<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tiger Capital Management on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tiger Capital Management on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tigercapmgmt?source=rss-e4142ca3917------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:40:49 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@tigercapmgmt/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[21Vianet — A Turnaround Story at the Heart of China’s Cloud]]></title>
            <link>https://tigercapmgmt.medium.com/21vianet-a-turnaround-story-at-the-heart-of-chinas-cloud-b55c9997997c?source=rss-e4142ca3917------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b55c9997997c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[data-center]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iaas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tiger Capital Management]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2021 03:23:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-26T03:36:53.483Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Industrials &amp; Energy Group</h4><h3>21Vianet — A Turnaround Story at the Heart of China’s Cloud</h3><h4>Rare opportunity where an inflection on an S-Curve meets significant undervaluation</h4><p><em>Tiger Capital Management’s Industrials &amp; Energy Group: Ryan Jiang ’23, Autumn Tan ’23, Katie Kolodner ’24, Yash Parikh ’24, Grace Zhuang ’23, and Muhammad Umar ‘22</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*SP2F5UMsgGfwksNS.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Executive Summary</strong></h3><p>21Vianet is the Industrials &amp; Energy group’s highest conviction idea for 2021. We believe 21Vianet is a <strong><em>3-bagger</em></strong> in the next two years as the multi-year overhang continues to clear, hard catalysts play out, and the company successfully transitions to a more attractive business model. This is a classic case of a company’s messy history resulting in investors overlooking a clear turnaround story. 21Vianet is a Chinese mid-cap that faced fraud allegations in 2014, saw consistent management misexecution from 2014–2017, failed a privatization transaction in 2015, and until Dec. 2020, certain institutional shareholders were expected to dump large block-sales onto the market. Thus, the #2 data center provider at the center of one of the great investment themes of the decade trades at a 45% discount to peers.</p><p>This investment has two premises:</p><ol><li>The overhang around the name has finally cleared and VNET will continue to re-rate to peers (VNET currently at 20x 2021 EBITDA vs $GDS and $CD at &gt;35x 2021 EBITDA).</li><li>Sell-side is severely mismodeling VNET’s incremental margins as it transitions from retail to wholesale data centers. We are 40% above sell-side consensus for 2023 EBITDA due to our modeling of operating leverage.</li></ol><p>Our price target is <strong>$126.37 </strong>by the end of 2022 from $36.83 today, reflecting a<strong> 95% IRR</strong>.</p><h3><strong>Company Overview</strong></h3><p>21Vianet is a carrier- and cloud-neutral internet data center provider, enabling customers to store their servers in “cabinets” inside of their data centers. They provide hosting services (storing a customer’s data) and value-added services such as VPN or cloud management, charged mostly on a recurring monthly revenue basis (&gt;90% of revenue is recurring). It manages 51,476 cabinets inside of 85 data centers in China, primarily concentrated around tier 1 cities like Beijing and Shanghai.</p><p>There are two types of data centers: retail and wholesale. Retail data centers serve multiple customers, each using a few cabinets for their servers to run their own operations. Wholesale data centers are built to the specifications of a particular client who uses the entire data center. Because wholesale clients source bandwidth separately and utilization rates are higher, wholesale cabinets have higher incremental margins (&gt;70% EBITDA) than retail cabinets (~55% EBITDA). 21Vianet is currently transitioning from retail to wholesale, with wholesale expected to make up 80% of net cabinet adds through 2023.</p><h3><strong>Industry Dynamics</strong></h3><p><em>China’s cloud is three to five years behind the United States, and they are nearing the inflection point for widespread cloud adoption.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/908/1*YKSXJB9eto3961PPhpGqSA.png" /><figcaption>Our build for China’s IDC Demand</figcaption></figure><p>On the demand side, both major public cloud providers and emerging technology leaders are significantly ramping up data center capital expenditures. Alicloud expects to spend RMB 200B on data centers in the next 3 years (&gt;100% of their revenue per year), and Baidu is targeting 333k cabinets by 2030 (from 50k est. today). Moreover, emerging technology players like ByteDance and PinDuoDuo are increasingly demanding private/hybrid cloud servers, and wholesale data providers are the beneficiaries of this demand. We expect 70% of this CapEx to be outsourced to data center operators rather than in-house, which will result in demand significantly outpacing near-term supply and subsequently pressuring pricing upwards. Note that we do not model in any pricing increases — it is a free call option on the investment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*spjzdt-rqICDFTMOVbGVeg.png" /><figcaption>Our build for China’s IDC Supply</figcaption></figure><p>On the supply side, there are seven relevant carrier-neutral data center operators and three major telecom data center operators. While the three major telcos make up &gt;60% of the market today, these telcos do not meet the needs of growing enterprises in China and thus will lose market share to carrier-neutral operators. We expect telco data centers to be market share donors as they grow at a ~3% CAGR over the next three years. Comparatively, the consensus industry projection is a significant y/y topline acceleration to 41% in 2021 vs 37% in 2020 and 27% in 2019 for the seven top carrier-neutral data center operators. Among carrier-neutral operators, we believe that 21Vianet is a strong #2 (behind GDS), with 15% market share among the seven players. Our projections for the seven players indicate that 21Vianet will gain significant market share in the next 3 years, increasing to 21% market share by the end of 2023.</p><h3>Investment Thesis</h3><h4><strong>Thesis Point 1: Sell-side is significantly mis-modeling operating leverage as 21Vianet transitions to wholesale.</strong></h4><p>The unit economics of 21Vianet’s transition is incredibly messy to model, and sell-side consensus does not understand the incoming inflection upwards in EBITDA margins.</p><p><strong>1A: Wholesale cabinet incremental EBITDA margins are ~70%, significantly higher than retail (at ~58%)</strong></p><p>We estimate the unit economics for wholesale cabinet costs to be 20% depreciation, 21% utilities, 5% rent/operations/maintenance, and 6% labor, reflecting a 68% incremental EBITDA margin. On the other hand, we estimate the unit economics for retail cabinet costs to be 18% depreciation, 2% operations/maintenance, 4.5% labor, and 35% utilities/bandwidth, reflecting a 58% incremental EBITDA margin. The bridge between these margins is higher retail bandwidth costs (20–25% of retail costs), offset by slightly lower labor and maintenance costs as well as slightly higher pricing. Moreover, wholesale data centers tend to have higher utilization rates (&gt;90%) versus retail (80–85%), spreading fixed costs over more units. Thus, retail data centers have ~40–50% EBITDA margins fully ramped versus wholesale at &gt;65%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*C0j9_bVUu58riV35" /><figcaption>Wholesale unit economic breakdown per GDS &amp; our estimates.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JGqVmzuq492r7hah" /><figcaption>Retail unit economic breakdown for a Chinese peer.</figcaption></figure><p>Our unit economic breakdown is derived from a mix of filings in Chinese from competitors (AtHub, BJ Sinnet, Baosight) and industry reports that have a much clearer understanding of the on-the-ground economics when compared to American sell-side analysts. We’ve also confirmed these margins with management comments (Q4 2019 — indicated adj. EBITDA margins &gt;70% for wholesale), GDS’s (a wholesale competitor) cost breakdowns, and project IRR numbers (10–15% unlevered, &gt;20% levered given 70/30 debt/equity financing) from multiple players in the space.</p><p><strong>1B: Sell-side’s projections of 34.7% EBITDA margins in 2023 do not make sense given the mix of net cabinet adds during the next three years. We project a 40.9% EBITDA margin in 2023 based on the project pipeline.</strong></p><p>During the last earnings call, management raised guidance from 15k net adds annually from 2021–2023 to 25k net cabinet adds annually during the same period. This is a significant acceleration of cabinet growth — their current cabinet count is ~51k, indicating that 21Vianet will more than double cabinet count by the end of 2022. Our thesis is that 21Vianet will be ~60% wholesale by 2024 (from 20% today), which bridges our delta to the Street consensus given higher wholesale margins. Such an assumption drives our ~40% 2023 EBITDA margin (vs wholesale peer EBITDA margins of ~47–50%).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WgdM71nFT3Kw6MtEd7emSw.png" /><figcaption>Cabinet Breakdown by Project through 2023</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yAuKxXiOa0oV9Xha0UMPzg.png" /><figcaption>Corresponding utilization rates given project breakdown, ramp-up trends, and economics</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YraUmvDSZUfAFQK7FyzRNQ.png" /><figcaption>Wholesale vs Retail Mix by Project</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ovb0hlO6Pdk56nkzPgJtaQ.png" /><figcaption>Corresponding GP given unit economics depicted above</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Our conviction comes from the following:</strong></p><ul><li>We noted that management guidance for 25k cabinets &amp; equivalent 180MW of capacity added annually implicitly guides for ~80% of these net adds to be wholesale (21Vianet’s wholesale cabinets are 8kw vs. 5kw for retail).</li><li>Our analysis of the projects in their pipeline (which they do not cleanly disclose wholesale/retail splits) indicates that ~80% of their pipeline through 2023 is wholesale, and management comments indicate they are prioritizing a wholesale split. Thus, we believe the pipeline will shift even more towards wholesale as they land more deals.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z8K_e_GffbDdktv63_dpMA.png" /><figcaption>Our projections vs. Sell-side consensus</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Why is sell-side so off?:</strong></p><ul><li>Sell-side notes often reference the former management guide from Q2 2020 for a 50/50 to 60/40 split between wholesale/retail among new cabinet adds. We believe these numbers are outdated and do not reflect the pipeline.</li><li>Sell-side is consistently conservative with 21Vianet due to its historical misexecution problems. We do not believe this to be a problem, as we’ll cover more in the second thesis point.</li></ul><h4><strong>Thesis Point 2: The company’s history has created a significant, multi-year overhang that has resulted in investors overlooking the company’s turnaround story. We think the stock will re-rate to 25x NTM EBITDA from 20x today.</strong></h4><p>From 2014 to 2019, the stock fell nearly 80% due to a series of missteps for the company and, despite a &gt;350% rally in 2020, trades at a &gt;45% discount to peers despite equivalent financial profiles and better or near-equivalent competitive positioning.</p><p>A largely refuted 2014 short-seller report alleging fraud, significant management misexecution from 2014–2017, and a failed privatization transaction in 2015 prompted the majority of sell-side to drop coverage, destroyed the long-term shareholder base, and created a significant overhang in the share price.</p><p><strong>2A: This overhang has begun to clear and investors will continue to wake up to the turnaround story in the works.</strong></p><p>We went line-by-line through the short-seller report and believe the allegations are false — the consensus among sell-side and our own view is that much of it has been disproven by 21Vianet’s rebuttal and subsequent financial performance by 21Vianet (see appendix). Moreover, structural changes in the company have successfully turned 21Vianet around in the past three years.</p><ol><li><strong><em>Management has largely been replaced:</em></strong> critical board members and executives were added, and financial disclosure has improved steadily since the fraud allegations and management missteps. After the short-seller report, Tus-Holdings, Tsinghua University’s Venture fund, took a position for 51% of voting rights and has overhauled management after consistent guidance misses &amp; misexecution. The CFO from 2014–2017, Terry Wang, was pushed out and replaced by Sharon Liu, who has not missed guidance since Q4 2018. Moreover, Alvin Wang, a former President of a Tus-Holdings subsidiary, was instated as Wholesale IDC CEO, and alongside Sharon Liu, has begun to successfully implement their shift to wholesale data centers. These are only two examples — nearly the entire former management team has been replaced with well-respected individuals in the industry.</li><li><strong><em>Blackstone TacOps Investment:</em></strong> In the Summer of 2020, Blackstone’s TacOps team invested $150 million in preferred shares for 21Vianet. We believe Blackstone’s quality of diligence is a major vote of confidence for the quality of management and helps to alleviate potential concerns about fraud. Moreover, we were told from a member of the team that the group targets 40–50%+ IRR, which also helps us build conviction in our model.</li><li><strong><em>Block shareholders have exited their investments:</em></strong> Kingsoft and Xiaomi, which together took a 15% stake in the company after the fraud allegations to stabilize the company, both sold their stakes in late 2020. Investors had been anticipating their exit given that the two companies invested to preserve the stability of their own relationships with 21Vianet, and they were looking for an exit upon recovery.</li></ol><p><strong>2B: Clearing of the overhang has already started to catalyze a re-rating towards industry peers, and we believe this will continue in the near future as the story continues to clear up and the turnaround becomes clearer.</strong></p><p>We view the stock’s 80% rally in late 2020 as an indication that investors are warming to the story. There is significantly more room for 21Vianet’s stock to re-rate. We see no reason that VNET should trade at a 45% discount to $CD (35x EV/2021 EBITDA vs VNET’s 21x) given that $CD is competitively behind 21Vianet and only growing 5–6% faster in 2022. We believe VNET’s multiple will continue to expand to 25x NTM EBITDA by 2023 (still a 25% discount to peer multiples). Moreover, wholesale data center multiples tend to be higher at &gt;30x EV/NTM EBITDA and VNET should re-rate as it transitions.</p><h3><strong>Valuation &amp; Core Assumptions</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*Qowb4asrZGbXFihzGkvR6Q.png" /><figcaption>Returns calculations</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1022/1*1wchmp046OhC1O_eUUtzSQ.png" /><figcaption>Our P&amp;L Statement in our base case</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Base:</strong> We are modeling:</p><ol><li>Revenue acceleration to 37.8% in 2021 and 41.4% in 2022 for 21Vianet due to its project pipeline, guidance raise to 25k net cabinet adds through 2023, and the broader industry dynamics at play.</li><li>Operating leverage from the wholesale transition driving a ~40% EBITDA margin in 2023 versus ~28% today.</li><li>25x 2023 EBITDA multiple to underwrite our <strong>$126.37 12/31/2022 PT</strong>. We believe this multiple is fair given that it corresponds to a <strong>3.5% 2023 steady-state FCF yield </strong>(subtracting only maintenance capex) with 40%+ steady-state FCF growth.</li></ol><p>For more color:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BkV_S-ybDtBtGrPTFhphBw.png" /><figcaption>Assumptions — built from a project-by-project summation of current cabinets &amp; pipeline</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Bear:</strong> There are two separate bear cases — one where the company is fraudulent and one where it misexecutes.</p><ol><li>If it is a fraud, we assign the company a value of $0. We believe the probability of this is minimal.</li><li>If it isn’t a fraud, there is nearly no downside. Given a 16.5x 2023 EBITDA multiple (down from 21x today and corresponding to a 6% SS FCF Yield), significant revenue deceleration (to LDD), and decremental margins (4.5%) yields <strong><em>0% downside</em></strong> from today’s price.</li></ol><h3><strong>Catalysts</strong></h3><ol><li><strong><em>Hong Kong Dual Listing:</em></strong> 21Vianet has hired Credit Suisse &amp; Morgan Stanley to consider a dual listing in Hong Kong. We believe such a move would catalyze significant share price appreciation as 21Vianet gains a domestic shareholder base that understands the value of the business, lowers its cost of capital, and increases sell-side coverage in Asia.</li><li><strong><em>Landing of Additional Wholesale Contracts:</em></strong> 21Vianet has already landed large wholesale contracts and MOUs with leading cloud providers in China. We believe more of these contracts will solidify the transition towards wholesale.</li><li><strong><em>Continued Management Execution:</em></strong> 21Vianet has a historic management credibility problem. Continuing to execute as they have for the past year will extend the rally that has started to re-rate the company back to industry peers.</li></ol><h3><strong>Risks</strong></h3><ol><li><strong><em>Management Misexecution/Fraudulent Financials:</em></strong> self-evident, read rest of note.</li><li><strong><em>Oversupply of Data Centers:</em></strong> See macro research in the appendix as well as the industry overview.</li><li><strong><em>Rising Interest Rates:</em></strong> This is a company that frequently raises capital across the capital structure, and rising interest rates will raise their cost of capital and subsequently make it harder for the company to aggressively grow.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b55c9997997c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[TransDigm Group: A Cheap, Consistent Compounder]]></title>
            <link>https://tigercapmgmt.medium.com/transdigm-group-a-cheap-consistent-compounder-9dbb3eb1c9b9?source=rss-e4142ca3917------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9dbb3eb1c9b9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aerospace-and-defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[equity-research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[princeton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[value-investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tiger Capital Management]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2020 08:56:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-11T21:22:52.811Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Industrials &amp; Energy Group</h4><h4>A rare opportunity to own a monopolistic compounder trading at a cheap valuation</h4><p><em>Tiger Capital Management’s Industrials &amp; Energy Group: Ryan Jiang ‘23, Autumn Tan ‘23, Katie Kolodner ‘24, Yash Parikh ‘24, Grace Zhuang ‘23, and Muhammad Umar ‘22</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*O6AuU57J9oqpn8b0.jpg" /></figure><h3>Executive Summary</h3><p>TransDigm Group (NYSE: TDG) sells a portfolio of proprietary aerospace parts in the original equipment market (production of the original plane) and in the aftermarket (spare replacement parts). As the sole provider for 80% of its aerospace parts, TDG is a cash-generative machine, with EBITDA margins higher than leading technology companies. That cash funds TDG’s levered roll-up acquisition strategy, acquiring companies with proprietary and sole-source aerospace parts at 20%+ IRR. We believe TDG’s pricing leverage and acquisition strategy is being mis-modeled by the Street, creating an opportunity to buy a monopolistic compounder run by one of the best management teams in Industrials at a discount. We believe that TDG is a compelling long with a 4Y PT of $955.22, reflecting ~15% IRR and a 1.7x MOIC from today’s share price.</p><h3>Company Overview</h3><p>TransDigm Group designs, produces, and supplies highly engineered aircraft components for almost every commercial or military aircraft. They are the sole source provider for products driving 80% of their revenue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*7halAlhNLmZYrXHJQIpPiA.png" /><figcaption>From TDG’s Q1 ’20 Earnings Presentation (in order to examine pre-pandemic mix)</figcaption></figure><p>Moreover, TDG operates with a decentralized business model, with 55+ smaller business units focused on selling just 5 to 7 aerospace parts across the lifecycle of an airplane program (e.g. Boeing 787).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/943/1*Dz1rX-Xv6MrZIB83c9R3UQ.png" /><figcaption>From 2018 Analyst Day Presentation</figcaption></figure><p>Each airplane program has a 70-year life cycle, during which TDG generates steady, recurring revenue by selling parts throughout this period.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/867/1*J4bGhGzePbLnInT7QgtYuA.png" /><figcaption>Life cycle of an airplane program</figcaption></figure><p>Their revenue is divided into four segments:</p><ol><li><strong>Commercial OEM Revenue:</strong> After approval, the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), such as Boeing or Airbus, will produce a new aircraft for 35 years, during which TransDigm will sell parts to the OEM for new airplanes. This comprised ~31% of aviation revenue in Q1 ’20 and is typically lower margin (45% EBITDA margins).</li><li><strong>Commercial Aftermarket Revenue:</strong> On top of the ~35 years that the OEM produces airplanes for a program, airlines use the aircrafts for 35 years. During the life of these planes, TransDigm sells replacement parts in the aftermarket, generating recurring revenue as parts break. This comprised ~32% of Q1 ’20 aviation revenue and is higher margin (55% EBITDA margins).</li><li><strong>Defense Revenue:</strong> Just as TDG services commercial airplanes, they also service both OEM and Aftermarket for the defense sector. This comprised ~37% of aviation revenue in Q1 ’20 and has EBITDA margins around ~50%.</li><li><strong>Non-aviation Revenue:</strong> TDG has a limited portfolio of parts used in non-aviation markets, often used in mining, ground transportation, or other heavy equipment-based industries. This comprises less than 5% of revenues.</li></ol><h3>Industry Overview</h3><p>COVID-19 aside, the industry landscape reflects a long growth runway for TDG:</p><ol><li><em>Adoption of Air Travel</em>: Worldwide revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) growth has been in the consistent mid-single digits for the past 30 years, and we do not expect this to slow. However, we are concerned with the near-term outlook of RPK growth for obvious reasons, and we do not find this tailwind relevant to the core value drivers of the pitch.</li><li><em>Aging Fleets</em>: Due to elevated deliveries in the mid-2010s, the number of airplanes aging out-of-warranty will rise considerably over the next half-decade. This cohort growth drives aftermarket demand — spare parts are needed on a more frequent basis as the plane depreciates. Per our proprietary research, the growth of out-of-warranty airplanes will accelerate to high-single digits, despite concerns about accelerated retirements due to the pandemic.</li><li><em>Fragmented Acquisition Landscape</em>: 85% of all parts suppliers in the industry do under $100 million a year in revenue, and these small companies compose 60% of the industry. Given that TDG focuses on acquisitions of individual product lines or business units, we are not at all concerned about TDG’s acquisition strategy facing declining economies of scale.</li></ol><p>Thus, we expect continued outperformance of industry peers by TDG. The global commercial and defense aerospace parts market totaled more than $100B in revenue in 2019. Historically, TDG has organically grown at 200bps faster than the industry average. Thus, it has quadrupled its market share in the past decade (from 1.1% to 4.5%), a trend we expect to continue given its limited penetration, aggressive acquisition strategy, and above peer average organic growth profile.</p><p>For an analysis of COVID-19’s effect on TDG, look at our assumptions below (specifically at the air travel recovery assumptions). We do <strong>not </strong>believe this is a play on better than anticipated air travel recovery.</p><h3>Thesis</h3><p><em>High Level: 1. TDG’s significant pricing leverage should offset near-term weakness in the aerospace industry, 2. TDG’s aggressive acquisition strategy should compound intrinsic value significantly due to the low interest rate environment and structural weaknesses in their competitors.</em></p><h4>Value Driver #1: TDG’s Pricing Strategy</h4><p><em>TDG’s dominant moat enables a pricing strategy that is misunderstood by the Street. The company has historically raised prices for products at </em><strong><em>&gt;5%</em></strong><em> annually, resulting in revenue growth with near 100% flow-through to the bottom line. This pricing strategy is enabled purely by insurmountable barriers to entry and extremely high switching costs for customers.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/741/1*QZuII1n2rNEsHe_Vey_7_Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/839/1*ZaRPZveBIk8UHPGiJh34dg.png" /><figcaption>Note that organic growth projections (including pricing) outpaces unit growth projections by &gt;5%, per 2018 Analyst Day projections</figcaption></figure><p><strong>There are significant barriers to entry which preclude competition with TransDigm.</strong></p><ol><li><em>Intellectual Property</em>: 90% of their products are proprietary, barring competitors from producing the same part.</li><li><em>Qualification Process</em>: During an airplane’s development process, each part on an airplane is “qualified” by the OEMs and the FAA. Absent qualification, airlines cannot purchase parts from a supplier. When not done by the OEM, third-party (PMA) qualification costs $75K-100K per airplane part and takes 1.5 years to complete. TDG’s parts cost $1000 on average, so it is uneconomical for competitors to even begin this process.</li></ol><p><strong>Simultaneously, customers face extremely high switching costs and are willing to accept higher price points.</strong></p><ol><li><em>Mission Critical Products</em>: TDG’s parts are mission critical to the aircraft. With a single broken part, an airline has to ground a plane with the revenue loss far outweighing overpaying for a seat belt replacement. Airlines are compensating TDG for the timely delivery of these replacements.</li><li><em>Minimal Cost Savings</em>: TDG’s parts are particularly inexpensive (average of $1000). The time and effort to requalify another supplier, coupled with slower delivery schedules prevent customers from seeking another seller (if there is one).</li></ol><p>These factors, combined with TDG’s decentralized model, result in TDG’s unparalleled margins and cash generation. Pricing alone creates a base for annual organic revenue growth at 5% at nearly 100% incremental margins.</p><p><strong>We believe TDG’s pricing leverage is not fully baked into the share price.</strong></p><ol><li><em>Artificially Depressed Margins</em>: TDG’s acquisition in Q2 ’19 of Esterline artificially depressed margins in the short-term and there is significant undermonetization of Esterline’s products (~26% of revenue in 1H 2020). TDG’s acquisition accounting is extremely difficult to navigate and sell-side does not do it — we triangulated multiple footnotes to financially engineer the margin breakdown and believe Esterline’s EBITDA margins will expand by another 1000–1500 bps.</li><li><em>COVID-19 Response</em>: TDG’s stock has been sold off disproportionate to what we believe the true impact of the pandemic on the company will be. Management mentioned briefly at a UBS conference in June that they were raising prices during the pandemic but did not mention it during the last earnings call. As a result, we believe sell-side is underestimating the ability for price increases to offset decremental margins from the pandemic. The proof is in the pudding: sell-side underestimated EBITDA margins in Q3 ’20 and is again projecting further decremental margins for Q4 ’20. We have confidence in management’s ability to maintain the &gt;40% EBITDA margin they guided during the pandemic.</li></ol><h4>Value Driver #2: TDG’s Acquisition Strategy</h4><p><em>TDG is sitting on $4.5B in cash, with a roll-up acquisition strategy that will benefit from the cheap debt environment and competitors struggling with coverage and liquidity amidst the pandemic.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/937/1*HlE7PY3GjngFQLc0zBgUnQ.png" /><figcaption>Historical Acquisition Composition (per 2018 Analyst Day)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>TDG follows a consistent, LBO-style acquisition playbook that they have executed over and over again during the company’s history.</strong></p><p>TDG’s levered capital structure and aggressive M&amp;A generates private equity-style returns. During its 25-year history, TDG has acquired over 60 businesses, spending $971M/year on their acquisitions in the past 12 years, with the following playbook:</p><ol><li><em>Targets</em>: TDG acquires companies with sole-source product lines at 9–12x EBITDA and 1–2x Sales. Management is extremely picky; 81% of the product lines they acquire are sole source. They finance acquisitions with 50% debt and 50% cash with the target of doubling EBITDA within 5 years. Given their credit profile, this reflects a &gt;20% levered IRR target.</li><li><em>Repricing &amp; Cost-Cutting</em>: Most suppliers that TDG acquires, despite being sole source providers, lack negotiating power with customers to price aggressively. Moreover, they accept unfavorable contracts with customers to land larger deals in the future; for example, they often allow the OEM to control the higher margin and more lucrative aftermarket. Upon acquisition, TDG renegotiates these contracts, raising prices by 50–60% overnight. TDG’s decentralized business model also has significantly lower SG&amp;A expenditure, and TDG restructures the workforce of their acquisitions immediately.</li></ol><p><strong>This acquisition strategy has a proven track record and management is incredibly disciplined with their capital.</strong></p><p>We calculated the IRR of all acquisitions for which we could triangulate the financial breakdown of their acquisitions (from filing footnotes), and management consistently beats their own 20%+ IRR targets:</p><ol><li><em>Esterline Example</em>: TDG acquired Esterline for $4.0B in Q2 ’19 (before divesting $900M for a profit in Q4 ’19) at 12x EBITDA. In a year, TDG increased Esterline’s EBITDA margin from 20.5% to 36.1%, all while growing revenue of the business. We’ve estimated that this is an unlevered IRR of &gt;75% assuming no revenue growth (there was) and no multiple change. Given that they financed this acquisition entirely via debt, the levered IRR is <em>unreal</em>.</li><li><em>Margins as Proof of Success</em>: The companies that TDG acquires generally have ~15–20% EBITDA margins, with SG&amp;A and COGS reflecting 20% and 60–65% of revenue. Despite TDG’s constant acquisitions of lower margin businesses, their EBITDA margin has not contracted, reflecting TDG’s success in increasing margins of their acquired companies.</li><li><em>Consistent Outperformance</em>: Management has bragged that they consistently beat their 20%+ IRR targets, often doubling EBITDA within the first three years of the five year target. We’ve back-checked this with their past acquisitions. For example, they doubled EBITDA of both Tactair and Breeze-Eastern within 2.5 years without sacrificing revenue growth.</li></ol><p><strong>TDG has a significant cash balance ready for a shopping spree, buying companies at heavy discounts.</strong></p><p>TransDigm is FCF-positive despite COVID-19 and sitting on a cash balance of $4.5B in a low-interest environment. Management has emphasized recently that they are looking for opportunities and we think these opportunities will arise:</p><ol><li><em>Struggling Competitors</em>: The decimation of air travel has created significant liquidity concerns for aerospace suppliers. ~39% of suppliers believe they lack the liquidity to ride out a prolonged downturn and competitors like the Triumph Group are already experiencing significant liquidity issues, with rumors of a TDG acquisition. 65% of the industry comprises small suppliers with high fixed costs and limited economies of scale, and struggling companies present cheap, compelling turnaround opportunities for TDG.</li><li><em>Cheap Financing</em>: TransDigm traditionally levers up at 5.5–7.0x, in-line with most private equity firms. The low interest rate environment increases the IRR on TDG’s acquisitions as interest expenses on their debt declines significantly. Already, TDG has refinanced their $7.5B term loans (⅓ of their debt), lowering the rates by 25 bps despite industry uncertainty.</li></ol><p><strong>We don’t believe future acquisitions are priced in.</strong></p><p>Not a single sell-side report we read models incremental future acquisition spend into their TDG valuation. Analysts are benchmarked by their ability to predict earnings of a given quarter, and acquisitions are too lumpy to accurately predict. A quick scan of TDG’s earnings history reveals that TDG has beaten consensus for 36 of the last 44 quarters by an average of 9.90% on an EPS basis. TDG has risen by an average of 3.72% the day after earnings for the past 11 years.</p><h3>Valuation</h3><p><em>Even assuming what we believe to be the worst case for air travel (especially in the context of recent news concerning a COVID-19 vaccine), we believe that TDG is attractively valued.</em></p><p>We modeled the intrinsic share value for TDG based on a 5Y projection period discounted cash flow model, taking an exit multiple given that we do not believe the company will reach steady-state within the next 5 years.</p><p>Given our assumptions (described below), we believe the next five years for TDG looks something like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cCntlyWYG3XkMQUOiNavRg.png" /><figcaption>Projected P&amp;L (dates based on TDG’s fiscal years)</figcaption></figure><p>Relative to sell-side, we are relatively in-line <strong>despite</strong> having significantly more conservative assumptions for TDG’s organic revenue. We think of better than expected results with respect to organic revenue as a free option to the investor, building in significant margin of safety.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iP_Qkw6xVQSb99ohSKMiEw.png" /><figcaption>Variance from sell-side consensus</figcaption></figure><p>On an intrinsic basis, we believe that TDG is trading in line with intrinsic value per our discounted cash flow valuation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*DjzufDppOBDg2XL22lH5mw.png" /><figcaption>Discounted Cash Flow Valuation</figcaption></figure><p>We also tested for sensitivity to our WACC &amp; Terminal Multiple calculations:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/1*k0IPJKuA-E5qK4o6ydgswQ.png" /><figcaption>Sensitivity to WACC and Terminal Multiple</figcaption></figure><p>However, given management’s skilled capital allocation and TDG’s compelling ROIC relative to WACC, we believe that on a 4Y IRR basis, TDG is quite cheap as an investment:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/848/1*wgk9vlFJerLuUmHwJ3Sn1w.png" /><figcaption>5Y IRR Calculations</figcaption></figure><h3>Assumptions</h3><p><em>For those who want to see the rigor behind each assumption, see bottom (Appendix) for a closer examination of each assumption.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ak-2-xDzXZzy3ru0W_Kfyw.png" /><figcaption>Our core assumptions for each scenario</figcaption></figure><p>High-level:</p><ol><li><em>Acquisitions</em>: Management will continue to acquire starting in CY2022, with $400M, $700M, and $800M spent per year in Bear, Base, and Bull cases. We model these acquisitions at 2x Sales and 12x EBITDA, financed with 50% debt and 50% cash. We project that management will double EBITDA of acquisitions in 5 years.</li><li><em>Air Travel Projections</em>: Air travel (RPKs) will recover to 2019 levels in 2H 2024 in our Base case, 1H 2024 in our Bull case, and after the projection period in our Bear case. We expect Aftermarket Revenue to recover half a year prior to RPKs and OEM Revenue to recover after RPKs (see Appendix).</li><li><em>Margins</em>: We model margins based on 1) the revenue mix in a given quarter and 2) the integration of acquisitions (which have lower margins). OEM, Aftermarket, and Defense have 45%, 55%, and 50% EBITDA margins, respectively (lower in the Bear case). We assume acquisitions begin with a 17% EBITDA margin.</li><li><em>Terminal Multiple</em>: We use a 14.0x, 16.0x, and 17.0x in the Bear, Base, and Bull case respectively. This corresponds with 4.4%, 3.5%, and 3.2% FCF Yields in the three cases, which we believe are reasonable in this interest rate environment given the steadiness of their FCFs. These multiples are also below recent historical averages for TDG.</li></ol><h3>Catalysts and Risks</h3><h4>Catalysts</h4><ol><li><em>Acquisition announcements</em>: Further acquisitions create opportunities for management to drive value with its cash.</li><li><em>Optimistic Recovery in Air Travel</em>: Better than anticipated air travel recovery will buoy aftermarket revenues.</li><li><em>Announcements of new airplane platforms</em>: Production by Boeing or Airbus could result in acceleration of revenue recovery in TDG’s OEM segment.</li></ol><h4>Risks</h4><ol><li><em>Continued Depression of Air Travel</em>: Certainly plausible, though we believe our assumptions do not rely on a better than expected recovery.</li><li><em>Accelerated Airplane Retirements &amp; Used Serviceable Materials</em>: Some sell-side analysts have expressed concerns about Used Serviceable Materials (USMs). These are basically parts that are taken off retired airplanes and sold in the aftermarket as replacement parts. The biggest risk here is that accelerated retirements could occur because of COVID-19, which could result in a headwind for the aftermarket industry. We don’t view this as a threat to TDG. The average TDG part is $1K and the average part price for a USM needs to be above $5–10K in order to be profitable. Nobody is going to be ripping seat belts off a retired airplane, because the manpower needed to do so just isn’t worth the selling price. Moreover, 2020 retirements are at &lt;2% of the installed base, contrary to early projections about accelerated retirement schedules. This is below the average of 2.5% of the installed base per year. We did our own research here as well and discovered that retirements perhaps have accelerated slightly, but even if retirements are 4.0% of the installed base (more than 2x sell-side estimates from yesterday), it does not significantly impact TDG.</li><li><em>Inspector General Audits</em>: In May of 2019, TDG officials testified in a congressional hearing with the House Armed Services Committee. This meeting was prompted by the <a href="https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1769041/review-of-parts-purchased-from-transdigm-group-inc-dodig-2019-060/">Inspector General Report</a> published in February of 2019 upon a 2017 prompt from three congressmen about the pricing of 2015–2017 Defense Department contracts. We do not believe that this is a significant risk to TDG — the U.S. federal government makes up only 6–8% of their revenue, of which 2% is through other distributors. Note also that the Inspector General has done multiple audits of TDG in the past, and they have not taken action beyond asking for a refund.</li><li><em>Overleveraged Capital Structure</em>: A few things give us conviction behind TDG’s aggressive leverage.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/727/0*UsP-RrwEGomlXjdk" /><figcaption>Post-9/11 Impact on Net Working Capital</figcaption></figure><ul><li><em>Strong Cash Balance &amp; Near-term Liquidity Tailwinds</em>: TDG has a $4.5B cash balance and we agree with both sell-side and management that TDG will remain FCF positive, with no concerns about liquidity in the near term. With respect to liquidity, we believe that in the short-term, net working capital and capex cuts should create a FCF tailwind for TDG given declining inventories and accounts receivables. We analyzed the elasticity of net working capital relative to revenue after 9/11 for 8 of TDG’s competitors, and we identified that AR and Inventory should fall in line or more than revenue, while AP should stay flat. Even without this tailwind, we still believe TDG will be FCF positive, but it provides additional conviction behind our belief.</li><li><em>Flexible Covenants</em>: TDG has incredibly flexible covenants on their debt with no concerns about a tripwire. They have no maintenance covenants on their term loans or indentures. The only covenant on their term loans ($7.5B) is a 7.25x net leverage ratio and a 5.00x secured net leverage ratio in order to request additional term loans or revolving facilities. Even in our bear case, they only fail this covenant through FY2021, during which we are confident they will not require additional liquidity given their $4.5B cash balance and positive free cash flow profile despite the pandemic. They have a maintenance covenant on their revolving credit facility. If the usage of the revolving credit facility exceeds 35% of total revolving commitments, TDG must maintain a maximum consolidated net leverage ratio of 7.25x. We are not concerned about this covenant: they withdrew only $200M of the $760M revolver in March as a precautionary move to protect against COVID-19, and they do not intend to withdraw more in the near future.</li><li><em>Strong Coverage Ratio</em>: Even in our bear case, we do not anticipate TDG’s coverage ratio to drop below 1.5x at any point in the near future.</li></ul><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>When the Industrials &amp; Energy group first pitched the position in TDG, the stock was trading at $470/share, which gave us conviction for 20%+ IRR over Tiger Capital’s 4-year time horizon. Despite the recent run-up, we believe that TDG is one of the most compelling growth-at-a-reasonable-price investments in the Industrials space. Thus, we are comfortable holding the position and we will continue to opportunistically buy at attractive price points.</p><p>We love investing in companies we admire, and the quality of management and their unwavering focus on maximizing shareholder value is one that cannot be understated. TransDigm was one of the best performing stocks in the Industrials space over the last 10 years, and we believe that recent concerns due to COVID-19 are not material to the long-term thesis and value-creation that the company is able to achieve. Certainly, the pandemic has and will continue to have an impact on the aerospace industry, but of all managements, we trust that TransDigm’s will successfully navigate this crisis.</p><p>Please reach out to us via email (ryjiang@princeton.edu) or via LinkedIn if you have any questions pertaining to our thesis.</p><p><em>Disclaimer:</em> <em>Tiger Capital Management owns shares of TDG. This article represents our thoughts, not investment advice. Please conduct diligence before purchasing shares of any company we write on.</em></p><h3>Appendix — Further Details on Assumptions</h3><p><em>For those who are interested, mostly concerning our base case assumptions</em></p><p>At a high level, management’s compensation structure relies on 10% EBITDA growth at the minimum for any vesting of their stock-based compensation (which approaches 100% of most of the important management’s pay). The target for their EBITDA growth for management payment is 17.5% — a target they have beaten with almost 100% success rate. With our EBITDA projections, management would only get paid at all in two of the five projection years, and they only beat the 17.5% target once during our projection period. We believe this reflects extreme conservatism on our part.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/0*E5ZYgIBhgFEQ57PD" /><figcaption>Historical AOP Targets vs Actual Results (from TDG’s Proxy Statements)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Acquisitions</strong></h4><p><em>High Level: Management will continue to acquire starting in CY2022, with $0, $700M, and $800M spent per year in Bear, Base, and Bull cases. We model these acquisitions at 2x Sales and 12x EBITDA, financed with 50% debt and 50% cash. We project that management will double EBITDA of acquisitions in 5 years.</em></p><p><strong><em>Assumption #1</em>:</strong> Management will acquire at 2x Sales, 12x EBITDA (corresponding to a 16.7% EBITDA margin), financed by 50% debt and 50% cash.</p><ol><li><em>Gut Check 1</em>: We took the most conservative estimates from what management has told us about their acquisitions (financed at least with 50% debt, 1–2x Sales, 9–12x EBITDA). We back-checked these with past acquisitions: they do indeed acquire at these multiples (in fact, often lower — they’ve acquired as low as 0.5x Sales).</li><li><em>Gut Check 2</em>: These multiples and margins tend to track closely with what many of TDG’s competitors trade at or have, which makes us confident that their acquisitions will be within this range. We also note that management often does not buy at a significant premium (in part due to their serial acquisitions of small product lines and companies).</li><li><em>Process</em>: We created an acquisition waterfall based on incremental acquisition expenditure per quarter. We modeled in TDG raising debt worth 50% of their acquisition expenditure every quarter to account for the increase in leverage. We built in the revenue and EBITDA from the acquisitions by their multiples — $175M in acquisition expenditure will result in $175 * (1/(2x Sales Multiple)) per year, which equates to $175M/8=$21.9M per quarter.</li></ol><p><strong><em>Assumption #2</em>:</strong> Management will spend $700M/year starting in 2022 (TDG Q2 2022).</p><ol><li><em>Gut Check 1</em>: With respect to the time table, we believe 2022 is reasonable (if not overly conservative) given that management is looking for opportunities already. We believe these opportunities will arise very soon: for example, the Triumph Group is already expected to bleed ⅔ of its market capitalization in cash in the current fiscal year and faces significant liquidity concerns.</li><li><em>Gut Check 2</em>: Management has consistently reinvested &gt;110% of their operating cash flow into the business over the past decade, and they have specifically spent 90% of their EBITDA on acquisitions every year. This comes out to 971.5M per year from 2008–2019. We believe $700M/year is extremely conservative, coming in at &lt;32% of EBITDA for every quarter. In the past twelve years, acquisition expenditure has only dipped below &lt;40% of EBITDA three times and each of these were offset by large acquisition spending in an adjacent year (&gt;100% of EBITDA value).</li><li><em>Gut Check 3</em>: We do not scale acquisitions even as TDG grows because we wanted to be conservative about their ability to actually find opportunities that are significant given their growing enterprise value. We believe this is conservative, given the fragmented landscape of small suppliers, TDG’s strategy of acquiring individual product lines, and the limited penetration of the overall industry (~4.5%).</li></ol><p><strong><em>Assumption #3</em>:</strong> Management can double the EBITDA of their acquisitions within 5 years.</p><ol><li><em>Gut Check 1</em>: Everything in our original thesis should apply here.</li><li><em>Gut Check 2</em>: We’ve profiled the 4 recent deals:</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/737/1*PaOWwJhBb7RXL6C69NXd2A.png" /><figcaption>Our own analysis of historical acquisitions from TDG filings &amp; other sources</figcaption></figure><p>3.<em> Modeling Process</em>: Given the general profile of their acquisitions, we believe this doubling of EBITDA reflects a blend of revenue growth (from pricing increases) and margin expansion. We assume a 8.6% margin expansion during the five years after an acquisition, which we believe to be <strong><em>extremely</em></strong> conservative given what we’ve outlined about their acquisitions. This comes from a base EBITDA margin of ~16.7% (SG&amp;A, COGS, and D&amp;A at 22.8%, 63.0%, and 2.5% respectively).</p><h4>Air Travel Projections</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/767/1*BSOlneVg4MCPoc9u4Kl2bA.png" /><figcaption>IATA RPK projections</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>RPK Recovery</em></strong>: We are projecting an RPK (revenue passenger kilometers) recovery to 2019 levels in 2H 2024 of our Base Case given that the IATA is projecting an early 2024 recovery to 2019 levels in RPKs, which is the projection that both management and sell-side relies heavily on. We do not believe that our assumptions have a reason to be more bullish than a consensus 1H 2024 recovery.</p><ol><li>The IATA assumptions are conservative — they are already building in a second-wave of the pandemic resulting in lockdowns that prolong longer than expected and weak billings numbers that reflect lower passenger volume for the rest of 2020.</li><li>We’ve cross-referenced this with sell-side industry projections of RPK recovery, which all tend to be on par or more bullish than the IATA projections.</li></ol><p><strong><em>Aftermarket Recovery</em></strong>: Given a 2H 2024 RPK recovery, we believe that aftermarket will recover prior to overall RPKs:</p><ol><li>RPKs measures passenger flight count, but we believe spare parts are more directly correlated with the number of flights and the utilization of airplanes, which rebounds first (passenger load factors are lagging — planes start flying before they are full).</li><li>We parsed through historical delivery counts for multiple OEMs (Boeing and Airbus) and we expect the number of out-of-warranty planes (ages 6+) to increase significantly over the next half-decade. Despite weaker travel recovery, the demand for spare parts should be offset partially by the cyclical tailwinds in aftermarket dynamics.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*2sA3oX4C8NftMoKHqGVDZg.png" /><figcaption>Per our analysis of historical delivery rates for Boeing &amp; Airbus</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>OEM Recovery</em></strong>: Conversely, we believe that the commercial OEM segment will likely recover in-line or after overall RPKs.</p><ol><li>Uncertainty about future demand is likely to result in persistent slowdowns in production schedules for OEMs. Boeing and Airbus specifically have guided to cut production for 2021 and through 2022, and we have no reason to believe that the production schedules will ramp back up quickly after.</li><li>In particular, we examined the supply/demand imbalance as a result of slowing demand over the next 4 years, and we believe that there will continue to be an imbalance through 2023 with severe cuts in production and through late 2024 with slightly less severe cuts in production. In either world, we believe production will not recover until the very end of our projection period.</li></ol><h4>Margins</h4><p>We model margins based on a couple of factors:</p><ol><li>We model in margins of acquisitions as seen above in the acquisitions assumption, and we simply calculate the total margin by weighting organic &amp; inorganic revenue by their respective margins.</li><li>For organic margins specifically, we used management’s numbers of 45%, 50%, and 55% EBITDA margins for their core Commercial OEM, Defense, and Commercial AM segments respectively. We believe these numbers are accurate based on our financial engineering of historical organic and inorganic margins, and we’ve noticed a trend towards higher margins during periods of slower acquisition expenditure.</li><li>We also looked at headcount growth versus revenue growth over time when deciding our SG&amp;A margin, and we believe that there will be limited operating leverage at the organic level for SG&amp;A.</li></ol><h4>Terminal Multiple</h4><p>We modeled in a 14x, 16x, and 17x terminal EBITDA multiple based on the following factors:</p><ol><li><em>Comparables</em>: We do not believe there are many true comparables to TDG, and TDG has historically traded at a premium to their peer group. The closest comparable is Heico Corporation ($HEI), which also sells proprietary aerospace parts, acts as a serial acquirer (77 businesses in 30 years), and has a similar market capitalization to TDG. HEI has traded at a premium to TDG in the past, so we do not feel comfortable using HEI as a factor in our exit multiple.</li><li><em>Historical Multiples</em>: TDG has historically traded above a 16x TTM EBITDA multiple, and we believe the interest rate environment mixed with their long growth runway warrants a similar multiple at the end of our projection period.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Tyl0vL13kLKbhCUP" /><figcaption>Historical EV/EBITDA Multiples for TDG</figcaption></figure><p>3. <em>FCF Yield</em>: Given a 16.0x EBITDA multiple, we arrive at a 3.5% FCF yield, which we believe is reasonable and conservative for a monopolistic company with steady, recurring free cash flows and a long growth runway given the interest rate environment.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9dbb3eb1c9b9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>