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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tyler Harttraft on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tyler Harttraft on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Tyler Harttraft on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tylerharttraft?source=rss-c7b34644fcdd------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[SEC V. TELEGRAM: BLOCKCHAIN LITIGATION UPDATE]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tylerharttraft/sec-v-telegram-blockchain-litigation-update-827070340994?source=rss-c7b34644fcdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/827070340994</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security-token]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[litigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tyler Harttraft]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2020 14:02:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-24T14:15:54.819Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On March 24, 2020, Judge Castel of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order granting the SEC’s motion to enjoin Telegram Group, Inc. and its affiliate corporation TON Issuer, Inc. (collectively, “Telegram”) from distributing “Gram” tokens — a digital cryptocurrency to be used in connection with the TON blockchain and the Telegram platform (“Grams”). This article explores the legal basis of the SEC’s position and the counterarguments made by Telegram leading to the Judge’s decision to prevent Telegram from issuing the tokens promised to purchasers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*jVOL1CQ7Tvu_JeKx4BV3eA.jpeg" /><figcaption>SEC v. Telegram Group, Inc. and TON ISSUER, INC.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Facts</strong></p><p>In 2018, Telegram received approximately $1.7 billion from 175 sophisticated entities and high-net-worth individuals in exchange for a promise to deliver Grams at a later date. The sales were conducted in two phases, and Telegram filed for an exemption from registration under 506(c) of Regulation D.</p><p><strong><em>The TON Blockchain</em></strong></p><p>After Telegram’s founders failed to monetize their popular messaging app, they set out on a new venture — the development of the TON blockchain, a “Proof of Stake” system. A proof of stake method of consensus allows validator nodes (computers running full versions of the blockchain software) to earn rewards for authenticating new blocks and voting on rule changes. Validators for the TON blockchain would earn Grams for their services and would be required to stake at least 100,000 Grams as collateral. Initially, the supply of Grams would be limited to 5mm tokens. Each Gram sold would be priced slightly higher than the last.</p><p><strong><em>Telegram Sells Tokens to Initial Purchasers</em></strong></p><p>Telegram sold “interests in Grams” to initial purchasers in two sales, one ending in February (First Sale) and one ending in March (Second Sale). Under the purchase agreements executed in the First Sale, the initial purchasers received a <em>right to Grams in the future</em> when and if the team successfully launched the TON blockchain.</p><p>The purchase agreements also included a lock-up provision prohibiting the initial purchasers from selling the Grams unless sold per the following schedule: 1/4 of the grams received could be sold within 3 months of their receipt; the remaining 3/4 could be sold within 6, 12, and 18 months, respectively, of the launch of the TON blockchain. The Purchase Agreements executed in the Second Sale did not include a lock-up provision. The Court noted this distinction in its Howey test analysis (discussed below) and held it supported the SEC’s argument that purchasers expected profits from their purchase of Grams.</p><p>Telegram did not register either sales and claimed the exemption provided under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, which permits the offer and sale of securities without registration if such offers and sales are made only to accredited investors. This exemption also permits general solicitation and advertising of the offering, an important permission since Telegram sought to market their sale of Grams. Following its sales of the Grams Tokens, Telegram developed the TON blockchain and prepared to deliver the Grams to the initial purchasers by its deadline of October 31, 2019.</p><p><strong>The Law</strong></p><p><strong><em>Registration Requirement for Offers and Sales of Securities</em></strong></p><p>U.S. securities laws prohibit the offer and sale of securities unless such securities are registered (under a public offering) or exempt from registration. Specifically, Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits the offer, sale, or delivery after the sale of any security without an effective or filed registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), ©. A “security” is an investment contract. Under the <em>Howey</em> Test, the Supreme Court defined an “investment contract” as “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” <em>S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.</em>, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).</p><p><strong><em>Rule 506(c) Exemption</em></strong></p><p>Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the conditions of Rule 506 of Regulation D are not deemed public offerings within the meaning of section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Rule Rule 506(c) of Regulation D is an exemption that permits the offer and sale of securities to accredited investors only but prohibits resales to non-accredited investors for one year. Additionally, an issuer relying on 506(c) must “exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers of the securities are not “underwriters” within the meaning of section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act. This requirement is the crux of the decision in this case.</p><p><strong>Analysis</strong></p><p>Judge Castel offered the following straightforward summary of the transactions conducted by Telegram:</p><p><em>Telegram entered into agreements and understandings with the Initial Purchasers who provided upfront capital in exchange for the future delivery of a discounted asset, Grams, which, upon receipt (and the expiration of the lockup periods for Round One Purchasers), would be resold in a public market with the expectation that the Initial Purchasers would earn a profit. A reasonable Initial Purchaser understands and expects that they will only profit if the reputation, skill, and involvement of Telegram and its founders remain behind the enterprise, including through the sale of Grams from the Initial Purchasers into the public market.</em></p><p><strong><em>SEC Argument</em></strong></p><p>The SEC argued that the 175 initial purchasers constitute “underwriters” ready to engage in a distribution of Grams in the public market, whose participants would have been deprived of the information that a registration statement would reveal. Essentially, Telegram’s private sale was window-dressing for the planned secondary offering that would occur using the initial purchasers as conduits to access the public market.</p><p>According to the opinion, Telegram argued that the transactions should be viewed separately and argued: (1) the purchase agreements granting initial purchasers <em>a right to receive</em> Grams in the future constitute securities contracts, and Telegram’s offer and sale complied with the requirements of Rule 506(c) making these transactions exempt from registration; and (2) the delivery of the Grams to purchasers upon the launch of the TON blockchain does not constitute a sale of securities because the Grams will have functional consumptive uses and, therefore, would be considered a commodity.</p><p>This argument is a bit nuanced. Essentially, Telegram is arguing it sold securities when it sold the <em>contracts for Grams</em>, but its delivery of the Grams would not be the delivery of a security. It would deliver a commodity that purchasers could transact with on the TON blockchain. If the Grams constitute a commodity, then the prohibitions on resale do not apply since such regulations only apply to securities.</p><p>This argument is well-supported by commentary from a speech given in June of 2018 (six months after the initial sale) by former SEC Commissioner William Hinman, who stated that digital assets, such as Bitcoin or ETH, transacted on sufficiently decentralized networks are not securities. Generally, a decentralized network will be one in which the actions or efforts of a centralized third party are not required. Commissioner Hinman even stated, “digital assets with utility that function solely as a means of exchange in a decentralized network could be packaged and sold as an investment strategy that can be a security.”</p><p>With this backdrop, we can see Telegram’s angle. Though these remarks were made 6-months after Telegram executed the purchase agreements, perhaps there were communications between the SEC and Telegram at this time that led the company to their two-step strategy — sell the purchase agreements; quickly decentralize. If it could sell interests in the Grams to qualified investors in compliance with securities laws, it could deliver a commodity with no restrictions on resale and rely on the initial purchasers to sell the Grams without filing a registration statement.</p><p>The Court did not buy Telegram’s argument and refused to bifurcate the sale of interests in Grams and the intended delivery. Judge Castel determined the economic realities of the transactions as a whole constitute a single scheme constraining it to evaluate the offer, sale, purchase, and delivery under <em>Howey.</em></p><p>In holding that the SEC showed a substantial likelihood of success that the delivery of Grams would constitute violations of securities laws, the court made three findings:</p><p><strong>(1)</strong> <strong>the transactions and undertakings by and between Telegram and the initial purchasers constitute a security under <em>Howey;</em></strong></p><p><strong>(2)</strong> <strong>the Grams are not evaluated upon the launch of the TON blockchain; and</strong></p><p><strong>(3)</strong> <strong>the Grams Sales to Initial Purchasers do not fall within an exemption and constitute a violation of securities laws.</strong></p><p><strong><em>Howey Analysis</em></strong></p><p>For brevity, I will provide an outline of the court’s application of the Howey test to the facts on the record. Importantly, the court determined that the analysis should apply at the time of the sale of the interests in Grams rather than at the time of the release of the Grams tokens.</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Investment of Money in a Common Enterprise</strong></p><p>· Telegram collected investments of money and pooled the funds of the initial purchasers to develop the TON blockchain and expand the success of the Messenger app.</p><p>· The ability of each initial purchaser to profit on his or her investment depended on the successful launch of the TON blockchain, thereby establishing <strong>horizontal commonality</strong> at the time of the sales.</p><p>· The Court also found that <strong>horizontal commonality</strong> existed after the launch of the TON blockchain because the Grams continued to represent pooled funds of the initial purchasers that remain tied to the success of each other’s fortunes and of the TON blockchain.</p><p>· The SEC made a substantial showing of <strong>strict vertical commonality</strong> between the purchasers and Telegram existed since both parties’ fortunes were dependent on the successful development and launch of the TON blockchain. This was evident from the offering materials circulated by Telegram, which stated that it would hold a reserve of 28% of all Grams following the launch of the TON blockchain. Although Telegram argued it intended to transfer the reserve to its foundation or lock the reserve forever, it was under no legal or contractual obligation to do so. If it retained the reserve, its financial success would be linked to the success of the TON blockchain.</p><p>· Interestingly, the Court also made mention of various non-monetary benefits that Telegram and its founders would receive upon the successful launch of the TON blockchain, implying that “fortunes” need not be monetary. Such benefits included increased goodwill in the business, the ability to attract new talent, and the potential to raise capital for the messaging platform. This language suggests that strict vertical commonality exists where, upon the successful launch of a blockchain, non-monetary benefits may be imparted on key persons and affiliates of a token issuer.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Expectation of Profits</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Discounts. </strong>Sales prices were discounted from future sale prices .38, .33 vs. 3.62.</li><li><strong>Telegram’s Price Control Powers. </strong>Telegram’s TON Foundation could stabilize the price of grams by purchasing them on the open market, establishing a price floor.</li><li><strong>The size and concentration of initial purchases reflect investment intent</strong>, not <strong>consumptive intent.</strong> The fact that individuals were willing to purchase millions of dollars’ worth of Grams indicates investment intent.</li><li><strong>The Terms of the Purchase Agreements Show Investment Intent</strong>. The lockup prohibiting the sale by initial purchasers granted an exclusive window for the Round Two Purchasers — who paid considerably more per Gram — to resell Grams and profit from their investment before Grams owned by the First Sale purchasers could be sold into the market and thereby place downward pressure on the price of Grams. This exclusive window creates a structural incentive for the Second Sale purchasers to resell their holdings of Grams quickly and indicates that they likely bought Grams with investment intent.</li><li><strong>Lock-Up Periods</strong>. The existence of the lockups in the First Sale negates the likelihood that a reasonable purchaser of Grams made such a purchase for his or her consumptive use. The Judge practically questioned what rational person would agree to freeze millions of dollars for up to 18 months (following a lengthy development period) if the purchaser’s intended to obtain a substitute for fiat currency.</li><li><strong>Economic Realities</strong>. The economic reality of the transaction is that wide adoption, as boasted by Telegram, would increase the value of the Grams.</li></ul><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>Efforts of Others</strong></p><p>· The initial purchasers were reliant on Telegram’s essential efforts to develop the TON blockchain.</p><p>· Telegram advertised the development of the TON blockchain as creating a mass-market opportunity for Grams. According to the opinion, this instilled initial purchasers with the view that they could profit from purchasing the Grams.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion</em></strong></p><p>The Court found that the SEC showed a substantial likelihood of success in proving that the contracts and understandings at issue, including the sale of 2.9 billion Grams to 175 purchasers in exchange for $1.7 billion, are part of a larger scheme to distribute those Grams into a secondary public market, which would be supported by Telegram’s ongoing efforts. Considering the economic realities under the <em>Howey</em> test, the Court found that the resale of Grams into the secondary public market would be an integral part of the sale of securities without a required registration statement.</p><p>This case is ongoing and this ruling does not reflect a final decision in the matter, but it shows a clear view of Judge Castel’s take on the matter in the late stages of this litigation, teeing up a potential settlement by Telegram. It also provides a well-written analysis of the various securities laws that can be applied to the sale of digital assets before the development of a decentralized network and illustrates that the economic realities of a series of transactions will be viewed as a whole under the <em>Howey</em> test.</p><p>The author of this article is <a href="/service/mailto:tyler@bullblockchainlaw.com">Tyler Harttraft, Esq</a>., a partner at <a href="http://bullblockchainlaw.com/">Bull Blockchain Law</a>. Tyler represents token issuers, digital asset exchanges, and other businesses specifically focused on projects related to blockchain technology, digital assets, and virtual currency activities. To schedule a consultation, you can email <a href="/service/mailto:tyler@bullblockchainlaw.com">tyler@bullblockchainlaw.com</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=827070340994" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Meet Facebook’s Libra and the Oligarchy of Private Banking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tylerharttraft/meet-facebooks-libra-and-the-oligarchy-of-private-banking-e3ff5a9a3f3c?source=rss-c7b34644fcdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e3ff5a9a3f3c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[calibra]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tyler Harttraft]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2019 14:22:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-19T14:26:02.807Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/737/1*22_MmTmOYQ9dN4YJYmKyHw.png" /><figcaption>Libra Association Founding Members</figcaption></figure><p>The crypto industry is buzzing about a new cryptocurrency in the form of a stable coin developed through a concerted effort by tech and financial giants such as Facebook, Uber, Lyft, Paypal, Visa, and Mastercard among others.</p><p>This article will introduce you to the Libra Association, its goals for the functionality of the Libra coin, and user and regulatory concerns that may impede mass adoption.</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>The Libra Association</strong></p><p>While Facebook is associated with the Libra project, a nonprofit organization called Libra Association is behind the Libra cryptocurrency. The Libra Association is an independent, not-for-profit membership organization headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. The location was chosen for its neutrality and dedication to innovation in fintech and blockchain technology.</p><p>The Founding Members include heavy hitters in financial, technology, and blockchain industries, among others:</p><p>The mission as stated in the Libra whitepaper is to permit “money to move around the globe as easy and cost-effective as — and even more safe and secure than — sending a text message or sharing a photo.”</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>What type of crypto is Libra?</strong></p><p>All cryptocurrencies are not created equal. Some are created to act as a store of value. Some are created to act as a digital asset that represents rights in an asset, a company, or a debt. Others are created to act as a form of payment.</p><p>Libra is created to act as a remittance coin. It will be stable coin — a coin with a value tied to the value of a fiat currency, except Libra will be a global currency backed by a reserve of various fiat currencies. Because Libra is backed by a basket of fiat currencies, the valuation will fluctuate as the respective values of reserve currencies oscillate.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>What is the Libra Reserve?</strong></p><p>Unlike many cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ether, stable coins are backed by a reserve, typically cash. Tether, for example, is backed by a fractional reserve of cash, similar to how banks keep a fractional reserve of cash.</p><p>In contrast to Bitcoin and Ether, Libra is backed by a reserve of fiat currencies. The intent is to stabilize the price so the currency can be widely used as a means of predictably valued digital cash.</p><p>The cash reserves will come from (1) private investors of the Libra Association whom will receive payouts in Libra Coin; and (2) users of Libra who may purchase the coins. Portions of the reserve will then be reinvested in low-risk assets.</p><p>The power of the reserve cannot be understated. If Libra succeeds at scale, the capital held in reserve could make the Libra Association the most powerful money manager in the world.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> <strong>Which Blockchain is Used by Libra?</strong></p><p>Libra is built on the open-source Libra Blockchain. You can read about the technical aspects of the Libra blockchain by visiting this <a href="https://developers.libra.org/docs/the-libra-blockchain-paper">link</a>.</p><p>The Libra Blockchain is a permissioned blockchain as compared to a public ledger. A public or permissionless blockchain, such as the Bitcoin Blockchain, allows anyone to participate, without vetting. In contrast, consortiums or administrators evaluate and determine each entity’s proposed participation in a permissioned chain.</p><p>The Libra whitepaper states that the association believes no permissionless blockchain can deliver the stability needed to handle billions of transactions. And they’re right, for now. To date, the. core devs of cryptocurrencies based on public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ether are working to solve scalability issues. Libra intends to operate a permissionless blockchain within 5 years. To do so, it will directly compete with virtual currencies such as Bitcoin and work to solve scalability issues privately.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> <strong>When Will Libra Launch?</strong></p><p>The target launch date is the first half of 2020.</p><p><strong>6.</strong> <strong>User Concerns</strong></p><p>Libra is a centralized coin and not censorship resistant. The select group of organizations listed above ultimately operate the nodes and control the permissioned ledger.</p><p>With a permissioned blockchain, the essence of an open-source, decentralized system is muted. Essentially, they function as databases to which the keys are held by a group of centralized third-parties. This model is ideal in situations where the parties approach each other with a pre-established level of trust. Corda uses a permissioned ledger to share financial agreements amongst a vetted group of banks. JP Morgan created JPM coin to facilitate payments for its institutional customers. In both situations, the parties have established internal trust.</p><p>Users should also be concerned with the potential for developers to operate nefarious apps on the blockchain. The Association intends to create an ecosystem where app developers can create a marketplace and transact the Libra coin. However, the vetting procedures for app developers is uncertain.</p><p>Finally, a concentration of wealth amongst a conglomerate of corporations is antithetical to the theories underpinning the decentralization movement. Bitcoin was created to give people power over their money. The phrase “to have and to hold” is not redundant because having and holding are not synonymous. The Libra Whitepaper preaches similar ideals, but the power is in transacting quickly and cheaply. The power of the purse (to hold) remains with the companies who will make up the Libra Association. In essence, the Libra Association is a massive private bank.</p><p>Adding a variety of players will stem concerns regarding the concentration of power among a few powerful technology companies, but the successful scaling of Libra will lead to a concentration of wealth in the Libra Association that is unprecedented for any conglomeration.</p><p><strong>7.</strong> <strong>Regulatory Concerns</strong></p><p>At a minimum, organizations hosting wallets, such as Facebook’s subsidiary Calibra, will need to comply with AML/KYC laws of the jurisdictions in which the wallet services are offered.</p><p>Regulators from France and England have promised to scrutinize Libra every step of the way. Because the blockchain is permissioned, the Libra Association can be held accountable by governmental authorities that choose to enforce new compliance standards or even ban the coin that represents an unprecedented fintech development.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3ff5a9a3f3c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Breaking Down the Token Taxonomy Act]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tylerharttraft/breaking-down-the-token-taxonomy-act-c1bb604e248?source=rss-c7b34644fcdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c1bb604e248</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security-token]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-asset]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tyler Harttraft]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2019 14:27:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-28T14:27:11.003Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*EBDPNn9nBlXmJFj7CahsQg.png" /></figure><p><em>Disclaimer: Nothing here should be considered legal or investment advice.</em></p><p><strong>Introduction:</strong></p><p>On December 20th, 2018 two U.S. Representatives, Warren Davidson (R-OH, 8th) and Darren Soto (D-FL, 9th), introduced H.R. 7356, now known as the “Token Taxonomy Act” (the “Token Act”), which seeks to amend the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to exempt digital tokens (“tokens” and/or “cryptocurrencies”) from the traditional definition of a security. The Token Act also proposes: (1) the first comprehensive definition of a “digital token” from Congress; (2) tax exemptions for pure virtual currency transactions; and (3) additional regulatory changes for “digital units.” This article breaks down the Token Act and analyzes the regulatory impact of its provisions, if enacted.</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Excluding Digital Tokens from the Definition of a U.S. Security.</strong></p><p>The Token Act’s attempt to exclude digital tokens from the definition of a security is not a sweeping effort to revamp nearly 100 years of precedent. Rather, it offers a narrow definition of the type of token regulatory agencies within the U.S., e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), have publicly stated do not constitute a security under the <em>Howey </em>test<em>,</em> and proposes an explicit exemption for tokens meeting such a definition. The underlying goal for this piece of legislation is twofold: (1) to address a nascent technology that disrupts traditional notions of finance and securities regulation; and (2) to provide regulatory clarity for stakeholders within the blockchain/cryptocurrency industry above and beyond the scant amount of administrative precedent set through isolated decisions and judgements.</p><p>Overall, the proposed definition outlines the technical and economic features of an exempted digital token. Specifically, the definition details the following characteristics: (1) token creation; (2) token transaction history; (3) decentralized token trading; and (4) economic token representation.</p><ul><li><strong>Token Creation</strong></li></ul><p>This first prong is broken down into three exclusive sub-prongs: (i) the token is created “in response to the verification and collection of proposed transactions;” or (ii) no central authority can impact the token creation or supply; or (iii) the token is created as an initial allocation of digital units in accordance with (i) and (ii). Overall, the token creation prong prohibits the token from being controlled by a common enterprise, aligning the definition with one of the four prongs of the Howey Test that is sued to determine whether a financial instrument is a security. Therefore, projects looking to fit within this definition may rely on this language as well as prior administrative precedent set by the SEC detailing how projects satisfied the Howey Test, e.g., DAO Report &amp; Munchee Inc. decision.</p><p>Specifically, the first sub-prong contemplates a token created as a result of “the verification and collection of proposed transactions,” e.g., the Proof-of-Work (“PoW”) model underlying Bitcoin that uses computational power to verify transactions within the Bitcoin Blockchain. In other words, a major thematic point within this proposed definition is how the token is created and verified as a legitimate instrument to be used on a specific blockchain. This differs from traditional modes of finance — like fiat currency — where a medium of the currency is verified by public and private third parties, i.e., government and licensed entities. Alternatively, decentralized blockchain based tokens using PoW require consensus from a network of computational power, with no single entity controlling, verifying, or changing the processing of transactions. To be clear, not all blockchains are structured in such a way, and this proposed definition within the Token Act is attempting to carve out a specific place for tokens that fit this…for lack of a better term…decentralized model. Indeed, without getting into much detail, there are other ways of verification such as Proof-of-Stake (“PoS”) that approach the verification process differently.</p><p>Separately, tokens with a fixed set of rules dictating the token creation and supply have the ability to fit within the token creation prong. Just like no actor can control whether transactions are processed in PoW, a token business could structure the overall supply to ensure even the business itself could not change the supply. This shows how token projects like Paragon (“PRG coin”) and Munchee (“MUN”), whose tokens were categorized as securities by the SEC, clearly fall outside this prong. Recall in the <a href="https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf">Munchee decision</a>, the SEC highlighted Munchee’s representation that it could “burn” tokens, thereby taking a portion of tokens out of circulation and causing an increase in the value of remaining tokens. This finding, among others, caused the SEC to determine Munchee Inc. was a third party controlling the value of the token, which satisfied the fourth prong of the Howey Test. Accordingly, Munchee would also fail this second sub-prong. Therefore, a portion of this creation prong relies on the notion that projects creating tokens should not code in the ability for the business to either control the verification of transaction process nor the overall supply of the token — a feat few token-based projects have accomplished.</p><p>Lastly, the third sub-prong is the hardest to decipher. It allows for an “initial allocation” of digital tokens. This seems to suggest tokens may be released at different stages, which traditionally poses issues with platform creation in the securities context. While this could change the common understanding within the industry that pre-sale tokens and airdrops may trigger securities regulation, the general takeaway for us is that pre-issued tokens still require a functioning platform and the rules dictating these tokens cannot be different from tokens created subsequently. Alternatively, this may be a special carve out for providing founders with an allocation of tokens. With that said, we believe further clarification is needed for this sub-prong language.</p><ul><li><strong>Transaction History</strong></li></ul><p>The “transaction history” prong of the four-part test is essentially a description of blockchain technology. Under the proposed definition, a token’s ledger of recorded transactions must be “distributed,” i.e., achieved through a mathematically verifiable consensus, and immutable by a single person or group of actors under common control. The “under common control” qualifier takes into account the open-source nature of blockchain technology and the ability of a community, rather than a centralized group, to propose and make alterations to the source code.</p><ul><li><strong>Decentralized Exchange</strong></li></ul><p>To qualify for the exemption, the token must also be tradable or transferable between persons without an intermediate custodian — the “exchange” prong. This is another straightforward provision and it describes an indispensable characteristic of most cryptocurrencies in that peer-to-peer transfers of tokens are available to all users.</p><p>In a similar vein, a recent ruling by the SEC against a decentralized exchange called EtherDelta throws a tangential wrench into common understandings of what a decentralized exchange actually is. Questions arise regarding the threshold of decentralization required to satisfy this prong. Does an exchange need to completely avoid data storage off of the blockchain? What if the entity behind the exchange creates a front-end user interface and promotes usage of the exchange? There are certainly questions that require clarification in this context due to the EtherDelta ruling.</p><p>With that said, there is most likely not much impact regarding this prong because it focuses on the ability of users to send tokens without any third-party intermediary. While EtherDelta was considered one of the first decentralized exchanges, it stood as a third-party intermediary in the eyes of the SEC. Regardless, this prong will most likely not be difficult for token-based projects to satisfy.</p><ul><li><strong>No Economic Rights</strong></li></ul><p>Lastly, and most importantly, the “economic” prong prohibits the token from representing a financial interest in a company or asset, including debt interest or revenue share. In the past, companies unsuccessfully touted the decentralized nature of the network to circumvent this prong. Indeed, many projects claimed their tokens where “utility tokens” that only provided functionality on a platform, and did not represent a financial interest, but SEC representatives disagree on several occasions. According to the SEC, only Bitcoin and Ether are sufficiently decentralized so as to not constitute a U.S. security. Furthermore, it is unclear whether investments in certain tokens constituted a security at their inception as opposed to after their networks were significantly developed. For now, it is important to acknowledge that any token providing an economic right will most likely not fall under the Token Act’s definition of an exempt token.</p><p>In fact, a growing sub-industry to the blockchain and cryptocurrency space deals with security tokens, which are tokens that represent some financial ownership in either a company or an asset. Akin to digital stock, security tokens are offered through a Security Token Offering (“STO”) analogous to a private placement, allowing investors to purchase ownership in a company or some future economic benefit such as a dividend payment. Indeed, companies all over the world are looking to tokenize their stock or traditional assets. We’ve worked with several companies to receive approval of a token offering from the SEC, but to be clear, these types of projects offer tokens pursuant to an SEC exemption. Thus, such token offerings are not structured to and need not comply with the definitions provided in the Token Act.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Taxation of Virtual Currencies Held in Individual Retirement Accounts</strong></p><p>Moving away from the categorization of tokens, the Token Act also provides provisions regarding the taxation of virtual currencies. For example, in certain types of individual retirement accounts, the acquisition of “collectibles,” e.g., art, stamps, and coins (non-digital) constitute a distribution from the account, which constitutes a taxable event on the gain or loss from the transaction. Currently, exemptions apply for certain coins like gold and silver.</p><p>The Token Act proposes an exemption from the taxation of investments withdrawn from individual retirement accounts to invest in “virtual currencies.” (Note, “virtual currency” is a term used by FinCEN and the treasury, while the SEC typically uses “digital token,” but the terms are interchangeable).</p><p>While investors are likely not jumping at the idea of committing significant portions of retirement money to virtual currencies, some may desire exposure to Bitcoin or Ether but are unwilling to move their retirement savings into these tokens for fear of a hefty tax penalty. The Token Act offers a solution to this issue.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>Tax Exemption for Pure Virtual Currency Transactions</strong></p><p>The Token Act also proposes that exchanges of virtual currency be treated as nontaxable events. An analogy is the exchange of like-kind real property. If you traded your residence for another residence, you do not realize gain or loss on the transaction for tax purposes. In contrast, you do recognize gain or loss when you sell your house for currency.</p><p>The Token Act proposes to treat the exchange of virtual currency akin to the exchange of like-kind property, effectually deeming the transaction a non-taxable event. Therefore, after you traded BTC to ETH to PRL to XVG to LTC to BTC, you report your ultimate gain or loss rather than the gain or loss from all five transactions., which is the current model and has caused significant confusion for actors within the cryptocurrency industry. This tax exemption alleviates an enormous burden faced by all who took seriously their tax burden in the early days of trading cryptocurrency.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> <strong>De Minimis Tax Exemption for Gains Realized from the Sale or Exchange of Virtual Currency for Other Than Cash</strong></p><p>Finally, the Token Act proposes a second solution that addresses the problem discussed above — the tax reporting burden implicated when constantly exchanging virtual currencies. Under the Token Act, a gain of less than $600 from the sale or exchange of virtual currency for cash or cash equivalents will be excluded from gross income.</p><p><strong>Conclusion:</strong></p><p>Overall, we believe the Token Act proposes sound adjustments to the regulatory treatment of digital tokens that would benefit users and businesses and help pave the way for increased adoption. If passed, several onerous tax reporting requirements for cryptocurrency transactions will be curbed. While the SEC has been the most active regulatory player as of late, comments from the Token Acts backers suggest that regulation of digital assets will continue to overlap among agencies including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). Accordingly, those operating within the space as well as others looking to enter should certainly consult legal and financial advisors in navigating the myriad of laws that might apply to their projects…especially when considering a token issuance.</p><p><em>Note: This Article does not address the Bill’s amendments to the Investment Advisor’s Act of 1940.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c1bb604e248" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ICO Litigation Looms in 2019]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@tylerharttraft/ico-litigation-looms-in-2019-15348052eed0?source=rss-c7b34644fcdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/15348052eed0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-investment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tyler Harttraft]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jan 2019 11:40:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-16T11:40:00.152Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ms3U_5M_VtmM1GhMwYPv_Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Sebastian Pichler</figcaption></figure><p>The Office of the Investor Advocate is a branch of the SEC dedicated to reporting on concerns and identifying policy initiatives related to protecting investors. Twice a year the Office reports on its objectives for the fiscal year.</p><p>In its Fiscal Year 2018 report, the Office reported ICOs raised $4 billion in 2017 and $16.7 billion through 2 quarters in 2018. It also noted that 86% of projects were below listing price at the time of the report and 30% of all projects lost substantially all of their value. Moreover, a staggering 10% of ICO proceeds were lost due to hacking.</p><p>The stat regarding proceeds lost due to hacking highlights the nascency of a technology many believed was prime to cause widespread upheaval and turmoil throughout various industries. Indeed, blockchain will change the way we transact with each other in many ways. However, developers and technologists are quickly recognizing that groundbreaking ideas do not trump the law. The days of compliantly raising money without consequence never truly existed and 2019 is shaping up to be the year of reckoning for the SEC and many investors with buyer’s remorse.</p><p>Just nine days into the new year, investors who contributed 2.5 million dollars to Worldwide Asset eXchange (WAX) filed suit against the company and its chief officers for violating securities laws. WAX is an online marketplace for virtual goods, namely video game add-ons. The Complaint alleges the creators of WAX created and sold the WAX token thereby constituting an investment contract under the <em>Howey</em> test. The defendants allegedly touted that the value of WAX tokens would grow as a result of the successful launch of the WAX platform.</p><p>If we take the allegations in the Complaint as true, the WAX offering and sale of tokens has all of the hallmarks of an investment contract — (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profit (4) based on the efforts of others. This test has been extensively discussed in other enforcement actions against those raising funds through initial coin offerings. (See <a href="https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf"><em>DAO</em></a>, <a href="https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf"><em>Munchee</em></a>, <a href="https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10574.pdf"><em>Paragon</em></a><em>).</em></p><p>The noted SEC enforcement actions and the WAX Complaint largely focus on the representations made by the offerors to investors to show that investors had a reasonable expectation of profits. A common representation is the promise of an ecosystem that will be developed by the controlling entity resulting in an increased demand for the token. Additionally, some offerors have gone as far as saying their control of the token supply and ability to burn tokens will increase the value of the tokens. Promises that the coin will be listed on secondary exchanges are also problematic for unregistered offerings.</p><p>Given the staggering amount of money raised from 2017–2018 by way of initial coin sales and the viciousness of the current bear market, the number of lawsuits brought by investors regretting their investments is likely to increase dramatically. I expect that SEC enforcement proceedings will also trend upwards this year.</p><p>Interestingly, those who made regrettable investments will seek to use the securities laws as a sword and recoup their entire investment plus interest. So long as the company is solvent — an unlikely happening given the depressed prices — these investors may have made a no-risk investment, a concept that will not sit well with those working on legitimate projects without ill intentions. This highlights the importance of complying with securities laws. Ignorance of the law is no excuse and even <a href="https://www.thetokenattorney.com/blog/2018/12/9/coinalpha-fined-50k">an innocuous failure to file a document with the SEC can land you a hefty fine and sanctions</a>.</p><p>From the company’s standpoint, this might seem unfair, especially for those who made mistakes or generally have not acted with malice. However, U.S. securities laws exist to protect investors. In weighing the options, the risks associated with a failure to comply with securities laws far outweigh any potential benefit given the remedy is rescission of investors’ funds in the event of a private lawsuit or disgorgement and a hefty fine by the SEC in the event of an enforcement proceeding. Even in a best-case scenario where a project is functional and producing revenue, which many ICOs are not, such penalties can be a death sentence for a young company.</p><p>From an investor standpoint, it is ironic that one can make a speculative investment with full knowledge that the investment does not comply with the law and later complain if and only if the investment does not work out. In the case of the WAX lawsuit, the plaintiffs were likely sophisticated (I am presuming this based off of their 2.5 million dollar investment. However, I realize wealth is not a great indicator for intelligence or investor sophistication). Moreover, the plaintiffs were likely familiar with private investments and only decided to object to the nature of the investment once it became clear that their investment had not performed as expected. If WAX is solvent and can afford to pay back the investors, the investors essentially made a highly speculative no-risk investment — undoubtedly a frustrating realization for the WAX token creators.</p><p>Nonetheless, investor protections have their place and we are only beginning to the first ripples of buyer’s remorse from the hectic ICO frenzy that took place last year. Investments made in unproven projects were largely driven by FOMO, a lack of information, and misrepresentations by scammers. Investor protections such as disclosure requirements and prosecution of bad actors will curb two out of three of these causes. The post-ICO era will offer many lessons regarding market psychology and investor protection policies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=15348052eed0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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