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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by The Unseen Dossier on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by The Unseen Dossier on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by The Unseen Dossier on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 086: Bowers to Lawrence, 17 Years of Sodomy Laws the Supreme Court Upheld, Then Struck]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-086-bowers-to-lawrence-17-years-of-sodomy-laws-the-supreme-court-upheld-then-struck-653b4ea8ed4d?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitutional-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lgbtq-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 15:21:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-10T15:21:02.092Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 1986 the Supreme Court said Georgia could make private, consensual sex between two men a felony. In 2003 it said that ruling was wrong when it was made. The statutes it allowed are still written into several state codes.</p><p>In August 1982, an Atlanta police officer walked into Michael Hardwick’s bedroom to serve a warrant and arrested him under Georgia’s sodomy law. The statute allowed a court to imprison a person “for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of sodomy,” as Justice Lewis Powell later wrote. The district attorney declined to take the charge to a grand jury. Hardwick sued anyway, and the case reached the Supreme Court.</p><p>On June 30, 1986, the Court ruled 5–4 that the Constitution did not protect him. Seventeen years later, in <em>Lawrence v. Texas</em>, the Court said that ruling “was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”</p><p>This dossier follows the record between those two dates: who was arrested, what the justices wrote, and what the states did with laws the Court eventually said they could not enforce.</p><h3>A warrant, a bedroom, and a test case</h3><p>According to the <a href="https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/bowers-v-hardwick/">New Georgia Encyclopedia</a>, a project supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the arrest began with a ticket for public drinking outside the bar where Hardwick worked. He missed his court date, a warrant issued, and he later paid a $50 fine. The officer, Keith Torick, “was unaware that Hardwick’s account was settled,” the encyclopedia says, and on Aug. 3, 1982, entered Hardwick’s home to serve the warrant.</p><p>The Supreme Court’s own account is shorter. Hardwick was charged “with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of respondent’s home,” Justice Byron White <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/478/186">wrote</a>. “After a preliminary hearing, the District Attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed.”</p><p>The American Civil Liberties Union had been looking for a case to challenge the law. Hardwick agreed to be the plaintiff.</p><p>“I was arrested in my own house. So I was a perfect test case,” he later said, as quoted by the encyclopedia. A federal district court dismissed his suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the statute violated his fundamental rights. Georgia’s attorney general, Michael Bowers, appealed.</p><h3>Five votes for Georgia</h3><p>White framed the question narrowly: whether the Constitution “confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” He wrote that “no connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.” He pointed out that until 1961 all 50 states outlawed sodomy, and that “24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.” Against that background, he wrote, a claim that the right was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” was “at best, facetious.”</p><p>Chief Justice Warren Burger added a concurrence: “To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”</p><p>Powell supplied the fifth vote, with a reservation. He wrote that a prison sentence for such conduct, “certainly a sentence of long duration,” would “create a serious Eighth Amendment issue.” But Hardwick “has not been tried, much less convicted and sentenced,” Powell wrote, so the question was not before the Court.</p><p>Justice Harry Blackmun wrote for the four dissenters. The case, he said, was about “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,” namely, “the right to be let alone.” He closed with a prediction: “I can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis.”</p><h3>The fifth vote’s second thoughts</h3><p>Powell retired in 1987. In October 1990, answering questions from New York University law students, he was asked whether any decision gave him doubts in retrospect. “I think I probably made a mistake in that one,” he said, according to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/10/26/powell-regrets-backing-sodomy-law/a1ae2efc-bec6-47ec-bfb6-1c098e610c5b/"><em>Washington Post</em></a>. The <em>Post</em> reported that Powell “later acknowledged that he had initially voted to strike down the statute but then switched his vote.”</p><p>His biographer, John Jeffries of the University of Virginia, recorded a fuller version, as <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-when-justices-express-regrets/">SCOTUSblog</a> recounted: “When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments.” The regret changed nothing in law. <em>Bowers</em> remained binding.</p><p>Michael Hardwick died on June 13, 1991, near Gainesville, Florida, of complications from AIDS. His obituary, the <a href="https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/bowers-v-hardwick/">encyclopedia</a> notes, did not mention his sexual orientation or his role in the case.</p><h3>State courts moved first</h3><p>While <em>Bowers</em> stood, state supreme courts began striking down their own sodomy laws under their own constitutions. The <em>Lawrence</em> opinion later listed five: Kentucky in 1992, Tennessee in 1996, Montana in 1997, Georgia in 1998, and Arkansas in 2002.</p><p>Georgia’s decision, <em>Powell v. State</em>, struck the same statute the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld. The Georgia court wrote, as quoted by the encyclopedia, that “we cannot think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private and more deserving of protection from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual activity.”</p><h3>A weapons call in Houston</h3><p>The case that ended <em>Bowers</em> began with a false lead. Officers of the Harris County Police Department “were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance,” Justice Anthony Kennedy <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/539/558">wrote</a>. They entered the apartment of John Geddes Lawrence and found him with another man, Tyron Garner. “The right of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned,” Kennedy noted.</p><p>Both men were arrested, held overnight, and charged under Texas Penal Code § 21.06, which makes it an offense to engage in “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” The <a href="https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._penal_code_section_21.06">statute</a> classes the offense as a Class C misdemeanor. Lawrence and Garner pleaded no contest and were each fined $200 plus $141.25 in court costs. A Texas appeals court, bound by <em>Bowers</em>, upheld the convictions.</p><h3>“Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled”</h3><p>On June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court reversed, 6–3. Kennedy’s opinion took apart <em>Bowers’</em> framing, saying its statement of the question “discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.” He noted that the 25 states with such laws at the time of <em>Bowers</em> were “reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct,” and that even in those states there was “a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.”</p><p>The holding was direct: “The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” And on precedent: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”</p><p>Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred on equal-protection grounds alone. “I joined Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it,” she wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting with Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote that “the Court has taken sides in the culture war.” Thomas added a separate dissent calling the Texas law “uncommonly silly” and saying, “If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal it.” He still found no constitutional right that would let him strike it.</p><h3>What a conviction carried</h3><p>The <em>Lawrence</em> majority spent several paragraphs on what even a minor conviction meant. The offense was “but a class C misdemeanor,” Kennedy wrote, yet it “remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.” A Texas conviction under the statute would bring the person within the sex-offender registration laws of at least four states, the Court was told. Convictions also followed people onto “job application forms.”</p><p>The Court also named the broader effect: criminalizing the conduct was “an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” That sentence is interpretation by the majority, not a finding of fact about any individual. It is also the sentence Scalia singled out as proof the Court had taken sides.</p><h3>Struck, but not removed</h3><p><em>Lawrence</em> made the statutes unenforceable against private, consensual adult conduct. It did not delete them. Legislatures had to do that themselves, and many did not.</p><p>In 2013, the Baton Rouge <em>Advocate</em> reported that East Baton Rouge Parish sheriff’s deputies had used Louisiana’s crime-against-nature law in undercover stings. According to the <a href="https://americanpress.com/2013/07/30/east-baton-rouge-sheriff-issues-apology-for-park-arrests/">Associated Press</a>, at least a dozen men had been booked since 2011 on counts of attempted crime against nature, and District Attorney Hillar Moore III declined to prosecute because the men had committed no criminal violations. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna52623843">NBC News</a> reported that none of the men “were found to have committed sexual acts in a public place.” Sheriff Sid Gautreaux apologized. “Again, we made mistakes,” he said, and told employees “they are not to use these unconstitutional laws.”</p><p>The next spring, a Baton Rouge legislator introduced a bill to remove the invalid provisions. On April 15, 2014, the Louisiana House <a href="https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=223620">rejected it</a>, 27 yeas to 67 nays, according to the official <a href="https://legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=893911">roll call</a>.</p><p>Texas still carries § 21.06. In May 2025 the Texas House passed House Bill 1738 to repeal it, which the <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2025/05/15/texas-homosexual-misconduct-ban-gay/"><em>Texas Tribune</em></a> called the furthest a repeal bill had gone. The <a href="https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?Bill=HB1738&amp;LegSess=89R">legislative record</a> shows the Senate received the bill on May 19, 2025, with no further action.</p><p>In 2023, the <em>New York Times</em> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/21/us/politics/state-anti-sodomy-laws.html">reported</a> that such laws remained in 12 states. Florida has since repealed its own: the Legislature passed House Bill 1525, which removes the state’s “unnatural and lascivious act” statute, 108–0 and 38–0. The governor approved it on June 16, 2026, and it took effect on Oct. 1, 2026, according to the <a href="https://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2026/1525">Florida Senate</a>. As of Oct. 26, 2026, Texas had not repealed § 21.06, and the official text of Louisiana’s <a href="https://legis.la.gov/legis/LawPrint.aspx?d=78695">crime-against-nature statute</a> still defines the offense to include “unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with another of the same sex or opposite sex.”</p><h3>Why the dead laws still matter</h3><p>The concern is not hypothetical to the people who track these statutes. In 2022, concurring in <em>Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization</em>, Thomas <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf">wrote</a> that “in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.” The majority wrote that nothing in its opinion “should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Thomas wrote only for himself.</p><p>That is the open question the record leaves. <em>Lawrence</em> removed the power to prosecute. It did not remove the text, and it did not reach the arrests already made under that text, in Atlanta in 1982, in Houston, and in Baton Rouge a decade after the Court said the law could not be used. Whether those statutes stay dormant depends on legislatures that, in several states, have chosen to keep them.</p><h3>Timeline</h3><ul><li><strong>Aug. 3, 1982:</strong> Michael Hardwick is arrested in his Atlanta home under Georgia’s sodomy law; prosecutors do not take the case to a grand jury.</li><li><strong>Feb. 14, 1983:</strong> ACLU lawyers file Hardwick’s federal suit.</li><li><strong>1985:</strong> The Eleventh Circuit rules the Georgia statute violates his fundamental rights.</li><li><strong>June 30, 1986:</strong> <em>Bowers v. Hardwick</em>, 5–4, upholds the law.</li><li><strong>October 1990:</strong> Retired Justice Powell tells NYU law students he “probably made a mistake.”</li><li><strong>June 13, 1991:</strong> Hardwick dies.</li><li><strong>1992–2002:</strong> Kentucky, Tennessee, Montana, Georgia, and Arkansas courts strike their own sodomy laws.</li><li><strong>June 26, 2003:</strong> <em>Lawrence v. Texas</em>, 6–3, overrules <em>Bowers</em>.</li><li><strong>July 2013:</strong> East Baton Rouge sheriff apologizes for arrests under Louisiana’s invalid law.</li><li><strong>April 15, 2014:</strong> Louisiana House rejects repeal, 27–67.</li><li><strong>June 24, 2022:</strong> In <em>Dobbs</em>, Thomas urges reconsideration of <em>Lawrence</em>.</li><li><strong>May 16, 2025:</strong> Texas House passes HB 1738 to repeal § 21.06; the Senate does not act.</li><li><strong>Oct. 1, 2026:</strong> Florida’s repeal of its “unnatural and lascivious act” statute takes effect.</li></ul><h3>Sources</h3><ol><li><em>Bowers v. Hardwick</em>, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), opinions of the Court, Burger, Powell, Blackmun and Stevens, via Cornell Legal Information Institute. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/478/186">https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/478/186</a></li><li><em>Lawrence v. Texas</em>, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), opinions of the Court, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas, via Cornell Legal Information Institute. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/539/558">https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/539/558</a></li><li>Oyez case records for <em>Bowers v. Hardwick</em> (argued March 31, 1986; decided June 30, 1986) and <em>Lawrence v. Texas</em> (argued March 26, 2003; decided June 26, 2003). <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-140">https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-140</a> ; <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102">https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102</a></li><li>Tracy Barnett, “Bowers v. Hardwick,” <em>New Georgia Encyclopedia</em> (Georgia Humanities, supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities). <a href="https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/bowers-v-hardwick/">https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/bowers-v-hardwick/</a></li><li>Ruth Marcus, “Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law,” <em>The Washington Post</em>, Oct. 26, 1990. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/10/26/powell-regrets-backing-sodomy-law/a1ae2efc-bec6-47ec-bfb6-1c098e610c5b/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/10/26/powell-regrets-backing-sodomy-law/a1ae2efc-bec6-47ec-bfb6-1c098e610c5b/</a></li><li>“When Justices express regrets,” SCOTUSblog, May 2013. <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-when-justices-express-regrets/">https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-when-justices-express-regrets/</a></li><li>NYU School of Law, “Writing LGBTQ history at NYU Law” (timeline entry for Oct. 18, 1990). <a href="https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/stonewall-50th-anniversary-lgbtq-history-timeline">https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/stonewall-50th-anniversary-lgbtq-history-timeline</a></li><li>Texas Penal Code § 21.06, “Homosexual Conduct,” via Public.Law. <strong>Primary (statute text).</strong> <a href="https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._penal_code_section_21.06">https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._penal_code_section_21.06</a></li><li>“East Baton Rouge Sheriff issues apology for park arrests,” Associated Press via <em>American Press</em>, July 30, 2013. <a href="https://americanpress.com/2013/07/30/east-baton-rouge-sheriff-issues-apology-for-park-arrests/">https://americanpress.com/2013/07/30/east-baton-rouge-sheriff-issues-apology-for-park-arrests/</a></li><li>“Advocate editor not impressed by sheriff’s apology on sodomy arrests,” NBC News / MSNBC, July 2013. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna52623843">https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna52623843</a></li><li>Louisiana Legislature, HB 12 (2014 Regular Session) bill history and House final-passage roll call, April 15, 2014. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=223620">https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=223620</a> ; <a href="https://legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=893911">https://legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=893911</a></li><li>Texas Legislature Online, HB 1738 (89th Legislature, Regular Session) history. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?Bill=HB1738&amp;LegSess=89R">https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?Bill=HB1738&amp;LegSess=89R</a></li><li>“Texas House votes to repeal sodomy ban,” <em>The Texas Tribune</em>, May 2025. <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2025/05/15/texas-homosexual-misconduct-ban-gay/">https://www.texastribune.org/2025/05/15/texas-homosexual-misconduct-ban-gay/</a></li><li>“The Supreme Court Struck Down Sodomy Laws 20 Years Ago. Some Still Remain,” <em>The New York Times</em>, July 21, 2023 (confirmed via search; site blocks automated access). <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/21/us/politics/state-anti-sodomy-laws.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/21/us/politics/state-anti-sodomy-laws.html</a></li><li>The Florida Senate, CS/CS/HB 1525 (2026), “Lewd or Lascivious Acts,” bill history (Chapter 2026–159). <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2026/1525">https://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2026/1525</a></li><li><em>Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization</em>, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), slip opinion including Thomas concurrence. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf">https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf</a></li><li>Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:89, “Crime against nature,” official text, Louisiana State Legislature. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://legis.la.gov/legis/LawPrint.aspx?d=78695">https://legis.la.gov/legis/LawPrint.aspx?d=78695</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=653b4ea8ed4d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 040: Two Killings in Minneapolis and the Fight Over Who Gets to Investigate]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-040-two-killings-in-minneapolis-and-the-fight-over-who-gets-to-investigate-2e55b4e764b1?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e55b4e764b1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[minneapolis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[use-of-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[border-patrol]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 14:56:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-03T14:56:01.578Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Federal agents shot Renee Good and Alex Pretti 17 days apart in January 2026; nine months later, Minnesota’s lawsuit over access to the evidence is still pending, and no one has been charged in either death.</h4><p>For more than two months after Renee Good died, her Honda Pilot sat in an FBI storage facility in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota. State investigators held a search warrant for it. According to a lawsuit filed by the State of Minnesota, the car was shrink-wrapped and, as far as the state knew, had never been examined.</p><p>The car was one piece of a larger dispute. Two U.S. citizens were killed by federal immigration personnel on Minneapolis streets in January 2026, and a third man was wounded. Federal agencies took control of the evidence, and the state agency that ordinarily investigates police shootings was kept out. This dossier sets out what the record shows, what is alleged, and what remains unsettled as of Nov. 2, 2026.</p><h3>The operation</h3><p>In December 2025, the Department of Homeland Security began an enforcement action in the Twin Cities called Operation Metro Surge. The <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2026/03/MN-v-DOJ-Complaint.pdf">state’s complaint</a> says DHS described it as the largest immigration operation in the department’s history. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvw89p3p1o">BBC reporting</a> in late January put the number of officers at about 3,000.</p><p>The operation ended in February, when thousands of agents withdrew, according to the <a href="https://abc7news.com/post/dhs-ice-shootings-minnesota-prosecutors-obtain-long-withheld-evidence-renee-good-alex-pretti-shooting-deaths/19501175/">Associated Press</a>. By then, three shootings by federal personnel in Hennepin County had become the center of a conflict between the state and federal governments.</p><h3>January 7: Renee Good</h3><p>Renee Good was 37, a mother of three, and a U.S. citizen. Her family’s complaint describes her as a poet who lived in south Minneapolis with her partner, Rebecca “Becca” Good. That morning the two had dropped Renee’s six-year-old son at school and, on the way home, came upon ICE agents working in the neighborhood.</p><p>What follows in this section is the family’s account, drawn from the <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Renee-Good-family-suit-against-Ross.pdf">complaint against ICE officer Jonathan Ross</a> filed Oct. 1. It is an allegation, not a finding. The complaint says Renee stopped on Portland Avenue and honked to warn neighbors while Becca got out to film, and that about 11 vehicles, Ross’s Tahoe among them, drove around the stopped car.</p><p>According to the complaint, Renee told Ross as he passed her window, “That’s fine dude. I’m not mad at you.” Two other agents then stopped a pickup, ordered her out of the car, and one reached through her window. The family alleges she turned her wheels to the right, away from Ross, and began to pull slowly forward. Ross, they allege, fired once through the windshield and twice through the open driver’s window as the car turned away.</p><p>The family’s <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mnd.236479/gov.uscourts.mnd.236479.1.0.pdf">FTCA complaint</a> says one round struck her left temple, that a bystander who identified himself as a physician was turned away, and that she was pronounced dead at Hennepin County Medical Center at 10:30 a.m. It quotes the medical examiner’s record: manner of death homicide, “shot by a law enforcement officer.” In a medical examiner’s usage, homicide means death at the hands of another person. It is not a legal judgment of guilt.</p><h3>The federal account of Good’s death</h3><p>Federal officials described a different event, and they did so within hours. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/ice-shooting-investigation-jonathan-ross-fbi-b2904055.html">The Independent</a>, citing The Washington Post, reported that Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and other officials accused Good of “weaponizing” her car in an act of “domestic terrorism.” The family’s complaint quotes Noem saying the officer “acted quickly and defensively shot to protect himself and the people around him.”</p><p>The complaint also quotes DHS spokesperson Tricia McLaughlin telling PBS that the officer fired “fearing for his life” and that injured officers were expected to recover. Ross has not given a public account. His version of the encounter, and any evidence supporting it, has not been tested in any court.</p><p>Whether Good drove at Ross is the central disputed fact. Video of the shooting circulated widely, and the state’s complaint relies on it. Investigators and, eventually, courts will have to decide what the video and the physical evidence show.</p><h3>January 14: Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis</h3><p>One week later, a federal immigration agent shot Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis, a Venezuelan national, in the leg at the door of his Minneapolis home. Federal prosecutors charged Sosa-Celis with attacking the agent. On Feb. 12, they moved to dismiss the case with prejudice, citing “newly discovered evidence” that was “materially inconsistent with the allegations in the Complaint Affidavit,” as the state’s complaint records.</p><p>The agent, Christian Castro, was later charged by state prosecutors with assault and falsely reporting a crime, the AP reported. <a href="https://www.fox9.com/news/minneapolis-ice-shootings-where-criminal-investigations-stand">FOX 9</a> reported on Oct. 1 that Castro, now a former agent, was on house arrest. Of the three shootings, it is the only one that has led to a criminal charge. Castro is presumed innocent.</p><h3>January 24: Alex Pretti</h3><p>Alex Pretti was 37, a U.S. citizen and an intensive-care nurse at the Minneapolis VA. He was killed by two federal officers near Nicollet Avenue and 26th Street.</p><p>DHS’s first statement said one Border Patrol agent fired “defensive shots” and that Pretti had “approached” agents with a 9 mm handgun, according to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/two-federal-agents-fired-their-weapons-during-alex-pretti-shooting-report-congress-says/">CBS News</a>. Noem said he approached with a gun in an effort to kill officers. Border Patrol commander Gregory Bovino accused him of trying to “massacre law enforcement.”</p><p>Three days later, CBP sent Congress a preliminary review by its Office of Professional Responsibility, based on body-camera footage and agency records. CBS published it in full. It says an officer pepper-sprayed Pretti and a woman who would not leave the roadway, that Pretti “resisted” when agents tried to take him into custody, and that during the struggle an agent yelled “He’s got a gun!” several times. About five seconds later, a Border Patrol agent and a CBP officer fired. “After the shooting, a BPA advised he had possession of Pretti’s firearm.”</p><p>The review does not say Pretti drew or reached for his gun. CBP told CBS that such notifications “do not convey any definitive conclusion or investigative findings.” Minneapolis Police Chief Brian O’Hara said Pretti was a lawful gun owner with a permit to carry. The state’s complaint says that, based on video, Pretti appears to have been restrained by several officers when two masked officers shot him. That is the state’s reading, and what Pretti was doing in the seconds before the shots is still disputed.</p><h3>Shut out</h3><p>Minnesota’s Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) investigates officer-involved shootings in the state, including some involving federal officers. The state’s complaint says that on the morning Good died, the BCA and the FBI’s Minneapolis office agreed to a joint investigation, and that the first assistant U.S. attorney confirmed it. By evening, the complaint says, the U.S. attorney told the BCA there would be no joint investigation and no evidence sharing.</p><p>After Pretti’s death, the complaint alleges, a federal incident commander said he had been ordered not to let the BCA onto the scene. The BCA sued that day. Judge Eric Tostrud entered a temporary order requiring evidence to be preserved, then dissolved it on Feb. 2. <a href="https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/02/03/judge-lifts-order-requiring-investigators-to-preserve-evidence-in-fatal-shooting-of-pretti">MPR News</a> reported that he found federal agencies unlikely to destroy evidence. He also called statements by top officials about Pretti’s motives “troubling,” writing that they reflected “snap judgments informed by speculation and motivated by political partisanship.”</p><p>The record also shows why the state worried. CBS reported that the agent who took Pretti’s handgun put it in a vehicle, and that investigators had no documented chain of custody for it.</p><h3>The civil rights questions</h3><p>On Good’s death, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche said on Jan. 18: “We investigate when it’s appropriate to investigate. And that is not the case here.” The quote appears in the state’s complaint and in The Independent’s report.</p><p>The Independent, citing The Washington Post, reported that a federal civil rights review of Ross’s conduct was opened and then dropped. The FBI said those decisions “were not made by the FBI” and that “the facts do not support civil rights investigation.” The New York Times reported, as cited in the state’s complaint, that six prosecutors resigned over a push to investigate Good’s widow. It also reported that an FBI agent resigned after trying to investigate Ross. Who decided to end the review, and why, has not been explained on the record.</p><p>Pretti’s case went differently. On Jan. 30, Blanche said the Justice Department had opened a civil rights investigation, while saying he did not want to “overstate” the move, the BBC reported. DHS said the FBI would lead it with support from the Civil Rights Division. CBP placed the two officers on administrative leave. On Sept. 9, <a href="https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/09/09/federal-investigators-interview-key-witness-to-alex-pretti-shooting">MPR News</a> reported that the FBI had interviewed Wynnie Savageford, a key witness, though the Justice Department did not immediately respond to a request to confirm the investigation.</p><h3>The lawsuit over evidence</h3><p>On March 24, Minnesota, Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty and BCA Superintendent Drew Evans sued the Justice Department and DHS in Washington. The case, <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/72590076/state-of-minnesota-v-united-states-department-of-justice/">Minnesota v. DOJ</a>, is before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. The state claims that federal refusals to answer its formal evidence demands violated the Administrative Procedure Act. It says the refusals reflected a blanket policy of noncooperation, not decisions based on each case.</p><p>The complaint says that on March 18 the FBI told the BCA that the evidence on Good would go only to DHS’s inspector general. On June 18, the state amended its complaint. Four days later, the AP reported, the state told the court that the FBI, the U.S. attorney’s office and state officials had “re-engaged in discussions” about sharing information.</p><p>On July 13, Moriarty announced that federal authorities had handed over hard drives with statements, body-camera video and Good’s SUV, the AP reported. “The wonderful thing now is we have all the evidence,” she said. Attorney General Keith Ellison said it “should never have taken this long.” According to the AP, court filings suggest the turnover followed a federal request for the state’s evidence against Castro, which the state had offered on a reciprocal basis.</p><p>The handover did not last. In sworn filings on Oct. 13, BCA Superintendent Drew Evans said the U.S. attorney’s office stopped sharing evidence after that news conference, despite a written agreement reached in June, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/minnesota-feds-stop-sharing-evidence-good-pretti-shootings-lawsuit/">CBS Minnesota</a> and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/renee-good-alex-pretti-evidence-immigration-d18378b40675bb107f9c2d519c2b9853">Associated Press</a> reported. The state’s brief says the U.S. attorney told Moriarty on Sept. 10 that sharing was paused indefinitely “in light of challenges with D.C.”</p><p>According to Evans, federal authorities still hold the cellphone of the agent who killed Good, her clothing and recordings of interviews about the shooting. In Pretti’s case, he said, the state has not received the officers’ firearms, the gun taken from Pretti before he was shot, the officers’ cellphones, the projectiles and casings, or a recorded statement from one of the officers. Those are the state’s sworn claims. The government’s answer, in its reply brief, is that the state has not been blocked from bringing charges, and that by Moriarty’s own July words it already has “all the evidence.” Moriarty’s response, in a statement, was that the federal government is “intent on obstructing our investigations for however long they can.”</p><p>So the lawsuit continued. The state’s claim targets what it calls a policy of noncooperation, and no court has decided it.</p><h3>Where things stand</h3><p>As of Nov. 2, 2026, Minnesota v. DOJ is fully briefed and undecided. The government moved on Sept. 28 to dismiss the case or transfer it to Minnesota. On Oct. 13 the state opposed that motion and asked Sullivan for summary judgment ordering the agencies to hand over the evidence. The government replied on Oct. 20, accusing the state of forum shopping and arguing that its decisions to withhold information are discretionary and not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The state filed its final reply on Oct. 27. The public docket shows no ruling on either motion.</p><p>On Oct. 1, Good’s family filed two suits in federal court in Minnesota. One is against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, after the family’s administrative claims went unanswered for six months. The other is against Ross and senior officials, including Stephen Miller, Noem, Corey Lewandowski, Tom Homan, Todd Lyons and Bovino. It alleges constitutional violations and a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Justice Department had no comment, FOX 9 reported.</p><p>Hennepin County prosecutors have not announced charging decisions on Good or Pretti, and Moriarty has declined to give a timeline. No federal charges have been brought in either death. The Justice Department told ABC News on Oct. 27 that its investigation into Pretti’s death is ongoing.</p><h3>Chronology</h3><ul><li>Dec. 2025: DHS launches Operation Metro Surge in the Twin Cities.</li><li>Jan. 7, 2026: ICE officer Jonathan Ross shoots and kills Renee Good; the joint state-federal investigation is called off the same day, the state alleges.</li><li>Jan. 14: Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis is shot and wounded; federal prosecutors charge him.</li><li>Jan. 18: Blanche says, “we are not investigating” Good’s death.</li><li>Jan. 24: Federal officers shoot and kill Alex Pretti; the BCA sues and obtains a temporary preservation order.</li><li>Jan. 27: CBP’s preliminary review reaches Congress.</li><li>Jan. 30: DOJ announces a civil rights investigation into Pretti’s death.</li><li>Feb. 2: Judge Tostrud dissolves the preservation order.</li><li>Feb. 12: Federal charges against Sosa-Celis are dismissed with prejudice.</li><li>Mar. 24: Minnesota sues DOJ and DHS in Washington.</li><li>June 18: The state files an amended complaint.</li><li>July 13: Moriarty announces that the federal evidence, including Good’s SUV, has been turned over.</li><li>Sept. 9: The FBI interviews a key witness to Pretti’s shooting, her lawyers say.</li><li>Sept. 28: The government moves to dismiss Minnesota v. DOJ.</li><li>Oct. 1: Good’s family files FTCA and Bivens/§ 1985(3) suits.</li><li>Oct. 13: The state opposes dismissal, seeks summary judgment and says in sworn filings that federal evidence sharing stopped after July.</li><li>Oct. 27: Briefing closes in Minnesota v. DOJ; no ruling as of Nov. 2.</li></ul><h3>What is still open</h3><p>Some of the evidence reached state hands in July. By the state’s sworn account, the rest stopped coming, including the shooters’ phones and guns. The question of access is still open, and so is the larger one. Can federal agencies decide alone whether a state may examine a killing by a federal officer on its own streets? A court has not ruled on that.</p><p>The account of the shootings themselves is also unsettled. The government’s descriptions of both deaths have been disputed by video, by a CBP review and by the families. A charging decision, or a decision not to charge, would be the first official answer. As of Nov. 2, 2026, there has been none.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li>[PRIMARY] State of Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Justice, №1:26-cv-01007 (D.D.C.), docket: <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/72590076/state-of-minnesota-v-united-states-department-of-justice/">https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/72590076/state-of-minnesota-v-united-states-department-of-justice/</a></li><li>[PRIMARY] Minnesota v. DOJ, complaint (Mar. 24, 2026): <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2026/03/MN-v-DOJ-Complaint.pdf">https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2026/03/MN-v-DOJ-Complaint.pdf</a></li><li>[PRIMARY] Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension v. Noem, №0:26-cv-00628 (D. Minn.), complaint (Jan. 24, 2026): <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/BCA-v-Noem.pdf">https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/BCA-v-Noem.pdf</a></li><li>[PRIMARY] Ganger and Good v. Ross et al., №0:26-cv-04231 (D. Minn.), complaint (Oct. 1, 2026): <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Renee-Good-family-suit-against-Ross.pdf">https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Renee-Good-family-suit-against-Ross.pdf</a></li><li>[PRIMARY] Ganger and Good v. United States, №0:26-cv-04230 (D. Minn.), FTCA complaint (Oct. 1, 2026): <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mnd.236479/gov.uscourts.mnd.236479.1.0.pdf">https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mnd.236479/gov.uscourts.mnd.236479.1.0.pdf</a></li><li>[PRIMARY, as published] CBP Office of Professional Responsibility preliminary review sent to Congress, reproduced by CBS News (Jan. 27, 2026): <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/two-federal-agents-fired-their-weapons-during-alex-pretti-shooting-report-congress-says/">https://www.cbsnews.com/news/two-federal-agents-fired-their-weapons-during-alex-pretti-shooting-report-congress-says/</a></li><li>CBS Minnesota, “Feds stopped sharing evidence in Good, Pretti killings after July announcement, Minnesota suit claims” (Oct. 22, 2026): <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/minnesota-feds-stop-sharing-evidence-good-pretti-shootings-lawsuit/">https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/minnesota-feds-stop-sharing-evidence-good-pretti-shootings-lawsuit/</a></li><li>Associated Press, “Federal government stopped sharing evidence on killings during immigration crackdown, Minnesota says” (Oct. 22, 2026): <a href="https://apnews.com/article/renee-good-alex-pretti-evidence-immigration-d18378b40675bb107f9c2d519c2b9853">https://apnews.com/article/renee-good-alex-pretti-evidence-immigration-d18378b40675bb107f9c2d519c2b9853</a></li><li>Good Morning America / ABC News, “Alex Pretti’s parents seek answers from federal government 9 months after son’s killing” (Oct. 28, 2026): <a href="https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/alex-prettis-parents-seek-answers-federal-government-9-137601904">https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/alex-prettis-parents-seek-answers-federal-government-9-137601904</a></li><li>Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, Minnesota v. DOJ: <a href="https://clearinghouse.net/case/47964/">https://clearinghouse.net/case/47964/</a></li><li>MPR News, “Judge lifts order requiring investigators to preserve evidence in fatal shooting of Pretti” (Feb. 3, 2026): <a href="https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/02/03/judge-lifts-order-requiring-investigators-to-preserve-evidence-in-fatal-shooting-of-pretti">https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/02/03/judge-lifts-order-requiring-investigators-to-preserve-evidence-in-fatal-shooting-of-pretti</a></li><li>MPR News, “Federal investigators interview key witness to Alex Pretti shooting, attorneys say” (Sept. 9, 2026): <a href="https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/09/09/federal-investigators-interview-key-witness-to-alex-pretti-shooting">https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/09/09/federal-investigators-interview-key-witness-to-alex-pretti-shooting</a></li><li>Associated Press via ABC7, “Minnesota prosecutors obtain long withheld evidence” (July 13, 2026): <a href="https://abc7news.com/post/dhs-ice-shootings-minnesota-prosecutors-obtain-long-withheld-evidence-renee-good-alex-pretti-shooting-deaths/19501175/">https://abc7news.com/post/dhs-ice-shootings-minnesota-prosecutors-obtain-long-withheld-evidence-renee-good-alex-pretti-shooting-deaths/19501175/</a></li><li>BBC News, “Civil rights investigation opened into Alex Pretti shooting” (Jan. 30, 2026): <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvw89p3p1o">https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvw89p3p1o</a></li><li>The Independent, “FBI denies shutting down civil rights investigation into ICE shooter Jonathan Ross” (citing The Washington Post): <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/ice-shooting-investigation-jonathan-ross-fbi-b2904055.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/ice-shooting-investigation-jonathan-ross-fbi-b2904055.html</a></li><li>FOX 9, “Minneapolis ICE shootings: Where the criminal investigations stand” (Oct. 1, 2026): <a href="https://www.fox9.com/news/minneapolis-ice-shootings-where-criminal-investigations-stand">https://www.fox9.com/news/minneapolis-ice-shootings-where-criminal-investigations-stand</a></li><li>Reuters, “US review of Alex Pretti killing does not mention him brandishing firearm” (Jan. 28, 2026); the page blocks automated fetches, but search confirms it exists. Facts in the text come from the CBS-published review text: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-review-alex-pretti-killing-does-not-mention-him-brandishing-firearm-2026-01-28/">https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-review-alex-pretti-killing-does-not-mention-him-brandishing-firearm-2026-01-28/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e55b4e764b1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 085: How the McMartin Preschool Case Was Built, and Why It Collapsed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-085-how-the-mcmartin-preschool-case-was-built-and-why-it-collapsed-1143c2495f51?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1143c2495f51</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[moral-panic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[child-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[satanic-panic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 15:06:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-27T15:06:01.480Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between 1983 and 1990, police, a child-abuse clinic, two district attorneys, and the press turned one complaint into the longest criminal trial in U.S. history. Two juries would not convict. The people accused, and the children at the center of it, paid for the years in between.</p><p>On Sept. 8, 1983, the Manhattan Beach Police Department mailed a letter to families whose children had attended the Virginia McMartin Pre-School. It said that Ray Buckey, an employee of the school, had been arrested the day before. It asked parents to “question your child to see if he or she has been a witness to any crime or if he or she has been a victim,” and it listed the sexual offenses police suspected. The <a href="https://www.famous-trials.com/mcmartin/901-lettertoparents">letter</a> asked for a reply within eight days.</p><p>The same letter said there was “no evidence” that the school’s management knew of any wrongdoing, and that no other employee was under investigation. Six months later Buckey’s mother, sister, grandmother, and three other teachers had been arrested too.</p><p>What followed lasted nearly seven years and ended without a single conviction.</p><h3>The complaint and the letter</h3><p>The case began in the fall of 1983, when the mother of a toddler who attended McMartin told Manhattan Beach police that her son had been abused by “Mr. Ray.” The <em>Los Angeles Times</em> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-223-story.html">reported</a> that later physical examinations indicated the boy had been abused. Buckey was arrested and then released as the investigation widened.</p><p>The letter went to hundreds of parents, and “a wave of hysteria swept through the affluent beach town,” the <em>Times</em> wrote in 1990. Many parents took their children to Children’s Institute International (CII), a private child-abuse diagnostic and treatment center in Los Angeles. “The majority were told that their children had been victimized,” the <em>Times</em> reported.</p><p>Jurors would later <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-224-story.html">criticize</a> the letter.</p><h3>The interviews</h3><p>CII’s interviews became the evidentiary core of the case. Kee MacFarlane, the CII therapist who supervised them, was described in Peggy McMartin Buckey’s later lawsuit as the principal investigator. According to a 2000 <em>Times</em> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-18-me-1525-story.html">retrospective</a>, social workers interviewed 384 children who had attended the preschool, and 349 of them ultimately disclosed what the social workers called “yucky secrets.”</p><p>The <em>Times’</em> 1990 verdict story described the process bluntly: CII, “deluged with concerned parents, enlisted untrained therapists to assess the children, resulting in videotaped interviews filled with leading and suggestive questions.” The children often answered using puppets. The 2000 retrospective quoted one recorded exchange in which an interviewer told an 8-year-old that the parents “got tricked” and reminded her, “Remember I told you 183 kids?”</p><p>MacFarlane defended the work. After the verdict she <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-224-story.html">said</a> inconsistencies in children’s testimony are normal and that child-abuse cases are always difficult to prove under the reasonable-doubt standard.</p><p>Psychologists later tested the techniques directly. In a 1998 <em>Journal of Applied Psychology</em> <a href="https://scholarworks.utep.edu/psych_papers/100/">study</a>, researchers at the University of Texas at El Paso used methods drawn from McMartin transcripts to question preschool children about a visitor to their classroom. Children questioned with the McMartin methods made false accusations 58 percent of the time, compared with 17 percent for children asked only suggestive questions. The authors concluded that social influence and reinforcement “appeared to be more powerful determinants of children’s answers than simple suggestive questions.”</p><h3>The broadcast</h3><p>The case became public on Feb. 2, 1984, when KABC-TV reporter Wayne Satz told viewers that more than 60 children had described being abused and photographed at the school. David Shaw, the <em>Times’</em> media critic, later spent three months examining the coverage. His <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-226-story.html">series</a>, which won the 1991 Pulitzer Prize for criticism, concluded that the media had been “major players in the story, influencing events as well as chronicling them.”</p><p>Shaw named the failures: “Pack journalism. Laziness. Superficiality. Cozy relationships with prosecutors.” He reported that stories about child pornography rings, children traded between preschools, and a link to an old murder ran widely, and that “none of these charges was ultimately proved.” People who were never charged were named and photographed because prosecutors called them “uncharged suspects.” A reporter who had covered the case for the <em>Daily News</em> told him: “I’m very sorry I didn’t ask more questions.”</p><p>The <em>Times</em> also <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-07-29-mn-1346-story.html">reported</a> in 1990 that the therapist who interviewed the children had a brief romance with the television newsman who broke the story. Peggy McMartin Buckey later alleged in a federal lawsuit that MacFarlane leaked the story to Satz. That is an allegation, not a finding.</p><h3>The charges</h3><p>In March 1984, after a Los Angeles County grand jury returned an indictment of 115 counts, seven people were arrested: Ray Buckey; his mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey; his sister, Peggy Ann Buckey; his grandmother and the school’s founder, Virginia McMartin; and teachers Betty Raidor, Babette Spitler, and Mary Ann Jackson. In May prosecutors replaced the indictment with a complaint charging 208 counts involving 41 children, according to the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-223-story.html"><em>Times</em></a>.</p><p>The paper’s own verdict-day account put it plainly: “The case was hastily filed, and it was flawed from the beginning.” District Attorney Robert Philibosian was running for reelection, and the <em>Times</em> wrote that he and the media “were pressing for action.” He lost to Ira Reiner.</p><p>The allegations, as the <em>Times</em> summarized them, went well beyond molestation. They included pornographic photography, trips away from the school, animal mutilation, threats, and “satanic-like ritual and sacrifice.” Eight other South Bay preschools were eventually shut down. People dug up a vacant lot next to the school looking for animal remains. Someone spray-painted “Ray Must Die” on the school’s walls.</p><h3>The preliminary hearing</h3><p>The preliminary hearing began in the fall of 1984 and ran 18 months before Municipal Judge Aviva Bobb. One child was questioned for 16 days. Only 14 of the scheduled child witnesses testified; one did so by closed-circuit television under a state law the <em>Times</em> said was passed “especially for the McMartin case.” Bobb ordered all seven defendants to stand trial on 135 charges.</p><p>A week later, in January 1986, Reiner dropped the charges against five of the seven, citing “incredibly weak evidence.” Only Ray Buckey and Peggy McMartin Buckey would be tried. One of the case’s own prosecutors, Glen Stevens, changed his mind about Buckey’s guilt midway through, according to the <em>Times</em>. He was fired from the district attorney’s office and later testified for the defense.</p><h3>Two trials</h3><p>Jury selection began in April 1987, and testimony began that July before Superior Court Judge William Pounders. Nine of the 11 children named as victims testified and stood by their accounts. Physicians testified to medical evidence. Both Buckeys testified and denied every charge. By the end the jury had heard 124 witnesses and more than 60,000 pages of testimony, and had 10 videotapes of interviews in evidence.</p><p>On Jan. 18, 1990, after nine weeks of deliberation, the jury <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-18-mn-560-story.html">acquitted</a> both defendants on 52 counts. It deadlocked on 13 counts against Ray Buckey, and the judge declared a mistrial on those and dismissed a conspiracy count against his mother.</p><p>The jurors did not say the children were lying. Nine of the 11 jurors interviewed by the <em>Times</em> said they believed some children had been abused but that the prosecution had not proved the Buckeys were responsible. What decided it, most said, was the CII videotapes. “The key evidence that swayed me was the interview tapes,” the foreman, Luis Chang, said. “The questions that were given to the children were . . . too biased, too leading.” Another juror said the children “were never allowed to say, in their own words, what happened to them.”</p><p>Prosecutor Lael Rubin said she respected the verdict “even though I personally disagree with it.” Reiner called the length of the trial “insane.”</p><p>Prosecutors retried Ray Buckey on eight of the deadlocked counts before Judge Stanley Weisberg. On July 27, 1990, that jury also deadlocked, leaning toward acquittal on six counts, split on one, and leaning toward conviction on one, the <em>Times</em> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-08-02-me-1421-story.html">reported</a>. Reiner said he would not try the case a third time. The way the children were interviewed was “the single fundamental flaw of the case,” he <a href="https://www.deseret.com/1990/7/29/18873802/prosecutor-calls-mcmartin-case-flawed/">told reporters</a>, blaming his predecessor’s office for referring the children to the therapists. On Aug. 1, 1990, Weisberg dismissed the remaining counts.</p><h3>What it cost</h3><p>The <em>Times</em> put the cost to taxpayers at $15 million; other <em>Times</em> accounts used $14 million and “more than $13 million.”</p><p>Ray Buckey spent about five years in jail before supporters posted more than $3 million in property as bail in 1989. Peggy McMartin Buckey spent nearly two years in jail. “I’ve gone through hell and now we’ve lost everything,” she said after the acquittal. Peggy Ann Buckey lost her teaching job and won it back only after lengthy legal proceedings. The <em>Times</em> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-07-29-mn-1346-story.html">reported</a> that the other teachers, including Virginia McMartin, lost their life savings, and that the defendants were repeatedly evicted from rentals when neighbors learned who they were. Ray Buckey’s lawyer took the school property as part of his fee. The building was later torn down.</p><p>The harm did not fall only on the accused. Families of children who testified described years of distress, and one father told the <em>Times</em> his son, nearing 14, “continues to have nightmares and traumas.” He moved his family to another city. On verdict day, children who had testified said they were telling the truth. Whatever happened at the school, those children spent most of their childhoods inside a criminal case built on interviews that two juries could not trust.</p><p>The case reached people with no connection to the school. A church in Hermosa Beach that one child named as a ritual site was vandalized for years. The mother who made the first complaint died in 1986, before trial. A defense investigator died by suicide, and an uncharged suspect died of an apparent overdose, the <em>Times</em> reported.</p><h3>The wider panic, and the FBI’s answer</h3><p>Shaw wrote that early coverage of McMartin “ignited a nationwide panic” and that its accusations “were soon echoed in similar cases across the country.” The 2000 <em>Times</em> retrospective called McMartin the first in a series of nursery-school abuse prosecutions in the 1980s and early 1990s “that collapsed for lack of persuasive evidence.”</p><p>In January 1992, Supervisory Special Agent Kenneth V. Lanning of the Behavioral Science Unit published the <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/136592NCJRS.pdf"><em>Investigator’s Guide to Allegations of “Ritual” Child Abuse</em></a>. Lanning wrote that when he first heard such stories in 1983 and 1984, “I tended to believe them.” By 1992 there were “hundreds of victims alleging that thousands of offenders are abusing and even murdering tens of thousands of people as part of organized satanic cults, and there is little or no corroborative evidence.”</p><p>Lanning, who had spent more than a decade on child sexual victimization, did not deny that children are abused. His conclusion concerned the conspiracy: after at least eight years of aggressive investigation by American law enforcement, “there is little or no evidence for the portion of their allegations that deals with large-scale baby breeding, human sacrifice, and organized satanic conspiracies.” Explaining why victims alleged such things, he wrote, was now a job for mental health professionals, not police.</p><h3>What the record does not settle</h3><p>The criminal record establishes acquittals and hung juries, not innocence or guilt as historical fact. Jurors in both trials said they believed some children had been harmed. The legal outcome means the state could not prove the charges against the people it accused.</p><p>After the dismissal, Ray Buckey announced a <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-08-02-me-1421-story.html">lawsuit</a> against the county, the city, Philibosian, CII, MacFarlane, ABC, and Satz. Peggy McMartin Buckey filed a federal civil rights suit against largely the same defendants. In 1992 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit <a href="https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/968/968.F2d.791.90-56333.html">reversed</a> its dismissal so she could amend her complaint, without deciding whether her allegations were true. The final outcome of those suits was not confirmed for this dossier. In 1991 the Buckeys, Virginia McMartin, and Peggy Ann Buckey won a slander suit against one parent and were awarded $1, the <em>Times</em> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-17-me-1254-story.html">reported</a>.</p><p>Virginia McMartin died in 1995. Peggy McMartin Buckey died on Dec. 15, 2000, at 74. Ray Buckey’s lawyer, Danny Davis, said of her: “she lost everything.” The record explains how the case was built and why it failed in court. It does not show that anyone who built it was held responsible for the years it took from the people it accused, or from the children it asked to carry it.</p><h3>Timeline</h3><ul><li><strong>Sept. 7–8, 1983:</strong> Ray Buckey is arrested; police send a letter to McMartin parents asking them to question their children.</li><li><strong>Feb. 2, 1984:</strong> KABC-TV breaks the story.</li><li><strong>March 1984:</strong> Grand jury indicts seven defendants on 115 counts.</li><li><strong>Fall 1984 to January 1986:</strong> 18-month preliminary hearing; all seven ordered to trial on 135 charges.</li><li><strong>January 1986:</strong> District Attorney Ira Reiner drops charges against five defendants.</li><li><strong>Jan. 18, 1990:</strong> Acquittals on 52 counts; jury deadlocks on 13.</li><li><strong>July 27, 1990:</strong> Retrial on eight counts ends in a hung jury.</li><li><strong>Aug. 1, 1990:</strong> Remaining charges dismissed.</li><li><strong>January 1992:</strong> FBI’s Kenneth Lanning publishes his guide to “ritual” child abuse allegations.</li><li><strong>Feb. 19, 1992 (amended July 1):</strong> Ninth Circuit allows Peggy McMartin Buckey to amend her civil rights suit.</li><li><strong>Dec. 15, 2000:</strong> Peggy McMartin Buckey dies at 74.</li></ul><h3>Sources</h3><ol><li>Manhattan Beach Police Department, letter to McMartin Pre-School parents (Sept. 8, 1983), transcribed on Famous Trials, Prof. Douglas O. Linder, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. <strong>Primary (transcription).</strong> <a href="https://www.famous-trials.com/mcmartin/901-lettertoparents">https://www.famous-trials.com/mcmartin/901-lettertoparents</a></li><li>Lois Timnick, “Not Guilty! Both Buckeys Cleared in Historic McMartin Case: Trial Cost $15 Million in 6 Years,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Jan. 18, 1990. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-18-mn-560-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-18-mn-560-story.html</a></li><li>Lois Timnick and Carol McGraw, “McMartin Verdict: Not Guilty,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Jan. 19, 1990. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-223-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-223-story.html</a></li><li>Tracy Wilkinson and James Rainey, “Tapes of Children Decided the Case for Most Jurors,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Jan. 19, 1990. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-224-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-224-story.html</a></li><li>David Shaw, “Where Was Skepticism in Media?,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Jan. 19, 1990 (first of a four-part series; 1991 Pulitzer Prize for criticism). <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-226-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-226-story.html</a> (archived copy with full text: <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211217191212/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-226-story.html)">https://web.archive.org/web/20211217191212/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-19-mn-226-story.html)</a></li><li>“Trial May Be Over, but McMartin Will Never End,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, July 29, 1990. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-07-29-mn-1346-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-07-29-mn-1346-story.html</a></li><li>“Prosecutor Calls McMartin Case Flawed,” <em>Deseret News</em>, July 29, 1990. <a href="https://www.deseret.com/1990/7/29/18873802/prosecutor-calls-mcmartin-case-flawed/">https://www.deseret.com/1990/7/29/18873802/prosecutor-calls-mcmartin-case-flawed/</a></li><li>“Charges Against Buckey Dismissed,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Aug. 2, 1990. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-08-02-me-1421-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-08-02-me-1421-story.html</a></li><li><em>Buckey v. County of Los Angeles</em>, 968 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended July 1, 1992. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/968/968.F2d.791.90-56333.html">https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/968/968.F2d.791.90-56333.html</a></li><li>Kenneth V. Lanning, <em>Investigator’s Guide to Allegations of “Ritual” Child Abuse</em>, FBI Behavioral Science Unit, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (January 1992), via the National Criminal Justice Reference Service. <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/136592NCJRS.pdf">https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/136592NCJRS.pdf</a></li><li>NCJRS catalog record for the Lanning guide. <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/investigators-guide-allegations-ritual-child-abuse">https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/investigators-guide-allegations-ritual-child-abuse</a></li><li>Sena Garven, James M. Wood, Roy S. Malpass, and John S. Shaw III, “More Than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques From the McMartin Preschool Case,” <em>Journal of Applied Psychology</em> 83(3): 347–359 (1998). Abstract: <a href="https://scholarworks.utep.edu/psych_papers/100/">https://scholarworks.utep.edu/psych_papers/100/</a> ; DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.83.3.347">https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.83.3.347</a></li><li>Mitchell Landsberg, “McMartin Defendant Who ‘Lost Everything’ in Abuse Case Dies at 74,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Dec. 17, 2000. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-17-me-1254-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-17-me-1254-story.html</a></li><li>“McMartin Case’s Legal, Social Legacies Linger,” <em>Los Angeles Times</em>, Dec. 18, 2000. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-18-me-1525-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-18-me-1525-story.html</a></li><li>“Peggy McMartin Buckey, 74; Caught in a Child-Abuse Ordeal,” <em>The New York Times</em>, Dec. 19, 2000 (confirmed via search; site blocks automated access). <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/19/us/peggy-mcmartin-buckey-74-caught-in-a-child-abuse-ordeal.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/19/us/peggy-mcmartin-buckey-74-caught-in-a-child-abuse-ordeal.html</a></li><li>“David Shaw, 62, Dies; Media Critic Took On His Paper,” <em>The New York Times</em>, Aug. 3, 2005 (confirms the 1991 Pulitzer for the McMartin series; confirmed via search, site blocks automated access). <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/business/media/david-shaw-62-dies-media-critic-took-on-his-paper.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/business/media/david-shaw-62-dies-media-critic-took-on-his-paper.html</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1143c2495f51" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 038: Fired Without the Process Their Own Agency Promised: The Fourth Circuit Rules]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-038-fired-without-the-process-their-own-agency-promised-the-fourth-circuit-rules-5d879dd25a3e?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5d879dd25a3e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-service]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intelligence-community]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[employment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 21:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T21:01:01.813Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Nineteen career intelligence officers temporarily assigned to diversity programs were told to choose a separation option within a day or be fired immediately. Two federal courts have now said the CIA and ODNI must first give them the reassignment and appeal rights in the agencies’ own rules.</h4><p>Nobody accused them of misconduct. Nobody said their work was poor. The government has never claimed otherwise, according to the <a href="https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251527.P.pdf">federal appeals court that ruled on their case</a> in July 2026.</p><p>The officers were career employees of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. All had been temporarily assigned to positions dealing with diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility, known as DEIA. Those duties included carrying out civil rights laws such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act.</p><p>In February 2025, while on paid administrative leave, they were told they would be terminated and given a set of options for the timing of their separation. If they did not choose within a day, they were told, they would be fired immediately.</p><p>This dossier lays out what happened next, what the courts decided, and the legal question that remains, as of Oct. 6, 2026.</p><h3>Two executive orders and two memos</h3><p>On Jan. 20, 2025, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14151, which called DEIA programs “illegal and immoral” and directed agencies to “terminate, to the maximum extent allowed by law, all DEI [and] DEIA . . . offices and positions.” The next day he signed Executive Order 14173 with similar aims.</p><p>The Office of Personnel Management followed with a memo directing agencies to put all employees in DEIA offices on paid leave as of Jan. 22. Two days later, a second memo told agencies to begin reductions in force, or RIFs, eliminating DEIA positions and offices. The CIA and ODNI complied.</p><p>The CIA director, John Ratcliffe, later stated in a court declaration that he made the termination decisions to “effectuate the directives in” the first executive order and the OPM memos. He said he understood those directives “effectively prescribed terminating the employment” of the officers.</p><h3>What the agency’s own rules say</h3><p>Intelligence agency employees are excluded from the civil service protections most federal workers have. Under the National Security Act, the CIA director may fire any employee “whenever the Director deems the termination . . . necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” The director of national intelligence has the same power over ODNI staff. In 1988, in <em>Webster v. Doe</em>, the Supreme Court held that this language bars ordinary judicial review of such firings under the Administrative Procedure Act, while leaving room for constitutional claims.</p><p>The CIA also has an internal rule, Agency Regulation 4–16, which ODNI follows as well. It repeats that the directors may fire employees with or without cause. But it also sets out procedures. When employees are cut because of “excess personnel functions or needs,” an agency representative must meet with them about other positions, and if they want reassignment, the agency “will broker an Agency-wide placement effort.” Nearly all employees facing termination may also appeal internally.</p><p>The officers asked for both. According to the appeals court, the CIA “altogether refused” and told its officers they were not entitled to those procedures. ODNI allowed internal appeals, but they had not been decided when the officers went back to court.</p><h3>The district court’s two rulings</h3><p>The officers sued under pseudonyms in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming a violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process. Senior District Judge Anthony J. Trenga first declined to block the firings. He found the officers had no property interest in keeping their jobs, but suggested they might have a claim to the regulation’s procedures. Because they had not yet asked for them, he said, the claim was premature, and there was “no reason to think” the agencies would not consider such requests “in good faith.”</p><p>About a month later, after the CIA had refused, the officers returned. On March 31, 2025, Trenga issued a preliminary injunction. He found the firings were part of a reduction in force, which triggered the regulation’s reassignment and appeal rights, and that the officers were likely to win their due process claim.</p><p>He found that the officers faced termination “without any suggestion of wrongdoing or poor performance,” that most “were only temporarily assigned” to DEIA roles, and that “at bottom” they were “being penalized” for being in the wrong place at the “wrong time.” He ordered the agencies to provide the two procedures and barred them from carrying out any termination “without further Court authorization.”</p><h3>The appeals court affirms</h3><p>The government appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard argument on Dec. 10, 2025, and ruled on July 2, 2026, amending its opinion on July 7.</p><p>Judge Nicole G. Berner, joined by Judge Stephanie D. Thacker, affirmed. The opinion identifies the plaintiffs as “nineteen career national intelligence officers,” even though the case caption lists 11 pseudonymous plaintiffs, six John Does and five Jane Does. The opinion does not explain the gap; the dissent says 19 employees “commenced or later joined in this action.”</p><p>Berner wrote that the officers “do not claim a right to continued employment,” and that “it is undisputed that no such right exists.” What they claimed were two specific rights the regulation guarantees. In the reassignment section, she wrote, “the Termination Regulation provides no room for discretion. As long as the employee subject to termination chooses to pursue reassignment, the Agencies must attempt to reassign her.” The appeal section likewise “constrains agency discretion.”</p><p>The government pointed to language in the regulation saying it creates no property interest or enforceable rights. The majority was not persuaded and held that the regulation’s specific, mandatory terms create an entitlement the due process clause protects. It also upheld the requirement that the agencies notify the court before carrying out any firing. That requirement, Berner wrote, “does not prevent the Directors from terminating the Intelligence Officers”; it lets the court confirm that they received the process owed.</p><h3>The dissent</h3><p>Judge Paul V. Niemeyer dissented in strong terms. The directors, he wrote, used their statutory discretion to fire “more than 50 employees” at the two agencies after the executive order. The regulation itself says the director may fire “any employee” “at any time without regard to any procedural steps set forth in this regulation or elsewhere.”</p><p>In his view, the regulation governs lower-level officials, not the directors, and the “unfettered discretion” Congress gave the directors means no employee has an entitlement protected by the Constitution. “It is absurdity,” he wrote, “to require the Director to grant an appeal to himself of his own discretionary decision.” He called the injunction an intrusion on the executive’s national security powers and wrote that he hoped the Supreme Court would take up the case.</p><h3>What the ruling does and does not require</h3><p>News coverage described the ruling as an order to rehire the officers. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/court-orders-trump-administration-rehire-fired-intelligence-officers-rcna352836">NBC News</a> reported it that way. The opinion’s text is narrower. The injunction blocks the firings from taking effect without court authorization and requires the agencies to consider the officers for reassignment and hear their appeals. It does not require the agencies to keep them permanently, and the directors’ final authority remains intact.</p><p>Kevin Carroll, the officers’ lawyer, said in a statement to NBC: “Intelligence officers have due process rights, too.” NBC reported that the CIA and ODNI did not respond to requests for comment.</p><h3>Where the case stands</h3><p>On Aug. 17, 2026, the agencies petitioned the full Fourth Circuit to rehear the case, according to the <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70237144/john-doe-1-v-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence/">court’s docket</a>, and the court temporarily stayed its mandate. The petition seeks to restore the agencies’ ability to fire the officers without the reassignment and appeal procedures or advance court approval, <a href="https://www.mealeys.com/mealeys/articles/2515516/intel-agencies-want-4th-circuit-to-rehear-split-panel-s-deia-worker-firing-ruling">Mealey’s reported</a>. The officers filed their opposition on Sept. 17. As of Oct. 6, 2026, the petition is pending, and no Supreme Court petition could be found in the sources reviewed for this dossier.</p><p>The ruling is also a preliminary one. It decides that the officers are likely to win, not that they have won. The underlying claims have not been finally decided.</p><p>The legal question is whether an agency rule that says it creates no rights can still bind the agency when its terms are mandatory, and whether a director with near-total power to fire must first follow the steps his own agency wrote down. Two judges on one panel have said yes. One has said no. The full court, or the Supreme Court, may have the final word.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><em>Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence</em>, №25–1527 (4th Cir. July 2, 2026; amended July 7, 2026), published opinion with dissent. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251527.P.pdf">https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/251527.P.pdf</a></li><li>NBC News, “Court orders Trump administration to rehire fired intelligence officers” (July 2026). <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/court-orders-trump-administration-rehire-fired-intelligence-officers-rcna352836">https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/court-orders-trump-administration-rehire-fired-intelligence-officers-rcna352836</a></li><li>Bloomberg Law, “Intelligence officers with DEI links win appeal over firings” (July 2026). <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/intelligence-officers-with-dei-links-win-appeal-over-firings">https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/intelligence-officers-with-dei-links-win-appeal-over-firings</a></li><li>Mealey’s, “Intel Agencies Want 4th Circuit To Rehear Split Panel’s DEIA Worker Firing Ruling” (Aug. 19, 2026). <a href="https://www.mealeys.com/mealeys/articles/2515516/intel-agencies-want-4th-circuit-to-rehear-split-panel-s-deia-worker-firing-ruling">https://www.mealeys.com/mealeys/articles/2515516/intel-agencies-want-4th-circuit-to-rehear-split-panel-s-deia-worker-firing-ruling</a></li><li><em>John Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence</em>, №25–1527 (4th Cir.), docket (CourtListener). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70237144/john-doe-1-v-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence/">https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70237144/john-doe-1-v-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5d879dd25a3e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 037: Four Missed Chances: How a Court-Martial Conviction Never Reached the System]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-037-four-missed-chances-how-a-court-martial-conviction-never-reached-the-system-0df227c54a8a?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0df227c54a8a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[inspector-general]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gun-violence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[background-checks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 15:01:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T15:01:05.310Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Dossier 037: Four Missed Chances: How a Court-Martial Conviction Never Reached the Background-Check System</h3><h4>An airman convicted of domestic violence in 2012 should have been barred from buying guns. The Air Force never sent his records to the FBI, and in 2017 he killed 26 people in a Texas church.</h4><p>Of the 11 members of the Holcombe family who went to First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, on the morning of Nov. 5, 2017, three survived. The dead, as a federal judge later recorded, included Crystal Holcombe and the child she was carrying, whom John Porter Holcombe named Carlin Brite after her death.</p><p>In all, the gunman killed 26 people and wounded 22 more. He had bought his guns from licensed dealers, passing a federal background check each time.</p><p>He should not have passed. Five years earlier, the U.S. Air Force had convicted him by general court-martial of assaulting his wife and his young stepson. Under federal law, that conviction barred him from buying a gun. The system meant to enforce the bar never received it.</p><p>This dossier traces how that happened, drawing on the findings of the Defense Department inspector general and of U.S. District Judge Xavier Rodriguez, who presided over two trials on the government’s responsibility.</p><h3>The conviction</h3><p>In June 2011, a pediatrician at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico examined the airman’s young stepson and found a fractured collarbone and bleeding beneath the skull. The doctor reported suspected child abuse. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations, known as AFOSI, opened a case the next day.</p><p>Over the following year, according to Rodriguez’s <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txwd.949434/gov.uscourts.txwd.949434.452.0_1.pdf">July 2021 findings</a>, the airman choked his wife and threw her against a wall, was investigated by base Security Forces for assault, admitted himself to a behavioral health facility, escaped over a fence in June 2012, and was placed in pretrial confinement. Investigators found internet searches for body armor and guerrilla tactics.</p><p>On Nov. 7, 2012, a general court-martial sentenced him to 12 months of confinement, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade and a bad-conduct discharge. The report of the result of trial specified that the conviction was for a “crime of domestic violence.” The memo approving the sentence carried, in large bold letters, a reference to the federal statute barring people convicted of such crimes from having guns.</p><h3>The chances to report it</h3><p>Department of Defense rules required military investigators and jailers to send fingerprints and case outcomes to the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division. Those records feed the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, or NICS, which gun dealers query before a sale.</p><p>The court’s findings, based in part on facts the government stipulated, identify the points where that should have happened and did not:</p><ul><li><strong>June 9, 2011.</strong> AFOSI agents took two sets of the airman’s fingerprints at the end of an interview. They did not mail them to the FBI.</li><li><strong>Feb. 17, 2012.</strong> Security Forces investigators concluded he had assaulted his wife, giving them probable cause to submit fingerprints. “They never did,” the court found.</li><li><strong>June 8, 2012.</strong> Rules required AFOSI agents to fingerprint him and submit the prints. An agent certified that he had fingerprinted him, but the file contained no prints from that date.</li><li><strong>After the conviction.</strong> The confinement facility was required to fingerprint him and submit the prints with the conviction. It did neither.</li></ul><p>On Dec. 14, 2012, the AFOSI detachment received the results of the court-martial and was required to send a final disposition report to the FBI. It did not. That same day, the court found, the special agent in charge “certified on the closing checklist in the electronic file” that the fingerprints and disposition had been submitted, “though they had not.” The certification allowed him to close the case.</p><p>The Defense Department inspector general’s <a href="https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1707300/report-of-investigation-into-the-united-states-air-forces-failure-to-submit-dev/">December 2018 report</a>, as summarized by <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/air-force-repeatedly-failed-notify-fbi-about-gunman-prior-sutherland-n945226">NBC News</a>, found that the Air Force failed to submit his fingerprints on four occasions, in addition to the missing disposition report. These four fingerprint failures give this dossier its title.</p><h3>What the inspector general concluded</h3><p>The defense secretary asked the inspector general to investigate the day after the shooting. Over the following year, investigators interviewed more than 40 witnesses. The report, issued Dec. 6, 2018, was blunt.</p><p>“The investigators and confinement personnel had a duty to know, and should have known, the DoD and USAF fingerprint policies, and should have followed them,” it said, as quoted in the court’s findings. “The failures had drastic consequences and should not have occurred.” It concluded “there was no valid reason” for the failures.</p><p>NBC reported that one case agent told investigators he did not know submission was required, and that other agents could not give a “clear, supportable reason or explanation.” The inspector general also recommended that the Air Force run background checks during recruiting, after finding the airman had multiple instances of alleged criminal activity before he enlisted.</p><p>The problem was not new. A February 2015 inspector general review, cited at trial, had found the Air Force submitted fingerprints in only 69% of qualifying cases from mid-2010 to late 2012, and final dispositions in 68%. After that report, AFOSI headquarters emailed its regional commands: “if you are presently doing anything less than 100% review in this particular area… you are falling short.” His conviction fell outside the review’s sample period.</p><h3>Liability</h3><p>Survivors and families sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which lets people sue the United States for its employees’ negligence. Rodriguez held a liability trial in April 2021.</p><p>On July 6, 2021, he ruled that the government “failed to exercise reasonable care in its undertaking to submit criminal history to the FBI,” and that the failure “proximately caused the deaths and injuries.” He found the United States 60% responsible.</p><p>“The trial conclusively established that no other individual — not even Kelley’s own parents or partners — knew as much as the United States about the violence that Devin Kelley had threatened to commit and was capable of committing,” he wrote. Had the government reported the conviction, “it is more likely than not that Kelley would have been deterred from carrying out the Church shooting.”</p><p>The government did contest causation. It argued that the gunman “was aware of many avenues for obtaining firearms without going through a background check,” and that his “premeditation and determination” settled the question. The court disagreed. Every gun he owned on the day of the shooting came from a licensed dealer, Rodriguez found, and the government “offered no evidence” that he ever bought a gun at a gun show, used a straw buyer, or stole or built one. “The mere possibility that he could have obtained firearms by other means does not make it probable.”</p><h3>The damages, and the settlement</h3><p>A second bench trial on damages ran from October to November 2021. On Feb. 7, 2022, Rodriguez issued <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/sutherland-springs-conclusions-of-law.pdf">185 pages of findings</a> describing each plaintiff’s injuries and losses. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/07/1079013006/a-judge-ordered-the-u-s-to-pay-230-million-to-victims-of-a-texas-church-massacre">NPR reported</a> that the awards to some 80 people totaled more than $230 million. The opinion itself sets out individual awards rather than a single total; the $230 million figure is the one reported by NPR and later by CBS News.</p><p>The government appealed. In April 2023, the Justice Department reached an agreement in principle to settle for $144.5 million, ending that appeal, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sutherland-springs-mass-shooting-victims-144-million-settlement-department-of-justice/">CBS News reported</a>. “No words or amount of money can diminish the immense tragedy of the mass shooting in Sutherland Springs,” Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta said.</p><p>The court approved the settlement in May 2023, to be shared among more than 75 survivors and families, according to <a href="https://news4sanantonio.com/news/local/judge-approves-1445-million-settlement-for-victims-of-sutherland-springs-shooting">News 4 San Antonio</a>. Jamal Alsaffar, the plaintiffs’ lead trial lawyer, said the families had “endured and won two trials against the Federal Government.”</p><h3>Who was held accountable</h3><p>The sources reviewed for this dossier show no criminal charges against anyone in the reporting chain and no one losing a job over the failures. In early 2019, according to the court’s findings, the Air Force issued letters of admonishment to three employees involved in the 2011–2012 investigations.</p><p>The letters found that the failure to ensure reporting to the FBI was a dereliction of duty that “fell below the minimum standards” and “contributed to Devin P. Kelley not being properly identified as an individual prohibited by law from purchasing a firearm.” Whether anyone else faced discipline, including the official who certified that records had been sent, is not established in the sources reviewed for this dossier.</p><p>That gap is not a finding that the Air Force as a whole acted in bad faith. The court’s record describes specific people who were required to take specific steps and did not, inside an agency that had already been warned its compliance rate was about 70%.</p><h3>What remains open</h3><p>The money has been paid out, and the liability question has been settled. What the public record leaves unanswered is narrower. It does not show how fully the Air Force, and the other services, now submit fingerprints and dispositions to the FBI, or whether anyone checks those submissions against the courts-martial that produce them.</p><p>Rodriguez found that the government knew more about this man’s capacity for violence than anyone else did. The records that would have turned that knowledge into a denied gun sale sat in files at Holloman. As of Oct. 6, 2026, whether a similar file could sit unsent today is a question only the services and their inspectors general can answer with data.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><em>Holcombe v. United States</em>, №5:18-cv-555 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2021), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on liability, ECF №452. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txwd.949434/gov.uscourts.txwd.949434.452.0_1.pdf">https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txwd.949434/gov.uscourts.txwd.949434.452.0_1.pdf</a></li><li><em>Holcombe v. United States</em>, №5:18-cv-555 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2022), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on damages, ECF №584 (Courthouse News copy). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/sutherland-springs-conclusions-of-law.pdf">https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/sutherland-springs-conclusions-of-law.pdf</a></li><li>U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, <em>Report of Investigation into the United States Air Force’s Failure to Submit Devin Kelley’s Criminal History Information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation</em> (DODIG-2019–030, Dec. 6, 2018). <strong>Primary document.</strong> The report page’s public summary was opened and confirms the four missed fingerprint submissions; quotations from the report are taken from the court’s findings and NBC News. <a href="https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1707300/report-of-investigation-into-the-united-states-air-forces-failure-to-submit-dev/">https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1707300/report-of-investigation-into-the-united-states-air-forces-failure-to-submit-dev/</a></li><li>NBC News, “Air Force repeatedly failed to notify FBI about gunman prior to Sutherland Springs massacre” (Dec. 2018). <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/air-force-repeatedly-failed-notify-fbi-about-gunman-prior-sutherland-n945226">https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/air-force-repeatedly-failed-notify-fbi-about-gunman-prior-sutherland-n945226</a></li><li>NPR, “A judge ordered the U.S. to pay $230 million to victims of a Texas church massacre” (Feb. 7, 2022). <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/07/1079013006/a-judge-ordered-the-u-s-to-pay-230-million-to-victims-of-a-texas-church-massacre">https://www.npr.org/2022/02/07/1079013006/a-judge-ordered-the-u-s-to-pay-230-million-to-victims-of-a-texas-church-massacre</a></li><li>CBS News, “Sutherland Springs mass shooting victims reach tentative $144.5 million settlement with DOJ” (April 5, 2023). <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sutherland-springs-mass-shooting-victims-144-million-settlement-department-of-justice/">https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sutherland-springs-mass-shooting-victims-144-million-settlement-department-of-justice/</a></li><li>News 4 San Antonio, “Judge approves $144.5 million settlement for victims of Sutherland Springs shooting” (May 2023). <a href="https://news4sanantonio.com/news/local/judge-approves-1445-million-settlement-for-victims-of-sutherland-springs-shooting">https://news4sanantonio.com/news/local/judge-approves-1445-million-settlement-for-victims-of-sutherland-springs-shooting</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0df227c54a8a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 036: A Judge’s Review of Immigration Agents’ Force Against Protesters and Press in Chicago]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-036-a-judges-review-of-immigration-agents-force-against-protesters-and-press-in-chicago-f793b0dc2b59?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f793b0dc2b59</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[use-of-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[press-freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[border-patrol]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chicago]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 21:46:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-25T21:46:01.483Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>In a 233-page opinion, a Chicago judge compared federal agents’ accounts of Operation Midway Blitz with their own body-camera footage and found that the two did not match. An appeals court later vacated her injunction without deciding whether her findings were right.</h4><p>On the evening of Sept. 19, 2025, the Rev. David Black stood outside the immigration processing center in Broadview, Illinois, wearing clerical garb. Black is senior pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Chicago. Three masked officers in military fatigues stood on the roof.</p><p>Black raised his arms toward them with palms outstretched, he later told a federal court, and “urged the ICE officers to repent.” Agents fired pepper balls at him. Two hit him in the head, and he dropped to his knees.</p><p>That scene, captured on video, became one of dozens examined by U.S. District Judge Sara L. Ellis. Her <a href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/11-20-2025-Chicago-Headline-Club-v.-Noem-Opinion-and-Order.pdf">opinion of Nov. 20, 2025</a> runs 233 pages and examines dozens of incidents in which federal agents used force during the operation. This dossier sets out what she found, what the government argued, and why the ruling no longer has legal effect.</p><h3>The lawsuit</h3><p>The federal government’s enforcement surge in the Chicago area that fall was known as Operation Midway Blitz. Protests followed, especially outside the Broadview facility west of the city.</p><p>On Oct. 6, 2025, a coalition filed a class action against Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and other officials. The journalist plaintiffs included the Chicago Headline Club, Block Club Chicago, the Chicago Newspaper Guild and three individual reporters. There were also five protesters and four members of the clergy, among them Black. They alleged that agents had fired pepper balls and rubber bullets, thrown flash-bang grenades and sprayed tear gas at protesters, clergy and reporters without legal justification or adequate warning.</p><p>Ellis issued a temporary restraining order and later required agents equipped with body cameras to turn them on during enforcement activity. After a two-day hearing, she issued a preliminary injunction from the bench on Nov. 6 and released her written opinion two weeks later.</p><h3>What she found about credibility</h3><p>Ellis began by saying what the case was not about. It did not turn, she wrote, on whether she agreed with the administration’s immigration policies or thought Chicago should be a sanctuary city. It was about whether the agents’ “apparent indiscriminate use of force against protesters, religious practitioners, and the press” violated the First and Fourth Amendments.</p><p>Then she addressed the evidence. “After reviewing all the evidence submitted to the Court and listening to the testimony,” she wrote, “the Court finds Defendants’ evidence simply not credible.” The plaintiffs had submitted more than 80 declarations. The government submitted use-of-force reports and hours of body-camera footage, and pointed the court to the clips it considered most helpful.</p><p>Those clips, Ellis found, showed “the opposite.” In footage from Sept. 19 that the government itself flagged, the scene appears quiet as the gate opens on protesters holding signs. Agents then throw flash-bangs, tear gas and pepper balls “almost immediately and without warning,” and someone exclaims “fuck yea!” In another clip, agents acknowledged among themselves that explosions blamed on protesters’ “fireworks” were their own flash-bangs.</p><p>She also noted that, in at least one instance, an agent asked ChatGPT to write a report narrative from a brief sentence and some images. To the extent agents used it for use-of-force reports, she wrote, that “further undermines their credibility.”</p><h3>The findings on Gregory Bovino</h3><p>The opinion reserved its sharpest language for Gregory Bovino, the Border Patrol commander who led the operation in Chicago. Ellis found that over three days of deposition he “appeared evasive,” “either providing ‘cute’ responses to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions or outright lying.”</p><p>Shown video of agents hitting Black with pepper balls, Bovino denied seeing a projectile hit Black in the head. Shown video in which Ellis said he “obviously tackles” a man named Scott Blackburn, he said force had been used against him instead.</p><p>The most consequential finding concerned Oct. 23 in the Little Village neighborhood. Bovino and DHS had said publicly that a rock hit him in the helmet before he threw tear gas. On the first day of his deposition, Ellis wrote, Bovino conceded he was not hit until afterward, but said a rock had “almost hit” him first. On the final day, Nov. 4, he admitted he was again “mistaken” and that no rock was thrown at him before he deployed the first canister. “Most tellingly,” Ellis wrote, “Bovino admitted in his deposition that he lied multiple times about the events that occurred in Little Village that prompted him to throw tear gas.”</p><p>She also rejected his testimony that people in “maroon hoodies” signaled gang members. Footage showed a handful of people wearing maroon, one of them Alderman Byron Sigcho-Lopez in a maroon sweater under a suit jacket.</p><h3>Reporters with press badges</h3><p>The opinion catalogs what happened to journalists. Charles Thrush, a DePaul University journalism student reporting for Block Club Chicago, wore a visible press credential at Broadview on Sept. 26. Around 10:20 a.m., Ellis found, an agent fired a pepper ball at him while he stood away from protesters, filming. It hit the hand holding his camera near his face.</p><p>Raven Geary, a co-founder of Unraveled Press, wore a press lanyard and a helmet marked “PRESS” on the front and back. At 8:58 a.m. that same day, according to her declaration, an agent shot her in the face with pepper balls from across a parking lot while she sheltered behind a vehicle with other photographers.</p><p>Clergy described similar encounters. The Rev. Beth Johnson, a Unitarian Universalist minister wearing her clerical collar, said agents fired pepper balls at her group without warning while they sang; she has severe asthma and had to leave. The Rev. Abby Holcombe, a Methodist pastor, said an agent fired at her while she prayed near the gate.</p><h3>The government’s account</h3><p>The government’s position, as summarized in the opinion, was that agents faced real danger. An ICE official described a nationwide “marked increase in aggressive and hostile actors” who “harass[ed], attack[ed], and brutaliz[ed]” officers and threatened their families. DHS described spotters tracking agents’ movements to enable “ambushes.” Bovino testified that criminal networks, including the Latin Kings, had tried to ram Border Patrol vehicles.</p><p>On the Black incident, an ICE official testified that surveillance footage showed agents gave the pastor “multiple commands to remove himself from government property.” Ellis noted that the footage had no audio, and that while Black stood “ever so slightly” on federal property, he testified he was never told he was trespassing. Ellis did not find that every protest was peaceful; she recounted, for example, protesters blocking federal vehicles at Broadview on Sept. 6.</p><p>“Defendants would have people believe instead that the Chicagoland area is in a vise hold of violence, ransacked by rioters, and attacked by agitators,” she wrote, which would justify “the unprecedented swath of indiscriminate uses of force.” Her conclusion: “That narrative simply is untrue.”</p><h3>Stayed, dismissed, vacated</h3><p>The ruling did not last. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction on Nov. 19, 2025, the day before the written opinion came out, calling it overbroad. Earlier, it had blocked Ellis’s order requiring Bovino to appear in court daily, finding that it put the court “in the position of an inquisitor.”</p><p>In December, with the surge winding down, the plaintiffs asked to dismiss the case, telling the court it “appears that Operation Midway Blitz has ended.” On Jan. 22, 2026, Ellis dismissed it without prejudice, meaning the plaintiffs could refile, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/federal-judge-dismisses-chicago-headline-club-lawsuit-use-of-force/">CBS Chicago reported</a>. She also decertified the class. The plaintiffs had asked for dismissal with prejudice, the appeals court later noted, and it faulted Ellis for giving no reasons for either step.</p><p>On March 5, 2026, a Seventh Circuit panel <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ca7.55235/gov.uscourts.ca7.55235.48.0.pdf">vacated the preliminary injunction</a> in an unsigned opinion joined by Chief Judge Michael Brennan and Judge Michael Scudder, then dismissed the appeal. The case appeared moot, the panel said, and the injunction was “overbroad” and “constitutionally suspect.” It worried the plaintiffs could refile and ask for a near-identical order based on the same findings. It said the plaintiffs’ dismissal “deprived appellate courts of the chance to decide” whether Ellis erred in finding the government’s witnesses “categorically not credible.”</p><p>Judge Frank Easterbrook dissented. Once both sides wanted out, he wrote, “you can’t have an appeal without an appellant,” and a losing party’s choice not to pursue an appeal does not support vacating the lower court’s order.</p><h3>What remains</h3><p>As of Oct. 6, 2026, no court has reviewed Ellis’s factual findings on the merits. The vacatur means her opinion carries no legal force as precedent or as the basis for an injunction. The appeals court said future cases should not adopt its findings “without further, more detailed analysis.” It did not say the findings were wrong.</p><p>The opinion itself remains public, with its video citations and deposition excerpts. Whether federal agents used force lawfully against the people Ellis described is a question that now has a detailed answer from one judge and no answer from any appellate court. A future lawsuit would have to build the record again.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><em>Chicago Headline Club v. Noem</em>, №1:25-cv-12173 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2025), opinion and order (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression copy). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/11-20-2025-Chicago-Headline-Club-v.-Noem-Opinion-and-Order.pdf">https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/11-20-2025-Chicago-Headline-Club-v.-Noem-Opinion-and-Order.pdf</a></li><li>Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, <em>Chicago Headline Club v. Noem</em> document page. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://clearinghouse.net/doc/165409/">https://clearinghouse.net/doc/165409/</a></li><li><em>Chicago Headline Club v. Noem</em>, №25–3023 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026), per curiam opinion with dissent. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ca7.55235/gov.uscourts.ca7.55235.48.0.pdf">https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ca7.55235/gov.uscourts.ca7.55235.48.0.pdf</a></li><li>Chicago Sun-Times, “Judge delivers critical review of federal immigration agents’ ‘unprecedented’ use of force” (Nov. 21, 2025). <a href="https://chicago.suntimes.com/immigration/2025/11/21/judge-hands-down-critical-review-of-federal-immigration-agents-unprecedented-use-of-force">https://chicago.suntimes.com/immigration/2025/11/21/judge-hands-down-critical-review-of-federal-immigration-agents-unprecedented-use-of-force</a></li><li>CBS Chicago, “Federal judge dismisses Chicago Headline Club lawsuit over federal agents’ use of force, says plaintiffs can refile in future” (Jan. 22, 2026). <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/federal-judge-dismisses-chicago-headline-club-lawsuit-use-of-force/">https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/federal-judge-dismisses-chicago-headline-club-lawsuit-use-of-force/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f793b0dc2b59" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 035: 7,200 Files and 300,000 Names: The CIA’s Watch on the Antiwar Movement]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-035-7-200-files-and-300-000-names-the-cias-watch-on-the-antiwar-movement-501d56105c5c?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/501d56105c5c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[declassified]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cold-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-liberties]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 15:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-25T15:31:01.910Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>For nearly seven years, a sealed-off CIA unit called Operation CHAOS gathered information on Americans who opposed the Vietnam War, while its own analysts kept reporting that no foreign power was behind them.</h4><p>The question two presidents kept asking was simple. Were foreign Communists directing, funding or training the Americans marching against the war and protesting in the streets?</p><p>The CIA kept answering no. In November 1967, a study delivered to President Lyndon Johnson found “little evidence of foreign involvement and no evidence of any significant foreign financial support.” In June 1969, a report for President Richard Nixon’s White House found “no evidence of communist direction and control.” In 1970 and again in 1971, the agency reached the same conclusion.</p><p>Each answer brought a demand for more coverage. By the time the operation ended in March 1974, it had files on about 7,200 American citizens and a computer index of some 300,000 names. This dossier traces how that happened, drawing mainly on the <a href="https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/exhibits/intelligence/rockcomm_chap11_chaos.pdf">1975 report of the Rockefeller Commission</a> and the <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-94755-iii.pdf">1976 Church Committee staff report</a>.</p><h3>The line in the 1947 law</h3><p>The CIA’s founding statute set a boundary. The National Security Act of 1947 provided that the agency “shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions.”</p><p>The law did not define “internal security functions.” But the Senate’s Church Committee found that the legislative history reflected public worry that the CIA “might become a secret police agency, an American ‘Gestapo,’ spying on opponents of the government in power.” Domestic security work belonged to the FBI.</p><p>Operation CHAOS sat on that boundary from its first day. Its assignment, as the Rockefeller Commission put it, “necessarily partook of both domestic and foreign aspects.” The question of foreign influence “could not be answered adequately without gathering information on the identities and relationships of the American citizens involved.”</p><h3>August 1967: a desk is created</h3><p>In July 1967, after riots in several cities, Johnson created the Kerner Commission on civil disorders and told federal agencies to help it. On Aug. 15, Thomas Karamessines, the CIA’s deputy director for plans, ordered the chief of the agency’s Counterintelligence Staff to set up an operation, in a memo titled “Overseas Coverage of Subversive Student and Related Matters.”</p><p>The order relayed instructions from Director Richard Helms. Helms testified that he acted under “continuing, substantial pressure” from the president. The commission found his account corroborated by a contemporaneous FBI memo: “The White House recently informed Richard Helms, Director, CIA, that the Agency should exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U.S. racial agitators who might travel abroad.”</p><p>The unit’s first product was the peace movement study Helms handed to Johnson on Nov. 15, 1967. It found little foreign involvement. But in gathering material for it, the commission noted, the group “gained an extensive amount of data for its later operations.” Most of that information came from the FBI.</p><h3>1968: a cryptonym and a warning</h3><p>In mid-1968 the group received its cryptonym, CHAOS. A July 1968 cable told every CIA station abroad to send all information on dissident groups through a single restricted channel, “Eyes Only,” to the operation’s chief.</p><p>That year Helms commissioned a paper called “Restless Youth,” which concluded that student radicalism grew out of alienation at home, “not from conspiratorial activity masterminded from abroad.” One version included a section on American students. When Helms sent it to Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser, on Feb. 18, 1969, his cover memo flagged the problem himself.</p><p>“This is an area not within the charter of this Agency,” Helms wrote, “so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.”</p><h3>1969: the White House asks for more</h3><p>On June 20, 1969, Tom Charles Huston, a White House staff assistant, wrote to the CIA that Nixon wanted a report on foreign Communist support for protest movements. Huston asked what resources were aimed at the problem, what gaps existed and what could be done to “provide maximum possible coverage.” He gave the agency 10 days. Helms testified that the letter accurately reflected the president’s attitude.</p><p>The CIA answered on June 30 with the finding of no Communist direction or control. The commission described what happened next across both administrations: “The Agency’s repeated conclusion in its reports — that it could find no significant foreign connection with domestic disorder — led to further White House demands.” The cumulative effect was “the addition of more and more resources, including agents.”</p><p>On Sept. 6, 1969, Helms sent an unusual memo to the head of every CIA directorate ordering support for the operation. He wrote that the agency was “strictly observing the statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvements.” The commission noted that the memo was written partly to answer “dissent which had been voiced within the CIA” about the operation.</p><h3>How the files grew</h3><p>The unit worked from a vaulted basement, under security measures the commission called “extreme, even by normally strict CIA standards.” Its staff eventually totaled 52.</p><p>Information arrived from FBI reports, CIA stations overseas, the agency’s New York mail-opening program and an international communications intercept program run by another agency, which the Church Committee identified as the National Security Agency. CHAOS supplied watch lists of names to both programs. The intercept materials alone came to about 1,100 pages, concerning mostly antiwar activity and travel to international peace conferences.</p><p>The commission found that analysts indexed “the names of all persons mentioned in intelligence source reports.” Under time pressure, “little judgment could be, or was, exercised in this process,” and the files filled with data “having little, if anything, bearing upon its foreign intelligence objective.” A CIA evaluation found nearly 65% of the files had been opened to handle FBI information or requests.</p><p>By August 1973 the paper trail included roughly 13,000 files, about 7,200 of them on individuals; more than 11,000 FBI memos and reports; more than 3,000 disseminations to the FBI; and about 3,500 internal memos. The index held more than 300,000 names of people and organizations that, “with few exceptions,” were American and “apparently unconnected with espionage.”</p><h3>Agents among the protesters</h3><p>Beginning in late 1969, CHAOS ran its own agents, fewer than 30 in all. To give them credible cover for assignments abroad, the operation recruited people from domestic dissident groups or told recruits to join such groups in the United States.</p><p>Most were not directed to report on Americans at home, but what they observed often ended up in the files anyway. On three occasions, the commission found, agents were used specifically to collect domestic intelligence. One traveled to report on major demonstrations in late 1969, producing 17 disseminations to the FBI, most “solely” about domestic matters. Another, recruited in April 1971, was sent to Washington to “get as close as possible” to coordinators of the May Day protests.</p><p>Helms testified that he did not know of this domestic use. The commission also found “no evidence” that anyone in the operation used wiretaps, electronic surveillance or break-ins against dissidents; agents reported what they personally saw and heard.</p><h3>Kept from its own watchdogs</h3><p>The secrecy reached inside the agency. In November 1972, the CIA inspector general’s staff was barred from reviewing CHAOS files. An Office of Management and Budget team surveying CIA field operations was “intentionally not informed.” The commission found “no indication” that the CIA’s general counsel was ever consulted.</p><p>Not everyone went along. A group of 14 midlevel officers wrote two memos in 1971 questioning the project’s propriety. One division wanted “nothing to do” with it, believing the work belonged to the FBI. Helms responded in a December 1972 memo for the record: “CHAOS is a legitimate counterintelligence function of the Agency and cannot be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like this activity.”</p><h3>The end, and the exposure</h3><p>As the war wound down, the traffic fell off. In August 1973, new Director William Colby ordered the operation restricted to collecting information abroad on foreign activities, touching Americans “only incidentally.” The CIA terminated CHAOS on March 15, 1974.</p><p>The public learned of it nine months later. On Dec. 22, 1974, Seymour Hersh reported on the front page of The New York Times that the CIA had run a huge domestic operation against antiwar forces, according to the <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm">National Security Archive’s account</a>. Hersh wrote that “a check of the CIA’s domestic files ordered last year” had turned up evidence of other illegal activities. That check, ordered in 1973 by Director James Schlesinger, produced a 693-page internal compilation later known as the “Family Jewels.” The CIA declassified it in 2007; it includes CHAOS documents reflecting employee resentment of the program.</p><p>President Gerald Ford created the commission led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller on Jan. 4, 1975. Its June 1975 report concluded that “some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA’s statutory authority.” The data it accumulated “exceeded what was reasonably required” and “was thus improper,” and the domestic use of agents “was beyond the CIA’s authority.”</p><h3>What the record settles, and what it leaves open</h3><p>The commission’s first recommendation on CHAOS was aimed at the White House: “Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks.” It also urged the agency to resist such efforts “whatever their origin,” and recommended destroying files with no foreign intelligence value once investigations ended and the law allowed.</p><p>Some questions the record does not fully answer. The documents establish sustained presidential pressure, but they do not show how much any president knew about the operation’s methods or the size of its files. Helms testified he was unaware of the domestic agent work. The files went to the FBI by the thousands, and what the bureau did with each one is a matter that would have to be traced document by document.</p><p>The record does answer the question the operation was built to ask. Over and over, the CIA’s own analysts found no foreign hand directing the antiwar movement. The files kept growing anyway. The Church Committee put the stakes plainly: for the citizen, the fact that the government “keeps a file on his associations, or monitors his travel and his advocacy of dissent, is far more important than the question of which office in the bureaucracy is doing it.”</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li>Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), <em>Report to the President</em>, Chapter 11, “Special Operations Group: Operation CHAOS” (June 1975), Ford Library. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/exhibits/intelligence/rockcomm_chap11_chaos.pdf">https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/exhibits/intelligence/rockcomm_chap11_chaos.pdf</a></li><li>Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, <em>Report to the President</em> (June 1975), full text, Ford Library. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0005/1561495.pdf">https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0005/1561495.pdf</a></li><li>U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), <em>Final Report, Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans</em> (1976), “CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: CHAOS.” <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-94755-iii.pdf">https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-94755-iii.pdf</a></li><li>National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book №222, “The CIA’s Family Jewels,” ed. Thomas Blanton (June 2007), with links to declassified CIA documents. <strong>Primary documents with archival commentary.</strong> <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm">https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm</a></li><li>Seymour M. Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” <em>The New York Times</em> (Dec. 22, 1974). Quoted through the National Security Archive’s account; the Times archive page blocks automated fetches (403), but search confirms it exists. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html">https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=501d56105c5c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 034: Escorts, Pledges and Revoked Passes: The Court Rulings on Reporters at the Pentagon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-034-escorts-pledges-and-revoked-passes-the-court-rulings-on-reporters-at-the-pentagon-a9a2330e8b7c?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9a2330e8b7c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pentagon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[courts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[press-freedom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[first-amendment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 21:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-24T21:01:01.874Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A federal judge has ruled three times against the Defense Department’s press restrictions, and an appeals court has twice let the department keep reporters under escort while it appeals.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*csCaKYk2P0IQ85xBySBLrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo: U.S. Department of Defense, Tech. Sgt. Andy Dunaway, 2003 (public domain)</figcaption></figure><p>On or around Oct. 15, 2025, Julian E. Barnes handed in his Pentagon press credential. He had held one almost continuously since 2004, attending hundreds of briefings as a national security reporter for The New York Times. Six of his Times colleagues turned theirs in too, along with most of the reporters who then held passes to the building.</p><p>They had been told to sign an acknowledgment of a new Defense Department policy or lose their credentials. They declined. Barnes, according to a <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/nyt-pentagon-press-opinion-dc.pdf">March 2026 court opinion</a>, had not been back to the Pentagon since.</p><p>What followed was a lawsuit, a ruling for the reporters, a replacement policy issued within days, a second ruling, two appellate stays and a second lawsuit. This dossier lays out that record, separating what the courts found from what the parties argue, as of Oct. 6, 2026.</p><h3>What the credential used to mean</h3><p>The passes at issue are Pentagon Facilities Alternate Credentials, known as PFACs. For decades, according to facts both sides agreed on in the litigation, reporters got them by submitting a letter from their employer and passing a background check. Beginning in the early 2000s, they also signed a one-page form with rules such as wearing the badge above the waist.</p><p>With a credential, reporters could attend briefings called on short notice, walk between press offices and talk informally with officials and public affairs staff. Secure areas stayed off limits. The government did not dispute that this arrangement had posed “no security or safety risk to Department property or personnel,” a point the appeals court later noted.</p><p>Reporters who covered the building for decades told the court they knew of no case in which the department had pulled a credential over security concerns or the content of a reporter’s work. Robert Burns of the Associated Press said that no matter how critical he was, “I never experienced any threats — direct or indirect — to my credential.”</p><h3>The 2025 policy</h3><p>The changes came in stages. In May 2025, the department restricted reporters from areas near the secretary’s office and required escorts elsewhere, citing a need “to reduce the opportunities for in-person inadvertent and unauthorized disclosures.” In September, chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell circulated a new briefing form and acknowledgment that every credential holder would have to sign.</p><p>The department did not identify any security breach that prompted the change, according to the undisputed facts in the case. The final policy, issued Oct. 6, 2025, said a credential “may be denied, revoked, or not renewed if a person is reasonably determined to pose a security or safety risk.” That determination could rest on the “unauthorized disclosure” of classified or controlled unclassified information, and on a reporter’s “solicitation” of such information.</p><p>The policy’s examples of solicitation included “general appeals, such as public advertisements or calls for tips.” Parnell had earlier written to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press that the focus was “preventing active solicitation that encourages [Department] personnel to violate [the Department’s] disclosure rules,” and that merely receiving unsolicited information “would not normally, on its own, trigger revocation.”</p><h3>Who got the passes instead</h3><p>On Oct. 22, 2025, Parnell announced “the next generation of the Pentagon press corps” on X, praising outlets that had signed the policy and calling the departed reporters “activists who masquerade as journalists.” The court record lists new credential holders including Laura Loomer, Matt Gaetz, James O’Keefe, Mike Lindell and Tim Pool.</p><p>When Loomer posted that her platform was now credentialed and invited tips, the department said hers was “a general tip line, which is constitutionally permissible.” It said a Washington Post tip line violated the policy because it “targets military personnel.” In December 2025, Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson called the former credential holders “propagandists” who “continue[] to lie.”</p><h3>The first ruling: vague and viewpoint-based</h3><p>The Times and Barnes sued on Dec. 4, 2025, naming the department, Secretary Pete Hegseth and Parnell. On March 20, 2026, U.S. District Judge Paul L. Friedman granted them summary judgment.</p><p>He found the policy unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment. “The Policy on its face makes any newsgathering and reporting not blessed by the Department a potential basis for the denial, suspension, or revocation of a journalist’s PFAC,” he wrote. “It provides no way for journalists to know how they may do their jobs without losing their credentials.”</p><p>He also found it violated the First Amendment. The department argued that outlets across the spectrum, including Fox News, Newsmax and the Daily Caller, had refused to sign, so the policy could not target liberal media. Friedman called that “beside the point.” The evidence showed discrimination by “editorial viewpoint,” he wrote, meaning whether an outlet would publish only what was “favorable to or spoon-fed by Department leadership.” He concluded: “That is viewpoint discrimination, full stop.”</p><p>Friedman vacated the challenged provisions and ordered the Times reporters’ credentials restored. He acknowledged that “national security must be protected, the security of our troops must be protected, and war plans must be protected,” but wrote that the public needed information from many perspectives about what its government was doing.</p><h3>The replacement policy and the second ruling</h3><p>The next business day, the department sent the Times a “revised policy, in accordance with the Court’s decision.” A memo from Parnell said the department “disagrees with the Court’s decision and is pursuing an appeal.”</p><p>The interim policy swapped “solicitation” for “intentional inducement of unauthorized disclosure” and added six “safe harbors,” such as publishing general tip lines. It also presumed a reporter knew a source was unauthorized if the reporter offered anonymity. It closed the Correspondents’ Corridor, the reporters’ workspace inside the building, and allowed credential holders into the Pentagon only for scheduled briefings and arranged interviews, escorted “at all times.” The stated reason was that after the court’s ruling, unescorted access “cannot be responsibly maintained without the ability to screen PFAC holders for security risks.”</p><p>On April 9, Friedman granted a motion to compel compliance. (That opinion is the document filed as <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.287334/gov.uscourts.dcd.287334.55.0_2.pdf">docket entry 55</a> in the first case.) He found the department had answered an order to restore the Times reporters’ access “by instead cutting off that access for all journalists.” He cited a declaration from Barnes describing a March 31 visit in which he arrived for an escorted interview, was redirected to another entrance, saw the interview postponed and “was immediately escorted out of the building.” The department’s response was that the escort “had not been fully briefed.” Friedman’s reply in the opinion was one word: “Really?”</p><h3>The first stay</h3><p>The department did not ask the appeals court to revive its whole interim policy. On April 27, 2026, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit <a href="https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/04/26-5113.FINAL.pdf">granted a narrow stay</a> of the April 9 order “to the extent that it entitles journalists to access the Pentagon unescorted.” Judges Walker and Garcia formed the majority, as Garcia later confirmed in a separate opinion.</p><p>The unsigned order found the interests on both sides weighty. It credited a declaration from Wilson that, before the 2025 policy, reporters obtained “sensitive or classified” information “often monthly,” and that unescorted access let them “observe activity patterns.” It then decided on the merits question: the escort rule was new and generally applicable, and the March 20 order had not addressed it, so the department was likely to win the argument that it could not be blocked through a motion to enforce that order.</p><p>Judge J. Michelle Childs dissented. “An injunction is not an invitation to circumvention,” she wrote. The department had restored the credentials, she said, “but stripping away much of what made them matter.”</p><h3>The second lawsuit and the second stay</h3><p>The Times and Barnes then sued again, this time attacking the escort requirement directly. On June 30, 2026, Friedman issued a <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-06-30-NYT-v.-DoD-Pentagon-preliminary-injunction-granted.pdf">preliminary injunction</a>, finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed in showing the requirement “was issued to retaliate against the plaintiffs for exercising their constitutional rights.” He noted that the “activity patterns” rationale had appeared only after his April ruling rejected the department’s first explanation, and that this “immediately raises suspicions.”</p><p>On July 16, 2026, a different D.C. Circuit panel <a href="https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/07/26-5253LDSN2.pdf">stayed that injunction too</a>. Judges Henderson and Millett found the department likely to show that a “generally applicable escort requirement” applied evenhandedly to all reporters was not a sufficiently adverse action to support a retaliation claim. They noted the plaintiffs had not argued the rule hit them harder than other reporters.</p><p>Garcia, who had voted for the April stay, dissented this time. The district court had now ruled on the escort requirement itself, he wrote, and its findings on retaliatory motive could be overturned only if clearly erroneous. The panel expedited the appeal.</p><h3>Where things stand</h3><p>As of Oct. 6, 2026, the department may require escorts for credentialed reporters while both appeals proceed. Clerk’s orders entered Sept. 18 set oral argument in both appeals for Nov. 16, 2026, according to the dockets for the appeal of the March 20 and April 9 rulings, <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73177534/new-york-times-company-v-dod/">№26–5113</a>, and the escort appeal, <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73576883/new-york-times-company-v-dod/">№26–5253</a>. The cover of an <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-09-21-NYT-v-DoD-escort-policy-amicus.pdf">amicus brief filed Sept. 21</a> by the Reporters Committee and other media groups lists the same date. In the escort appeal, the Times filed <a href="https://medialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026.09.04-APPELLEE-BRIEF-2191696-filed-by-Julian-E.-Barnes-and-New.pdf">its brief</a> on Sept. 4. The government filed its reply brief in №26–5113 on Oct. 5.</p><p>Neither appellate stay decided whether the policies are constitutional. Both rested on predictions about how the department’s legal arguments would fare. The district court’s findings that the 2025 policy was vague and viewpoint-based, and that the escort rule was likely retaliatory, remain the only merits rulings so far.</p><p>The open question is a legal one: how far the government may condition reporters’ access to the military’s headquarters on terms it sets, and whether a rule applied to every reporter can still be retaliation against some of them. The D.C. Circuit has not answered it.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №25-cv-04218 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2026), opinion. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/nyt-pentagon-press-opinion-dc.pdf">https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/nyt-pentagon-press-opinion-dc.pdf</a></li><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №25-cv-04218 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2026), opinion granting motion to compel compliance (ECF №55). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.287334/gov.uscourts.dcd.287334.55.0_2.pdf">https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.287334/gov.uscourts.dcd.287334.55.0_2.pdf</a></li><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №26–5113 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2026), order granting stay in part, with dissenting statement. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/04/26-5113.FINAL.pdf">https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/04/26-5113.FINAL.pdf</a></li><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №26-cv-01690 (D.D.C. June 30, 2026), preliminary injunction opinion (RCFP copy). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-06-30-NYT-v.-DoD-Pentagon-preliminary-injunction-granted.pdf">https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026-06-30-NYT-v.-DoD-Pentagon-preliminary-injunction-granted.pdf</a></li><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №26–5253 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 2026), order granting stay, with dissenting statement. <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/07/26-5253LDSN2.pdf">https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/orders/docs/2026/07/26-5253LDSN2.pdf</a></li><li>Brief for The New York Times Company and Julian E. Barnes, №26–5253 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 4, 2026). <strong>Primary document; party filing.</strong> <a href="https://medialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026.09.04-APPELLEE-BRIEF-2191696-filed-by-Julian-E.-Barnes-and-New.pdf">https://medialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026.09.04-APPELLEE-BRIEF-2191696-filed-by-Julian-E.-Barnes-and-New.pdf</a></li><li>Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al., №26–5113 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 21, 2026). <strong>Primary document; amicus filing by press-freedom advocates.</strong> <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-09-21-NYT-v-DoD-escort-policy-amicus.pdf">https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-09-21-NYT-v-DoD-escort-policy-amicus.pdf</a></li><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №26–5113 (D.C. Cir.), docket (CourtListener). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73177534/new-york-times-company-v-dod/">https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73177534/new-york-times-company-v-dod/</a></li><li><em>New York Times Co. v. Department of Defense</em>, №26–5253 (D.C. Cir.), docket (CourtListener). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73576883/new-york-times-company-v-dod/">https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/73576883/new-york-times-company-v-dod/</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9a2330e8b7c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 033: Gul Rahman, the Salt Pit, and the Lawsuit That Reached the CIA's Contract Psychologists]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-033-gul-rahman-the-salt-pit-and-the-lawsuit-that-reached-the-cias-contract-psychologists-2ae8b4fe5e9a?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ae8b4fe5e9a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lawsuit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[detention]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[torture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 14:56:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-24T14:56:01.471Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Dossier 033: Gul Rahman, the Salt Pit, and the Lawsuit That Reached the CIA’s Contract Psychologists</h3><h4>An Afghan detainee froze to death in a CIA prison in November 2002. A recommended 10-day suspension was overruled, prosecutors declined charges, and a lawsuit set for a jury trial ended in a confidential settlement.</h4><p>Gul Rahman spent his last night chained to the wall of a cell at a CIA prison north of Kabul. He was wearing a sweatshirt and nothing below the waist, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee, and the position he had been shackled in forced him to rest on bare concrete. The next morning, guards found him dead.</p><p>The prison was called COBALT in the committee’s 2014 study; those held there knew it as the Salt Pit or “The Darkness.” Rahman is the only person known to have died in a CIA-run prison, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/31/us-cia-detainee-prison-deaths">according to the Guardian</a>. His death is the most direct measure of the harm the CIA’s detention program did. It is also a case study in how accountability was proposed, reduced and, at each stage, set aside.</p><p>This dossier follows the record from the cell to the CIA’s internal review, to the Justice Department, and to a federal courtroom in Spokane, Washington.</p><h3>Who he was</h3><p>Rahman was an Afghan who was detained in Pakistan in October 2002 and died about a month later, <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/17/544183178/psychologists-behind-cia-enhanced-interrogation-program-settle-detainees-lawsuit">NPR reported</a> in 2017. The CIA held him as a suspected Islamic extremist with possible links to al-Qaida and the Afghan militant group Hezbi Islami.</p><p>The Senate study’s list of detainees the CIA should not have held includes a phrase that is easy to pass over: “Gul Rahman, another case of mistaken identity.” The heavily redacted footnote gives no further detail. It places him among at least 26 of the program’s 119 known detainees who, by the committee’s count, were wrongfully held and did not meet the standard for detention.</p><h3>The last weeks</h3><p>The <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf">Senate Intelligence Committee’s executive summary</a> describes Rahman’s interrogation in November 2002. A CIA contract interrogator the study calls “Hammond DUNBAR,” one of two primary interrogators of Abu Zubaydah earlier that year, traveled to COBALT to assess a detainee for possible enhanced techniques and helped interrogate Rahman.</p><p>As reported to CIA headquarters, that interrogation included “48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment.” Headquarters had not approved those methods in advance. When the cables arrived, headquarters officers replied that they were “motivated to extract any and all operational information on al-Qa’ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman” and suggested “enhanced measures” might be needed.</p><p>A few days later, the officer managing the site, identified in the study only as “CIA OFFICER 1,” ordered Rahman shackled to the wall. He had earlier ordered Rahman’s clothing removed after judging him uncooperative. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman “likely died from hypothermia — in part from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants.” A CIA death investigation listed dehydration, lack of food and immobility from “short chaining” as other contributing factors.</p><p>According to the committee, the site manager’s first cable to headquarters about the death “included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations.”</p><h3>A reward, then a recommended suspension</h3><p>The committee found that the death led CIA headquarters to learn about coercive techniques at COBALT that had not been reported, and to put the facility under a headquarters unit in early December 2002. It found that many of the same people stayed on.</p><p>“Many of the same individuals within the CIA — including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC Station who had recommended the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul Rahman — remained key figures in the CIA interrogation program and received no reprimand or sanction for Rahman’s death,” the study states.</p><p>In March 2003, four months after the death, the CIA station recommended that the site manager receive a $2,500 cash award. He remained manager of the site until July 2003, and was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical part of his training was waived because of his experience at COBALT.</p><p>In late 2005, a CIA accountability board reviewed the death. It recommended a 10-day suspension without pay for the site manager, describing him as “the only individual who made decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman’s death.”</p><h3>The decision to impose nothing</h3><p>On Feb. 10, 2006, the CIA’s executive director, Kyle “Dusty” Foggo, told the officer he intended to take no disciplinary action. The Senate study quotes his memo: “While not condoning your actions, it is imperative, in my view, that they… be judged within the operational context that existed at the time.” Foggo wrote that cable traffic showed “conclusively that Headquarters generally was aware of, and posed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques being imposed on Rahman.”</p><p>That reasoning moved responsibility up the chain without assigning it to anyone there. In its June 2013 response to the committee, quoted in the study, the CIA itself conceded: “Most egregiously, we believe that CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to the death of Gul Rahman.”</p><p>Sen. Angus King, an independent from Maine, addressed one part of the CIA’s response in additional views attached to the study. The agency had said that delegating management of the site to a junior officer “was not a prudent managerial decision given the risks inherent in the program.” King wrote: “It is difficult to imagine a greater understatement of what occurred.”</p><h3>The prosecutors</h3><p>Criminal review did not produce charges either. According to the Guardian, two federal prosecutors reviewed Rahman’s death before John Durham did and could not prove that the officer running the Salt Pit intended to harm him.</p><p>In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder expanded Durham’s mandate, which had begun with the destroyed interrogation videotapes, to examine whether CIA interrogators and contractors broke the law. On Aug. 30, 2012, Holder closed the investigations into two deaths in U.S. custody. The Justice Department did not name the two men, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-19432553">according to the BBC</a>, but they are widely reported to have been Rahman and Manadel al-Jamadi, who died in Iraq.</p><p>Holder said the department would not proceed “because the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt,” <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/08/30/160331755/justice-department-closes-investigation-into-deaths-of-two-detainees">NPR reported</a>. He added that the inquiry was “limited to a determination of whether prosecutable offenses were committed” and did not “resolve broader questions regarding the propriety” of the treatment.</p><h3>The lawsuit</h3><p>The Senate study’s 2014 release changed what could be litigated. Earlier civil suits over the program had been dismissed after the government argued they would expose state secrets. On Oct. 13, 2015, three plaintiffs sued in federal court in Spokane: Suleiman Abdullah Salim, a Tanzanian held by the CIA in Afghanistan; Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud, a Libyan held in the same prison; and Obaid Ullah, the personal representative of Rahman’s estate. The Guardian described him as Rahman’s nephew, a young Afghan computer engineer.</p><p>They did not sue CIA officers. They sued the two contract psychologists, James Mitchell and John “Bruce” Jessen, who the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/cia-torture-psychologists-settle-lawsuit">ACLU says</a> designed and implemented the agency’s interrogation program. The Senate study reports that the CIA’s contract with the company the two men formed was worth more than $180 million with all options and that the contractors received $81 million before it ended in 2009. The CIA also gave the company an indemnification agreement against legal liability.</p><p>The claims were brought under the Alien Tort Statute and alleged torture, cruel and degrading treatment, nonconsensual human experimentation and war crimes. According to the <a href="https://clearinghouse.net/case/15349/">Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse</a>, Senior U.S. District Judge Justin L. Quackenbush denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss in April 2016 and January 2017, and denied both sides’ motions for summary judgment in August 2017. In that last ruling, quoted by the ACLU, he wrote: “The evidence would support a finding Defendants designed the [enhanced interrogation techniques] to be used on detainees, and thus they clearly had knowledge they would be so used.” Unlike in earlier cases, the ACLU noted, the Justice Department did not try to have the suit dismissed.</p><h3>The settlement</h3><p>Trial was set for Sept. 5, 2017. On Aug. 17, the parties settled on confidential terms, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. No amount has been disclosed.</p><p>The settlement included a joint statement. In it, Mitchell and Jessen “acknowledge that they worked with the CIA to develop a program for the CIA that contemplated the use of specific coercive methods to interrogate certain detainees.” The statement says Rahman “was subjected to abuses in the CIA program that resulted in his death and in pain and suffering for his family.”</p><p>The two sides kept their dispute on the record. The plaintiffs “stand by their allegations regarding the responsibility of Drs. Mitchell and Jessen.” The psychologists “assert that they were unaware of the specific abuses that ultimately caused Mr. Rahman’s death and are also not responsible for those actions,” and say the abuse of Salim and Ben Soud occurred without their knowledge or consent. Jessen said, according to NPR, that their actions were “legal and authorized and protected our country from another vicious attack.”</p><h3>What the case did and did not settle</h3><p>The lawsuit forced depositions of the two psychologists and of former senior CIA officials Jose Rodriguez and John Rizzo, according to the ACLU, and brought out documents that had been classified. A trial, the Guardian noted, would have been the first time a jury decided whether the program’s designers owed anything to former prisoners. It never happened.</p><p>The record now establishes that Rahman died in CIA custody after treatment the CIA’s own investigators linked to his death, that he was listed by the committee as a case of mistaken identity, that the one sanction recommended against the officer in charge was overruled, and that the agency later called the absence of accountability its most serious error in the case. The settlement records the psychologists’ regret without an admission of liability.</p><p>What remains unresolved is who, if anyone, answers for a death that the CIA’s executive director attributed to conditions headquarters knew about and did not stop. No court ever ruled on that question, and no official was disciplined.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ol><li>Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, <em>Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program</em>, Findings and Conclusions, Executive Summary and additional views (S. Rept. 113–288, Dec. 2014). <strong>Primary.</strong> <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf">https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf</a></li><li>Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, Salim v. Mitchell, №2:15-cv-00286 (E.D. Wash.), case summary and docket. <strong>Primary (docket record).</strong> <a href="https://clearinghouse.net/case/15349/">https://clearinghouse.net/case/15349/</a></li><li>ACLU, “CIA Torture Psychologists Settle Lawsuit” (Aug. 17, 2017). Advocacy organization and plaintiffs’ counsel. <a href="https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/cia-torture-psychologists-settle-lawsuit">https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/cia-torture-psychologists-settle-lawsuit</a></li><li>NPR, “Psychologists Behind CIA ‘Enhanced Interrogation’ Program Settle Detainees’ Lawsuit” (Aug. 17, 2017). <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/17/544183178/psychologists-behind-cia-enhanced-interrogation-program-settle-detainees-lawsuit">https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/17/544183178/psychologists-behind-cia-enhanced-interrogation-program-settle-detainees-lawsuit</a></li><li>The Guardian, “CIA torture: lawsuit settled against psychologists who designed techniques” (Aug. 17, 2017). <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/17/cia-torture-lawsuit-settled-against-psychologists-who-designed-techniques">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/17/cia-torture-lawsuit-settled-against-psychologists-who-designed-techniques</a></li><li>NPR, “Justice Department Closes Investigation Into Deaths Of Two Detainees” (Aug. 30, 2012). <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/08/30/160331755/justice-department-closes-investigation-into-deaths-of-two-detainees">https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/08/30/160331755/justice-department-closes-investigation-into-deaths-of-two-detainees</a></li><li>The Guardian, “US justice department rules out prosecutions over CIA prison deaths” (Aug. 31, 2012). <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/31/us-cia-detainee-prison-deaths">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/31/us-cia-detainee-prison-deaths</a></li><li>BBC News, “CIA interrogation probe ends without any charges” (Aug. 31, 2012). <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-19432553">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-19432553</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ae8b4fe5e9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dossier 032: What the Inspector General Found When It Audited the FBI’s Secret Records Demands]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@unseendossier/dossier-032-what-the-inspector-general-found-when-it-audited-the-fbis-secret-records-demands-c21cfda7f6e1?source=rss-e2f009670720------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[civil-liberties]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inspector-general]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fbi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[patriot-act]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Unseen Dossier]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T21:01:02.157Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>National security letters let the FBI collect phone, bank and credit records without a judge, and in 2007 the Justice Department’s own watchdog showed how loosely the bureau had been using them.</h4><p>A national security letter is a page or two of paper. The FBI sends it to a phone company, a bank or a credit bureau and demands customer records. No judge reviews it first, and the recipient is usually barred from telling anyone it arrived.</p><p>For most of the years after Sept. 11, almost nobody outside the bureau could see how often these letters went out or whether the rules governing them were followed. That changed in March 2007, when the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General published <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0703b/final.pdf">the first audit</a> that Congress had required when it renewed the USA Patriot Act.</p><p>The audit found that the FBI had undercounted its own letters to Congress, had missed violations in its own files and had obtained thousands of phone records with letters that misstated the facts. This dossier walks through what the inspector general documented, what the FBI said in response, and what remains unknown about a tool that is still in use.</p><h3>A tool that predates the Patriot Act</h3><p>National security letters were not invented in 2001. Before the Patriot Act, the inspector general explained, the statutes required a senior FBI headquarters official to certify that the bureau had “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe” that the person whose records were sought was a foreign power or an agent of one.</p><p>Section 505 of the Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, removed that requirement. The new threshold was that the records be “relevant to an authorized investigation” of international terrorism or espionage, as long as an investigation of a U.S. person was not based “solely” on activity protected by the First Amendment. As a result, the report noted, letters could seek information about people who were not themselves the subjects of an investigation.</p><p>The act also let the heads of the FBI’s 56 field offices sign the letters, and it added a new authority to obtain full consumer credit reports in international terrorism cases. The letters cover four broad kinds of records: telephone and email subscriber and billing information, financial records, credit information and, in limited cases, full credit reports.</p><h3>The numbers Congress was given, and the real ones</h3><p>The inspector general reported that the FBI issued about 8,500 national security letter requests in 2000, the last full year before the Patriot Act. The figure rose to about 39,000 in 2003, about 56,000 in 2004 and about 47,000 in 2005, for a total of 143,074 requests over the three-year review period.</p><p>The share tied to investigations of U.S. persons grew from about 39% of requests in 2003 to about 53% in 2005. The <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0803b/final.pdf">follow-up report in March 2008</a> found that the trend continued: 49,425 requests in 2006, with about 57% generated from investigations of U.S. persons.</p><p>Even these figures were too low. The FBI tracked its letters in a database kept by its Office of the General Counsel, and the department used that database for its classified reports to Congress. When inspectors compared it with case files in four field offices, they found about 17% more letters and 22% more requests in the files than in the database. “As a result,” the report said, “we believe that the total number of NSL requests issued by the FBI is significantly higher than the FBI reported.”</p><p>The database also mislabeled people. In 12% of the case files examined, the database listed the target as a non-U.S. person while the file’s own approval paperwork described a U.S. person or presumed U.S. person.</p><h3>Violations the FBI had not found</h3><p>The FBI was required to report possible intelligence violations to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. For 2003 through 2005, the bureau identified 26 possible violations involving national security letters and reported 19 of them. Twenty-two were FBI errors; four were mistakes by the companies that received the letters.</p><p>Inspectors then reviewed 77 investigative files themselves. Seventeen of them, or 22%, contained at least one violation the FBI had not identified, including letters that sought different information from what a supervisor had approved. “We believe that a significant number of NSL violations are not being identified or reported by the FBI,” the report concluded.</p><p>Internal controls fared worse. Sixty percent of the files examined had at least one violation of FBI policy on national security letters, such as missing documentation of supervisory review or approval memos that omitted the authorizing statute or the number of records sought. Because the FBI had no policy requiring it to keep signed copies of the letters, the inspector general wrote, a full audit of compliance was impossible.</p><p>The report described other problems in plain terms. The FBI’s counterterrorism division had issued more than 300 letters from administrative “control files” rather than investigative files, so no one could tell whether they were tied to a proper investigation. In a few cases, agents sought educational records with a type of letter that did not cover them, or obtained full credit reports in counterintelligence cases, which the statute did not allow.</p><h3>Seven hundred letters that claimed subpoenas were coming</h3><p>The most serious finding involved a unit at FBI headquarters called the Communications Analysis Unit. Starting in March 2003, the unit sent what it called “exigent letters” to three telephone companies. The 2007 report counted at least 739 of them through December 2005, covering about 3,000 telephone numbers.</p><p>The letters typically told the companies that “[s]ubpoenas requesting this information have been submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s Office who will process and serve them formally.” In examining support for 25 of the letters in a random sample, inspectors “could not confirm one instance” in which a subpoena had been submitted before the letter was sent.</p><p>The inspector general concluded that the FBI had “circumvented” the statute governing phone-record letters and violated the attorney general’s guidelines and FBI policy. The letters were used in non-emergency situations, often without a properly opened investigation, and the formal paperwork that was supposed to follow often came late or not at all.</p><p>A later, deeper investigation, published in January 2010, recounted the same practice over a longer period and produced slightly different numbers. As Inspector General Glenn A. Fine <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/news/testimony/statement-glenn-fine-inspector-general-us-department-justice-house-committee-3">told a House subcommittee</a>, the unit issued at least 722 exigent letters from March 2003 to November 2006, seeking records on more than 2,000 telephone numbers. The two reports covered different periods and used different methods, and neither number should be treated as a complete total.</p><h3>Post-it notes and “sneak peeks”</h3><p>The 2010 investigation found that exigent letters were only part of the story. Employees of the phone companies worked on site at the FBI, and agents often asked them for records “by e-mail, by telephone, face-to-face, and even on post-it notes,” Fine testified. Those informal requests covered at least 3,500 telephone numbers, though the FBI’s record-keeping made the full scope impossible to determine.</p><p>Some requests were “sneak peeks,” in which a company employee previewed whether records existed for a number and sometimes summarized the calls, with no documentation of why the FBI wanted to know. In three media leak investigations, the FBI sought, and in two cases received, calling records for numbers assigned to reporters without the attorney general’s approval that regulations required. In one case, the reporters’ records sat in an FBI database for more than three years until the inspector general’s investigators found them.</p><p>In 2006, after the inspector general began asking questions, the counterterrorism division issued three “blanket” letters meant to “cover” earlier requests. Fine testified that the law did not allow retroactive legal process and that the blanket letters “did not cure prior violations.” He described “numerous, repeated, and significant management failures” that continued until the first report came out in March 2007.</p><h3>How the FBI and the department answered</h3><p>The 2007 report drew a line between carelessness and intent. It found no “deliberate or intentional violations” in the matters the FBI reported, and it “did not find any indication that the FBI’s misuse of NSL authorities constituted criminal misconduct.” It also noted the pressure the bureau was under after the 2001 attacks and that in most cases the FBI could have obtained the information lawfully by following the rules.</p><p>Fine summarized the causes for reporters. According to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2007/03/09/7812242/fbi-investigations-faulted-in-scathing-report">NPR’s account</a>, he said many problems were “the result of sloppiness, mistakes, confusion, inadequate training, inadequate oversight,” which he called “unacceptable,” and he found no “intentional misuses of the statute.”</p><p>FBI Director Robert Mueller said he was “particularly concerned about findings in this report that indicate we did not have appropriate policies in place.” Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was more direct. “I believed that the FBI was acting responsibly in using national security letters,” he said. “Because of the good work of I.G., I’ve come to learn that I was wrong.” He asked critics to be patient rather than strip the bureau of the authority.</p><p>The reaction crossed party lines. Sen. Jon Kyl, an Arizona Republican who had supported the expanded authority, told NPR: “It shakes my confidence in the organization which is given a very important power.” Anthony Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, an advocacy group that had challenged the letters, said “there’s no judge who signs off on that request for information.”</p><h3>The follow-up audit</h3><p>A year later, the inspector general reported that the FBI and the department had made “significant progress.” The bureau had issued new guidance, required training, prohibited exigent letters, built a new data system for issuing letters and created an Office of Integrity and Compliance. The department’s National Security Division had begun its own reviews.</p><p>The FBI’s own 2007 review of its field offices confirmed that the same kinds of problems had occurred across the bureau from 2003 through 2006. It found a possible violation rate of 9.43%, higher than the 7.5% the inspector general had found. Yet when the inspector general rechecked files the FBI had marked as clean in three field offices, it found 15 more possible violations.</p><p>The 2008 report declined to declare the problem solved. Because only a year had passed, it said, “it is too early to definitively state whether the new systems and controls developed by the FBI and the Department will eliminate fully the problems with NSLs that we identified.” It also criticized a privacy working group’s proposal for failing to address how records obtained through the letters should be labeled, kept or shared.</p><h3>What the public can see now</h3><p>The letters remain in use. In its <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2026/cy2025-annual-statistical-transparency-report_20260401.pdf">annual transparency report for 2025</a>, dated April 2026, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that the FBI issued 8,865 national security letters containing 29,203 requests for information in 2025, down from 10,854 letters and 37,267 requests in 2024. The report counts requests rather than people, and it says the number of requests is “significantly larger” than the number of individuals or organizations involved.</p><p>Those figures say nothing about compliance. The public record does not include a comparable independent audit of how the letters have been used in recent years, and the gag orders that accompany many letters mean recipients rarely describe them. Critics, including civil liberties groups, have argued in court that those gag orders chill lawful speech; that argument is an allegation that courts have weighed case by case, not a settled finding.</p><p>The inspector general’s work showed something specific. When the bureau’s records were finally checked against its files, the files told a different story from the reports Congress had received. Whether today’s reporting gives Congress enough to know if that gap has closed is a question for Congress, and as of Oct. 6, 2026, it remains open.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li>U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, <em>A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of National Security Letters</em> (March 2007). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0703b/final.pdf">https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0703b/final.pdf</a></li><li>U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, <em>A Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006</em> (March 2008). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0803b/final.pdf">https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0803b/final.pdf</a></li><li>Statement of Inspector General Glenn A. Fine before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, on the OIG report on exigent letters (2010). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/news/testimony/statement-glenn-fine-inspector-general-us-department-justice-house-committee-3">https://oig.justice.gov/news/testimony/statement-glenn-fine-inspector-general-us-department-justice-house-committee-3</a></li><li>U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, <em>A Review of the FBI’s Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records</em> (January 2010; Nov. 24, 2014 version). <strong>Primary document.</strong> <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/o1411.pdf">https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/o1411.pdf</a></li><li>Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <em>Annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities, Calendar Year 2025</em> (April 2026). <strong>Primary document</strong> (copy hosted by GlobalSecurity.org). <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2026/cy2025-annual-statistical-transparency-report_20260401.pdf">https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2026/cy2025-annual-statistical-transparency-report_20260401.pdf</a> ; ODNI listing page (its title is confirmed by search, but automated fetches return ODNI’s general newsroom page): <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2026/4149-astr-cy25">https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2026/4149-astr-cy25</a></li><li>NPR, “FBI Investigations Faulted in Scathing Report” (March 9, 2007). <a href="https://www.npr.org/2007/03/09/7812242/fbi-investigations-faulted-in-scathing-report">https://www.npr.org/2007/03/09/7812242/fbi-investigations-faulted-in-scathing-report</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c21cfda7f6e1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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