’s Future Aircraft Carrier Force and the Need for Strategic Flexibility.</em> [25.11.2014, IDSA: <a href="http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasFutureAircraftCarrierForceandtheNeedforStrategicFlexibility_irehman_010610">http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasFutureAircraftCarrierForceandtheNeedforStrategicFlexibility_irehman_010610</a>].</p><p>Sakhuja, V. (2011) <em>Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia</em>, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp.14–15.</p><p>Sakhuja, V. (04.08.2014). <em>BRICS: The Oceanic Connections. </em>[30.11.2014, IPCS: <a href="http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/brics-the-oceanic-connections-4594.html].">http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/brics-the-oceanic-connections-4594.html].</a></p><p>Sieff, M. (20.11.2014). <em>Philippines, Vietnam losing ship building race with China. </em>[30.11.2014, APD Forum: <a href="http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2014/11/20/ship-building-race].">http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2014/11/20/ship-building-race].</a></p><p>Theory Talks (19.12.2009). <em>Barry Buzan on International Society, Securitization, and an English School Map of the World. </em>[29.11.2014, Theory Talks: <a href="http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html].">http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html].</a></p><p>Trabanco, J. M. A. (5.02.2009). <em>Brazil Does Have the Potential to be a Great Power.</em>[30.11.2014, Global Research<em>:</em> <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/brazil-does-have-the-potential-to-be-a-great-power].">http://www.globalresearch.ca/brazil-does-have-the-potential-to-be-a-great-power].</a></p><p>Tsypkin, M. (2012). <em>The rise of naval powers in Asia and Europe’s decline, </em>Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Oslo Files on Defence and Security (December 2012, n. 6). (<a href="http://brage.bibsys.no/fhs/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_36150/1/OF_6_2012_nett.pdf">http://brage.bibsys.no/fhs/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_36150/1/OF_6_2012_nett.pdf</a>).</p><p>Tunsjø, Ø. (2012). <em>Emerging naval powers in Asia. China’s and India’s quest for sea power, </em>Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Oslo Files on Defence and Security (June 2012, n. 2). (<a href="http://brage.bibsys.no/fhs/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_30086/1/OF_2_2012_nett.pdf">http://brage.bibsys.no/fhs/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_30086/1/OF_2_2012_nett.pdf</a>)</p><p>United States Navy (n.d.). <em>USS George Washington Facts </em>[30.11.2014,<em> </em>United States Navy: <a href="http://www.gw.navy.mil/core/About/about.html">http://www.gw.navy.mil/core/About/about.html</a>].</p><p>Waltz, K. N. (1993). <em>The Emerging Structure of International Politics</em>, Intenational Security<em>, </em>18: 44–79.</p><p>Wein, T. (2011). <em>BRIC Countries Russia and Brazil Flex Their Muscles in Race forRegional Control. </em>(Defence IQ, <a href="http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/bric-countries-flex-their-defence-muscles-in-a-bid/">http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/bric-countries-flex-their-defence-muscles-in-a-bid/</a>).</p><p>Willet, L., de Larrinaga, N., &amp; Anderson, G. (05.09.2014). <em>France halts first Russian Mistral delivery in response to Ukraine crisis. </em>(IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/42755/france-halts-first-russian-mistral-delivery-in-response-to-ukraine-crisis">http://www.janes.com/article/42755/france-halts-first-russian-mistral-delivery-in-response-to-ukraine-crisis</a>).</p><p>Yoshihara, T. (2012). <em>War By Other Means: China’s Political Uses of Seapower. (</em>The Diplomat, <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/war-by-other-means-chinas-political-uses-of-seapower/?all=true">http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/war-by-other-means-chinas-political-uses-of-seapower/?all=true</a>).</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2014/12/23/naval-military-power-in-the-bric-countries/"><em>thielemanst.wordpress.com</em></a><em> on December 23, 2014.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80e597ba75ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Greater Kurdistan: between gains and losses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/stories-on-mena/greater-kurdistan-between-gains-and-losses-f6e546ef05ad?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6e546ef05ad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kurdistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[middle-east]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 14:30:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T14:30:28.205Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The capture of Mosul in Iraq by ISIL/Da’esh (the ‘Islamic State’) insurgents and the declaration of the Caliphate during the summer of 2014 gave the political kaleidoscope of the Middle East a profound shaking. Iraq “after Mosul” has presented the Kurdish people with an unprecedented political momentum, one in which they see their aspirations to control their own destiny strengthened by Baghdad’s weakness and in step with powerful regional forces that would now support their plans. Also, since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurdistan Region has developed from an isolated and war-ravaged backwater into a regional powerbroker.</em></p><p><em>As the Kurds sit on a great deal of the Middle East’s oil and its possibly even more important water resources, Kurdish nationalism will probably become increasingly salient in the years to come. The Kurdish uprising that has accompanied the Arab Winter since 2011 clearly illustrates the truth of this situation. But who exactly are the Kurds and how will their responses to the increasing instability define the future of the Middle East? The purpose of this article is to survey the Kurdish impetus towards independence. To this end it analyses the recent military, economic and political developments along the boundaries of Greater Kurdistan.</em></p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*dm1r4xMji4ChHfcT.jpg" /></figure><p>In Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, mosques and minarets are now outnumbered two to one by tower cranes. New shopping malls, hotels and blocks of flats are being built at an extraordinary rate. With one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Iraqi Kurdistan is fast becoming a magnet for foreign investors as it begins a new dawn. These constructions echo increased self-confidence among the Kurds that after a century of hardship and statelessness, now is their time. However, Erbil is situated less than 80 kilometres from both Kirkuk and Mosul — two of the most dangerous places on earth. While Kurdistan indulges in its building and commercialisation binge, the rest of Iraq is still practically a war zone. The dramatic seizure of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, in the summer 2014, by a coalition of Sunni Arab militias spearheaded by ISIL/Da’esh (the ‘Islamic State’), marks what may be a fateful turning point in the Kurdish history. At one moment, as a result of the battlefield victories by ISIL/Da’esh, Iraqi Kurdistan shared a 1000-km border with the so-called Islamic State.</p><p>Today, daily life in Erbil is largely stable, as Mohammed A. Salih points out. According to the Kurdish Affairs’ analyst, based in Iraqi Kurdistan, the worst days appear to be over. “<em>At some point in August 2014, everything seemed to be in danger but now life is quite normal. People of course understand that ISIS is still a threat of sorts but no way as powerful as it used to be until a few months ago</em>. <em>As far as the ISIS threat is concerned, Kurdistan appears to be largely secure. However, its internal political and factional divisions are going to pose a serious threat in the future</em>.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>Meanwhile on the Arabian Peninsula, the Saudi Arabian air strikes of March 2015 against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen have been touted as the latest escalation in a regional proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As the two countries continue to aid rival militants in the Syrian civil war, and to support opposing sides in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon and Yemen, questions have been raised about where this now-militarised regional rivalry could go.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>If the Kurds declare independence in the north and Iraq is divided into three parts, then the Iranians — with their access to the Shi’ite region — will be land-neighbours with Saudi Arabia. Such a situation could provide Iran with a substantial opportunity to provoke the Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. The Saudis, who also intervened in Bahrain to prevent the outbreak of the Arab Spring, will do everything possible to prevent Iraq’s fragmentation.</p><p>As for the Kurds, Mohammed A. Salih argues that if Kurdistan fails to unite around key strategic objectives and allow certain regional countries, such as Iran and Turkey, to play an important role in shaping their policies toward one another and the outside world, Kurdistan will be in a tough position that can destabilise it to some degree.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>Some authors have gone further, arguing that the entire system of nation-states designed in 1916, when British diplomat Mark Sykes and his French counterpart François Georges-Picot secretly planned the eventual fate of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, is now being erased.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn4">[4]</a> As things develop quickly in the Middle East, the academic world, media and policy makers have remained relatively silent to the so-called “Kurdish issue”: the Kurdish demand for independence along with cultural, social and political rights and their immediate implementation before the window of opportunity closes.</p><p>In Iraq, the Kurdistan Region now stands on the threshold of restructuring the Iraqi state according to its federal or confederal design, or exercising its full right to self-determination and seceding from Baghdad, perhaps as the Republic of Kurdistan. By ignoring the realities of Kurdish strength in Iraq, the U.S. and other Western powers run the risk of losing influence in the only part of Iraq that can be called a success story. However, by acknowledging Kurdish strength, Washington could be drawn into a complex reconfiguration of the Iraqi state, or even underwriting a new Republic of Kurdistan and being involved in the reordering of a new Middle East state system.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>All of this means that the Kurds find themselves on the verge of establishing their first viable national homeland — nearly a century after the Great Powers carved up post-World War I Ottoman Empire into the countries of today’s Middle East. As Salih points out: <em>“If the regional dynamics keep change in a way that it strengthens the Kurdish position, Kurdistan might become a fully autonomous state, especially as the rest of Iraq appears to be in a serious turmoil!”</em></p><p><strong>Who are the Kurds?</strong></p><p>Defining Kurdistan or Greater Kurdistan is a complicated task. Some authors describe it as the largest nation without an internationally recognised territory. Although there are no formal statistics on the population of Kurdistan, an estimated 32 million Kurds live in a geographic area consisting of Turkey (North Kurdistan), Syria (West Kurdistan), Iran (East Kurdistan) and Iraq (South Kurdistan), roughly following the Taurus and Zagros mountain ranges, covering a surface slightly larger than Spain. In addition, Kurdish communities are also found much wider afield, notably in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and they form sizeable communities in such cities as Istanbul, Tehran and Baghdad, not to mention Berlin and London.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/0*SC9hin3-xlGSSqo-.png" /></figure><p><em>Kurdish diaspora</em></p><p>A recent phenomenon is the formation of a Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe. In the 1960s, Kurds from Turkey began to arrive in Germany, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland and France as immigrant workers under contracts based on inter-government agreements regarding immigrant labour. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the military <em>coup d’état</em> in Turkey in 1980 and the Iraqi regimes long drawn out and murderous extermination campaign against the Kurds (Anfal), successive waves of Kurdish political refugees arrived in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America. Other campaigns against the Kurds in the 1990s have increased the Kurdish exodus to Europe. No precise and reliable census of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been recently carried out, but the most widely accepted estimates set their number at about 850,000.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p><em>Culture and language</em></p><p>Just as the Kurdish people inhabit different countries, the Kurds have several distinctive dialects: Kurmanji (also known in Iraq as ‘Badini’ or ‘Badinani’) is spoken most widely mainly in the north and west, while Sorani predominates the southern and eastern parts of Kurdistan. It is the latter, however, that has made the most headway in recent years by virtue of its position of the main language in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq.</p><p>One cannot even rely on religion when defining ‘Kurdishness’. While the large majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, some fifteen per cent are Shi’ites; including the so-called Faili Kurds, who were largely expelled to Iran by the former Ba’ath regime in Iraq. There are also some other significant Kurdish-speaking religious minorities.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>Kurdish nationalism emphasizes grassroots participation, gender egalitarian approach, and increased women’s participation in all levels of social, political, and public life. Many credit the imprisoned Kurdish PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, known as an ardent promoter of gender equality. Around a third of his PKK guerrillas are thought to be women.</p><p>In Rojava or Western Kurdistan, a <em>de facto</em> autonomous region in northern and northeastern Syria, the empowerment of women has been a key to the Rojava revolution. A recent report of Roj Women, shows that since the self-declared autonomy, Kurdish women have established a dozen women’s unions, associations and committees and have carried out gender awareness campaigns on a large scale in the region.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p><strong>Key moments in Kurdish history</strong></p><p>Against such a confusing and complex background of what constitutes Kurdistan, a brief overview of the long and complicated history of the Kurds is unavoidable to set the context and to explain the Kurdish struggle for economical and political independence. For centuries the stateless Kurdish people have grappled with shifting power structures in the Middle East, ranging from the centralised forces of the Ottoman Empire to ethnic persecution under former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.</p><p>After World War I, a large portion of Kurdistan was returned to Turkish control. In 1920, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Sèvres Treaty promised the Kurds the formation of an autonomous state, which would have the right to elect for complete independence after one year, subject to the League of Nation’s approval. Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk later rejected the deal, and Turkey repressed Kurdish uprisings over the next few decades. The borders were fixed and Kurdistan was split up, as it is today, finding themselves divided among superior regional adversaries, namely Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria.</p><p><strong>Victims of the Cold War</strong></p><p>In 1946, the Kurds, supported by the USSR, established the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Moscow hoped to make use of the Kurds to counter British influence in Iran and to put pressure on the central government for an oil concession. Later that year, though, in the context of the very initial phases of the Cold War, the Kurds witnessed their first major blow, when the state collapsed, due to U.S. demands for Moscow’s withdrawal from northern Iran.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn10">[10]</a> In the early 1960s the first serious contacts were made with Washington, as the Kurds were emerging as a significant force in Iraq. During this period the Americans gradually gained influence in the Middle East to the detriment of the British Empire. The U.S. continued to show sympathy, but no material support, for the Kurdish cause. According to Shareef, the U.S. had more to gain from regional allies such as Turkey and the Shah’s Iran than from the stateless Kurds in Iraq.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*fTZKL5euV8bjmw4n.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Turkey-PKK conflict</strong></p><p>When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, the Turkish Kurds made up some eighteen per cent of the population, but the new republic did not recognize its approximately 1.8 million Kurds as a distinct minority with its own culture, language, and traditions. The Turkish government considered the Kurds to be “Mountain Turks”. In an effort to assimilate and perhaps control the Kurds, the Turkish government launched a series of repressive policies intended to diminish the Kurds’ identity by various means, including banning their language.</p><p>In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê [PKK]) launched an armed struggle against the Turkish state by attacking both military and civilian targets — both Turks and Kurds — in order to maintain some sort of hold over the population in the region. The PKK’s ideology was originally a fusion of revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism, seeking the foundation of an independent, Marxist-Leninist state in the region, which was to be known as Kurdistan. Most of their bases were outside Turkish borders, mostly in Lebanon and Syria, while significant numbers of PKK members were sent to Europe to mobilise the Kurds who had migrated primarily for economic reasons and who did not have a politicized Kurdish identity.</p><p>For nearly four decades Turkish jet fighters dropped their bombs on the snow-capped Qandil mountains in northern Iraq to flush out the PKK forces. However, the conflict took a different turn in 1999 when the PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya, with the help of U.S. intelligence. In October 2002, Mr Öcalan was sentenced to life imprisonment.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn12">[12]</a> During his capture, he repeatedly called for a bilateral ceasefire.</p><p><strong>‘Kurdish Opening’</strong></p><p>By the summer and autumn of 2009 the long festering Kurdish problem in Turkey seemed on the verge of a solution when the ruling AKP government of Erdoğan and former President Abdullah Gül announced a Kurdish Opening or Initiative (a.k.a. the Democratic Initiative), a comprehensive, multi-tiered policy approach to resolving tensions between the Turkish government and Turkey’s Kurdish population. The “Kurdish opening” envisaged bringing members of the PKK back to Turkey from the organisation’s bases in Iraq and cells in Europe through an unofficial amnesty. This approach, however, failed and the government has since backed down, calling off its plan to bring more PKK members back to Turkey. As a result, the “Kurdish opening” flopped. Turkey’s AKP government has, thus far, tried to resolve this impasse by giving collective, ethnicity-based group rights to the Kurds.</p><p>By March 2013, being imprisoned on an island south of Istanbul for more than ten years, Mr Öcalan stated that the era of armed struggle was over and that a deal with the Turkish government was within reach. Exactly two year later, in 2015, he repeated his statement.</p><p>For the PKK, the release of Mr Öcalan is a priority. But for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the ultimate solution would be part of a larger vision, involving a new constitution and an overhaul of Turkey’s parliamentary system towards what he calls a “Turkish-style presidency” — in this case case, giving himself executive powers.</p><p>According to a report provided by the Turkish army, a total of 41,828 people are estimated to have been killed in the conflict. In contrast, the PKK statistics show significantly lower militant but higher security forces deaths.</p><p>PKK commanders now are willing to lay down arms inside Turkey once there is a deal, but would continue as regional force in Iraq and Syria. Regional dynamics beyond Turkey’s borders make a Turkey-Kurdish deal inside Turkey even more complicated as the PKK (through its Syrian affiliate) has been fighting jihadis along Turkey’s southern border for the past two years.</p><p>Meanwhile in Iraqi Kurdistan, from 1987 to 1989, a series of military campaigns against Kurdish “saboteurs” were undertaken by Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, leader of the Ba’ath Party’s northern bureau. What began as a counterinsurgency during the Iran-Iraq war, resulted eventually in genocide. An estimated 180,000 people died during the campaigns.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn13">[13]</a> Although the Kurds and the Iraqi ruling elite were all Sunni Muslim, the Kurds were never happy under Arab rule, which persisted, in effect, until the Kurdish area of Iraq became autonomous under Western protection, following the first Gulf War in 1991. More than a million Kurds had fled to Turkey, Iran and the mountainous areas of northern Iraq.</p><p>In 1992, parliamentary and presidential elections were held and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) became reality by the virtue of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, an alliance of political parties. For the first time in decades the Kurds had a state of their own, although hardly on the terms they had imagined, since their autonomy was entirely dependent on outside forces. Unfortunately, violent factional fighting between the two major Kurdish parties soon after beset the region: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriot Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn14">[14]</a> Eventually, in the late 1990s after two days of lengthy sessions, both parties reached a tentative agreement that came to be called the Washington Accord, with each party asserting control over a portion of the Kurdish enclave.</p><p>One of the articles of the Washington Accord stressed that both parties would endeavour to create a united, pluralistic and democratic Iraq that would ensure the political and human rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq and of all Iraqis on a political basis decided by all the Iraqi people. In addition, it stressed that both parties aspired to an Iraq reformed on a federal basis that would maintain the nation’s unity and territorial integrity.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn15">[15]</a></p><p><strong>Post-Saddam Hussein period</strong></p><p>During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Bush administration deployed a significant amount of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Northern Iraq to combat the 150.000 Iraqi troops on the border of the <em>de facto</em> Kurdish enclave. A more political reason was to keep the Kurdish troops, a.k.a. <em>peshmerga</em>, in line, preventing the Kurds from taking the oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk. After the American invasion, the Kurds’ perception was that their political power was starting to devalue within the context of the new Iraq. During the Interim Government Period, the Kurds were non-players in Iraq; it was only when the constitutional drafting process began that they suddenly became players again.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*xo_WdbYPX_jQQpny.jpg" /></figure><p>In the 2005 election the Iraqis voted in favour of a new constitution. To counterbalance a probable Islamist agenda, the U.S. aimed at more Kurdish power in the new transitional government. As a result, the first Kurdish president in Iraq’s history was democratically elected. The new constitution, which was approved by 78% of the voters in a hotly contested national referendum, recognised the Kurdistan Region’s institutions including the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdistan Parliament. At the start of the next year, the PUK and KDP agreed to unify the two administrations. Later, on the 7th of May 2006, Prime Minister and nephew of the current president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani, announced a new unified cabinet. Since then, this autonomy increased step by step, leading to developed and autonomous institutions, including a parliament, a national anthem and fast-developing trade and diplomatic relationships with other countries. Though for the time being, Iraqi Kurdistan still remains under Baghdad’s writ.</p><p><strong>Economical issues</strong></p><p>So, what has held the Kurds back in their attempt to establish a fully autonomous region? According to many, it can be explained in one word — cash. It is in the economic realm that the Kurdistan Region is most keenly tied into the Iraqi framework, or that is, until recently. With the institutions of the Iraqi state in chaos, the need for the KRG to generate revenues has become even more acute. The financial burden has been increased by the addition of more than 300,000 internally displaced Iraqis, and a quarter of a million Syrian refugees, and the need to re-supply and re-equip the <em>peshmerga </em>and security forces, so they at least have the tools with which to defend the region on an equal basis to the abilities of ISIL/Da’esh to attack.</p><p>In view of the foregoing the World Bank published in February 2015 its Economic and Social Impact Assessment on the Syrian Conflict and ISIS Crisis. According to the report, the KRG is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis as a result of the influx of the Syrian refugees (starting in early 2012) and more recently the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in 2014. Economic growth has contracted five percentage points, and poverty rate has more than doubled, increasing from 3.5 per cent to 8.1 per cent. The stabilisation cost for 2015 is estimated at $1.4 billion in additional spending above and beyond the KRG budget. This estimate could get much higher depending on how long the crisis will continue.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p><em>“This crisis has been an extremely big burden for the KRG to carry given that it has not received its budget share from Baghdad since February 2014,” </em>as Mohammed A. Salih says<em>. “The Iraqi government hardly seems to be taking any serious responsibility for the refugee / IDP crisis in Kurdistan. Kurdistan has reached out to foreign countries and bodies such as UN to help it tackle this issue and despite numerous challenges it has been able to tackle it rather successfully so far</em>.”</p><p>In a statement from the Kurdistan Regional Government: “<em>Finance is a sector in the region, which has seen development in recent years, but further reforms are still needed to enhance this sector. Foreign Direct Investment along with local investment is key to the development of the regional banking system</em>.” Although membership is presently not possible, the KRG could encourage the World Bank/IMF to set up working groups on Iraqi Kurdistan.</p><p>With respect to the Kurdish banking system, which is virtually non-existing, the Kurdish Globe mentioned that, until now, the majority of the people traditionally keep their savings in safes, or hide here and there at their homes as they do not have trust in the banks to deposit their savings in.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn17">[17]</a> As a result of the lack of regulation and historically weak banking culture, a cash economy has emerged, which has hindered the investments and funding needed to rebuild the region. Therefore, from Kurdish perspective, banking and the introduction of fiscal planning must take priority if the Iraqi Kurds intend to become a credible political force in the region and a government that investors can trust.</p><p><strong>Struggle for oil</strong></p><p>With the discovery of significant oil and gas reserves, the Kurds have the potential to become a key player within this resource-rich region. Recently, the KRG in Erbil funded a new pipeline, which can start pumping up to 400,000 barrels per day of Kurdish oil a day to Turkey from early 2014. The current pipeline runs from the TaqTaq oil field and connects with the above-mentioned Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, bypassing Iraqi territory and thus excluding Baghdad from any of the proceedings. Only just the TaqTaq field has been described as being “part of the largest great onshore oilfield in the world”.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>Yet despite the presence of natural resources, the Kurds in Iraq have been battling a financial crisis since Baghdad authorities cut budget payments in January 2014 as punishment for its attempts to export oil independently.</p><p>For years, policy makers in Baghdad have been trying to finalise a national hydrocarbons law that would determine once and for all how to share oil revenues across the different regions and clarify legal issues regarding ownership and exports of national resources. Baghdad says that under the constitution, the Iraqi central government has the sole right to export oil and distribute revenues.</p><p>In theory, Erbil is meant to receive seventeen per cent of Iraq’s budget, which would equate to $14.6 billion per year. In practice, before the suspension of payments, KRG officials were of the view that the sums received rarely crept above ten per cent — or some $8 billion.</p><p>If the Kurds would develop, however, their own export routes, then 83 per cent of the revenues would still go to Baghdad. Yet, the vision of the KRG is to include a Turkish bank or company in the process. With the development of oil and gas export routes to Turkey, the Kurds would become less vulnerable to the crippling halts of payments from the Iraqis. Thus, starting to self-govern oil exports is yet another step toward increased independence and the solidification of the <em>de facto</em> state discourse as Baghdad loses its main pressure point to the Kurdistan Region.</p><p>Washington tried to settle the dispute between Baghdad and Erbil through a new national hydrocarbon law, but the two sides could not agree. Instead, in 2007, the Kurdish parliament passed its own law regulating oil and gas contracts in the region, which the central government in Iraq considered illegal, permitting generous production-sharing deals with dozens of foreign companies, such as the Anglo-Turkish company Genel Energy, China’s Addax Petroleum, France’s Total, Norway’s DNO, and Russia’s Gazprom.</p><p>By 2012, even major U.S. oil companies, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil, had sealed exploration and production agreements directly with Erbil, openly challenging Baghdad — and the Obama administration, which, despite Washington’s established support for Iraqi Kurdistan, has opposed the deals, fearing that oil disputes within Iraq could threaten the country’s stability.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn19">[19]</a></p><p>In reaction, Baghdad signed, in mid-January 2013, a preliminary deal with the British company BP to develop the Kirkuk line, just west of ExxonMobil’s area.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn20">[20]</a> Yet Kurdistan claimed rights to the same field. By rejecting the BP deal in Kirkuk, the Kurds complained that any such agreement must be approved first by all parties in the dispute, as Reuters reported.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>An energy agreement was finally brokered between Baghdad and Erbil on the 2nd of December 2014. Underscoring a simple philosophy at the heart of the complicated negotiations, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s office stated: “<em>that Iraqi oil belongs to all Iraqis</em>.” At the same time, Mr al-Abadi’s government also agreed to pay the salaries of the Kurdish <em>peshmerga</em> and will also allow the flow of weapons from the U.S. to the Kurds, with the government in Baghdad as intermediary. Although many interpreted the agreement as a step back for Barzani and Kurdish independence, it was considered to be a major victory. The terms do indeed reinstate Baghdad’s right to receive all oil revenues from the Kurdish-controlled areas in return for providing the KRG its long overdue but constitutionally mandated 17 per cent of the national budget. However, the agreement also recognizes the KRG’s legal sovereignty over extraction and sale of oil and gas in all Kurdish areas.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>It is thus the fear of being economically dependent on Baghdad that moved the Kurds to plan for an independent oil and gas sector as early as 2004. The more Baghdad squeezes, the more the Kurds move towards economic independence.</p><p><strong>Greater Kurdistan?</strong></p><p>In 1991 the Kurdistan Region in Iraq came to interact with the international community as it became a <em>de facto </em>independent state. Based on its early learning, it came to rely on the democratisation of its system as the foundation for its earned sovereignty. Toward the end of the second decade of this <em>de facto</em> statehood, the KRG made significant socio-political progress, and reached an advanced stage of state building — a progress at least partly correlating with its commitments to maintain a viable and secure autonomy within Iraq. KRG’s foreign policy of demonstrating its earned sovereignty actually paved the way to further reforms in the KRG.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*Algn1xoa2bXz58Ax.jpg" /></figure><p>On the 9th of December 2014, Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, reaffirmed his commitment to Kurdish statehood after making a historic call for an independence referendum on the 30th of June 2014. Barzani’s announcement came after the ISIL/Da’esh incursion into northern Iraq earlier that month, which effectively eliminated Baghdad’s control over the disputed territories of Kurdistan. Against this background, Barzani told the BBC that he is intending to hold a referendum on independence within months. “<em>Everything that has happened recently shows that it’s the right of Kurdistan to achieve independence</em>,” Mr Barzani said. He and other Kurdish leaders say that for more than ten years they have done their best to help build a stable, federal Iraq by participating fully in the Baghdad central government. “<em>From now on, we won’t hide that that’s our goal. Iraq is effectively partitioned now. Are we supposed to stay in this tragic situation the country’s living? It’s not me who will decide on independence. It’s the people. We’ll hold a referendum and it’s a matter of months</em>.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><p>Indeed, Barzani must act fast. In fact, in the best-case scenario, the Kurdish referendum must occur before the June 2015 Turkish parliamentary elections because Barzani is unlikely to have more leverage over Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan than he has now. To keep Turkey’s Kurdish areas quiet and ensure an election victory, the AKP government needs to demonstrate that it is making progress in the so-called resolution process with Öcalan’s PKK within the next few months. But a breakthrough between the AKP and PKK could potentially boost Mr Öcalan’s position at Barzani’s expense; it could give a dose of legitimacy to Mr Öcalan’s plan — to unite all Kurdish regions under one federation — which clashes with Barzani’s vision for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>As the summer of 2014 wore on, the KRG had difficulties to defend its positions from ISIL/Da’esh attacks, putting a damper on Kurdish exuberance about the upcoming referendum. The fall of Sinjar and Zumar and other strategic areas near Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital, Erbil, showed that the <em>peshmerga </em>were beatable. But even that turned into a political blessing for Barzani’s government. Western powers, including the United States and its NATO partners initiated direct military cooperation with Erbil, and military aid began arriving from Europe during August 2014.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>All this means that the Kurds now find themselves on the verge of establishing their first viable national homeland. So what would be the balance sheet of the pros and cons of supporting the Kurds in their quest for independence? First of all, the Kurdistan Region is still officially part of the Republic of Iraq, which is caught in an increasingly sectarian geopolitical power struggle in the region spreading from Iran to Lebanon, and more recently Yemen. Secondly, a declaration of secession by Iraqi Kurdistan could prompt the final collapse of rump Iraq into separate small Sunni and Shi’ite states, intensifying the risk of becoming a failed state. Thirdly, infrastructure weaknesses further challenge Kurdish energy and political ambitions: the amount of oil the KRG is actually exporting is still insufficient to significantly raise Baghdad’s export levels or support an independent Kurdish state. Also, Kurdistan today consists of several ethnic groups, which are united to combat one common enemy (i.e. in the past Iraq and now ISIL/Da’esh). However, if the Kurds gain independence, they probably will have to deal with internal divisions (cf. South Sudan). In addition, since the Iraqi Kurds in Kirkuk have no access to the sea, they are dependent on the goodwill of Baghdad or their neighbours to ship their oil to world markets. And collapsing oil prices certainly do not help either.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn26">[26]</a></p><p><strong>Regional criticism</strong></p><p>The 32 million Kurds of the Middle East do not only live in Iraq, of course. But all of them are feeling the tremors of change. Iran, for instance, has a significant Kurdish minority of its own: about seven per cent of the Iranian population. Tehran is more and more strengthening its ties with the KRG, which it views as a vital ally in the fight against ISIL/Da’esh. And in Syria, the civil war has enabled the Kurds to set up wide-ranging self-administration in the northeast of the country.</p><p>As such, the outlook of regional powers has been in flux even before the invasion of Mosul in 2014, and the rise of ISIL/Da’esh. Since then, these events have only served to further divide the perspectives into a camp that includes several states — namely Turkey, Israel, and some Arab states — that views the Kurdistan Region of Iraq moving towards independence as a positive development, and a camp of one state, Iran, that views Kurdish independence as unacceptable. Interestingly, Western powers, and most notably the U.S. and the U.K., are more in line with Iran than with their Turkish, Israeli and Arab allies.</p><p><strong>European position</strong></p><p>Regarding the Kurdish question, the European Union’s emphasis has been strongly on human rights and finding a holistic solution to the situation in Turkey, being a candidate member Throughout the 1990s, the European Parliament called for a political solution to the question: “<em>The key to the Kurdish question lies in Turkey, which is, an ally and an important trade partner of Europe…The settlement of the Kurdish problem in Turkey will greatly contribute to finding a solution for the Kurds in neighbouring countries</em>.” Eventually, the Kurdish question became part and parcel of Turkey’s eventual EU candidacy during the 1999 Helsinki Summit.</p><p>Since the 1990s, Kurdish-British relations have improved tremendously thanks to the U.K.’s contribution to overthrowing Saddam Hussein and its recognition of the Kurdish genocide. Also the Germans have since the beginning of 2009 a Consulate-General in Erbil, a fact that also reflects the importance of the Kurdistan-Iraq region and of the Kurdish returnees who had been living in exile in Germany.</p><p>During the 2000s, the Kurdish lobby in the EU failed to bring the issue on the EU agenda and became somewhat disorganised following the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan. The EU had also designated the PKK a terrorist organisation.</p><p>During the summer 2014 events, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU welcomed the decision by individual Member States to respond positively to the call of the Kurdish regional authorities for urgent military material. The EU Ministers also invited the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure a stronger presence in Erbil. Given the Kurdish’ role in the fight against ISIL/Da’esh and in the resolution of Iraq’s political crisis, the EU today seeks to increase its presence in Erbil, in full respect of Iraq’s constitutional order.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p><strong>Turkey</strong></p><p>From being the singular most important block to Kurdish independence breaking out anywhere –with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once famously joking that he would object to Kurdish independence even in Argentina — Turkey is now the strongest supporter of Kurdish self-determination in Iraq.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn28">[28]</a> Recently in Turkey, home to the region’s largest Kurdish minority, the government of Erdoğan has abandoned long-held policies aimed at the suppression of a distinct Kurdish identity and is conducting peace talks with the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), responsible for a decade-long insurgency in eastern Turkey.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>Rather than being a threat to the integrity of Turkey, an independent Kurdistan (in Iraq) is increasingly seen as essential to Turkey’s own security — by allowing for the engaged management of Turkey’s own “Kurdish issue” with regard to the PKK, as important for Turkey’s energy security — by being a source of much-needed natural gas, and serving as a buffer between Turkey and what is seen as either a jihadist-dominated Sunni Arab region, or a region in the throes of what could well be one of the most devastating sectarian conflicts the Middle East has witnessed. By treating the Kurdistan Regional Government as a <em>de facto</em> nation-state, Turkey legitimises the KRG internationally and increases its sovereignty, knowing that this can eventually result in Kurdish independence.</p><p>As Ankara and Baghdad each began to view the other as pursuing antipathetic sectarian-focused policies, Turkey quickly found strong economic and security-based linkages with Erbil — linkages that would prove useful in managing the PKK threat and, most importantly, giving an opportunity to Turkey to improve its energy security and, in the future, limit its exposure to Russian and Iranian natural gas imports.</p><p>In 2012 the volume of trade between Iraq and Turkey had reached twelve billion dollars, of which seventy per cent was between Turkey and the Kurdish Region. Interestingly, the latest developments in Turkish-KRG relations have raised alarm in Washington concerning the possible disintegration of Iraq.</p><p>Özge Hewal-Ilbay, a female Turkish Kurd who works and lives in Germany, believes that there is a potential for the Kurds to establish a republic by uniting the Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi regions of Kurdistan. Although Mr Öcalan’s historic bid for a cease-fire between the PKK and Turkey’s AKP government rescinded the Kurds’ demand for a separate homeland, she remains dubious, however, as many other Kurds, about the recent developments. “<em>In Turkey, they have been trying to obtain autonomy via political debates for more than ten years. The Kurds have made progress, but in my opinion it is hard to finalise it by virtue of peace conditions. In the Middle East it is almost impossible to gain independence without war and bloodshed</em>.” Beside the independence of the Kurdish nation, Özge also pleads for more peace, and human and social rights in the Kurdish region. “<em>In the future, Turkey needs to pay more attention to these factors</em>.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p><strong>Israel</strong></p><p>For Israel, with a long-standing partnership with the Kurdish leadership and particularly with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) that stems back some fifty years to the days when Barzani proved to be a well-placed ally for Tel Aviv, it is a second nature to support initiatives that serve to break the integrity of Arab states — even those that no longer have the ability to challenge Israel’s right to exist. Perhaps it should not come as a much of a surprise that, in June 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voiced support for Kurdish statehood, taking a position that appeared to clash with the U.S. preference to keep the war-torn Iraq united.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p><strong>Sunni Arab States</strong></p><p>Since the uprising of the Kurdistan Region in 1991, there is little enthusiasm between the Kurds and Arab Gulf states. However, after the regime change in Iraq and the growth of the KRG’s economy, the KRG has proved to be for the Gulf states an alternative arena to assert their influence and check Iranian-Shia power, as well as to pursue commercial opportunities in general. Newly established consulates from Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, UAE and Palestine attest to the KRG’s expanding regional support base and its investment potential.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn32">[32]</a> For instance, in 2014 during the opening ceremony of a new branch office in Erbil, Dubai Chamber’s President and CEO Hamad Buamim stressed his organisation’s commitment to enhancing ties with the Kurdistan region. “<em>The office in Erbil provides added value for UAE companies and will help them access businesses opportunities in Kurdistan</em>.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn33">[33]</a></p><p><strong>Iran-Kurdish relations</strong></p><p>The mood in Tehran towards the unfolding plans of Erbil is ambiguous. In line with the policies of the U.S. and the U.K., Iran extended its full support for Iraq’s independence, national solidarity, and territorial integrity and, in so doing, criticised the Kurdish leadership in Iraq concerning the occupation of Kirkuk and the plans to hold a referendum there, and going as far as to refer to the exporting of oil as illegal.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn34">[34]</a></p><p>As the Kurds in northern Iraq are receiving support from various Western powers, the concern of Iran over Kurdish independence is perceived among Iranian rulers that Washington is attempting to ferment rebellion among the Kurds minority in Iran, and in this way weaken Tehran.</p><p>Kurdish issues have been an important part of the myriad political and socioeconomic problems that have preoccupied the Islamic Republic of Iran since its inception. The Kurdish factor has also been an important determinant of Iran’s regional foreign policy in the past three decades. War in Iraq paved the way towards a growing strategic-military alignment between Ankara and Tehran on the Kurdish insurgency. However, unlike Turkey, Tehran did not take its own Kurdish problem as an issue of primary importance, due to its historical relations with Iraqi Kurdish communities.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn35">[35]</a> In fact, the Iranians are more aware of the rising number of Azeris, who represents thirty to forty per cent of their population. If the Azeris were to achieve federalism, it would be the end of the Iranian state.</p><p>Nonetheless, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iran and the KRG have enjoyed growing ties. Trade and economic relations between Iran and the KRG have made considerable growth over the past twelve years: from an estimated $100 million in trade exchange value in 2000 to almost $6 billion in 2015. Moreover, in February 2015, a joint council was established between the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture of Sanandaj, capital of Iran’s Kurdistan Province, and its counterpart in Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with the aim of boosting trade ties between the two Kurdish-inhabited regions.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn36">[36]</a></p><p>Iran also has demonstrably taken the lead in aiding Iraqi Kurds in their war against extremist fighters loyal to ISIL/Da’esh. As Kurdish President Massud Barzani explained in late August 2014, “<em>The Islamic Republic of Iran was the first state to help us…and it provided us with weapons and equipment.”</em><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn37"><strong><em>[37]</em></strong></a></p><p><strong>Syria</strong></p><p>The strongest faction amongst the Syrian Kurds is the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat [PYD]), an organisation closely associated with the PKK. With their close ties to the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel [YPG]), the PYD has significant forces. Being aware of the situation, the Kurdistan Regional Government has engaged in foreign policy and has begun to interfere in the on-going Syrian civil war, keeping in mind a three-legged strategy.</p><p>First of all, Kurdistan takes in hundreds of thousands of refugees as part of pan-Kurdish responsibility in times of crisis. Secondly, Massoud Barzani supports the Erbil-based Kurdish National Council (KNC), the Syrian counterpart of the PYD, while at the same time criticising the PYD’s unilateral move.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn38">[38]</a> Thirdly, the KRG trains Syrian-Kurdish fighters within Northern Iraq who could possibly return to Syria, where they would strengthen the pro-KDP position, thus limiting the influence of PKK-friendly groups.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn39">[39]</a></p><p>Also in Syria, IS emerged as the main threat to Kurdish self-rule. The siege of the Syrian border city Kobani, that ended with the withdrawal of IS, was even hailed by the media as the “Stalingrad of the Kurds”, adding an epic dimension to the Kurdish nation-building that was accelerated on the ashes of the Arab Winter. The resistance of Kobani has also become the pride of the Democratic Union Party.</p><p><strong>The Rojava Model</strong></p><p>Amid the Syrian civil war and the withdrawal of the Syrian Army in the north of Syria in 2012, the population of Rojava (i.e. Western Kurdistan) took control of their region and declared a democratic multi-ethnic and multi-religious autonomy similar to the Swiss model with three separate and geographically detached administrative regions or cantons (Kobane, Afrin and Cizire). Despite economic hardship and a <em>de facto</em> embargo from trade with other parts of Syria, Turkey and KRG, the people of Rojava have been using their newly acquired freedom to experiment with radical democracy, by applying the Democratic Autonomy project propagated by Abdullah Öcalan.</p><p>The Rojava model is based on two main pillars. The first pillar is direct democracy as the basis of a communalist system in which citizens participate actively in decision-making and the management of the polis, from the neighbourhood to the municipality and as far as the government. The second pillar, equally revolutionary, is the denial of the nation-state Rojava, many different religious and ethnic groups –Christians, Yezidis, Arabs, Turkmens, Chechens, and Armenians — live together with the large Kurdish majority.</p><p>By officially and insistently denying the nation-state and by trying to create administrative structures that incorporate these different elements, the Rojava model gives to minorities a participatory role unprecedented in the Middle East — a role as equals in the management of the polis.</p><p>Within two years Rojava has witnessed substantial institutional and political changes and for the first time in Syrian history, the communities are governing themselves without the intervention of an authoritarian central government. Referring to these developments as the ‘Rojava Revolution’, the people of Rojava have eagerly been involved in organising their own affairs, from running schools and hospitals to generating electricity and even making their own tanks.</p><p>The most visible change has perhaps been the inclusion of women in the defence force and the police as separate units through the establishment of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) and the Women’s Security Forces (HAJ). According to various estimates, female fighters make up between 7,000 and 10,000 of the Kurdish forces fighting in Syria, representing roughly one third of the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) in Rojava.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn40">[40]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*ZPV4PzBgJfGvBSzS.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>The United States</strong></p><p>While the U.S. does have an Iraq policy, it also has a <em>de facto</em> policy towards the Kurds. Over time the very nature of U.S. interaction with the Kurdish movement evolved from informal contacts to a much more institutionalised relationship. Secondly, the Kurdish issue has been a critical issue for important neighbouring states, namely Iran and Turkey, and therefore has played a major role in America’s policy towards those states as well.</p><p>Traditional U.S. policy towards Iraq has been to support fully and unconditionally the territorial integrity of the country. U.S. policy makers have, since 2003, been mindful of satisfying the Kurds’ federal demands and in keeping the Kurds engaged as fully as possible in the political process in Baghdad. However, there has never been any notion whatsoever of Washington supporting any form of restructuring the Iraqi state into a confederal system. In this system sovereignty would be held by the regions and voluntarily handed over to an independent Kurdish state.</p><p>Nonetheless, since 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan has enjoyed <em>de facto</em> nationhood under U.S. protection. Washington is also wary of the precedent Kurdish independence in Iraq could set to other possible secessionist-minded people across the region, including the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iran, and also, perhaps, Shi’ites in Saudi-Arabia, and maybe even a Basra secessionist movement in the south of Iraq.</p><p>That said, the U.S. is popular (by Middle East standards) in Iraqi Kurdistan, thanks to the establishment of a no-fly zone over the region after the Allied victory over Saddam in 1991, and the overthrow of Saddam and his Ba’ath regime in 2003. The Kurdish community in the U.S. has a presence at the lobbying level through the Kurdish National Congress of North America, established in 1988. Between 2003 and 2014 the KRG representation in Washington spent in excess of $8.5 million on lobbying and public relations.</p><p>And yet President Obama and his predecessors have all been notably reluctant to give their fiat to Kurdish statehood. America was extremely unclear and inconsistent on where it stood with reference to the Iraqi constitution and its support for what was, essentially, ethnic federalism.</p><p>Washington also fears that creating a new player in such a volatile neighbourhood could invite serious instability. However, from a Western perspective, the Kurdish <em>peshmerga</em> troops remain the best hope for those who want to stop IS in Iraq, and the Obama administration will likely attempt to persuade them to join the offensive — or at least to provide substantial logistical and intelligence support to the Iraqi army.</p><p>In fact, the U.S. did not want oil-rich Kirkuk to go to the KRG, because it believed that this would lead to Kurdish independence. David Mack explained that, when it comes to the Kurdish issue, for Washington, ‘regional stability’ and the stability of ‘our NATO ally Turkey’ are major considerations.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn41">[41]</a></p><p>By the summer of 2014, shortly after U.S. bombs started to fall in Iraq, President Obama made clear what his model for the country’s future was. “<em>The Kurdish region is functional in the way we would like to see</em>,” he said in a speech. “<em>It is tolerant of other sects and other religions in a way that we would like to see elsewhere. So we do think it is important to make sure that that space is protected</em>.”</p><p>The initiation of military support for Iraq’s Kurds and airstrikes in northern Iraq marked an important turn in U.S. foreign policy. Although military support for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) remained limited, arming the Kurds represented a serious change in U.S.-Kurdish relations and appeared to conflict with previous U.S. policy in Iraq.</p><p>What appears to have changed in the summer of 2014 was a newfound alignment of Kurdish and U.S. interests in Iraq. From the Kurdish standpoint, fears of further setbacks at the hands of the Islamic State made the Kurds increasingly willing to ally with Baghdad and shift their military strategy from defending Kurdistan to crushing the broader threat to Iraq by the Islamic State. Once the front line against the Islamic State shifted from Baghdad to Erbil and Iraqi forces began cooperating with the Kurds, arming the Kurds was no longer a break from U.S. interests to preserve a stable and united Iraq. Instead, the Kurds had become integral to saving Baghdad.</p><p>This argument finds support in the growing literature on third-party support for rebel groups, which cites the alignment of the third-party and armed group’s strategic objectives as one of the critical factors behind external support.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn42">[42]</a> Effective marketing and diplomacy by these groups are ways in which they make such strategic overlap known to potential sponsor states. Therefore, changing strategic goals and Kurdish framing of those goals may have contributed to the United States’ decision to directly support the <em>peshmerga</em>.</p><p>By March 2015, the Kurds were able to hold a 1000-km front against the Islamic State’s advance. Their steadfastness could prompt America to rethink its alliances and interests in the region and to deepen its relationship with the Kurds. The U.S. has also urged the region to rethink its planned oil pipeline to Turkey, which is being constructed in defiance of the central government in Baghdad. Nevertheless, many U.S. oil companies have ignored Washington’s advice, rushing in to join in the growth of now-booming Kurdistan.</p><p><strong>With or without Iraq?</strong></p><p>In the week following the fall of Mosul, the expansion of ISIL/Da’esh, the paralysis of the Government of Iraq, the remobilization of the Shi’a militias, Western leaders remained committed to the shoring up of the unified Iraqi state. Arguably, the collapse of states and the emergence of new ones present scenarios that are inherently complex, demanding, and potentially dangerous with unknown consequences.</p><p>Yet, right now, the position of Washington has been to pressure the Kurds to lead the way in finding a solution to Iraq’s problems, rather than implementing ways forward for their own self-determination. This pressure, it seems, has been ignored by the Kurdish leadership who now seem to be on the verge of taking matters into their own hands, irrespective of what Washington wishes to see.</p><p>There are also international legal niceties that the U.S. government would be acting against, including the principle of the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of existing state borders — making it problematic for the United States to publicly support a secessionist movement beyond acknowledging that there exists a right to self-determination.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn43">[43]</a></p><p>The break-up of Iraq beyond the current federal status is believed neither to be in the U.S. interest nor to be in the interest of the Kurds. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Kurds were expected to be helpful to the Americans and not a source of instability.</p><p>There are other reasons to be cautiously optimistic. First of all, it cannot be inferred that the internal divisions in Kurdistan have been stabilised thanks to a common enemy. Secondly, Kurdish independence could create an important precedent for Kurds living in other regions. Also, within the realm of international politics, and in particular, in the Middle East, the notion of ‘loyal allies’ has to be put into perspective. Furthermore, the presence of a third party might balance the current antagonism in Iraq between the Sunni and Shia Muslims.</p><p>The positive points, though, at least match if not outweigh the cons. Firstly, within Iraq, the removal of the debilitating “Kurdish problem” would then leave Arab Iraq to work out its differences without the complicating factor of dealing with the Kurds either as enemies or allies. Also, the KRG has enjoyed in federal Iraq all the advantages of independence without any of its disadvantages. In regional terms, bringing the Republic of Kurdistan into a closer embrace with the United States may further serve to limit Iran’s options to foment difficulties in either Kurdistan or what remains of Iraq. From a U.S. perspective, the Kurds would be a staunch and loyal ally in a region that remains of critical importance to Washington, irrespective of any refocusing of U.S. strategic efforts elsewhere. Lastly, in terms of how this plays in the U.S. heartland, the Kurds are a nation deserving of a state. The embracing of Kurdish independence may be seen as a positive policy action in a region that is currently in the throes of many terrible conflicts.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>According to a Kurdish proverb, “<em>Kurds have no friends but the mountains</em>.” Today, however, Kurds are evolving from a victimised people to a relatively coherent political community with viable national aspirations. At the same time they are caught up in the strategic geopolitical calculations of the various influential actors of the Middle East. With the creation of the post-colonial order, both superpowers and regional powers have fought relentlessly for domination of the Middle East. As a result, and at their peril, the stateless Kurds have had to play at both regional and international levels to advance their ethnic struggle. With Saddam’s regime gone, the Iraqi Kurds had the rare change to forge a new Iraq: democratic, pluralistic and decentralised. However, the United States and other western allies have all been notably reluctant to give their fiat to Kurdish statehood.</p><p>In Turkey Mr Erdoğan was bold in starting peace negotiations with the outlawed PKK, but a Kurdish deal is now tangled up with his ambitions. Both sides prefer peace, but they also benefit from tackling one another, as Asli Aydıntaşbaş of the Financial Times points out.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn44">[44]</a></p><p>The Kurds are thus in a vulnerable position: they are mostly a valuable pawn to Washington, but remain redundant enough not to make the major powers care. Which vision prevails will have profound implications for the future of Iraq and the wider region. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s attempt to maintain central authority over Iraq’s provinces has reignited ethnic and sectarian violence, which in turn has raised doubts about whether Iraq can hold itself together. Indeed, an effort by Baghdad to block Kurdish-Turkish cooperation could easily backfire, provoking the KRG to declare Kurdistan’s independence.</p><p>The Kurds are at a historic crossroads. However, right now, there are still numerous unknown variables that could potentially pose a threat to the developments I argued above. These include the development of the Syrian civil war and regional sectarian violence and the perspective of the sections on Iran. At this point, it is too early to speculate about exactly how these factors will influence the Kurds. However, it seems to be that the geopolitical map of the Middle East will be redrawn in one way or another.</p><p><em>Thomas Thielemans<br>17 April 2015</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Interview with Mohammed A. Salih, 7 April 2015.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Younis, N. (2015). <em>The Saudi-Iran powerplay behind the Yemen conflict</em>. The Guardian, Available at: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/29/iran-saudi-arabia-yemen-conflict">http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/29/iran-saudi-arabia-yemen-conflict</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Interview with Mohammed A. Salih, 7 April 2015.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Sayigh, Y. (2015). <em>Are the Sykes-Picot Borders Being Redrawn?</em> Carnegie Middle East Center, Available at: <a href="http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/26/are-sykes-picot-borders-being-redrawn/hej5">http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/26/are-sykes-picot-borders-being-redrawn/hej5</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Stansfield, G. (2014). <em>Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq. Brookings Institute</em>, Washington DC.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Philips, D. (2015). <em>The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East</em>. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Foundation-Kurdish Institute of Paris. THE KURDISH DIASPORA. Available at: <a href="http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/">http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Sir Clark, T. (2015). <em>Kurdistan: Historical Perspectives and Modern Travels</em>. Asian Affairs, 46:1, 84–101.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Roj Women (2014). <em>Humanitarian Emergency Scale Perceived Needs(HESPER) Assessment &amp; GenderCbased</em></p><p><em>Violence Situation Analysis</em>. Available at: <a href="https://rojwomen.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/a-gbv-report-on-rojava_sezidi-emergency2.pdf">https://rojwomen.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/a-gbv-report-on-rojava_sezidi-emergency2.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Shareef, M. (2014). <em>The United States, Iraq and the Kurds: Shock, Awe and Aftermath.</em> Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Öcalan was sentenced to death, but due to the EU accession reforms in Turkey, the Turkish parliament decided to abolish capital punishment.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Kelly, M. (2008). <em>Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide</em>. Praeger Security International.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref14">[14]</a> After the fall of Sadddam Hussein, Talabani was elected the 6th President of Iraq on April 6, 2005 by the Iraqi National Assembly.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Morse, J. (1998). <em>TALIBANI, BARZANI SIGN HISTORIC ACCORD.</em> FAS. Available at:</p><p><a href="http://fas.org/irp/news/1998/09/98091706_nlt.html.">http://fas.org/irp/news/1998/09/98091706_nlt.html.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref16">[16]</a> World Bank (2015). <em>The Kurdistan Region of Iraq Needs an Estimated US$1.4 billion this Year to Stabilize the Economy</em>. Available at: <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/02/12/kurdistan-region-iraq-stabilizeeconomy.">http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/02/12/kurdistan-region-iraq-stabilizeeconomy.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Tashan, S. (2012). <em>Banking system can’t cope with economic activities</em>. The Kurdish Globe. Available</p><p>at: <a href="https://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/B4FD691F7D88146C75192365AF8654FA/Bankig-system-can-t-cope-witheconomic-activities.html.">https://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/B4FD691F7D88146C75192365AF8654FA/Bankig-system-can-t-cope-witheconomic-activities.html.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Black, I. (2013). <em>Golden Oil of Iraqi Kurdistan Raises Tensions with Baghdad</em>. The Guardian, 10.06.2013. Available at: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/oil-iraqi-kurdistan-baghdad.">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/oil-iraqi-kurdistan-baghdad.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Ottaway, M. &amp; Ottaway, D. (2014). <em>How The Kurds Got Their Way</em>. Foreign Affairs, May/June Issue: available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141216/marina-ottaway-and-david-ottaway/how-the-kurds-got-their-way">http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141216/marina-ottaway-and-david-ottaway/how-the-kurds-got-their-way</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Reuters (2013). <em>Iraq minister, BP CEO visit Kirkuk to win support for oil deal</em>. Available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/iraq-oil-bp-idUSL5N0IR2SF20131106">http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/iraq-oil-bp-idUSL5N0IR2SF20131106</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Reuters (2013). <em>Iraqi Kurds defend oil policy, reject BP Kirkuk dea</em>l. Available at:</p><p><a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/uk-energy-iraq-kurdistan-idUKBRE90H09N20130118">http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/uk-energy-iraq-kurdistan-idUKBRE90H09N20130118</a> &amp; Johnson, K. (2014). <em>Iraq’s Oil War</em>. Foreign Policy, 17.01.2014. Available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/17/iraqs-oil-war.">http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/17/iraqs-oil-war.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Arango, T. (2014). <em>Iraqi Government and Kurds Reach Deal to Share Oil Revenues</em>. The New York Times, 01.12.2014, available at: <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/world/middleeast/kurd-pact-with-baghdad-againstislamicstate.html?module=Search&amp;mabReward=relbias:r,%7B&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;:&amp;quot;RI:15&amp;quot;%7D&amp;_r=0">http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/world/middleeast/kurd-pact-with-baghdad-againstislamicstate.html?module=Search&amp;mabReward=relbias:r,%7B&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;:&amp;quot;RI:15&amp;quot;%7D&amp;_r=0</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref23">[23]</a>BBC (2014). <em>Iraq Kurdistan independence referendum planned</em>. Available at: <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-28103124.%20">http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-28103124.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Ibidem.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Tanchum, M. (2015). <em>The Kurds’ Big Year</em>. Foreign Affairs, available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142765/michael-tanchum/the-kurds-big-year">http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142765/michael-tanchum/the-kurds-big-year</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Natali, D. (2012). <em>The Politics of Kurdish Crude</em>. Middle East Policy Council. Journal Essary, Volume XIX, Number 1.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref27">[27]</a> European Commission (2015). JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL. Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat. Brussels, 6.2.2015 JOIN(2015) 2 final.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref28">[28]</a> İnce, B. (2012). <em>Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk”s Republic to the Present Day. </em>London: I. B. Tauris, p. 172.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Caryl, C. (2015). The World’s Next Country. Foreign Policy.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Interview with Özge Hewal Ilbay on March 25, 2015.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref31">[31]</a> Al-Jazeera (2014). Netanyahu endorses Kurdish independence. Available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/netanyahu-endorses-kurdish-independence-2014629174546263489.html.">http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/netanyahu-endorses-kurdish-independence-2014629174546263489.html.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref32">[32]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref33">[33]</a> Kurdistan in Business (2014). <em>Dubai Chamber opens branch office opening in Erbil.</em> Available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.kurdistaninbusiness.nl/#!news-26-1-2014/c1661.">http://www.kurdistaninbusiness.nl/#!news-26-1-2014/c1661.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref34">[34]</a> FARS News Agency (2014). <em>Iran reiterates support for Iraq’s territorial integrity</em>. Available at:</p><p><a href="http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930409000408.">http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930409000408.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref35">[35]</a> Gülden, A., S. (2014). <em>Turkey and Iran: Between friendly competition and fierce rivalry</em>. Arab Studies Quarterly, 36.1: 6–26.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref36">[36]</a> IRNA (2015). <em>New chapter in ties with KRG</em>. Available at: <a href="http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81523197/">http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81523197/</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref37">[37]</a> Al Arabiya (2014). <em>Barzani: Iran supplied weapons to Iraq’s Kurds. </em>Available at: <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/08/26/Barzani-Iran-supplied-weapons-to-Iraqi-Kurdish-forces-.html">http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/08/26/Barzani-Iran-supplied-weapons-to-Iraqi-Kurdish-forces-.html</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref38">[38]</a> Van Wilgenburg, W. (2013). <em>Kurds divided over Syrian Autonomy</em>. Al-Monitor, available at: <a href="http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/syrian-autonomy-divides-kurds.html%23.">http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/syrian-autonomy-divides-kurds.html</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref39">[39]</a> Arraf, J. (2012). <em>Iraqi Kurds Train Their Syrian Brethren.</em> Aljazeera, available at:</p><p><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/07/201272393251722498.html.">http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/07/201272393251722498.html.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref40">[40]</a> Aretaios, E. (2015). <em>The Rojova Revolution</em>. OpenDemocracy, available at: <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/arabawakening/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-revolution">https://www.opendemocracy.net/arabawakening/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-revolution</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref41">[41]</a> Mack, D. (2000). Remarks by David Mack, moderator of panel on Iraq at AU conference on Kurds, April 17. 2000. Available at: <a href="http://www1.american.edu/cgp/pdf/mack.pdf">http://www1.american.edu/cgp/pdf/mack.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref42">[42]</a> Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K.S. &amp; Cunningham, D.E. (2011). <em>Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. </em>International Organization, Volume 65, Issue 04, pp. 709–744.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref43">[43]</a> <em>Ibid.</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref44">[44]</a> Aydıntaşbaş, A. (15.04.2015). On the Kurdish question, the endgame is in sight but just out of reach<em>. Financial Times</em>. FT Special report, p. 2.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://kib.be/articles/953/greater-kurdistan-between-gains-and-losses"><em>kib.be</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6e546ef05ad" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/stories-on-mena/greater-kurdistan-between-gains-and-losses-f6e546ef05ad">Greater Kurdistan: between gains and losses</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/stories-on-mena">Stories On MENA</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[African Ownership Over Conflicts And Elections: The Beginning of a New Era?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era-f07b73e9f738?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f07b73e9f738</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 13:43:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T13:43:24.934Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>As elections approach in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda and Rwanda, the entire Great Lakes Region is bracing itself for a potential of election-related violence.</em> <em>At a time when Western policies towards Africa are largely preoccupied with halting the expansion of Islamist terror groups, fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia and combatting against North African people-smugglers, there is a feeling of déjà vu and perhaps intervention-fatigue. In Burundi, the EU already has suspended its observer mission due to the crackdown on the opposition and the media, after violence broke out late in April 2015, after President Pierre Nkurunziza announced he would seek a third term. As the Great Lakes Region and its electoral processes reach the agendas of the international community, many observers argue that international engagement is essential to monitor — and possibly tame — any outbreak of violence. This article critically evaluates the state of the current democratisation processes in Africa and in particular the Great Lakes Region.</em></p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In any democracy, elections are a ‘viable means of ensuring the orderly process of leadership succession and change and an instrument of political authority and legitimation’. Yet elections are also and more importantly an institutionalised attempt to actualise the essence of democracy: rule of the people by the people. However, in contexts where the power of a state is viewed as a prize to be won, and a vehicle for the primitive accumulation of national wealth and resources for private gain, elections become a means to legitimise political governance by ‘political entrepreneurs’. Accordingly, elections may not necessarily democratise the polity but legitimise autocratic regimes.</p><p>Political transitions, including electoral processes, present a major source of instability, particularly in the Great Lakes Region. Elections are necessary for democracies to function, yet political leaders and parties too often will manage them via corruption and violence, in a context often marked by decisive electoral contests and polarised politics. As a result, the role of elections in the democratisation process has been the subject of debate in recent years. A growing number of scholars have argued against the importance of elections and have criticised the current international emphasis on electoral practices.</p><p>Despite the growing amount of debates and published articles, the number of literature on contemporary elections and democratisation in Africa is still relatively thin compared to that of southern Europe and Latin America. Some efforts to understand issues like party systems have suffered from methodological problems undermining findings (e.g. Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005) but that is to be expected when new ground is being broken. Nonetheless, we are in a very dynamic period of academic research on Africa and as always scholars differ in their conclusions on where countries are heading, if things are getting better or worse, and to what extent the developments they see fits various theories.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*t52qmw7tFdHxKbHj.jpg" /></figure><p>Africa is a large continent, not only geographically but in numbers too. About a quarter of all the world’s states are found on the continent and it accordingly has produced a wide variety in terms of political institutions and outcomes. Africa had its first wave of democratisation in the late 1950s as countries engaged in struggles for national independence. But the history of elections and political participation in Africa started even before that. Already from 1848, a few “assimilated” Africans in Senegal were able to vote for a <em>député. </em>From 1946, Africans in the French colonies voted, both in elections to assemblies in France and to local government councils. Interestingly, these initial elections were generally carried out in a peaceful manner; they were fairly free and fair; and the outcomes were never generally disputed.</p><p>The first wave of electoral democracy in sub-Saharan Africa was short-lived, however. Once in power, the political leaders of the new nation-states approached the double tasks of national development and national integration by insisting on national uniformity, which set in motion a reversal towards autocracy across the continent that lasted for almost three decades. Between independence from colonial rule in the early 1960s and the end of the Cold War in 1991, not a single African ruler was peacefully ousted at the ballot box, except in the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius.</p><p>The Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), for instance, like many other ruling parties in Africa, became virtually synonymous with the state, such that it views its political survival as that of the state and any opposition to it as a threat to the national security. The more competitive the political struggle for power in Zimbabwe, the more unfair and violent means President Mugabe and his regime applied. In general, only a few African countries continued multiparty elections from independence: Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal. <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>In the short term at least, autocracy does not always seem to curb economic growth. Some anti-democrats — Ethiopia’s late ruler, the authoritarian Meles Zenawi, is a favourite example — have seen their economies increase faster than those of their more democratic neighbours. The increasingly ruthless Paul Kagame has made Rwandans a lot better off. Thanks to oil, Equatorial Guinea and Angola are among the fastest-growing countries in the world.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>Today we see that free and fair elections are becoming increasingly common. The 2015 election vote in Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most-populous nation, has been described by African Union observers as ‘calm, peaceful and credible’ and that ‘it provided an opportunity for the Ethiopian people to express their choices at the polls’. According to official results, Ethiopia’s ruling party, the EPRDF, and its allies have won every single parliamentary seat. The EPRDF has been in power since the overthrow of the military government in 1991.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>In late April 2015, Togo returned President Gnassingbé yet again for a third term, thanks to his own amendment to the constitution that in the past had restricted a president’s tenure to two terms. Yet stability and the absence of electoral violence in this country can be chalked up as positive signs. In neighbouring Benin, parliamentary elections took place largely without incident, but deficiencies in the distribution of electoral cards and other technical difficulties triggered violent clashes.</p><p>According to Lindberg’s findings in <em>Democracy and Elections in Africa</em>, more countries are holding elections with an increasing share of elections achieving a minimum standard of democratic fairness. South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Namibia for example, all have stable one-party dominant systems even if they are (at least electoral) democracies. To a more pessimistic observer, a legitimate question mark still remains as to whether ruling elites in countries like Tanzania, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Niger and Zambia will actually accept to step down if and when it becomes reality.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>Whereas several African countries have made steady progress in terms of infrastructural development, there still are obvious gaps to be filled. Worse still, many elections in Africa have been characterised by various forms and degrees of fraud, gross human rights violations and mass violence. Nigeria’s politics is so corrupt that it gives the D-word a bad name. Other examples are Kenya, Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire, <em>inter alia</em>.</p><p>These countries all epitomise the effects of flawed electoral systems that, far from expressing the popular will, engendering political changes and the legitimation of political regimes have become a means of legitimising authoritarian governments while delimiting political space for the incumbent.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>Although this article focuses on election violence in Africa, the problem is not limited to this continent. It is not uncommon in some Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Philippines and Malaysia. In the Philippines, 75 people were killed prior to the May 2007 elections, while 80 others were wounded in election-related violence.</p><p>The resultant upsurge of electoral violence in these and other sub-Saharan countries but also the intensity of political polarisation have raised concerns over the militarisation of politics and the role of regional multinational organisations in guaranteeing a political transition to democracy and safeguarding the integrity of electoral processes.</p><p><strong>Power politics</strong></p><p>For decades the sight of gunmen arriving on motorcycles and in pick-up trucks at the gates of an African presidential palace spelled disaster. From mass pro-democracy revolts in North Africa to post-electoral disputes in the Sahel and in sub-Saharan Africa, the dominant role of the security sector has become increasingly visible both as ‘enablers’ and ‘spoilers’ of democratic political transition, illuminating the weakening role of elections as a legitimate basis for change of government. In most cases, regional and multinational institutions have been unable to resolve electoral disputes and ensure a democratic change of government, leaving African multinational institutions on the sidelines of resolving governance crises on the African continent.</p><p>To deter popular revolts and organised opposition, many African leaders such as President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have intensified the militarisation of the police force and intelligence service, and have politicised the military, leaving the real powers to change government with the security sector rather than with electoral processes. The same could be said of Egypt, where the security forces initially sided with the Hosni Mubarak regime against pro-democracy protesters before defecting and supporting the revolution that eventually ousted Mubarak.</p><p>However, recent coups in Burundi and Burkina Faso have, if not upended, at least complicated attitudes to military coups. In Burundi, a group of generals declared the President, Pierre Nkurunziza, dismissed while he was out of the country on May 13th. They acted in support of groups protesting against an attempt by the president to stand for a third term and ignoring constitutional term limits by doing so. Loyalist forces regained control after two days and the president returned. Hopes of a negotiated end to the protests were dampened after an opposition leader was killed.</p><p>A coup in Burkina Faso in October 2014 is another example of a potentially useful political intervention by the military — even if far from ideal in a democracy. There President Blaise Compaoré, was chased from power by his own guards when the Burkinabé politician, who held the country together for 27 years, tried to ignore term limits. New elections are scheduled for October 2015.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p><strong>Old crocodiles</strong></p><p>At the end of the 20thcentury, many African countries adopted presidential term limits as part of a broader set of constitutional rules that accompanied the transition from personal and authoritarian rule to pluralistic modes of governance. While term limits were widely embraced by the larger African public, these rules have in recent years come under increasing attack from incumbent presidents seeking to extend their tenures. In the first six months of 2015 alone, the presidents of Burundi, Benin, the DRC, and Rwanda have either personally or through their supporters expressed the intention to dispense with or circumvent term limits in order to seek additional terms of office.</p><p>An attempt by West African leaders in May 2015 to adopt a common position in favour of a maximum of two terms for all presidents in the region failed following disputations from the presidents of Togo (which abolished term limits in 2002) and Gambia.</p><p>Whether these incumbents will be able to successfully pursue constitutional change to stand for a third term will depend on interaction between international and local politics, as Dr Omar Shahabudin McDoom of the London School of Economics (LSE) points out. “An international norm for external actors to act to prevent these third terms is crystallising but whether it is enforceable will depend on the leverage donors possess and the extend they are willing to use it.”</p><p>Nevertheless, development agencies and/or ministries do not always pursue the same policies as their foreign ministries who are often more willing to act against illiberal practices. <em>“</em>Local politics are more unpredictable and much depends on the constellation of forces who would serve to act as counterweights to challenge the incumbent.<em>” </em>These forces do not only consist of opposition political parties, but also of the Church and influential civil society organisations such as human rights organisations, trade unions, and student and professional organisations.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p><strong>Congo’s conundrum</strong></p><p>In Kinshasa, the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, appears to be entrenching himself and his regime in order to cling to power despite a constitutional limit, which should see him leave office by December 2016. Ever since the controversial 2011 elections, large segments of the population have mobilised against government attempts to maintain power. In January 2015, protest against a new electoral law descended into street protests and riots: as many as 36 people died in the violence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/0*jTfRUXG9Guz6kHJ_.jpg" /></figure><p>In the DRC the political landscape is fragmented, as there are only a few large majority and opposition formations and a plethora of small, “one-man” parties, most often with a strong regional or ethnic affiliation. The political opposition has been very fluid and nearly invisible since the 2011 elections. The main challenger then, Etienne Tshisekedi, isolated himself from the political debate by maintaining his position as self-declared elected president and legitimate head of state. Tshisekedi has been the primary Congolese opposition leader for decades. Although he served in the government of dictator Mobutu Sese in various positions, he also led the campaign against Mobutu, and was one of only a few politicians who challenged that dictator. Since the disputed 2011 elections, the Congolese population seems to have lost its belief in elections as an instrument for change or a way to improve their living conditions.</p><p>According to the Constitution, the Congolese state has to organise elections before the end of 2016 and President Kabila cannot stand for a third term. Prior to these elections, President Kabila has several options. The three main options are: (A) if Kabila decides to respect the Constitution and step down as president, the regime will have to appoint a successor; (B) Kabila decides for a new mandate as president of the DRC and (C) he opts to remain in power by slowing down the electoral process.</p><p>Meanwhile, because of election-related tensions and resurging conflict in the eastern provinces after the appearance of the M23 rebel group in March 2012, the planned provincial, senatorial and local elections were postponed. The takeover of Goma was in fact a major humiliation for President Kabila.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>In the Great Lakes Region, however, it is not only the DRC’s domestic troubles, which are spilling across the borders. In Rwanda, for instance, people talk of a “Putin-Medvedev scenario” that would let Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s dynamic but authoritarian ruler stay in charge, perhaps a prime minister, when he supposedly final term as president ends in 2017. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni has now served 29 years in total. Denis Sassou-Nguesso has ruled Congo-Brazzavlle for most of the past 31 years. Elsewhere, the Republic of Congo recently expelled thousands of DRC citizens from Brazzaville, igniting social, economic and political tensions. Recent conflicts in the Central African Republic had led to thousands of refugees fleeing into the northern parts of the DRC. Also South Sudan and Uganda both have porous borders with the DRC.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p><strong>African Ownership Over Conflicts And Elections</strong></p><p>The violent conflicts that have ravaged the Great Lakes Region since the early 1990s can be seen as domestic wars, such as in Rwanda (1990–94, 1997–99), Burundi (1993–2003) and the DRC (1996-today). However, they were also regional and even continental, with considerable inputs and outputs across national borders. The main reason for this extension is the nature of the Congolese state, which does not empirically perform essential state functions, chief among them the exercise of territorial control.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>René Lemarchand, a retired French-American political scientist who is known for his research on ethnic conflict and genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Darfur has summarised the complex dynamics of the Great Lakes Region in his 2000 occasional paper. He believes that the marginal ranking of Africa in the scale of international priorities is just one explanation for this generalised lack of interest in the Great Lakes crisis. Another is the sheer complexity of the forces involved. When one considers the multiplicity of political actors, domestic and foreign, the fluidity of factional alliances, the spill-over of ethnic violence across boundaries, the extreme fragmentation of political arenas, it is easy to see why the international community should have second thoughts about the wisdom of a concerted peace initiative.</p><p>According to Lemarchand the key concept around which much of this discussion revolves is that of exclusion<em>. </em>“Political, economic and social exclusion are seen as the principal dimensions that need to be explored if we are to grasp the dynamics of domestic and inter-state violence in the Great Lakes. Briefly stated, the central pattern that recurs time and again is one in which ethnic polarization paves the way for political exclusion, exclusion eventually leading to insurrection, insurrection to repression, and repression to massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, which in turn become the vectors of further instability. The involvement of external actors, is inseparable from the perceived threats posed by mobilized refugee diasporas to their countries of origin as well as to specific communities within the host country.”<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn11">[11]</a> Lemarchand’s assertion is one that in 2015 still corresponds to reality.</p><p><strong>African solutions for African problems?</strong></p><p>An interesting new development is that African countries and multilateral institutions recently have been quite eager to play a role in the process of solving their own, internal conflicts; or at least preventing it from developing into an open regional war. For instance, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries tried to get actively involved by sending troops for the MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade and the African Union (AU) sought to promote its own visibility and leadership.</p><p>Also, in November 2014 ten East African nations have launched a joint military force aimed at improving security in the region and supporting the AU’s missions. The African Standby Force (ASF) was launched in the central Ethiopian city of Adama after almost a decade of planning and preparation. The force consists of up to 5,200 troops from the African countries of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.</p><p>Yet, at the same time, the African coalition partners seem to struggle to engage effectively with uprising conflicts. In most African elections the international community has been an observer rather than an actor. In more powerful countries, such as Nigeria and Sudan, the international community plays a marginal role. Both were dominated by internal dynamics and politics, and little or no influence was exerted from abroad.</p><p>In this year of African elections, it is, as Christa Barrios of EUISS points out, not the West’s principles and policies that should be the focus. “Rather, it is African opposition parties and civil society who will use the polls to open up windows of opportunity that can be used to contest domestic policies and attract international attention”.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>Enforcement has proved to be a challenge for the AU, as for most regional organisations, since intervening in the affairs of another African state is still controversial. The Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC) cannot be easily used to deal with security issues. The SADC is considered a promising trans-regional endeavour, but some countries such as the DRC, remain peripheral in its structures.</p><p>Since its official inauguration on 9 July 2002, the African Union (has made the promotion of democracy and good political governance for the development and stability of Africa one of its main priorities. Despite the AU’s interventions, elections in Africa remain one of the weakest links in the democratisation process, turning out to be democratic liabilities, instead of assets.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>For the AU to be truly effective in conflict-resolution, it must be able to make the member states comply with AU’s decisions. In 2009, the AU took the unprecedented step of calling for UN sanctions of one of its members — Eritrea — for aiding jihadist fighters in Somalia and causing the deaths of AU peacekeepers. Although the AU has a built-in ability to become an efficient player in conflict resolution in Africa, it faces extensive challenges, which can only be overcome with extensive external support.</p><p>The AU’s election-monitoring reports are known, in several instances, to have contradicted those of sister organisations, both international and domestic. While the international and domestic observer groups condemned the 2011 Republic of Congo election as lacking in integrity, citing various irregularities, the AU observers described it as ‘successful’.</p><p>Another major challenge confronting the AU’s election observation missions is the fact that their reports, like those of other monitoring groups, be they domestic or international, do not have the force of law. Consequently, no matter how damning the reports might be, the AU is largely powerless to intervene in the internal affairs of the host country, except in exceptional cases where electoral irregularities degenerate into acute post-election violence beyond what can be handled internally. In fact, the greatest challenge of the AU in conflict resolution in Africa, is to prove that Africans are capable of resolving African problems.</p><p><strong>Towards the 2016 elections</strong></p><p>As was always the case, the security and future of the countries in the Great Lakes Region is a regional affair. Congo’s allies (Angola, South Africa, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville) are very interested in the elections. Their main concern is not the democratic quality (most of them face similar problems of searching for a balance between credible elections and their dedication to remain in power) but stability at their borders related to their economic interests.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>Therefore the next electoral cycle in the DRC is of historic importance. In October 2015 the Congolese will elect their local representatives (<em>représentants locaux).</em> Presidential elections are currently slated for 2016. As earlier mentioned, under the current constitutional dispensation, it will mark the end of President Kabila’s second and final mandate. According to Chatham House, the central questions, therefore, are whether these elections will happen on time, and whether Kabila will seek to stand for a third term. A full electoral cycle will include polls at multiple levels, across a vast country with limited infrastructure — their organisation will demand enormous resources.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn15">[15]</a></p><p>A peaceful transition of power through electoral democracy would be a remarkable step forward for the DRC. Professor of Law and Politics Filip Reyntjens of the University of Antwerp believes that the elections definitely will lead to situations of local instability. However, as it is a strong ‘diluted’ process, Reyntjens does not except any major outbreaks of violence on macro-level.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>The central lesson from electoral uncertainty in Kinshasa and in other major African cities is that — for a short moment — the international community could have a disproportionate influence on long-term outcomes. The Congolese political system is adept at drawing in and subverting possible opponents. The population is deeply cynical about politics and politicians, and the country lacks a significantly developed urban middle class. Pressure for political change — let alone the ‘Arab Spring’ type of uprising that some have foreseen — is unlikely to arise spontaneously. In fact, the country seems close to reverting to the resignation of the Mobutu era.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The DRC, still emerging from decades of war and generations of pervasive misrule, may be in a position to break loose from a seemingly eternal repetition of violence and mismanagement, and move towards both a democratic transition of power and genuine post-conflict stabilisation. The financial, political and technical support offered by the wider international community will remain extremely significant, but is unlikely to be formative. Secondly, it is important to note that the twin imperatives of political legitimacy and internal security are also interrelated. As noted, it is extremely difficult to conduct elections amid the chaos of conflict — and elections themselves could generate unrest, particularly at the local level. Also, and more fundamentally, it has long been argued that one of the key obstacles to achieving an effective security sector in the DRC has been a lack of political will at the centre. This generates a self-fulfilling cycle. Instability prevents the growth of a mature political culture, based on the competition of ideas and policy rather than power and patronage. Successive regimes lack the firm foundation of a legitimate mandate, and thus feel compelled to subvert the coercive functions of the state — most importantly the military — for fear that they will turn against them.</p><p>Twenty years after the Rwandan genocide, it seems that the need to respond rapidly to conflicts has never been more important. It also gives an impression that the Africans definitely want to take measures into their own hands and becoming less independent of the international community. Addressing election-related violence is therefore the combined responsibility of all citizens of Africa, including the regional and continental organisations.</p><p>© <em>Thomas Thielemans 2015</em></p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Lindberg, S. (2006). <em>Democracy and Elections in Africa. </em>Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> The Economist (12.10.2013). <em>Too many dinosaurs. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587787-too-many-dinosaurs">http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587787-too-many-dinosaurs</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> BBC (22.06.2015). <em>Ethiopia election: EPRDF wins every seat in parliament. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33228207">http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33228207</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Lindberg, S. (2007). <em>The Power of Elections Revisited, </em>at the conference<em> Popular Identities and Elections in Africa, </em>Yale University<em>, </em>26–28 April 2007<em>.</em></p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Adejumobi, S. (2000). <em>Elections in Africa: a fading shadow of democracy? </em>International Political Review 21, 59–73, 60.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> The Economist (23.05.2015). <em>Burundi. Good coup, bad coup. </em>Vol. 415, n°8939, p.32.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Email correspondence with Dr Omar Shahabudin McDoom, 12 May 2015.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> International Crisis Group (2015). <em>Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible? </em>Africa Report N°225, 5 May 2015.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Barrios, C. (2015). <em>Congolese lessons for the Great Lakes. </em>European Union Institute for Security Studies: Brief Issue; 3.2015, pp. 1–4.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Reyntjens, F. (2009). <em>The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. </em>New York: Cambridge University Press; Prunier, G. (2009). <em>Africa’s World War. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. </em>Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Lemarchand, R. (2000). <em>Exclusion, Marginalization and Political Mobilization: The Road to Hell in the Great Lakes. </em>Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies University of Copenhagen, p. 2.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Barrios, C. (2015). <em>Elections in Africa: half-full, half-empty? </em>EUISS: Alert Issue 29. Available at: <a href="http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_29_Africa_elections.pdf">http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_29_Africa_elections.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Omotola, J.S. (2014). <em>The African Union and the Promotion of Democratic Values in Africa: An Electoral Perspective. </em>Occasional Paper n°185, South African Institute of International Affairs.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Riche, M. &amp; Berwouts, K. (24.06.2014). <em>DRC Elections: Will Kabila stay or go? And many other questions on the road to 2016. </em>African Arguments, available at: <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/24/drc-elections-will-kabila-stay-or-go-and-many-other-questions-on-the-road-to-2016-by-manya-riche-and-kris-berwouts/">http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/24/drc-elections-will-kabila-stay-or-go-and-many-other-questions-on-the-road-to-2016-by-manya-riche-and-kris-berwouts/</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Shepherd, B. (2014). <em>Beyond Crisis in the DRC The Dilemmas of International Engagement and Sustainable Change. </em>Chatham House: Africa Programme. Available at: <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141222DRC_Research_Paper.pdf">http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141222DRC_Research_Paper.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Email correspondence with Professor Filip Reyntjens, 14 August 2014.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era/"><em>thielemanst.wordpress.com</em></a><em> on July 14, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f07b73e9f738" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa/african-ownership-over-conflicts-and-elections-the-beginning-of-a-new-era-f07b73e9f738">African Ownership Over Conflicts And Elections: The Beginning of a New Era?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa">Reports on Africa</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Foreign Direct Investment and Good Governance Challenges: The Case of the Democratic Republic of…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-80c95ed88109?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80c95ed88109</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-direct-investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[congo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 13:41:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T13:41:23.008Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Foreign Direct Investment and Good Governance Challenges: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo</h3><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p><em>In recent years, the developing countries have increasingly relied on private capital as a source of funding. Since the early 1990s, private sources of funding have made up over 75% of their external capital flows. The major contributing group to this private capital has consistently been foreign direct investment (FDI), with 2007 having the highest level of FDI ever recorded.</em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn1"><em>[1]</em></a><em> Since the early 1980s, it is a widely held view that a relationship exists between foreign direct investment (FDI) and development, and that foreign capital is essential to developing countries in order to finance their economic growth and to improve their access to technologies. During the heyday of the “Washington consensus” </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn2"><em>[2]</em></a><em>, conventional wisdom held that FDI was “good” for development (as long as the foreign firms did not engage in flagrant worker abuse or environmental pollution), and the more the better. This consensus view, for instance, is expressed at the Ninth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1996.</em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn3"><em>[3]</em></a><em> Is this uncritical enthusiasm for FDI justified today?</em></p><p>Proponents of economic liberalism point to average per capita incomes in developing countries that have doubled over a fifty-year period, with the GNP of some economies growing more than five times and less developed countries enjoying an ever-increasing share of world exports. Therefore liberal economic thinkers generally agree that economic development and growth cannot be uncoupled from trade. Their detractors, however, contend that the gap between rich and poor is increasing, both between and within countries. Yet at the same time, both acknowledge that the challenge of economic governance is to narrow the gap between rich and poor by stimulating economic growth and development.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>When transnational corporations (TNCs) enter markets of developing countries, it is often market failures that attract FDI and give them the advantage in the market. It is when FDI becomes dominant in the developing countries that foreign investors’ objectives may clash with those of the developing countries, and government protection is particularly needed. Thus, important variables for understanding growth and development in developing countries are the autonomy and strength of the state and the development policies and structure of the political processes.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>It is thus not surprising that the developing countries have long been critics of economic liberalism and expressed their dissatisfaction through the UN, particularly through UNCTAD. They have criticised the central pieces of economic governance, sought to regulate multinational corporations, and offered reform proposals. Therefore constructivism offers an alternative approach to understanding and examining state policies and actions. Constructivists give more importance to market forces, private enterprise and FDI but at the same time they argue that the state should govern the market through strong regulatory bodies. Their theoretical arguments are backed up by numerous econometric studies that purported to show a positive relationship between improvements in good governance and various measures of economic performance, in particular economic growth.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>This essay outlines the role of institutions and the impact of corruption as a determinant of economic performance on FDI inflows in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).</p><p><strong>Literature Review</strong></p><p>Numerous studies have analysed the relationship between FDI and economic growth to determine the extent, if any, to which FDI impacts economic development.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn7">[7]</a> These studies analyse the overall impact of FDI on economic growth, assuming a perfect positive correlation between economic growth and welfare. Cole et al. note, for instance, that developed economies generally benefit from the presence of foreign companies through the spillover effects of such presence to other companies, or through increased supply of products and increased demand for inputs and employment.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>The impact of corruption as a significant determinant of economic performance and FDI in developing countries has also been analysed in academic studies. In contrast to the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, which saw the state as a “helping hand”, it is now common to see the government portrayed as a “grabbing hand”, controlled by politicians who “do not maximise social welfare and instead pursue their own selfish objectives”.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn9">[9]</a> The relative importance of the two aspects determines whether the overall impact of corruption on FDI is positive or negative, rendering it an empirical question as to which of the two dominates.</p><p><strong>FDI and Economic Growth</strong></p><p>From the viewpoint of the neo-classical growth theory, FDI inflows increase the stock of capital in host countries thereby allowing higher rates of growth than would be possible from reliance on domestic savings. For those developing countries with limited industrial bases, increased export earnings facilitate imports of capital goods that can lead to higher levels of economic growth. Some empirical research has also suggested that whether FDI promote economic growth or not depends on the country absorptive capacity, which is determined by factors such as the quality of human capital, the level of development of the financial sector, technological development and the quality of infrastructure.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>Major determinants of FDI are economic factors such as market size and trade openness, as measured by exports and imports in relation to the total GDP. However, these determinants may not be equally important all over the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased trade openness did not spur FDI as much as it did in other regions. Nonetheless, FDI became especially important for SSA as a source of funding in the wake of the 2008–2009 debt crisis, given the significant reduction in the official flows and other private capital.</p><p>According to existing research, FDI can fill at least three ‘development gaps’: (1) the ‘investment gap’ by providing capital for investment; (2) the ‘foreign exchange gap’ by providing foreign currency through investments and export earnings; and (3) the ‘tax revenue gap’ by generating tax revenues through economic activities.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p>Recognizing these benefits, developing countries have eased their restrictions on FDI inflows and the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) such as General Electric (GE) and Exxon Mobil. In 2012, the developing countries received more than half of the global FDI inflows ($703 billion) and as many as 9 of the 20 largest FDI recipients were developing countries (World Bank, 2012). While FDI flows into Northern Africa have declined significantly, those into Sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow — by 4.7% in 2013, and at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19.5% since 2007.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>Overall, there is a broad stream of research, which argues on the one hand that FDI effects can be unpredictable, unintended, and counterproductive or even threatening.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn13">[13]</a> <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn14">[14]</a> Other authors show a very positive and engaged posture with development issues. <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn15">[15]</a> Much research focuses on economic development, and only a few authors deal with more institutional factors such as good governance and corruption (i.e. constructivist or neo-institutionalist view). However, these issues are often crucial for TNCs strategies and long-term success.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p><strong>FDI and Corruption</strong></p><p>This section explores the impact of corruption on the flow of FDI. Corruption can be anticipated to decrease the expected profitability of investment projects. Investors will therefore take the level of corruption in a host country into account in making decisions to invest abroad. This implies that corruption can affect the impact that FDI has on economic growth. While the effect of FDI on democracy has long attracted attention among economists and the public, the reverse effect of democracy on FDI has been relatively less studied.</p><p>There is an ongoing debate about whether corruption greases or sands the wheels of economic growth. As with the literature on economic growth and FDI, the findings from the empirical studies on the impact of corruption on economic growth are mixed. Proponents of the greasing hypothesis are of the opinion that corruption encourages trade that may not have happened otherwise and promotes efficiency by allowing private sector agents to avoid unwieldy regulations.</p><p>For instance, Acemoglu and Verdier contend that some degree of corruption may be part of the optimal allocation of resources in the presence of incomplete contracts or on account of market failure.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn17">[17]</a> The opposing school of thought contends that corruption exerts adverse effects on or sands the wheels of long-term economic growth and sustainable development.</p><p>The papers that are closely linked to the aim of this essay are Resnick (2001), Harms and Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003) and Resnick and Li (2003). The hypotheses on the impact of institutions on FDI are non-controversial, but empirical studies have to deal with the lack of accurate measures of institutions. Wei shows that FDI is strongly negatively correlated with corruption. <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn18">[18]</a> The empirical relationship between political instability and FDI flows is unclear. Some studies find a negative relation, while more recent studies find no effect. <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn19">[19]</a></p><p>Resnick and Li (2003) argue that there are competing effects of democratic institutions on FDI flows. On the one hand, political participation and representation of the common citizen in the legislature ensure credible property rights protection. On the other, the democratic constraints over elected politicians tend to weaken the monopolistic positions of TNCs. Their empirical results suggest that, controlling for property rights protection, democratic institutions reduce FDI inflows. Harms and Ursprung (2001) find the opposite result. They conclude that investors are marginally more likely to invest in countries, which respect political and civil liberties. Jensen (2003) also finds a significant positive effect of democracy on FDI inflows. Egger and Winner also find a negative impact of corruption on FDI, which, in turn, suggests that the helping hand effects of corruption are outweighed by the grabbing hand effects. Their results also indicate that the growth of FDI in non-OECD economies is driven mainly by economic growth and a change in factor endowments and to a lesser degree by corruption.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p>Mathur &amp; Singh are one of the first to demonstrate that foreign investors care about economic freedoms, rather than political freedoms, in making decisions about where to locate capital. Hence more democratic countries may receive FDI flows if economic freedoms are not guaranteed and vice versa. Secondly, the greater the number of restrictions that governments impose on citizens, the greater the potential for corruption (such as bribe-taking) when administrative decisions determine access to foreign exchange and increase the risk of discouraging legitimate and desirable transactions.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>Fostering the conditions for continent-wide economic development has always been on the agendas of all African countries. With the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) Action Plan and the African Union’s anticorruption convention, a common view is that corruption hinders development. This is premised on the neoliberal idea that if African states take steps to promote good governance, including curbing corruption, then international aid and investment will follow. Also the World Bank and other institutions have put corruption on their agenda when dealing with developing countries. Although the World Bank is based on a liberal motion that economic stability and development are best achieved when trade and financial flows occur with as few restrictions as possible, when the staff were able to frame in economic terms — that corruption had negative effects on development — they were able to establish their case. Thus the Bank, once apolitical, increasingly addresses political issues, promoting sound governmental management and anticorruption measures.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn22">[22]</a> <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><p><strong>Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Congo</strong></p><p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a Sub-Saharan African country with a large population and vast resources. Considered by the UN as the least-developed nation in the world, fewer than 40% of the nearly 70 million inhabitants live in urban areas according to the latest NSI estimates. Congo is in fact near the bottom of the rankings on almost every indicator of development. The DRC is the biggest producer of cobalt globally and the sixth-largest copper miner. With over 80 million hectares of arable land and over 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the potential to be one of the richest countries of the African continent and a driver of African growth. However, the Congolese population has been recovering from a decade-long period of instability, violence and state decay since 1996, when the <em>Great African War</em> started, to 2006, when elections formally ended the political transition in the DRC.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>The DRC remains a fragile country with enormous needs in terms of reconstruction, economic growth and good governance. During the last quarter of 2008, commodity prices temporarily collapsed. After an economic slump in 2009 that brought the growth rate down to 2.8% due to the global financial crisis, the DRC posted an economic growth rate of 8.7% in 2014, which is well above the average in SSA. Public investments have also helped spur growth.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn25">[25]</a> Kinshasa is now looking for international financial support, as it is preparing for provincial elections by December 2015 and a presidential vote in November 2016, which together will cost $1.1 billion, or more than ten per cent of its annual budget.</p><p>After nearly a decade of suspended activities due to widespread corruption and growing insecurity, the World Bank re-engaged in the DRC in 2001. Since 2010, Kinshasa has been committed to consolidate the reforms launched under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative<em>. </em>Also the relationship between Kinshasa and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has improved recently: the IMF is now ready to provide a $1 billion loan to the DRC.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn26">[26]</a></p><p>Nonetheless, an uncertain legal framework, conflicts with armed militias, endemic corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the mining sector and the economy as a whole. Also protection of property remains weak and dependent on a dysfunctional public administration and judicial system. Bureaucratic and regulatory barriers impede the free flow of trade and discourage FDI.</p><p>From independence to the present day, the DRC has struggled with a legacy of entrenched corruption at all levels of society. According to Transparency International, corruption permeates all sectors of the DRC’s economy, undermining development prospects and compromising the fragile post- conflict equilibrium. However, one year before the 2006 elections, the DRC enacted an anti-corruption law, which brought provisions of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption into the national context, purportedly providing an adequate legal framework to fight corruption.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>According to the World Bank, the DRC’s economic outlook seems favourable although its political and security situation remains fragile. The economy is expected to grow steadily in the medium term at over 8%, owing to increased investment and growth in the extractive industries and the contribution of public works and the tertiary sector. Inward FDI flows jumped in 2012 from $1.7 billion to $3.3 billion. Minerals account for the vast majority of the DRC’s exports and represents the single largest source for FDI.</p><p>Maintaining a restrictive monetary policy and fiscal discipline is critical to containing inflation below the 5% goal. World Bank estimates confirm that the support strategy for investments in large-scale infrastructure projects, led by the authorities, could significantly support growth, provided that priority is accorded to high-return projects (transport, electricity). These types of investments clearly demonstrate that the World Bank has not yet shifted from an emphasis on economic security of the state to economic security and well-being for the individual.</p><p><strong>The Grand Inga Dam</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*BGniGWKWRQleqBZx.jpg" /></figure><p>The African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank and other multilateral development banks have recently allocated huge funds to promote in the DRC their specific agenda of large infrastructure development projects. These banks have also been instrumental in the recent efforts to launch the Grand Inga Dam project on the Congo River, arguing that “centralised infrastructure with private participation will lower the costs of services”. Therefore in 2013, a $12 billion proposal for Inga phase III was put forth by the Congolese government, in cooperation with the AfDB and the government of South Africa. The World Bank provided an additional $73 million in technical assistance for the project in 2014.</p><p>The emphasis on big projects seems to be back. In part that is because recent research shows energy access can be powerful in addressing extreme poverty, and advocates for infrastructure now include people worried about the poorest of the poor, not just a country’s overall output.</p><p>The Grand Inga Dam, which will be jointly constructed by South Africa and the DRC, will have a capacity of 40,000 megawatts (MW). It will be the world’s largest hydropower scheme and become part of a greater neoliberal vision to develop a power grid across Africa with the intention of stimulating FDI flows and the continent’s industrial economic development. If built, it would double the electricity production capacity of Africa in one stroke and resolve what Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, calls Africa’s ‘energy apartheid’. <a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn28">[28]</a></p><p>Sceptics are unconvinced; they argue that the large amount of FDI will force the state’s hand to enter into agreements concerning the final destination and usage of the power generated, which many believe will end up supplying power to energy intensive industries in South Africa, while the majority of the Congolese population will literally be left in the dark.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>Both Banks’ focus on infrastructure development is underpinned by their conviction that improvements in infrastructure necessitates regional integration, enables intra-regional trade, connect regions to global market and attracts private sector investment. This can be said to be one of the underlying reasons why the both Banks are in support of the megalomaniac Inga Dam scheme.</p><p>The Grand Inga Dam’s massive price tag, coupled with the poor governance record of the DRC, could also be a recipe for serious corruption problems as bribery, collusion and deception are not uncommon in the construction, operation and maintenance phases of large infrastructure development projects. For any large investment, adequate maintenance of the completed asset is critical; maintenance deferred can lead to deterioration of the asset and the need for expensive repairs, according to International Rivers, an organisation opposed to large dams.<a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The scale of the Inga Dam project in the DRC is certainly astounding. But in one of the world’s most corrupt and politically volatile countries, can today’s planners succeed where so many others have failed? While policymakers place great importance on foreign direct investment (FDI) in advancing development in developing countries, the links between FDI, economic development, and human development remain tenuous. Most academic results indicate that countries such as the DRC that are endowed with natural resources or have large markets will attract more FDI. However, good infrastructure, an educated labour force, macroeconomic stability, openness to FDI, an efficient legal system, less corruption and political stability also promote FDI. In contrast, corruption and political instability have the opposite effect according to most thinkers. These findings are consistent with the reports of multinational companies that operate in the region.</p><p><em>Thomas Thielemans</em></p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Acemoglu, D. &amp; Verdier, T. (1998). <em>Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: a general equilibrium approach</em>. Economic Journal, Vol. 108.</p><p>Albornoz, F., Cole, M., Elliott, R. &amp; Ercolani, M. (2009). <em>In Search of Environmental Spillovers</em>. World Economy 32:1, pp. 136–163.</p><p>Bardy, R., Drew, S. &amp; Kennedy, T.F. (2012). <em>Foreign Investment and Ethics: How to Contribute to Social Responsibility by Doing Business in Less-Developed Countries. </em>Journal of Business Ethics<em>, </em>Vol.106, Issue 3, pp 267–282.</p><p>Beith, M. &amp; Richardson, P. (2015). <em>IMF Ready to Lend $1 Billion to Democratic Republic of Congo. </em>Bloomberg.</p><p>Bosshard, P. (2012) <em>Infrastructure for Whom? A Critique of the Infrastructure Strategies of the Group of 20 and the World Bank. </em>International Rivers, p.2 ; International Rivers (2013). <em>Grand Inga Dam, DR Congo</em> , available at <a href="http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/grand-inga-dam-dr-congo">http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/grand-inga-dam-dr-congo</a>.</p><p>Egger, P. &amp; Winner, H. (2004). <em>How Corruption Influences FDI: A Panel Data Study.</em></p><p>EY (2014). <em>EY’s attractiveness survey. Africa 2014. Executing growth. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014/%24FILE/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014.pdf">http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014/$FILE/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014.pdf</a>.</p><p>Freckleton, M., Wright, A. &amp; Craigwell, R. (2012). <em>Economic growth, foreign direct investment and corruption in developed and developing countries</em>. Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 39 Iss: 6, pp.639–652.</p><p>Freedom House (2010) <em>Countries at Crossroad- DRC Country Report, </em>available at <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&amp;edition=9&amp;ccrpage=43&amp;ccrcountry=181">http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&amp;edition=9&amp;ccrpage=43&amp;ccrcountry=181</a>.</p><p>Gray, H. &amp; Khan, M. (2010). <em>Good governance and growth in Africa: what can we learn from Tanzania?, </em>in Padayachee, V., The political economy of Africa. London, UK : Routledge, 2010, pp. 339–356.</p><p>Karns, M. &amp; Mingst, K.A. (2010). <em>International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. </em>Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 395–398.</p><p>Mathur, A. &amp; Singh, K. (2013) <em>Foreign direct investment, corruption and democracy</em>. Applied Economics, 45:8, 991–1002.</p><p>Palitza, K. (2011). <em>$80bn Grand Inga hydropower dam to lock out Africa’s poor</em>. <em>Africa Review</em>, Available at: <a href="http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/80-billion-dollar-Grand-Inga-dam-to-lock-out-Africa-poor/-/979184/1274126/-/kkicv7/-/index.html">www.africareview.com/Business—Finance/80-billion-dollar-Grand-Inga-dam-to-lock-out-Africa-poor/-/979184/1274126/-/kkicv7/-/index.html</a>.</p><p>Reiter, S.L &amp; Steensma, K. (2010). <em>Human Development and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: The Influence of FDI Policy and Corruption. </em>World Development, 2010, Vol.38(12), pp. 1678–1691.</p><p>Reyntjens, F. (2009). <em>The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. </em>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Shleifer, A. &amp; Vishny, R. (1998). <em>The Grabbing Hand. Government Pathologies and their Cures</em>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</p><p>UNCTAD (2008). <em>World investment report: Transnational corporations and the infrastructure challenge</em> (No. WIR2008). United Nations, New York and Geneva.</p><p>Wei, S.J. (2000). <em>How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? </em>Review of Economic and Statistics. 82: 1–11.</p><p>World Bank (2015). <em>Democratic Republic of Congo. Country Overview. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc">http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> UNCTAD (2008). <em>World investment report: Transnational corporations and the infrastructure challenge</em> (No. WIR2008). United Nations, New York and Geneva.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> The Washington Consensus became the dominant approach to economic prosperity undergirding almost all international development lending and IMF aid to countries experiencing financial and debt crises. Ingredients of the consensus include using public expenditures in a pro-growth, pro-poor way for basic healthcare; fiscal discipline; government deregulation in favour of open competition; foreign direct investment and tax reform.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> UN doc. No. TD/378.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Karns, M.P &amp; Mingst, K.A. (2010). <em>International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. </em>Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 395–398.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Reiter, S.L &amp; Steensma, K. (2010). <em>Human Development and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: The Influence of FDI Policy and Corruption. </em>World Development, 2010, Vol.38(12), pp. 1678–1691.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Gray, H. &amp; Khan, M. (2010). <em>Good governance and growth in Africa: what can we learn from Tanzania?, </em>in Padayachee, Vishnu, The political economy of Africa. London, UK : Routledge, 2010, pp. 339–356.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> (e.g., Alfaro, 2003; Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, &amp; Sayek, 2010; Apergis, Lyroudia, &amp; Vamvakidis, 2008; Carkovic &amp; Levine, 2005; Chowdhury and Mavrotas; Hansen &amp; Rand, 2006).</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Albornoz, F., Cole, M., Elliott, R. &amp; Ercolani, M. (2009). <em>In Search of Environmental Spillovers</em>. World Economy 32:1, pp. 136–163.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Shleifer, A. &amp; Vishny, R. (1998). <em>The Grabbing Hand. Government Pathologies and their Cures</em>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Freckleton, M., Wright, A. &amp; Craigwell, R. (2012). <em>Economic growth, foreign direct investment and corruption in developed and developing countries</em>. Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 39 Iss: 6, pp.639–652.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> According to UNCTAD the components of FDI are: equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital (mainly intra-company loans). As countries do not always collect data for each of those components, reported data on FDI are not fully comparable across countries. In particular, data on reinvested earnings, the collection of which depends on company surveys, are often unreported by many countries.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> EY (2014). <em>EY’s attractiveness survey. Africa 2014. Executing growth. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014/%24FILE/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014.pdf">http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014/$FILE/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Nunnenkamp 2001; Yamin and Sinkovics 2009.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Dixon et al. 1986; Mengistu 2009.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Meyer 2004; Ramamurti 2004.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Bardy, R., Drew, S. &amp; Kennedy, T.F. (2012). <em>Foreign Investment and Ethics: How to Contribute to Social Responsibility by Doing Business in Less-Developed Countries. </em>Journal of Business Ethics<em>, </em>Vol.106, Issue 3, pp 267–282.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Acemoglu, D. &amp; Verdier, T. (1998). <em>Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: a general equilibrium approach</em>. Economic Journal, Vol. 108.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Wei, S.J. (2000). <em>How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? </em>Review of Economic and Statistics. 82: 1–11.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Schneider &amp; Frey (1995), op crit.; Jaspersen, F.Z., Aylward, A.H. &amp; Knox, A.D. (2000). <em>The Effects of Risk on Private Investment: Africa Compared with Other Developing Areas, </em>in Collier, P. and Patillo, C. (eds), <em>Investment and Risk in Africa. </em>New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 71–95.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Egger, P. &amp; Winner, H. (2004). <em>How Corruption Influences FDI: A Panel Data Study.</em></p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Mathur, A. &amp; Singh, K. (2013) <em>Foreign direct investment, corruption and democracy</em>. Applied Economics, 45:8, 991–1002.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Ibidem.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref23">[23]</a> There has been increased discussion about the role of multilateral organisations in promoting good institutions in developing countries (Asiedu and Villamil, 2003; Frankel, 2003; and Hakura and Nsouli, 2003).</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Reyntjens, F. (2009). <em>The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. </em>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref25">[25]</a> World Bank (2015). <em>Democratic Republic of Congo. Country Overview. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc">http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Beith, M. &amp; Richardson, P. (2015). <em>IMF Ready to Lend $1 Billion to Democratic Republic of Congo. </em>Bloomberg.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Freedom House (2010) <em>Countries at Crossroad- DRC Country Report, </em>available at <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&amp;edition=9&amp;ccrpage=43&amp;ccrcountry=181">http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&amp;edition=9&amp;ccrpage=43&amp;ccrcountry=181</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Bosshard, P. (2012) <em>Infrastructure for Whom? A Critique of the Infrastructure Strategies of the Group of 20 and the World Bank. </em>International Rivers, p.2 ; International Rivers (2013). <em>Grand Inga Dam, DR Congo</em> , available at <a href="http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/grand-inga-dam-dr-congo">http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/grand-inga-dam-dr-congo</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Palitza, K. (2011). <em>$80bn Grand Inga hydropower dam to lock out Africa’s poor</em>. <em>Africa Review</em>, Available at: <a href="http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/80-billion-dollar-Grand-Inga-dam-to-lock-out-Africa-poor/-/979184/1274126/-/kkicv7/-/index.html">www.africareview.com/Business—Finance/80-billion-dollar-Grand-Inga-dam-to-lock-out-Africa-poor/-/979184/1274126/-/kkicv7/-/index.html</a>.</p><p><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#_ftnref30">[30]</a> More information concerning the Inga Dam, see: <a href="http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/grand-inga-hydroelectric-project-an-overview-3356">http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/grand-inga-hydroelectric-project-an-overview-3356</a>.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/"><em>thielemanst.wordpress.com</em></a><em> on August 18, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80c95ed88109" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa/foreign-direct-investment-and-good-governance-challenges-the-case-of-the-democratic-republic-of-80c95ed88109">Foreign Direct Investment and Good Governance Challenges: The Case of the Democratic Republic of…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa">Reports on Africa</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UK 2015 parliamentary elections: The consequences for UK foreign policy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thomasthielemans/uk-2015-parliamentary-elections-the-consequences-for-uk-foreign-policy-2627cddc34bc?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2627cddc34bc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 12:58:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T13:39:13.065Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>On May 7th Britain is holding a general election to choose a new government. After several weeks of campaigning the opinion polls have hardly stirred. Labour is slightly ahead of the Conservatives in overall votes, and probably slightly behind in parliamentary seats. Among the possible outcomes of the 2015 general election are the following: a Tories’ commitment to a referendum on the EU that could quite conceivably see the UK vote to leave; a new prime minister (Labour’s opposition leader Ed Miliband); a pivotal role in government for the SNP, a party devoted to splitting up the UK; and a chaotic minority government, facing the risk of a collapse.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h6bfmbRcP2fcLu7K.jpg" /></figure><p>Recent coverage of the election from <em>May2015.com</em> has suggested that there are few scenarios in which the Conservatives are likely to survive a vote of confidence, meaning that Ed Miliband, a product of Oxford and Harvard, has a good chance of becoming the Prime Minister after May 7th. Even though in the past five years Labour has declined in Scotland and lost votes to both the left-wing Greens and right-wing UKIP, the 2015 UK general election maths clearly favour Labour. All the outcomes currently implied by the polls or predicted by forecasters put the centre-left political party in a superior position. So for Mr Cameron to win, he needs to win more seats than Labour — considerably more. In the event neither party succeeds to win support for their legislative programme by May 27th, when the Queen is due to open parliament formally, a second election in the autumn is almost inevitable.</p><p>According to the academic forecast of <em>May2015.com</em> the ‘anti-Tory’ parties — Labour, the Scottish National Party (SNP), and smaller parties like the Greens, Plaid Cymru, SDLP and Respect — are going to win 337 members of parliament (MPs), fourteen more than they need to ‘lock Cameron out’, as former SNP leader Alex Salmond stated in March.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>The big regional contests in this election will be between the Tories and the centrist Liberal Democrats in the southwest, and between Labour and the SNP in Scotland. If the SNP fades, Labour is the most likely to benefit. And if the Lib Dems could strengthen their ranks, the Tories will probably lose out.</p><p><strong>How British elections work</strong></p><p>As Britain is a constitutional monarchy, electors will be voting solely for their local MPs rather than directly for a head of state. The new Prime Minister will be the person who can command a majority of MPs in the House of Commons, the popularly elected legislative body of the bicameral British Parliament. He or she will then be sworn into office by the unelected head of state, Queen Elizabeth II.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*E-CcZd4x3JIQp_Tl.jpg" /></figure><p>One of the most important features of the Westminster model, as it is often called, is the “first past the post” system (FPTP). In short, it is a system where the country is divided in 650 constituencies and the politician in each constituency with the highest number of votes, gets the seat. England, the biggest and most populous part of the United Kingdom, has 533 seats. The Scots have 59 seats, Wales 40 and Northern Ireland 18. If a general election results in no single political party winning an overall majority in the House of Commons, this is known as a situation of no overall control, or a ‘hung Parliament’. The electoral system makes this unlikely, but the high number of parties with a fair chance of winning seats this election might usher a repetition of the 2010 elections.</p><p>Under the FPTP system, political parties usually only need to get a bit over a third of the popular vote to secure a majority of the MPs and so form a government. While the electoral system in Britain tends to over-represent the larger parties, it penalises small and middle-sized parties. The system has favoured strong, one-party rule with a strong executive.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>This tradition may now be changing, however. Smaller parties, such as the Scottish National Party, the Green Party and UKIP of Nigel Farage now have been polling over five per cent each.</p><p><strong>Polls and predictions</strong></p><p>On present predictions it seems certain that once again neither the Conservatives nor Labour will be able to command an overall majority. After weeks of electoral combat, neither David Cameron nor Ed Miliband has managed to inflict serious damage on their opponent. The polls have been static for weeks, with the Conservative and Labour parties being stuck on roughly 34 per cent each.</p><p>The Tories are likely to win most seats but Mr Cameron might struggle to form a coalition. In the event of a hung parliament, he might try to conceal a deal with Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats — their current coalition partner — and Northern Ireland’s Unionist parties. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) may end up with ten seats, which could prove crucial in a closely tied parliament. Some Tory strategists prefer the idea of a Conservative minority government, while others warn about the problems of trying to govern without a majority.</p><p>In the meantime, Ed Miliband is the bookmakers’ favourite for Downing Street 10. For a Labour-led formal coalition to get off the ground, Labour would need to rely mainly on the Lib Dems as well. If the Lib Dems win the thirty seats they are currently projected to, Labour would need to get close to 295 to have a chance of making this work. Although projections suggest the Lib Dems could lose half of the 57 seats it won in 2010, Nick Clegg remains an important force.</p><p>The Labour party has yet another option up its sleeve: Mr Miliband could head towards a minority government backed from the outside by the Scottish National Party. In this event, there would be no formal coalition but the nationalists would keep Miliband in power in exchange for concessions. If the SNP opt to be a ‘silent partner’ in exchange for full fiscal autonomy or the so-called devo-max, as some pundits think likely, Labour could govern in this way without them.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*bDanwLoujGRZvkQN.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>The rise of SNP</strong></p><p>650 kilometres to the north, the Scottish National Party (SNP) is expected to score considerably better than in 2010. The Scottish nationalists lost last year’s independence referendum, but now they are set to rip the UK asunder. Some polls even expect the party of Nicola Sturgeon, who succeeded Alex Salmond as SNP leader and Prime Minister of Scotland in 2014, to wallop Labour for the first time in history.</p><p>The bookmakers see Ms Sturgeon as pivotal to Labour’s chances of taking power. She has assured Scottish voters that her party will never prop up the Conservatives, and on March 6thconfirmed that its opposition to Britain’s nuclear deterrent programme Trident would not block a deal with Labour.</p><p>Following her performance in a televised leaders’ debate, the <em>Daily Mail</em>, a right-wing tabloid, ran a front page calling her the “most dangerous woman in Britain”. In the more qualitative press, Sturgeon’s confident TV performance is widely appreciated and considered to be bad for Labour. A <em>Financial Times</em> editorial recognised that “Ms Sturgeon confirmed the popularity that has seen SNP membership soar since the independence referendum”.</p><p>One of Scotland’s foremost political commentators, <strong>David Torrance</strong>, estimates that the SNP will score considerably better than in 2010.</p><p>“In 2010 the SNP got just six seats, but any more than eleven MPs will be the party’s best ever result. I should think around thirty MPs is a conservative estimate.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>One has to keep in mind that all election forecasts are associated with a significant degree of uncertainty. Much of the uncertainty in these predictions comes from the fact that even immediately before election day, general election polls in the UK have not been very accurate in the past. In 2010, the average of the election-day polls missed party vote shares by as much as four percentage point.</p><p><strong>Absence of foreign policy</strong></p><p>So far, foreign policy has not featured heavily in the political debates. Labour has been campaigning on the National Health Service and living standards, and the Conservatives on leadership and economy. Britain outperformed its G7 peers in 2014, but there are mounting fears that a weak Eurozone economy and geopolitical tensions will start to weigh on the domestic economy. Living standards, which took a hit in the aftermath of the crisis, are finally increasing, thanks to rising wages and falling inflation. The UK currently has a good employment performance, but at the same time witnessed a collapse in growth of output per worker and output per hour. In short, the UK economy has enjoyed a weak, yet job-creating, recovery.</p><p>As the outcome of the UK general election remains exceptionally unpredictable, markets may be in for a bumpy ride in the immediate aftermath of May 7th, according to some economists.</p><p>In the party leaders’ pre-election debate on April 2nd2015, not a single direct question about foreign or defence policy was asked, and the closest the debate came to these issues was immigration and Britain’s membership of the EU. Nonetheless, foreign policy represents a key area of fault lines among the parties contesting the 2015 general elections. Few modern elections have been so clearly a search for national identity and meaning as the 2015 contest is.</p><p>Many pundits and scholars believe that Tory- or Labour-led Britain is retreating from the world. This pattern can be illustrated by the absence of election debates on foreign affairs. In the American campaign, foreign affairs have shrunk to the three I’s: Iran, Israel and ISIL/Da’esh. In Britain, foreign affairs seem to have shrunk to nothingness.</p><blockquote>“This is partly because David Cameron has not taken as close an interest in foreign affairs as Tony Blair did in the past. The Iraq War also casted an obvious legacy: the focus now is much more on soft power” — David Torrance</blockquote><p>Then there is immigration: according to Economist/Ipsos MORI March 2015 Issues Index, almost 27 per cent of the British population names it the most important issue.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn5">[5]</a> In 2012 Britain absorbed eight immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants — more than twice the EU average.</p><p>Other topics such as banks, Europe and global security barely feature. For instance, only five per cent of voters perceived defence/foreign affairs/international terrorism as important issues and only one per cent of voters told that the EU was the most important issue. So, with regard to world politics, no one will be the wiser. Yet one has to keep in mind that the same polls routinely find low levels of knowledge and interest among Britons in the EU, raising the obvious question of how far one can value the findings of polls in Britain on the EU when so few Britons appear able to make informed judgements about European issues.</p><p><strong>Internationalism or isolationism?</strong></p><p>The British foreign policy has been badly distorted by pressures at home. The rise of UKIP has forced the Tories in particular to think local rather than global, forcing them into promising a referendum on UK membership of the EU. This may be enough to rescue some votes from UKIP, but it makes for a terrible international image. Combined with Mr Cameron’s futile opposition to the appointment of Luxembourg’s Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission president, this has left Britain more isolated in Europe than ever.</p><p>Some have gone further, drawing the conclusion from the public mood of Cameron’s Britain that the UK has embarked on a journey into isolationism. This rise of UKIP, with its core aim of UK withdrawal from the EU, supported by a significant section of the Tory party, can be seen as a symptom and a cause of this isolationist mentality.</p><p>However, this thesis is not supported by a Chatham House analysis, based on surveys by YouGov. The results indicate that there has been no clear movement towards isolationism: in fact, in some policy areas the reverse appears to be true. Overall, there is support for an ambitious British foreign policy and leadership role. This analysis clearly identifies a growing, or perhaps a reviving, appetite for the UK to aspire to be a “great power” rather than accept its decline — 63% of the British public have this aspiration, the highest figure in such surveys since 2010.</p><p><strong>Beyond Brexit</strong></p><p>On perhaps the biggest foreign policy question facing the UK, the future of its relationship with the EU, the public and opinion-formers diverge significantly. Public perceptions of the EU remain broadly negative, but there has been a modest but consistent improvement since the survey was last conducted in 2012. Nonetheless, there is support for the government’s ambition to negotiate a looser relationship with the EU, with the return of powers from Brussels to the UK seen as the priority for reform.</p><p>Meanwhile, opinion-formers-leaders drawn from the worlds of business, media, politics, academia, science and the arts-are overwhelmingly supportive of membership of the EU. Voters in London and Scotland would vote to stay in the EU, while those in the rest of the South, the Midlands/Wales and Northern England would vote to leave. Scottish respondents are more pro-European, more supportive of development aid, and more likely than English ones to say ethics should play a role in foreign policy.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Mr Cameron’s promised EU referendum, which is likely to occur by the end of 2017, could wrench the nation out of the EU and his immigration rules would shut out the hard working and talented from abroad. As for the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, he sees the world as largely irrelevant to his grand project to build a fairer society.</p><p>In a rare mention of foreign policy during the election campaign, Mr Miliband said Mr Cameron “bears some responsibility<em>” </em>for the stream of refugees fleeing from Libya to Europe in a speech that accused the prime minister of diminishing Britain’s standing in the world.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>In 2013, Number 10 Downing Street accused Miliband of ‘flipping and flopping’, ‘buggering around’ and ‘playing politics’ whilst others, including some Labour voices, blamed him for almost single-handedly diminishing the role of the UK on the international stage. Mr Miliband received all this criticism because Labour refused to support the government’s decision to participate in almost immediate air strikes against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>Yet Ed Miliband’s refusal to countenance a EU referendum is welcomed in Europe. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair praised Mr Miliband for standing against the tide on the EU, and said Eurosceptics “need to get real about how difficult it would be for Britain to negotiate a new relationship with the EU. If Britain left, the rest of Europe will be vigorous in ensuring the UK gets no special treatment.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>Many argue Cameron’s Britain has stepped back from the active global and regional engagements favoured by most of his recent predecessors. The end of NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 supposedly drew a line under difficult counter-insurgency campaigns in distant places. Public caution has compelled Mr Cameron not to intervene in the Syrian civil war. Moreover Cameron has distanced Britain even further than his predecessors from the Eurozone and its momentum on European integration. Any remaining appetite for adventures abroad was sated by the 2011 intervention in Libya.</p><p>True, Mr Cameron has joined the conflict against ISIL/Da’esh in Iraq and sent forces to Western Africa against the Ebola threat. But he has also left the difficult and unsavoury job of dealing with Russian President Vladimir Putin to other European leaders, principally with Angela Merkel.</p><p>With the general election just a few days away, foreign eyes are now turning to Britain. With a high probability of a hung parliament, political experts expect three foreign policy issues to have a significant impact on coalition negotiations: overall defence spending, the Trident nuclear deterrent and the question of a referendum on the EU.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*JHybnJaHGLmGMhl5.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Military spending</strong></p><p>After a decade dominated by long and controversial campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, seen by many as distant and unsuccessful, the country seemed to be facing a sustained period without a military engagement, only to be pulled back into a multilateral operation in Iraq in the autumn of 2014. Despite this recent development, however, there is a growing perception that the public and the political elite have lost appetite for foreign intervention.</p><p>For many years Britain has shown leadership within NATO by actually meeting the commitment all members make to spend at least two per cent of their GDP on defence. Although defence spending is falling, in a speech to the NATO summit in Wales, Mr Cameron suggested that a future Conservative-led government would be willing at least in principle to increase defence spending in real terms. The PM committed, for example, to bring two new aircraft carriers into service: “(…) Our brand new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth (…) will be the mightiest ship the Royal Navy has ever put to sea, able to protect and project our interests across the globe for decades to come<em>.”</em><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn10"><strong><em>[10]</em></strong></a></p><p>Labour, on the other hand, has traditionally seen defence as a lower priority than domestic spending, and seems unlikely to match Conservative plans in this area. The party has committed itself to an immediate strategic defence review if it wins power at May’s General Election.</p><p>In stark contrast to the Tories and Labour, Nigel Farage has indicated that Ukip will actually increase defence spending to €67billion — despite protesting that the UK is far too involved in “foreign” wars.</p><p>So, a new spending review is expected after the election, but no one knows what the results will be. What is clear is that Britain’s capacity to project force abroad has already been drastically reduced. This is already colouring Downing Street’s relationship with the White House.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn11">[11]</a> In Washington it has not gone unnoticed that Labour leader Ed Miliband’s recent foreign policy speech barely mentioned the US.</p><p><strong>Renewing Trident</strong></p><p>The second issue is the question of replacing the ageing Trident system, UK’s nuclear deterrent. The decision has been put back until after the elections following disagreements between the Tories and the Lib Dems. UK’s nuclear deterrent force currently consists of four submarines each capable of carrying up to sixteen ballistic nuclear missiles, capable of hitting a target up to 12,000 kilometres away. It is estimated that the cost of renewing the nuclear-armed submarines will cost in excess of €35 billion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*UXZc6YTy7Agc01M_.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Conservatives as well as Labour are in favour to retain the deterrent, though Labour is willing to countenance a cheaper, pared-down option. A recent survey by Chatham House-YouGov highlighted that public opinion favours saving money but prefers to keep the nuclear option alive.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn12">[12]</a> In the event neither party wins outright, the SNP have threatened to only join in coalition with Ed Miliband if he agrees to scrap Trident — which is based in Scotland — turning Britain’s nuclear future into an electoral issue.</p><p><strong>EU Membership</strong></p><p>The final area is, of course, Britain’s place in the EU. In 2012, the issue of Britain’s membership in the European Union exploded in the media, becoming a hot political issue in the wake of the Eurozone crisis and the rise of Euroscepticism.</p><p>Britain has been a member of the EU for just over forty years, and if the Britons were to vote ‘out’ in a referendum, there would undeniably be noticeable changes in terms of Britain’s international relationships and access to trade and markets. A “Brexit” would remove one of the EU’s most dynamic economies and, besides France and Germany, one of the few European countries with real military capacities.</p><p>Those in favour of leaving the EU argue that the benefits of cutting the expenditures associated with EU membership outweigh the potential costs of leaving. Increasingly, however, business interests have become more vocal, maintaining that a Britain outside of Europe would see a diminished level of political and economic influence. For Eurosceptics, Brexit would liberate British businesses, particularly their financial services, to operate on a global stage.</p><p>By 2017, Mr Cameron promises a referendum. Some argue that it is as an exercise in political calculation and party management. Mr Cameron argues that by renegotiating a better deal for Britain in the EU and then putting it to a vote, he will settle the question of the UK’s future in Europe and bolster its influence.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>However, as Cameron brings Europe to the forefront with no firm commitments, UKIP capitalises on the British public’s lack of knowledge and distrust of the EU to encourage rampant Euroscepticism. In short, Mr Cameron, in an attempt to mitigate the rising number of Eurosceptics, has actually allowed it to escalate to the point where he can no longer control it.</p><p>On the campaign trail this referendum promise is regularly repeated, though about the reform, renegotiation and repatriation that are supposed to precede it, nothing is said. While Mr Cameron remains silent on what he actually wants in Brussels, he is clear that if he gets it he will recommend that Britain will stay in.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>The public is split on the virtues of EU membership. The Chatham House-YouGov study found forty per cent of respondents would vote to retain it, 39 per cent to give it up. It is clear that public opinion is an important driver of UK policy towards the EU. One important consequence is the frequent clash between party political proposals designed to appease public opinion and governmental negotiating positions designed to achieve reform in Brussels.</p><p>Questions about the EU (and the related issue of immigration) have already featured during the election campaign and they will be central to any coalition negotiations. If the Tories are elected, there will certainly be a renegotiation followed by a referendum. If Labour is elected, Ed Miliband will not hold a referendum unless there is a further transfer of powers to Brussels. Finally, if a coalition government is formed with one of the smaller parties, the coalition agreement might stipulate other terms and conditions that have to be met in order to hold the referendum.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Foreign policy has not featured heavily in some of the debates so far, but the question of EU membership in particular will come to the fore as UKIP’s campaigning is being brought to completion. The government’s hope to negotiate a looser relationship with the EU resonates with a Eurosceptic public, yet its handling of Europe does not receive very high marks from voters. Nor does its handling of foreign policy overall. We can expect that the answers to these issues certainly will shape Britain’s foreign policy stance for a generation.</p><p>In 2010, the Cameron-Clegg coalition came about in less than a week but this time in Britain it may take longer. It could therefore be the turn of the smaller parties to wield influence in forming the next government, much as Clegg did before. The crucial number after May 7th will be 323 — the number of legislators required for a government to avoid losing a vote of confidence in the House of Commons. While the Tories may still win more votes and seats than Labour, it is hard to see how David Cameron can pool enough seats for a majority. The haggling starts on May 8.</p><p><em>Written by </em><strong><em>Thomas Thielemans</em></strong><em>. This text previously appeared on his </em><a href="https://thielemanst.wordpress.com/2015/05/04/uk-2015-parliamentary-elections-the-consequences-for-uk-foreign-policy/"><em>personal blog</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> May2015.com (2015). <em>Election 2015: Polls suggest Ed Miliband is likely to become Prime Minister. </em>Available at: <a href="http://may2015.com/featured/election-2015-polls-suggest-ed-miliband-is-likely-to-become-prime-minister/">http://may2015.com/featured/election-2015-polls-suggest-ed-miliband-is-likely-to-become-prime-minister/</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> UK Parliament (2015). <em>Elections and Voting. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/">http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Parker, G &amp; Stacey, K. (24.04.2015). Who will run Britain? <em>Financial Times, </em>p. 7.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Interview with David Torrance on 21 April 2015.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Ipsos MORI (2015). <em>Ipsos MORI Issues Index Issues Index March 2015. </em>Available at: <a href="https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/March15IssuesIndex_topline.pdf">https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/March15IssuesIndex_topline.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Raines, T. (2015). <em>Internationalism or Isolationism? The Chatham House–YouGov Survey British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150130Raines.pdf">http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150130Raines.pdf</a>; Kettle, M. (30.01.2015). This general election could define Britain’s global role into the next decade, <em>The Guardian. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/30/general-election-britain-global-role-trident-europe-isolationism">http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/30/general-election-britain-global-role-trident-europe-isolationism</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Rigby, E. &amp; Parker, G. (25.04.2015). UK premier attacks Labour’s ‘ill-judged’ remarks on Libya. <em>Financial Times, </em>p. 2.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Dominiczak, P. (30.08.2013). Flip-flopping Miliband accused of playing into hands of Assad, <em>The Telegraph. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/10275320/Flip-flopping-Miliband-accused-of-playing-into-hands-of-Assad.html">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/10275320/Flip-flopping-Miliband-accused-of-playing-into-hands-of-Assad.html</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Wintour, T. (07.04.2015). Tony Blair: I support Ed Miliband 100%, <em>The Guardian. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/07/tony-blair-i-support-ed-miliband-100-labour-election">http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/07/tony-blair-i-support-ed-miliband-100-labour-election</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> UK Prime Minister’s Office (2014). <em>NATO Summit 2014: PM end of summit press conference. </em>Available at: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nato-summit-2014-pm-end-of-summit-press-conference">https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nato-summit-2014-pm-end-of-summit-press-conference</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> David, M. (2015). <em>State of the Nation: Britain’s Role in the World Just Keeps Shrinking. </em>International Relations and Security Network (ISN) ETH Zurich. Available at: <a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&amp;id=190229">http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&amp;id=190229</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Raines, T. (2015). <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150130Raines.pdf">http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150130Raines.pdf</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Rigby &amp; Parker, 25.04.2015, p. 2.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Kerr, J. (22.04.2015). When you have a plan for Europe, Mr Cameron, do let us know<em>. Financial Times, </em>p. 7.</p><p>5 May 2015 by Thomas Thielemans</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://kib.be/articles/988/uk-2015-parliamentary-elections-the-consequences-for-uk-foreign-policy"><em>kib.be</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2627cddc34bc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China and Africa: more than metals, minerals and machinery]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa/china-and-africa-more-than-metals-minerals-and-machinery-3d9560a6010a?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d9560a6010a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 12:16:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T12:16:51.200Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In recent years, China has been expanding its economic power through overseas investment in order to secure the supply of raw materials, energy, and other commodities for its economic development. In this regard, China has become a major economic business partner of Africa, with trade exceeding US$166 billion. By 2020 Beijing is even committed to double bilateral trade with African countries to US$400 billion. The economic presence in Africa has led to a heated debate, about the nature of Chinese involvement and its implications for the continent. The debate is partially motivated by the rapid growth of China’s economic presence in Africa. This aid to Africa has also raised many questions, such as the composition, the goal and nature. Chinese construction workers are coming to Africa in ever-greater numbers: an estimated one million are now residing in Africa. The main focus of this article is to determine whether China’s engagement has contributed to economic growth in Africa or not.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*NplyTrtJMBdJUGE3.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>For the first time in decades, the African continent has been attracting the positive attention of the rest of the world. Despite the optimism, sustainable development and long-term investments still pose momentous challenges for most of Africa. China’s increased trade and investment with Africa particularly presents a significant opportunity for growth and integration of the sub-Saharan continent into the world economy. The rise of Chinese investments in Africa also marks a new trend in South-South economic relations and transforming traditional patterns of economic development, as China’s approach is said to be different in character.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn1">[1]</a> A 2010 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report described this difference in the following terms: <em>“(…) the big Southern partners (mainly China) generally use official flows to promote trade and investment activities in Africa</em>.”<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>For instance, in contrast to European entrepreneurs, who had relatively longer commercial ties with Africa and tend to initiate investments in the African market through acquisition of existing businesses, the vast majority of Chinese firms have entered Africa through so called ‘greenfield investments’<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn3">[3]</a> (also called ‘mortar and brick investments’).</p><p>Many African economies have grown by five per cent a year or more over the past decade. This rapid economic growth underlies the rising dynamism of African firms on the continent, in terms of both trade and foreign investment. According to EY’s 2014 Africa Attractiveness Survey, Africa moved from seventh in 2011, to become the most attractive investment destination in the world for UK companies in 2014. The latest data shows that the UK topped the global table with total of 104 projects worth US$4.6bn.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>The most striking observation from the 2014 survey is how far Africa’s perceived attractiveness has improved. In less than five years, Africa has risen to become the second most attractive investment destination in the world, tied with Asia. Overall, the US and the UK remain the top two sources of investment into Africa, while the number of FDI projects from Asian countries, particularly India and China, is on a rise.</p><p>Even so, African countries are desperately short of investment, both from locals and international investors. According to the World Bank an extra US$90 billion a year is needed for infrastructure, not to mention other businesses. African countries especially need longer-term investors to pay for railways, power lines etc. Across the continent improved infrastructure of all sorts may increase economic growth by two percentage points a year, says the World Bank. Sub-Saharan Africa spends some US$6.8 billion a year paving roads, but it ought to spend closer to US$10 billion.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn5">[5]</a> Greater investment in technology should make many African workers more efficient over the next two decades, while a larger proportion of the population is likely to enter the formal economy.</p><p>In addition, the African continent has also the fastest-growing middle class in the world: according to the African Development Bank, the continent’s middle class numbers about 120 million now and will grow to 1.1 billion by 2060. These demographic trends and stable macroeconomic policies are likely to positively impact investment inflows. Rapid urbanization, a growing consumer class and investments in infrastructure are now laying foundations for the development of urban clusters and corridors. In the future these factors will be key drivers of economic activity on the African continent.</p><p><strong>Substantial shift towards consumer related sectors</strong></p><p>Although foreign investors in Africa have typically favoured natural resource assets, there has been a substantial shift away from the extractive industries and the continent is seeing growing investment in other sectors. For the first time ever in 2013, mining and metals exited the top 10 sectors when measured by FDI project numbers. An IMF study in 2011 also found that less than thirty per cent of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa was in the mining sector. However, new data on Chinese activity in Africa suggests, that it still appears to be resource motivated. Having operated in Africa for the past twenty years, Sinopec, the second largest Chinese oil company, for instance, plans to invest another US$20 billion in Africa in the next five years.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn6">[6]</a> Yet, compared to OECD countries, China remains a relatively small player in Africa’s oil sector.</p><p>Reflecting this substantial shift, foreign direct investment (FDI) is starting to diversify into consumer-market oriented industries, including consumer products such as food, information technology, tourism, finance and retail. In 2013 the top three sectors were technology, media and telecommunication, accounting for over fifty per cent of FDI projects. Therefore many new private-equity investors are now scouring the continent for opportunities. Record amounts are being raised to invest in business there. In 2014 private equity raised a record US$4 billion for Africa, financing entrepreneurs from small soap factories to Internet providers.</p><p>In the eyes of many international companies, the African continent is thus nowadays above all seen as a place to do business other than digging natural resources out of the ground.</p><p><strong>Intra-African investments</strong></p><p>Another interesting trend is the increasing amount of intra-African investments, led by South African, Kenyan, and Nigerian transnational corporations (TNCs). Between 2009 and 2013, the share of announced cross-border greenfield investment projects originating from within Africa increased to eighteen per cent, from less than ten per cent in the preceding period. For many smaller, often landlocked or non-oil-exporting countries in Africa, intraregional FDI is a significant source of foreign capital. These intra-African projects are mainly concentrated in manufacturing and services. Only three per cent of the value of announced intraregional greenfield projects is in the extractive industries.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>African investors nearly tripled their share of FDI projects over the last decade, from 8% in 2003 to 22.8% in 2013. This growth is fuelled by the need for improved regional value chains and strengthening regional integration. Another driver of growth is the African investors’ understanding of the market and of the potential opportunities and challenges.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*TtVmXF6UIfMEJcrJ.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Sino-African relations</strong></p><p>As earlier mentioned, Sino-African relations have increased in importance in the past decade. Recent trends point to Chinese involvement in three areas of interest: economic policy, diplomacy, and military cooperation. Beijing’s policies with reference to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) reflect clear goals: expanding export markets, gaining access to the continent’s mineral resources, and increasing China’s international influence.</p><p>Sino-African economic relations have only intensified since the beginning of the new millennium. The political relationship between Beijing and Africa, however, dates back many decades. China has long viewed itself as the leader of the developing world, and was involved in Africa as far back as the late 1960s and early 1970s, providing development aid to African socialist regimes, and supporting anti-colonial insurgencies.</p><p>In the late 1990s China’s policy makers realized that in order to sustain high-level growth it needed to ensure its future supply of natural resources (copper, diamond, oils…). As China changed from being an energy exporter to an energy importer, its economic relationship with Africa gained strategic significance in China’s external relations. In China’s Africa policy, emphasis had switched from paying scant attention to economic cost to emphasizing economic benefits. In other words, China adjusted itself from being Africa’s friend to being Africa’s partner.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>Eventually in 2000 the importance of the African continent in China’s foreign policy led to the establishment of the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). In 2002, Chinese authorities started pushing the “going global” or “stepping out” strategy as part of the economic reform process and to promote global industry champions in the wake of its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Although this policy was not primarily targeted at Africa, it provided Chinese enterprises with easy access to loans, foreign exchange and preferential policies for taxation, imports and exports.</p><p><strong>China’s great investment outflow</strong></p><p>China’s rapid economic growth raises its confidence in looking outside its boundaries for investment opportunities. China’s overseas direct investment projects concentrate mainly in the developing countries, especially in Africa.</p><p>In addition, in January 2015 the Chinese government signed a contract with the African Union (AU) that envisions a network of high-speed railways to link all countries on the African continent in the next few decades.</p><p>Meyersson <em>et al</em>. have studied the impact of African resource exports to China on African economic and political development. According to the authors, exporting natural resources to China as compared to the rest of the world has a large positive effect on economic growth and investment in Africa.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn9">[9]</a> Also, the results of Whalley and Weisbrod suggest that a significant portion of the accelerated growth in some African countries in the years immediately before and after the financial crisis can be attributed to Chinese FDI inflows.</p><p>Other academic studies show, however, that seeking markets and resources are not the only motives driving China’s investment overseas. Other crucial motives include cost of production, agglomeration or herding behaviour, and pressure to seek higher investment returns for the huge US$2.8 trillion (and growing) foreign exchange reserves. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*t6tii8NRKdjjdBzS.jpg" /></figure><p><strong><em>Political motives</em></strong></p><p>The financial and economic value of China’s aid is considerably enhanced by political considerations. The Chinese government and its African counterparts frequently stress that Beijing’s aid comes with few political strings attached. Contrary to Western donors, China’s cooperation with or support of African governments does not hinge on conditionalities pertaining to specific political objectives or standards (i.e. human rights, democracy).</p><p>Another important appeal, according to Tull, stems from the fact that China stubbornly sticks to the dogma of national sovereignty. It fiercely repudiates the increasingly powerful notion that outside interference into the domestic affairs of a state can be legitimate.</p><p>Furthermore, Chinese aid tends to benefit the governments of receiving countries more directly than the policies of Western donors, who are preoccupied, with the reduction of poverty and corruption. The Chinese, unlike Western countries, finance grandiose and prestigious buildings (presidential palaces, football stadiums) that African leaders highly appreciate for their own political reasons. In return, Beijing can count on valuable diplomatic support from African governments to defend its interests at the international level, particularly in multilateral organisations with ‘one country — one vote’ arrangements. In return, China promises to raise the status of African voices on the international level.</p><p>Since most infrastructure projects are public sector works, China conceives its investments as goodwill projects to woo the sympathies of African state leaders. This enables Beijing to gain political influence, which often opens the doors to commercially or strategically more attractive businesses in other sectors, e.g. to win tenders for oil and mining concessions.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p><strong>Chinese Diaspora</strong></p><p>From the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese companies started to increase their investments in Africa. Consequently the number of construction workers in Africa has increased rapidly: 350,000 in South Africa (2009), 259,000 in Angola (2012), 100,000 in Zambia (2013), 20,000 in Nigeria (2012), and 7,000 in Kenya (2013). <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>With the growing Chinese population in Africa, violent actions against these people have also increased in countries such as South Africa, Madagascar and Nigeria. The Chinese government has therefore started to strengthen its management of the social responsibility of Chinese companies on the African continent.</p><p>As China is sucked more deeply into the affairs of distant lands through its global expansion policy, its ability to stay out of trouble is declining. During the Middle East-North Africa troubles, for instance, Beijing scrambled to evacuate its 35,000 Chinese workers in the Libyan oil, rail, telecommunications, and construction industries in late February 2011.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*GrCyDJxSRXrckeuH.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>China Inc.</strong></p><p>Busse, Erdogan and Mühlen have analysed Sino-African economic relations on the basis of three factors of economic interaction, namely trade, FDI and aid (economic cooperation). <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p><strong><em>Trade</em></strong></p><p>Bilateral trade has increased significantly in the last decade and reached some US$166 billion in 2012. Until recently Sino-African trade largely concentrated on a few big resource-rich countries and product groups. The major resource exporters to China are South-Africa, Angola, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. When one looks at African imports from China, the trade pattern is different, i.e., African countries import mainly non-resource products from China.</p><p>As such, Africa’s heavy concentration on resource exports and non-resource imports reflects a traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-type trade pattern. This means that African countries concentrate on the export of natural resources where they have a comparative advantage, and in return import labour-intensive manufactured goods from China, which is labour-abundant.</p><p>For example, Chinese companies like Geely, SAIC Motor Corporation Limited and Great Wall Motor Co. are increasingly exporting automobiles made in the home country to African countries, rather than to other Asian nations. In 2009, the Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Chinese government’s business liaison between Africa and China said that “Chinese auto exports to Africa reached a total of 102,000 vehicles and US$1.74 billion in sales, surpassing those with Asia and making Africa the largest destination continent for Chinese auto exports”.</p><p>To be successful in Africa, however, foreign companies must be prepared to face a certain amount of challenges, including the risk of unsteady economic prospects and, perhaps most worrisome, the potential for political and social unrest that could disrupt imports, factory output and consumer confidence. Many foreign investors have not forgotten the rash of nationalisations across the African continent in the 1960s and 1970s.</p><p><strong><em>Foreign direct investment</em></strong></p><p>Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an increasingly significant catalyst for trade in developing countries, especially in Africa. FDI delivers a number of important contributions to economic development in terms of investment, employment and foreign exchange. However, it is FDI’s spill-over potential — the productivity gain resulting from the diffusion of knowledge and technology from foreign investors to local firms and workers — that is perhaps its most valuable input to long-run growth and development.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn15">[15]</a> Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.</p><p>Chinese FDI is both diversified (oil, copper, cobalt, iron, platinum, timber, textiles, railways and retail developments) and geographically spread across all regions of the continent. The total merchandise trade between China and Africa increased from $9 billion in the year 2000 to US$166 billion in 2012, making China Africa’s largest market partner.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn16">[16]</a> In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), Chinese FDI flows to Africa increased from US$200 million in 2000 to US$2.9 million in 2011, turning China into the largest developing country investor in Africa.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn17">[17]</a>. At the same time Africa’s GDP per capita grew by an annual average of 2.4 per cent in 2000–2009, while the growth rate in 2010–2012 amounted to 1.8 per cent.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>According to the World Investment Report 2013, China is currently the biggest developing country investor in Africa. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn19">[19]</a> When looking at the average share of Chinese FDI in total FDI flows in 2000–2011, Chinese FDI accounted for 52 per cent of the FDI inflows in Zimbabwe and 13 per cent in Zambia.</p><p>In 2006, China announced its intention to establish three to five economic and trade co-operation zones (ETCZs) in Africa as an instrument to promote economic development within the framework of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. In Zambia, where the state-owned China Nonferrous Metal Mining has considerable investment in the copper industry, a special economic zone was established called Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ). Officially inaugurated in February 2007, the ZCCZ became the first Chinese overseas economic &amp; trade cooperation zone established in Africa. Secrecy surrounding the negotiations, has resulted in strong criticism of the agreement and a widespread belief that the land was given free of charge.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p><strong><em>Economic Cooperation</em></strong></p><p>The highest turnover of Chinese economic cooperation projects occur mostly in Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. Areas of economic cooperation where China is most active in Africa include infrastructure (railways, roads, telecommunication) and facility construction projects (government buildings, stadiums, hospitals and schools). For instance, in 2012, the African Union (AU) inaugurated its newly Chinese-built HQ in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Abeba. The entire US$200 million project was funded by China as a gift to the AU. Most of the materials used were imported from China and even the furnishings were paid for by Beijing.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn21">[21]</a> Another notable example is the rehabilitated 1350-km Benguela railway line, which now connects Angola’s Atlantic coast with Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia as well as the much-famed Thika road super highway in Kenya.</p><p><strong>“The Angola Model”</strong></p><p>Angola has been one of the four biggest recipients of Chinese investment for infrastructure projects. Indeed, the China and Angola’s partnership has come to be known as the “Angola model”. Under this model, the recipient country receives a loan from the China EximBank; the government then awards a contract for infrastructure projects to a Chinese firm, while also giving rights for the extraction of its natural resource to a Chinese company as repayment for the loan. In 2004, Beijing gave Angola a US$2 billion credit line for the development of its infrastructure. In return, Angola agreed to provide China with 10.000 barrels of crude oil a day.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>In 2008, the China Railway Group used the same model to secure the mining rights to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s copper and cobalt mines under the slogan “(Infrastructure) projects for resources”.</p><p>In addition, the China Africa Development Fund, launched by the China Development Bank, provides equity investment capital for Chinese companies to invest in African countries. Established in June 2007, the CAD Fund has a target size of US$5 billion to be reached in phases, with first-phase funding of $1 billion provided by China Development Bank. The CAD Fund was one of eight measures announced by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006. The fund has already (co-) financed more than sixty projects across thirty African countries.</p><p><strong>Chinese boots and arms</strong></p><p>In recent years, China’s military presence on the continent has also increased considerably. From January 2000 to February 2015, the number of Chinese personnel deployed worldwide to UN peacekeeping operations increased from only 52 to 2,370. Accordingly, China has provided more troops, police, and observer teams to UN peacekeeping missions than Great Britain, Russia and the United States. However, these Chinese troops perform primarily non-military operations.</p><p>Sceptics of China’s intentions in Africa frequently point to Chinese presence in resource-rich countries and claim that gaining access to resources is the primary motivation for Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping efforts.</p><p>When it comes to military sales, China considers it as just one more element of its trade with African countries, and it has proactively pursued African markets.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn23">[23]</a> It moved up the ranks of Africa’s arms suppliers from #4 (with a six per cent share by volume) in 1996–2000, to #1 in 2006–2010 (with a 25 per cent share).<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>Whereas the US and other Western countries have imposed arms embargoes on several African countries due to their records of human rights abuses or political repression, China has been willing to sell weapons to such countries, arguing that refusing to engage in trade with recognized government constitutes unacceptable interference in that country’s internal affairs. China has historically played a role as a supplier of low-cost, militarily useful weaponry without political conditions to Southern states and liberation movements. But this pattern is coming under the twin pressures of the demand for stricter regulation of transfers to African states.</p><p>For instance, in September 2014, Beijing decided to halt weapons sales to South Sudan after it discovered the state arms manufacturer sold millions of dollars worth of equipment to the war-torn nation, according to Bloomberg.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p><strong>Competition or Cooperation?</strong></p><p>China’s establishment as one of Africa’s main strategic partners has not suited everyone. The EU and its member states’ initial reactions to China’s growing appeal in Africa were disdainful at best. This was in part due to the realization in Brussels that China could offer an alternative to EU policies on different fronts, which could potentially put European interests at risk (in terms of investments, political affiliations, development objectives and value systems). Even more, the emergence of Chinese actors on the African continent would make much of the EU’s policy on good governance and the rule of law largely irrelevant. However, despite all the brouhaha about China’s sudden rise in Africa, the EU remains the key influence in virtually all countries in Africa.</p><p>Nonetheless, in 2008, the European Commission put forward the idea of trilateral cooperation between Africa, China and the EU, focusing on four areas: peace and security, infrastructure, sustainable management of the environment and natural resources, as well as agriculture and food security. This has not been materialised, mainly due to conflicting perceptions of the principles underlying trilateral cooperation, and different approaches to development such as non-interference and conditionality.</p><p>China is like all other actors on the African continent — it needs stability and security in order for its investments to flourish. Thus, whilst in the current period there sometimes appears to be divergence, there can ultimately only be growing convergence with EU policy aims — maybe not with regard to democracy, but certainly with regard to governance and security.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn26">[26]</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>China’s growing stature in a wide range of different sectors in Africa (business, investment, foreign aid, security, development, infrastructure, regional integration) has led to its establishment as one of Africa’s major external actor.</p><p>By offering their African counterparts a mix of political and economic incentives, the Chinese government is successfully driving home the message that increased Sino-African cooperation will inevitably result in a ‘win-win situation’ for both sides, as Tull points out.</p><p>Sino-African trade has clearly an impact: African imports from China, particularly non- resource imports, have a negative impact on economic growth in Africa. African exports to the world (excluding China), however, are positively associated with growth in Africa.</p><p>The main challenge is to escape the resource curse that arises too often in African countries with weak institutions. Also known as the “paradox of plenty”, the resource curse is a paradoxical situation in which countries with an abundance of non-renewable resources experience stagnant growth or even economic contraction.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn27">[27]</a> Partly due to China’s strong demand for raw materials, African exports are more and more concentrated in the primary sector, thus enhancing the risk of the resource curse.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn28">[28]</a> Secondly, Chinese manufactured firms could displace their African competitors in case they produce similar goods. This applies in particular to textiles, furniture or footwear.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>So, is China good for Africa? Undoubtedly, its rising demand for continent’s natural resources has helped re-establish Africa as a source of valuable commodities for the growing global market. At all events, this booming relationship seems to hold both positives and negatives for Africa. To quote Tull once more: “<em>China’s economic impact may prove to be a mixed blessing, whereas the political consequences of its return are likely to prove deleterious</em>.”</p><p><em>Thomas Thielemans</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Won, K. &amp; Weidong, Z. (2014). <em>China-Africa Investment Treaties: Old Rules, New Challenges. </em>Fordham International Law Journal. Vol.37(4), p.1035–1085.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> UNCTAD (2010). <em>Economic Development in Africa Report, </em>supra note 3, at 24.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Greenfield FDI refers to investments that create new production facilities in the host countries (e.g. starting a new plant)</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Ernest &amp; Young (2014). <em>Africa is the top investment destination for UK businesses.</em> Available at: http://www.ey.com/UK/en/Newsroom/News-releases/14-06-27—Africa-is-the-top-investment-destination-for-UK-businesses.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> The Economist (2015). <em>African roads and rails. All Aboard. </em>Vol.414, N. 8927.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> China Daily (2013). <em>Sinopec drills deep into Africa. </em>Available at: <a href="http://www.ecns.cn/business/2013/12-10/91954.shtml.">http://www.ecns.cn/business/2013/12-10/91954.shtml.</a></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> UNCTAD (2014). <em>World Investment Report 2014. Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan.</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Meng, J. &amp; Burton, B. (2013). <em>China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors?. </em>Ashgate Publishing, p. 7.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Meyersson, E., Miquel, G.P. &amp; Qian, N. (2008). <em>The Rise of China and the Natural Resource Curse in Africa. </em>London School of Economics and Political Science, Economic Organisation and Public Policy Programme.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Lo, C. (2011). <em>Going Global. The risks and rewards of China’s new international expansion. </em>The International Economy.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Tull, D. (2006). <em>China’s engagement in Africa : scope, significance and consequences</em>. Cambridge University Press , Journal of Modern African Studies, 44, 3, pp. 459–479; Taylor, I., Kopinski, D. &amp; Polus, A. (2014). <em>China’s Rise in Africa: Perspectives on a Developing Connection. </em>Oxon: Routledge.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Namasaka, M. (2015). <em>The China-Africa relationship and what Africa can do to profit.</em></p><p>(<a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/02/02/the-china-africa-relationship-and-what-africa-can-do-to-profit/">http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/02/02/the-china-africa-relationship-and-what-africa-can-do-to-profit/</a>).</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Chee-Beng, T. (2013). <em>Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora. </em>Oxon: Routledge.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Busse, M., Erdogan, C. &amp; Mühlen, H. (2014). <em>China’s Impact on Africa — The Role of Trade and FDI.</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Farole, T. &amp; Winkler, D. (2014). <em>Making Foreign Direct Investment Work for Sub-Saharan Africa: Local Spillovers and Competitiveness in Global Value Chains. </em>World Bank Publications.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref16">[16]</a> UN Comtrade (2014). United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, SITC Rev. 3. (comtrade.un.org).</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref17">[17]</a> UNCTAD (2013). <em>World Investment Report 2013. </em>New York and Geneva: United Nations.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref18">[18]</a> World Bank (2014). World Development Indicators.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref19">[19]</a> UNCTAD (2013).</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Alves, C.A. (2011). <em>The Zambia–China Cooperation Zone at a Crossroads: What Now?</em> Policy Briefing 41. China in Africa Project. SAIIA.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref21">[21]</a> BBC (28.01.2012). <em>African Union opens Chinese-funded HQ in Ethiopia. </em>(<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16770932">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16770932</a>).</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref22">[22]</a> World Bank/PPIAF (2008). <em>Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Africa. </em>PPIAF Gridlines Note 42.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref23">[23]</a> China was among the 22 states that abstained on the vote of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 2 April 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Wezeman, P., Wezeman, S. &amp; Béraud-Sudreau, L. (2011). <em>Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa. </em>SIPRI Policy Paper 30. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, p.10.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Gridneff, I. (2014). <em>China Halts Arms Sales to South Sudan After Norinco Shipment. </em>Bloomberg. Available at: <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-29/china-halts-weapons-sales-to-south-sudan-after-norinco-shipment">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-29/china-halts-weapons-sales-to-south-sudan-after-norinco-shipment</a>.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Chafer, T. &amp; Cumming, G. (2013). <em>From Rivalry to Partnership? New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa. </em>Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., p. 202.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Ibidem.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Carmignani, F. &amp; Chowdhury, A. (2012). <em>The Geographical Dimension of the Development Effects of Natural Resources</em>. , Environmental and Resource Economics, 52 (4): 479– 498.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Morrissey, O. &amp; Zgovu, E. (2011) <em>The Impact of China and India on Sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities, Challenges and Policies.</em> London: Commonwealth Secretariat.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://kib.be/articles/886/china-and-africa-more-than-metals-minerals-and-machinery"><em>kib.be</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d9560a6010a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa/china-and-africa-more-than-metals-minerals-and-machinery-3d9560a6010a">China and Africa: more than metals, minerals and machinery</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/sub-saharan-africa">Reports on Africa</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[‘Narconomics’: a stain on the community of Latin America]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@thomasthielemans/narconomics-a-stain-on-the-community-of-latin-america-bd39cec683a?source=rss-eb67061d7811------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd39cec683a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[drugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mexico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colombia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Thomas Thielemans]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 12:13:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T12:14:47.524Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Anticipating to the current War on Drugs, the lyrics of Movimiento Alterado, a typical narcocorrido song, capture several facets of the brutal drugs-related violence in the Americas. Since former Mexican President Felipe Calderón, in conjunction with the U.S., conducted a massive campaign against drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s) in 2006, a major conflict escalated that would contribute to the deaths of tens of thousands of people, according to estimations of Human Rights Watch. It is thus worth remembering that the death toll from the drug war in the Americas over the last year is almost equal to the rising death count in Syria’s on-going civil war. While the U.S. has supplied funding and intelligence to increase institutional capacity of the Latin American countries to address drug trafficking, its primary focus has been on the flow of drugs into the country and domestic law enforcement. A growing number of scholars and experts agree, however, that the American War on Drugs is a failure and necessitates a new approach. The aim of this article is to look at recent evolutions within this area.</em></p><p>Fighter helicopters, night vision goggles: the War on Drugs in the Americas is high tech, and expensive. Between 2005 and 2009 the U.S. government spent more than $3.1 billion on counter-narcotics contracts in Latin America.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn1">[1]</a> But for the moment it is a war with no clear end in sight. Frequently Latin American governments send military troops and police forces into drugs-infested areas, resulting in a serious upheaval of <em>los narcos, </em>impeding some trafficking routes and weapon seizures. Yet these actions have only prompted the drug cartels to sow even more mayhem.</p><p>Latin America is the world’s only supplier of cocaine, processed from the coca leaf, a traditional crop of the Andean highlands. Though Afghanistan accounts for eighty per cent of global opium production, America gets most of its heroin from Mexico. Mexico has even been called a ‘natural smuggling platform’ for the United States. In 1991, fifty per cent of the U.S.-bound cocaine came through Mexico; by 2004, ninety per cent did. In 2009 David Luhnow of <em>The Wall Street Journal</em> wrote: ‘Mexico became the FedEx of the cocaine business’.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn2">[2]</a> Neighbouring countries Bolivia, Colombia and Peru produce an estimated 550 tons of cocaine a year. Venezuela, as Colombia’s neighbour but with a government more tolerant of the cocaine trade, has also become an important transit country in recent years.</p><p>There are also signs that the northern triangle of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) has become an area of much greater drug smuggling activity. Other Caribbean nations serve as transit countries as well. This can be illustrated by the fact that roughly half of South American cocaine still passes through the Caribbean. Costa Rica has also become one of the more recent important transit points for the international traffickers. When the drug traffickers are on the high seas, local Costa Rican fishermen leave the mangroves to refuel the drug traffickers’ speedboats. In return the fishermen are paid with packages of cocaine.</p><p>More efficient control measures and a crackdown on trafficking have resulted, however, in a declined drug production, in both Peru and Bolivia. Also Colombia has seen a 25 per cent decline, in coca bush cultivation. According to the statistics of the World Drug Report 2014 these estimations are the lowest levels since the beginning of available estimates in 1990. Overall, the latest supply indicators suggest that the global availability of cocaine has fallen in the medium term. However, the significance of the recent decline can be tempered by the improvements in the efficiency of the cocaine manufacture process that is believed to have taken place over the long term. Secondly, the UNODC (United Nations on Drugs and Crime) has also witnessed a regional increase in terms of trafficking and of consumption of various forms of cocaine, including crack. Particularly in Brazil, due to factors including its geographical location and a large urban population, people are more and more snorting coke through rolled banknotes. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p><strong>Drug prohibition approach</strong></p><p>International drug control efforts, currently governed through the United Nations, can be traced to 1909 and resulted in an almost entirely supply–centric, so-called <em>drug prohibition paradigm</em>. This means that governments attempt to restrict or ban the production, trafficking, sale and consumption of these illegal substances, using criminal and military policy tools.</p><p>From the perspective of producer and transit countries, prohibitionist drug policies can be understood as a transfer of the costs of the ‘drug problem’ faced by consumer countries to producer and transit countries. Consumer countries of cocaine, namely North America and Western and Central Europe<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn4">[4]</a>, end up implementing supply-reduction efforts, making the price of drugs reaching consumer countries higher and their availability lower. Such activities consist of eradicating illicit crops; interdicting drug shipment; detecting and destroying drugs producing labs; and arresting notorious kingpins.</p><p>Although prohibition can possibly benefit final market countries, it also hurts production and transhipment countries. From an international political economy (IPE) perception, the current prohibition approach is little more than the transfer of a major part of the costs of the drug problem from consumers to producer and transit nations. In fact, in the end it is more about some consumer countries compensating others for having transferred an important part of the costs of their drug problem.</p><p>Both American and Mexican officials, for example, are at the moment well aware of the extraordinary amount of money — estimates range from $19 and $29 billion — that travels annually from the US into Mexico to fuel illegal activities.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn5">[5]</a> This is, at a very high cost in terms of violence, corruption and the loss of legitimacy of state institutions, i.e. the <em>rule of law</em>.</p><p><strong>The balloon effect hypothesis</strong></p><p>Recent anti-narcotic campaigns show that when country (A) is successful in their endeavour against drug production and trafficking, drugs organisations will simply move to country (B) where they find more favourable environments to run their illegal operations. These findings can be demonstrated by the fact that according to a recent study, ‘scarcity created by more efficient cocaine interdiction policies in Colombia may account for 21.2 per cent and 46 per cent of the increase in homicides and drug related homicides, respectively, experienced in the north of Mexico’. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn6">[6]</a> This is the so-called <em>balloon effect hypothesis. </em>The “balloon effect” is an often used but rather dismissive representation of the effects of drug law enforcement. It is the tendency of transnational harmful networks to relocate their bases from regions and countries in which they are military pressed to other locations. When country (A) marks success, it is often offset by country (B)’s setback. In the War on Drugs, Latin American drug lords and traffickers moved back and forth between Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico after their governments applied increasing military pressures on the illicit drug industry. Former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld even compared the War on Terror to the War on Drugs, claiming it to be a long-term effort against a persistent and elusive transnational threat. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>In this model, the effect of intensified interdiction is simple. Costs are now higher, making other countries relatively more attractive. Surely, smugglers, like other profit-making entrepreneurs, have incentives to respond to changes in costs. Several authors, such as Cornelius Friesendorf and Antonio Maria Costa, a former executive director of the UNODC, have, however, clearly rejected the term, explaining that these so-called balloon effects can be inferred from various repeated correlations but that the causality can hardly be measured or proven. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>The question is rather how much increased interdiction can erode the competitive advantage of existing drug routes such as the so-called “southern route”, with heroin being smuggled through the area south of Afghanistan reaching Europe, via the Near and Middle East and Africa.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn9">[9]</a> These drug routes have been one of the main targets of the War on Drugs, which was declared by former American President Nixon in the early 1970s. This means that, in a quest to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S., the American drug war has been spanning the globe for more than forty years now.</p><p>Some authors such as Daniel Weimer believe that during the Cold War the prevalence of modernization and counterinsurgency discourses within the anti-drug policy only guaranteed continued American intervention in the “Third World”, where the majority of illegal drug crops grew.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p><strong>Opium Bans</strong></p><p>The U.S. efforts to eradicate Turkey’s opium production clearly demonstrate the absolutist prohibitionist approach that the American administration adopted. There, in the early 1970s U.S. officials started an intensive campaign to achieve the prohibition of Turkish opium cultivation. In return the U.S. undertook to provide the Turks with 35 million dollars in loans over a three-year period. For some the most important reason was the desire of Turkish rulers to strengthen relations with the U.S. Others believed that when the opium cultivation was halted, drug traffickers would not be able to smuggle weapons into Turkey. In the end, however, U.S. pressures failed to force the Turkish government to ban the cultivation completely as the Ecevit government resumed poppy cultivation as a proof of its independence of the USA.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p>In Southeast Asia the US policy to fight Communism through proxy armies even led to the forge of alliances with local drug traffickers. Though slowly, US-financed law enforcement gained momentum and thus more and more prohibition laws and arrests of drug lords appeared also in this part of the world.</p><p>The international drug network seemed disrupted but the Nixon administration failed to prevent the spill over of the drug industry to Latin American countries where drug control was initially ineffective and merely symbolic. Big international drug traffickers needed new sources, transit points and safe havens.</p><p><strong>NAFTA</strong></p><p>As a result of the recession of the 1980s and the free competition of the 1990s the ‘informal economy’ of Latin America grew, and nowhere more so than in the illegal production of drugs. Although deregulation and a variety of free trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been good for international business and trade, they have also reshaped and expanded the illegal narco-economy, according to several scholars. In this perspective, NAFTA helped to consolidate the central role of the drug trade in the Mexican economy. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>From a Latin American perspective, U.S. drug policy from the early 1980s, particularly affected the countries producing the coca plant used to produce cocaine. As mentioned earlier, the policy was consistently ‘supply led’ in that it prioritized eradication at source, providing few real economic alternatives. For Washington reduced supply increased the costs and so shrank demand. By the end of the 1990s this policy was not a success, according to James Dunkerley. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*uAkNifSBfRXSkLKk.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Plan Colombia</strong></p><p>Even though the international consensus around the current supply-centric and prohibitionist-oriented approach began to break apart, the US administration conducted in Latin America several expensive operations such as ‘Plan Columbia’ and the ‘Merida Initiative’.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn14">[14]</a> Critics argue that both have failed to stop the flow of illegal drugs and resulted in the spread of regional instability. Authors Doug Stokes and Francisco Ramirez Cuellar go even further and argue that the main intent of the program was not the intended eradication of drugs but to fight leftist guerrillas. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn15">[15]</a><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>During the second half of the 1990s Colombia became the main producer of cocaine. As result of the increasing production, the Colombian government announced in 1999 a strategy known as ‘Plan Colombia<em>’. </em>The first objective was to reduce the production and trafficking of drugs, mainly cocaine by fifty per cent in six years. Secondly, large areas that were under control of armed groups had to be reclaimed. Washington disbursed about $500 million per year between 2000 and 2008 in subsidies to the <em>Fuerzas Militares de Colombia. </em>The military component of Plan Colombia accounted for about 1.1% of Colombia’s yearly GDP during this period, making this Plan one of the largest interventions ever implemented in drug markets in producer countries.</p><p>Using economical tools, Daniel Meijía of the Universidad de los Andes, estimates that the Colombian government faces a net cost of about $0.32 for every dollar that the drug producers are able to obtain from illegal drug production activities, and a net cost of about $0.13 for each dollar that the drug traffickers are able to obtain from their illegal activities. This result can, in some sense, illustrate as to why some Latin American countries have been insistent in attacking drug production activities, despite its ineffectiveness in reducing cocaine production. This also indicates that, while the American objective is to reduce the amount of drugs reaching its borders, the Latin American governments are keener to reduce the total net cost generated by drug production and trafficking activities.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn17">[17]</a></p><p>Interestingly, the social justice and the <em>rule of law </em>components of Plan Colombia have been growing over time, while the military component has been shrinking.</p><p>Through the ‘Merida Initiative’, the U.S. has allocated over $2 billion in aid to Mexico, an aid package agreed upon in 2007 without a year cap, to help Mexico combat organized crime. However, as the recent situation in Mexico has made clear, more countries are beginning to recognise that the cash they acquire from governments of consumer countries to help finance supply-reduction efforts are not sufficient to compensate the high costs they have to pay for maintaining this seemingly endless war on drugs. Colombia has even begun a nationalisation process of the costs of the War on Drugs. Also these current supply-centric and prohibitionist-oriented approaches have ended up displacing the bases of criminal operations to other countries in the region, i.e. the earlier mentioned ‘balloon effect hypothesis’.</p><p>As a result, about three years ago several reports such as The Global Commission on Drug Policy made an urgent call for a revision of prohibitionist drug policies and advocated treating drug consumption as a public health issue. John Collins pleads that in 2016 the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) can and should be used ‘as an opportunity to examine other global regulatory models’. He continues: ‘If, however, the international drug control system fails to respond, national and regional institutions should unilaterally move towards addressing this issue.’<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn18">[18]</a> The goal of a ‘drug-free world’ has also been recognised as an impossible target.</p><p>Prohibition is thus considered extraordinarily expensive on multiple dimensions, including budgetary costs, enrichment of criminal gangs and deprivation of liberty. While the absolutist prohibition approach could not seal the borders, it succeeded in making drugs extremely expensive. Prices of illegal drugs continued to increase substantially as they moved down the supply chain: cocaine prices increased by more than $100 per gram. These price increases were almost entirely due to prohibition. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn19">[19]</a> However, a gram of pure heroin in America now costs about $400, less than half the price, in real terms, that it costs in the 1980s. These days traffickers demand $10.000 or more per kilogram to move cocaine from South America to the U.S. DHL or FedEx, however, will ship a similar package for less than $50.</p><p>Over the past decades drug entrepreneurs proved highly flexible and were thus able to continue or even expand their activities. They profited and often circumvented state attempts to curb their illicit business. As government policies aimed at suppressing the supply of illicit substances, Vanda Felbab-Brown suggests only a maximum of a two-year lag between successful interdiction and eradication. A higher level of violence is also likely as the least efficient and less violent actors are cleared from the drugs market, which can help explain the escalation of drug war violence in the Americas.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn20">[20]</a> More recently she argued quite negatively that ‘there is not one single case over the past five decades where eradication policies succeeded in bankrupting or defeating belligerents<em>.’</em></p><p><strong>Alternative counter-narcotics policies</strong></p><p>Meanwhile, the changing drug use patterns in the U.S. should be highlighting the declining importance of the Andean region for U.S. drug control policy. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): ‘cocaine use is down, while heroin and methamphetamine use is up’. But the biggest “threat” for the U.S. is presented by controlled prescription medicines, which are produced and regulated domestically. In other words, the U.S. is increasingly the source of its own illicit drugs. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn21">[21]</a> Also, these days most of the cannabis in the United States is home grown and nearly half the states have legalised medical marijuana.</p><p>Nonetheless, going after drugs at the “source” in the Andean countries remains at the heart of U.S. international drug control policy, with the amounts of coca eradicated and cocaine interdicted still put forward as the most important indicators of ‘success’.</p><p>Until about 2007 the seven nations of Central America were considered to serve as trans-shipment countries only in the passive sense that the drug passed through their territory. Yet there is a positive evolution in sight. Some Latin American countries, such as Venezuela and Colombia, have launched assaults against these international drug lords to burnish anti-crime credentials, as Washington accused these countries that they were not doing enough to combat drug trafficking.</p><p>More recently the government of the Bolivian President Evo Morales adopted a ‘coca yes, cocaine no’ strategy. Although the UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs banned the coca leaf in 1961 along with cocaine, heroin, opium and morphine, Evo Morales, who is himself a former coca grower or <em>cocalero</em>, has long opposed American eradication efforts and has championed the decriminalization of the leaf since he came into office in 2006, chewing coca in international forums and praising its nutritional qualities. The coca leaf has in fact without significant processing any mind-altering effects and it is chewed in Bolivia to mitigate hunger and increase stamina.</p><p>While cocaine interdiction efforts have continued unabated, the new approach to coca control focuses on gradual and consensual coca reduction through economic development and income diversification, combined with “social control” exerted by powerful coca growers unions. This so-called <em>uno cato </em>policy permits households to cultivate a small area of land with coca. So far, the cooperative coca reduction strategy is working. According to the UNODC 2012 Coca Monitoring Survey net coca cultivation in Bolivia fell twelve per cent in 2011 and another seven per cent in 2012.</p><p>For Coletta Youngers rural economic development, carried out in tandem with gradual coca reduction, offers far more promise of long-term results than forced eradication and could also help pull people out of poverty. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn22">[22]</a> Even if smart alternative livelihoods efforts were undertaken globally, they would not eliminate the global drug trade. People will still be tempered to break the law in order to make a high income. These alternative livelihoods programmes have been no more successful than eradication on a countrywide scale.</p><p>Also, recently arrests of high profile traffickers appeared in the media such as Daniel Barrera, known as <em>El Loco</em>, which was the result of an elaborate four-nation endeavour.</p><p>These counter measurements have been intensified during the 2000s when several anti-trafficking units were created, supervised and financed by the United States. As some cocaine manufacturing and trafficking syndicates produce more than 350.000 kg of cocaine each year, a seizure of more than five million metric tons is no exception these days. Seizures of heroin at the border with Mexico have risen from 560 kg in 2008 to about 2.200 kg in 2013. But military forces tend to be lousy at long-term drug interdiction. They are prone to accept bribes and can abuse human rights when they enforce the law. Some Latin American polices forces have been cleaned out but many officers fired on corruption charges have turned to kidnapping and other criminal activities. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*WfEFzxxbvZSTfTaJ.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Mexico’s struggle</strong></p><p>As Mexico offered ideal geographical, climatic, economic, and political conditions for drug traffickers, for more than 25 years, between 1985 and 2010, the country was the principal transit country for Colombian cocaine entering the U.S. Washington’s belated policies, however, did little to prevent the displacement of the drug industry. It was not until the late 1980s, in the wake of the successful dismantling of Colombia’s drug cartels that Mexican drug organizations rose to their current prominence. As the Colombian route was disrupted, Mexican gangs shifted from being couriers for Colombia to being wholesalers.</p><p>Counter-measures were taken in the past, though mostly ineffective and symbolic, as <em>Time Magazine</em> in 1972 for example reported: ‘the U.S. Air Force was ordered to install radar stations near the U.S.-Mexican border and to maintain fighter inceptors to deter smugglers who transported the drugs into the U.S., flying at “cactus level<em>”</em>.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>Even more, some interdiction measures preoccupied with the suppression of drug flows have evolved into a set of undesirable effects. In Mexico, at the end of 2006 the Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched an intense campaign against his nation’s major Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTO) that resulted in major conflict within the cocaine-smuggling sector; violence reached extraordinary levels, with over 60.000 drug-related homicides in the six years of the Calderón presidency.</p><p>Upon taking office in December 2012, the Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto acknowledged that the War on Drugs launched by his predecessor had also led to serious atrocities by the security forces that continued to mesmerise the country. In early 2013, the administration said that more than 26,000 people had been reported disappeared or missing since 2007. Furthermore the city of Juárez experienced an exodus of approximately 124,000 people seeking safety, some migrating to the Mexican interior and others to the United States.</p><p>Blood spattered cars, mass graves, and corpses with eyes gorged out and left on the pavement, police officers killed by the <em>narco gangsters </em>for no reason other than marking their territory. It has become a common sight in some Mexican cities or <em>ciudades</em> such as Culiacán Rosales and Juárez. According to the most recent survey, up to 73.3 per cent of the Mexican citizens report feeling insecure. Under the current presidency of Peña Nieto a much-celebrated decline in homicides occurred, but the nation’s annual victimization survey indicates that the country remains beset by violent crime. The most common crimes are robbery, extortion, and car theft, as <em>InSight Crime</em> reported.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>One way to explain this evolution is by looking at recent changes in criminal activities. Major drug cartels such as the feared <em>Los</em> <em>Zetas </em>have a wide portfolio of crimes and have therefore expanded their criminal activities with more legal trades, including mining and logging.</p><p><strong>Money laundering</strong></p><p>Drug trafficking between nations and across international borders have contributed greatly to the globalization of crime. As such, DTO’s move their product by land, sea, and air, using commercial or private facilities. International drug lords have discovered that movement between countries can be an excellent way to avoid detection by local authorities. In the context of the War on Drugs, money laundering was not considered much of a problem until the 1980s, when the US started criminalizing money laundering. Today, a person suspected of money laundering is treated as a potential terrorist.</p><p>Money laundering is the process by which illegally obtained money is ‘washed’ for the purpose of concealing its origin. This can be accomplished by (1) the purchase of real estate and automobiles; (2) bringing the cash to a casino, gambling briefly, and then cashing out; (3) breaking a large amount of money down into smaller units and purchasing bearer bonds or money orders (this process is commonly referred to as <em>smurfing)</em>; (4) acquiring a financial institution in a jurisdiction like the Cayman Islands with weak anti-laundering laws.</p><p>Typically, money laundering involves three steps: placement, layering and integration. First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the ‘dirty money’ appears ‘clean’.</p><p>International financial institutions are having a hard time bolstering their systems given the rapidly evolving regulatory environment and growing challenges. These banks have additional and strict policies, if not more, compared to national and international regulations. Some international illegal transactions, however, were kept under the radar of banking regulations. This can be illustrated by a recent case of money laundering whereby the Sinaloa drug cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle cartel in Colombia were allowed to move more than $881 million through HSBC’s U.S. unit from 2006 to 2010.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn26">[26]</a> Western Union, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase&amp;Co, Citigroup, Wachovia amongst many others have also allegedly failed to comply with American anti-money laundering (AML) laws.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>The instruments used so far by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) such as blacklisting, have, due to their lack of transparency and fair treatment of all member states, lacked legitimacy.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn28">[28]</a> Zürn argues that, as actors, who are not directly under the control of nation states, carry out increasingly monitoring and verification of international rules, money-laundering issues face more and more problems that are typical for global regimes.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p><strong>Corruption</strong></p><p>Another obstacle in the region is the high level of corruption and can be narrowly linked to money laundering. Drug cartels have funded political campaigns, have penetrated media outlets and have corrupted the most remote corners of society. More and more criminal organisations, such as the <em>Knights Templar </em>that controlled the state of Michoacan, are becoming entrenched in the local economy and thus they can account undoubtedly for a non-negligible fraction of the nation’s GDP.</p><p>Even more, <em>El Universal </em>has reported that high-level officials of the Sinaloa cartel have met the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents more than fifty times since 2000. The DEA is an United States federal law enforcement agency under the U.S. Department of Justice, tasked with combating drug smuggling and use within the United States. The arrangement allowed the organisation to smuggle billions of dollars of drugs into the U.S. while Sinaloa provided crucial ‘intel’ on rival cartels.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p><strong>Vigilantism</strong></p><p>An increasingly popular form of activism against the drug-related violence in Latin America is <em>vigilantism, </em>whereby citizens take justice into their own hands. In Guatemala, lynching (<em>linchamiento) </em>is used to punish reputed criminals and has reached epidemic proportions. For some scholars it appears to be an extremely detrimental form of negative political capital that demonstrates a lack of willingness to obey the law and a lack of confidence that formal political institutions can provide for public order.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p>In response to the state’s failure to provide security, also Mexican security companies have grown significantly in recent years. Mexico holds third place world-wide in the purchase of security equipment. Mexican government has had serious problems in regulating these companies, most of which are illegitimate since they lack the necessary legal permits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*vMAC_T23MTRDf8Wx.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Privatising the war</strong></p><p>The growing role played by private military and security companies (PMSC) has not gone unnoticed. However, only a limited amount of information is currently available, even though some contractors have been active in the Americas for at least twenty years. Colombia in particular, was the testing ground for the use of military contractors. PMSCs were involved in a wide range activities but the main task undertaken was the aerial eradication of coca crops. From a U.S. perspective one of the great advantages of using contractors is that it reduces the level of scrutiny and concern that normally attends such involvement abroad. Relying so heavily on outside companies, the widespread use of PMSC also worked at cross-purposes with Plan Colombia’s core aim of improving security and the <em>rule of law. </em>These PMSC contractors were employed under bilateral military pacts, which provided US personnel — including contractors — with total immunity.<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn32">[32]</a></p><p>It is also clear that PMSC are active in Mexico. U.S. intelligence has already detected one private military training camp in Mexico, where the cartel forces of the Arellano Felix organisation were trained. Elsewhere in Mexico, several private organisations have hired their own private armies. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn33">[33]</a></p><p>Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman are some of the major PMSC now employed under the Merida Initiative. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn34">[34]</a> The level of impunity with which Mexican drug cartels have been operating, as well as the rise of vigilante groups challenging them, have raised troubling questions about whether the state is in danger of losing its monopoly of the use of force. In this regard, PMSCs present themselves as a potentially valuable alternative, though they represent at the same time a paradoxical solution, as the state is effectively outsourcing its monopoly on violence in order to maintain it. As Kevin O’Brien writes, ‘By privatizing security and the use of violence, removing it from the domain of the state and giving it to private interest, the state in these instances is both being strengthened and disassembled.’<a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn35">[35]</a></p><p>A core rationale for using these military contractors is that they are meant to be cost-effective. There are, however, huge sums of money spent that could instead be used for prevention programmes, development assistance or other non-militarised ways of supporting <em>rule of law </em>initiatives. Therefore there are considerable opportunity costs involved that arise from the prohibitionist approach strictly maintained by the United States. <a href="http://kib.be/#_ftn36">[36]</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The absolutist approach of recent years will mostly be unachievable, and will be particularly problematic in acute weak states where underdeveloped and weak state institutions are standard. Current US drug policies in the Americas link <em>los narcos </em>under the single term “narco-terrorists” and efforts to stem the drug trade have become increasingly militarized.</p><p>Yet interdiction efforts conducted by military forces, will remain a crucial policy tool for weak Latin American states; they also will allow the states to prevent gangs from accumulating coercive power and corruptive power which threatens the security, the <em>rule of law </em>and political integrity of these countries. Internal monitoring is also critical: in many source countries subjected to intense suppression efforts, the top law enforcement officials became the top traffickers.</p><p>Counter-narcotics policies should therefore help to lessen the grip of drugs on society, thereby giving citizens greater confident in the <em>rule of law </em>in their country. The issue of drugs trafficking seen as a national security threat should be transformed into a public safety problem. A more public health oriented and less militarized approach has thus to be considered.</p><p><em>Thomas Thielemans</em></p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Peacock, Steve, ‘Senate Panel Questions whether $3.1 Billion in ‘Drug War’ Contracts were Worthwhile,’ US Trade and Aid Monitor, 2011.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Luhnow, David, ‘Saving Mexico,’ The Wall Street Journal, 2009.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> UNODC, ‘World Drug Report 2014’.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref4">[4]</a>According to <em>World Drug Report 2013 </em>these two markets together are estimated to account for approximately one half of cocaine users globally.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ‘United States — Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study,’ 2010.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Castillo, J., Mejía, D. &amp; Restrepo, P. ‘Scarcity without Leviathan: The Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War,’ Center for Global Development, WP n° 356, 2014.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Lowenheim, O., ‘Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority’ University of Michigan Press., 2009, p. 179.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Chouvy, P.A., ‘A Typology of the Unintended Consequences of Drug Crop Reduction’ Journal of Drug Issues, April 201, vol. 43 no. 2, 2013, pp. 216–230.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref9">[9]</a> (1) ‘The Southern Route’: Afghanistan -&gt; Pakistan -&gt; SE Asia (Heroin, 150 metric tons); (2) Andean region -&gt; USA (Cocaine, 140 metric tons); (3) ‘The Balkan Route’: Afghanistan -&gt; Iran -&gt; Turkey -&gt; Southeast Europe -&gt; Western Europe (Heroin, 105 metric tons); (4) ‘The Northern Route’: Afghanistan -&gt; Central Asia -&gt; Russia -&gt; Western Europe (Heroin, 95 metric tons) and (5) Andean region -&gt; Europe (Cocaine, 60 metric tons).</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Weiner, Daniel, ‘Seeing Drugs<em>. </em>Modernization, Counterinsurgency, and U.S. Narcotics Control in the Third World, 1969–1976,’ Diplomatic Studies, 2011.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Uslu, N., ‘The Turkish-American relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance,’<em>. </em>New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp. 217–252.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Morales, M.C., Morales, O., Menchaca, A.C. &amp; Sebastian, A., ‘The Mexican Drug War and the Consequent Population Exodus: Transnational Movement at the U.S.-Mexican Border,’ Societies, 3, 2013, pp. 80–103.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Dunkerley, James. ‘US foreign policy in Latin America<em>. </em>In US Foreign Policy, edited by Michael Cox, Doug Stokes<strong>, </strong>Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 292.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Bewley-Taylor, D.R.,‘International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured,’ Cambridge University Press, 2012.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Stokes, Doug, ‘America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia,’ Zed Books, 2005.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Cuellar, Francisco Ramirez, ‘The Profits of Extermination: How U.S. Corporate Power is Destroying Colombia,’ Common Courage Press, 2005.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Meijía, Daniel, ‘The War on Drugs under Plan Colombia,’ In Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism. (Eds. by Zedillo, E. &amp; Wheeler, H.), Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Collins, J., ‘The Economics of a New Global Strategy,’ In Ending the Drugs War: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, May 2014.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref19">[19]</a> UNODC, ’World Drug Report 2013,’ Vienna: United Nations, 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organised crime: Concepts and practicalities,’ Modernising Drug Law Enforcement Report II (International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013).</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref21">[21]</a> DEA, ‘2013 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary,’ 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Youngers, Coletta, ‘<em>Shifts in Cultivation, Usage Put Bolivia’s Coca Policy at the Crossroads</em>,’<em>. </em>World Politics Review, 5.12.2013, pp. 1–3.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Ironically, it is commonly held that the birth of all Mexican drug cartels can be traced to former Mexican Judicial Federal Police agent Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, a.k.a ‘El Patrino’. Although he had been known by the DEA for years, Félix Gallardo founded the Guadalajara Cartel in 1980 and controlled virtually all illegal drug trade in Mexico and the trafficking corridors across the Mexico–USA border throughout the 1980s. Langton, J. ‘<em>Gangland: The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels from El Paso to Vancouver</em>,’ Mississauga, Ontario: John Wiley &amp; Sons Canada, 2012.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Time Magazine, quoted in Gooberman, 1974: 184.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Corcoran, P., ‘Mexico Crime Survey Reveals Conflicting Trends,’ InSight Crime, 2014.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Smythe, C., ‘HSBC Judge Approves $1.9B Drug-Money Laundering Accord<em>,’</em> Bloomberg, 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Murphy, D. ‘Money Laundering and The Drug Trade: The Role of the Banks<em>,’ </em>Global Research, 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Unger, B. &amp; van der Linde, D. ‘Research Handbook on Money Laundering<em>,’</em> Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Zürn, M., ‘Global multi-level governance,<em>’</em> In Levi-Faur, D. (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance<em>, </em>Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Gomora, D., ‘La guerra secreta de la DEA en Mexico<em>,’</em> El Universal, 2014.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref31">[31]</a> Booth, J. A. &amp; Seligson, M. A., ‘The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America<em>,’</em> New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref32">[32]</a> Cabrera, I. &amp; Perret, A., ‘Colombia: Regulating Private Military and Security Companies in a Territorial State,’ PRIV-WAR Report–Colombia, National Reports Series 19/09, 2009.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref33">[33]</a> Singer, P.W., ‘Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry,’ Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 17.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref34">[34]</a> Perret, A., ‘Privatization of the War on Drugs in Mexico and Colombia: Limiting the Application of Humanitarian Law and Endangering Human Rights,’ Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law 7, no. 1, 2013, pp. 45–67.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref35">[35]</a> O’Brien, Kevin, ‘Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatised Peacekeeping,’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1998, p. 78.</p><p><a href="http://kib.be/#_ftnref36">[36]</a> Hobson, C., ‘Privatising the war on drugs<em>’. </em>Third World Quarterly, 35:8, 2014, pp. 1441–1456.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://kib.be/articles/757/narconomics-a-stain-on-the-community-of-latin-america"><em>kib.be</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd39cec683a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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