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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ujjwal Agarwal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ujjwal Agarwal on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ujjwal Agarwal on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[REFUSAL TO EXECUTE THE SALE AGREEMENT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO CHEATING AND ENTITLES A PERSON ONLY FOR…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/refusal-to-execute-the-sale-agreement-does-not-amount-to-cheating-and-entitles-a-person-only-for-e034917d4a92?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e034917d4a92</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-agreement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[complaints]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cheating]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 09:38:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-14T09:38:51.556Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><a href="http://www.myadvo.in/refusal-to-execute-the-sale-agreement-does-not-amount-to-cheating-and-entitles-a-person-only-for-civil-remedy/">REFUSAL TO EXECUTE THE SALE AGREEMENT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO CHEATING AND ENTITLES A PERSON ONLY FOR CIVIL REMEDY</a></h3><p>CASE NUMBER: Appeal (crl.) 632 of 2006</p><p>CASE TITLE: Ram Biraji Devi &amp; Anr vs Umesh Kumar Singh &amp; Anr</p><p>DATED: 11 May, 2006</p><p>CORAM: J. Ashok Bhan, J. Lokeshwar Singh Panta</p><p><strong>FACTS</strong></p><p>Complainant Umesh Kumar Singh-respondent №1 herein, filed a complaint against the appellants before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya alleging that Smt. Ram Biraji Devi appellant №1, was allotted MIG Plot No. M-27 situated in Housing Board Colony, Gaya. In July 2002, both the appellants represented to the complainant that they were badly in need of money and wanted to transfer the allotted plot to some person interested to purchase the said plot. The complainant expressed his willingness to purchase the plot. It was alleged by complainant that the parties orally agreed that the complainant would pay to the appellants a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs as price of the plot and on payment of the said amount, the appellants would transfer the plot in favour of the complainant.</p><p>It was also alleged by the complainant that the complainant paid a sum of Rs.80,000/- to the appellants as consideration amount of the sale price of the plot on different dates between 15.7.2000 and 15.12.2002. The appellants alleged to have made promises to the complainant that they would execute a written agreement in favour of the complainant on 15.1.2003, but since they failed to execute the agreement on 20.1.2003, the complainant along with three other persons went to the house of the appellants and enquired about the reason for delay in execution of the agreement. The appellants flatly denied acceptance of Rs.80,000/- and refused to transfer the plot in favour of the complainant. On the basis of the above premise, a criminal complaint was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, against the appellants.</p><p><strong>ARGUMENTS ADVANCED</strong></p><p>The counsel for the appellants contended that the Hon’ble High Court has failed to appreciate that on bare perusal of the contents of the complaint, no offence is made out against the appellants and the complaint filed by the complainant is mala fide, false and frivolous against appellant №1, who is stated to be about 70 years old lady and is suffering from heart disease, whereas the appellant №2 was working in New Delhi at the relevant time and had gone to Bombay to look after his ailing sister, Manju Tripathi, who was suffering from cancer, on the date of occurrence as alleged in the complaint.</p><p>According to the learned counsel, the dispute involved in the alleged complaint is of civil nature and none of the acts allegedly committed by the appellants gave rise to any criminal liability.</p><p>However, counsel for the respondent-complainant contended that the contents of the complaint would disclose the commission of the cognizable offence and this Court at the preliminary stage would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the complaint. He also contended that mere fact that a dispute is of civil nature could not be made a ground for quashing the complaint or FIR. In support of this submission, reliance is placed upon a decision of this Court in <strong><em>Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal &amp; Ors.</em></strong> [(1999) 8 SCC 686].</p><p><strong>OBSERVATIONS OF SUPREME COURT</strong></p><p>It appears from the record that Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gaya, recorded the statements of the complainant and his witnesses on 19.4.2003 and thereupon took cognizance of the offences under <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/988620/">Sections 406</a>, <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1667388/">419</a>, <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1436241/">420</a> and <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1897847/">120-B</a> of Indian Penal Code vide order dated 8.8.2003. Being aggrieved against the order of taking of the cognizance by the Judicial Magistrate the appellants approached the High Court of Patna under <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1679850/">Section 482</a> of the Cr. P.C. praying for quashing of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate. The High Court by the impugned order dated 13.1.2005 dismissed the said petition. Hence, this appeal by way of special leave.</p><p>Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that on examination of the contents of the complaint, we find that there is not even a whisper ofallegation or averment made therein constituting an offence for which cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate against the appellants.</p><p>On the one hand, the complainant himself has stated in the complaint that oral agreement to sell the plot took place in July 2002 and on the other hand, he has alleged that he started paying the consideration amount for the purchase of the plot between 15.7.2000 and 15.12.2002. The version of the complainant is self-contradictory and, therefore, no prima facie case is made out against the appellant involving them in the commission of the alleged offences.</p><p>The learned Magistrate in his order has categorically stated that the perusal of the complaint would make it clear that there was a dispute in respect of sale and purchase of land between the parties. In our view even if the allegations made in the complaint are accepted to be true and correct, <strong>the appellants cannot be said to have committed any offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust. Neither any guilty intention can be attributed to them nor there can possibly be any intention on their part to deceive the complainant.</strong> No criminal case is made out by the complainant against the appellants in his complaint and in the statements of the complainant and his witnesses recorded by the Magistrate before taking of the cognizance of the alleged offences. <strong>The averments of the complaint and the statements of the complainant and his witnesses recorded by the Magistrate would amount to civil liability inter se the parties and no criminal liability can be attributed to the appellants on the basis of the material on record.</strong></p><p>In <em>Trisuns Chemical Industry’s case</em> (supra), relied upon by the complainant, this Court held as under:</p><p>“Quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions. Merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. The provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases.”</p><p>There cannot be any disagreement to the well-settled proposition of law that the High Court should exercise its inherent powers in extreme exceptions to quash an FIR or a complaint. The ratio as laid down in Trisuns Chemical Industry’s case (supra) is of no help and assistance to the complainant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The complaint instituted does not disclose that an offence under <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1436241/">Section 420</a> is made out.</p><p>Cognizance taken by the Magistrate thereon against the appellants for offences u/Ss. 406/419/420 and 120-B <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1569253/">IPC</a> are clearly an abuse of the process of court and interference by this Court is expedient in the interest of justice. This is a case of extreme exception where the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction and power to set aside the unwarranted and unjustified order of the Magistrate impugned before it by the appellants.</p><p><strong>DECISION</strong></p><p>For the aforementioned reasons, we quash the impugned order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 13.01.2005 passed in Criminal Misc. №11930 of 2004. Consequently, the complaint filed by the Complainant and subsequent order dated 8.8.2003 of the Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, in Complaint Case №298 of 2003 T.R. 808/03 whereby and whereunder cognizance of offence under <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/988620/">Sections 406</a>, <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1667388/">419</a>, <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1436241/">420</a>, <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1897847/">120-B</a>, <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1569253/">IPC</a>, has been taken against the appellants and summons have been ordered to be issued against them for facing trial for the above-said offences shall also stand quashed.</p><p>For more blog visit www.myadvo.in</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e034917d4a92" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SON HAS NO RIGHT IN THE HOUSE OF THE FATHER]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/son-has-no-right-in-the-house-of-the-father-9d2b0c513ae4?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9d2b0c513ae4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[house]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fathers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 09:21:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-14T09:21:42.231Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>CASE NUMBER: RSA 136/2016 and CM №19123/2016</p><p>CASE TITLE: Sachin and Anr. v. Jhabbu Lal and Anr.</p><p>Bench: J. Pratibha Rani (Delhi High Court)</p><p>DATE OF DECISION: 24th November, 2016</p><p><strong>FACTS</strong></p><p>The suit initially was filed by Jhabbu Lal (respondent №1 in the RSA) and (respondent №2 in RSA), Raj Devi pleading that they are senior citizens residing on ground floor in House and construction has been raised up to second floor. Their elder son Sanjay along with his wife Mamta was permitted to live on the second floor whereas the younger son Sachin along with his wife Neetu was permitted to live on the first floor of the said property out of love and affection for their sons.</p><p>In the suit, parents claimed themselves to be owner of the suit property which was self-acquired. It was further pleaded by the parents of the appellants that their sons as well their wives made the life hell for them so much so that they were not even paying the electricity bills. The old parents were constrained to make various complaints to the police and issued public notice on 5th January, 2007 and 17th May, 2012 disowning their sons and debarring them from their self-acquired property. Since the behaviour of the two sons and their wives became unbearable, they filed a suit seeking a decree of mandatory injunction directing them to vacate the floors in their possession and also to restrain them from creating any third party interest in the said property.</p><p>Following issues were framed by the Civil Court:</p><ol><li><em>Whether the plaintiff is entitled to be relief of mandatory and permanent injunction as prayed? OPP </em>(means Onus of proof is on Plaintiff)</li><li><em>Whether the plaintiff is not the exclusive owner of the suit property and the defendant are the co-owners? OPD </em>(means Onus of proof is on Defendant)</li></ol><p>Civil Court decreed the suit on the following grounds:</p><ol><li>The documents i.e. GPA, agreement to sell, receipt and Will being in favour of the plaintiff №1 (Father of defendant Nos.1 &amp; 3) though do not make him absolute owner but he has a better title as compared to the defendants.</li><li>It has not been denied by the defendants that the property stands in the name of the plaintiff №1 Sh. Jhabbu Lal. No evidence has been led by defendants to prove that they are the co-owners having contributed their share towards the purchase of the said property.</li></ol><ul><li>The testimony of the plaintiffs that defendants were licensees and their license has been revoked stands unrebutted.</li></ul><ol><li>Suit for mandatory injunction being filed within a reasonable time i.e. within six months after termination of the license. Decree for mandatory and permanent injunction was accordingly passed in respect of the suit property.</li></ol><p>Thereafter, first appeal bearing was filed only by defendant Nos.3 and 4 i.e. younger son Sachin and his wife Neetu. The appeal was dismissed observing that it was a case of gross-negligence on the part of the appellants/defendant Nos.3 &amp; 4 in defending the case. It was further held that in the absence of any evidence being led by the appellants and the testimony of the respondents/plaintiffs having remained unchallenged, the impugned order was not suffering from any illegality.</p><p>Finally, Regular Second Appeal №136/2016 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed against the impugned judgments of the Court below i.e. of the trial Court dated 16th March, 2015 and of the First Appellate Court dated 13th January, 2016 whereby Civil Suit №49/14 filed on 11th February, 2014 by the parents of the appellants (respondent Nos.1 &amp; 2 herein) against their two sons and their wives seeking decree of permanent and mandatory injunction has been decreed.</p><p><strong>PROCEEDINGS IN HIGH COURT</strong></p><p>On 7th September, 2016 after hearing respondent №2 i.e. mother of the appellant №1, with the consent of the parties, appellant №1 Sachin was directed to pay 3500/- per month to the respondents/parents with effect from September, 2016. Appellant №1 Sachin undertook to comply with this obligation. He also agreed not to stop his elder brother Sanjay (Defendant №1) from using the second floor of the property.</p><p>Matter was also referred to the mediation. Mediation report dated 17th October, 2016 received with the report that it was ‘Non-Starter’.</p><p>Then on 24th November, 2016 appellant №1 Sachin was asked as to whether he has complied with the order dated 7th September, 2016 by making payment to his parents, he simply stated that he has no money to pay and sought time to change his counsel. The appellant №1 was again asked whether he is ready to comply with the directions dated 7th September, 2016 as in that case he can be given time to make the payment to his parents. But appellant №1 has refused to make any payment to his parents.</p><p><strong>OBSERVATIONS</strong></p><p>When the mediation failed on 17th October, 2016, if the appellants intended to change their counsel, nothing prevented them from doing so. The appellants cannot be permitted to abuse the process of law by seeking adjournment on one pretext or the others especially when they are enjoying ad-interim stay against their dispossession from this Court granted in their favour on 20th May, 2016.</p><p>Two separate written statements were filed by the Sanjay and his wife and Sachin and his wife Neetu denying the claims of their parents to be the exclusive owner of the suit property or that it was their self-acquired property. They claimed to be co-owner having contributed towards purchase as well as towards costs of construction for the said property.</p><p>The appellant №1 is the younger son of the respondent №1/plaintiff №1 Jhabbu Lal who has led detailed evidence both oral and documentary duly corroborated by testimony of his wife, respondent №2/plaintiff №2 Smt. Raj Devi to prove their case. The respondent Nos.1 and 2/plaintiffs may not have proved themselves to the owner of the suit property as may be established in a case of acquiring title under a registered sale deed but surely, they would have better rights/entitlement to seek possession of the suit property from his sons who were permitted to live on the first floor only out of love and affection towards them.</p><p><strong>DECISION</strong></p><p><strong>Where the house is self-acquired house of the parents, son whether married or unmarried, has no legal right to live in that house </strong>and he can live in that house only at the mercy of his parents up to the time the parents allow. Merely because the parents have allowed him to live in the house so long as his relations with the parents were cordial, does not mean that the parents have to bear his burden throughout his life.</p><p>“In my opinion in a case such as the present one where the appellants/defendant Nos.3 &amp; 4 have led no evidence to prove that it waived self-acquired or co-ownership in the suit property whereas respondents/plaintiffs №1 &amp; 2 have proved their case on the basis of documentary evidence i.e. copies of General Power of Attorney, Agreement to Sell, Receipt possession letter Affidavit etc., the learned trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit which was upheld by the First Appellate Court.”</p><p>For more blog visit www.myadvo.in</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9d2b0c513ae4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN BUSINESSMMENT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/non-disclosure-agreement-and-its-importance-in-businessmment-758878dda24?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/758878dda24</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-agreement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nda]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 09:02:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-14T09:02:53.069Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>You must have been asked to keep a secret before and you might have kept it as well out of love or affection or for the sake of the bond that you share with that person. A Confidentiality Agreement, also called a Non-Disclosure Agreement or NDA, takes the notion of keeping a secret even further. This contract creates a legal obligation to privacy. Nowadays NDAs are very common in many business settings, as they offer one of the surest ways to protect trade secrets and other confidential information meant to be kept secret.</p><p><strong>What is a Non-Disclosure Agreement?</strong></p><p>In simple words, a Non-Disclosure Agreement is a legally enforceable, written contract by which one or more parties agree not to disclose confidential information that they have shared with each other as a necessary part of doing business together.</p><p>It is a legal contract between two parties that outlines confidential information that the parties wish to share with one-another for certain purposes, but wish to restrict other’s use or access to. Basically, the parties agree to not disclose the information covered by the agreement. For example, a company can ask a freelance writer to sign an NDA that states that all information gathered while writing and in the writing itself, is confidential information until the company chooses to use it.</p><p><strong>Common NDA Content</strong></p><p>The type of information covered by an NDA is virtually unlimited. The Content of an NDA varies depending on who the signing party is and considerations regarding what private information the signatory may be exposed to. Each NDA should be tailored to the specific relationship. Each employee, client or potential investor is different and therefore, how you approach each situation requires consideration of different legal aspects and business strategy.</p><p>Regardless of its function or the information it protects, there are some basic clauses or content which is almost same in all NDAs which is as follows:</p><ul><li>Name of the parties involved</li><li>The definition of what is confidential- this can be very vague for the purpose of being all-inclusive (e.g. Information commonly protected by NDAs might include schematics for a new product, client information, sales and marketing plans or a unique manufacturing process)</li><li>The disclosure period (e.g. 3 years or forever)</li><li>Any exclusions from what must be kept confidential (i.e. materials already available to the public or things which can be disclosed which are usually immaterial to your business)</li><li>Any obligations to keep the information confidential</li><li>Any miscellaneous provision</li></ul><p><strong>Why an NDA is Important</strong></p><p>Non-disclosure agreements are extremely important for all types of business deals. It is especially useful for small businesses and start-ups who will most likely outsource a lot of work to contractors or freelancers. It can also be important if you plan on utilizing consultants to get some business ideas.</p><p>For example, if you are developing a new product or writing content or otherwise developing something for sale, you may need to hire someone to help. Maybe it is a freelancer, a consultant, or some factory developing your prototype. At that point of time, you don’t want the person or company to steal your product or other information and sell it themselves. Imagine if Apple developed the iPhone and did not ask the manufacturer to sign an NDA and the manufacturer would have made a generic iPhone and sold it themselves. The same is true for any type of product development.</p><p>Using a nondisclosure agreement means your secrets will stay protected and if not then you will have legal recourse and can sue for damages.</p><p>NDAs typically serve two key functions:</p><ul><li>NDAs protect sensitive information. By signing an NDA, parties promise not to share information any further which has been shared with them. If the information is leaked, the aggrieved person can claim damages for breach of contract.</li></ul><p>In the case of a new product or concept development, properly drafted NDA can help the original creator hold onto the rights to a product or idea. In other words, it deters theft of intellectual property.</p><p>For more blog visit www.myadvo.in</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=758878dda24" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[GUIDELINES FOR COMPUNDING OF OFFENCE OF DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE (u/s 138 NI Act)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/guidelines-for-compunding-of-offence-of-dishonour-of-cheque-u-s-138-ni-act-78fc31aeee1a?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/78fc31aeee1a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[criminal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 08:35:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-14T08:35:19.188Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You must have known or read it that bouncing of cheque is a criminal offence and you can be prosecuted for the same. But as per Supreme Court, it is a compoundable offence and detailed guidelines for compounding of such an offence were given in the case mentioned below:</p><p>CASE NUMBER: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 963 OF 2010</p><p>CASE TITLE: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H.</p><p>Bench: K.G. Balakrishnan, P. Sathasivam, J.M. Panchal</p><p>DATE OF DECISION: May 03, 2010</p><p><strong>FACTS</strong></p><p>Parties were involved in commercial transactions and that disputes had arisen on the account of the dishonour of five cheques issued by the appellant. Thereafter, the parties went through the several stages of litigation before their dispute reached this Court by way of special leave petitions.</p><p><strong>OBSERVATIONS</strong></p><p>Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “With regard to the impugned judgments delivered by the High Court of Bombay at Goa, the appellant has prayed for the setting aside of his conviction in these matters by relying on the consent terms that have been arrived at between the parties. The respondent has not opposed this plea and, therefore, we allow the compounding of the offence and set aside the appellant’s conviction in each of the impugned judgments. However, there are some larger issues which can be appropriately addressed in the context of the present case.”</p><p>Hence, Supreme Court traced <strong>the law of Negotiable Instruments</strong>: The object of bringing Section 138 into the statute was to inculcate faith in the efficacy of banking operations and credibility in transacting business on negotiable instruments. It was to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficient arrangements made by the drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers. If the cheque is dishonoured for insufficiency of funds in the drawer’s account or if it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account, the drawer is to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both.</p><p>When the offence was inserted in the statute in 1988, it carried the provision for imprisonment up to one year, which was revised to two years following the amendment to the Act in 2002. It is quite evident that the legislative intent was to provide a strong criminal remedy in order to deter the worryingly high incidence of dishonour of cheques. What must be remembered is that the dishonour of a cheque can be best described as a regulatory offence that has been created to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. The impact of this offence is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions.</p><p>As per the 213th Report of the Law Commission of India, more than 38 lakh cheque bouncing cases were pending before various courts in the country as of October 2008. This is putting an unprecedented strain on our judicial system.</p><p>The facts herein are an illustration of how parties involved in cheque bounce cases usually seek the compounding of the offence at a very late stage. The interests of justice would indeed be better served if parties resorted to compounding as a method to resolve their disputes at an early stage instead of engaging in protracted litigation before several forums, thereby causing undue delay, expenditure and strain on part of the judicial system. This is clearly a situation that is causing some concern, since Section 147 of the Act does not prescribe as to what stage is appropriate for compounding the offence and whether the same can be done at the instance of the complainant or with the leave of the court.</p><p>In <strong><em>O.P. Dholakia v. State of Haryana</em></strong>, (2000) 1 SCC 672, a division bench of Supreme Court had permitted the compounding of the offence even though the petitioner’s conviction had been upheld by all the three designated forums. After noting that the petitioner had already entered into a compromise with the complainant, the bench had rejected the State’s argument that Court need not interfere with the conviction and sentence since it was open to the parties to enter into a compromise at an earlier stage and that they had not done so. The bench had observed:</p><p>“… Taking into consideration the nature of the offence in question and the fact that the complainant and the accused have already entered into a compromise, we think it appropriate to grant permission in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, to compound.”</p><p>Similar reliefs were granted in orders reported as <strong><em>Sivasankaran v. State of Kerala &amp; Anr.</em></strong>, (2002) 8 SCC 164, <strong><em>Kishore Kumar v. J.K. Corporation Ltd.</em></strong>, (2004) 12 SCC 494 and <strong><em>Sailesh Shyam Parsekar v. Baban</em></strong>, (2005) 4 SCC 162, among other cases.</p><p>It would be apt to clarify that <strong>in view of the non-obstante clause, the compounding of offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is controlled by Section 147 and the scheme contemplated by Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be applicable </strong>in the strict sense since the latter is meant for the specified offences under the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is in the nature of an enabling provision which provides for the compounding of offences prescribed under the same Act, thereby <strong>serving as an exception to the general rule incorporated in sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the CrPC</strong> which states that ‘No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section’. A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also cannot be compounded. However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non-obstante clause.</p><p>In <strong><em>Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd.</em></strong>, (2008) 2 SCC 305, Supreme Court had examined ‘whether an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act which is a special law can be compounded’. After taking note of a divergence of views in past decisions, Court took the following position:</p><p>” … This provision is intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of negotiable instruments in issuing cheques without sufficient funds or with a view to inducing the payee or holder in due course to act upon it. It thus seeks to promote the efficacy of bank operations and ensures credibility in transacting business through cheques. In such matters, therefore, normally compounding of offences should not be denied. Presumably, Parliament also realised this aspect and inserted Section 147 by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 (Act 55 of 2002). …”</p><p>The compounding of the offence at later stages of litigation in cheque bouncing cases has also been held to be permissible in a recent decision of this Court, reported as <strong><em>K.M. Ibrahim v. K.P. Mohammed &amp; Anr.</em></strong>, 2009 (14) SCALE 262:</p><p>“11. As far as the non-obstante clause included in Section 147 of the 1881 Act is concerned, the 1881 Act being a special statute, the provisions of Section 147 will have an overriding effect over the provisions of the Code relating to compounding of offences. …</p><ol><li>It is true that the application under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was made by the parties after the proceedings had been concluded before the Appellate Forum. However, Section 147 of the aforesaid Act does not bar the parties from compounding an offence under Section 138 even at the appellate stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, we find no reason to reject the application under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act even in a proceeding under Article 136 of the Constitution.”</li></ol><p><strong>GUIDELINES ISSUED</strong></p><ul><li>That Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the <strong>first or second hearing of the case</strong> and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court <strong>without imposing any costs on the accused</strong>.</li><li>If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an <strong>application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage</strong>, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the <strong>accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount</strong> <strong>to be deposited as a condition for compounding </strong>with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.</li><li>Similarly, if the <strong>application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal</strong>, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the <strong>accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs</strong>.</li><li>Finally, if the <strong>application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount</strong>.</li></ul><p>It was also clarified that any costs imposed in accordance with these guidelines should be deposited with the Legal Services Authority operating at the level of the Court before which compounding takes place. For instance, in case of compounding during the pendency of proceedings before a Magistrate’s Court or a Court of Sessions, such costs should be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority. Likewise, if cost is imposed by the High Court then it should be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority and those imposed in connection with composition before the Supreme Court should be deposited with the National Legal Services Authority.</p><p>It was also directed that <strong>it should be mandatory for the complainant to disclose that no other complaint has been filed in any other court in respect of the same transaction.</strong> Such a disclosure should be made on a sworn affidavit which should accompany the complaint filed under Section 200 of the CrPC. If it is found that such multiple complaints have been filed, orders for transfer of the complaint to the first court should be given. These directions should be given effect prospectively.</p><p>For more blog visit www.myadvo.in</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78fc31aeee1a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SECOND WIFE IS ALSO ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE UNDER SECTION 125 OF Cr.P.C: SUPREME COURT]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/second-wife-is-also-entitled-to-maintenance-under-section-125-of-cr-p-c-supreme-court-e9d7dcf6a18b?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e9d7dcf6a18b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decisions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marriage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[maintenance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2016 10:39:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-13T10:39:50.258Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You must have read in newspapers or magazines or have heard that second marriage is illegal in India and the husband can be prosecuted by first wife under section 494 IPC. First wife is legally wedded wife and has all the rights of maintenance under personal laws as well Cr. P.C. But what about second wife? Is she entitled to any maintenance? Answer to this question was provided by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case mentioned below:</p><p>CASE NUMBER: Criminal Miscellaneous Petition №19530/2013</p><p>CASE TITLE: Badshah Versus Sou.Urmila Badshah Godse &amp; Anr.</p><p>DATED: October 18, 2013</p><p>CORAM: .J. Ranjana Prakash Desai and J. A.K.Sikri</p><p><strong>FACTS</strong></p><p>The respondents had filed an application under section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and stated in the petition that respondent №1 was married with Popat Female. However, in the year 1997 she got divorce from her first husband. After getting divorce from her first husband in the year 1997 till the year 2005 she resided at the house of her parents. On demand of the petitioner for her marriage through mediators, she married him on 10.2.2005 at Devgad Temple situated at Hivargav-Pavsa. Her marriage was performed with the petitioner as per Hindu Rites and customs. After her marriage, she resided and cohabited with the petitioner. Initially for 3 months, the petitioner cohabited and maintained her nicely.</p><p>After about three months of her marriage with petitioner, one lady Shobha came to the house of the petitioner and claimed herself to be his wife. On inquiring from the petitioner about the said lady Shobha, he replied that if she wanted to cohabit with him, she should reside quietly. Otherwise she was free to go back to her parent’s house. When Shobha came to the house of petitioner, respondent №1 was already pregnant from the petitioner. Therefore, she tolerated the ill-treatment of the petitioner and stayed along with Shobha. However, the petitioner started giving mental and physical torture to her under the influence of liquor. The petitioner also used to doubt that her womb is begotten from somebody else and it should be aborted. However, when the ill-treatment of the petitioner became intolerable, she came back to the house of her parents. Respondent №2, Shivanjali, was born on 28.11.2005. On the aforesaid averments, the respondents claimed maintenance for themselves.</p><p>The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 28.2.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in which the High Court has upheld the award of maintenance to respondent №1 at the rate of Rs.1000/- per month and to respondent №2 (daughter) at the rate of Rs.500/- per month in the application filed by them under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.</p><p><strong>ARGUMENTS BY PETITIONER</strong></p><p>The petitioner his relation with respondent Nos.1 and 2 as his wife and daughter respectively. He alleged that he never entered into any matrimonial alliance with respondent №1 on 10.2.2005, as claimed by respondent №1 and in fact respondent №1, who was in the habit of leveling false allegation, was trying to blackmail him. He also denied co-habitation with respondent №1 and claimed that he was not the father of respondent №2 either. According to the petitioner, he had married Shobha on 17.2.1979 and from that marriage he had two children viz. one daughter aged 20 years and one son aged 17 years and Shobha had been residing with him ever since their marriage. Therefore, respondent №1 was not and could not be his wife during the subsistence of his first marriage and she had filed a false petition claiming her relationship with him.</p><p>The counsel for the petitioner referred to the judgment of this Court in <strong><em>Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav vs. Anantrao Shivram Adhay &amp; Anr.</em></strong> In that case, it was held that a Hindu lady who married after coming into force Hindu Marriage Act, with a person who had a living lawfully wedded wife cannot be treated to be “legally wedded wife” and consequently her claim for maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. is not maintainable.</p><p>He also referred to later judgments in the case of <strong><em>Savitaben Somabai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat &amp; Ors. </em></strong>wherein the aforesaid judgment was followed.</p><p>On the strength of these two judgments, the counsel argued that the expression “wife” in Section 125 cannot be stretched beyond the legislative intent, which means only a legally wedded-wife. He argued that Section 5(1) (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 clearly prohibits 2nd marriage during the subsistence of the 1st marriage, and so respondent №1 cannot claim any equity; that the explanation clause (b) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. mentions the term “divorce” as a category of claimant, thus showing that only a legally wedded-wife can claim maintenance. He submitted that since the petitioner had proved that he was already married to Shobha and the said marriage was subsisting on the date of marriage with respondent №1, this marriage was void and respondent №1 was not legally wedded wife and therefore had no right to move application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.</p><p><strong>OBSERVATIONS OF THE COURT</strong></p><p>The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that evidence was led by both the parties and after hearing the arguments the learned JMFC negatived the defence of the petitioner. These findings are upheld by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment while dismissing the revision petition of the petitioner as well as the High Court. We proceed on the basis that the marriage between the petitioner and respondent №1 was solemnized; respondent №1 co-habited with the petitioner after the said marriage; and respondent №2 is begotten as out of the said co-habitation, whose biological father is the petitioner. However, it would be pertinent to record that respondent №1 had produced overwhelming evidence, which was believed by the learned JMFC that the marriage between the parties took place on 10.2.2005 at Devgad Temple.</p><p>The learned JMFC proceeded on the basis that the petitioner was married to Shobha and was having two children out of the wedlock. At the same time, it has also come on record that the petitioner duped respondent №1 by not revealing the fact of his first marriage and pretending that he was single. After this marriage, both lived together and respondent №2 was also born from this wedlock. <strong>In such circumstances, whether respondents could have filed application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., is the issue.</strong></p><p>It was observed by the Supreme Court that so far as respondent №2 is concerned, who is proved to be the daughter of the petitioner, in no case he can shun the liability and obligation to pay maintenance to her. The learned counsel ventured to dispute the legal obligation qua respondent №1 only.</p><p>The Supreme Court referred to two judgments: <strong><em>Dwarika Prasad Satpathy vs. Bidyut Prava Dixit &amp; Anr.</em></strong> (1999) 7 SCC 675. In this case it was held:</p><p>“The validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under s.125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under section 494 of the IPC. If the claimant in proceedings under s.125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the court can presume that they are legally wedded spouse, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption. Once it is admitted that the marriage procedure was followed then it is not necessary to further probe into whether the said procedure was complete as per the Hindu Rites in the proceedings under S.125, Cr.P.C. From the evidence which is led if the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied with regard to the performance of marriage in proceedings under S.125, Cr.P.C. which are of summary nature strict proof of performance of essential rites is not required.”</p><p>Second case was <strong><em>Chanmuniya vs. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha &amp; Anr.</em></strong> (2011) 1 SCC 141. The Court has held that the term “wife” occurring in Section 125, Cr.P.C. is to be given very wide interpretation. This is so stated in the following manner: “A broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term “wife” to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not be a pre-condition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. so as to fulfill the true spirit and essence of the beneficial provision of maintenance under Section 125.”</p><p><strong>DECISION</strong></p><p>In the facts of the present case, we are dealing with a situation where the marriage between the parties has been proved. However, the petitioner was already married. But he duped the respondent by suppressing the factum of alleged first marriage.<strong> On these facts, in our opinion, he cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of maintenance to the respondent, taking advantage of his own wrong.</strong> Our reasons for this course of action are stated hereinafter:</p><ol><li>Firstly, in Chanmuniya case, the parties had been living together for a long time and on that basis question arose as to whether there would be a presumption of marriage between the two because of the said reason, thus, giving rise to claim of maintenance under Section 125,Cr.P.C. by interpreting the term “wife” widely. The Court has impressed that if man and woman have been living together for a long time even without a valid marriage, as in that case, term of valid marriage entitling such a woman to maintenance should be drawn and a woman in such a case should be entitled to maintain application under Section 125,Cr.P.C. On the other hand, in the present case, respondent №1 has been able to prove, by cogent and strong evidence, that the petitioner and respondent №1 had been married each other.</li><li>Secondly, as already discussed above, when the marriage between respondent №1 and petitioner was solemnized, the petitioner had kept the respondent №1 in dark about her first marriage. A false representation was given to respondent №1 that he was single and was competent to enter into martial tie with respondent №1. In such circumstances, can the petitioner be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and turn around to say that respondents are not entitled to maintenance by filing the petition under Section 125,Cr.P.C. as respondent №1 is not “legally wedded wife” of the petitioner? Our answer is in the negative.</li></ol><p>We are of the view that at least for the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C., <strong>respondent №1 would be treated as the wife of the petitioner</strong>, going by the spirit of the two judgments we have reproduced above.</p><p>For this reason, we are of the opinion that the judgments of this Court in <strong><em>YamunaBai Adhav and Savitaben cases</em> would apply only in those circumstances where a woman married a man with full knowledge of the first subsisting marriage.</strong> In such cases, she should know that second marriage with such a person is impermissible and there is an embargo under the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer the consequences thereof. <strong>The said judgment would not apply to those cases where a man marriages second time by keeping that lady in dark about the first surviving marriage.</strong> That is the only way two sets of judgments can be reconciled and harmonized.</p><ol><li>Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125, Cr.P.C. While dealing with the application of destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the Constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Therefore, it becomes the duty of the Courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.</li></ol><p>Lastly Supreme Court observed that “This approach is particularly needed while deciding the issues relating to gender justice. We already have examples of exemplary efforts in this regard. Journey from <em>Shah Bano </em>to<em> Shabana Bano</em> guaranteeing maintenance rights to Muslim women is a classical example.”</p><p>For more blog visit www.myadvo.in</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e9d7dcf6a18b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PASSPORT LAW]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/all-you-need-to-know-about-passport-law-829707404739?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/829707404739</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legislation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2016 09:57:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-13T10:02:56.332Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>LEGISLATION:</strong></p><p>The Passport Act, 1967</p><p><strong>INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS:</strong></p><p>The Act consists of 27 Sections. Main aim of the Act is “to provide for the issue of passports and travel documents, to regulate the departure from India of citizens of India and for other persons and for matters incidental or ancillary thereto.” The Act applies to whole of India and to the citizens of India who are living outside the Country. Under <strong>Section 3</strong>, a person whoever makes an attempt to depart from India must hold a valid passport or travel document. As per <strong>Section 2 </strong>of this Act, Passport means a passport issued or deemed to have been issued under this Act; and includes a passport which been issued by or under the authority of Government of a Foreign Country and satisfies the conditions which prescribed under the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and travel document includes a document which been issued by the Government of a foreign country.</p><p><strong>TYPES OF PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS</strong></p><p>There are certain classes of passports and travel documents as provided under <strong>Section 4</strong> and it says that the classes of passports which may be issued under this Act are- ordinary, official and diplomatic passport and types of travel documents which may be issued are- emergency certificate authorizing a person to enter India, Certificate of identity for the purpose of establishing the identity of person and other as may be prescribed.</p><p><strong>PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING PASSPORT</strong></p><ol><li>Online Registration can be done at:</li></ol><p><a href="http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/procFormSubOnl">http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/procFormSubOnl</a></p><ol><li>Documents required for persons who were born in India after 26/01/1989 and are eligible for Non-ECR Category<a href="http://www.myadvo.in/all-you-need-to-know-about-passport-law/#_ftn1">[1]</a> are:</li></ol><ul><li>Proof of Present Address</li><li>Proof of Date of Birth</li><li>Documentary proof for any one of the Non-ECR categories</li><li>Citizen Certificate issued by Ministry of Home Affairs</li></ul><p>List of Documents required for other categories can be checked at:</p><p><a href="http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/docAdvisor/attachmentAdvFresh">http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/docAdvisor/attachmentAdvFresh</a></p><ol><li>Applicable fees<a href="http://www.myadvo.in/all-you-need-to-know-about-passport-law/#_ftn2">[2]</a>:</li></ol><p>Fees is non-refundable.</p><p>*applicable to minors between 15 to 18 years of age who wish to get a 10-year full validity passport.</p><p>Sr. No.Service RequiredApplication FeeTatkal Fee1.Fresh Passport/Re-issue of Passport including additional booklet due to exhaustion of visa pages (36 pages) of 10 years validity.Rs.1,500/-*Rs.2,000/-2.Fresh Passport/Re-issue of Passport including additional booklet due to exhaustion of visa pages (60 pages) of 10 years validity.Rs.2,000/-Rs.2,000/-3.Fresh Passport/Re-issue of Passport for Minors (below 18 years of Age), of 5 years validity or till the minor attains the age of 18 whichever is earlier (36 pages)Rs.1,000/-Rs.2,000/-4.Replacement of Passport (36 pages) in lieu of lost, damaged or stolen passportRs.3,000/-Rs.2,000/-5.Replacement of Passport (60 pages) in lieu of lost, damaged or stolen passportRs.3,500/-Rs.2,000/-</p><p>6.Police Clearance Certificate (PCC)Rs.500/-NA7.deletion of ECR / Change in personal particulars (10 year validity)Rs.1,500/-</p><p>Rs.2,000/-8.Replacement of Passport (60 pages) for deletion of ECR / Change in personal particulars (10 year validity)Rs.2,000/-Rs.2,000/-9.Replacement of Passport (36 pages) for deletion of ECR/ Change in personal particulars for Minors (below 18 years of Age), of 5 years validity or till the minor attains the age of 18 whichever is earlier.Rs.1,000/-Rs.2,000/-</p><p><strong>RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT:</strong></p><p>In the case, <em>Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi, (SC), 1967 AIR (SC) 1836</em> it was observed by the Supreme Court that “the compendious expression in personal liberty used in Article 21 included in its ambit the right to go abroad and a person could not be deprived of that right except according to procedure established by law as laid down in Article 21”.</p><p>Also in <em>Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (SC), 1978 AIR (SC) 597</em>, Supreme Court ruled by majority that the expression ‘personal liberty’ which occurs in Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to travel abroad and that no person can be deprived of that right except according to procedure established by law. The Passports Act which was enacted by Parliament in 1967 in order to comply with that decision prescribes the procedure whereby an application for a passport may be granted fully or partially, with or without any endorsement, and a passport once granted may later be revoked or impounded. But the mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of Article 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. The question whether the procedure prescribed by a law which curtails or takes away the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 is reasonable or not has to be considered not in the abstract or on hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full-dress hearing as in a Court-room trial, but in the context, primarily, of the purpose which the Act is intended to achieve and of urgent situations which those who are charged with the duty of administering the Act may be called upon to deal with. Secondly, even the fullest compliance with the requirements of Article 21 is not the journey’s end because, a law which prescribes fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing or taking away the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 has still to meet a possible challenge under other provisions of the Constitution like, for example, Article 14 and 19………. To sum up, personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person.<strong> Travel makes liberty worthwhile. </strong>Life is a terrestrial opportunity for unfolding personality, rising to higher states, moving to fresh woods and reaching out to reality which makes our earthly journey a true fulfilment — not a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing, but a fine frenzy rolling between heaven and earth. The spirit of Man is at the root of Article 21, absent, liberty, other freedoms are frozen……. <strong>Freedom of movement of the individual within or in leaving his own country, in travelling to other countries and in entering his own country is a vital human liberty</strong>”.</p><h3>IMPOUNDING OF PASSPORT</h3><p>Under <strong>Section 10</strong>, the passport authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or travel document:</p><ul><li>if the passport authority is satisfied that the holder of the passport or travel document is in wrongful possession thereof;</li><li>if the passport or travel document was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the passport or travel document or any other person on his behalf;</li><li>if the passport authority deems it necessary to do so in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country, or in the interests of the general public;</li><li>if the holder of the passport or travel document has, at any time after the issue of the passport or travel document, been convicted by a court in India for any offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than two years;</li><li>if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of the passport or travel document are pending before a criminal court in India;</li><li>if any of the conditions of the passport or travel documents is contravened;</li><li>if it is brought to the notice of the passport authority that a warrant or summons for the appearance, or a warrant for the arrest, of the holder of the passport or travel document has been issued by a court under any law for the time being in force or if an order prohibiting the departure from India of the holder of the passport or other travel document has been made by any such court and the passport authority is satisfied that a warrant or summons has been so issued or an order has been so made;</li><li>A court convicting the holder of a passport or travel document of any offence under this Act or the rules made thereunder may also revoke the passport or travel document.</li></ul><p>The <strong>question</strong> that arises now is: can a passport be impounded by Police by exercising power under section 102 read with section 165 and 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973? The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in <em>Suresh Nanda v. CBI (2008) 3 SCC 674 </em>has answered this question in negative and observed that while the police may have the power to seize a passport under Section 102(1) Criminal Procedure Code 1973, it does not have the power to impound the same. Impounding of a passport can only be done by the passport authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.</p><h3>RESTRICTIONS ON GRANTING PASSPORT</h3><p>Under <strong>section 6</strong>, the passport authority or central shall refuse to issue passport on any one or more of the following grounds and no other ground:</p><ul><li>That the applicant may, or is likely to, engage in such country in activities prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India:</li><li>That the presence of the applicant in such country may, or is likely to, be detrimental to the security of India;</li><li>That the presence of the applicant in such country may, or is likely to, prejudice the friendly relations of India with that or any other country;</li><li>That in the opinion of the Central Government the presence of the applicant in such country is not in the public interest;</li><li>That the applicant is not a citizen of India;</li><li>That the applicant has, at any time during the period of five years immediately preceding the date of his application, been convicted by a court in India for any offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than two years;</li><li>That proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant are pending before a criminal court in India;</li><li>That a warrant or summons for the appearance, or a warrant for the arrest, of the applicant has been issued by a court under any law for the time being in force or that an order prohibiting the departure from India of the applicant has been made by any such court;</li><li>That the applicant has been repatriated and has not reimbursed the expenditure incurred in connection with such repatriation.</li></ul><p>In case, your passport has been refused on any other ground or in an arbitrary or unfair manner then a writ for the issuance of the same can be filed.</p><p>For more blog visit www.myadvo.in</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=829707404739" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Clarification on Cash Deposits in Bank Account post Demonetization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@ujjwal_60379/clarification-on-cash-deposits-in-bank-account-post-demonetization-5655eac4aba4?source=rss-82ff0ed47eeb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5655eac4aba4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lawyers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ujjwal Agarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2016 13:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-12T13:22:45.288Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There has been a big hue and cry over the demonetization of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 currency for the last 8 days with opposition parties shedding tears for the discomfort of the common man. The business community who are relatively well-off were also upset because of the threatening statement of the government that any deposit above Rs. 2,50,000 would be liable for probe and could meet with 200% penalty. Whether those statements have any legal basis or not, was debated across the country by the intellectuals. The statement of the government did not state whether the deposit ceiling is with reference to savings account or current account or loan account or all the accounts put together.</p><p>Among the intelligentsia it was concluded that no penalty could be levied for depositing the amounts representing demonetized currencies into the bank account(s) of the taxpayers if it is admitted as income. The government in return stated that it would seek information before the end of the financial year and would crackdown the tax evaders who deposited unaccounted money into their bank account at this point of time in spite of admitting such deposit as income and reconciling to pay tax at 30% or so.</p><p>Earlier the government did not also spell out as to how and when the banks have to submit the report for further proceedings by the tax department. Now the CBDT has amended the Income-tax rules and prescribed the reporting i.e. AIR which must dispel the fears of the taxpayers.</p><p><strong>Notification of CBDT</strong></p><p>The CBDT has issued in Notification №104/2016 dated 15.11.2016 which when examined closely would show that the government silently has eased out the difficulties of the business community who operate their business transactions through current account by prescribing a threshold limit of Rs. 12,50,000 for reporting those transactions by banks, co-operative banks and post offices.</p><p>The CBDT has also amended rule <a href="http://www.myadvo.in/Downloads/?Page=CASELAWS&amp;id=103120000000007541&amp;source=link">114B</a> of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 meant for quoting PAN by substituting Sl.№10 by including cash deposit of Rs. 50,000 or more on any one day or aggregating to more than Rs. 2,50,000 during the period 9th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016. This parameter would apply for deposits made with a banking company or a co-operative bank to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 applies or Post office.</p><p>Further the CBDT has inserted Sl.№12 to rule <a href="http://www.myadvo.in/Downloads/?Page=CASELAWS&amp;id=103120000000007545&amp;source=link">114E</a> by which filing of statement of financial transaction i.e. AIR would apply to the following:</p><p>i) Cash deposits during the period 9th November, 2016 to 30th December,2016 aggregating to Rs. 12,50,000 or more in one or more current account of a person or Rs. 2,50,000 or more in one or more accounts (other than current account) of a person is liable to be reported by</p><p>a) a banking company or a co-operative society to which the Banking Regulation Act,1949 applies;</p><p>b) Post Master General as referred to in clause (j) of section 2 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898.</p><p>Further, sub-rule 5 to section 114E has been amended whereby the statement of financial transaction (i.e. AIR) of newly listed Sl.No.(12) must be furnished before 31.01.2017 though the statement of financial transactions (regular AIR) in respect of other items are to be furnished by 31st May of the succeeding financial year.</p><p><strong>Impact of amendment to Income-tax Rules</strong></p><p>The impact of the amendments could be listed as under:</p><p>i) Cash deposit in a bank account or post office exceeding Rs. 50,000 on any one day requires quoting of PAN on mandatory basis (with exceptions given in proviso to rule 114B).</p><p>ii) Cash deposit aggregating to more than Rs. 2,50,000 from 09.11.2016 to 30.12.2016 requires quoting of PAN when such deposit is made with a banking company or a co-operative society to which the Banking Regulation Act,1949 applies or when such deposit is made in post office.</p><p>iii) Cash deposits in one or more current account aggregating to Rs. 12,50,000 during the period 09.11.2016 to 30.12.2016 will be reported by the banking company or a co-operative bank to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 applies or by the Post Master General, as the case may be.</p><p>iv) Cash deposit during the period 09.11.2016 to 30.12.2016 aggregating to Rs. 2,50,000 or more in one or more accounts, other than current account of a person will be liable for inclusion in the statement of financial transaction to be submitted by a banking company or a co-operative society to which the Banking Regulation Act,1949 applies or the Post Master General, as the case may be.</p><p>v) These transactions have to be reported before 31.01.2017 by a banking company or a co-operative bank as the case may be or by the Post Master General.</p><p>vi) A businessman can deposit Rs. 12,50,000 in his current account and also Rs. 2,50,000 in his bank account not being a current account. In short, Rs. 15 lakh could be deposited by a businessman in his current account and other accounts by appropriating the amounts properly.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The CBDT perhaps has taken note of the woes of the business community who may have fund inflow due to collections from debtors which they may have omitted to deposit post Diwali and hence has prescribed the cash deposit limit of Rs. 12,50,000 in current account besides the existing limit of Rs. 2,50,000 in any other account. This would provide the much needed relief to the traders and small micro entities to overcome working capital crunch.</p><p>The amendments to Income-tax Rules, 1962 could not be deciphered by the common man on bare perusal of the amendments and the professional fraternity has to allay the fears of businessmen by explaining the benefit of such amendment in order to set the businesses back to their rails. May be, the CBDT has to give enough publicity in the media about the amendments made so that legitimate accounted money of business community could be deployed without any fear.</p><p>The CBDT may also clarify whether repayment of loans by the borrowers directly into their loan account / working capital facility accounts (being a borrowal) would be scrutinized or not by the tax authorities. Any encouraging clarification in this regard would also help the banks to realize many NPA accounts at this juncture.</p><p>Written by <strong><em>Mr. Mukesh Bansal</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5655eac4aba4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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