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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tiaan Stals on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tiaan Stals on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Tiaan Stals on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tiaanstals?source=rss-fcc398d28a72------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building our in-house bioreactor control system, Vow Process Control]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/vow-food/building-our-in-house-bioreactor-control-system-vow-process-control-3a6c9031afb0?source=rss-fcc398d28a72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a6c9031afb0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[manufacturing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cultured-meat]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tiaan Stals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Nov 2024 22:05:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-18T22:05:11.653Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xaRyuFq3SvXB5ajkD-Q5tQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>VPC on one of our bioreactors, Simba</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Authors Note:</strong></p><p>Although I wasn’t one of the core contributors to building Vow Process Control, it’s been clear throughout the journey that the team is creating something truly special.</p><p>Sharing our experience is important to me because I want other engineers who enjoy creating new things to know they can do that here at Vow.</p><p>Vow is a first-of-its-kind business. It’s become second nature for us to approach problems from first principles, as we often have no other option — no blueprints to follow. One area where we’ve made significant progress with this approach is in designing and building our own bioreactor control systems. After a successful year validating this approach, we wanted to share our progress and what we’ve learned.</p><h4>Bioreactor Manufacturing: It’s not straightforward</h4><p>Let’s take a trip down memory lane to 2023. Vow had just signed the lease for a large factory in Sydney, planning to fill it with stainless steel bioreactors and the supporting equipment to operate them. We initially took the traditional path of partnering with an external engineering company to co-design and manufacture our bioreactors and their control systems.</p><p>Despite our optimistic expectations, the process started off poorly with incomplete shipments and the complete absence of any kind of instruction manual. Things quickly went from bad to worse, as the promised control software was nowhere near completion. We faced months of delays and escalating costs and needed a solution — fast.</p><p>One of the great things about Vow is our ability to zoom out in moments like these. What do we need to accomplish here? What’s the shortest path to success? If you are the person who offers solutions, you are listened to. If you take action, you are enabled and supported.</p><p>This situation presented the perfect opportunity for Will, one of our engineers. Will had long believed that we could build our own bioreactor control systems. To achieve our goals, it was clear that we couldn’t rely solely on the existing core technology used in the industry — we needed to innovate.</p><h3>Introducing a New Paradigm, Bit by Bit</h3><p>There was an enormous challenge ahead, but also an equally exciting opportunity.</p><p>What needed to be done? In simple terms, we needed to finish assembling our bioreactors and provide a control system that wouldn’t delay us another three months.</p><p>At their core, bioreactor control systems read data from sensors and control actuators. The typical setup (simplified) might resemble the diagram below. The control process starts with the HMI (Human-Machine Interface), usually a touchscreen that lets users interact with the system. The HMI sends input to the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), which is the brain of the control system. The PLC processes these inputs and communicates with the IO (Input/Output) Module, which translates the PLC’s instructions into signals that the sensors and actuators can act upon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nWUVedqwD4Z_4Vsy" /><figcaption>Typical setup for industrial automation systems (simplified)</figcaption></figure><p>We did not have experience utilising industry-standard HMIs or PLCs, and we had a hunch they might not be the best fit for us as a company. Our team had much more exposure to the technologies commonly used for delivering the internet. The question was, could we run our factories differently than everyone else?</p><h3>Software-defined factories</h3><p>Compared to the traditional approach of developing PLC and HMI logic on proprietary systems, utilising software from the “internet stack” offered key advantages:</p><ul><li><strong>Leverage standard software engineering practices</strong>: Version control, modularity, open source software, and access to a growing ecosystem of AI capabilities.</li><li><strong>People</strong>: We could hire from a much larger pool of software engineers instead of specialised industrial automation engineers. Plus, we already had a team of software/systems engineers working at Vow.</li><li><strong>Software reusability and simplicity</strong>: Using software allows us to create helpful abstractions that are reusable for any new device we need to control.</li><li><strong>No vendor lock-in and ease of integration</strong>: We already had strong patterns for cloud monitoring and other software systems that would integrate with our bioreactors in the future. Being in control of these integrations was a major plus.</li><li><strong>Focus</strong>: Vow has unique requirements for industrial automation, particularly in the control of novel bioreactor technologies. By focusing on our use cases, we could choose the best architecture and make development easier.</li></ul><p>We had assessed that the risks of trialling this on one bioreactor was low, and the potential upside enormous. In true Vow spirit, a basic MVP was running one of our bioreactors in two weeks.</p><h3>Our very own Vow Process Control</h3><p>This system became known as Vow Process Control, or VPC as we call it today. Implementation varied slightly across different bioreactors, but the basic architecture is as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bmTkB63scf6N3Ap6" /><figcaption>VPC Architecture</figcaption></figure><p>We have a Python backend (Process Control) running on Linux that does the heavy lifting. The backend directly controls field devices using Modbus or relays commands via an OPC UA server on a PLC. Users interact with the system via a React-based web application, accessible on the touchscreen next to the bioreactor or over our internal network. Time series data is written to a local database and synced with a cloud-based database. The entire system is self-contained and can operate without external network connectivity.</p><p>The scope of Process Control excludes hard real-time requirements like motion control or safety-critical systems and focuses on the control of complex biological processes that evolve relatively slowly.</p><p>Process Control allows developers to configure a “machine” by defining the inputs/outputs it cares about and how to control them. Inputs (e.g., a DO probe) can be used in process functions to precisely control outputs (e.g., oxygen sparging). A basic user interface is automatically generated, allowing immediate testing of the machine’s logic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/708/0*GBIFcEa8OVvych-b" /><figcaption>Insight into the basic building blocks of a VPC application</figcaption></figure><p>The framework also allows developers to define step functions, specific UI elements, alarms, logging, interactive P&amp;ID diagrams, interlocks, and more. Building more complex sequences takes time, but it’s often straightforward — copying sections of standard operating procedures into an IDE and using AI to generate the actual code.</p><h3>Why VPC Has Been So Successful</h3><p>After nearly a year, VPC has been used all across our factories — and it has been a huge enabler of rapid progress and industry-first outcomes. In fact, it has been so successful that we now have a policy that any new systems should default to VPC.</p><p>The success of this approach narrows down to a few factors:</p><ul><li><strong>Speed</strong>: The biggest advantage of VPC is how quickly we can iterate. Issues during bring-up and production can often be debugged and fixed within minutes, with no interruption to the process. This is not a function of the technology itself, but rather a function of having full control over our infrastructure.</li><li><strong>Integration</strong>: We’ve supported seamless integration with our existing infrastructure for higher-level orchestration — working toward our automation goals.</li><li><strong>Building on the internet stack</strong>: VPC leverages many standard technologies from the internet age, benefiting greatly from open source software and tools designed for rapid development. ChatGPT-style software tools have exceeded our expectations, rapidly increasing productivity.</li><li><strong>Data loops</strong>: Our data is continuously collected and fed into our existing infrastructure, maximising learning across the factory floor. We’re collecting nearly 100 million data points every 24 hours.</li><li><strong>Cross-functional understanding</strong>: By owning the entire stack, our engineering teams have built better systems and gained a deeper understanding of bioreactor operations.</li><li><strong>Focused scope</strong>: Unlike conventional generic industrial automation platforms, our specific scope allows us to use Python over low-level IEC languages. Python’s wide adoption, clear syntax, object-oriented nature, and expressiveness allow faster development and more powerful abstractions than PLCs.</li></ul><h3>Looking ahead, the future of VPC and Vow</h3><p>Vow’s mission is to feed billions of people with food they choose selfishly. While great bioreactor control software helps, we need to manufacture cultured meat at a scale the world has never seen, with extremely low costs. VPC is a core part of our future software strategy, but it’s certainly not the end of our innovation.</p><p>The next piece of the puzzle is how to best coordinate across our factory to synchronise our bioreactors, utilities, and post-processing equipment. Ideally, operator involvement will be minimal, and a factory-wide management system will understand how the different pieces of the plant need to work together.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/561/0*m769fIIYHXGPtUfa" /><figcaption>The long term vision for a fully automated factory</figcaption></figure><p>Data remains at the core of our strategy. With nearly 100 million data points collected daily, we’re investing heavily in our data infrastructure. Our goal is to leverage this vast amount of information to drive optimal decision-making across our operations, continually improving our processes and outcomes.</p><p>VPC started as a vision — an optimistic bet that we could better achieve our ambitious goals by solving our most critical problems ourselves. Its success is another example of the barriers Vow is breaking through as we shape the future of food production.</p><h4>Interested in helping us shape the future of food?</h4><p>Please check out our open roles:</p><p><a href="https://www.eatvow.com/careers">https://www.eatvow.com/careers</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a6c9031afb0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/vow-food/building-our-in-house-bioreactor-control-system-vow-process-control-3a6c9031afb0">Building our in-house bioreactor control system, Vow Process Control</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/vow-food">Vow.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mysterious glowing liquid, chef/scientist hybrids & robots. Just your average day at Vow]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/vow-food/mysterious-glowing-liquid-chef-scientist-hybrids-robots-just-your-average-day-at-vow-63ab196d5372?source=rss-fcc398d28a72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63ab196d5372</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tiaan Stals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 May 2024 01:32:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-19T00:44:39.809Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>First impressions really do last</h3><p>Walking onto the factory floor at Vow was awe-inspiring. My eyes were immediately drawn to a floor-to-ceiling stainless steel cylinder. It was inside a glass box with an assortment of tubes, pipes and cables poking out in all directions. I could see a mysterious pink tone glowing from within one of the “peek holes”.</p><p>I walked into a “control area” and saw a large poster explaining a cell’s life cycle posted on the wall. The room was full of computer screens flickering as real-time data flooded in, various pieces of scientific equipment, and what appeared to be some mid-build custom electronics. As we walked around the corner I saw a robotic arm picking up some labware and putting it into another complicated-looking machine. Before exiting, I briefly passed a kitchen where someone that looked like a chef-scientist hybrid was laying out a variety of prototypes across the counter.</p><p>There was a clear pattern: this wasn’t an ordinary business. Working at Vow would be unusual, and I’d learn things that I couldn’t anywhere else. There was an energy in the air, a feeling that these people were on a mission to do something that hadn’t been done before. Every part of the experience drew me in. I knew I had to work here and that every other job that I could get would feel dull in comparison.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TWDjC3DTk5MX7SjE_MQaXA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’ve been at Vow for eighteen months now, and on reflection, my initial impulses were spot on. Vow <em>is</em> unusual. You learn things that you won’t learn anywhere else. Every day is different, and the variety of work you are exposed to would be hard to match. The pace is frantic, the vibes are “chaotic good”, and the experience feels like an emotional rollercoaster, but I could hardly imagine a better place to have started my career after university.</p><p>Vow is launching the Hyper Learners Internship, a program for those early in their career who are open-minded, curious, and want to jumpstart their journey in startups. To illustrate more of what a hyper-learner’s experience at Vow may look like, I’ll share some of my experiences at Vow after having started in an equivalent program and joined full-time thereafter.</p><h3>A mind-exploding first month</h3><p>Vow has a belief that people learn fastest by doing, even if that means making mistakes, all of which we view as opportunities to learn. From Day 1, you’re thrown into this fast-paced environment and given heaps of ownership, but coupled with support and encouragement from the team around you.</p><p>Two key areas I dove into within my first few days at Vow:</p><ol><li><strong>Learning the ins and outs of cell culture. </strong>I hadn’t studied biology since high school, so my first week on the job was a sprint learning the basics of cell culture (i.e., growing cells in an R&amp;D setting). Despite being hired as a software engineer, understanding the core R&amp;D underlying Vow’s food products is hugely important, so I spent a few weeks hands-on in the lab. This experience set the tone for the next few months. Vow expected me to learn how all the different parts of the company worked together, and to <em>really</em> learn it, with hands-on experience. Vow’s culture is largely permissionless: as long as you are being safe you are allowed to get involved anywhere.</li><li><strong>Food safety and manufacturing. </strong>One of the key company priorities early on in my time was obtaining a <a href="https://haccp.com.au/">HACCP certification</a> for our factory, a crucial standard for managing food safety risks within the manufacturing process to ensure that consumers could eat <em>safe</em>, delicious food. To do this, I had to understand <strong>every</strong> step that occurred in our factory, from the very first cell we used in a batch, to the end product, so that I could then help to apply engineering skills to create the right internal tools and systems to enable effective safety tracking, data collection, etc. The best part of going so deep into these new areas was just how kind everyone at Vow was. I asked a lot of questions but always received kind, considerate and thoughtful responses.</li></ol><h3>Some personal highlights</h3><h4>Bioreactors, robots and other machinery</h4><p>Vow is a manufacturing company, which means working with physical machinery: robotic arms, automated liquid handlers, microscopes, bio-analysers, chromatography machines, bioreactors and centrifuges, <em>none </em>of which I’d ever worked with before</p><p>At times I have been a student, learning in high levels of detail how one of our cell counters works or thinking about how to better regulate the back pressure in a centrifuge. Other times I have been given ownership of large open-ended projects, such as managing the creation of an automated media mixing process, and given free rein to make it a reality. Vow moves at a pace that is impossible to match for the typical vendors in the biotechnology industry, which often leads us to build in-house solutions ourselves. Because of this, I’ve had incredible opportunities to build first of their kind machinery and tools, ranging from in-house bioreactor control systems to getting my hands dirty assembling a physical bioreactor.</p><h4>Mammoth Meatball mayhem</h4><p>Two weeks before Vow wanted to share its now infamous Mammoth Meatball, we realised that we didn’t have a website live that the world could visit to learn more about this very special project (i.e., the creation of a meatball from DNA extracted from the long-extinct woolly mammoth). I made a case that this was a worthwhile priority, and suddenly I was involved. Despite not considering myself a web design person at all, “that’s not my job” is never a phrase you hear at Vow, so the new task was mine to run with.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*H9_hx6L6ZMcSbIiAwyy5xg.jpeg" /></figure><p>To make this website happen, I needed designs, a tool to build it with, and the content we wanted to share. I was thrown in the deep end and had to figure out everything, ranging from how to find and support a good freelance designer, negotiate a contract with them, implement their designs in the website builder, and implement the analytics tools we needed to understand what was happening. The largest takeaway from that project was learning that whilst experience matters, you only need first principles thinking and a genuine desire to accomplish something even if it’s completely new for you.</p><h4>I thought I had good taste…</h4><p>As someone who loves food, you can only imagine my excitement when I was added to Vow’s internal sensory evaluation panel. Put simply, one of our quality control processes is making sure what we produce tastes as we expect: it should be delicious. Our panel was trained by an external sensory evaluation company through which I “learned” how to actually taste and give more critical feedback around food, its properties, characteristics, etc. Now, every time the product team develops a new dish we get to taste it first; often we’re the first in the world to taste the weird and wonderful prototypes and give feedback to shape the direction the company moves in. It is a minor thing, but to me, it is symbolic of the variety of experiences you are exposed to at Vow and how we believe that everyone on the team is part of our mission to help create delicious, sustainable food.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OqJnuH5c3lqPEy7DGSFoXA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>BLE (Big Learning Energy)</h3><p>Trying to distil learnings from the last 18 months is a challenge, but I’ll highlight two key lessons which resonate from my experiences:</p><ol><li><strong>Don’t underestimate your ability to become an expert, especially in new technologies, quickly. </strong>Whilst it may sound like Vow is the kind of place where you become a jack of all trades, master of none, you will undoubtedly be allowed to become a specialist in <em>something</em>. We have world-class talent in several disciplines, and as part of your growth, you will be mentored by very experienced colleagues and then given the opportunity to use these skills to build out and develop new technologies, products, etc. As a software engineer, I felt supported in developing pure, critical software engineering skills, but Vow also made an active effort to help me develop and level up across many skills and areas of the business. The team has a strong belief in nurturing employees and developing the best talent base in the world. If there is one thing about Vow that is truly special, it’s the people. They are unlike anywhere else.</li><li><strong>The ‘softer skills’ may be the more critical ones to help you grow and for companies to achieve their mission.</strong> Back when interviewing with Vow, I asked: “What is the thing you have learnt at Vow that surprised you most?” My interviewer answered that Vow has a truly diverse range of teams and expertise: engineers, scientists, manufacturing operators, project managers, regulatory teams, marketing and product development. Every one of these teams almost speaks a different language, has been trained in different ways, and sees problems from different perspectives. Learning to work collaboratively with such diversity is something that I don’t think I could have learnt anywhere else, but I’m increasingly convinced just how important it is. At Vow, you learn to communicate clearly, manage projects with a fine-tuned attention to detail, and to work effectively with the diversity of people around you. You’re prompted to appreciate that your colleagues might possess distinct skills and have unique perspectives, yet you all share a common goal and can benefit from each other’s insights. For the rest of my career, I believe the skills I acquired working with such a diverse range of people will serve me both at Vow and beyond.</li></ol><h4>Sound like your vibe?</h4><p>If you’re eager to learn, a clever and curious generalist, or a tech nerd looking for an out-of-the-box career path, we’d love to hear from you.</p><p>Find out more and apply here:</p><p><a href="https://www.eatvow.com/jobs/hyper-learners-internship">Vow - Hyper-learners Internship</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63ab196d5372" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/vow-food/mysterious-glowing-liquid-chef-scientist-hybrids-robots-just-your-average-day-at-vow-63ab196d5372">Mysterious glowing liquid, chef/scientist hybrids &amp; robots. Just your average day at Vow</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/vow-food">Vow.</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Avoiding geopolitical risk in the Australian agriculture sector]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tiaanstals/avoiding-geopolitical-risk-in-the-australian-agriculture-sector-cfb09e7ed85a?source=rss-fcc398d28a72------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfb09e7ed85a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tiaan Stals]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2020 11:40:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-21T11:40:32.693Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ystPyn-LKmnlRauXiUYLHQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Geopolitical risk, but more specifically, trade-based economic coercion from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) presents as arguably the most considerable risk to the Australian agriculture sector, rivalled only by climate change. Following the ascent of Xi Jinping to power in 2012, the CCP has reaffirmed more authoritarian values, often at odds with liberal democracies.¹ Chinese objection on the political scene has since spilled over into trade strategy, leaving every country with a dependence on China heavily exposed to political manipulation. Industries like agriculture and mining are at risk as Australia increases efforts to protect its sovereignty, hold the CCP accountable and upholds its values. To mitigate this risk, governments should focus on long term efforts, including business education, trade partner diversification and political discipline. In the short term, a tit-for-tat trade strategy may be useful in reducing the frequency of the CCP’s attempts at political strong-arming but should be avoided if possible due to the destructive nature. Individual farmers also hold responsibility for crop and revenue stream diversification, whilst the Australian insurance market may see some value in a novel political risk insurance product to protect farmers and serve as a new revenue stream. We cannot deny the Australia agriculture sector has left itself exposed due to customer concentration; however, as participants become aware of the risk, a significant reduction is possible.</p><p>Contemplating risk within the Australian agricultural sector requires targets. What quantity or progression becomes jeopardised by the realisation of a risk factor? The National Farmer’s Foundation (NFF) is the peak body representing farmers and more broadly agriculture across Australia. The NFF developed a roadmap to exceed farm gate output of $100B by 2030, known simply as the “2030 Roadmap”. This roadmap is widely accepted as the industry target, representing approximately a $40B (67%) increase from where we stand today.² The $100B figure is also $16B above the predicted output at current trends — meaning there would have to an acceleration of growth on today’s standards. In specific regard to trade, the NFF roadmap seeks to “<em>Champion efforts to open new markets, reduce tariffs and increase quotas for Australian produce</em>”, with the metric measuring this progress listed as “<em>An average tariff faced by agricultural exports of 5%</em>”. The NFF Roadmap also makes specific reference to a goal of a 50% reduction in exports which experience non-tariff barriers. During the development of the 2030 Roadmap, the NFF consulted with 380 industry stakeholders including both private sector and government entities, farmers, researchers, educators and government.</p><p>The goals seen in the 2030 Roadmap and projections from the discussion paper feature a key trend which is of significance; they include robust demand from Asia, and incredibly strong demand and growth in demand from China. James Fell from The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARES) comments, <em>“The rise of food consumption in China will be characterised by a move towards more western-style diets, with higher intake of high-value foods, such as dairy products, beef, sheep and goat meat, fruit and vegetables. Consumption of starchy staples, such as rice, is expected to fall as rising incomes allow households to diversify the foods they consume.”³</em> A 2014 Report by ABARES titled “What Asia Wants” neatly summarises the general industry consensus:</p><blockquote>“In China, sustained income growth is projected to lead to significantly higher demand for many food commodities. Compared with 2007, the real value of consumption in 2050 is projected to rise by 18 per cent for coarse grains (in 2007 US dollars hereafter), 61 per cent for vegetable oil, nearly double for sugar and beef, 75 per cent for sheep and goat meat and more than double for dairy products. Higher domestic consumption is expected to lead to increased import demand for these commodities.”⁴</blockquote><p>These are two examples, but the overarching message within the industry is that China is expected to continue being the heavyweight they are today — and even accelerate growth from here. To be clear, this is no critique of ABARES or the NFF Roadmap. These projections are based on evidence, historical trends and many thousands of hours of in-depth consultation with relevant stakeholders. In all likelihood, the Australian agricultural sector will continue to export a large share of production to China with little deviation from the current path.</p><p>There are several conclusions we must draw from this assumption. Firstly, even though the likelihood is that nothing will change — we must consider the situation in which things do change. In what scenario can we no longer rely on a robust Chinese export market? Related to this, but a more worrying implication — if the future of Australian agriculture is China-dominated, then China, but more specifically the CCP, holds a large degree of power in determining the Australian agricultural future.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/369/1*dUxL-_LFFliyNm6CZEf4jg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1 — ABS Export Share China vs Japan (2019). Some figures adjusted for confidentiality</figcaption></figure><p>How much power? Of course, this is a difficult question to answer. To get some rough estimates, however, we can consider the role China occupies today. The Rural Bank estimates China accounted for 28.4% of Australian agricultural exports in FY2018–19, with a compound annual growth rate of 15.8% over the last ten years.⁵ China is also the major exporter for all commodity groups, excluding vegetables, sugar and beef. China is so important to Australian agricultural exports that it accounts for more export value than the next three export markets (USA, Japan and the Middle East/North Africa).</p><p>The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicates that around two-thirds of agricultural products produced in Australia are exported, with only 35% on the revenues going to the sector coming from domestic consumers.⁶</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/404/1*OHy3myd3Uk7qLniGicn85A.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2 — Perth USAsia Centre submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic</figcaption></figure><p>These figures are disconcerting if you are a stakeholder in Australian agriculture and even the Australian economy generally. Export dependence increases the economic risk to exogenous shocks, and the magnitude of that risk is strongly correlated to export concentration.⁷ Whilst exogenous shocks present a threat, this does not even consider a more pressing issue at the heart of the matter: China relies heavily on trade-based economic coercion to further the diplomatic goals of the CCP.</p><p>As China’s industrial dominance has grown since the early 2000s, the CCP has increasingly relied upon economic means to punish countries and businesses that cross Chinese interests on sensitive issues. In an article published in the Quarterly Essay, Peter Hartcher details at least 11 examples of the CCP imposing specific trade tariffs for transgressions of Chinese interests from trading partners in the last ten years.⁸ These transgressions include wide-ranging political matters such as territorial disputes, support for dissidents, support for democracy in Hong Kong/Taiwan and even the installation of US missile defence systems by regional neighbours. A key characteristic of this approach is that the CCP likes to have plausible deniability, and often targets particular industries citing some disruption to trade utilising the complex WTO laws. As the Lowy Institute writes, “Rather than publicly announcing formal legal sanctions and linking them to a foreign policy dispute, Beijing typically denies that it is imposing economic punishments while explaining the disruption to trade by reference to other plausible justifications.⁹ The China-US trade war was not included in Hartcher’s analysis, but the tit-for-tat tariff war gives us an indication of how quickly tariffs can negatively affect an industry. The US agricultural sector saw exports to fall from $15.8B to $5.9B between 2017 and 2018.¹⁰</p><p>Australia has begun to feel the might of Chinese economic power following the Morrison government’s stance on several issues; Banning Huawei from the 5G network, speaking up about human rights abuses in Xinjiang and advocacy of an international inquiry into the origins of coronavirus. The Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, denounced the Australian government’s involvement (into the coronavirus probe) as “dangerous” and politically motivated. The Ambassador further added that Chinese consumers might lose their taste for Australian beef and wine.¹¹ Following this interview with the Australian Financial Review, China imposed 80.5% tariffs on Australian barley, much higher than the expected 56.14% following the anti-dumping investigation initiated in 2018.¹² Alongside this, China also banned four major abattoirs from trade, citing labelling issues, and another for chemical detection.¹³ An anonymous beef analyst from China noted that the latest ban was politically motivated:</p><blockquote>“This announcement is partly related to the current difficult China-Australia relationship… China Customs destroyed the whole batch of goods and it will have a strong psychological impact to Australian beef traders. They will shy away from Australia suppliers and increase beef import from other regions… To be honest, I’ve warned my friends in the beef-importing business not to touch Australian beef this year. It is extremely risky due to the frosty China-Australia relationship.”¹⁴</blockquote><p>China also followed through with its threat on wine, launching an anti-dumping probe into Australian exports of wine and one week later another countervailing-duties investigation into containers less than 2 litres. Dr Jeffrey Wilson from the Perth USAsia Centre commented in an interview with the ABC “China’s probe against Australian wine follows the same logic as recent moves against barley — the use of seemingly ‘technical’ trade measures to disguise what is fundamentally a political sanction”.¹⁵ More recently, China also announced it would apply enhanced inspections on shipments of wheat arriving in Australia.¹⁶ As tensions cool further, these types of measures will become the norm. Another factor to consider is Australia’s close relationship with the US. Australia-US allegiance will become a key talking point as China moves into superpower status. We can easily find more examples of such behaviour from the CCP. The question then becomes, how exactly can we protect Australian farmers against such political risk?</p><p>On a macro level, an effective strategy would need to include Federal government policy to circumvent the ‘economic coercion’ from the CCP mentioned above, whilst simultaneously preserving economic prosperity in Australia. Pathways in this direction are numerous; however, we will consider how the Australian government can utilise game theory to guide economic policy regarding the CCP. In 2018 the Chinese economy was 9.4 times the size of the Australian economy¹⁷, and Chinese exports accounted for 6.7% of Australian GDP.¹⁸ In the same period Australia only accounted for 1.9% of China’s exports.¹⁹ You may then ask the question; if Australia has such power relative to China, how can we model interactions using game theory which depends on relatively equal power. A possible answer lies in China’s reliance on Australian iron ore. In 2019, China imported a staggering 62% of its iron ore from Australia, almost three times as much as the second closest competitor, Brazil, with 21%.¹⁹ Foreign affairs analyst Darren Lim from the Australian National University commented on the hesitation of the CCP to implement sanctions that may affect the production side. “They view the political costs of such disruption (in terms of job losses and ripple effects) to be too great”.²⁰ As with any trade flow, involving iron ore in a dispute will cut both ways. Australia exports 90% of its iron ore to China²¹, and iron ore accounts for around 30% of Australian exports.²² Iron ore is the nuclear option — Australia should avoid using it if possible, not to mention that it would be highly unusual Australia to engage in such a policy.</p><p>Game theory allows us to model how using export restrictions on China will play out. Consider a 2-move game, in which China moves first. This game is a highly simplified model but allows us to think about how the Australian government should respond to Chinese actions and the relative payoff of different responses. This sort of model is especially crucial in the short term, where other reform measures such as diversification and subsidies for agriculture are out of scope. Note, in considering the binary reality of “Tariff” vs “No Tariff”, the tariffs here represent relatively equivalent quantities. E.g. an 80% tariff on Australian barley could be met with a +30% increase on import duty for manufactured steel from China, both with relatively equal monetary effects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/341/1*N5UIKSCzGL9U3B87dTnfvg.png" /></figure><p>We can see here from the respective payoff values (China.Australia), that having open trading policies is in the best interests of both partners. When there are two-way tariffs, this does not particularly benefit anyone. The propensity of China to impose tariffs as the aggressor means that Australia is likely to be faced with the right-hand scenario. In this situation, it may be of value to impose a tariff or trade restriction on China. As we have seen with the US-China trade war; however, this sort of tit-for-tat style of trade negotiations leads to both parties being worse off. The ultimate goal of such a strategy is short-term destruction, leading to more cooperative policy in the longer term. If Australia places a trade restriction on iron ore, it will hurt the CCP politically and force them to reconsider utilising economic means to assert foreign policy objectives.</p><p>Conversely, would be an incredibly unpopular domestic policy considering the relative value of iron ore exports. In the short term, this is one of the very few options available to the Australian government apart from conceding to the whims of the CCP, or doing nothing at all and suffering the losses induced by tariffs. It is worth noting that such losses may direct the market towards alternative trade partners — a desirable outcome. We can conclude that although there is merit in dealing with Chinese coercion using a tit-for-tat strategy, using it is a last resort.</p><p>On a longer timeframe, we can suggest some slightly more preferable strategies for dealing with the economic coercion of China, but there will be no easy options. As Sam Roggeveen from the Lowy Institute writes, “The word ‘diversification’ trips far too easily off the tongues of Australian strategic commentators.”²³ Consider the dollar value of exports going to China, estimated at $12.3B in FY2018–19.²⁴ To make a meaningful divergence or ‘diversification’ to say only 20% of Australia’s agricultural exports (currently ~ 30%) would require finding a new market for $4B worth of exports. That’s equivalent to the value of Australian agricultural exports to the USA. Long term diversification will take time and require sustained efforts. Australia has begun to take steps to build better trading relationships with other partners, including hosting the ASEAN summit in 2018, the Indian Economic Strategy²⁵ and working on expanding Australia’s free trade network. In February 2020 parliament also begun an Inquiry into Diversifying Australia’s Trade and Investment Profile.²⁶ Some other ideas the government could implement in the short run include:</p><ul><li>The Morrison government needs to operate with discipline regarding China. No unnecessary provocation but also not caving to their impositions on sovereignty</li><li>Ensure the businesses sector has the necessary information to deal with the risks that dealing with China entails, including trade disruptions, cyber risk, manipulation and intimidation</li><li>Provide more resources through DFAT and other organisations to help businesses diversify output, diversify buyers and encourage long term thinking.</li></ul><p>The goal here is to reduce the volatility induced by trade issues on Australian farmers. Volatility makes conducting business in any form difficult and reduces the likelihood of long-term survival. ABARES included a thought-provoking section on their 2020 Snapshot of Agriculture, indicating the high levels of risk faced by Australian farmers. The report suggests Australian farmers face the highest natural and economic volatility out of the 15 countries surveyed.²⁷ The last resort for the government will be to give high levels of subsidies to Australian farmers. Subsidies are always tricky, become highly contentious and if possible, should be avoided.</p><p>Individual operators in the agricultural value chain similarly hold a responsibility to mitigate China-specific risk. Farmers should consider buyers in other countries, even if at slightly lower prices. A report by ABARES notes a significant possibility for export growth in India, with “Income growth, population growth and urbanisation are projected to underpin large increases in agri-food consumption in the future”. The report also concludes that “Dairy products, fruit and vegetables will be those commodities most strongly in demand by 2050” as agricultural consumption will double by 2050.²⁸ Of course, there are significant challenges associated with entering a new market. India has relatively closed agricultural markets and doesn’t lend itself towards imports/exports trade like China. Market barriers present enormous obstacles for entering both the EU and Indonesia, and higher levels of effort into free trade agreements will be required to enter these markets.²⁹ That being said, Australia likely has a China problem because Australia has always focused on China. If the rest of the world gets more attention, the likelihood for increased access and potential earnings increases significantly. Farmers could also consider alternative lines of revenues — such as biofuels or carbon capture and sequestration. The Emissions Reduction Fund run by the Clean Energy Regulator is an example of a pathway to achieve this.³⁰ The ERF offers Australian carbon credit units for negative emissions entities, providing payment for carbon sequestered. Farmers will need to address these issues on a case by case basis; however, the message is clear — there is an inherent risk in having a customer concentration with China.</p><p>One last point worth considering revolves around easily the most effective means society deals with uncertainty: insurance. Most major insurers offer some form of political risk insurance today³¹ ³², but these policies are mostly cover for war, civil unrest or embargoes. Agricultural insurance is also usually focused on natural events; even Multi-Peril crop insurance does not include such a risk. Therein lies a unique opportunity for insurance companies in Australia to work directly with farmers to ensure there is some form of financial cover for trade-related losses. Generally, crop insurance is complicated due to the highly specific nature of a given farm, their farming practices and the information available to the insurance company. Trade-related insurance would be quite generic and could be utilised as a once-off payout that gives farmers time to reconsider their options, or possibly diverge away from trade affected crops. Insurers could also assess geopolitical risk on an annual basis and give farmers an indication of the expected premiums for different produce, allowing farmers to understand the risk more effectively. An insurance market will also help to discourage the concentration of trading partners as premiums go up, increasing market efficiency as capital flows follow the inverse of risk (premiums).</p><p>The Australian agricultural industry and government must realise the exceptional risk brought on by extensive trade with a trading partner that is willing to manipulate. Such risk is unpredictable and leaves us open as a nation to a compromise on our values, something that is unthinkable for most Australians. These risks need to be dealt with to ensure the long-term prosperity of the agricultural industry.</p><h3>References</h3><p>1. Xi Jinping Thought. (2020). Retrieved 20 September 2020, from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi_Jinping_Thought">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi_Jinping_Thought</a> 2030 Roadmap</p><p>2. AustralianFarmers. (2020). Retrieved 20 September 2020, from <a href="https://farmers.org.au/roadmap/">https://farmers.org.au/roadmap/</a></p><p>3. The future of Chinese agricultural policy — Department of Agriculture. (2020). 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Australian Financial Review; Australian Financial Review. <a href="https://www.afr.com/companies/agriculture/china-slaps-new-ban-on-aussie-beef-20200828-p55q5x">https://www.afr.com/companies/agriculture/china-slaps-new-ban-on-aussie-beef-20200828-p55q5x</a></p><p>15. China launches anti-dumping investigation into Australian wine exports — ABC News. (2020, August 18). ABC News. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-18/china-launches-investigation-into-australian-wine-exports/12569640">https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-18/china-launches-investigation-into-australian-wine-exports/12569640</a></p><p>16. China puts Australia on notice over wheat exports — ABC News. (2020, September 14). ABC News. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2020-09-14/china-put-australia-on-notice-over-wheat-exports/12661710">https://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2020-09-14/china-put-australia-on-notice-over-wheat-exports/12661710</a></p><p>17. Countryeconomy. (2020). 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Australian Financial Review; Australian Financial Review. <a href="https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/why-china-needs-australian-iron-ore-20200514-p54sts">https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/why-china-needs-australian-iron-ore-20200514-p54sts</a></p><p>21. Fickling, D. (2020, September 12). Australia Has a Nuclear Option in Its China Diplomacy. Bloomberg.Com; Bloomberg. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-12/australia-china-diplomacy-economic-ties-come-down-to-iron-ore">https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-12/australia-china-diplomacy-economic-ties-come-down-to-iron-ore</a></p><p>22. Salomae Haselgrove. (2020, July 27). Iron ore becomes Australia’s $100bn export industry — Australian Mining. Australian Mining. <a href="https://www.australianmining.com.au/news/iron-ore-exceeds-100bn-in-export-value/">https://www.australianmining.com.au/news/iron-ore-exceeds-100bn-in-export-value/</a></p><p>23. Roggeveen, S. (2020, July 15). Canberra vs Beijing: Getting serious about costs. Lowyinstitute.Org; The Interpreter. <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/canberra-vs-beijing-getting-serious-about-costs">https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/canberra-vs-beijing-getting-serious-about-costs</a></p><p>24. Overview of recent ABARES China research — Department of Agriculture. (2014). Agriculture.Gov.Au. <a href="https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/trade/overview-recent-china-research#events-in-china-affect-australian-farmers">https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/trade/overview-recent-china-research#events-in-china-affect-australian-farmers</a></p><p>25. An India Economic Strategy To 2035 — Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2018). Dfat.Gov.Au. <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/index.html">https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/index.html</a></p><p>26. 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Agriculture.Gov.Au. <a href="https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/publications/insights/opportunities-in-india#india-is-a-highly-protected-market">https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/publications/insights/opportunities-in-india#india-is-a-highly-protected-market</a></p><p>29. Diversification: trade mission impossible? (2020). Anz.Com. <a href="https://bluenotes.anz.com/posts/2020/06/its-global-trade-disruption-diversification-china-covid19">https://bluenotes.anz.com/posts/2020/06/its-global-trade-disruption-diversification-china-covid19</a></p><p>30. Step 4-Delivery and payment. (2020). Cleanenergyregulator.Gov.Au. <a href="http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Want-to-participate-in-the-Emissions-Reduction-Fund/Step-4-Delivery-and-payment">http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Want-to-participate-in-the-Emissions-Reduction-Fund/Step-4-Delivery-and-payment</a></p><p>31. Political Risk — Insurance from AIG in Australia. (2020). Aig.Com.Au. <a href="https://www.aig.com.au/business/products/political-risk">https://www.aig.com.au/business/products/political-risk</a></p><p>32. Political Risk Insurance | Aon. (2020). Aon.Com. <a href="https://www.aon.com/middle-east/risk-solutions/political-risk-insurance.jsp">https://www.aon.com/middle-east/risk-solutions/political-risk-insurance.jsp</a></p><h3>Images</h3><p>· Figure 1 — <a href="https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/publications/insights/future-of-chinese-agricultural-policy#changes-bring-opportunities-and-challenges-for-australias-exporters">https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/publications/insights/future-of-chinese-agricultural-policy#changes-bring-opportunities-and-challenges-for-australias-exporters</a></p><p>· Figure 2 — <a href="https://twitter.com/JDWilson08/status/1283907414819876864">https://twitter.com/JDWilson08/status/1283907414819876864</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfb09e7ed85a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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