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            <title><![CDATA[Morten Dahm Kjaergaard — Don’t Be a Lucky Fool]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tomhwilliams23/morten-dahm-kjaergaard-dont-be-a-lucky-fool-faf8b296d727?source=rss-1e6b469259f7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tom Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2024 09:46:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-14T09:46:11.352Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Morten Dahm Kjaergaard — Don’t Be a Lucky Fool</h3><h3><strong>“So every choice you take, you take them out of common sense.”</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mj0wPxncwltks-top9Ypww.png" /></figure><p>A few months ago I stumbled upon a manager in the 3rd tier of Danish football with extremely progressive ideas. A coach who, against the odds, had steered a part time side to consistent top 3 finishes, all whilst playing some extremely attractive football. This part time side dominate the ball more than any other team in the league, playing with principles which really resonate with the way I view the game. This coach was Morten Dahm Kjaergaard, Head Coach of Aarhus Fremad.</p><p>The managerial vacancy at Notts County was the primary reason for discovering Kjaergaard; after all, the Notts owners are Danish Brothers who favour this style of play. Whilst that move didn’t materialise, I was able to establish a good relationship with the man in question (the power of social media I suppose). An hour long interview and several messages later, we have arrived here.</p><p>Not only will we look to analyse Aarhus Fremad, and their impressive style, but through the fortune of having spoken to the man himself, we will look to dive into what he is like as a coach, and even as a person. So often the characteristics which define us as people are reflected in our work, and that is no different with football. As always, there is a mixture of analysis, data and opinion, as we take a deeper look at the side who are turning heads in the Danish 2. Division.</p><p><strong>Aarhus</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V-7jNsO4zltKt7NY6KhLrA.jpeg" /><figcaption>‘The Icebergs’, Aarhus — VisitDenmark</figcaption></figure><p>The second largest city in Denmark, Aarhus is home to around 290,000 people, and, perhaps more importantly, two football teams in the top three tiers of Danish football. In the Superliga (top tier) sit Aarhus Gymnastikforening, or AGF as they are more commonly stylised. An extremely successful side, AGF have won the Danish top tier on 5 separate occasions, and have finished in the top 3 a further 21 times, finishing 3rd as recently as the 22/23 season. That meant they played in Europe this season, with their campaign on the continent ending in Belgium. But still, with that success comes money, and with that comes extra resources. AGF cast rather a large shadow over their neighbours, but, with the help of a 40 year old Head Coach, they look to emerge from the darkness bit by bit.</p><p>Aarhus Fodsportsforening, or Fremad for short, were founded in 1947, some 67 years after their ‘big brother’. They’ve spent just 2 seasons in the Superliga, spending the vast majority of their history in the third tier, where they find themselves now. Yet, in recent years they’ve been pushing to get back up the leagues. Since Kjaergaard’s arrival in 2020, Aarhus Fremad have finished in the top 4 in all but one of the seasons. They’ve finished as high as 2nd place, and find themselves in 3rd place this term, just 2 points off of the promotion places. 2 teams are promoted to the Danish 2nd tier, so you may be wondering how Fremad finished 2nd, yet still remain in the 3rd tier? The answer is simple; Covid. That curtailed the season, meaning they missed out on promotion on goal difference alone.</p><p>Promotion this season really will hinge on finishing 2nd place. 5 time Danish Superliga champions Esbjerg, who have spent 69 of the last 74 years in the top 2 tiers, are in the 3rd tier this season. A full professional side, it’s perhaps no surprise that they find themselves someway clear at the top of the table; 13 points ahead of Fremad at the time of the winter break. 7 of the 12 sides in the division are professional; Fremad make up the 5 that are part time. “We have have one of the lowest budgets in the league and we are fighting against teams that have a lot more money than we have” Kjaergaard tells me. Yet Fremad have a chance of promotion. Through a clear play style, innovative methods, and an unwavering belief in what they do, Aarhus Fremad are battling against the odds; and are winning. Let’s have a look at exactly how they are punching so above their weight.</p><p><strong>Dominating the Ball</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oq06AqdHlJti1yj-_m7gnw.png" /><figcaption>Morten Dahm Kjaergaard — Din Avis Aarhus</figcaption></figure><h3>“You have to pick a way and then develop that”</h3><p>As we’ve established already, Aarhus Fremad are a side who like to dominate the ball. They average 59.9% possession, which is 4.5% higher than the next best side, top of the table Esbjerg. That has been a consistent theme over Kjaergaard’s time there. In 20/21 they ranked 2nd for possession, averaging 59.2%, whilst in both 21/22 and 22/23 they topped the possession charts, recording 59.3% and 59.5% respectively. We can also see that their possession numbers were extremely consistent, just under 60% across a 32 game campaign, which is an incredibly high number. They’ve become even more dominant on the ball, underlining their general approach.</p><p>The way in which they’ve been able to compete with the larger sides is through keeping the ball; something that is supported by the data. This, for me, is the key to their success. It’s their differential, what sets them apart from their peers. You might expect sides like Esbjerg to dominate the ball; after all, they have the quality of player to do so. But for a side like Aarhus Fremad, this is a much more deliberate approach, one which has clearly been undertaken over a number of years. Keeping the ball is no easy feat, especially when you’re a part time side; the patterns in which possession based play can be coached takes several repetitions. It’s also not easy when you lose key players throughout the season, as we will discuss later. Yet, despite all of that, it remains a constant theme of Kjaergaard’s style; and one which, I believe at least, is the single most important defining characteristic of their play.</p><p>When you speak to Kjaergaard, it’s really no surprise that his teams play this way. “So the first thing you have to keep in mind is that football is the lowest scoring game, so randomness is really, really high. You have to know that. If you don’t know that, in football, then you can make a lot of mistakes” Kjaergaard tells me. Clearly his style of play is about limiting the element of randomness. And what is the best way of eliminating that random element? By retaining possession. The top sides, the top coaches; the most common way to control the game is by controlling the ball. The great Johan Cruyff said “There is only one ball, so you need to have it”. In short, if the opposition does not have the ball, they cannot score. And by limiting the amount of time they have the ball, by keeping it yourself, you also limit the amount of randomness that occurs when they have possession; this is a view that Kjaergaard subscribes to.</p><p>Kjaergaard has his style; and he will stick to it. “I think all of us have to choose which path we want to go (down) because it’s so important that one day we go to a totally different defensive style. Not having the ball, kick the ball away and then the other day I will try to to play out from the goal kicks and be dominating, because then the players cannot be really good in anything. You have to pick a way and then develop that<strong>.” </strong>Clearly Kjaergaard’s way is dominating the ball; and that won’t be changing any time soon.</p><p><strong>The Lucky Fool</strong></p><h3><strong>“So every choice you take, you take them out of common sense.”</strong></h3><p>Kjaergaard is influenced heavily by a book, not one on football, but one about stock markets; <em>Fooled by Randomness </em>by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. In particular, there is one term that Kjaergaard resonates with in particular; <em>the Lucky Fool. </em>This term is defined in the book as someone ‘who benefited from a disproportionate share of luck but attributes his success to some other, generally very precise, reason’. Lucky fools do not even realise that they are lucky fools, and this is precisely what Kjaergaard tries to avoid. He’s able to apply this to his footballing philosophy too.</p><p>“If you’re winning and you don’t look into the game, what was good, what was bad, bad in the game, what can you do? What can bring us the next step?. Then you fool yourself.”</p><p>“And then of course there’s unlucky here as well. Because when you lose a game, it’s not all bad and you have to be calm in this kind of world and football is so many feelings and feelings, feelings is fantastic, but when you are a head coach or director in the football club, you have to control even the game, but also your feelings as well. So every choice you take, you take them out of common sense.”</p><p>He is cerebral in his approach to games; he looks to analyse them without bias, allowing him to draw fairer conclusions. This all ties back to his philosophy, and the way in which he not only sees the game; but his outlook on life in general too. “So every choice you take, you take them out of common sense”. I think this line is rather poignant, but also a perfect way to surmise the philosophy of Kjaergaard. He has taken a choice to play his football in a certain way. This choice is steeped in common sense. He wants to control as many aspects of the game as possible. How do you control games? By controlling the ball; this is reflected in their possession data. The choice therefore is simple; Kjaergaard’s sides must play in a possession based way, in order to control the variables. The decisions are made out of common sense; so as to not be a lucky fool.</p><p><strong>Team Shape</strong></p><p>Into the more tangible areas now, but even here Kjaergaard’s football is fluid, and sometimes veers into the philosophical. In his own words, “the shape we have, it can be difficult to explain sometimes”. He does go on to elaborate: “normally our shape is a 4–3–3, but both in the defensive plays and in the offensive plays, we have a lot of rotations”. This is clear when you watch his sides. They are incredibly fluid in their set up. The 4–3–3 is probably easiest to see out of possession, but in possession, they play in a much more open style. Jamie Hamilton, a brilliant writer here on Medium, often questions the incessant need to assign numbers to the formations in football. This is evident none more so than in Kjaergaard’s side. You would have to stylise it as a 2–1–2–5, but what do the numbers really mean?</p><p>“When we have the ball, our build up structure is 3 build up players. Our full backs will push up high, onto the last line, with our striker in position. Our wingers will then come inside, so that we have 5 players in between the lines. We then have 2 players close to the build up game. That’s if we play against a back 4; if we play against a back 5, we are able to push 1 of the close build up players forwards, so that we have 6 players in attack”. Hopefully the below illustrations help underline the point Kjaergaard is making here. Their 6 does often drop in between the CBs, but even more often he sits just in front, offering a triangle in a more advanced position, rather than as a deep 3rd CB, as we often see. This is due in part to the keeper’s positioning; as he is so advanced, he often occupies the spaces a more traditional sweeper would take.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*YSO6_3z6qrroo6ENLu8mvw.png" /></figure><p>In fact, in the build play at least, Aarhus Fremad’s 6, or DM, is the single most important player. Almost all of the play comes through him, and he forms the link between the defence and the midfield. As we will see later on, he often recycles the play in order to facilitate the more direct runners in the final third. But he also plays an important role in ball retention and deep circulation. Whilst we often look at the DM as being at the base of midfield, I’d actually say that Fremad’s DM is rather at the tip of the defence. The pattern of build up is so often keeper to CB, CB to DM, but from there it becomes more varied. He is given a freer role in build up, and is the side’s chief distributor. In this sense, he is the most important player in the side; he keeps everything ticking, and when they are at their best, their moves will, in some form or other, have come through the 6 at some point along the way.</p><p><strong>Data</strong></p><p>One thing Kjaergaard talks about frequently is data. It’s something we build a rapport over; after all, it is data that pointed me in the direction of the Danish coach in the first place. But it’s also part of Kjaergaard trying to use whatever tools he has available to him to compete against some of the bigger sides: “We have one of the lowest budgets in the league and we are fighting against teams that have a lot more money than we have so it’s really interesting to try to beat the randomness of the market of the football world in a short moment of time as well.” Kjaergaard is able to use data as a tool to gain an advantage over others who may not yet be on board with the use of data within the game.</p><p>He continues “you have to look into data to find some of those truths as well. So, we are able to look at where we are succeeding with the things we want to do well. Of course we’re looking at it with our video and these kind of things, but data is so quick to tell you oh, this is good. This is good. Okay, why are we not performing in this part of the game? So some of the data things we are looking into is is not not that much of a position wise, it’s more about the progressive passes progressive runs, touches in the box, and how how many times can we get our best dribblers set up again, one against one”. Kjaergaard is an advocate for the use of data; it aligns with his forward thinking nature.</p><p><strong>Goal Kicks</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/tomhwilliams23/status/1756750885567209716&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f34747b77899bb13ad165664d2f08be9/href">https://medium.com/media/f34747b77899bb13ad165664d2f08be9/href</a></iframe><p>I have linked above a more detailed analysis of Morten Dahm Kjaergaard’s goal kicks. But in summary, they tend to play it out short from goal kicks, and use their goalkeeper as an extra man. This is especially effective when teams look to press man for man, as the goalkeeper is able to offer that extra outlet, meaning they can create an overload, and ultimately play out from the back.</p><p>You can also see from their goal kicks that these are extremely well practised; if they were not, there is no way that his players would remain so calm under pressure. They’re able to bait the opposition press, and have the composure to remain patient, waiting for the right moment to exploit it. Another thing which really impressed upon me is how high and wide they put their full backs. This is absolutely crucial to their goal kick routines, and has even influenced my own coaching. For me, this is now an absolutely vital part of a goal kick, if you wish to play out from the back. It means that the pitch is stretched, and it also means that your side isn’t squared off. You can’t be boxed in, otherwise the opposition will turn the ball over and score; by putting the full backs as high and as wide as possible, this won’t happen.</p><p><strong>Final Third Efficiency</strong></p><p>Whilst we’ve spoken at length about the way in which Kjaergaard likes his sides to dominate the ball, and also remain as patient as possible in build up, one consistent theme which really struck me was the way in which Aarhus Fremad were so efficient in the final third. For a side who register so many passes, they transition to a much more direct style in the opposition half, sometimes registering as few as 1 or 2 passes between entering the opposition half, and registering a shot on goal, sometimes seeing no opposition half passes at all. They are patient in build up, but once they have beaten the opposition press, they are ruthless. They want to reach the opposition goal as soon as possible once they have entered the opposition half; there is a lot less measured, slow tempo build up once they start an attack.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/tomhwilliams23/status/1801542868298760221&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/081d0a2d71c64c68b84d0002802c9885/href">https://medium.com/media/081d0a2d71c64c68b84d0002802c9885/href</a></iframe><p>Take the two goals (one above, one below); both incredibly similar in their make up, but in actuality from two different games, with different contexts too. The first is the goal I analysed in greater detail above, from the goal kick all the way to scoring. There were in fact 15 passes inside their own half. By contrast, they recorded no passes in the opposition half. I find this extremely stark, and a reminder that, whilst they do look to control possession, they are extremely efficient with the ball in advanced areas. Again, a similar theme with the next goal, where just 2 passes in the opposition half are made, instead progressing the play through ball carrying, rather than passing. They look to get into the final third as quickly as possible, attacking with pace with the opposition on the back foot, not allowing them to get set properly.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/tomhwilliams23/status/1801541813460783198&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/61fe9f580d238487a5952f46d449c460/href">https://medium.com/media/61fe9f580d238487a5952f46d449c460/href</a></iframe><p>This is backed up by the data too. Whilst they did record the most passes in the league, (16,195, 1,211 more than 2nd most (esbjerg)), they also recorded the most dribbles in the league too (940, 67 more than 2nd most (Roskilde) and 325 more than Esbjerg). Evidently Kjaergaard encourages his players to run with the ball, looking to stretch the space they find themselves in as much as possible. This is clear all over the pitch; he has constructed a team of willing ball carriers. But it also sets them apart from their peers, namely Esbjerg. The difference in the number of passes, relatively speaking, wasn’t all that great. But the difference, proportionally, in terms of dribbles was huge. Aarhus Fremad run with the ball far more often than their league leading counterparts.</p><p>The man himself sums it up perfectly. “So if your team is going to press my team really really high, to prevent my team from having the ball, then then my team has ]to be really good at playing on the back (foot) and and so when we are really good at playing out from the back, and you will apply pressure then; then we will play through you and make big, big chances because all of your team is open. Let’s say you go, man. Man marking because you have to shut t the team down. Then there are some even more big spaces you can go through. So it’s always about being dominating but also being dominating in space control as well.”</p><p><strong>Lopsided Full Backs</strong></p><p>Something which I found really interesting was the role of the full backs in possession; or, more to the point, the difference in these roles. The far side full back, usually Emil Junge on the left or Magnus Kirchheiner on the right, stays as wide as possible. Just like from goal kicks, he hugs the touchline. He stays as wide as possible at all times, stretching the opposition play, and always offering an outlet for the diagonal ball. His role is especially good in attacking transitions. He stays high and wide, and often is left completely unmarked at the back post. For example, for the opener against top of the league Esbjerg, Junge is left completely free at the back post. He arrives slightly late, and takes the chance really well. That’s what the Aarhus Fremad full back is all about; width, width and more width.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/tomhwilliams23/status/1801544144998838408&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/21c423263285107ed5a89a33ff0f4f6b/href">https://medium.com/media/21c423263285107ed5a89a33ff0f4f6b/href</a></iframe><p>The ball side full back on the other hand has a slightly different role in possession. The width on the ball side is actually provided by the winger, in this example Lucas From. The right full back, Magnus Kirchheiner here, steps inside as an inverted full back. He joins the double pivot in midfield, turning it from a midfield two into a midfield three. He offers another passing outlet in the middle, and allows Fremad to win the numerical battle in the centre of the pitch. He adds an extra body in an area they look to keep control of. This is what this positioning is all about; control. It was a move popularised by Pep Guardiola, having a full back become a third midfielder, and it’s a move mirrored by Aarhus Fremad here. They maintain control through the use of their right full back, whilst they stretch the play as much as possible with the use of their left.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M9pKZ7gYLLb0Z0Rx9PKjDQ.png" /><figcaption>Junge (highlighted) is able to find space on the opposite side</figcaption></figure><p>This highlights their adaptability, and is also one of the rotations that Kjaergaard spoke of earlier. They are able to perform this rotation on either side. So whilst their general principle is to push their full backs high and wide, and have the wingers come inside, they also want two players close to the build up. Often, this cannot be the central midfielder, due to various reasons. As such, the full back is able to tuck inside, creating this extra man for the build up. This adaptability, and flexibility, really sets Fremad apart; their rotations are often so fluid that opposition defences don’t know who to mark. It creates openings for them, and is done so with clever rotations.</p><p><strong>Centre Backs Squeezing</strong></p><p>Another common theme of their out of possession play is the willingness of the centre backs to step up and look to steal the ball. They look to squeeze the opposition, stepping out of the back 4 to quickly press the opposition, usually when their back is to goal. The defensive shape we talked about enables this. As Aarhus Fremad are very narrow in their shape out of possession anyway, the centre back stepping up leaves nowhere near as big of a gap as it would usually. The full backs just tuck in ever so slightly, but to be honest, the spacing is already pretty tight. They then form a back 3, whilst the centre back who has stepped up acts as another man in midfield.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dgYHN6Ch7vbreeIChwoJPw.png" /><figcaption>1 — CB steps. 2 — CB wins the ball. 3 — CB drives with the ball. 4 — CB releases ball in final third</figcaption></figure><p>What I also found interesting was the instruction if the centre back actually manages to steal possession when springing out like that. They don’t simply recycle possession, like you might expect a centre back to do. Instead they’re encouraged to be progressive ball carriers, joining the attacks as much as possible. This just highlights how complete Kjaergaard wants his players to be; his centre backs have to have the on the ball qualities to effect the play in the final third. But this also creates unique overloads in the final third. Defences struggle to deal with another runner driving at them from deep, especially one with the physical profile of a centre back. By joining the attack they offer an extra body, in dangerous central areas too; it can be really effective.</p><p><strong>The Goalkeeper</strong></p><p>Kjaergaard’s goalkeepers must not only be good shot stoppers, but they must also be proficient with their feet. In fact, considering the amount of the ball they see v the amount of saves they have to make, you could even argue that it’s more important that his keepers are strong with the ball at their feet. They will see a lot, and I mean a lot of the ball. They are a crucial player in build up, not just from goal kicks as discussed, but from open play too. Often they are the out ball when the play is cycled backwards, to rebuild from the back. But also, the keeper is often given possession whilst the positional rotations take place. The keeper must be able to put his foot on the ball, and allow these rotations to happen; for this, he must be incredibly composed, and not panic under the opposition press. He must also be able to see the pictures in front of him. He must understand the rotations, and know when and where to play the ball. The role of keeper in a Kjaergaard team is not a simple one.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*41F9NIqO3g_i6BDjh5DHTg.png" /><figcaption>Pena is comfortable with the ball at his feet outside his own box</figcaption></figure><p>You only have to see the positioning of the keeper in open play to begin to understand this. Kjaergaard’s keepers must have bravery. It is unnatural for plenty of keepers to play this far out of their goal; it goes against a lot of natural instincts to protect the goal. To do this, they must have full, unwavering belief in the system and style that Kjaergaard employs. In fact, so must the rest of the team, as they must not only trust Kjaergaard, but trust the keeper too; in many ways, these come hand in hand. But finding this type of keeper at this level, part time football in a country with a far smaller football playing population than England, is not easy. In fact, it is extremely difficult. The fact that Kjaergaard is able to get this out of his keepers is just another string in his bow.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dfc_eJInzVNBGePUtEqJZQ.png" /><figcaption>Pena is also comfortable being out of his own box when out of possession</figcaption></figure><p>His keeper this season has been Benicio Pena, a 21 year old keeper of El Salvadorian descent. The young stopper joined in the summer from promoted B 93, where he had previously made just 1 league appearance. Not only did Kjaergaard sign a keeper with very little experience, not only did he sign an extremely young keeper, but he has done so whilst also asking Pena to play in a very expansive manner. He gets the best out of players, no matter their role, or experience. But Pena must take a lot of credit too. Pena has played almost 1,000 passes this season (976), which, considering the amount of games he has played, is an incredible amount.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LKzjqYn91HwDNAwFZMQDRw.png" /><figcaption>Pena doesn’t panic when he is pressed on the ball</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Out of Possession</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LmPFIQ74WclZLWR_Ujv5sA.png" /></figure><p>As you can see, Aarhus Fremad’s shape without the ball is incredibly narrow. They settle into their 4–3–3, and often don’t look to press the opposition backline, instead allowing the centre forward to apply some pressure, but ultimately allowing, or even encouraging the opposition defenders to play long balls forward, as most sides in the league tend to favour. They’re content to build again from deep, and as we’ve established earlier, in the final third they’re incredibly efficient. Therefore, if they do manage to turn the ball over, they will be direct straight away. But, more often, you will see them either restart from a dead ball situation, such as a goal kick, or recycle the possession deep once they have turned it back over, restarting from the defence, settling into their usual build up play.</p><p>I wanted to use another quote here from Johan Cruyff, which I feel really illustrates Aarhus Fremad’s out of possession play, and what they are trying to achieve without the ball. “If you have the ball you must make the field as big as possible, and if you don’t have the ball you must make it as small as possible.” You can see both facets of this in Kjaergaard’s play, and it explains why his side become so compact when defending. The full backs get back into position and tuck in, the midfielders, who are usually more advanced, drop off, whilst the wingers don’t really have to change their positioning. But by making the spacing tight, it makes them harder to break down. It would be easy for Kjaergaard, as a coach who knows his side will have more of the ball, to neglect the defensive shape. But there is still a clear, compact structure in place.</p><p><strong>Substitutions</strong></p><p>It might only be a minor point, but one interesting stat I found was that Aarhus Fremad made the most substitutions across this season, making 147 changes across the campaign, with 1 game remaining. Esbjerg by contrast have made just 122 changes. This was also the case last season, where Fremad made 144 substitutions, 3 more than the eventual league champions Kolding, and 8 more than runners up B 93. Clearly Kjaergaard not only likes to make in game changes to try and manage games, or control them, but he also looks to utilise his squad as much as possible.</p><p><strong>Recruitment</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/784/1*XTfs-j1zTehr2EfUnFkd0w.png" /><figcaption>Frederik Hogh Jensen — Aarhus Fremad</figcaption></figure><p>Kjaergaard has shown himself to be a very shrewd recruiter over his time there as well. As you find with a lot of managers who play this way, they are often able to improve players, and move them on for a tidy profit. This is especially important when you consider the discrepancy between them and the sides they are competing with when it comes to budget. Kjaergaard must find ways to bridge this gap, and through clever recruitment he is able to do so.</p><p>One example of this came just in January, where top flight side Silkeborg signed Aarhus Fremad CB Frederik Rieper. The 24 year old had played every single minute this season, and had clearly impressed enough for a Superliga side to pay a fee for him. It’s just one example of the work Kjaergaard does. He brings players in, and improves them, not only helping his side improve their performance levels, but also helping the players themselves realise their ambitions within their careers. This is what Kjaergaard is all about; development, not just as a footballer, but as a person too. Rieper arrived in Aarhus in 2021, as a 21 year old, and leaves 3 years later, having developed enough to earn himself a top flight move.</p><p>Kjaergaard doesn’t just improve individuals though in order to generate player sales. You’d have to argue that his system, and the way he plays, often makes players look better than they actually are. His system allows players to get on the ball, and to express themselves; it makes sense that a side who record over 60% possession makes the players within the system look better. That is no more evident than in the striking department. As we have covered already, this possession based system is all about generating high scoring chances for the forward players. They have plenty of the ball, but also create lots of chances for the forwards as a result.</p><p>28 year old forward Frederik Hogh Jensen is a prime example of exactly what Kjaergaard can do with his forwards. You can see why he signed him; his physical profile is immense. At 6’4”, Hogh Jensen is the perfect physical presence to play at the spearhead of the Aarhus Fremad attack. But when you look at his goal return, your eyebrows might be raised a little. In 21/22 he played just 9 games, for a total of 431 minutes; he scored 1 goal in that time. In 22/23 he played 24 games, for a total of just 875 minutes; he bagged 4 goals in that period. Both of those seasons came at this level, with a side, B 93, who were ultimately promoted last season.</p><p>Yet this season, Hogh Jensen is Fremad’s top scorer, and the 2nd top scorer in the division, with 19 goals in 28 games. He’s played a total of 2,242 minutes this season, meaning his minute to goal ratio under Kjaergaard has improved to 118 minutes per goal, far better than his 219 and 431 minute to goal ratios he had in his previous 2 seasons. But how has Hogh Jensen seen such an improved return? No doubt Kjaergaard has improved him on the training ground; he’s bound to have worked on things like off the ball movement. But the main reason for the upturn in form is the system in which he is playing. It creates chances for forwards, and besides, Kjaergaard hand picked him to play within this system; he clearly saw some characteristics which made him believe he would suit.</p><p>The underlying data backs this up as well. Hogh Jensen has scored 19 goals from an xG of 15.32. He is slightly above where you would expect him to be. He isn’t outperforming his xG by a crazy amount; to the contrary, he is performing around the figures you would expect. This points towards the system getting the most out of him as a forward. Kjaergaard is an proponent of the use of xG, mentioning it to me on various occasions: “t’s important that when you’re talking about expected goals, that if if you have 20 shots from from from outside the box from the middle, of course you will get some some expected goals. But but it’s it’s important that the expected goals you will get is from is from some good positions too”.</p><p>If he keeps this rate up, he may even break the 20 goal barrier, which is sure to attract attention from higher up the leagues. By creating chances for a forward, Kjaergaard has manufactured a goalscorer, one who can be sold for a very tidy profit in the future. He has to be shrewd in his recruitment; both in terms of incomings and outgoings. He brought in a forward who had scored 5 goals in 2 seasons, turned him into his top scorer through creating plenty of high scoring opportunities, and now has the chance to move him on for a profit. It’s very good business.</p><p><strong>A Young Squad</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OYpWQKHllFuyXaall3dRJQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Lucas From — Arhus Stiftstidende</figcaption></figure><p>Here are the ages of the players to have made over 20 appearances for Aarhus Fremad so far this season: Pena (21), Nissen (27), Kirchheiner (26), Rieper (24), Junge (22), From (25), Grube (24), Kirchheiner (22), Sidhu (23), Mortensen (28), Haarbo (21), Hogh Jensen (29), Callo (21) and Buch Jensen (25). That gives an average age of 24.14. If you add in 20 year old Gustav Junge, who has made 17 appearances, then the average age comes down even further to 23.87.</p><p>Kjaergaard clearly likes to operate with a younger squad. That’s not to say he doesn’t use older players; but they have been used more so as squad players. The trusted core is made up of young players, who have been given a platform to express themselves. This trust in younger players certainly brings results, and is a clear sign that player development is a key part of what Kjaergaard tries to do. For example, winger Lucas From continues to improve season upon season under his management. Before he joined Aarhus Fremad in the 20/21 season, he had 1 senior goal to his name, also at the same level with Middlefart. Since then, he has amassed goal tallies of 6 (20/21), 8 (21/22), 12 (22/23) and 13 thus far in 23/24, with another game still to play. There is a clear progression and improvement, some of which I am sure is down to Kjaergaard’s coaching.</p><p><strong>High Scoring</strong></p><p>Since the start of April, Aarhus Fremad’s results have been incredibly high scoring, both in a positive, and negative manner. Since the 6th April, the game before splitting into the promotion group, Aarhus Fremad have scored 25 goals, whilst conceding 15. That’s across 10 games, meaning they average 4 goals per game. In that time they’ve recorded 2 5–0 wins, a 4–1 win, as well as some heavy defeats, 6–2, 3–0 and 5–3. The common theme in all of those is goals, and watching Kjaergaard’s sides is an extremely exciting exercise.</p><p><strong>Promotion?</strong></p><p>Before they entered the promotion group, Aarhus Fremad sat 3rd in the table, on 41 points, ahead of 4th placed Middlefart on goal difference. They sat just 3 points behind 2nd placed Roskilde, whilst 1st placed Esbjerg looked to be running away with it, sat on an impressive 59 points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*on6aNGxC_G2Y6f5C2oZYQQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Table at the end of the regular season</figcaption></figure><p>However, following a very strong start to the promotion group, which included 2 wins and 2 clean sheets against league leaders Esbjerg, Aarhus Fremad find themselves sitting 2nd heading into the final matchday. With the top 2 places gaining promotion to the 2nd tier, Kjaergaard and his Aarhus Fremad side are, at the time of writing, on the cusp of incredible success. They’ve managed to close the gap at the top to 10 points, so have had by far the most successful end to the campaign, but their promotion hopes have been dented somewhat by back to back defeats in their last 2 games.</p><p>But this is where things get interesting. Aarhus Fremad play 3rd placed Roskilde on the final day, at home. Roskilde sit just 2 points behind Aarhus Fremad, meaning this is a straight shootout for promotion. If Aarhus Fremad win or draw, they will be promoted. A win for Roskilde however will see them promoted. It couldn’t be any closer heading into the final game.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IbPHBpOm32zZS5WujxQ8Hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Table heading into the final day</figcaption></figure><p>I want to take this opportunity to wish Morten and his side the best of luck today (at the time of writing they will be playing at 1pm UK time). I’d also like to take the opportunity to thank you, the reader, for coming this far. Hopefully you’ve enjoyed learning about Morten and his side as much as I did. Data was taken from Wyscout, and the league tables are taken from Fotmob.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=faf8b296d727" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Notts: Analysing the 4–2–3–1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tomhwilliams23/notts-analysing-the-4-2-3-1-657ba9482929?source=rss-1e6b469259f7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/657ba9482929</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[notts-county]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analysis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tom Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2024 18:24:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-16T18:24:15.762Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this week I released my first Medium article, analysing why Notts had struggled of late. We covered a lot in there, but came to the conclusion that a back 4 was potentially the solution to the problems. That’s exactly what transpired on Tuesday night against Newport, as Notts not only switched to a back 4, but also ran out 3–1 winners away at a very in form Newport side. It only seemed right therefore to go back and analyse Notts’ performance in that one, looking at how some of those tweaks came to life, and how this 4–2–3–1 shape works in practice.</p><p>Whilst some of the suggestions put forward came to life, some things that really worked on Tuesday caught me by surprise. Langstaff playing on the wing for example was a real surprise, but a welcome one, and credit must go to the management team for finding a system that incorporated all 4 of Langstaff, McGoldrick, Jones and Crowley. There’s lots to unpick here, from shape to individual performances, all of which was enabled by a shift to a 4–2–3–1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2GnbSo57ndQk4aILYU6KmQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Shape</strong></p><p>The first thing to look at is the shape itself. On paper Notts lined up in a 4–2–3–1, and for once when it comes to formations, this was very much the case in practice too. Notts operated with a flat back 4, and in front the midfield pairing of Bostock and Robertson formed a double pivot, one which screened the back 4 really nicely. When defending their own box the back 4 would come more narrow, especially down the right hand side where Jodi Jones would track back, almost forming a back 5 when defending deep. Further up the pitch Langstaff was given a slightly freer role, often dovetailing as a second striker, rather than playing as a wide player, but down the right Jones stuck to his flank, playing very much as a winger. Langstaff drifting into this forward role would often see Crowley shift slightly over to the right, picking up the positions he plays in the usual system, giving Notts a slightly lopsided attack, with a very much dominant feel down the right hand side. Whilst these nuances were certainly evident, the general shape throughout the game, both in and out of possession, was that of a 4–2–3–1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*FXKGV0TcG0a59M8BlRCB9w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/934/1*HDtFXMuA4ewaS0r0tJaYLg.png" /><figcaption>Notts out of possession/general shape (left) and Notts shape in possession (right).</figcaption></figure><p>One of the key things to note in the difference of shape is the back 4 itself. In particular the return to the side of Lewis Macari, who was a key outlet all night. This is due to his positioning; he stays nice and wide, especially when Notts played short from their goal kicks, which is essential in order to not narrow the team off. The ball would be worked out to Macari’s touchline frequently, partly due to the Newport press. Newport operate with a front 2, so working the ball out wide to Macari often meant he was in space, and had time to start building the attack, either through progressive ball carrying, playing the ball down the line to Jones, or going inside to one of the midfielders dropping slightly deeper. This pattern was used consistently throughout the night, and was one of the main advantages of switching to the 4 at the back system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kQjCNko5pfg9Q7tG9C8wTA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Rotations</strong></p><p>One thing I noticed early on, and made a note of, was the lack of natural angle that could be afforded due to Baldwin being the LCB. That’s through no fault of his own; he’s right footed, and on the left of a back 4 you would ideally have a left footed defender, to, as mentioned, offer natural passing angles. This was clearly something the management team had also considered, and also clearly something they worked on, as a solution was found extremely early on. As we can see, John Bostock would drop into the LCB role, completing a deep rotation which made our back 4 slightly more progressive. He’s able to open his body out onto his natural foot, something which allows him to play wide. It opens up the left side of the pitch when playing out, so this rotation was actually extremely clever.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UZLx5N9eEVrK5sfizM5VHQ.png" /></figure><p>We also saw a consistent use of rotations down the right hand side. The change in shape saw Lewis Macari come in at right back, a position he’s played plenty of in his career. He got forward really well, overlapping from the very first minute. This complimented the man he had ahead of him, Jodi Jones. Once again, it comes down to the preferred foot. On the right, the natural thing for Jones to do is cut inside onto his stronger left foot. When this was happening as a wing back, we would often lose our width; Jones coming inside would narrow us off. The overlapping run of Macari not only allows us to maintain our width as a team, but it also creates doubt in the defenders mind. He can no longer simply follow Jones inside, as that would mean leaving Macari in a lot of space. This opens up the space ever so slightly for Jones, which is all he needed.</p><p>In those wide right areas we saw a lovely rotation between Macari, Crowley and Jones. Here is a great example of it, using a wide triangle to create an overload. Macari pushes forward to occupy the furthest forward position, which of course is unusual considering he is the only one of the three who starts the game as a defender. This in turn allows Jodi to rotate inside, receiving the ball in a deeper position. Being on the opposite side to his stronger foot also opens up more passing options when he receives in this position; he’s able to open his body shape out.</p><p>This is actually where the goal comes from. All the talk is about Jodi’s unbelievable skill, and rightly so; he had no right to do that. But, if you rewind a few moments, you get a better picture that this goal was coming. Simply put, Newport were penned in down the right. Around 25 seconds before the ball hits the net, Macari presses down that side. He wins the ball back, really well I must add, and even though they are forced to clear, the pressure isn’t off. Robertson then shuttles over to cover, and you can see a pattern emerging; they are compressed down that side. It’s no surprise that a few passes later Newport are reluctant to commit; the bombardment down the right for the first 20 minutes paid off, and it all comes back to those rotations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GRWcYS27W9zuQ5D4VhkCLw.png" /></figure><p>Another rotation we saw was actually very simple; Bostock and Robertson consistently changing sides. This had quite a few effects, not least allowing them to share playing on their natural side, as both are left footers. It also gave respite to the other, taking it in turns to play on the right, where most of the action was taking place. A word here must be given to Robertson and his performance. He keeps getting better with each appearance. He conducted his work with energy, which was perfectly summed up around the 30 minute mark. On the left of the midfield 2 he broke the lines through progressive running, taking his man on, travelling 25 yards before slipping McGoldrick in for a chance. Moments later he’s on the right, pressing Newport, forcing them back. His energetic, all action performance was instrumental in Notts achieving what they set out to do.</p><p>Robertson would also consistently swap places with Crowley. This would allow Crowley to come deep and get on the ball, and whilst he perhaps doesn’t carry the same influence when deep, he does possess the ability to break the lines with his passing, something which is crucial when looking to develop the play by building from the back. This comes into play in the 2nd goal. Crowley actually starts the move from basically in the back line. The ball is lost, but because the energetic Robertson is further forward, he’s able to turn the ball over, and re-start the attack. Robertson got praise for winning the ball back, and restarting the attack; but that actually comes from the rotation of roles.</p><p><strong>Defensive Shape</strong></p><p>Sometimes Notts’ defensive issues are actually very easy to boil down; there simply aren’t enough men behind the ball. This isn’t something which can be levelled at the performance on Tuesday night. Every time the ball was played over the top or in behind, Notts ensured that they, as a very minimum, at least matched Newport man for man, but mostly had at least one extra defender, which is the ideal scenario when defending a transition. It seems like something really simple to fix, but up until the new management team arrived, it was still a recurring issue. This should be the case no matter what shape you play, and highlights the importance of recovery runs when defending. But the 4 at the back shape actually makes it a lot easier to defend in transition. When you play with a 3 back, with 2 extremely attacking wing backs, you often find that only the central centre back is in a good position to recover. Sometimes the wide CB on the other side is also well placed to get back, but that’s still only 2 players. When a side played a front 2, Notts struggled far more; that is no coincidence.</p><p>When operating with the new 4 at the back shape, Notts always had an extra defender back in position. The central 2 CBs held their positions, as they no longer had to provide support from wide areas; that’s the role and responsibility of the full back. In addition, the full back on the opposite side of the attack is able to push up slightly, but is still in a good position to track back. This is especially relevant when you consider that the full backs, Macari and Cameron, have played plenty of times as a CB for Notts. All of a sudden you’ve gone from having 1 or maybe 2 defenders in a good position to defend, to 2 or 3 being in a good position. This makes a significant difference when defending transitions, so the 4 at the back, perhaps unsurprisingly, improved our defensive shape too.</p><p>This was also the case when defending the box. Too often Notts have found themselves either evenly matched, or outnumbered in their own box. That wasn’t the case on Tuesday. Here we can see 8 Notts players within the box (Jones enters the box just after this frame). To even match Notts, Newport would have to commit 8 players into the box, leaving themselves extremely exposed. As we will look at later, they were vulnerable on the break, something Notts are almost inviting by packing out the box. Having those numbers also makes scoring more difficult, simply due to the sheer number of bodies it has to pass through. Of course, it’s not always possible for Notts to get that many men into a defensive position, but there was certainly more diligence when it came to defensive duties.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AaL1VCevDhV0YFo4Rwx2ug.png" /></figure><p><strong>Dominating the Transitions</strong></p><p>One thing we have heard over a number of seasons is that Notts are vulnerable in defensive transition. But something which isn’t highlighted nearly enough is how good Notts are in their own attacking transitions. The devastating counter attacking goal against Forest Green springs to mind, and even greater emphasis was placed on this on Tuesday night. The team shape has a lot to do with this. Notts operated with wingers, which Newport really struggled with due to their wing back system. Nobody was able to go out and mark either Jones or Langstaff; their wide CB can’t leave the back 3, as he would leave far too much space in the key central areas, whilst their wing backs have to join the attacks when Newport have the ball.</p><p>By leaving Jones and Langstaff higher up in these moments, Notts were able to take full advantage of the space afforded to them in these wide areas. Picking up these pockets of space made Notts incredibly threatening on the counter, something which we saw time and time again on Tuesday. It certainly helps that in those wide areas Notts possess plenty of pace, in the form of Jones and Langstaff, but make no mistake, these counters were enabled by shape and positioning. Notts used these moments to full effect as well; all 3 goals came from the wide areas for this very reason. Looking ahead to the weekend against Wrexham, it’s something we could see again, as they also operate with a wing back system. If they are unable to mark Jones or Langstaff in the wide areas, which the shape prevents them from doing, we may see similar outcomes to those we saw on Tuesday night.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dXcYxxYyW8v7YVEeup-eZQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Control Remains</strong></p><p>Despite having more focus on competing in transitions, especially attacking ones, Notts did still control the majority of the game. Let’s be clear; Notts have not become a counter attacking team overnight. The way Notts have played for a long time, playing out from the back, keeping the ball and controlling the game very much remained. That was clear in the way Notts built when Newport were in their shape; Notts were patient, building from the back, whilst working the ball gradually forward. Once again, the data supports this. Notts averaged 60% possession, showing that, despite having less than the ball than Notts may have become accustomed to, they were still dominant when it comes to possession. Notts usually record 65% possession, and also average 540.9 accurate passes per match. Against Newport Notts only recorded 473 accurate passes, at a slightly reduced accuracy of 86%. However, this was still over 200 more passes than their opposition, so whilst the general theme of the passing may have been slightly riskier, the element of control very much remained.</p><p><strong>No More Short Corners?</strong></p><p>After 20 minutes, we saw quite a significant moment in the Maynard tenure. Notts received their first corner of the game, and instead of going short, as they have done previously, Jodi Jones opted to play the ball straight into the box. This wasn’t a moment where an individual made that decision; nobody even offered a short option, a sign that this was a clear instruction from the management team to pay the first corner into the box. This could be one of the defining details that sets them apart from their predecessors. It almost worked too; the ball dropped just out of Cameron’s reach. But this is a promising sign. There may be more creativity when it comes to set pieces under this current management team, which would be a significant difference. If they can get the best out of set pieces, that will only increase the level of threat Notts have within the side.</p><p>It wouldn’t surprise me to see short corners still used, but this once again comes back to the central theme; variety and flexibility. Towards the end of Luke Williams’ tenure it all became a little too predictable. That’s not to say Williams is one dimensional as a coach, and I believe he would have made the necessary tweaks, although this we will never find out. But just like the move to a back 4 has given us more flexibility, so too has the use of direct set pieces. This of course is also another by product of having 4 defenders in the side. Simply put, we had more aerial threat than we usually do on Tuesday night. And with the news that Alassana Jatta is finally in the country, after having his Visa accepted, we are only going to see even more height added to the side.</p><p><strong>Ashby-Hammond impresses on debut</strong></p><p>One noticeable change was the inclusion of Ashby-Hammond in goal, something I suggested as a possible tweak in the last article. In that article I also highlighted the similarity in data between the 3 keepers at our disposal, and whilst Ashby-Hammond certainly had a strong start to his tenure as a Notts keeper, in truth he wasn’t tested all that much. Still, he certainly deserved a debut clean sheet, which unfortunately was taken away from him by a late penalty, which can only really be described as ‘soft’.</p><p>But what impressed me most about Ashby-Hammond was how comfortable he was on the ball. Something I noted when he signed was his ability to use both feet when distributing, but I perhaps didn’t realise quite how strong he is on both sides. Once again, it comes back to passing angles. When he’s put under pressure, Ashby-Hammond has the ability to play out of trouble, no matter which angle he is being pressed at. To be able to play the ball on both sides allows him to play himself out of most tricky situations. Having the ability to play off both feet also opens the game out completely, like we see here. Ashby-Hammond would often arrive between the centre backs, who split, forming a back 3 when in possession. Due to his comfort on the ball, we didn’t really lose the back 3 shape, a shape which naturally gives you more control over possession. It also negated their press. Newport lined up with a 5–3–2 shape, with their 2 Centre Forwards under clear instructions to press the Notts Centre Backs. However, that often left Ashby-Hammond as the spare man, beating Newport’s aggressive man to man press with relative ease.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GS4f_pLJG7ElTWqi28P1gw.png" /></figure><p>The data backs this up too. In general, Ashby-Hammond’s distribution was really strong. He completed 71% of his passes on Tuesday evening, which, for a goalkeeper, is very high. By comparison, Aidan Stone has completed 62.4% of his passes. This is still enough to rank him in the top 69% of League 2 keepers in terms of accuracy of distribution, but there is a clear difference between the pair, a discrepancy of almost 9% in Ashby-Hammond’s favour. However, this contrast only becomes even more stark when it comes to long distribution. Stone completes, on average, 27.1% of his long passes; that ranks him in the bottom 20% of League 2 keepers. Ashby-Hammond on the other hand completed 44% of his long passes on Tuesday night. This comes back to something that has been referenced; Ashby-Hammond’s ability to see the passes ahead of him. Combine this with a good ball striking technique, and it explains this large increase in long passing accuracy. One of my favourite moments of the evening came on the stroke of half time. Ashby-Hammond played the ball all the way through to McGoldrick, who was stood behind the Newport defence; you cannot be offside from a goal kick, so this is certainly a weapon we could look to use again.</p><p><strong>Players did exist before Notts County</strong></p><p>I’m as guilty of this as anyone else, but as fans we tend to categorise players based on where and how they have played for our team. Yet, unless they’ve come through the academy, players have often had long careers before they join a football club. These long careers often involve players playing in different roles, sometimes even predominantly having played a different position for another club. This is no different for Notts County, where a vast amount of the playing squad have had different roles at previous clubs. This explains why, on initial impressions at least, the side used on Tuesday night seemed odd. But, when you dig a bit deeper into the players’ pasts, it was a decision which made a lot of sense.</p><p>Starting from the back, Lewis Macari was used as a right full back. Notts fans have only ever seen Macari used as a RCB, so will have been forgiven for being confused when they saw the teamsheet on Tuesday. However, during a loan spell with Dundalk in the League of Ireland, Macari made 33 appearances; only 1 of these came as a CB. He made 6 as a LB, and 26, the vast majority of his senior minutes, came playing as a RB. Similarly, Jodi Jones has played 65.5% of his senior games as a winger, 36.3% of which came playing off of the right; it’s his most common role as a senior pro. David McGoldrick made 29 appearances in League One last season, 20 of which came as the main striker, the other 9 with him playing behind the striker. Macaulay Langstaff was probably the most eyebrow raising selection, yet in 21/22, the season before he joined Notts, a season in which he scored over 30 goals, Langstaff played 50% of his games as a centre forward, and 50% as a winger. He’s played as a wide forward before, and scored plenty of goals doing it. So whilst the selection certainly caught a lot of people, including myself, off guard, there was certainly ‘method to the madness’.</p><p><strong>Flexibility and Variety</strong></p><p>I believe the overarching theme of this change is that of flexibility. Whether the change to a back 4 is permanent remains to be seen. The management team used a back 3/5 at Wealdstone, a very similar shape to our usual system, part of the reason why they felt like such good choices. But, what this does give Notts is an extra dimension. To be comfortable playing a variety of shapes and systems can only be a good thing. It will make Notts harder to prepare against for a start, especially this weekend, where very little footage of Notts exists playing with a back 4. It also gives Notts the ability to transition between the systems if and when necessary within a game. The players are flexible enough to do that; Kyle Cameron for example played as a LB despite having almost exclusively been used as a CB for Notts previously.</p><p>The main advantage being able to shift fluidly between systems gives you is the ability to respond to in game situations. Should we need to control a game more, or see a game out, the use of a back 5 may be implemented. Likewise, if we’re chasing a game late on, having the ability to transition to a 4–3–3 or 4–2–3–1, a system which is better suited to breaking teams down, just gives us an extra dimension to our game. Notts now have an extra facet of their game. And whilst shape isn’t everything, it certainly gives Notts another look, making them less one dimensional than they have been previously. Will this be the norm moving forwards? I wouldn’t even be surprised to see a back 5 at the weekend! But this was an extremely successful first outing for the 4–2–3–1, which can only be a positive moving forwards.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=657ba9482929" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Notts: A Change in Fortunes Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tomhwilliams23/notts-a-change-in-fortunes-explained-a2df5fd26f5b?source=rss-1e6b469259f7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a2df5fd26f5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[football-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[notts-county]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tom Williams]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Feb 2024 09:27:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-13T09:27:31.688Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/482/1*Fe-BLrJQCwQtegS1qdbEUA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Whilst there has always been a perception that Notts have a soft underbelly, the reality, and certainly the statistics tell a very different story. Last season Notts were, relative to the level they played at, one of the best defensive sides in the division. Notts conceded the 2nd fewest in the division, just 2 more than the tightest defence in Boreham Wood. They conceded 1 less than eventual league winners Wrexham, a side who are acknowledged as being tough to play against. Yet Notts actually conceded fewer than the Welsh side. So whilst there was definitely a perception that Notts had defensive frailties, the reality was that things probably weren’t quite as bad as they seemed.</p><p>The same cannot be said about this season. Notts have already conceded 15 goals more than last season. Of course, they have gone up a division. But Wrexham by contrast have conceded 16 fewer than the Magpies; they conceded more than Notts last season remember. Only 2 sides in League 2 have conceded more goals than Notts this season; they make up 2 of the bottom 3. There has therefore been a real shift this season. Notts have scored the 2nd most in the league. Yet they have amassed just 14 points from their last 15 games. That’s relegation form. Clearly something has drastically changed. Here I aim to analyse, with the help of data, why this change might have occurred.</p><p><strong>Step up in level</strong></p><p>The first and most obvious difference to last season is the level at which Notts are playing at. Of course, there is a difference in quality between the leagues; however, I would question how significant that gap is, and also how significant of a bearing that is having upon the performances. Notts started the season well, and fellow newly promoted side Wrexham are challenging for the title; that isn’t a sign that the league we have just come from is full of weaker sides. Stockport County too are challenging for the title, having been promoted the season before. So, whilst it is true that there has been a step up, the size of that step is certainly up for debate. Has it had some impact? Absolutely, and I think it would be naive to suggest otherwise. But I also think it would be naive to solely blame the clear issues upon this. Notts are not just ‘a newly promoted side’. The aim going into this season was never to simply consolidate; the line coming out of the club was that we were going for another promotion. That isn’t a sign of a side who believe the step up in leagues will see a downturn in fortunes.</p><p><strong>Change in personnel</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/526/1*LLT16lIXAN7fp3a0UY7YRA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/522/1*8lzTqWauYte2w6gR6FKdHw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Above we can see the side that started the playoff final, compared to the side that started our last game v Gillingham. Straight away you can see that it’s quite a different side; only 5 players feature in both XIs. Of course there are some mitigating factors involved here; there’s no doubt Matty Palmer would feature in both, had he not been injured for the season. But, when you look at the two sides, one seems inherently more defensive, or at least has personnel who offer more out of possession. I don’t think anyone would argue that Adam Chicksen offers less defensively than Jodi Jones does in the LWB role. That stands to reason as well; after all, Jones is a winger converted back, whereas Chicksen is a full back pushed further forward. Even the two attacking midfielders who sit behind Langstaff offer more out of possession; Austin and Rodrigues are a more diligent pair than McGoldrick and Crowley.</p><p>Pouring over the data here made for stark reading. Last season Notts ranked extremely highly for pressing metrics. The Magpies had a Challenge Intensity (how many defensive actions a team is doing per minute of opponent ball possession) of 7, whilst they registered a PPDA (Passes Per Defensive Action (how many passes an opposition team makes before a defensive action) of 8.62. This season that number has risen to 11.98, meaning the opposition makes over 3 more passes on average before a defensive action is made. Challenge Intensity has also dropped this season, falling to 6.1, meaning Notts register around 1 less defensive action per minute this season. That was incredibly wordy, but in essence it means that Notts’ pressing stats have fallen dramatically.</p><p>I believe there is a strong correlation between the difference in personnel, and the reduction in pressing metrics. Of course, correlation does not always mean causation, and there are bound to be mitigating factors at play, such as the change in level. But I do believe the single most significant factor is the difference of key personnel. Notts have gone from having a back 5 comprised of 4 defenders and a winger, to 3 defenders and 2 wingers. They’ve also lost off the ball work higher up the pitch. There is a significant difference off the ball when comparing Sam Austin and Ruben Rodrigues to David McGoldrick and Dan Crowley. Not only is there a discrepancy in terms of work rate, but also intelligence of press; Ruben Rodrigues would often lead the press, due to his understanding of pressing triggers.</p><p>The individual data goes even further to support this. No Notts County player was involved in more defensive duels last season than Ruben Rodrigues, who recorded 251 defensive duels across the season, at an average of 5.43 per 90. Rodrigues was also successful in those defensive duels; he won a very solid 62.55%, which, for an attacking midfielder especially, is strong. Rodrigues ranked 53rd for the whole National League in terms of volume of defensive duels. This supports the idea that Rodrigues was in fact our leading presser, arguably the biggest element lost through his departure.</p><p>By comparison, this season no Notts player made it into the top 100 for defensive duels this season, reinforcing that across the board, the pressing has been worse. The data also backs up the claims that individually, Crowley and McGoldrick aren’t quite at the high level Rodrigues set last season. McGoldrick averages just 3.21 defensive duels per 90, albeit winning a similar proportion at 62.22%. Still, the volume is far smaller, over 2 fewer defensive duels per game. Crowley is more active than McGoldrick, yet still less so than Rodrigues; he averages 4.73 defensive duels per 90, 0.7 less than the Portuguese midfielder. Crowley is also less successful; he wins just 57.04% of his defensive duels. The numbers don’t lie; and they point towards the level of pressing from the front being of a lower standard this term.</p><p>The difference between the left wing backs this season is interesting too. Chicksen had a roughly average defensive success rate (for a wing back) of 58.2%. There is a fairly hefty drop off to Jones, who stands at 52.14%. Whilst this is yet more evidence to support the theory, I’m not sure why, but this one doesn’t feel quite as stark as I expected. Whether that was expecting Chicksen’s defensive success to be higher, expecting Jodi’s to be lower, or a bit of both, I’m not sure, but whilst there is a gap, it’s perhaps not as significant as I expected. And, there also needs to be the caveat that the data isn’t entirely predictive. There is a chance that the data is skewed the other way; that because we are pressing worse as a unit, individual data looks worse, rather than the individuals contributing to worse defensive output. But, either way, the numbers don’t lie; there has been a drop when it comes to pressing this season.</p><p><strong>Striking a balance</strong></p><p>I want to reiterate that this isn’t a piece meant to criticise our best players. I realise there I have highlighted what I perceive to be potential deficiencies in the game of 3 of our most important players. However, it is equally important to acknowledge the attacking output these players have. Crowley has 11 goals and 8 assists. McGoldrick also has 11 goals, as well as 4 assists. And Jodi Jones has 5 goals, and a record breaking 18 assists. You can also add in Macaulay Langstaff, 20 goals, 5 assists, and Aaron Nemane, 6 goals and 2 assists, to complete the attacking quintet; the latter 2 haven’t been mentioned to this point as they were regulars both this season, as well as the last campaign too. Still, those players do not put up the numbers they have without playing alongside one another. It’s not as simple as taking one out of the team; doing so would sacrifice attacking power.</p><p>Hopefully it’s clear how much I appreciate these players. And whilst I generally believe comparisons to Rodrigues are scarcely useful (ironic I know), I’ve done it throughout this piece in terms of off the ball metrics, so I might as well do it on the ball too. For what it’s worth, I believe all 3 of McGoldrick, Crowley and Rodrigues are very similar on the ball; in fact, I don’t think there’s anything to choose between them at all. If anything, I’d say the current Notts players, McGoldrick and Crowley, are the ones that actually have the edge in that department; Crowley has already scored as many goals as Rodrigues did last season from open play. Therefore, I don’t want this article to come across as some sort of bashing exercise. I am enamoured by the way all 3 of Crowley, McGoldrick and Jones play; the latter of the trio I consistently say is the best player in the league.</p><p>But (there’s always a but in these scenarios), it does feel like something has to give. Something has to change if Notts are going to address the clear deficiencies. And whilst it’s a measure that nobody wants to take, some bravery might be needed in order to ‘drop’ one of the front 5 from the team. I’ve put ‘drop’ in quotation marks intentionally, as I’m not actually sure you’d see it as dropping, as the man left out the team wouldn’t be left out for long. But it may now be time for some rotation. Most importantly, that may give us the balance we need to stop the goals, but also not completely compromise our attacking output. And, almost as an aside, it would finally give us some threat from the bench, something which has been sorely lacking for far too long now.</p><p><strong>Goalkeepers aren’t the (main) problem</strong></p><p>I’m not going to sit here and write how amazing our goalkeepers have been this season, as that would be disingenuous. I do however strongly believe that an unfair amount of blame is apportioned to the men between the sticks for Notts County. This isn’t a recent phenomenon, although it does feel like this season has been particularly unfair for goalkeepers at the club. Once again, the data might surprise a few people.</p><p>When comparing Aidan Stone from this season to Sam Slocombe to last season, there is very little difference. Stone has a save percentage of 63.1%, whilst Slocombe’s is almost identical at 63.63%. When it comes to line leaving actions (attempt to deal with a cross, either by punching or catching), once again they are almost identical, with Stone recording 1.08 line leaving actions per 90, and Slocombe recording 1.01 per 90. Coincidentally, both rank extremely low when it comes to this metric, which perhaps speaks volumes about how they command their box. Ashby-Hammond’s data for Aldershot last season is slightly better, with 1.86 line leaving actions per 90, and a save percentage of 67.5%.</p><p>The only real significant difference between Stone and Slocombe from last season is the volume of shots faced by Stone. Notts’ current keeper faces 4.27 shots per 90, whilst Slocombe faced just 2.48 per 90 last term. The reality is therefore that Notts are simply giving up far more chances than they did last season. In essence, they aren’t helping their keeper out, so no wonder he is struggling. The goals prevented (which is calculated against the xG faced by a keeper) makes for stark reading though. Slocombe failed to prevent 3.32 less goals than he should have according to the model. Stone’s number makes for even worse reading, at 6.85 fewer saved than predicted. This though could be due to the volume of shots faced. And, let’s face it, had Stone prevented an extra 7 goals, Notts would still have conceded 50 goals, still 8 more than the total they faced last season. In fact, Stone has faced just 7 less shots than Slocombe faced in the entirety of last season, despite playing 18 fewer games. Worryingly, Ashby-Hammond had a prevented goals of 11.17 fewer than expected, which makes for terrible reading, but, once again, the volume of shots could skew this data slightly; Ashby-Hammond faced 228 shots last season, more than Stone’s and Slocombe’s totals combined.</p><p>Having said all of that, it may be time to see what Luca Ashby-Hammond can do. Whilst he didn’t arrive with much fanfare, he does deserve a chance to prove himself, and it feels like the time for that chance is now. If it isn’t, with keepers at the club clearly struggling, when will be the right time? In this scenario, psychology comes heavily into play, not just for Ashby-Hammond, but for Stone too. Ashby-Hammond may feel, if he doesn’t get his chance now that it may never come at all. Stone on the other hand perhaps needs to be taken out of the line of fire, for his own good more than anything. He would of course not admit that, which is understandable. But the constant criticism he receives cannot be doing him any favours mentally, so a break away from the pressure and criticism may do him some good; don’t forget he is still a young keeper.</p><p>Will bringing Ashby-Hammond into the XI solve things overnight? Almost certainly not. But, it surely has to be worth a try. It does feel that whoever is brought in, the level of performance will be very similar; after all, what Notts look for in a keeper is not only extremely demanding, but it’s also extremely hard to find at this level. Keepers are generally at this level for a reason, so if they are good with their feet, as our style dictates is needed, then there is likely to be deficiencies in other parts of their game; otherwise, they simply wouldn’t be playing in League 2.</p><p>So, in short, whilst clear improvement is needed when it comes to the standard of keeping at the club, I do believe there are bigger issues to be dealt with. I do not believe, as it appears others do, that a goalkeeper would be the solution to all of our problems. In fact, if anything it would be a bit like a plaster covering a cut which needs stitches. It might stop the flow of blood initially, but a more long term solution will be needed.</p><p><strong>Risky Recruitment</strong></p><p>Hindsight is a wonderful thing. But our approach in the summer is now often questioned. I have to say, I don’t generally enjoy revisionism when it comes to recruitment. I prefer to judge things off of how we felt at the time, as that’s how we judged the window as and when it happened. There was an incredible sense of excitement going into the new season, mainly due to McGoldrick returning to the club. And, let’s be transparent and fair, the club did get some of the business right; the aforementioned McGoldrick and also Crowley have been big hits, and for good reason.</p><p>But what was once seen as a sensible approach, renewing the contracts of the core of the squad, now appears to be anything but. Notts now have a whole host of fringe players on multi year contracts. This has a massive knock on effect on how the club conducts its transfer dealings. Firstly, the budget, and therefore the scope to bring in fresh faces, is impacted. There is already committed spend on the wages of said fringe players, not just in this year’s budget, but beyond too. A fair few of those on the fringes have also been injured, and with several players already on the periphery, Notts have been reluctant to bring in squad players to bolster the bench, as they have a number waiting to return to action. The presence of multi year contracts also makes any type of perceived rebuild that many believe we need this summer is far harder; although that is a discussion for another day.</p><p>But what has been a recurring theme of Notts’ season is injuries; and I’m not convinced the high volume has been a coincidence. But one thing is for certain; injuries could define Notts’ season. I’m not referring to Matty Palmer in either of the above points; nobody could have foreseen that a player who had barely missed a minute since arriving at Meadow Lane would be ruled out for the foreseeable future. But considering the injury records of the likes of Will Randall, it is perhaps no great surprise that some of the new signings haven’t really featured. In fact, both Junior Morias and Charlie Colkett were signed whilst injured, something which I feel characterises Notts’ recruitment of late; risky.</p><p>The obvious counter argument to that is a certain Jodi Jones; and that is a very compelling argument. But it does feel like Notts are trying to repeat that trick, perhaps one too many times. Taking that risk alongside more sensible, assured signings is fine. But when your January window comprises 2 loanees who have played 9 league games between them, a midfielder who last played in November, an injured midfielder and a striker who couldn’t get a Visa until the middle of February, then question marks are raised. The 5 players signed in January played a combined 1,543 minutes this season before signing for Notts; that’s an average of 308.6 minutes per player. Even if you add in Lewis Macari, who made his loan move permanent in the winter window, the total minutes is only 2,061, or an average of 343.5 minutes for each of the 6 players. That certainly strikes you as risky business.</p><p>The risks don’t just include the players signed; they also include the players not signed, or rather the players Notts did no opt to replace. Both Cedwyn Scott and Geraldo Bajrami suffered long term injuries before the close of the summer window, yet Notts opted to enter the season without finding replacements for them. That’s a decision that ultimately backfired, but once again it highlights Notts’ recruitment plan this season; risky. It might seem harsh, as you cannot foresee injuries. But in these two instances, Notts did have a chance to act, but instead chose to take the risk, to gamble on the potential return dates. You could argue that Notts have been unfortunate that they’ve suffered further injuries in those areas, to Matty Palmer and Junior Morias, but the pessimist, or perhaps pragmatist, would point out that they were risks that could have ultimately been avoided.</p><p>I do want to once again point out that I am not being negative for the sake of it here, and that I am fully aware of the positives of the recruitment Notts have done. I’m also fully aware that not every signing can be a success, and also that every signing does, to some degree, carry a certain element of risk. My point more presides over the sheer volume of risks that Notts have taken when it comes to recruitment this season, especially in January. At the start of January Notts were 5th place, and just 4 points outside the playoffs, coming off the back of back to back home wins, where 8 goals were scored, and 0 were conceded. That is an incredibly strong position to build from.</p><p>However, instead of signing players that are ready to come straight into the XI, Notts signed 5 players who, in truth, weren’t match fit. I have no doubt that some, if not all of the signing will prove to be success stories in the long run. And I of course also acknowledge there was a change in. manager, although due to the way Notts operate, the impact upon recruitment should have been limited. But if promotion was a serious aim this season, one which was well within Notts’ grasp at the start of January, you might have hoped they would have added at least a few players who had played regularly this season, amidst the riskier signings.</p><p><strong>A change in shape</strong></p><p>In his first interview, Stuart Maynard highlighted that we ‘defend from the front’. One strength I believe the management team have displayed so far throughout their time is their ability to identify our weaknesses, both obvious and those slightly less so. I believe it’s no coincidence that he brought this up at the first presser; they had already identified what needs to improve. Their next challenge is about rectifying that deficiency; they must now put right the issues they’ve identified. But how could they do that? We’ve already seen them change things up in their short stint at the helm, which makes me believe they won’t be afraid to change things more permanently. Some of their changes so far have given cause for encouragement, and in combination with some of the things we’ve identified, there are some ways in which Notts could shape up moving forward.</p><p>One obvious change we could see as early as the Newport game is the implementation of a back 4. We’ve already seen Maynard use it late on in games, and considering the situation at the moment, it may be a short term solution to the problems. The issue once again would be down to personnel, and the need to drop one of the front 5 in order to make the system work. We saw Aaron Nemane play as a right back, behind Jodi Jones as a right winger on Friday v Gills, but I highly doubt this would be a system used from the off. Likewise, a potential 4–2–3–1 system, which is often suggested online, would only really look different on paper. It would involve the exact same personnel picking up the exact same positions; that would result in the exact same problems.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/518/1*2__PiaiqFkBUMyxyqYaSYg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The most obvious solution here would be Lewis Macari coming in at Right Back, a role he has played throughout his career. In fact, based on career minutes, you’d actually say he was a Right Back in a back 4, rather than a Centre Back, due to his loan with Dundalk. He impressed there, so seems like a natural choice, whilst on the other side captain Kyle Cameron could shift across to the Left Back position, taking advantage of his slightly more attacking instincts.</p><p>It’s also perhaps a surprise to absolutely nobody who has made it this far in the article that I believe Sam Austin should be in the XI, simply for what he offers off the ball. He’s an extremely disciplined footballer, one who is able to carry out instructions, something which underpins his versatility. That’s vital at the moment. I will also give credit to the recruitment team here, and say that at least one of their January ‘risks’ has paid off already. Scott Robertson may have taken a few games to get going, but for me, he looks to be one of the most positive and influential players in a Notts shirt at the moment. Robertson made the most tackles of any player at Meadow Lane on Friday night, made 7 recoveries, whilst also being the most accurate passer on the pitch, misplacing just 1 of his 64 passes, giving him a pass accuracy of 98.4%. He has to be in the team at the moment for me.</p><p>This is where things get complicated, and even perhaps messy. This is where finding a balance becomes so difficult, and also why I’m thankful I’m not the manager. Some difficult decisions need to be made, and at least 1, if not more of the fan favourites may need to be dropped in order to stop this short term rot. You’ll note that John Bostock has fallen victim of that here, and that is in no means due to him not being a personal favourite of mine, because he is. But I just feel the other 2 midfielders offer more out of possession, which is something that needs to be prioritised in this moment.</p><p>Then I’ve almost broken my own rules with shoehorning the attacking talent into the side. Dan Crowley is at his best on the right hand side, where he’s able to receive in space, and make crosses from the right half space. Whilst he’s not a traditional winger, this role would allow him to continue to get these crosses into the box from those areas. Jones has been at his best down the left hand side, where he’s amassed a record breaking 18 assists. Whilst I understand the reasoning behind him being on the opposite side, due to dribbling angles, switching him back to the left side, at least in the short term, seems to make a lot of sense. Then we have a slightly more free role for McGoldrick. Perhaps I have let heart rule head here, and this role could easily be given to Bostock to provide a more solid 3 man midfield. But McGoldrick has been at the heart of everything Notts do. Without him I fear we may lose some creativity; once again striking that balance. It isn’t easy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a2df5fd26f5b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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