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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tony Y. on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tony Y. on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tonyyeoh?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tony Y. on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Founder Screening: Don’t get starstruck (Part 2)]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/founder-screening-dont-get-starstruck-part-2-741089993a0e?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/741089993a0e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 04:11:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-03T04:11:01.445Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UbB2q6WMUsTf1JtYdC5Hgw.png" /></figure><p>I’ve passed on founders I liked.</p><p>Good conversations. Clear thinking. People I would be happy to work with. But we didn’t move forward.</p><p>One example that stuck with me was a seed-stage founder I met (In operations for ~12 months, revenue generating) building a D2C business.</p><p>Early in the call, I decided to spend time on unit economics. I asked him to walk me through it: what margins looked like, CAC to LTV, and what he expected to improve as the business scaled.</p><p>His response went in a different direction. He talked about securing contracts with major e-commerce platforms and getting better merchant rates through relationships.</p><p>It was a strong answer on distribution, but it didn’t answer the question.</p><p>I asked again, specifically on CAC, repeat behaviour, early cohorts.</p><p>He paused and said he would have his finance person follow up after the call with the numbers.</p><blockquote>That was where I lost interest.</blockquote><p>At that stage of the company, the numbers are the business. Not perfectly tracked, but understood. If a founder cannot walk through their own unit economics, it is very hard to believe they can scale it.</p><p>Towards the end of the call, he started asking about our internal timelines: how quickly we move, when decisions get made, and mentioned he was expecting term sheets that week from another VC.</p><p>That kind of pressure doesn’t work. It’s a small ecosystem. It’s usually easy to cross-check what’s real and what isn’t.</p><p>Nothing about the founder was a red flag. He was credible and clearly able to open doors.</p><p><strong>But I couldn’t get comfortable with the business.</strong></p><p><strong>Two separate signals, same conclusion.</strong></p><p><strong>I passed.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=741089993a0e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Founder Screening: Don’t get starstruck]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/founder-screening-dont-get-starstruck-0a5e21bd3263?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[singapore]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 14:07:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-02T14:07:32.798Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a75XVP8cSAyAn3Uqp0nwpA.png" /><figcaption>Don’t get starstruck</figcaption></figure><p>I spoke with a founder who had a strong track record, including prior success in China and the US. On paper, this was an easy story to get excited about.</p><p>During the conversation, I asked why he was now raising in Southeast Asia while his business was still operating in other markets.</p><p>The answer was polished. It sounded reasonable. But it didn’t really explain the shift. <strong>That was where it started to break for me.</strong></p><p>There’s a particular feeling you get in these conversations when something doesn’t quite line up. Nothing obviously wrong, but you find yourself filling in gaps in your head to make the story work. I’ve learned to pay attention to that.</p><p>So I went back to the question again, from a slightly different angle. The answers stayed at a high level. Nothing specific enough to anchor on.</p><p>After the call, I did a quick check. His previous company had been under investigation for fraud.</p><p>What stood out wasn’t just the outcome. It was how early the signal showed up. The inconsistency was already there in the first conversation.</p><p>Strong backgrounds make this harder, not easier.</p><p>When a founder “looks credible”, the tone of the conversation changes without you realising it. You ask fewer direct questions. You give the benefit of the doubt more quickly. You move on before something is fully explained.</p><p>Most of the time, nothing is obviously wrong. The answers are directionally correct. The story broadly makes sense. But the details don’t quite hold together.</p><p>That’s usually where I spend more time.</p><p>I don’t try to understand everything in one go. I’ll pick one area : go-to-market, product, sometimes just a single decision and stay there.</p><p>If a fintech founder tells me they have a proprietary credit decision model, I’m less interested in the label and more interested in what is actually running, what data is being used, and what has changed because of it. If we stay at the level of generalities, that usually tells me enough.</p><p>The same applies to parts of the story that get moved past quickly. Markets that didn’t work. Experiments that failed. Periods where growth slowed. Those are usually the most informative parts of the conversation, but they’re also the easiest to gloss over.</p><p>Good founders don’t avoid those areas. They go there themselves, often before you ask.</p><p>This cuts both ways.</p><p>The best founders I’ve met approach investors in the same way. They don’t get overly impressed by brand names or track records. They try to understand how you think, where your judgment comes from, and how you behave when things don’t go to plan.</p><p>They’re not just taking capital. They’re evaluating decision-making.</p><p>Early-stage investing doesn’t give you the luxury of complete information. Most decisions are made with partial data and imperfect visibility.</p><p>Because of that, a lot of mistakes aren’t due to missing information. They come from ignoring signals that were already there.</p><blockquote>A strong resume can get you into the meeting. It shouldn’t get you through diligence. The signals are usually there early. The mistake is choosing to ignore them.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0a5e21bd3263" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Winning the battle, but losing the war]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war-632aff7ccacf?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[negotiation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-01T00:31:01.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lOF5L75zM_2OYxnQFhldpA.png" /><figcaption>Winning the battle, but losing the war</figcaption></figure><p>Junior VCs aren’t wrong to push on price. In fact, it’s often one of the first instincts you develop: “this is too expensive”; or “we should come in lower”. On the surface, that feels like discipline. But it’s also where many early investors get stuck.</p><p>Consider a simple example. A founder says: “I want to raise $2Mn for 10%” implying a $20Mn valuation. The immediate reaction is to negotiate. Can we get in at $15Mn instead of $20Mn? Are we overpaying relative to the market? Nothing wrong with that. But notice what is happening. The focus is on negotiating the number.</p><blockquote>Valuation is not just a price. It sets the bar for the next round.</blockquote><p>At a $20Mn entry, you’re implicitly underwriting:<br> • Next round: $40–60Mn+ (2–3x step-up)<br> • Revenue required: ~$6–12Mn ARR (assuming ~5–8x multiple)<br> • Growth needed: 3–6x in ~18–24 months</p><p>If the company is at $2Mn ARR today, that means getting to ~$8Mn ARR just to support a mid-case next round.</p><blockquote>This is what the next investor needs to believe. And this is what you are underwriting today whether you realise it or not.</blockquote><p>Now compare two scenarios. You invest at $20Mn. You negotiate it down to $15Mn.</p><p>If the company cannot hit the milestones required for the next round, the next raise becomes difficult, you end up in flat or down rounds, signalling weakens and capital becomes defensive. The outcome is largely the same. Your “better entry price” does not fix a broken trajectory.</p><blockquote>The issue was never the price. It was the gap between where the company is and what it needs to become.</blockquote><p>Founders make a similar error. It’s common to see pushback like: “Can we reduce dilution from 12% to 10%?” On paper, that feels meaningful. But a 2% difference at this stage rarely determines the outcome. If the company cannot grow into the valuation, that marginal dilution saved today gets wiped out in future rounds through resets, defensive capital, or loss of leverage.</p><p>Again, the focus is on the number, not on what needs to be achieved next.</p><p>So the conversation shouldn’t start with “Is this valuation too high or too low?” It should start with what valuation the next round needs to be, what milestones support that step-up, and how realistic it is to achieve them in the given timeframe. Only then does the current valuation make sense or not.</p><p>At its core, venture is not about negotiating price. It’s about underwriting whether a company can clear the next bar. That bar is set by market expectations, growth trajectories and ultimately execution. Most companies won’t get there. And when they don’t, no entry price is cheap enough.</p><p><strong>Winning the negotiation on valuation can feel like progress. But if it doesn’t set the company up for the next round, you’ve only won the battle and lost the war.</strong></p><p>The job is not to optimise for price. It’s to anchor on what needs to be true next and whether the company, and more importantly the founders, are building towards that outcome.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=632aff7ccacf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Good business ≠ Good VC investment — Part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/good-business-good-vc-investment-part-2-f0e8531c5348?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f0e8531c5348</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[singapore]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 02:02:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-31T02:06:35.813Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L2-N_qOaMe1zZJDgM_sx9g.png" /><figcaption>Good business ≠ Good VC investment</figcaption></figure><p>The founder speaks well, his background is strong, and the market size is large. Everything looks right. It feels like a good business. So what else should you be looking at?</p><p>Go back to the SaaS example. The company reaches $3Mn in ARR and exits at a 7x multiple, or about $21Mn. On paper, that looks like a solid outcome.</p><p>But run the math from the fund’s perspective.</p><p>At 10% ownership on exit, that returns roughly $2.1Mn to the fund. On a $50Mn fund, that’s about 0.04x, even if everything goes right.</p><p>Now look at the same outcome from the founder’s perspective. Assuming ~40% ownership at exit, that’s about $8Mn. A meaningful, life-changing result.</p><blockquote>Same company. Same outcome. Completely different conclusions.</blockquote><p>This is where most junior investors get it wrong. They focus on whether the business is “good” instead of whether it fits the fund.</p><p><strong>A quick way to filter deals </strong>is to look at the revenue assumptions provided by the founders. Compare it to the following formula and determine if it fits the fund mandate.</p><blockquote><strong>Formula:</strong></blockquote><blockquote>(Fund size) / (Shareholding at exit) = Required Exit Value</blockquote><blockquote>Required Exit Value / Exit Multiple = Required Company Revenue</blockquote><blockquote><strong>In numbers:</strong></blockquote><blockquote>$50Mn / 10% = ~$500Mn Required Exit Value</blockquote><blockquote>$500Mn / 7x = ~$72Mn Required Company Revenue</blockquote><p>Now compare that to what the founder is projecting. If the business has no clear path to that scale, it doesn’t matter how compelling the story is, it was never investable to begin with.</p><p>There are, of course, deeper layers to this. Power law dynamics mean only a handful of companies drive returns. Portfolio construction, dilution, and market constraints all play a role. But this is one of the first filter.</p><p>Over time, you realise something uncomfortable.</p><p>You’re not rejecting bad companies.<br> You’re rejecting companies that are too small.</p><p>And that’s a very different game from what most people think venture capital is. <strong>Venture is not about avoiding bad deals. It’s about finding the few that can carry the fund.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f0e8531c5348" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Good business ≠ Good VC investment — Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/good-business-good-vc-investment-part-1-387348880c1f?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/387348880c1f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vc-funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[singapore]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 02:56:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-30T03:25:20.684Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y0q96qb6oK4NzPPHGLtQKw.png" /><figcaption>Good business ≠ Good VC investment</figcaption></figure><p>Most people misunderstand venture capital. They think VCs invest in great founders, strong businesses, and companies that are “doing well.” That’s not how it works.</p><p>Here’s what actually happens. You meet a startup with solid early traction, a compelling story, and founders who know how to sell. It looks like a great business. You bring it to your Partners. It gets killed in 5 minutes.</p><p>Not because it’s a bad company, but because it will never return the fund.</p><p>Let’s break the illusion. Take a $50Mn fund. After fees, you have roughly $40Mn to invest. That capital needs to come back, ideally multiple times over.</p><p>Now take a “good” outcome. A company reaches $3Mn in ARR and exits at a 7x multiple, or about $21Mn. At 10% ownership, that returns roughly $2.1Mn to the fund.</p><p>That’s about 0.04x fund return, even if everything goes right.</p><blockquote>From a founder’s perspective, assuming ~40% ownership, that’s an ~$8Mn outcome. A great result. From a VC’s perspective, it’s irrelevant.</blockquote><blockquote>This is the uncomfortable truth: VCs don’t invest in good companies. They invest in companies that can return the fund.</blockquote><p>Once you understand this, a lot of things start to make sense, why “good” startups don’t get funded, why VCs push for aggressive growth, and why profitability often doesn’t matter early on.</p><blockquote>The problem isn’t that investors are irrational. It’s that they’re playing a completely different game.</blockquote><p>And if you don’t understand the rules of that game, you’ll keep chasing deals that were never investable in the first place.</p><p>In Part 2, I’ll break down how experienced investors filter this within minutes and avoid wasting time on the wrong deals + why this matters even more in markets like Southeast Asia.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=387348880c1f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zero Moat in AI Application Startups]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/zero-moat-in-ai-application-startups-1c1428bf9ec0?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1c1428bf9ec0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2025 15:16:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-09T15:16:25.445Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Why building on top of someone else’s model will never make you defensible</h4><p>Every week, a new AI startup will pitch their idea as “defensible” when, in reality, they’re building on top of someone else’s infrastructure. After looking at over 2,000 startups, I have to ask —<strong> if you’re building on the same foundational model as everyone else, are you really defensible?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/1*mJMuxN7Ax2ao3-yultfzTw.jpeg" /></figure><p>AI application startups typically have the same structure:</p><ul><li><strong>Foundational model</strong> (think OpenAI, Google, Meta, Anthropic, etc.)</li><li><strong>Infrastructure &amp; tooling layer</strong> (think data pipelines, prompt orchestration, etc.)</li><li><strong>Application layer</strong> (think front-facing interfaces for specific industry use cases such as marketing or law)</li></ul><p>The application layer is dependent on the previous layer — similar to how iOS or Android apps are built on top of their respective ecosystems, but with less differentiation. Most AI startups pull their outputs from the same foundational models, and components of the infrastructure and tooling layer are typically available off the shelf.</p><blockquote><strong>But hang on — what about getting access to proprietary datasets to fine-tune the models?</strong></blockquote><p>Well, here’s the thing: most data isn’t really that proprietary. A lot of it is scraped from public sources or generated by users, which means other startups can get their hands on similar data pretty easily. For enterprise-focused startups, it’s even tougher — the data usually comes from clients, and they’re not going to let you use it to train a shared model. (Will a bank give you their client data so you can build a model for other banks? Probably not.) So whatever data advantage you think you have is usually short-lived.</p><p>And even if you do fine-tune a model with that data, the edge doesn’t last long. The model might perform better on specific industry tasks, but it still inherits the foundational model’s reasoning limits and architecture. When the next version of that base model comes out, your fine-tuned one quickly feels outdated. Competitors can usually reproduce comparable results with access to similar or synthetic datasets, eroding any short-lived performance gap.</p><blockquote>So what are true moats for AI application startups, then?</blockquote><p>In deep-tech investments, “moat” often refers to the technical knowledge that founders have gleaned from years of research — unique know-how that makes replication almost impossible. They are, quite literally, the only people in the world who know how to do things in a certain way.</p><p>In general tech investments, “moat” usually means distribution dominance, network effects, or simply access to more capital. Conventional wisdom says deep-tech startups are inherently harder to disrupt than general tech startups because their advantage lies in knowledge, not marketing.</p><p>AI application startups occupy a strange middle ground. They claim to be “deep-tech” because they work with advanced models, but in truth, they are consumers of deep tech, not creators of it. Their edge doesn’t come from proprietary algorithms or novel architectures — those belong to the foundational model companies.</p><p>At the same time, most of these startups haven’t yet developed the classic moats of general tech — brand, distribution, or network effects. That’s why defensibility in AI applications often looks illusory.</p><p>So, this brings me back to my original point: AI application startups that claim to be defensible often have zero moats at all. If anything, <strong>the true moats of AI application startups are likely (i) distribution, (ii) workflow integration, and (iii) ecosystem lock-in </strong>— not the model itself.</p><p>In short, AI application startups can’t rely on technology alone for defensibility. Technical excellence opens the door — but distribution, workflow depth, and ecosystem trust are what keep the startup alive.</p><p>With the massive amount of funding that has poured into AI-related startups — PitchBook data shows $73.1B raised in just the first quarter of 2025, more than half of 2024’s total — someone, somewhere, is in for a rude shock when the AI bubble bursts.</p><p>#AI #Startups #VentureCapital #DeepTech #TechnologyStrategy #ArtificialIntelligence</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1c1428bf9ec0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why invest in India?]]></title>
            <link>https://tonyyeoh.medium.com/why-invest-in-india-a7ae04aedb78?source=rss-147ae5ea94b4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7ae04aedb78</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tony Y.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 May 2025 08:39:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-09T08:39:41.898Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cradle of civilisation. Most populous country. Nuclear power. Do I need to say more?</p><h4>Historical Legacy</h4><p>India has always been a fascinating country. After all, it is one of the world’s oldest cradle of civilisation — Indus Valley Civilisation (alongside Ancient China, Mesopotamia, and Egypt). Sophisticated urban planning and architecture was seen in its city layout and buildings; it developed one of the world’s earliest cotton industries; and its technology and measurement prowess resulted in one of the earliest known systems of uniform weights and measures.</p><figure><img alt="Indian astronaut Shubhanshu Shukla" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*NlqanJYPCUpK89zs_-BynQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Indian astronaut Shubhanshu Shukla, 39</figcaption></figure><h4>Modern India has continued to be a powerhouse in the world.</h4><p>Think <strong>space power</strong> and India is just 1 of 4 countries in the world to land an unmanned craft on the Moon (The others are USA, China and Russia). It is also expected to send its second astronaut to space (Indian astronaut Shubhanshu Shukla) on a joint NASA and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) <a href="https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!technology/axiom-mission-4-set-to-launch-in-may-2025-with-india-gaganyaan-astronaut-shubhanshu-shukla-enn25040703514">Gaganyaan</a> mission.</p><p>In the <strong>medical arena</strong>, India has played a pivotal role in the global fight against the COVID-19 virus. <strong>Its strength as a pharmaceutical manufacturing hub enabled the production of over 2 billion Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines</strong> through the world’s largest vaccine manufacturer, The Serum Institute of India, which saved millions of lives across the globe.</p><p>India is also poised to produce the <strong>greatest source of software engineers </strong>(~9 to ~10 million) globally by 2030<strong>.</strong> Its highly competitive Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) remains one of the most selective engineering entrance exams globally with an acceptance rate of ~1.0%. Combined with a youthful population, English-speaking ability and an expanding tech industry, talented Indian software engineers will be inside every company!</p><h3>India’s economic and population indicators are positive.</h3><h4>Virtuous cycle of good founders who exited and started their 2nd company or a VC fund</h4><p>India‘s startup ecosystem has also matured with founders who have exited successfully and am starting their second company or VC fund . In 2024, ~45% of founders who secured seed-stage funding are second-time founders. While no precise figures are available to show the number of founders who became a VC, clear examples such as Mars Shot Ventures (Ex-Razorpay founders and founding team), Titan Capital (Snapdeal founders) and others indicate a healthy transfer of knowledge and funds returning to the startup ecosystem.</p><h4>Strong supply of startups + rebound in deal count</h4><p>A strong supply of startups and good deal count are clear indications of a healthy startup ecosystem and India has managed to achieve both metrics. In fact, India’s rebounded deal count in 2024 vs 2023 ( ~11%) is better than USA and China which have retained the same levels. Clearly,</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*2NQut_zfMV2kl8Sdc2tClg.png" /></figure><h4>Large population size + increasing no. of taxpayers + rising GDP per capita + a young population = growth in organic consumption</h4><p>The large population size of ~1.4Bn people presents a ready consumer market and India is well on its way to overtake China in terms of population growth. Over the last 10 years, India’s population increased by ~200 million people vs China which increased by ~53 million. In addition, the <strong>number of taxpayers</strong> who have filed their taxes has been increasing steadily from <strong>67 million in AY20–21 to ~91 million in AY24–25</strong>. This indicates a <strong>~36% increase</strong> in active taxpayers who are earning income and paying taxes — testament to a growing consumption market!</p><p>GDP per capita has also reached ~US$2,600, crossing the US$2,000 mark. This is typically seen by economists as a pivotal moment as basic needs have been met and consumption will turn towards discretionary spending. Coupled with a young population (~40% of India’s population is under the age of 24) who can power organic consumption as they enter the workforce, India’s mid to long term growth trajectory presents a rosy picture.</p><h3>Are there risks? Definitely but to highlight just one:</h3><p><strong>Political and regulatory risks remain.</strong> In early 2024, the authorities caused a heart attack when they expanded the scope of the Angel Tax to include unlisted companies — resulting in potential tax rates of ~30.9%. Luckily, this was abolished later on in the year at the Union Budget 2024. And around August 2024, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) announced stricter regulations for fintech companies targeting retail investors, where subscription products are capped at a maximum of three months subscription instead of an annual subscription. The changes negatively impacted fintech startups who had relied on such annual subscription revenue to demonstrate revenue quality. And definitely, at the time of this article, geopolitical tensions such as the India-Pakistan conflict has dampened consumer and investor confidence in the country.</p><p><strong>So there you have it.</strong></p><blockquote><strong>TLDR: Ancient country turned nuclear power with 118 unicorns in the startup ecosystem and a fast-growing young population set to take over the world.</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="Taj Mahal" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-S9ZuXJj9ySJdrJNuZ2KSA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Taj Mahal</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7ae04aedb78" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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