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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Toldandretold on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Toldandretold on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@toldandretold1?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Toldandretold on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@toldandretold1?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Ban Artificial Intelligence From Academia. Reference It!]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/dont-ban-artificial-intelligence-from-academia-reference-it-de5e2a5517f3?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Jan 2022 01:39:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-05T01:40:15.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Don’t Ban Artificial Intelligence From Academia. Reference It!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/557/1*Q-l_THPyBegroPeWtCVigg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Advances in <a href="https://toldandretold1.medium.com/fully-automated-luxury-writing-21b2da640e0c">AI text generation</a> pose a significant threat to universities. It is hard to detect plagiarism when the submitted work is original. A similar issue already exists with contract cheating. Students can go to dodgey, scam ridden sites and pay someone to write their assignments for them. But while these “essay mills” have been made illegal in several countries, the same response would be foolish for AI text generation. This is because AI offers clear efficiency gains for many professional writers.</p><p>Indeed AI companies market their services to the corporate world precisely for this reason. Even for serious academic research, AI will continue to offer key productivity gains. Imagine preliminary scans of archives that generate summaries for historians. This would save hours of time. Or, if all the data has been compiled, rough drafts of scientific papers could be generated. Whenever time is saved, already expensive research will reap greater rewards.</p><p>The only issue concerns transparancy, but this can be fixed with new referencing standards for AI. Of course, referencing AI is not as intuitive as might be assumed. It requires a particular understanding of the purpose of referencing. To some, referencing a source means flagging that a particular idea was the creation of some other person or group. If this is the purpose of referencing, then it doesn’t necessarily make sense to reference AI. Why? Because AI is based on a reading of millions of texts. In a sense it is the creation, in part, of all of us.</p><p>Fortunately, this is a silly way of thinking about referencing and authorship. For we are all like AI. We have all had our thinking shaped through “deep learning” with millions of “texts”, and countless other social experiences. The idea that the author of a particular text was the sole creator of its ideas has never made sense. So what, then, is the point of referencing?</p><p>- It shows who did the most immediate work (research and writing) of creating the particular text.</p><p>- It helps readers to track down the original sources.</p><p>Neither of these two purposes makes any claim about the extent to which an individual or a group is the sole creator or “owners” of a given idea. These points serve only to show who did the immediate work of research and writing to generate a given text, and where that text can be found.</p><p>According to this conception of the purpose of referencing, there is no reason why AI cannot be referenced. For example, referencing would help readers understand that a given percentage of the text was generated by AI. They would then understand who was responsible for the immediate task of producing a given text, including both research and writing, and they would, potentially, be able to reproduce similar results.</p><p>Accomodating AI in this way would allow any benefits of the technology to be used transparently and fairly. It would also force people to think more deeply about the authorship of research and writing, of the authorship also of our very lives.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de5e2a5517f3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Fully Automated Luxury Writing]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/fully-automated-luxury-writing-21b2da640e0c?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21b2da640e0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Dec 2021 23:11:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-17T00:32:08.749Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fully Automated Luxury Writing</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*BZ_3nNBhRx8S0fEXoZwy7g@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>AI text generation is phenomenally powerful. Having processed 175 billion values, it is able to generate articles, essays, blogs – almost anything. This is the beginning of automation for many “intellectual” jobs, like journalism. So far, though, the AI companies selling their services for 30–60 US dollars a month target corporate writers. AI is already good at writing social media ads, about pages, and LinkedIN profiles. For corporate writing, the tech can be used to produce multiple versions. These can target seperate audiences based on demographic data. Soon, advertisers will use a specific AI writing bot for each unique customer.</p><p>The implications for education are shocking. As scholars of pedagogy have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1358684X.2021.1941768">argued</a>, AI is best at the exact style of education that students are currently trained in. AI can already generate text to meet specific genre conventions. It already writes with flawless grammar. This is why these scholars are calling for education to adjust. They argue that teaching should focus on what humans still have a comparative advantage in: creating new ideas. For presently, at least, AI text generation needs to be sparked by some original insight.</p><p>This approach sees writers working in dialogue with AI. Writers enter their initial thoughts to generate a response. Having read the output critically, the text is adjusted so the AI can write again. Rather than the automation of writing, this is the automation of aspects of brainstorming and most typing. It is a form of writing as dialogue not just with AI but with the billions of authors the AI has been trained on.</p><p>Many take issue with this. Fine, it may be conceded, teach students to write in this new “more productive” way, but schools and universities must still be able to test a student’s own work. AI text generation is not a student’s own work. It is the theft of the ideas of almost everyone else.</p><p>This is not, of course, a new problem. What even is an original thought? All creation is social and historical. We learn together, are inspired by each other. Testing for individual skill is but a necessary evil of education as a certification factory. And this is a necessary sorting tool for capitalists wanting to mitigate the risks of hiring workers they have never met before.</p><p>But the arguments of progressive education theorists have their own flaws. By claiming that education should focus on what humans still have an advantage in (creating new ideas), it is implied that when AI eventually surpasses humans on this front, we should stop writing all together. When we have no comparative advantage in writing at all, we should shut up and just consume what our overlords email us.</p><p>Both arguments – those that want to keep AI out of the classroom, and those that want to embrace it – are wedded to neoliberal commonsense. Education is viewed only as as a training ground to teach workers the skills needed to create commodities. The ironic thing is that AI text generation represents the exact automation that will render this “pragmatic” and “common sense” approach to education obsolete.</p><p>When there are no capitalist jobs for humans, it will be counterproductive to condition students to want to be productive workers who create commodities. This will only set students up for failure. What will be needed – even now – is an education focused on guiding students in the creative pursuit of meaningfulness. How can humans find meaningfulness when we no longer have essential tasks to perform? This will be the core existential question that the society of <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/3156-fully-automated-luxury-communism">fully automated luxury communism</a> must ask. Indeed, it should be one of the central questions we ask today. Instead, the planet is being destroyed in an insatiable thirst for profits, and elites never stop to ask why.</p><p>In a model that helps students create meaning in a worker-less world, grading individual abilities is absurd. So inferior will all humans be to AI that there won’t be any point comparing ourselves to each other. A young student will ask their mentor:</p><p>“Do we use AI text generation or not?”</p><p>They will be told: “No one cares. Chill. Take your time. Does the text you produce mean something? Who for?”</p><p>In response to the increasing automation of all of our jobs, we should not simply wallow in depression, and stop learning how to create. That is the capitalist logic, which only teaches our students because it is a rational investment for profit making. The alternative is to continue teaching, teaching all skills, but for a different purpose: the creation of meaningfulness.</p><p>We should embrace each other’s efforts not as the work of individuals but of people living in the shared meaning created through the social relations of many overlapping communities. We should embrace the fact that no one knows for sure why we are here, or if there even is a meaningful purpose for our lives. We should use AI – if we want – to help create new meaning, new projects to work on, new art. The last thing we should do is subject students to surveillance, force them through hoops, and certify them as productive wage labourers. We should try instead to create citizens that will build and thrive in fully automated luxury communism.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21b2da640e0c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Raising Welfare will Raise the Economy]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/raising-welfare-will-raise-the-economy-3688f7635cfd?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[australian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[recession]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Feb 2020 23:40:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-20T23:43:04.620Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Raising Welfare will Raise the Economy</strong></p><p>The Australian economy has been precarious for at least a year. As Greg Jericho has shown, the private sector has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2019/dec/05/the-story-behind-the-gdp-data-the-incredible-shrinking-private-sector?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other">in recession for the last four quarters</a>. This was before the bushfires –– whose costs are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jan/08/economic-impact-of-australias-bushfires-set-to-exceed-44bn-cost-of-black-saturday">set to exceed $4.4 billion</a> –– and before the Corona outbreak, which is on track to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/wuhan-coronavirus-australia-economy-asx-cost-2020-1">cost the Australian economy over $2 billion</a>.</p><p>Recession isn’t inevitable, but best protecting against one requires prompt structural reforms. Fortunately, the problem is not a lack of policy options. Unfortunately, the problem is getting politicians, the only true dole bludgers, to do their job.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6kKI8Iobg61j6VBFfSvgIg.png" /><figcaption>The joint <a href="https://percapita.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Working-It-Out-FINAL.pdf">Per Capita and Australian Unemployed Workers Union report</a> shows clearly that unemployment is not the fault of the uenmployed.</figcaption></figure><p>A prime example is the <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/the-economic-case-for-increasing-newstart/">urgent need to increase the Newstart allowance</a> (soon to be Jobseekers Allowance). An increase to Newstart would do the most to attack poverty and inequality in Australia. The payment has not been raised in real terms since 1994, and while it is tied to CPI inflation, this has <a href="https://www.google.com.au/amp/amp.abc.net.au/article/11350530">risen slower than the true cost of living</a>. Even Australia’s dismal wage growth has far surpassed it, leaving the poorest materially worse off, and Australian society far more unequal. This is itself a huge problem for the economy, with high levels of inequality <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf">shown by the IMF to inhibit growth</a>.</p><p>More immediately, increasing welfare is the economic stimulus the economy needs. As <a href="https://www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DAE-Analysis-of-the-impact-of-raising-benefit-rates-FINAL-4-September-...-1.pdf">Deloitte Access Economics has shown</a>, increasing Newstart by only 75 dollars would boost the economy by $4 billion, and create 12, 000 jobs. While this would increase the budget deficit, it would do so only temporarily. Eventually the boost to GDP would lead to a boost in tax revenue. Just as Liberal politicians patronisingly retort, it’s about growing the pie, not just dividing it.</p><p>Importantly, this is a conservative estimate. Why? Because the poverty of the unemployed makes them <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/the-economic-case-for-increasing-newstart/">the most likely to spend</a>. They are also more likely to spend locally. So as the Deloitte report highlights, we can expect a welfare raise to boost the economy by far more than the calculated $4 billion. The benefits are even greater if Newstart is raised by Deloitte’s recommenced $100 [<a href="https://www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DAE-Analysis-of-the-impact-of-raising-benefit-rates-FINAL-4-September-...-1.pdf">p. 16</a>].</p><p>Raising newstart would lead to moderate increases in interest rates. However, this would be useful in a recession, because currently the Reserve Bank has little up its sleeves to lower further. Indeed, Reserve Bank Governor Philip Lowe has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jul/02/reserve-bank-governor-calls-for-more-federal-spending-to-boost-economy">already called for the Government to increase stimulus spending</a>. For the economist Adam Triggs, Newstart is especially suited for this, because it <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/the-economic-case-for-increasing-newstart/">‘automatically increases government spending when the economy is weak (through payments to the rising number of unemployed people) and reduces demand when the economy is strong’</a>.</p><p>Equally beneficial, however, would be the boost to Australia’s historically unprecedented low wage growth. While some like to pit the interests of the unemployed against the employed, nothing could be further from the truth. Wage growth has been stagnant because of widespread precariousness in the labour market. Raising Newstart addresses this, better positioning workers to bargain for a raise, or to risk seeking a more suitable job.</p><p>Lastly, the cost of the increase can be easily subsidised. Simply closing the 1.3 billion dollar employment service provider industry, which has been shown to be <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2020/02/australia-digital-workhouse-work-for-the-dole-unemployment">corrupt</a> and <a href="https://percapita.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Working-It-Out-FINAL.pdf">grossly ineffective</a>, would pay for more than one third of the Newstart increase. With 12, 000 jobs on the line, its closure would be the most the industry ever did for the unemployed.</p><p>Alas, while the Australian economy teeters political elites waste their time debating a proposed extension to the cashless welfare card. The cards constrict the spending of the unemployed, which is bad for the economy. And by <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/feb/06/i-feel-sick-thinking-about-being-forced-onto-cashless-welfare-its-so-insulting?fbclid=IwAR3IxEmZBl5C1dTQZBmoO2tcqyQ8tt5L7-Omj4uNs3REsJ-ndgy1sC9BLeg&amp;__twitter_impression=true">removing key cost saving measures</a>, like online second-hand trading, the card inflames the problems it’s designed to fix. Why? <a href="https://www.google.com.au/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/01/drug-addiction-income-inequality-impacts-recovery">Because drug and alcohol abuse are worsened by precariousness and poverty</a>, and trials of the card <a href="https://thewest.com.au/news/crime/crime-rates-climb-in-kununurra-after-cashless-welfare-card-introduced-ng-b88570106z">have already shown increases in crime rates</a>. Faced by the prospect of the first recession in three decades, the government insists on digging the economy into a deeper and deeper hole. As it turns out, if you punish the unemployed for existing in an economy that requires unemployment, you punish everyone else too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3688f7635cfd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Democracy is Good For The Climate, So Flux Should Start Saying So]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/digital-democracy-is-good-for-the-climate-so-flux-should-start-saying-so-38274756576c?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38274756576c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australian-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[flux]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[direct-democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-democracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jan 2020 02:17:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-16T01:44:50.630Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/817/1*ydF940DTsvp0xDoYWzlicA.png" /></figure><p><strong>For the last few elections, Australians have been able to vote for experiments in a far more democratic system. But “neutrality” is preventing proponents from highlighting its role in solving the climate crisis.</strong></p><p>The <a href="http://voteflux.org/"><em>VoteFlux.org</em></a> party fields candidates who pledge to vote according to the results of a blockchain-based app. The app allows citizens to custom fit their vote. They can vote as direct (by voting per act of parliament) or as representative (by designating representatives for some or all issues) as they wish. As such, <em>Flux</em> is more democratic than a purely direct system, because those who don’t want to vote on every bill don’t have to —– it’s as direct as voters want it to be at any given moment.</p><p>While a supporter of Flux, I wonder whether its electoral failures are related to its strategic decision to exist almost as an apolitical political party. For in some ways <em>Flux</em> is less a political movement than a tech startup. Already, it turns a profit selling its underlying code (which is clearly a huge asset, and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/labor-s-dirty-little-pokie-secret-and-its-recalcitrant-tassie-cousin-20190201-p50v2z.html">far more commendable than owning millions of dollars worth of pokies</a>). And while it does stand firmly for experiments in systemic reform, on specific policies it is completely neutral.</p><p>This makes intuitive sense. The party is literally offering “the people” whatever they vote for, and it needs to convince voters that its candidates will do what the app tells them. The position is also “safe” — it shouldn’t alienate too many people. But it isn’t winning over many voters, and to me this isn’t surprising. Why? Because while the <em>Flux </em>app<em> </em>can far more accurately represent each voter’s preferences, no individual voter can be sure that in aggregate the <em>Flux </em>system<em> </em>would actually help or hinder their interests. Or at least they can’t be sure so long as <em>Flux </em>makes no attempt at determining what the result of “<em>Fluxing</em> the system” would actually be.</p><p>This deep uncertainty at the heart of <em>Flux</em> is related to deep uncertainties that have always bedevilled democratisation. While democrats want “the people” to have more power, many of “the people” don’t always agree. Of course, such fears are manufactured and stoked by a media that benefits from being divisive. Regardless of why, many are keen to blame things such as Brexit, Trump, and a lack of action on climate change on the masses. If idiots keep voting for morons, can idiots really be trusted?</p><p>But this need not be how the debate unfolds. In reality the world is beset by a plethora of problems caused by elites, and elites do nothing but wash their powerful hands of responsibility. Meanwhile, and tragically, it’s the masses who cop the blame. It is in finding a solution to this, to the quagmire that has the earth dependent on a path towards ecological and economic collapse, that <em>Flux </em>is a solution for.</p><p>Why? To take just one example, a vote for <em>Flux</em> is a vote for meaningful action on climate change. When polled at the last election (before the bushfires), 82 percent of Australians considered global warming an important issue. Most strikingly, even when voters were categorised according to which party they voted for, all groups viewed global warming as an important issue. 98 percent of Greens voters did, and 93 percent of Labor voters did, as is not surprising. But 68 percent of Coalition voters did too. There are important differences though. Of Coalition voters, only 22 percent viewed it as extremely important, while 46 percent viewed it as ‘quite important’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/482/1*uBRuqpAy0MR5KfzQbATCUA.png" /></figure><p><em>(From: </em><a href="https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-Election-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf"><em>https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-Election-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf</em></a><em>, p. 9)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/621/1*9WetNWW6DtDmXgn5tA6F-w@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>(From a Lowy Institute study: </em><a href="https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/climate-change-and-energy/"><em>https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/climate-change-and-energy/</em></a><em>)</em></p><p>Nevertheless, for democrats who don’t want millions of people to die from climate-induced displacement, the results are overwhelmingly positive. While climate skeptics get elected, this shouldn’t be held against moves towards increased democracy. Instead, it is related to problems with the current system. With a majority of Coalition voters viewing climate change as significant, the party’s intransigence reflects not the wishes of the people, but the way political elites balance the interests of their financial backers with the relative care that voters place on different issues. Because Coalition voters view ‘the economy’ as the most important issue, and because they can’t seperate their vote on economic issues from their vote on environmental issues, coal-hugging elites like Scomo can win the climate skeptic vote without losing many of those who are moderately concerned.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/482/1*x4KI8bwwNz3Q0IsGn7E1gA.png" /></figure><p><em>(Also from: </em><a href="https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-Election-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf"><em>https://australianelectionstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/The-2019-Australian-Federal-Election-Results-from-the-Australian-Election-Study.pdf</em></a><em>, p. 23)</em></p><p>If given the option to vote only on climate change, there would be more action on climate change. This is exactly what <em>Flux </em>offers. If the <em>Flux </em>system was introduced Coalition voters could vote for climate action without sacrificing what they believe Scomo offers them. In theory, they can vote directly on climate change, or for Labour or Greens to represent them on climate change, while still giving Scomo their vote on all other issues. Of course, it gets tricky because “economic” issues are not easily seperable from climate policy for all voters. Thus, only the <em>Flux</em> app could truly show where voters’ preferences lie. Nevertheless, preliminary polling is overwhelmingly positive. A vote for <em>Flux </em>is a vote to save the planet, and a vote to end the toxic attacks on “the people” that climate-inaction-fuelled polarisation can provoke.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38274756576c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Great Blading Bubble: How Toxic Masculinity Inflated and Burst Aggressive Inline]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/the-great-blading-bubble-how-toxic-masculinity-inflated-and-burst-aggressive-inline-4313e4930714?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4313e4930714</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[skateboarding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender-roles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rollerblading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[roller-skating]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[toxic-masculinity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Oct 2019 12:10:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-01T22:55:52.495Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The Great Blading Bubble: How Toxic Masculinity Inflated and Burst Aggressive Inline</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*CI_ko1tO5NpzcxF0B2ATTw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="http://www.theblademuseum.com/">Matt Mantz — Backslide Vegas ’97</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>[disclaimer: this is a speculative interpretation of intangible cultural forces.]</em></p><p>In the early 1990s inline skating broke out as the world’s fastest growing sport. By 1997 there were 29.1 million skaters world wide. Within this movement, teenagers inspired by skateboarding and BMX began pushing the limits of what was possible in terms of jumps, spins, speed, and sliding down handrails. This group, self identifying as “aggressive inline skaters”, would compete on live television at the x-games. Their skater-owned brand, Senate, sold millions of t-shirts. But then, the rise reversed. Nike sold its recently acquired inline skate brand, Bauer, for about half of what it had originally paid. Aggressive inline as an aspect of rollerblading was almost completely forgotten by popular culture. There, rollerblading lingered only as a joke that sparked a casually homophobic nostalgia for the strange mirage of the 1990s.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/621/1*9y1vBbWILttObqG93P7tCg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Many explanations of the rapid rise and precipitous decline of inline skating have been put forward. In Barely Dead the decline is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DArRi_PooDc">explained in terms of bullying by rollerblading’s Big Brother</a>, corporate skateboarding, which was able to monopolise cool by kicking blading from the x-games. Others have linked blading’s demise to timing. The sport’s rise came when its “pros” were too young to be professional. Whereas Tony Hawk could speak to camera and grow a multi-million dollar brand, the pro bladers of the late 1990s were running amok with the reward systems of teenage brains, fame and drugs. Finally, blading’s decline has been explained in terms of broader cultural shifts. Blading, perceived by popular culture as the epitome of the 1990s, <a href="https://the-cauldron.com/did-9-11-kill-rollerblading-yes-ecc180a41442">was destroyed when that yuppy carefree era ended on September 11, 2001</a>. From this point on, it is alleged, popular culture was too melancholic for spandex. How can you shoot down the sidewalk in pink tights when we don’t know where Bin Laden is? Do you hate America?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Y_CQKlNndI3ALxqhFAPL7g.jpeg" /><figcaption>pre 9/11 blading</figcaption></figure><p>Without attempting to weigh up the specific merits of preceding interpretations, this article argues that there is also a more structural, or foundational, explanation. It conceives the rise and fall of Aggressive Inline Skating as an economic bubble. To be a bubble, the 90s rollerblading industry must have been built upon false expectations. But what were these false expectations? Were people not simply exchanging money for inline skates? This was not, surely, the same as sub-prime loans or bit-coin mania. But in a way, it was the same. The Great Blading Bubble (GBB) was fuelled by a marketing campaign that promised not just inline skates, but a new source of individual freedom. Ads in magazines and on TV convinced millions of mostly teenaged boys that they could skate fast, jump high, spin out, and be radical and extreme. Indeed, this was “aggressive”. Here, as I will show, the anxieties of a homophobic and hyper masculine demographic were exploited through a PR campaign that for the majority of young men could not deliver. Most teenagers, viewing themselves and rollerblading through the ideas of 1990s America, found it extremely difficult to feel cool and aggressive on inline skates. Instead, they just flailed. They couldn’t stop their legs from drifting apart. They felt peculiarly out of place when they tried to jump. It just wasn’t befitting for a man. So, while millions of teenagers tried aggressive inline, most just felt weird doing it and stopped. The bubble was inflated by the hope of becoming a tough, extreme skater. The bubble was burst when aggressive inline iteself agreed that gumby rollerblading was “gay”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/710/1*czxAKl0CjNi41Pkhk3CHJA.jpeg" /><figcaption>“no homo” — blading’s response to the taunts from the wealthier, more powerful, skateboard industry was to go huge with big “hammers”</figcaption></figure><p>Thus, the story of the Great Blading Bubble is a savage journey to the heart of toxic masculinity, and of how it can be created and manipulated by the forces of capital. Instead of shrugging off the goofiness of unrefined rollerblading, rollerbladers doubled down. “We are not gay”, they said, “we are aggressive”. Bladers sought to overcome allegations of meek feminine homosexuality by jumping off taller and taller buildings, and sliding down ever kinkier poles. Here, rollerblading missed a genuine opportunity to embrace its “feminine” side as powerful, liberating and marketable. As a result, the majority of consumers simply threw out their rollerblades. Most young men who looked at rollerblading magazines felt only further emasculated by the perception that they could never have enough controlled “aggression” to perform such death defying stunts. And so, the Great Blading Bubble burst. The rollerblading industry, controlled by major corporations, could turn a huge but ephemeral profit by promising radical speed and air time, but such “products” are not tangible. To get what they were actually looking for, teenaged boys would have to endure months, maybe even years, of perceiving themselves through a culture that shamed gumby and uncoordinated skating as feminine, and feminine men as homosexual, and homosexuality as inherently and especially shameful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*s_te72LOkON5hJg9XTM9ZQ.gif" /><figcaption>Even as the great bubble burst, professional inline skating kept evolving. By the time Chris Haffey was the world’s best “aggressive” inliner, bladers had grown somewhat embarrassed by the term.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>What Is a Bubble?</strong></p><p>The liberal economist Russ Roberts often points out that it is impossible to determine that something is a bubble until it has burst. That is, it is only possible to determine that something <em>was</em> a bubble. No one knew that rollerblading was a bubble before it declined. In 1997, as accounts make clear, pro rollerbladers assumed that they would be earning a decent living at least into the medium term. That a bubble can only be known after it has burst, though, poses problems for it as a concept. Is there really nothing unique about an economic bubble that could be understood before it burst? Marxist political economy takes a different view. Here, an economic bubble is understood as an inflation of prices that does not reflect the fundamentals of production for a socially required use. If many people buy spoons, not because they want to use the spoons but because they think that the price of spoons will go up, then the price rise will not reflect an actual increase in the need for spoons. This is a speculative bubble. The “exchange value” of spoons found on the market would not reflect the “use value” that society actually has for them. Here it is possible, at least theoretically, to determine that something is a bubble before it has burst. It would require being able to distinguish sales made for the use of a good and sales made out of an expectation that prices might rise later. When speculative sales feed into each other, the resulting price rise can lead to further belief in a continued price rise. This can lead to even more gambling, to an even more inflated bubble. That all commodities have both use values and exchange values is therefore one of the contradictions that Marxists see as central to capitalism’s tendency for crisis.</p><p>Clearly, this was not the sort of bubble experienced by the inline skating industry in the 1990s. There was never a large secondary market of inline skates, in which skates were collected for an expected resale price that rose so high that kids who actually wanted to skate could no longer afford to. Rollerblading experienced a very different sort of bubble. It was a bubble made possible by mass media advertising. What made it a bubble was the fact that the industry’s rapid and ginormous growth was based on an implicit lie, or at least a sleight of hand. Blading’s rise was an example of a certain kind of fictitious capital. Markets were inflated by the mass promotion of something that was never delivered. To analogise, the Great Blading Bubble was fed by a highly effective snake-oil salesman.</p><p>While consumers paid for skates and skates were delivered, it was not only skates that were being sold. Indeed, skate sales are themselves only imperfect indicators of the participation rate of something much larger – a social movement. People were buying into an idea, the idea of being an “aggressive inline skater”. Advertisements sold both the prospect of a radical new form of individual freedom and membership into a new club, or subculture, a new identity. Rollerblading would be a new way for teenagers to “express themselves”. They could go super fast, do crazy spins, and slide down hand rails. This, it was implied, would help make them a man. It would prove their fierceness. To sell this idea, companies hired not only the best rollerbladers, the rollerbladers who did the most death defying stunts. They also hired the most marketable personalities. Senate –– whose t-shirts gained infamy when their tags printed “destroy all girls” –– generated enough of this “cultural capital” to grow into a multi-million dollar company. In 1997 they sold 750, 000 t-shirts. What they sold was an idea, the idea of what it was to be an aggressive inline skater.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/1*HojS67njiUm_y--S-w1kyA.jpeg" /></figure><p>But how sustainable was it to sell this idea of masculine cool to teenagers? Certainly, this punk-rock rebellion was viable for skateboarding. Many people bought skateboards. Many felt punk rock, even if they didn’t get that good at skateboarding, and skateboarding remained a viable industry. Nevertheless, even skateboarding has seen declines in sales, and a homophobic punk rock rebellion is no longer its main marketing strategy. Instead, skateboarding succeeded by gaining new sources of growth. It increasingly mainstreamed, even finding acceptance at the olympics, and it sold video games and shoes. Another comparison is scootering. Scooters are also heavily ridiculed by skateboarders, but scootering hasn’t stopped growing. Top scooter riders, like Ryan Williams, have forged a path for scootering at events like the Nitro World Games. The sport is not “aggressive”. Rather, it presents a positive self image and world class professionalism that doesn’t seem to have stopped parents taking their 5-year-olds to the skatepark. So why did scooter kids keep scootering, and <a href="https://www.wheelscene.co.uk/2019/09/what-happened-to-blading/">why did blader kids stop blading?</a></p><p>Something unique to blading is the extent to which the sport relies on body language. To rollerblade well is to be in control of body movements. It is difficult to make rollerblading look natural and smooth. However, this foundational clumsiness grants much more room for style. Of course, there are endless different styles of skateboarding, BMX, soccer, and scootering. But style is more fundamental to rollerblading, so much so that it has often been compared to dancing. Indeed, like ice-figure skating, rollerblading is both dance and sport. It is this aspect of inline skating that made its initial sales pitch unsustainable. While skateboarding is, clearly, an incredibly difficult sport to master, it is not that hard to feel comfortable standing on a skateboard, rolling along a footpath. Essentially, to skateboard is to stand, which is what you do when you’re not skateboarding anyway. Likewise, when riding a bike or a scooter, one has somewhere for their hands and arms to go. They just hold on to handlebars, nothing to worry about here. In the body language of insecure and homophobic 90s America, there was nothing to be ashamed of in riding along, even with minimal skill, on a skateboard or a bike. A teenager would not feel any more self conscious for having skateboarded on their street.</p><p>Rollerblading is a very different experience. To put on a pair of rollerblades is to rapidly increase ones chance of flailing around goofily. Any teenage boy interested in becoming a radical aggressive inline skater knew how quick the school yard was to taunt those who walked or ran “funny”. If you could barely catch a ball you were clumsy “like a girl”. This awkwardness is felt, when rollerblading for the first time, all through the body. The imbalance of skating leads people to hunch over in all sorts of strange ways. No doubt, such wobbles can be ironed out, but it takes time. This was not a part of rollerblading’s advertising. Instead, this reality was hidden by the rollerblading industry, by bladers who no longer felt like this any way, because they had gained control. As such, millions of young teenaged boys bought not rollerblades but the promise of controlled aggression and sheer speed. What they actually got was awkwardness. They sought to escape insecurities that were instead heightened.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*hxB9b_FziHVVdffhJhJQnQ.gif" /><figcaption>Soichiro Kanashima is regarded as one of the most stylish rollerbladers</figcaption></figure><p>This is why the rise and decline of inline skating is best thought of as the Great Blading Bubble. The huge growth of the rollerblading industry was fictitious. Rollerblading did not grow so big simply because so many people loved the action of rollerblading. It grew so big because self-conscious teenaged boys were manipulated by PR departments into believing that they could become cool, extreme, and radical young men. This was a lie, at least in the sense that what they really wanted did not come in the box with their skates. For 100 dollars they could buy rollerblades. But for controlled aggressive coolness they would need to spend months, if not years, of extra work. As such, a huge economic bubble ballooned up from the heartlaned of MTV America. Rollerblading companies promoted aggressive coolness, and sold skates. With the profits they could reinvest in more advertisements, more skate demos. The inline craze ballooned across America. Then the next competition, then a bigger one. Millions and millions of mostly teenaged boys bought skates, or got their parents to buy them skates. But then these millions of teenaged boys who had dreamed of being aggressive, fast and cool, had their bubbles burst. And so for the majority, also for the whole –– the Great Blading Bubble burst.</p><p><strong>How do we know that toxic homophobic masculinity was at the heart of the Great Blading Bubble?</strong></p><p>It is important to stress, however, that the experience of rollerblading is not an objective, or purely biological, one. Rather, what it felt like in the 1990s and early 2000s to be a clumsy inline skater was a product of historical conditioning. What it was to be a clumsy rollerblader was very different in France than it was in New York to what it was in California and to what it was in Adelaide. Clearly, many people didn’t care that they flailed around. Many people embraced this, eventually becoming extremely smooth sailers, able to perform death defying balancing acts at high speed along thin railings. Nevertheless, the experience of rollerblading was, at least in the then core hub of the sport –– the United States of America –– shaped by a toxic and homophobic masculinity. In the world of 1990s skate culture, femininity was constructed as fragile, weak and uncoordinated. Homosexuality was constructed as feminine. Through this lens, the awkwardness of beginner inline skating was not just seen as, but felt deeply within the bodies of participants to be, effeminate and gay. Clearly, such a framing is absurd. There is nothing weak or uncoordinated about being a woman, or being feminine. This was proven directly to skate culture by the pioneering female rollerbladers and skateboarders, like Fabiola Da Silva, who competed on vert ramps in the X-games directly against men. Likewise, there is clearly nothing inherently effeminate about being a homosexual man. Nevertheless, through the culture of 1990s extreme sports, and the wider punk-rock teen culture more generally, being clumsy was effeminate, and effeminate was gay, and gay was shameful. This framing, although itself not static, was what underlay the eventual bursting of the Great Blading Bubble. This can be put another way: if it were not for a toxic and homophobic masculinity, people wouldn’t have cared that they felt weird when rollerblading for the first time. They might even have embraced it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*CTWXmu3Zry3az-i9ga6ipw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="http://www.theblademuseum.com/">Fabiola Da Silva — x games 1997</a></figcaption></figure><p>To explore the toxic masculinity of turn-of-the-century skate culture, it is useful to mention the infamous joke hurled at inline skating:</p><blockquote><em>Q: What’s the hardest part of rollerblading? A: Telling your dad that you’re gay.</em></blockquote><p>Here, quite clearly, being gay is seen as a massive insult. If it were not so, this joke would not have gained so much traction within a skateboarding industry defensive of its market share. Of course, it need not be perceived as an insult. Arguably, in the late 1990s telling your dad that you were gay would have been harder than almost all rollerblading tricks. It was most likely more difficult than Tony Hawk landing a 900, especially considering the clear immaturity of an entire mass culture that thought it so obviously hilarious to mock something for “being gay”.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FVmMAE0za2-w%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DVmMAE0za2-w&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FVmMAE0za2-w%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1fe5c175a8d26e40beac3039a107c8b7/href">https://medium.com/media/1fe5c175a8d26e40beac3039a107c8b7/href</a></iframe><p>It is interesting, however, to ask why this joke was so easily “gotten” by pop culture. For the “radical” extreme sports culture of the 1990s it was not tough to do things that were not dangerous or punk rock. Ballet is gay, ice figure skating is gay. Rollerblading is a lot like dancing and – clearly – ice figure skating. So even the perfected form was seen as effeminate and gay. However, as discussed, the act of rollerblading can expose ones sense of self to deep imbalance. Millions of Americans knew this feeling. They had tried rollerblading. When they were told that blading was gay, this aligned with their own memory of heightened insecurity when they had flailed around their suburb for 20 minutes before nearly breaking their wrists.</p><p>The fact that blading was, in the “common sense” of turn of the century USA, dismissed as gay is clear evidence of the toxicity of then mainstream masculinity. This masculinity was toxic because it was fuelled by a self loathing that was then rebranded as homophobia. Young men, ashamed at their own selves for having felt awkward on skates, rebranded this insecurity as hatred towards some unbeknownst other – homosexuals. For further evidence of the prevalence of this toxic homophobic masculinity, mention can be made to the fact that it took so long for pro skateboarders and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3si9MIuVLQY">rollerbladers to feel comfortable coming out</a>. Just like in the era’s rap battles, homophobia had been at the crux of the intra-extreme sports turf wars. This toxic masculinity had been the lens through which a generation of inline skaters perceived themselves, and this was why the Great Blading Bubble had to burst. If it had been otherwise, then people wouldn’t have felt weird getting better at blading in public. More people would have kept blading.</p><p><strong>A missed opportunity: why embracing femininity and “gayness” might have saved blading</strong></p><p>So far, I have outlined what could be considered a structural explanation for the Great Blading Bubble. It was created by the marketing campaigns of companies, which sought to sell a cool controlled aggression, fast times and radical airs dude. But this bubble would eventually burst, because the mass consumer market felt only a heightened insecurity at their own sense of “gayness” when they flailed around in the suburbs. But this explanation, while important, must not be taken to ignore the decision making of rollerbladers and rollerblading as a social movement. Indeed, rollerblading was not simply a bunch of anxious teens trying to prove how tough they were. Rollerblading was a movement of likeminded people who wanted to put wheels on their feet, a clearly fun extension of what it is to be human. Embracing this activity, blading as a social movement saw possibilities that no corporation ever could. Unfortunately, they had to fight to project what they saw as “genuine” about their own social movement, a battle waged uphill against the companies that actually had the money to fund advertising campaigns.</p><p>It is important to recognise, therefore, that the “aggressive” branding was, in part, simply an attempt to distance one aspect of inline skating from corporate branding. Secondly, it is not as though rollerbladers, or skateboarders, or even teenagers, invented casual homophobia and sexist gender norms. Instead, young people who happened to be extremely good at rollerblading were attempting –– and in the short term succeeding at –– an extremely difficult business venture: branding themselves as genuine and as different to the image of inline skating projected by major corporations. Thus, the whole notion of “aggressive inline skating”, and the shaming of lame and uncool recreational skating, was arguably a necessary marketing strategy at the time. It is not necessarily the bladers’ “fault” for pursuing this form of identity politics. Indeed, as the t-shirt sales show, it must have been effective in the short term.</p><p>Nevertheless, with hindsight this strategy seems to have been a huge missed opportunity. In an attempt at claiming a unique position for “Aggressive Inline Skating”, rollerbladers were essentially agreeing with corporate skateboarding that all other forms of rollerblading were “gay” and lame. Rollerbladers agreed with their own detractors that to look goofy on skates while skating around suburbs and along beeches was gay. And, rollerbladers agreed that because it was gay it was a bad thing. Unfortunately for Aggressive Inline this search for a pure, tough heterosexual identity was a direct attack on what had sustained the emergence of rollerblading in the first place. To get teenagers to do stunts on inline skates it was necessary for there to already be many teenagers who knew how to roll around with basic coordination. But aggressive inline skaters attacked this source of talent as lame, just like skateboarders attacked all rollerbladers in general.</p><p>Toxic homophobic masculinity strangled rollerblading. This is particularly sad considering how cool gay culture is. Perhaps it is because of the difficulties of being openly homosexual at a time when being called gay was an “obvious” insult. Whatever the reason, gay culture was everything that might very well have stopped the Great Blading Bubble from being a bubble. It was accepting of individual difference. It loved love, and it encouraged people to feel fantastic. If rollerblading had responded differently to homophobic corporate bullying, it may well have gained the support of the homosexual community. Rollerbladers have always loved competitions held in streets. Imagine rollerblading competitions at gay pride rallies. Imagine how lame skateboarding would look, in the current climate, if it had been skateboarding alone that had attacked sexual freedom, while rollerblading had embraced it and all its partying.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CeB9p6ZqhjhVDwFDAKsybQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.instagram.com/estrojen/">Estrojen, a rollerskater with more followers than the best pro bladers, doing a backflip.</a></figcaption></figure><p>If this seems a bit of a stretch, take a look at the present day resurgence of roller skating. Roller skating, as in the skates worn at roller discos, has recently surged in popularity, particularly amongst women. This can be traced to an earlier resurgence in roller derby, but now these highly athletic women can also do backflips and grinds. They are just as punk rock as aggressive inliners ever were, but their sub-culture is far more open to difference. Indeed, the movement embraces the uniqueness of human body types, and is encouraging of all styles. This is a sport where you do not have to constantly doubt your own sense of self in order to gauge how cool you are. This is a sport that is not attacking the foundations of its own industry in an attempt to prove how un-gay it is.</p><p><strong>Where to from here?</strong></p><p>Following the bursting of The Great Blading Bubble, aggressive inline continued and, in fact, only improved in terms of athleticism, skill and risk taking. Even while pay checks for professional skaters have been in constant decline since September 11, 2001, skaters have continued to push the creative and physical limits of what is possible on skates. Rollerblading is now far less insecure about its sense of self. Movements like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziRih_WD518">Mushroom Blading</a> promote the quirkiness of inline skating. Aggressive Inliners as a demographic are an ageing population. This means that its skater-owned brands are far less angsty, far less concerned with being tough and hetero. Experimentalism and creativity are now highly valued. And while rollerblading seems to have declined in the United States, it has been blossoming as a truly global phenomenon. The most exciting young talent is arguably in Japan and South Korea. In Africa, shipments of second hand skates purchased during the Great Blade Bubble are currently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/feb/14/all-those-90s-rollerblades-ended-up-in-nairobi-where-its-more-than-a-fad">underlying an entirely new wave of inline skating</a>. Just as there is a relative decline in US hegemony at the level of world order, and a rise of “the rest”, a similar phenomenon seems to be occurring for “Aggressive Inline”. Could it be that without the strange insecurities of turn-of-the-century teenaged consumerism, a new era of inline skating might flourish?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vNmK1yYUey69bg38wLTAzg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.instagram.com/pittsandpieces/">A sign of optimism: pro blader Robbie Pitts embraces his own creativity</a></figcaption></figure><p>If this admittedly speculative history is anything to go by, the answer hinges on the development of a healthy introspection within rollerblading. Blading is lucky in one sense. Its near fatal demise means that when its top pros are accused of rape by fellow female bladers, <a href="http://bladeordie.com/rollerblading-and-a-metoo-moment/">the carnage barely leaves Instagram</a>. This isolation may allow blading the breathing time it needs to become more accepting of difference and quirkiness, to oppose sexism, homophobia and… rape. If such acceptance can be combined with an honest understanding of what it is to rollerblade, and can avoid a self-loathing identity politics fuelled by corporate PR departments, then the future of human evolution through mechanical adaptation may well be bright. More and more people might come to again embrace the at-times strange and, let’s face it, merrily gay feeling of attaching wheels to their feet.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4313e4930714" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Evidence that a Universal Basic Income is, if anything, “too affordable”.]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/evidence-that-a-universal-basic-income-is-if-anything-too-affordable-d9355946824f?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d9355946824f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[universal-basic-income]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basic-income]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[negative-income-tax]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ubi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 Jun 2018 01:29:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-21T08:10:54.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*UY-a1FgeupRMSQ_sv_WluA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Could Australia afford a Universal Basic Income such that everyone would receive 25, 000 dollars, with which they could do whatever they wanted? Would it cost more than we currently spend?<em> [Short answer: in many cases, it will actually cost less.]</em></p><p>So far, when talking about a UBI at “pubs” (let’s be honest, I can only afford to drink in backyards), I run up against the criticism that it “just isn’t affordable”. I found it frustrating to find the calculations on this, so eventually learned to perform a back-of-the-envelope technique by plagiarising the work of <a href="https://works.bepress.com/widerquist/75/download">a far more intelligent person</a> who had already done this for the United States.</p><p>The only change I made was to calculate the spending as a percentage of GDP. The benefit of this was that I could rely on OECD data that simplified the problem of dealing with both state and federal spending. As such, I was able to provide estimates for both a Loosey Lefty version (which maintained current health and education spending), and a Righty Tighty version (which cut current health and education spending, leaving these services to be delivered by private health and education providers, and paid for via the new UBI).</p><p>A Universal Basic Income, under this arrangement, can be understood as a 25, 000 dollar tax deduction. Whatever the income tax a person pays, whether it is 1 dollar or 50, 000 dollars, it is subsidised by the 25, 000 dollar UBI. An unemployed person doesn’t pay income tax, so when their zero tax is subsidised by the UBI, they end up receiving the whole 25, 000 dollars. If someone earns one dollar then, because there is no tax free threshold, they would still pay tax. At 35%, they would pay 35 cents. However, because everyone receives the UBI, their 35 cents of tax is subisidised by the 25, 000 dollars. As such, they end up receiving $24, 999.65 of “net UBI”. Because everyone earns a different amount of money, and pays a different amount of tax, they receive a different “net UBI”.</p><p>This basic mechanics of the UBI is important in calculating its cost. If the 25, 000 dollars is simply multiplied by the number of Australians, a shockingly large figure appears. 600 billion is very scary. However, the actual cost of the UBI, the amount of money that “net payers” pay to “net receivers” is a completely different figure. It can only be calculated using data that shows peoples income. Thus, to calculate the cost of the UBI, I relied on Census data that lists the number of people who exist within certain income brackets. I could not (and did not want to) calculate for every person individually, <a href="http://abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6523.02015-16?OpenDocument">because the data gives income in ranges (1–100 dollars, 100–150 dollars, for example).</a> As such, I first had to select the middle income figure of each income range. Then, I multiplied each of these income figures by two different tax rates (35% and 50%). Having calculated the tax for each income range, I subtracted the 25, 000 dollar UBI. This gave me the net UBI for each income range. When I multiplied this by the number of people in each income range, I had the total figures for all net recipients. I could then divide this figure by Australian GDP, in order to compare the cost of the UBI to current government spending.</p><p>Doing this exercise helped me to better understand how funding a UBI works. The cost of the UBI is determined not only by the amount of UBI, but also by the tax rate. This is because a lower tax rate will result in a larger number of net recipients. In any case, by crunching the numbers on a UBI of 25, 000 dollars at two different tax rates, I found that, under a Loosey Lefty model, the cost remained slightly more than current government spending, or significantly less. Under a Righty Tighty model, spending was completely slashed, to the point that it would be potentially more reckless and radical to implement the fiscally “conservative” option.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qfUun8kAadWlnLTLmYYQsQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Conclusion:</strong> this very simple calculation is useful only for providing a rough gauge of how costly a Universal Basic Income would be. The 25, 000 dollar figure that I used <a href="https://pirateparty.org.au/wiki/Platform#Merger_of_tax_and_welfare_systems.2C_and_establishment_of_a_basic_income">is far higher than most UBI </a>proposals. This means that these figures show quite high costings for Universal Basic Incomes, and that much lower basic incomes would be even more affordable. While these results should be treated with a grain of salt, they indicate that initial experimentation with a UBI is itself affordable. It is not, of course, a comment on what the <a href="https://medium.com/basic-income/wouldnt-unconditional-basic-income-just-cause-massive-inflation-fe71d69f15e7">flow on effects </a>to the economy would be, or on which tax system would actually be appropriate. All it suggests is that sufficient wriggle room exists for experiments in many different UBIs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d9355946824f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Evolution of Meaning]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/the-evolution-of-meaning-b6675834fd53?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6675834fd53</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[evolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[meaning-of-life]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jun 2017 03:04:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-09T03:01:15.488Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many humans feel incomplete. As they contrast the ticking time bomb of their own life expectancy – statistical, but no less real – with the job that they work and they hate, they feel as though their life is “meaningless”.</p><p>Strangely, however, there isn’t much agreement on what “meaningfulness”, in this sense of the word, actually means. Most attempts at defining the word strike as semantic sleights of hand. The sound “meaning” is replaced with another sound, a synonym, like “purpose”. But such word juggling does not clear things up. Indeed, couldn’t ones life be purposeless, and yet still be meaningful? Maybe. We just don’t know, because no one we ever talk to has any idea about what these words actually mean. (Or maybe I should just speak for myself?)</p><p>Surely, however, a good place to start would be the beginning. Specifically, where did this seemingly innate sense of longing for meaningfulness come from? Like all of our other traits, it must be an at least indirect outgrowth of our evolutionary past, whether selected for being advantageous, or emerging as a benign or malignant byproduct.</p><p>Unlike things such as legs and arms and specific joints, “meaningfulness” can’t be mapped out genetically, amongst all the other species in the web of life. But if we can’t compare the evolutionary development of meaningfulness between species, neither can we compare it between individual humans. Just as each individual has had that same trippy day-dream – what if everyone sees colours differently duuude… – it’s probably also true that people experience their sense of meaningfulness subjectively.</p><p>But if meaningfulness was selected evolutionarily – if meaningfulness itself had its own evolutionary purpose – then it should also be expected that it has an objective aspect. Maybe there are no hard and fast rules. Maybe it feels different for everyone, but maybe there is an almost unshakable correlation between, say, being bitter to everyone you meet, and not having a meaningful life. When socially alone and bitter, and so unable to communicate with other vessels of meaningfulness about meaningfulness, most humans will feel incomplete.</p><p>At this point, when we begin to realise that meaningfulness, although subjective at the individual level, is also an inherently social activity, we realise also that it is so closely related to language, and communication, that the answer to our original question may have been far more easy to grasp than it first seemed. That is, what if the longing for meaningfulness is a drive that evolution selected for its ability to propel the evolution of language? This makes sense evolutionarily, because a group of people who could communicate with ever increasing nuance would be able to out-bid the genetic competition with ever more ease. But it also explains the longing we feel. Humans spend a lot of their time thinking. That is, using language to process meaning. So the invention of language, and therefore the invention of the communication of meaning, has shaped us deeply. We think about who we are with language. When we think about what it would be like to stop thinking for an extended period of time, we feel like we would be sacrificing ourselves. We almost are the words we think. Or at least, that’s what it sometimes feels like.</p><p>So it’s perfectly likely that the same yearning for meaning that drove forwards the evolution of language, is still within us, driving us to find meaning in places other than words.</p><p>Of course, this is where the chicken and egg come to rear their perennial heads and shells. If the evolution of language came first, perhaps out of sheer practical necessity, then there is a reasonable chance that our senses of meaningfulness are redundant byproducts. That is, humans have so far just failed to realise that using the longing for meaning to drive forwards existential thoughts is actually a gross over-stretch of its intended purpose of language formation. The implication of this is that humans should just stop thinking so much, so as to relax, and more easily chat amongst themselves. Alternatively, if the longing for meaning comes first, and it is language that is the logical outgrowth – language as just a way to better get to the bottom of what things mean – then there actually might be some greater purpose to the pursuit of meaningfulness.</p><p>In any case, the process clearly snowballs, with language leading to deeper searches for meaningfulness, and those searches leading to the discovery and invention of more language. The more words one learns, the more questions he or she is able to ask. From these questions, we project outwards into ourselves a larger search for more meaning. From this we discover a new word, or a new concept, and it changes everything.</p><p>Is there a purpose to all of this? Did the evolution of meaningfulness arise for some greater reason? Is there an endpoint to this longing we feel, from which we could finally rest in contemplative satisfaction, relying on the luxury of the complete catalog of all meaningful sound bites in order to appreciate through conversation the reason we are here, having such a merry old time?</p><p>Maybe. But at this stage we simply don’t know. And yet we do long for more meaningfulness. And by any measure, we should keep the search alive, because currently – after thousands of years of human history – still no body really knows what meaningfulness actually means.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6675834fd53" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why we should at least get our feet wet in Flux]]></title>
            <link>https://toldandretold1.medium.com/why-we-should-at-least-get-our-feet-wet-in-flux-8c5e4a497f4?source=rss-8b7776c30b7e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c5e4a497f4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[end-of-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[flux]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Toldandretold]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2016 03:45:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-09T09:38:22.107Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For each ideology, there exist simplified summaries that help to categorise the political landscape, but that damage a healthy understanding of what each ideology actually believes its concerns and conclusions to be.</p><p>So Marxists want to make everyone exactly equal by taking away all belongings, because they hate everything about capitalism.</p><p>And libertarians want to replace all welfare with ruthless evolutionary competition so as to kill off all poor people.</p><p>For <a href="http://voteflux.org/">Flux</a>, the simplification is probably something like: kids these days think that because they voted on Australian Idol over SMS in 2003, they should get to vote on tax reform and gay rights on their phones as well.</p><p>Funnily enough, this isn’t a bad point. There are endless examples of digital voting that shine a light on potential alternatives. Also, Flux comes from the tech start up world, so an explanation of it must elaborate on the fact that current technology is viable, and that it stems from a group of people who understand technological development as having a vital potential for progress. Nevertheless, there are other reasons why flux is needed today. These reasons stem from our culturual, intellectual, and political histories.</p><p>That there are problems in our world that need fixing has always been a truism. Nevertheless, we have today the biggest problems that history has ever grappled with. But while we require forms of collective decision making that meet the task, the political system we inherited no longer works well even for traditional problems.</p><p>Voting for one of two shit options as a means of reflecting all of our many beliefs has suffocated rather than encouraged healthy democratic conversations. A political class and culture emerged that was blind to large segments of voters. Because voters were ignored, healthy public discourse was impossible. This is why the political class has been so surprised by Brexit, Trump, and Sanders.</p><p>The surprise that the political elites felt towards attempts at attacking the status quo, however, was also supported by a sense — which is fading — that “there is no other option”. This feeling, while once widespread, was wrong but not stupid. It was an intelligent response to our past.</p><p>When the Cold War ended, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man">leading intellectuals pronounced that the historical struggle for the best political and economic system had ended.</a> Market democracies, they argued, were the best that we would ever get. These assurances rested on fundamentalist overconfidence in both representative democracy and free trade. But even for those who weren’t so fundamentalist in their support of these ideas, there didn’t seem to be any other options. When looking back at the 20th century, we see a litany of creative and hopeful political experiments that achieved, in total, a crushing of the very emancipatory spirit they had aimed for, and millions of dead people.</p><p>While this history feeds into the deep cultural assumption that our system of representative democracy is terrible but still the best option, it also feeds into our intellectual history. That is, the failure of fundamentalist ideolgical ambitions in the 20th century created a suspicion of any set of ideas that claims to have “figured it all out”. Most people understand that they vibrate at their own political frequency, one that borrows little bits from all over the many different political spectra. Is this mishmash a result of our political beliefs being illogical? Sometimes. But it’s also because we realise that each political ideology is, essentially, a useful but limited way of thinking. Or at least we either tend to realise this, and so produce our own unique syntheses, or we grow increasingly and mistakenly disillusioned by a belief that nothing is worth risking what we already have, even though what we have has many problems.</p><p>What this all means is that for a political movement to break through the current stalemate of ideas, it can’t pretend to have all the answers. There is too much justified suspicion for one-sized-fits-all political ideologies. Without the possibility for belief in this way, how can we create a better system? We can do it by offering not a rigid and fundamentalist political ideology, but one that takes pride in the fact that there is no one objective answer.</p><p>Proper democracy is based on such an understanding. Rather than there being one correct answer, it understands that there exist many possible answers each with their own downsides. But it is the conclusion that democracy makes about this situation that is pivotal. It concludes that because there is no one best answer, the true best alternative is a good public conversation about which downsides (or for the optimists, which upsides) people would like to chose.</p><p>Less economic growth, but also less poverty?</p><p>more economic growth, so that we can then redistribute more later?</p><p>Or a rainbow/green fascist alliance to end overpopulation and deforestation by killing all heterosexuals, so that we can have more public orgies in more rainforests?</p><p>Each option has its ups and downs, obviously.</p><p>In the current cultural, political, and intellectual stalemate, we require a system that maximises creativity, so that political experimentation can fine tune our understanding of the downsides of policy choices. Flux doesn’t promise or even try to give the correct answer on policy, but it promises the current best way to strive to find out the most possible number of answers, and the best way to learn about their problems.</p><p>Through a system where each person decides how representative, and how direct, they want democracy to be for them, the contours of the political system are themselves always in flux. And this constant fluctuation reflects as precisely as history ever has the will of the people.</p><p>In such a topography of power, wide sections of voters can never be ignored. If a group of people have views that shock you, you will know it exists early on. Social movements will have the best possible chance of empathising with each other, in attempts at growing consensus.</p><p>But best of all there is no fundamentalism about this. Beginning as an experiment within systems of rigid representative democracy, if it fails, it fails. But it’s failure, by representing a monumental reemergence of creative political experimentation, cannot possibly be anything but a success. OK so maybe that’s a tad fundamentalist.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c5e4a497f4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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