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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Twinkle Adhikari on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Oligopoly in the OTT Market in India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@twinkle.adhikari/oligopoly-in-the-ott-market-in-india-9a2c163ebc91?source=rss-302817b29d4b------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Twinkle Adhikari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2023 15:27:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-01T15:27:36.617Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>India’s media and entertainment industry is currently growing at a rate of 13.4% and is estimated to amass a revenue of 33.6 billion US$ by the end of 2021 (Harrison, 2021). Given the massive population of our country, the M&amp;E industry has an immense potential to grow and adapt to the ever-growing demands of consumers. The industry has a lot of subsectors — television, print, filmed entertainment, music, online gaming etc. One of them is digital media entertainment, or simply OTT. Over-the-Top (OTT) services deliver entertainment over the internet without the constraint of television or cable networks (Endavo, 2021). These services are further divided into two — AVOD and SVOD services.</p><p>Advertising Video on Demand (AVOD) services provide entertainment for free to their consumers and make money through advertisements, e.g., YouTube. Subscription Video on Demand (SVOD) services offer entertainment for a subscription charge from their consumers, e.g., Netflix. They are generally called OTT platforms (KPMG, 2019). A PwC report predicts that India will be the world’s fastest-growing OTT market and is poised to grow at a rate of 28.6% in the next four years (Jha, 2020). Therefore, it becomes essential for us to understand the fastest growing subsector of this industry — the OTT market. This report analyzes the market structure of the OTT platforms, specifically the SVOD services, and the interplay between the major players of this market.</p><h4><strong>The Oligopolistic Structure of the OTT Market</strong></h4><p>An oligopoly is a market with imperfect competition where only a few sellers exist and the product sold by the firms is similar or identical to each other. There exists a high concentration ratio, where a few particular firms control most of the market share. These firms are called the market leaders in an oligopoly. Furthermore, an oligopoly’s most unique characteristic is the interdependence between firms. Market players strategically interact with each other and the actions of one firm have a considerable impact on the others (Mankiw, 2016).</p><p>The SVOD market in India is an oligopoly. According to Mankiw (2016), if a market’s top five firms have a concentration ratio of 50%, i.e., if they control half of the market share, then the industry is an oligopoly. A report by Omdia estimates that the concentration ratio of the SVOD market is 85%, with the top 2 players, Disney+ and Eros Now, controlling 65% of the market share (Papavassilopoulos et al., 2021). This suggests that the market has an oligopolistic structure. The OTT platforms also exhibit interdependence between each other, which will be explored later in this report.</p><h4><strong>Major Players in the OTT Market</strong></h4><p>The major players in India’s OTT market by market share are Disney+ (41%), Eros Now (24%), Amazon Prime Video (9%) and Netflix (7%).</p><p><strong>Figure 1</strong></p><p><em>Major Players in the OTT market by market share as of March 2021</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/829/1*vSrrJh2kYLIVVrZoKsbN2Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Note. </em>Author’s Construction.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Disney+</strong></p><p>Star India, one of India’s largest television networks, launched Hotstar in February 2015. Hotstar had a domestic market advantage. Star India started to feature all the content from their channels in the OTT platform — Live Sports, TV Serials etc. and advertised the launch of the service extensively on their channels. They released episodes from TV shows even before they were aired on National Television to attract their cable network consumer base. After Disney bought 21st Century Fox in 2019, Star India also became part of its assets along with Hotstar. Disney refurnished the OTT platform as Disney+, which now included all the media conglomerate’s content — Disney, Marvel, Pixar and Lucas Films’ productions. This further expanded the OTT platform’s target market, and the number of subscribers tripled from 8 million to 25 million by the end of 2020 (Farooqui, 2021).</p><p><strong>Eros Now</strong></p><p>Eros Now was released in 2012 by Eros International, earlier than all the major market players. The main competitive advantage of this platform is that it offers the lowest prices among the four. It has two monthly plans — Plus (49/-) and Premium (99/-). The platform did not gain enough traction during its initial years. However, the company later partnered with firms from different industries, made the payment process easier, provided its consumers with many offers, and focused on their original content. It is currently the most affordable and accessible OTT platform to the general public in India (Shepel, 2019).</p><p><strong>Amazon Prime Video</strong></p><p>Amazon Prime Video was the last to arrive in the Indian market among the four. Launched in December 2016, Prime Video instantly garnered a lot of subscribers, owing to the company’s already existing image of being affordable. The subscription model was not limited just to the OTT platform. Subscribers could access free delivery services, ad-free music and the streaming service for 129/- monthly or 999/- annually. Furthermore, Amazon focused on local diversification and released hit films on their platform. Prime Video’s relatable and enjoyable original content also added to its popularity with the masses.</p><p><strong>Netflix</strong></p><p>Netflix arrived in the Indian market in January 2016. The platform’s existing brand reputation has enormously helped its expansion in India. It gained about 4.2 million subscribers within a year and a half after its launch, especially from metropolitan cities. While the platform is the market leader in the world, it did not assume a leading position in India. The most important reason for that is the pricing for Netflix. It came with three monthly subscription plans — Basic (500/-), Standard (650/-) and Premium (800/-). This was too costly for the Indian audience. The platform announced a mobile subscription plan costing 199/- per month to increase affordability. However, the ‘expensive’ image of the brand still inhibits its growth. Regardless, Netflix’s primary strategy is its product differentiation. Its user interface and diverse original content continue to grip viewers and contribute to its growing market share in the country (Cain, 2017).</p><h4><strong>Interdependence in the OTT Market</strong></h4><p>In an oligopoly, actions between firms are interdependent. Similarly, all the firms in the Indian OTT market are interdependent. The oligopoly in the OTT market leans towards quantity leadership and the Stackelberg model. Since all the firms entered the market at different times, strategic interactions occur in sequential order. We take a few instances to understand the interdependence in detail.</p><p><strong>Quantity Leadership</strong></p><p>Each OTT platform is a Stackelberg leader in its own way, except for Eros Now. Disney+ has an abundance of live sports, animated movies, and superhero productions. Netflix is a powerhouse of international and diverse original content. Amazon Prime Video has a lot of local films. Every other OTT platform is a Stackelberg follower in the respective areas. Eros Now, however, is a price leader. It was one of the earliest OTT platforms. However, the other firms are not price followers. Therefore, the OTT market does not follow price leadership but follows quantity leadership. Each firm has its own reaction function when it comes to following the Stackelberg leader of that respective area. It devises its iso-profit lines and reaction curve to achieve its individual Stackelberg equilibrium.</p><p><strong>Figure 2</strong></p><p><em>Stackelberg equilibrium of quantity followers</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/835/1*CULc-8TTMQ0x_eE6immiiA.png" /><figcaption><em>Note. </em>Derivation of a Reaction Curve. From <em>Intermediate Microeconomics</em>. Copyright by Hal R. Varian.</figcaption></figure><p>As Disney+ is the quantity leader of live sports, we see that Amazon Prime Video and Netflix do not have any content on the same. Similarly, Netflix has a range of international dramas such as K-Dramas and Spanish Dramas, and this content is sparse in Disney+ and Amazon Prime Video. From the Stackelberg reaction curve, we understand that as the quantity of the leader increases, the quantity of the follower decreases, which is seen clearly in the OTT market.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>From the above analysis, the OTT market in India follows an oligopolistic structure with a Stackelberg quantity leadership model. It is a non-collusive duopoly, where the competitors do not collude with each other to earn extraordinary profits. There exists cut-throat competition in the market, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown. There exists a high concentration ratio and therefore, there might be a problem of anti-trust arising in the future. Regardless, the present OTT market has a vast potential for its expansion in the Indian market, given the increasing digitalization of the country.</p><h4><strong>References</strong></h4><p>Cain, R. (2017, October 31). <em>Don’t Count Netflix Out As A Contender In India’s Streaming Video Wars</em>. Forbes. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/robcain/2017/10/31/dont-count-netflix-out-as-a-contender-in-indias-streaming-video-wars/?sh=3b2ff4d24647">https://www.forbes.com/sites/robcain/2017/10/31/dont-count-netflix-out-as-a-contender-in-indias-streaming-video-wars/?sh=3b2ff4d24647</a>.</p><p>Endavo. (2021, June 16). <em>What is OTT?</em> Endavo Media. <a href="https://www.endavomedia.com/what-is-ott/">https://www.endavomedia.com/what-is-ott/</a>.</p><p>Farooqui, J. (2021, May 7). <em>Disney+ Hotstar has 41% share of Indian online video subscription market: Omdia</em>. exchange4media. <a href="https://www.exchange4media.com/digital-news/disney-hotstar-has-41-share-of-indian-online-video-subscription-market-omdia-112817.html">https://www.exchange4media.com/digital-news/disney-hotstar-has-41-share-of-indian-online-video-subscription-market-omdia-112817.html</a>.</p><p>Harrison, J. (2021, July 13). <em>How a billion screens can turn India into an M&amp;E powerhouse</em>. Ernst &amp; Young. <a href="https://www.ey.com/en_in/media-entertainment/how-a-billion-screens-can-turn-india-into-an-m-e-powerhouse">https://www.ey.com/en_in/media-entertainment/how-a-billion-screens-can-turn-india-into-an-m-e-powerhouse</a>.</p><p>Jha, L. (2020, October 22). <em>India is the world’s fastest growing ott market: PWC report</em>. Mint. <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-is-the-world-s-fastest-growing-ott-market-pwc-report-11603355739242.html">https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-is-the-world-s-fastest-growing-ott-market-pwc-report-11603355739242.html</a>.</p><p>KPMG. (2019, September). <em>Unravelling the digital video consumer — Looking through the viewer lens</em>. KPMG and Eros Now. <a href="https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2019/09/ott-digital-video-market-consumer-india.pdf">https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2019/09/ott-digital-video-market-consumer-india.pdf</a>.</p><p>Mankiw, G. (2016). <em>Principles of Microeconomics</em> (8th ed.). Harvard University.</p><p>Papavassilopoulos, C., Teoh, K. L., &amp; Woo, J. W. (2021, March 16). <em>India: Online video trends and OMDIA consumer research highlights</em>. Omdia. <a href="https://omdia.tech.informa.com/OM016916/India-Online-Video-Trends-and-Omdia-Consumer-Research-Highlights">https://omdia.tech.informa.com/OM016916/India-Online-Video-Trends-and-Omdia-Consumer-Research-Highlights</a>.</p><p>Plesa , A. (2020, May 19). <em>Amazon Prime Video Price: How does it compare?</em> Finder India. <a href="https://www.finder.com/in/amazon-prime-video-price">https://www.finder.com/in/amazon-prime-video-price</a>.</p><p>Radia, N. (2016, January 7). <em>The Arrival of Netflix in India: All that you need to know</em>. Inc42 Media. <a href="https://inc42.com/resources/the-arrival-of-netflix-in-india/">https://inc42.com/resources/the-arrival-of-netflix-in-india/</a>.</p><p>Shepel, N. (2019, August 13). <em>Eros now : Price, features and content compared</em>. Finder India. <a href="https://www.finder.com/in/internet-tv/eros-now">https://www.finder.com/in/internet-tv/eros-now</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a2c163ebc91" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Central Political Districts in the Capital Cities of India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@twinkle.adhikari/central-political-districts-in-the-capital-cities-of-india-b457d0dfd10e?source=rss-302817b29d4b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[public-choice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[urban-planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[concentric-zone-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Twinkle Adhikari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2022 11:38:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-22T11:43:14.965Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Urbanization is a mass political cycle. Governments, political parties and their agendas play a significant role in influencing urban growth, especially in India’s democratic, multi-party system. However, mainstream literature has not wholly perceived their role to be important. Though there is a need for a public-private partnership to achieve urban growth, urban planning is essentially the role of the state (Clos, 2017). The Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies devise policies and schemes that promote urban growth and allocate money and resources to infrastructure development. Without balanced governance and civic accountability, there cannot be systematic urbanization in a democratic country (Sridharan, 2011).</p><p>In this article, we try to elucidate how urban centres in major capital cities of India resembles the pattern of growth explained by the concentric zone theory. We further try to comprehend if this concentric growth is centred around political hubs or business clusters. We take two cities — Bangalore and Chennai, as case studies to illustrate our hypothesis about urban expansion in the capital cities of India.</p><p><strong>Concentric Zone Theory</strong></p><p>In 1925, Sir Ernest Burgess proposed the theory of concentric zones to explain the structure and growth of a city. Burgess’s concentric zone theory of urban land-use patterns states that cities take the form of five concentric urban zones: central business districts, transitional zones, working-class residential zones, upper-class residential zone, and commuter zone. Growth is achieved by expanding each zone to the next one (Burgess, 1925). The concentric zone model postulates that as various communities, modern enterprises, and associations come to a city, a vast market is created for real estate. Communities with a high-income margin, e.g., businesses and the high society, can get the places they want. In contrast, those with lesser income, e.g., distressed migrant workers, need to make do with somewhere else (Schwirian, 2007).</p><p><strong>Figure 1</strong></p><p><em>The Concentric Zone Model</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*Rd5-Km8FLFy21cQgo31imw.png" /><figcaption>(<a href="https://rashidfaridi.com/2020/10/12/concentric-zone-theory-and-urban-crime/">https://rashidfaridi.com/2020/10/12/concentric-zone-theory-and-urban-crime/</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>According to the theory, the central business district is the driving force of the entire city. It consists of all essential economic and social services such as banks, government offices, places of importance such as museums, heritage sites, corporate offices and headquarters etc. The next zone is the transitional zone, which is currently transitioning into an industrial area. Due to the changing and dynamic nature of this zone, it is more volatile and prone to crime. The third zone is the working-class residential area, which has low land prices due to its proximity to the transitional zone (closer to city crime). The fourth zone is also a residential area but is costlier and is inhabited by the middle class. The final zone is the commuter zone, which is home to the relatively affluent sections of the city’s population (Gavaskar, 2020).</p><p><strong>Figure 2</strong></p><p><em>A Pictorial Representation of the Concentric Zones</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*aSX2svzeT6aegIK_20a_WA.png" /><figcaption>From <em>Prezi.com</em>. (<a href="https://www.re-thinkingthefuture.com/city-and-architecture/a2953-urban-planning-an-analysis-of-concentric-zone-model/">https://www.re-thinkingthefuture.com/city-and-architecture/a2953-urban-planning-an-analysis-of-concentric-zone-model/</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>However, the concentric zone model evolves under the political backdrop when the government enters the urbanization process. We try to understand how the model changes under the influence of governmental interference with Bangalore and Chennai as working examples in the next section of the article.</p><p><strong>Case in Point — Bangalore and Chennai</strong></p><p>Bangalore is a rapidly growing urban space in the southern part of India. Known as the Silicon Valley of India, the Census of 2011 positioned it as the fifth biggest metropolitan agglomeration of the country. Among the super urban communities of India, Bangalore has also registered the highest average annual population growth rate (4.73%) between 2001–2011. It has been reliably at the top in contribution to the country’s GDP over the past forty years (Verma et al., 2017).</p><p>Bangalore’s pattern of growth is unplanned and uneven, and is called urban sprawl. According to Bruegmann (2015), urban sprawl is defined as “low-density automobile-oriented settlement patterns with little comprehensive public planning” (p. 934). This urban sprawl is concentric in nature, with the city expanding radially from its centre to different concentric circles or zones (Nadh, 2020). The following image, constructed by Verma et al. (2017), provides a snapshot of the city’s urban sprawl from 1973 to 2016.</p><p><strong>Figure 3</strong></p><p><em>Bangalore Urban Sprawl and Centre of Growth</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/1*SF1UoD9lSik_T2d2Z1-YhA.png" /><figcaption>Temporal change of built-up area of Bengaluru City (1973–2016). From<em> </em>Verma et al. 2017 (<a href="https://doi.org/10.24193/jssp.2017.2.02">https://doi.org/10.24193/jssp.2017.2.02</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>From figure 3, we understand that Bangalore’s urban sprawl occurred in concentric circles. The centre area in purple that was already developed in 1973 is currently the city’s central business district. However, when paralleled against the map of Bangalore (Figure 4), we see that this area primarily consists of government establishments such as Vidhan Soudha, Cubbon Park, Majestic etc. This area is principally the political hub of Bangalore and has relatively few commercial business establishments or headquarters. This layout goes against the concentric zone model that states that at the centre of a city is a zone with the highest economic activity (Balakrishnan &amp; Jarvis, 1991). The Government of Karnataka developed this particular area. The Vidhana Soudha was built in 1956; the Majestic Bus Station was built in 1969, and the whole area dotted in purple was established before 1973 (Devaiah, 2019; NIC, n.d.).</p><p>Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the central business district converts into a central political district. Such an arrangement is not unique to Bangalore. It is common in all other major capital cities in India. Another example of this pattern is seen in Figure 5, where Chennai’s urban sprawl follows a similar design. The area that has already developed in 2010 is centred around a central political district denoted by the first concentric circle in Figure 5B (Aarthi &amp; Gnanappazham, 2019). This circle has the major political zones in Chennai — the State Secretariat and Georgetown, which is home to the High Court and the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu.</p><p><strong>Figure 4</strong></p><p><em>City Map of Bangalore</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/1*GiSkR_2MGmWrsC-yUAjtaQ.png" /><figcaption>Bengaluru City Map. Copyright 2017 by Maps of India. (<a href="https://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/karnataka/bangalore-map.htm">https://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/karnataka/bangalore-map.htm</a>).</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Figure 5</strong></p><p><em>Chennai’s Urban Sprawl and Concentric Zones</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/977/1*s07Y7ONd8_vsLh_TXeFjsQ.png" /><figcaption>Urban Sprawl and Entropy of the Study Region. From Aarthi &amp; Gnanappazham, 2019. (<a href="https://doi.org/10.4236/jgis.2019.111001">https://doi.org/10.4236/jgis.2019.111001</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>A significant inference from this observation is that urban growth starts with government intervention. In Bangalore and Chennai, the early stages of urban sprawl were concentrated around political hubs. This reinforces the government’s significant role in a city’s urbanization process. When a particular ruling party comes to power, they tend to allocate resources to urban projects that directly benefit their vote banks (Helsley, 2004). These actions satisfy the voters, and they will vote the ruling party back to power in the next elections. Such conduct of self-interest by government bodies influences their civic responsibilities. First introduced by James Buchanan, this theory is called public choice theory (Buchanan &amp; Tullock, 2003).</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The concentric zone model and other mainstream models of urban growth and structure fail to understand the importance and significance of political hubs in the process of urbanization. In our above analysis, we explain that the chief capital cities in India evolved and advanced into the metropolitan powerhouses they are today due to public schemes and government intervention for urban expansion. These government zones are also strategically located at the centres of rapid urban growth, which hint at their significance in promoting urban development. Therefore, it is necessary to look at urbanization as a political process and not just as a socio-economic process since it is the policies of political parties and their ideologies that drive urbanization in India.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Aarthi, A. D., &amp; Gnanappazham, L. (2019). Comparison of urban growth modeling using deep belief and neural network based cellular automata model — a case study of Chennai Metropolitan Area, Tamil Nadu, India. <em>Journal of Geographic Information System</em>, <em>11</em>(01), 1–16. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4236/jgis.2019.111001">https://doi.org/10.4236/jgis.2019.111001</a></p><p>Balakrishnan, T. R., &amp; Jarvis, G. K. (1991). Is the Burgess concentric zonal theory of spatial differentiation still applicable to urban Canada?. <em>Canadian Review of Sociology</em>, <em>28</em>(4), 526–539.</p><p>Bruegmann, R. (2015). Urban Sprawl. <em>International Encyclopedia of the Social &amp; Behavioral Sciences</em>, 934–939. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.74061-x">https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.74061-x</a></p><p>Buchanan, J. M., &amp; Tullock, G. (2003). What is public choice theory. <em>Rationalizing capitalist democracy: The cold war origins of rational choice liberalism</em>, <em>133</em>. <a href="https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/EEB-5.03-Public-Choice.pdf">https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/EEB-5.03-Public-Choice.pdf</a></p><p>Burgess, E. W. (1925). The Growth of the City. In Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W., &amp; McKenzie, R. W. (Eds.), <em>The City</em>. University of Chicago Press. <a href="https://shekhar.cc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/burgess_ch2.pdf">https://shekhar.cc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/burgess_ch2.pdf</a></p><p>Clos, J. (2017, May 19). Urbanization is a political process. <em>Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe. </em><a href="https://www.osce.org/magazine/318341#:~:text=Urbanization%20is%20a%20political%2C%20collective%20process.&amp;text=But%20what%20is%20paramount%20is,by%20political%20consensus%20and%20agreement">https://www.osce.org/magazine/318341#:~:text=Urbanization%20is%20a%20political%2C%20collective%20process.&amp;text=But%20what%20is%20paramount%20is,by%20political%20consensus%20and%20agreement</a>.</p><p>Devaiah, D. (2019, June 6). Bengaluru’s Majestic Bus stand, built on a lake, is now 50 years old. <em>The Indian Express.</em><a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/bangalore/bengalurus-majestic-bus-stand-built-on-a-lake-is-now-50-years-old-5768682/">https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/bangalore/bengalurus-majestic-bus-stand-built-on-a-lake-is-now-50-years-old-5768682/</a></p><p>Gavaskar, T. (2020). <em>Urban planning: An analysis of concentric zone model</em>. RTF | Rethinking The Future. <a href="https://www.re-thinkingthefuture.com/city-and-architecture/a2953-urban-planning-an-analysis-of-concentric-zone-model/">https://www.re-thinkingthefuture.com/city-and-architecture/a2953-urban-planning-an-analysis-of-concentric-zone-model/</a></p><p>Helsley, R. W. (2004). Urban political economics. In <em>Handbook of regional and urban economics</em> (Vol. 4, pp. 2381–2421). Elsevier. <a href="https://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Faculty/henderson/Helsley.pdf">https://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Faculty/henderson/Helsley.pdf</a></p><p>Nadh, N. (2020, August). Concentric Zone Theory. <em>Town and Country Planning. </em><a href="https://www.townandcountryplanninginfo.com/2020/08/concentric-zone-theory.html">https://www.townandcountryplanninginfo.com/2020/08/concentric-zone-theory.html</a></p><p>National Informatics Centre. (n.d.). Vidhana Soudha. <em>Karnataka Legislature. </em><a href="http://www.kla.kar.nic.in/vds.htm">http://www.kla.kar.nic.in/vds.htm</a></p><p>Schwirian, K. (2007). Ecological Models of Urban Form: Concentric Zone Model, the Sector Model, and the Multiple Nuclei Model. <em>The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeose004">https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeose004</a></p><p>Sridharan, N. (2011). Spatial Inequality and the Politics of Urban Expansion. <em>Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 2</em>(2), 187–204. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/097542531100200204">https://doi.org/10.1177/097542531100200204</a></p><p>Rao, P. M., &amp; Balasubrahmanya, M. H. (2017). The rise of IT services clusters in India: A case of growth by replication. <em>Telecommunications Policy</em>, <em>41</em>(2), 90–105. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2016.11.006">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2016.11.006</a></p><p>Verma, S., Chatterjee, A., &amp; Mandal, N. R. (2017). Analysing Urban Sprawl and Shifting of Urban Growth Centre of Bengaluru City, India Using Shannon’s Entropy Method. <em>Journal of Settlements and Spatial Planning</em>, <em>8</em>(2), 89–98. <a href="https://doi.org/10.24193/jssp.2017.2.02">https://doi.org/10.24193/jssp.2017.2.02</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b457d0dfd10e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Understanding Terrorism Through A Behavioral Lens]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@twinkle.adhikari/understanding-terrorism-through-a-behavioral-lens-b740aa07bc36?source=rss-302817b29d4b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b740aa07bc36</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[behavioral-economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prospect-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[loss-aversion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Twinkle Adhikari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Nov 2021 16:02:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-13T04:50:04.690Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>By <a href="https://medium.com/u/ad8af1d73de2">Deepali Desai</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/u/302817b29d4b">Twinkle Adhikari</a></blockquote><p>Humans are irrational. They are limited by the constraints of incomplete information, uncertainty and time, which often prevent them from making rational decisions. Analogous to chess players making irrational moves while playing blindfolded, this irrationality is not due to the inadequacies of the player. It is due to the blindfold. Though terrorists use violence as a means to achieve their socio-political goals, they are at their prime, humans. This article tries to delve into the behavior of terrorist organizations and understand its nexus with theories from behavioral economics.</p><p><strong>Prospect Theory and Certainty Effect</strong></p><p>Prospect theory, first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky, is one of the most foundational concepts in behavioral economics. It criticizes the expected utility model and suggests that consumers value certain outcomes more than uncertain outcomes, even if the reward is lesser. For instance, a person is more likely to choose a 100% chance of winning $50 than choose a 50% chance winning $100. This ‘certainty effect’ leads them to be risk averse when gains are sure (they do not want to lose out on more money) and risk seeking when losses are sure (they want to cover the losses they have already incurred). Further, the outcomes of a particular choice are valued against a reference point which guides their decision-making process (Kahneman &amp; Tversky, 1979).</p><p><strong>Figure 1</strong></p><p><em>Utility Function of the Prospect Theory</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qpSgooVcVS4YAxD6LX1luw.png" /><figcaption>The S-shaped utility function of prospect theory. From <em>Behavioural Economics and Terrorism: Law Enforcement and Patterns of Behaviour. </em>Copyright 2021 by Peter J. Phillips and Gabriela Pohl.</figcaption></figure><p>The prospect theory explains how terrorist groups decide on their method of attack. In a study by Phillips and Pohl (2021), popular types of attack methods in 2016 were ranked by how risky they were.</p><p><strong>Table 1</strong></p><p><em>Attack Methods, Expected Payoffs and Risk</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PnIAhm5I6rsbMCF4gnQ89g.png" /><figcaption>Attack methods 2016, least risky to most risky. From <em>Behavioural Economics and Terrorism: Law Enforcement and Patterns of Behaviour. </em>Copyright 2021 by Peter J. Phillips and Gabriela Pohl.</figcaption></figure><p>In the above table, the average fatalities per attack serve as the expected payoffs, and the standard deviation of the outcomes show how risky a particular attack method is. If the militant organization’s reference point is high comparative with the expected payoffs from the available attack methods, it will perceive a domain of losses and therefore will be risk seeking. For example, the organization expects to have at least 20 casualties in their next attack. Or maybe a rival organization’s recent attack yielded 20 fatalities. This serves as a reference point for the organization, and given the above table, all the available options project sure losses for the organization. Therefore, to try and achieve the expected payoff, the organization will surely choose an attack method that has a higher standard deviation, in hope that the higher risk yields higher payoff. Similarly, if the militant organization’s reference point is low (e.g., 2 fatalities) compared to the average payoffs, it will perceive a domain of sure gains and therefore will be risk averse (Phillips &amp; Pohl, 2021).</p><p>This decision-making process guided by prospect theory is starkly seen terror attacks. Terrorism usually garners a lot media attention. One of the primary goals of terrorist groups is to garner this attention and</p><blockquote>“to compete successfully for media attention, terrorists must be original enough to stage incidents that are a departure from past events” (Scott, 2001, p. 126 as cited in Walsh, 2010).</blockquote><p>Therefore, ‘to compete successfully’ with others, terrorist organizations take the scale of the attacks by their predecessors as a reference point and evaluate the options and resources they have against it. They may choose a riskier method of attack, plan an attack of a larger scale, or even develop novel methods of attack (Walsh, 2010; Phillips &amp; Pohl, 2014).</p><p><strong>Loss Aversion and Endowment Effect</strong></p><p>Indifference curves in the standard economic model assume that individuals make choices without reference to current assets. However, studies by Kahneman and Tversky have demonstrated that initial endowments play a significant role in trade-offs between goods. This implies that choices are reference dependent — under conditions of uncertainty, gains or losses will be ascertained with reference to a particular endowment point. This forms the basis for loss aversion which states that there is a higher disutility when giving up an object than the utility that is received when acquiring the good (Kahneman &amp; Tversky, 1991). By applying the theory of loss aversion to a terrorist group’s identity, one can evaluate how likely a terrorist will substitute a particular attack method with another.</p><p>Consider terrorist organizations A and B. A has a preferred strategy of bombing and B prefers hostage attacks. These activities have formed the group identities of A and B. Loss aversion of identity suggests that these two groups will be unwilling to substitute between these two attack methods even if a particular attack has a method that can be conducted with less risk (Phillips &amp; Pohl, 2021). Therefore, terrorist organizations are likely to stick to their particular signature attacks, which is evident in the case of Al Qaeda. The terrorist organization has stuck to its signature ‘spectacular’ attacks of which have been consistent with the group’s identity. The 9/11 Twin Tower attack, the killing of civilians in embassies in Nairobi and Kenya in 1998 and the Bali bombings in 2002 all have a common element of large number of people being killed in public places with then spectacle element of catching people off guard in places with emotional attachment.</p><p><strong>Figure 2</strong></p><p><em>Indifference curves for two terrorist groups with two different identities</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/1*fwru0MaIcDBRAmBXR9USxA.png" /><figcaption>Two attack methods, two groups, two identities. From <em>Behavioural Economics and Terrorism: Law Enforcement and Patterns of Behaviour. </em>Copyright 2021 by Peter J. Phillips and Gabriela Pohl.</figcaption></figure><p>People’s identity forms an intrinsic part of their choice, but this has not been explored in mainstream economics (Phillips &amp; Pohl, 2021). An organization is more averse to giving up an identity it is endowed with. Therefore, Group B will require a large amount of bombing activities to give up hostage taking and vice-versa. Thus, each group is unwilling to substitute between the two attack methods and adheres to the method associated with the group’s identity.</p><p><strong>Status Quo Bias in Terrorist Financing</strong></p><p>Terrorist activities require funding which involves transfers from one organization to another. Fund transfers for these purposes involve a large amount of risk of being discovered. However, FinTech services protect consumers’ information and mask the identities of those using the service for illegal activities. Therefore, there has been a spur in FinTech-enabled fund transfers for terrorist activities. The expected utility theorem states that a rational decision-maker would choose the service that offers the highest utility. Logically, terrorist organizations end up choosing a reliable FinTech service for their transactions. However, as circumstances change, economic agents should update their preferences. But once a terrorist organization experiences gains and a particular financial service is considered to be safer; they tend to stick to that particular FinTech service (Phillips &amp; McDermid, 2020). This is the status quo bias that arises in the face of a variety of options.</p><p>The FBI utilized this bias to conduct one of its largest sting operations, Operation Trojan Shield. They collaborated with an organization to develop a secret phone network targeted to intercept criminals using encrypted networks for illicit purposes. The network was called Anom and it had a secret tracking device (Cox, 2021). More and more criminals began to believe in the success of this supposedly encrypted network and began using this encrypted service. While there exist several options for encrypted networks, Anom became popular and using this network emerged as the status quo. The FBI then utilized this to their advantage and tracked several organized crime chains on the network for three years and caught around 1800 criminals (Cox, 2021). This demonstrates the ability of counter terrorism forces to predict criminal behaviour and helps them stay one step ahead of terrorist organizations.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Kahneman and Tversky, the vanguards of behavioral economics, debunked the myth of ‘Econs’ — the rationality-driven individuals in the world of economics. Human decision-making is far from rational. We rely on heuristics and several biases to make our decision-making easier. Similarly, terrorist organizations also suffer from these constraints. Therefore, on account of the increasing applicability provided by the theories of behavioural economics, counter-terrorist forces have begun utilizing these concepts to predict the behaviour of terrorist organizations. These behavioral insights help peacekeepers recognize the blind spots of terrorism and neutralize their threats to world peace.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Cox, J. (2021). <em>Trojan Shield: How the FBI Secretly Ran a Phone Network for Criminals</em>. <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-shield-anom-fbi-secret-phone-network">https://www.vice.com/en/article/akgkwj/operation-trojan-shield-anom-fbi-secret-phone-network</a></p><p>Kahneman, D., &amp; Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. <em>Econometrica</em>, <em>47</em>(2), 263–291. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185">https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185</a></p><p>Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., &amp; Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. <em>Journal of Economic Perspectives</em>, <em>5</em>, 193–206.</p><p>Kahneman, D., &amp; Tversky, A. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model. <em>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</em>, <em>106</em>(4), 1039–1061. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2937956">https://doi.org/10.2307/2937956</a></p><p>Phillips, P. J., &amp; Pohl, G. (2014). Prospect theory and terrorist choice. <em>Journal of Applied Economics</em>, <em>17</em>(1), 139–160. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s1514-0326(14)60006-4">https://doi.org/10.1016/s1514-0326(14)60006-4</a></p><p>Phillips, P. J., &amp; McDermid, B. (2020). FinTech, terrorism-related fund transfers and behavioural finance. <em>Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 14</em>(3), 226–246. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821074">https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821074</a></p><p>Phillips, P. J., &amp; Pohl, G. (2021). <em>Behavioural Economics and Terrorism: Law Enforcement and Patterns of Behaviour</em>. Routledge.</p><p>Walsh, J. (2010). Media Attention to Terrorist Attacks: Causes and Consequences. <em>Institute for Homeland Security Solutions. </em><a href="https://www.jamesigoewalsh.com/ihss.pdf">https://www.jamesigoewalsh.com/ihss.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b740aa07bc36" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Japan’s Extraordinary Debt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@twinkle.adhikari/japans-extraordinary-debt-219e8749e912?source=rss-302817b29d4b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/219e8749e912</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government-debt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[japan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Twinkle Adhikari]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Aug 2021 16:58:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-12T11:57:19.981Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many economists refer to Japan as an economic miracle. Rightly said, Japan’s economic dynamics are without exaggeration, very interesting. Even after facing a crushing defeat after World War II, Japan’s economy continued to grow rapidly. It is currently the world’s third-largest economy, and is also the world’s most indebted country (Silver, 2021). According to IMF’s World Economic Outlook estimates, Japan’s debt currently stands at $13.12 trillion, i.e.,256.5% of its GDP (2021). Japan has a long history with its government debt. By the 1990s, Japan was one of the strongest economies in the world. However, after an asset price bubble crash in 1989, the economy plunged into a recession. To stimulate demand, the Japanese government borrowed to inject liquidity into bad banks. From then on, Japan started accumulating huge levels of debt due to various fiscal policy stimuli by the government (Pham, 2017).</p><p><strong>Figure 1</strong></p><p><em>Japan’s General Government Gross Debt as percentage of its GDP</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hfCNVSnma1S6ChXs-8naCA.png" /><figcaption>Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2021. Estimated values start from 2019.</figcaption></figure><p>Greece, whose net debt level was at 149 % of its GDP in 2010, went through a debt crisis and received three bailouts from the IMF and the EU (Yoshino &amp; Vollmer, 2014). Given its larger amount of outstanding debt, Japan should already be in a crisis. However, Japan’s sovereign credit rating by Moody’s is at A1, indicating it is in a stable position to repay interests on its bonds without defaulting (Trading Economics, n.d.). Meanwhile India, whose gross debt stands at approximately 90% of its GDP is rated Baa3, implying that India might not be able to repay its debt (Bhattacharya, 2020).</p><blockquote>Is Japan truly immune to the ill effects of such a huge mountain of debt?</blockquote><h4><strong>Theoretical Analysis of Japan’s Government Debt</strong></h4><p>Before, we take the case of Japan, let us first understand how economic theory explains government debt dynamics. Running a debt to finance government spending has differential impacts on the economy. In the short run, it can lead to increased aggregate demand. Whenever any economy is in a recession, to boost aggregate demand, governments cut taxes and finance their spending through borrowing. As taxes are lower, disposable personal income increases and there is greater incentive to spend (Mankiw &amp; Elmendorf, 1998).</p><p>If we apply the IS-LM schedule to understand a scenario of debt financing, we understand that the IS curve shifts to the right and aggregate output rises. However, to reach equilibrium output, interest rate has to rise. This has a crowding-out effect on private investment and decreases output by some amount (Mankiw, 2015).</p><p><strong>Figure 2</strong></p><p><em>The IS-LM schedule when the Government finances expenditure through debt</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/722/1*Ra3HyvCxZQpWo51ZC5Sa4g.png" /><figcaption>An Increase in Government Purchases in the IS-LM Model. From <em>Macroeconomics</em>. Copyright 2015 by Gregory N. Mankiw.</figcaption></figure><p>While governments usually borrow to stimulate the economy, sustained levels of debt are always a concern. In the long run, the unintentional crowding out effect creates a dearth of investment in the country, leading to lower levels of technological advancement in the long run. This results in declining output and income which end up affecting the real wages of labor. Therefore, government debt is considered to be a burden in the long run.</p><h4><strong>Japan and its extremely low interest rates</strong></h4><p>Traditionally, we understand that interest rates rise when government spending is financed through debt. According to Kameda, if Japan’s government debt rises by 1% of its GDP, the real interest rate will increase by 2.54 basis points (2014). However, historically, Japan’s real interest rates have shown a decreasing trend, and at times were even negative.</p><p><strong>Figure 3</strong></p><p><em>Real Interest Rates of Japan</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*MZau7Qw9jtX_3CwWn1Rk8g.png" /><figcaption>Source: World Bank</figcaption></figure><p>The reason why Japan’s real interest rates have been low can be understood by looking at how Japan finances its debt. Normally, governments fund their debt through taxation. They borrow when the economy is in a recession and tax when the economy is in a boom, to pay off their loans. However, in Japan, 48.3% of its debt is monetized by the Bank of Japan (Kettenhofen, 2021). That is, the Bank of Japan prints money and lends it to the government. If analyse Japan’s scenario using the IS-LM schedule, we understand that its debt actually has an effect on the money market instead of the goods market, since money supply increases as the Bank of Japan prints more money. This shifts the LM curve to the right, which in turn reduces the interest rate and rises the aggregate output.</p><p><strong>Figure 4</strong></p><p><em>IS-LM dynamics of Japan’s Government Debt</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/1*-Etc2JZ6cLBO8lMiNIlT2A.png" /><figcaption>An Increase in Money Supply in the IS-LM Model. From <em>Macroeconomics</em>. Copyright 2015 by Gregory N. Mankiw.</figcaption></figure><p>From this, we can justify that the low interest rates maintained in Japan, even with high levels of government expenditure, is due to debt monetization.</p><p>However, very low interest rates hurt the economy’s overall investment. According to Keynes, there exists a critical interest rate, below which an individual incurs capital loss on their bond holdings. Therefore, he prefers to hold money rather than invest in bonds (Froyen, 2014).</p><p><strong>Figure 5</strong></p><p><em>An Individual’s Speculative demand for money</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/770/1*wX3v0KVIHJALRD5KpxS0TA.png" /><figcaption>Individual Speculative Demand for Money. From <em>Macroeconomics: Theories and Policies. </em>Copyright 2014 by Richard T. Froyen.</figcaption></figure><p>Japan’s interest rates, technically go below the imaginary critical interest rate. At times their interest rate is even negative. No rational consumer would want to invest in Japan’s Government Bonds (hereafter JGBs), because they get negative returns on their investment. Therefore, Japan’s only source of debt has to be the Bank of Japan. However, there are other significant sources that make up 51.7% of Japan’s debt, and they lend to the government through the JGBs which have negative yield.</p><p><strong>Figure 6</strong></p><p><em>Composition of Japan’s debt holders</em></p><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/6955368/embed" width="700" height="575" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/692483f0f32d7847d36b47559c52e930/href">https://medium.com/media/692483f0f32d7847d36b47559c52e930/href</a></iframe><p>The reasons for investment in JGBs are exogeneous to economic models. If we revisit our assumptions, we assume that all consumers are rational, self-interested and maximise satisfaction. In reality, that is not true. In this case, the behavioural concept of loss and risk aversion comes into play. Investors who are apprehensive of risky stock market conditions find JGBs as a steady investment and a ‘safe haven’. Older private investors hold most of these bonds, as they are more likely to prioritize stability over profit (Balmer, 2020). Furthermore, commercial banks of the country need to invest in their government’s bonds to store their excess savings (Horioka et al., 2013). Therefore, institutional factors also play a major role in supporting Japan’s ever-growing debt.</p><p>While debt monetization is one of the factors affecting interest rates in Japan, the Bank of Japan maintains very low or negative interest rates on purpose. This is called ‘financial repression’. When governments are not able to pay out their debts, they create a ‘captive audience’ (in Japan’s case, banks, private investors). They structure institutions in such a way that this captive audience continue to buy JGBs, even when they incur losses. When such bonds with negative interest rates are issued, the government firstly does not need to pay back what they are borrowing, and secondly, the investors will pay an interest to the government for taking their money. This method was used in many advanced economies after World War II to manage their debts (Reinhart et al., 2015).</p><h4><strong>Implications of Japan’s Government Debt</strong></h4><p>Liquidation of debt can have extremely disastrous consequences. After Germany lost World War I, it was charged with 132 billion gold marks as reparation for the damage caused in the war. Therefore, the country tried to pay off its reparations by printing more money, creating a situation of hyperinflation (Blakemore, 2019). Just like that, Japan has an impeding risk of inflation skyrocketing. Yet again, Japan presents a remarkably different scenario. Debt monetization, in fact, is working out extremely well for the Japanese Government. As money supply in the country increases, the value of yen further depreciates, stimulating foreign investment. Any fears of inflation can be squashed by strict contractionary monetary policy action by the Bank of Japan (Turner, 2015).</p><p>However, Japan’s rate of inflation is a matter of concern. In all those years of debt accumulation, there has been systematic deflation in the Japanese economy. The country has been struggling to cross the global standard of 2% of inflation (Fujikawa, 2018).</p><p><strong>Figure 7</strong></p><p><em>Percent change of Inflation in Japan</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/940/1*kQW6YT5RSZTUvd8lQrL3Iw.png" /><figcaption>Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2021. Estimated values start from 2020.</figcaption></figure><p>This deflation can be attributed to the interest rates on JGBs. According to Keynesian analysis, since investors rather hold money when interest rates are below the critical interest rate, a situation of liquidity trap develops. In Japan’s case, even though investors are holding bonds and sourcing government debt, government expenditure was not able to stimulate demand and consumption in the economy (Fujikawa, 2018). Only when the large scale spending of the government translates into real economic growth, can the Japanese economy emerge from this never-ending spiral of debt (Editorial Board of ANU, 2018). Therefore, the major concern of the government is to bring the economy out of stagnation.</p><h4><strong>Why is Japan not increasing taxes to pay off its debt?</strong></h4><p>The country is facing a demographic crisis. The dependency ratio of its population is increasing, and with more and more people getting old, its social security spending is on the rise. The wages in the economy have gone down and the price level is extremely low. In 2014, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced a hike in sales-tax, the country’s GDP shrank by 1.6% (Warnock &amp; Obe, 2014). A tax rise in this situation it would only hurt the economy. Therefore, the government has to resort to monetary policy measures to increase inflation and stabilize the country’s financial system.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>The above discussion summarises that while Japan is effectively managing its debt, there are negative side-effects on the health of its domestic economy. Furthermore, Japan does not need to worry about its ability to pay back the debt it owes to foreign investors, given that only 10% of its debt constitutes of foreign credit (Balmer, 2020). However, Japan has to limit its borrowing, given that domestic savings that fund its debt are set to decrease as the demographic profile of the country transforms. A study by OECD suggests that the three arrow approach undertaken by the Japanese Government can set the trajectory for its debt to gradually decline :-</p><blockquote>“bold monetary policy to achieve higher inflation, flexible fiscal policy and growth-boosting structural reforms” (Stráský &amp; Guillemette, 2015).</blockquote><h4>References</h4><p>Balmer, E. (2020, June 10). <em>Japan’s Debt Mountain: How Is It Sustainable?</em> Barron’s. <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/japan-s-debt-mountain-how-is-it-sustainable-01591775409">https://www.barrons.com/news/japan-s-debt-mountain-how-is-it-sustainable-01591775409</a>.</p><p>Bhattacharya, S. (2020, June 1). <em>Moody’s Demote India’s Rating By A Notch With Negative Outlook</em>. 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