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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Trussy Wallet on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Trussy Wallet on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@trussywallet?source=rss-3c20aa07432b------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Trussy Wallet on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@trussywallet?source=rss-3c20aa07432b------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Closer look on our prototype]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@trussywallet/closer-look-on-our-prototype-9f86d21af556?source=rss-3c20aa07432b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9f86d21af556</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hardware-wallet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Trussy Wallet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 27 Apr 2019 14:25:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-27T14:25:18.797Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Closer look at our prototype</h3><p>We have started the development of a trustless, secure and easy to use hardware wallet to overcome the current limitations in both safety and user-experience. If you’ve missed it, read more about our idea in previous articles:<br><em>Hardware wallet issues in general — </em><a href="http://bit.ly/hardware-wallet-trilemma"><em>http://bit.ly/hardware-wallet-trilemma</em></a><em><br>Our solution — </em><a href="http://bit.ly/interactive-cold-wallet"><em>http://bit.ly/interactive-cold-wallet</em></a><em><br>TrussyWallet in common attack scenarios — </em><a href="http://bit.ly/2IV0NR0"><em>http://bit.ly/2IV0NR0</em></a></p><h4>The journey is just about to start as our first prototype arrived form the manufacturer.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*5SW2I5geoFapbUUJs8CNqw.jpeg" /><figcaption>TrussyWallet #1 Prototype</figcaption></figure><p>We wanted to create a device, which is capable of seamless user interactions, with QR code communication. As cryptographic operations can have devastating hardware requirements it was a must to find a suitable ‘brain’, which is capable of solving the issues we face, all while remaining simple enough to be validated with a trustless attestation methodology.</p><p>Our decision was to build around the STM32F7 core, which has hardware accelerated cryptographic functions for the most common operations. Also it features a rich development community, which gives the possibility to maintain software development in a free and open-source way.</p><p>It has a 5MP OmniVision camera and a 4 inch touch screen as input/output capabilities, which is more than enough to handle transaction data and user inputs with ease.</p><p>We built in a 1450mAh battery to avoid any inconvenience about charging issues. Battery life will be promising, however tests are required to make it as good as possible.</p><h4>We have a lot ahead to make TrussyWallet a reality. Our focus will be on development of both the software and the manufacturing process of the single molded epoxi protection. Hope you like our solution!</h4><p>Stay tuned to be up-to-date about our efforts. Do you agree with our concept? Give it a clap or two!!!</p><p>Or do you have any ideas? Any toughs to add? Feel free to leave a comment or contact us at any of the following links:<br><a href="https://trussywallet.com/">Website</a> — <a href="https://t.me/trussywallet">Telegram</a> — <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?via=TrussyWallet">Twitter</a> — <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Trussywallet/">Reddit</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f86d21af556" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hardware wallet attacks and defenses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@trussywallet/hardware-wallet-attacks-and-defenses-609c0d1babfc?source=rss-3c20aa07432b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/609c0d1babfc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hardware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Trussy Wallet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2019 11:39:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-13T11:39:16.902Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We first introduced our unravel of the <a href="http://bit.ly/hardware-wallet-trilemma"><strong><em>Hardware Wallet Trilemma</em></strong></a>, which lead to an <a href="http://bit.ly/interactive-cold-wallet"><strong><em>Interactive Cold Wallet</em></strong></a>: trustless and simple to use to ensure top-notch security. Let’s move on with the common attacks against hardware wallets, and check what <strong><em>TRUSSY</em></strong> accomplishes to fit into the crypto economy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/1*cMJaN372-KPL6fEICdGNTA.png" /></figure><p>Note:<strong> If your wallet is connected online you are exposed to a constant threat</strong>. If your computer gets compromised, an attacker would have direct access to the USB connected hardware wallet. Trussy is an interactive cold wallet, communicating only via QR codes, therefore we go through the issues regarding physical access to the device.</p><h4>Supply Chain Attack</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/1*nY9Vao7broqMX9OoptKs3Q.png" /></figure><p>First issue regarding hardware wallets is your source of the product. <strong>How do you validate that nobody tinkered your device</strong> from manufacturing up until the point when you received it from the mailman (or FedEx, DHL, etc… of your choice) ?</p><h4>There are two mainstream solutions for this issue: Secure chip validation and stickers on the device.</h4><p>Neither of those methods grant you 100% certainty that you own an authentic piece of hardware.</p><p>In principle while using a secure chip only the manufacturer knows exactly what the secure enclave processor does. During validation it calculates a specific hash combined with a cryptographic challenge to make sure the memory content is as intended. While this approach may seem secure, it creates a closed black-box solution, where <strong>you do not have the ability to validate what your possession does</strong>. A trustless design is a must when we are about to create a suitable device for the crypto economy.</p><p>Using a sticker on an open-source solution (like Trezor does) can be a solution to validate that your device has not been touched since manufacturing. As it happens those stickers are usually, if not always, easy to remove. In some cases it is just as simple as using a hairdryer.</p><p>TRUSSY, on the other hand, uses a sticker which is molded inside the epoxy resin onto the USB plug. This method allows us to use an open-source Trezor based attestation with a state of the art tamper evident sticker solution. <strong>Any attempt to tinker your device during a supply chain attack is visually recognizable.</strong></p><h4>Evil Maid Attack</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/1*6pHtt0TqsA7Vk3t5gT9Txg.png" /></figure><p><em>Evil Maid</em> refers to the situations when an unauthorized person has access to your device while you are away. It can be anyone who is capable of putting hands on your wallet. From untrusted people to airport security, your device should be safe without any special actions. The difference between supply chain attacks is that the malicious party has fewer possibilities, no unlimited equipment and time. Easiest methods include putting bugs on the device or swapping it to an identical looking one.</p><p>There are several actions you can take to identify your device from signatures to remembering the specific angle and position on how you left your device. Wallets usually have an enclosing which can be removed and re-attached, while tinkering with the components inside. <strong>TRUSSY’s epoxy resin makes it simple to check your device for penetration attempts before trusting it with your secrets.</strong></p><p>As visual inspection is a must before using a security device, you may still be suspicious (as you should always be). We suggest diversifying your funds between different keys as well. Generation can also be handled by yourself to gain maximum control of your assets. <strong>TRUSSY can be used to calculate your signed transactions without storing your secrets at all.</strong></p><h4>Wrench Attack</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/1*fUTuvMQLNHfkC8bS3k-SXA.png" /></figure><p>It is hopefully a rare situation when an attacker physically forces you to hand over all of your secrets, however a secure device should have the ability to protect you even when such a scenario occurs.</p><p>In most cases it is more of a hidden feature than a main functionality to use your BIP-39 passphrase. While it is advised to use it in every day asset handling as well, it can be your best defense against people wanting to harm you. <strong>Using your mnemonic and a false passphrase you can mislead an attacker to think you have given access to your savings, while your secrets remain safe in your hands. </strong>This plausible deniability feature has been underrated in current solutions, while it is a common practice to use secret alarming codes in house security.</p><p>All stored data are AES encrypted, so even having lost your device your mnemonics are safe. Furthermore, to ensure immediate actions, <strong>TRUSSY enables you to use a false pin to erase the encrypted data from your device in case of an emergency.</strong></p><p>All of the introduced attack types include a variety of methods, which malicious parties try in order to steal your secrets. We strongly suggest you to get information on different attacks and keep your knowledge up-to-date.</p><h4>No matter how sophisticated solutions a device may offer, without proper background, you could be the most vulnerable piece!</h4><p>Stay tuned for our next article to get a closer look at the device! Do you agree with our concept? Give it a clap or two!!!</p><p>Or do you have any ideas? Any toughs to add? Feel free to contact us at any of the following links:<br><a href="https://trussywallet.com/">Website</a> — <a href="https://t.me/trussywallet">Telegram</a> — <a href="https://twitter.com/TrussyWallet">Twitter</a> — <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Trussywallet/">Reddit</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=609c0d1babfc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Interactive cold wallet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@trussywallet/interactive-cold-wallet-12bb88e06d62?source=rss-3c20aa07432b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/12bb88e06d62</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hardware-wallet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Trussy Wallet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jan 2019 14:55:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-18T15:27:07.529Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In our previous article, we discussed the hardware wallet trilemma, which needs to be solved in order to create a truly suitable device for the crypto economy. (Check out, if you missed: <a href="http://bit.ly/hardware-wallet-trilemma">http://bit.ly/hardware-wallet-trilemma</a>)</p><h4>Let’s go step-by-step through the issues and proceed with a design, which fulfills our needs. We aim to introduce the aspects of an interactive cold wallet named <em>TRUSSY</em>, which communicates over QR codes and features a touch screen as a user interface.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RXW4Nrr2wP118g2LSDyZKg.png" /><figcaption>TrussyWallet</figcaption></figure><p>For a <em>TRUSTLESS</em> device to operate we shall not be obliged to have faith in the numerous participants who are usually involved in the process: e.g. vendor, manufacturer, retailers.</p><p>Open-source software is a must to avoid trust in the vendor. While a community supervised code can reveal vulnerabilities faster, we have to make sure that our device is running that code as well. This process is called attestation, where we must be able to validate the hardware components and the program by ourselves.</p><p><strong>TRUSSY solves this issue using the existing bootloader of the Trezor device. Their attestation concept has been validated over a long time and they were kind to publish it for the greater good. Using that solution without a constant USB connection enables us to create a more secured device.</strong></p><p>The basic rule of attestation is that you have to make sure of the hardware first, hence a device with greater magnitude of performance can simulate the actions of the hardware, which we aim to validate.</p><p><strong><em>TRUSSY</em>’s hardware is encapsulated in a single molded transparent epoxy resin, which protects the device from tampering, while giving you the ability to check the hardware equipment of the device.</strong></p><p>As of today, anti-tempering mechanisms like tamper evident stickers are placed on the packaging of the device, rather than inside the device itself.</p><p>TRUSSY’s USB port is protected with a temper evident sticker below the epoxy layer, which makes you see if any intrusion has been made during the manufacturing and the shipment process. Once you receive your device you will be the first to damage the USB protecting sticker while accessing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XA7mDh9aaDgxyqoztJWHqg.png" /><figcaption>Temper-proof sticker inside the epoxy resin</figcaption></figure><p>The main goal of any hardware wallet is to ensure security of the private keys, which grant access to all of our funds. Hence a suitable device must protect against the known hacking techniques and have to be designed in a way to decrease the possible attack vectors.</p><p>An air-gapped device is by far the best solution in order to avoid all hacks without physical access, as any open interface just creates a possible gate for a malicious party.</p><p><strong><em>TRUSSY</em> communicates via QR codes, leaving you with the possibility to validate every communication. This creates an air-gapped cold wallet, which never directly connects to the internet.</strong></p><p>Although this solves the remote attack vectors, physical access can still cause harm. For these scenarios, numerous actions have been taken, such as software attestation against “evil-maid” attacks, or better user interface for address validation attacks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vifeTgcykMrEm5AHFhFqcA.png" /><figcaption>QR based communication</figcaption></figure><p>Any device should be easy to use. In the domain of blockchain technology, this issue happens to be one of the central obstacles of mainstream adoption.</p><p>TRUSSY aims to provide top user experience with its smart-phone like touch screen, which is able to provide additional information on every action, and let users interact with their secure wallet as they used to do with every smart device. While the input of a mnemonic on a device with 2–3 input buttons can last for 5 mins, with a touch screen this time can be reduced to 1 min only.</p><p>These extended user input abilities allow you to never save your mnemonic. The device will sign, then erase the data, in order to ensure top notch security.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/257/1*0c0HIKYvoTktDlZUEs2maA.png" /><figcaption>Entering mnemonic phrase, with the suggestion engine</figcaption></figure><h4>As we can see, there exists a solution, which can be developed in one trustless, secure and easy to use device. Our main goal is to create an interactive cold wallet, which can be used to store crypto assets in a secure manner, without the need for a trusted third-party.</h4><p>Stay tuned for our next article introducing the several attack vectors and the journey of our device. Do you agree with our concept? Give it a clap or two!!!</p><p>Or do you have any ideas? Any toughs to add? Feel free to leave a comment or contact us at any of the following links:<br><a href="https://trussywallet.com/">Website</a> — <a href="https://t.me/trussywallet">Telegram</a> — <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?via=TrussyWallet">Twitter</a> — <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Trussywallet/">Reddit</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=12bb88e06d62" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hardware wallet trilemma]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@trussywallet/https-medium-com-trussywallet-hardware-wallet-trilemma-fc59a2556942?source=rss-3c20aa07432b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fc59a2556942</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Trussy Wallet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:09:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-24T15:09:56.518Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since the beginning of blockchain, securing private keys has been a critical issue. Hardware wallets aim to protect users against numerous attacks by storing the access keys in a secure hardware module. While this approach enhances security, it can expose the users and can lead to stolen funds in case of a maleficent design.</p><p>Hardware wallets have three common criteria, which they should complete: <strong>Security, Simplicity and Trustless design.</strong></p><p>Trezor released its first hardware wallet back in 2014 since then, loads of new concepts raised from the original idea. As we will see, there exists a <em>trilemma</em> that none of the wallets have managed to overcome: <strong>All existing devices fulfill a maximum 2 out of the 3 needed properties.</strong></p><p>We will discuss the three criteria on the most popular devices and check how they rank in the hardware wallet trilemma.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/277/1*5yEkfcZhWlTtJi4Ybop-LA.png" /><figcaption>Hardware wallet trilemma</figcaption></figure><h4>The goal is to keep the access to our funds and never expose them to any malicious actor, hence the main focus is<strong> SECURITY</strong>.</h4><p>To better address the issue, first we must understand the critical points of the signing process. A wallet generates a private key (preferably a BIP-39 mnemonic phrase), which will give access to “accounts” on the blockchain. The generation itself is key in security. If it is hostile, then the vicious party has nothing else to do, they know (or are able to deduct) your secret phrase and will just wait for you to move enough tokens to your account.</p><p>Since we mainly cover hardware wallets where the private keys are stored in a specific hardware device, let’s first dig deeper into this subject. A straightforward option is to use a custom secure electronic device specifically designed to resolve this issue. <em>Ledger</em> uses two microchips in their design, where one element is dedicated to executing the cryptographic functions and evaluation. It is arguably the best solution to protect private keys, however in this case <strong>you must trust the secure chip manufacturer</strong> that the chip does what it’s supposed to do.</p><p>In the case of the Trezor device, you have an open-source architecture. If you are able to validate that your Trezor is running a specific firmware, then you are good to go, your generation process works as intended. So we found the best solution? Not really. Validating a firmware is called attestation and it is an active research area with a lot of possible attack vectors. To be able to validate with the method Trezor uses, you must keep your code-base compact to avoid any additional attack surface. There have been numerous hacks against the Trezor firmware already, and due to its connection to a computer via USB cable, <strong>an attacker could possibly steal your funds if your PC gets compromised</strong>.</p><p>Next critical issue is the connection itself during the signing process. If your device is connected to the internet (e.g.: mobile wallets), then you expose yourself for every possible attacker there is. If you are connected on cable, then validating the communication requires technological skills, and you just use your device as an additional “firewall” to your keys. Learning from the above a <strong>cold-wallet is a must</strong>, where you keys never touch any device, which has ever been connected to the internet.</p><p>We have mentioned trust in the vendor when we examined a secure chip solution.</p><h4>The main focus of blockchain is decentralization by distributing trust to the participants as a whole. No banks, no central authorities needed. The hardware wallet industry seems to not fully oblige to this philosophy.</h4><p>As it was introduced above, an open-source solution is a must, to give control to the public. However the <strong>device itself will still be manufactured by a third-party</strong> and in order to make sure you have the exact hardware you wanted, at least you should be able to examine the electrical components.</p><p>Trezor seals their devices with a tamper-proof sticker, indicating that nobody touched the device, since the manufacturing process (believe or not). You do not have the ability to check the content they shipped. Ledger does not use such stickers, due to the secure chip validation on the device (a more direct form of trust). <strong>An open-source solution for such a task has to be transparent and auditable, while keeping it hard to penetrate and alter the hardware.</strong></p><h4>All customer electronics have to be easy to use. In the blockchain domain it is extremely true. In order to better enhance mainstream adoption, while keeping token access where it belongs.</h4><p>When talking about Simple, Secure and Trustless qualities you probably realized, how they all tend to impact each other. Ease of use is not an exception either.</p><p>The best option would be a nice interface on your browser, just like Metamask, but storing my life savings in a chrome add-on … not so much. How about using a nice application on my phone? Connected to the internet, not enough security either.</p><p>As Trezor tried to satisfy the open-source auditable solution, it went to a decrease of usability. Typing 24 mnemonic words should be swift and easy, using two input buttons for that is way out for this century (same case for ledger). A larger user interface has a role in validation as well. It has to be resolved in order to check every detail before you send out a transaction.</p><p>Let’s see how a few hardware wallets fit into our triangle:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/479/1*qxkfdeeONQFrXCL8kxBwqQ.png" /><figcaption>Popular hardware wallets on the trilemma</figcaption></figure><p>Regarding these three crucial qualities of hardware wallets, we realized that none of the existing solutions managed to solve this trilemma. This led us to think about a solution, which fulfills all of the three criteria. <strong>A secure, simple and trustless hardware wallet for the crypto community.</strong></p><p>Stay tuned for our next article introducing our concept for solving the hardware wallet trilemma. Do you like this article? Give it a clap or two !!!</p><p>Or do you have any ideas? Any toughs to add? Feel free to leave a comment or contact us at one of the following links:<br><a href="https://trussywallet.com/">Website</a> — <a href="https://t.me/trussywallet">Telegram</a> — <a href="https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?via=TrussyWallet">Twitter</a> —<a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Trussywallet/"> Reddit</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fc59a2556942" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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