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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tristan Hoy on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tristan Hoy on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@tristanhoy?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Tristan Hoy on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Censorship in private BFT blockchains]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/censorship-in-private-bft-blockchains-ee618756ee67?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee618756ee67</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[consensus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Mar 2018 01:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-18T09:23:41.496Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Off-chain recourse is your enemy.</strong></p><h3>Consortium chains as clearinghouses</h3><p>Picture a scenario where a consortium blockchain is used to replace a regulated, independent clearinghouse, allowing banks and other large organisations to trade more efficiently between themselves.</p><p>By establishing a permanent record of “facts” agreed upon by all parties, transactions can be made in real time whilst simultaneously reducing the cost of detecting/preventing fraud.</p><p>From the viewpoint of regulators, the viability of such a system comes from the extent to which this permanent record can be trusted.</p><h3>Motivations for censorship</h3><p>The best attack against a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_fault_tolerance">Byzantine Fault Tolerant</a> (BFT) chain such as <a href="https://tendermint.com/">Tendermint</a> is <a href="https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/the-history-of-casper-chapter-4-3855638b5f0e">censorship</a>:</p><blockquote>“Tendermint is two dudes!” Matthew Wampler-Doty excitedly told me [<a href="https://medium.com/u/aa9bb0a9d2ad">Vlad Zamfir</a>], one evening. He explained that a cartel of Tendermint validators with more than 2/3 of the security deposits would form, because it does not require participation from the remaining validators to create finalized blocks (these “non-cartel validators” have less than 1/3 of security deposits). These less than 1/3 of nodes would be censored and eventually removed from the validator set. A new cartel with more than 2/3 of the (now smaller) set of security deposits would then form, and this process would continue until only [at most] 2 validators remain.</blockquote><p>A censorship attack does not need to have the goal of eliminating a party from a network. It may just be to block the actions of a specific party, for example blocking or delaying the sale of assets just as a market starts to crash.</p><h3>Recourse</h3><p>Implementers of a consortium chain may look for a combination of technology and contractual agreements to provide recourse against censorship.</p><p>For example, nodes may automatically retain a history of all transactions validated, whether or not they make it onto the chain, and a legal contract may impose penalties if evidence of censorship can be provided.</p><h3>Unintended consequences</h3><p>If any weight at all is given to this “evidence”, it creates a new, much cheaper attack vector.</p><p>A party need only obtain valid signatures from 1/3 of nodes (or less) for a transaction to “prove” that they have had their actions censored, and this can be done after-the-fact.</p><p>This evidence is trivial to falsify, and it is impossible to prove or disprove that it has been forged because it is not a “fact” in the same way that on-chain transactions are “facts”.</p><p>Picture the very same on-the-verge market crash: perhaps a party is not sure of how events will transpire and does not want to “commit” to the sale of a bag of assets. This off-chain recourse allows this party to do an after-the-fact commitment to a past transaction, but instead of directly benefiting from the trade, they receive (potentially equivalent) compensation.</p><p>As this attack requires participation from less than 1/3 of nodes, the cost of this attack is at most half that of censorship (plus legal fees), effectively halving the resilience of the solution.</p><p><strong>The moral of the story: censorship resistance needs to be on-chain.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee618756ee67" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/censorship-in-private-bft-blockchains-ee618756ee67">Censorship in private BFT blockchains</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How (not) to invest in crypto index funds]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/how-not-to-invest-in-crypto-index-funds-af36a3088fa5?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af36a3088fa5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2018 04:53:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-31T05:27:44.098Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Exploring the benefits — and risks.</strong></p><p><em>DISCLAIMER: This article is not financial advice.</em></p><h4>Spotlight: Crypto20</h4><p><a href="https://crypto20.com/en/">Crypto20</a> has had a phenomenal run — despite recent market conditions, it is still <a href="https://crypto20.com/en/portal/performance/">up almost 200%</a> since its launch at the end of October.</p><p>The idea behind Crypto20 is simple: the company manages a portfolio consisting of the top 20 coins by market cap, and a somewhat scientific algorithm automatically rebalances the portfolio once a week.</p><p>These assets are tokenized, and token holders are entitled to draw down the equivalent net asset value of their tokens in Ethereum at any time. The tokens can be traded on exchanges and are currently attracting a premium of 36% over the net asset value. Meanwhile, the management fee is just 0.5% per year.</p><p>This represents significantly better returns than HODLing long-term major coins without the extreme time commitment required to day trade.</p><p>It sounds like the perfect option for passive traders to maximise their profits — but there’s a problem.</p><h4>Counterparty Risk</h4><p>Even though Crypto20 has had their underlying asset holdings <a href="https://static.crypto20.com/crypto20_kpmg_aup.pdf">audited by KPMG</a>, and by all accounts appear to be a legitimate company, Crypto20 maintains direct ownership over all of the underlying assets — creating a single point of failure.</p><p><strong>If Crypto20 is hacked and the funds stolen, the tokens owned by investors will be worth nothing.</strong></p><p>The more time that elapses, the higher the risk that these funds will be stolen by someone inside or outside of the company. Because the underlying funds are cryptocurrencies, it is much easier for a thief to keep what they have stolen — making these funds a big target.</p><p>To get an idea of the likelihood of such an attack happening, one needs only look at statistics for exchanges: over the 8 years to August 2016, <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/08/29/risk-of-bitcoin-hacking-is-real/">a third of all exchanges were hacked</a>.</p><h4>Risk Management</h4><p>If similar risk was assumed for index funds (and there is no reason why it would be any different than exchanges), over an 8 year period there is a 1/3 chance of an index fund being completely wiped out.</p><p>It would be prudent to limit exposure to this asset class and to reinvest any significant profits (rather than adopt a “let your winners run” approach).</p><p><em>DISCLOSURE: The author of this article owns Crypto20 tokens.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af36a3088fa5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/how-not-to-invest-in-crypto-index-funds-af36a3088fa5">How (not) to invest in crypto index funds</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Fast, Quantum Safe Additively Homomorphic Encryption]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/fast-quantum-safe-additively-homomorphic-encryption-ccd950ebbb04?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ccd950ebbb04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2017 15:39:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-09T01:35:41.512Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>This article presents a means for executing private computation of addition operations on an untrusted server whilst protecting from a harvest-then-decrypt post-quantum attack.</p><p>It builds on the security of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal_encryption">ElGamal cryptosystem</a> which lacks quantum safety, however an approach for achieving quantum security by converting it to a symmetric encryption scheme is discussed.</p><p><strong>No new cryptographic techniques are presented in this article.</strong> It simply fine-tunes parameter selection for ElGamal to enable efficient additive homomorphic encryption.</p><p>This article assumes prior knowledge of discrete logarithm based public key cryptography, and some familiarity with ElGamal.</p><h3>The ElGamal Encryption Scheme</h3><p>ElGamal operates over a cyclic group <em>G</em> with order <em>q</em> and generator <em>g</em>.</p><p><strong>All operations are implied modulo <em>G </em>unless otherwise indicated.</strong></p><h4>Key Generation</h4><p>Secret key <em>s= </em>random number between <em>{ 1, …, q — 1 }</em></p><p>Public key <em>p= g^s</em></p><h4>Encryption</h4><p><em>j = </em>random number between <em>{ 1, …, q — 1 }</em></p><p>Ciphertext <em>(x, y) = E(m) = </em>(<em>g</em>^<em>j</em>, <em>m * p^j</em>)</p><h4>Decryption</h4><p>Plaintext <em>m = D(x, y) = modInv(x^s, G) * y</em></p><h4>Homomorphic Properties</h4><p>The ElGamal encryption scheme is homomorphically multiplicative:</p><p><em>E(m) * E(n) = </em>((<em>g</em>^<em>j) * (g^k)</em>, (<em>m * p^j) * (n * p^k)</em>)</p><p><em>E(m) * E(n) = </em>(<em>g</em>^(<em>j + k)</em>, <em>m * n * p^(j + k)</em>)</p><p><em>E(m) * E(n) = E(m * n)</em></p><p>For a more in-depth view into the mathematical basis for ElGamal, please consult the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal_encryption">wikipedia article</a>.</p><h3>Naive Approach to Addition</h3><p>The typical approach to enabling additively homomorphic encryption in ElGamal is to exploit the Product Exponent Rule.</p><h4>Encoding</h4><p><em>e = g^m</em></p><h4>Encryption</h4><p><em>(x, y) = E(e) = (g^j, e * p^j)</em></p><h4>Decryption</h4><p><em>e = D(x, y) = modInv(x^s, G) * y</em></p><h4>Decoding</h4><p><em>e = g^m</em></p><h4>Homomorphic Properties</h4><p><em>E(m) * E(n) = </em>((<em>g</em>^<em>j) * (g^k)</em>, (<em>g^m * p^j) * (g^n * p^k)</em>)</p><p><em>E(m) * E(n) = </em>(<em>g</em>^(<em>j + k)</em>, g^(<em>m + n) * p^(j + k)</em>)</p><p><em>E(m) * E(n) = E(m + n)</em></p><p>The decoding step requires solving the discrete logarithm problem by brute force, with operations in the order of <em>O(m).</em></p><p>This works, and certainly achieves the desired quantum safety (see below), but it is infeasible for large values of <em>m</em>.</p><h3>A Better Approach</h3><p>This uses an identical encoding method, however more efficient decoding is realised by careful selection of the public group <em>G</em> such that:</p><p><em>G = qr + 1</em></p><p>where:</p><ol><li><em>r</em> has many small prime factors (less than 20 bits), a subset of which possess a product that exceeds or approaches the largest value of <em>m</em> to be encrypted</li><li><em>q </em>is a very large prime, close to <em>G </em>in bit length</li></ol><p>Condition 1 allows efficient solving of discrete logarithms for small exponents via Chinese Remaineder Theorem, but without reducing the practical security level for general members of the group <em>G.</em></p><p>Condition 2 protects the scheme against a birthday (collision) attack by ensuring the order of the group is sufficiently large, and limits the effect Condition 1 has on large exponents.</p><p>An example group <em>G </em>is as follows:</p><p><em>G = </em>2^3094–135017 = <em>q</em> *<em> r </em>+ 1</p><p><em>r </em>= 2 * 7 * 23 * 191 * 359 * 7717 * 15791 * 4411409</p><p>In the above group, <em>q</em> is a 3021 bit prime.</p><h4>Encoding</h4><p><em>e = g^m</em></p><h4>Encryption</h4><p><em>(x, y) = E(e) = (g^j, e * p^j)</em></p><h4>Decryption</h4><p><em>e = D(x, y) = modInv(x^s, G) * y</em></p><h4>Decoding</h4><p>For each small factor <em>f </em>of <em>r:</em></p><p><em>c</em>[<em>i</em>]<em> = e^(Φ(G) / f</em>[<em>i</em>]<em>)</em></p><p><em>c</em>[<em>i</em>]<em> = (</em>g^<em>m</em>)^(<em>Φ(G)</em> <em>/ f</em>[<em>i</em>])</p><p><em>c</em>[<em>i</em>]<em> = (g^(Φ(G) / f</em>[<em>i</em>]<em>))^m’</em>[<em>i</em>]</p><p>The next step is to solve for <em>m’</em>[<em>i</em>] via brute force, where <em>m’</em>[<em>i</em>]<em> </em>is a value between 0 and <em>f</em>[<em>i</em>] <em>— </em>1.</p><p>Once the value of <em>m’</em>[<em>i</em>] has been found for each <em>f</em>[<em>i</em>], the value of <em>m </em>can be found by application of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_remainder_theorem">Chinese Remainder Theorem</a>:</p><p><em>m = m’</em>[0] mod <em>f</em>[0] = <em>m’</em>[1] mod <em>f</em>[1] = … = <em>m’</em>[<em>n — </em>1] mod <em>f</em>[<em>n — </em>1]</p><p>Solving for all the above congruences will yield the original value of <em>m.</em></p><p>The value of <em>m </em>can be tested for correctness by re-encoding it and ensuring it matches the value <em>e.</em></p><p>This technique was inspired by a similar approach employed in the decryption algorithm of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naccache%E2%80%93Stern_cryptosystem">Naccache-Stern cryptosystem</a>.</p><h4>How does this work?</h4><p>The key is in this equation:</p><p><em>c = (g^(Φ(G) / f</em>[<em>i</em>]<em>))^m’</em>[<em>i</em>]</p><p>The generator <em>(g</em>^(<em>Φ(G)</em> <em>/ f</em>[<em>i</em>])) has an order (and therefore brute force search space) of <em>f</em>[<em>i</em>]<em>.</em></p><p>Providing that <em>m</em> is less than (or not much larger than) the product of the factors being used, this makes the number of operations in the order of <em>O(F), </em>where <em>F </em>is the <em>sum </em>of the factors being used.</p><p>The example group allows numbers up to 11,869,137,094,642,789,887,814 (the product of the factors) to be decoded with a maximum of 24,088 brute force attempts (the sum of the factors).</p><p>Performance can be further boosted by performing the decoding step in multiple phases with progressively larger factors — and only proceeding to the next phase if it fails to find the correct value of <em>m</em>.</p><h3>Security Implications</h3><p>This approach most certainly weakens the ElGamal cryptosystem: it allows easier calculation of the discrete logarithm for small exponents, however this effect diminishes linearly for exponents larger than the product of the factors of <em>r.</em></p><p>If <em>s </em>is chosen to have a bit length close to <em>q </em>(and random selection all but guarantees this), brute-forcing <em>s</em> from <em>p</em> remains outside the realm of possibility.</p><h3>Quantum Safety</h3><p>A popular scheme for additive homomorphic encryption is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paillier_cryptosystem">Paillier cryptosystem</a>, however performing untrusted additions requires knowledge of the public key (the modulus <em>pq^</em>2), making it completely vulnerable to a harvest-then-decrypt quantum factorization attack.</p><p>In ElGamal, untrusted operations only require knowledge of the public group <em>G. </em>If this encryption scheme is effectively converted to a <em>symmetric </em>encryption scheme (where the public key is not disclosed, and therefore not public), perfect quantum security is achieved.</p><p>In order to decrypt the message, the quantum adversary must effectively solve for <em>m </em>where:</p><p><em>(x, y) = (g^j, e * p^j)</em></p><p>If <em>p </em>and <em>j </em>are unknown, this problem has <em>q</em> equally likely solutions (<em>q</em> being a 3021 bit number with our example group), providing information-theoretic security.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ccd950ebbb04" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/fast-quantum-safe-additively-homomorphic-encryption-ccd950ebbb04">Fast, Quantum Safe Additively Homomorphic Encryption</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Regulating ICOs will cause more harm]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/regulating-icos-will-cause-more-harm-a8913dd0c6a6?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a8913dd0c6a6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[erc20]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 05:17:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-09T01:40:17.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In point form.</p><ol><li>Regulated ICOs are only open to identified, sophisticated investors (SIs)</li><li>Unsophisticated and/or anonymous investors (UAIs) must wait until the token becomes freely tradeable to participate</li><li>The performance of the presale and the resulting media cycle increases perceived investment viability for UAIs, fuelling demand for post-ICO participation</li><li>SIs flock to the ICO looking to cash in on resale in the secondary market created by #3</li><li>#3 &amp; #4 are a speculative feedback loop with the potential to <em>increase </em>the net investment dollars contributed by UAIs, further inflate the market cap and <strong>ultimately result in more net investor losses</strong></li></ol><p>A lifetime “SI only” restriction sounds like a good idea except that:</p><ol><li>It would have an order of magnitude impact on ICO revenue as it removes the primary incentive for SI participation</li><li>It creates demand for an <em>indirect </em>secondary market that results in even less protections for UAIs because they won’t have control over their tokens</li></ol><p>Rather than create barriers that only serve as a moat for sophisticated investors, regulators seeking to make ICOs a safe, viable funding/investment model should be looking to addressing the underlying issue: <strong>investor education</strong>.</p><p>Solutions to this problem could include investment ratings services, risk management guides and better support for managed funds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8913dd0c6a6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/regulating-icos-will-cause-more-harm-a8913dd0c6a6">Regulating ICOs will cause more harm</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Attack Vectors in P2P Reputation Systems]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/attack-vectors-in-p2p-reputation-systems-edbfef7286a4?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/edbfef7286a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trust]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 31 Aug 2017 18:31:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-09T01:40:08.725Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>TL;DR</h3><p><strong>P2P reptuation systems:</strong></p><ul><li>Are slow to propagate awareness of bad actors</li><li>Leak a lot of private information that works against individuals and against the network</li><li>Being open source make attack evolution 10x faster</li><li>Place high reputation in the hands of fallible individuals (same goes for any social network, but so much worse when the network is being leveraged to detect phishing/scam sites)</li><li>Can’t distinguish which side is truthful whenever a balance of scores exist for a given actor (both good and bad)</li></ul><h3>1. Slow Propagation Attack</h3><p>P2P reputation systems, like any social networks, form “local clusters”. Information concerning bad actors propagates quickly between nodes in a local cluster due to the high number of node-node connections, but is slow to jump between clusters and the time to propagate across the whole network is unbounded.</p><p>In this attack, once awareness of a bad actor has penetrated a given local cluster to the point that the whole cluster is effectively insulated, the attacker jumps ahead of the “propagation front” and targets a different cluster with no direct connections to the original cluster. This extends the effective lifetime of the bad actor.</p><h3>2. Harvesting Infiltrator Attack</h3><p>A P2P network relies on broadcasting reputations to a semi-trusted local cluster.</p><p>In this attack, a passive spy infiltrates a local cluster and listens/queries the reputation of other nodes, harvesting data about the activity and interests of nodes on the network. This data can be sold to advertisers.</p><h3>3. Targeting Infiltrator Attack</h3><p>All reputation networks leverage the ability of a few “discerning” individuals to identity bad actors and thus protect the rest of the network.</p><p>In this attack, a passive spy infiltrates a local cluster and listens/queries the reputation of other nodes, collecting data about which nodes are most likely to detect a phishing domain (based on their activity and blacklists). This allows the attacker to sidestep “discerning” individuals and avoid detection for a longer period of time.</p><h3>4. Simulation Attack</h3><p>Many P2P reputation networks, especially decentralized networks, are open source.</p><p>In this attack, a developer creates a an entire network of nodes on their local machine, testing and evaluating the effectiveness of various strategies with incredibly short iteration time.</p><p>The attacker also uses the open source rule system to make informed design choices, rather than relying on educated guesswork.</p><p>The attacker can take this approach further, and unit test their strategy, allowing the developer to quickly respond to any protocol changes.</p><h3>5. Positive Reputation Attack</h3><p>Once reputation is gained in a P2P reputation network, that reputation can be leveraged to influence others and gain access to various services/resources. Given that this reputation is visible to a passive spy (see above), this places a target on the back of high-reputation individuals.</p><p>In this attack, a high-reputation identity is either purchased or stolen, and used to influence a local cluster. This may include promoting a phishing or scam site, or an app/site/service with embedded spyware/malware.</p><p>Any P2P reputation network that weights ratings by the reputation of the rater compounds this attack: it may take time before sufficent “true” ratings have accumulated to cancel out the positive rating and protect the local cluster.</p><h3>6. Negative Reputation Attack</h3><p>A P2P network that attempts to protect against positive reputation attacks may look to place more emphasis on negative ratings — however this opens the door to a different kind of attack.</p><p>In this attack, an incumbent for a given service establishes presence in a number of target local clusters and issues bad ratings against a newly launched competitor in an attempt to prevent them from doing business.</p><p>Because “length of reputation” cannot be relied on for new services, this attack is 100% indistinguishable from a positive reputation attack.</p><p>Any attempt to tweak the rules of the game will be quickly overcome by a simulation attack.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=edbfef7286a4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/attack-vectors-in-p2p-reputation-systems-edbfef7286a4">Attack Vectors in P2P Reputation Systems</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[High-Privacy Verifiable Claims]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/high-privacy-verifiable-claims-4e556af28fe2?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e556af28fe2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[verifiable-claims]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2017 20:59:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-09T01:41:21.523Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This article proposes a <strong>variation of </strong><a href="https://www.w3.org/2017/05/vc-data-model/CGFR/2017-05-01/"><strong>Verifiable Claims</strong></a><strong> </strong>that permits a greater range of privacy configurations.</p><p>This variation aims to acheive the following goals:</p><ol><li>Make disclosure of claims attributes (including attribute metadata) opt-in</li><li>Allow claims to be verified and bundled as dependencies while still preserving #1</li><li>Allow the revocation status of claims to be checked anonymously while still preserving #1</li><li>Make claims non-correlating by default</li></ol><p><em>This article is in a DRAFT state and may be updated at any time.</em></p><p><em>Feedback welcome.</em></p><h3>Scope / Core Concepts</h3><p>This identity schema is concerned only with the schematic elements common to all identity systems (illustration by <a href="https://medium.com/u/a5801cba1968">Tim Bouma</a> — read “Recipient” as “Holder”):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*5gGzbz7tMp3aLff0XGSfaQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/trbouma/status/889919145898364928">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>This schema defines an ecosystem where <a href="http://matthewschutte.com/2016/10/25/schuttes-critique-of-the-self-sovereign-identity-principles/"><strong>claims are all that exist</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><p>And this is the world we actually live in: passports, driver’s licenses, birth certificates, SSL certificates are all <em>claims — </em>and a person’s “identity” is the set of claims they choose to reveal in a specific interaction.</p><p>In the scope of this schema, there are no means by which an issuer, holder or verifier is identified other than with claims.</p><h3>Authentication</h3><p>Presentation of a claim is not sufficient to verify identity: the presenter must also prove that that they are the same party that the claim was issued to.</p><p>This can be achieved in a private, non-correlating way by following the example of SSL:</p><ul><li>Claims holder generates a single-use signing keypair and provides the public key in their claims request (strictly one claim per key)</li><li>Claims issuer generates a claim with the public key in place of a subject identifier</li><li>Claims holder can verify ownership of their claims by signing challenges issued by the claims verifier</li></ul><p>This authentication method does not require any kind of registry or other centralized service that could be subject to a denial of service attack or hacked to retrieve metadata.</p><p>The “subject” of a claim is one of the biggest risks to privacy via correlation — and by replacing it with a unique public key this can be eliminated (however this doesn’t prevent the contents of two claims from being correlatable).</p><h3>Revocation</h3><p>The ability to revoke fake, hacked, spam and lost identities/claims is critical to the success of an identity ecosystem (with success being defined as the extent to which identities in a given ecosystem are trusted by participants).</p><p>Logically, the issuer needs a mechanism by which it can inform the network that a given claim has been revoked. A verifier could issue a request to the issuer at the time of verification (e.g. OCSP) — however this is not desirable from a privacy perspective, as it reveals the verifier/holder relationship to the issuer.</p><p>Unless complex cryptography is used (“Private Set Memebership”), the verifier needs to obtain their own copy of an issuer’s revocation list in order to protect the privacy of their queries.</p><p>As each claim is uniquely identified by its public key, <strong>the entry for a claim in a revocation list should be a hash of the public key</strong>, with no other details used to generate the hash (so that knowledge of the claim contents is not required to check revocation).</p><p>This makes the revocation list sufficiently privacy-preserving that it may be distributed by any means.</p><p>Bloom filters or other space-efficient data structures supporting probablistic or deterministic set membership queries (such as cryptographic accumulators) may be used to reduce the compute or network cost of performing revocation checks.</p><p>However the revocation list is structured or distributed, revocations must be authenticated (e.g. signed) by the issuer, either individually or as a list.</p><h3>Dependent Claims</h3><p>Claims dependencies are an important optimisation — they provide an efficient mechanism by which a claims issuer can signal the conditions under which they would automatically revoke their claim.</p><p>By specifying a claim dependency, the claims issuer is asserting that <em>“claim X is issued on the basis of prerequisite claim Y being valid, and in the event that prerequisite claim Y is revoked or expired, claim X must be considered invalid”</em>.</p><p>As such, there is never any need for a claims verifier to know the <em>contents </em>of a prerequisite claim, only the revocation status and validity/expiry. This does not prevent the verifier from <em>requiring </em>that the claims holder provides the full contents of a given prerequisite claim — but this is specifically opt-in.</p><p>If a claim is to be issued on the basis of owning another claim or set of claims, then the issuers, public keys and validity periods of those claims — and any claims they in turn depend on — must be included as dependencies. A claim must provide the full dependency graph, and that dependency graph must be fully authenticated by the original issuers (so that issuers of dependent claims are not trusted to correctly transfer dependencies).</p><p>Claims dependencies, however, introduce scope for correlation: where multiple sibling claims are dependent on a single claim, it is recommended that the original claim is reissued with a new public key (before or after the fact) to prevent correlation via common dependencies.</p><h3>Logical Schema</h3><p>The following logical schema attempts to implement all of the above concepts.</p><p>The phrase “subject” has been removed and replaced with “public key” to ensure the intent of the schema is clear.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/681/1*Pc7xfT2rBTuvOCsSne-NxA.png" /></figure><h4>Claim</h4><ul><li><strong>Issuer: </strong>Claim about the issuer’s capabilities/permissions (may be self-certifying)</li><li><strong>Public Key: </strong>globally unique, single-claim public key used to authenticate the claim holder</li><li><strong>Dependencies:</strong> nested array of (Dependency)</li><li><strong>Valid From:</strong> the date/time from which the claim is considered to be valid</li><li><strong>Valid To: </strong>the date/time upon which the claim is considered to be expired</li><li><strong>Attributes:</strong> nested array of (Attribute)</li><li><strong>Signature</strong>: digital signature of (public key, dependencies, valid from, valid to, attribute hashes) using the private key of the issuer’s claim</li></ul><h4>Dependency</h4><p>A Dependency is simply a “view” of a Claim with only the hash of each attribute (not even the name of the attribute is revealed).</p><h4>Attribute</h4><ul><li><strong>Name: </strong>The name of the attribute</li><li><strong>Value: </strong>The value assigned to the attribute</li><li><strong>Nonce: </strong>A random cryptographic nonce to prevent brute forcing of name/value</li><li><strong>Hash: </strong>A hash of (name, value, nonce)</li></ul><h4><strong>Attribute Hash</strong></h4><ul><li><strong>Hash: </strong>A hash of (name, value, nonce)</li></ul><h4>Revocation</h4><ul><li><strong>Public Key Hash: </strong>hash of (claim public key)</li><li><strong>Timestamp: </strong>the time that the revocation was effected</li></ul><h4>Revocation List</h4><ul><li><strong>Revocations: </strong>array of (Revocation)</li><li><strong>Signature: </strong>digital signature of (revocations) using the private key of the issuer’s claim</li></ul><p>As the revocations reveal nothing about the claims they represent (not even the public keys), the Revocation List is considered public.</p><h3>Privacy</h3><p>Here’s how this identity system stacks up against the <a href="https://blog.tokenize.io/defining-identity-privacy-a38f53d42397">eight definitions of claims-based identity privacy</a>:</p><ol><li><strong>Data privacy: </strong>The contents of a claim MUST NOT be visible except to those strictly requiring this information <strong>[Depends on 4, 5 and 7]</strong></li><li><strong>Ownership privacy: </strong>The exact number and nature of all claims owned by a claims holder MUST NOT be visible to any party except the claims holder <strong>[CHECK]</strong></li><li><strong>Interaction privacy: </strong>The interactions and relationships between claims holders and claims verifiers MUST NOT be visible by default to any third party (this includes revocation checks) <strong>[CHECK]</strong></li><li><strong>Revocation privacy: </strong>Revocation notices MUST NOT reveal the contents or subject of the claims they revoke <strong>[CHECK]</strong></li><li><strong>Revocation data privacy: </strong>Revocation notices MUST NOT require knowledge of the contents of a claim in order to check its revocation status <strong>[CHECK]</strong></li><li><strong>Correlation privacy: </strong>Two claims issued to a single claims holder MUST be indistinguishable from two claims issued to two different claims holders (unless the content of the claims is specifically related) <strong>[CHECK]</strong></li><li><strong>Claims dependency privacy: </strong>A claim issued on the basis of owning another prerequisite claim MUST be verifiable without revealing the contents of the prerequisite claim (full verification is opt-in) <strong>[CHECK]</strong></li><li><strong>Claims dependency correlation privacy</strong>: Two claims that share a common dependency MUST be indistinguishable from two claims that share no common dependency (unless the content of the claims is specifically related) <strong>[CHECK*]</strong></li></ol><p><em>*Requires the use of claims duplication (see above), unless there is a clever cryptographic solution to this problem.</em></p><p>As this schema does not inherently violate any of the eight definitions of privacy, use of this schema supports (but does not guarantee) the privacy of an identity system.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>By stripping identity back to the bare essentials — claims — it is possible to realise a schema for expressing core identity concepts that’s private by default but otherwise unopinionated, offering maximum interoperability and flexibility to implementers.</p><p>This schema is also unopinonated about trust — as claims can be issued and chained in any way, this scheme supports certificate authority, web of trust, reputation and hybrid systems*.</p><ul><li><em>Inclusion of a trust system in this list is not to be taken as an endorsement.</em></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e556af28fe2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/high-privacy-verifiable-claims-4e556af28fe2">High-Privacy Verifiable Claims</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Defining Identity Privacy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/defining-identity-privacy-a38f53d42397?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a38f53d42397</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Aug 2017 21:32:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-20T21:32:09.638Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Privacy in the context of a <strong>claims-based identity system or standard</strong> has multiple definitions, each of which can be expressed as a requirement:</p><ol><li><strong>Data privacy: </strong>The contents of a claim MUST NOT be visible except to those strictly requiring this information</li><li><strong>Ownership privacy: </strong>The exact number and nature of all claims owned by a claims holder MUST NOT be visible to any party except the claims holder</li><li><strong>Interaction privacy: </strong>The interactions and relationships between claims holders and claims verifiers MUST NOT be visible by default to any third party (this includes revocation checks)</li><li><strong>Revocation privacy: </strong>Revocation notices MUST NOT reveal the contents or subject of the claims they revoke</li><li><strong>Revocation data privacy: </strong>Revocation notices MUST NOT require knowledge of the contents of a claim in order to check its revocation status</li><li><strong>Correlation privacy: </strong>Two claims issued to a single claims holder MUST be indistinguishable from two claims issued to two different claims holders (unless the content of the claims is specifically related)</li><li><strong>Claims dependency privacy: </strong>A claim issued on the basis of owning another prerequisite claim MUST be verifiable without revealing the contents of the prerequisite claim (full verification is opt-in)</li><li><strong>Claims dependency correlation privacy</strong>: Two claims that share a common dependency MUST be indistinguishable from two claims that share no common dependency (unless the content of the claims is specifically related)</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a38f53d42397" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/defining-identity-privacy-a38f53d42397">Defining Identity Privacy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Taking Web of Trust to the mass market]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/taking-web-of-trust-to-the-mass-market-3a6ffaeeb258?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a6ffaeeb258</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Jul 2017 18:41:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-01T16:38:14.726Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A pure web of trust implementation will fail in a mass market setting because establishing a trustworthy identity requires <em>effort</em>, and an identity that is effortless to establish is a magnet for fraud.</p><h3>The PGP Web of Trust</h3><p>PGP is no different in this regard: it works because of the effort invested by network participants.</p><p><strong>The community represented by the PGP web of trust does not even remotely resemble the general population.</strong></p><p>PGP usability imposes a very high barrier to entry and the typical PGP user will expend greater than average effort in verifying new identities and maintaining their existing contact list — and thus the network as a whole is able to sustain a reasonable level of safety for its users.</p><p>On the other hand, if the average participant in a network <em>doesn’t want to expend any effort</em> and blindly accepts identities based on the signals of others, then that acceptance cannot and must not be assigned any value or used as a signal of trust.</p><p>The current SSL ecosystem of trusted certificate authorities does NOT assign any value to user acceptance of SSL certificates — so the competence or incompetence of one end user does not affect the decisions other users make. The effort of establishing identities is invested entirely by certificate authorities and intermediates.</p><h3>Herd Immunity</h3><p>Any system that DOES assign value to user acceptance of identities — web of trust or other reputation systems — will not be able to sustain a reasonable level of safety for its participants in a mass market setting because the network lacks the critical mass of “conscious verifiers” required to stop fraudulent identities spreading with viral speed.</p><p>Unconscious verifiers in a web of trust increase the risk that conscious verifiers will be affected — automatic acceptance of the fraudulent identity is “transmitted” along trust lines.</p><p>And just like <a href="http://theconversation.com/herd-immunity-and-measles-why-we-should-aim-for-100-vaccination-coverage-36868">herd immunity</a>, even a small drop in the ratio of conscious verifiers will lead to an outsized reduction in the safety of the network.</p><p><strong>The speed at which a fraudulent identity propagates through a web of trust increases superlinearly with the ratio of “unconscious verifiers”.</strong></p><p>And as internet literacy is not equally distributed due to socio-economic factors, unconscious verifiers are likely to form highly vulnerable clusters.</p><h3>A safe Web of Trust is an exclusive one</h3><p>Identity network implementers looking to fix the inherent issues of certificate authorities should be very selective about who participates in a web of trust— and it is probably <em>not</em> the whole network.</p><p><a href="https://andrewgdotcom.wordpress.com/2014/11/13/wot-ca/">It has been proposed before</a> that a web of trust could be used to authenticate a small set of highly competent certificate authorities which subsequently provide traditional chain-based authentication for wider network participants.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a6ffaeeb258" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/taking-web-of-trust-to-the-mass-market-3a6ffaeeb258">Taking Web of Trust to the mass market</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Verifiable Claims spec does not champion privacy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/verifiable-claims-spec-does-not-champion-privacy-18d5e29276d5?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/18d5e29276d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[w3c]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jul 2017 20:15:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-18T06:49:57.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The current <a href="http://w3c.github.io/webpayments-ig/VCTF/architecture/detailed/">draft architecture for Verifiable Claims</a> describes a single point of privacy failure: the <em>identifier registry</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*GyJqNjF6csaqLTiaOn_CFA.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://w3c.github.io/webpayments-ig/VCTF/architecture/detailed/">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>Here is a set of cascading requirements, assuming the registry is some kind of “server”:</p><ul><li>The registry MUST be resilient to denial of service attacks</li><li>The registry MUST be able to discriminate between high-volume inspectors (e.g. Walmart, government agencies) and DDoS attackers</li><li>Therefore, the registry MUST authenticate inspectors</li></ul><p>And this gives the <strong>registry access to all of the metadata concerning who an identity holder is interacting with.</strong> While this is perfect in a government or corporate environment where every interaction will be logged regardless, it is not good for privacy.</p><p>Unless of course, the registry is a <em>blockchain, </em>and each inspector is running their own node. There is some very specific jargon that indicates that this may be the not-so-opaque intention of the architecture:</p><p>“<em>The registry MUST manage identifiers in a </em><strong><em>self-sovereign</em></strong><em> way</em>”</p><p>However this is speculation.</p><p>What isn’t speculation is that <strong>this architecture cannot possibly support interaction privacy unless the identity registry is a decentralized name service or some other flavour of blockchain.</strong></p><p>The <a href="https://www.w3.org/2017/vc/charter.html">working group charter</a> states:</p><p><em>“The Working Group will not…attempt to lead the creation of a specific style of supporting infrastructure”</em></p><p>But that’s exactly what’s happening: the registry is a required component, and if you want interaction privacy, the registry has to be a blockchain.</p><p>And this comes with potentially fatal drawbacks: decentralized name services critically lack the ability to block or revoke fake, hacked, spam and lost identities in the same way that SSL/DNSSEC/Estonia e-residency do. And because the blockchain is public, any implementation flaw (which is probable considering the high complexity) will permanently break privacy for all users <em>[Edit: this statement is somewhat hyperbolic, however: 1) privacy in a public database has one chance at success 2) blockchain is highly complex 3) this complexity makes failure more likely]</em></p><p>If the architecture was agnostic about the issuance and verification of authenticating subject identifiers, then you could have privacy without a blockchain.</p><p>The <a href="http://w3c.github.io/webpayments-ig/VCTF/charter/faq.html">FAQ</a> states in the answer to Q7:</p><p><em>“The proposed data model and syntaxes are designed to be storage system and transaction protocol agnostic”</em></p><p>But it’s not transaction protocol agnostic. The use of a registry implies a specific transaction protocol that is either technology specific or privacy violating.</p><p>Buried in the details, the <a href="https://w3c.github.io/vc-data-model/#privacy-considerations">data model</a> recommends the use of short-lived or single-use bearer tokens (e.g. a public-key signed JWT) for high-privacy applications. These bearer tokens would not require a central registry, although this is not stated.</p><p>Another alternative is to simply use per-claim public/private keypairs, which are self-sovereign, self-authenticating and stateless (no central store required). Upon presenting a claim, the claim holder can sign a challenge issued by the claim inspector to verify ownership (rather than just possession) of the claim.</p><p>But why isn’t a high privacy option — e.g. bearer tokens, public keys — the default configuration?</p><p>Why does the front-and-centre diagram include an identity registry, that is either technology specific or privacy violating?</p><p>Why does it state, nowhere, that the registry is optional?</p><p>Why does it seem like the spec places the needs of specific stakeholder groups above the absolute need for privacy? <em>[Edit: this statement refers to placement of particular configurations within the spec — it takes digging to figure out if this spec even supports high-privacy applications]</em></p><p><strong>Recommendations for the working group:</strong></p><ul><li>The “brochure” version of the spec is the most important — and should place zero-registry, high-privacy options first and foremost to encourage privacy-first adoption</li><li>The high-level architecture draft and interaction diagrams use singular language when referring to identifiers, indicating that a claims holder has only one identifier — this should be pluralized and indicate multiple identifiers by default to encourage privacy-first adoption</li><li>Fix the link on your <a href="http://w3c.github.io/webpayments-ig/VCTF/">proposal</a> to point to the current home of the <a href="https://www.w3.org/2017/05/vc-data-model/CGFR/2017-05-01/">data model</a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=18d5e29276d5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/verifiable-claims-spec-does-not-champion-privacy-18d5e29276d5">Verifiable Claims spec does not champion privacy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Could a human-readable identifier have saved CoinDash’s ICO?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tokenize-io/could-a-human-readable-identifier-have-saved-coindashs-ico-c64f739de9cc?source=rss-286439b7551f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c64f739de9cc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[coindash]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tristan Hoy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jul 2017 17:46:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-25T21:49:47.695Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just as CoinDash’s ICO started, a <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-ico-website-hacked-over-7-million-stolen-redirected">hacker replaced the address</a> on CoinDash’s website with one they controlled, siphoning off millions of dollars worth of cryptocurrency.</p><p>There are many things that would have prevented this — for example publishing the contract well in advance, or simply having better security.</p><p>But what if CoinDash used a decentralized name service to provide a human-readable alias for their address?</p><p>Would this resolve the indistinguishability of two public key addresses?</p><p><strong>No, it wouldn’t.</strong></p><p>The hacker could simply register a <em>very similar</em> alias and pull the same stunt.</p><p>Each human-readable alias has a much lower number of potentially indistinguishable names than a public key, but the attacker only needs <em>one.</em></p><p>And arguably, the alias <em>increases</em> the likelihood of success because generating even a remotely similar<em> </em>public key is difficult, and the alias may give users a false sense of trust.</p><p>It’s even worse in a decentralized name service: if that fraudulent alias somehow made its way into <em>software</em>, there is no way to forcibly revoke the alias and so the system will continue to be vulnerable until potentially <em>millions</em> of users update.</p><p><strong>The same problem extends to personal identity</strong> — an alias for a person’s public key provides a level of convenience (it can be memorized), but does little to protect against user misidentification.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/261/1*vElpexZLiTDiKF96NwsLCw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenize.io/">TOKENIZE.IO</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c64f739de9cc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io/could-a-human-readable-identifier-have-saved-coindashs-ico-c64f739de9cc">Could a human-readable identifier have saved CoinDash’s ICO?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tokenize-io">TOKENIZE.IO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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