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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by V3D on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by V3D on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by V3D on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Story of $$$$ Bounty: 80k+ Users Data Exposed via Signup Flaw]]></title>
            <link>https://v3d.medium.com/story-of-bounty-80k-users-data-exposed-via-signup-flaw-0f41e1d57481?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 04 Oct 2025 12:50:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-04T12:50:03.488Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Hackers, Ram Ram Bhyi Sarya Ne</p><p>Hope you’re doing great. This is V3D, sharing a quick write-up with my friend <a href="https://x.com/Zero2Infinity_">Gaurav Gajre</a> on one of our recent findings “<strong>Unauthorised Access to 80k+ User Data via Chatbot Signup</strong>.”</p><blockquote><strong><em>Note</em></strong><em>: </em>This was on a private Bug Bounty Program, so I can’t reveal the actual program name. Let’s call it REDACTED.COM.</blockquote><p>Without any further ado… let’s buckle up.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F2vqd1nnQVhp8rneZVi%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPWVjZjA1ZTQ3ZzdnOWY0bGFkNjA1aDBzOHk1bzJsZDgzZGpkNm44ajJhNXRoMGEwYiZlcD12MV9naWZzX3NlYXJjaCZjdD1n%2F2vqd1nnQVhp8rneZVi%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia3.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExaHkxc3Y0cnowOW9mOW5nMXdtYnE1NDhva25kMTYwOG0yNHZqZ3ppbiZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2F2vqd1nnQVhp8rneZVi%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="246" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/916492ae0ca9fcddd1d8e6fb23c38546/href">https://medium.com/media/916492ae0ca9fcddd1d8e6fb23c38546/href</a></iframe><p>So once upon a time, one of my best buddies, <a href="https://x.com/0xdln"><strong>Oxdln</strong></a>, found a vulnerability in a Bugcrowd public program. He found an IP, and when he opened it, there was a login page. He just tried admin: admin, and boom, he was logged in. He reported it and bagged a $2500 bounty. When he told me this, I was like - bro, when will I ever find something like this? He just said: “<em>It’s all about being at the right place at the right time.</em>” That line always stayed with me. And that’s pretty much where this story begins. Big shoutout to all my broskis who always have my back.</p><p>Fast forward, <a href="https://x.com/Zero2Infinity_">Gaurav</a> bhai and I were grinding on this private program for 18 days straight. Found a bunch of medium and low issues, but no critical or high. Then we thought, let’s run waybackurls on REDACTED.COM. That’s when we stumbled upon a URL we hadn’t seen before:</p><pre>https://terabot.redacted.com/home</pre><p>We opened it, and it showed us a signup page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z7fugSf6sdqOmwzfoc0E0w.png" /><figcaption>ChatBot Signup Page</figcaption></figure><p>We filled in the details and hit “Join your team.” To our surprise, we were directly logged into the application without any verification. Looked fishy, so we started digging deeper into every functionality.</p><p>And then we struck a gold mine, an “<strong>Omnichannel Contact Center</strong>” directory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N7x1-DmVZ2BEUc0Sv-TCnA.png" /></figure><p>Inside it, we found 80k+ user records including username, name, email, and phone numbers. Not just that, we could even create chatbot support agent accounts and interact with live super agents.</p><p>Our reaction:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F7syoBBth7N0He%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPWVjZjA1ZTQ3ZzdnOWY0bGFkNjA1aDBzOHk1bzJsZDgzZGpkNm44ajJhNXRoMGEwYiZlcD12MV9naWZzX3NlYXJjaCZjdD1n%2F7syoBBth7N0He%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia4.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdnN4MmY5NmZwcWN5MHRsMmN1ZTAwdGd3eGZmODB2OHpkdzhid3oyeSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2F7syoBBth7N0He%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/62d74f23489c4842b86f04e1b4dd2527/href">https://medium.com/media/62d74f23489c4842b86f04e1b4dd2527/href</a></iframe><p>We quickly prepared our report and sent it over. The team first accepted it as <strong>High</strong>, but we knew this was beyond High. We requested a re-evaluation. Even the company’s VP (Vice President) reached out to me directly on WhatsApp, encouraging our efforts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uSqkWZD9hEjE3v1lydePYw.jpeg" /></figure><p>After three days, we got the final reply, they reclassified it as Critical and increased the bounty amount.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*57xRrvuNKLaT4YUx-cFS6w.png" /></figure><p>And that’s how a random signup page turned into access to 80k+ users’ data. <strong>Right place, right time</strong>.</p><p>Hope you find this write-up helpful.</p><p>Hope you learned something new. If you like the write-up, give it a clap and follow me on <a href="https://x.com/v3d_bug"><strong>X( Twitter)</strong></a> and<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ved-parkash-320602110/"><strong>LinkedIn</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0f41e1d57481" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The $1000 Critical Bug: Unauthorised Access Leading to Support Admin Panel Takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/the-1000-critical-bug-unauthorised-access-leading-to-support-admin-panel-takeover-572d687566cd?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/572d687566cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacker]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 19:37:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-13T07:50:46.924Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello Hackers, Ram Ram Bhyi Sarya Ne</p><p>Hope you’re doing great. This is V3D, and I’m sharing a quick write-up with my friend <a href="https://x.com/Zero2Infinity_">Gaurav</a> Gajre on one of our recent findings, an “Unauthorised Access Leading to Support Admin Panel Takeover.”</p><blockquote><strong>Note</strong>: This was on a private Bug Bounty Program, so I can’t reveal the actual program name. Let’s just call it REDACTED.COM.</blockquote><p>Without any further ado… let’s buckle up.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FYSgOqsVIh2W2Ufgrj3%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPWVjZjA1ZTQ3d3Jvb2x5cjR1MDUyNWo3ZnZuZXU5MXh0cjVwYTdrMnR0eTRidDZqMCZlcD12MV9naWZzX3NlYXJjaCZjdD1n%2FYSgOqsVIh2W2Ufgrj3%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExeXl2bnplOHh0aGtmbW1meDkybjhrMmQydzBmemg2eWJwdTM1Y3NvNSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FYSgOqsVIh2W2Ufgrj3%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/55f28ee3abf406e894f24ef07c2efc78/href">https://medium.com/media/55f28ee3abf406e894f24ef07c2efc78/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Initial Discovery</strong></p><p>While hunting on target.com, we stumbled upon <strong>REDACTED.COM</strong>. At first, we assumed it was a subsidiary or asset of target.com. To be sure, we reached out to their security team. They confirmed it wasn’t part of their scope but advised us to report the issue, saying they’d pass it along to the right team.</p><p>We then received a response from the parent company of <strong>REDACTED.COM</strong>:</p><blockquote>“Regarding your request related to bug bounty on <a href="https://www.redacted.com/">https://www.redacted.com</a>, please read the policies on <a href="https://parentcompany.com/security-policies/">https://parentcompany.com/security-policies/</a> and submit the report to us (<a href="/service/mailto:security@parentcompany.com">security@parentcompany.com</a><br>) to be eligible under the company’s bug bounty program. We’ll assess the report and get back to you accordingly.”</blockquote><p>After reviewing their bounty policy, we began testing REDACTED.COM.</p><p><strong>Registration Flow</strong></p><p>The platform’s registration was based on a mobile number. While analyzing the signup request, we noticed two interesting parameters:</p><pre>_token=ALPHANUMERIC-VALUE&amp;userType=0&amp;Mobile=9999999999&amp;h_otp=1&amp;0tp=877430&amp;Name=asdfg&amp;Email=v3d%40wearehackerone.com&amp;PinCode=111111&amp;Date0fBirth=01%2F01%2F2000&amp;referralCode=&amp;termCondition=2&amp;UtmTerm=&amp;UtmMedium=&amp;UtmCampaign=&amp;proengsoft_jsvalidation=&amp;_jsvalidation=termCondition&amp;_jsvalidation_validate_all=false</pre><p>The two key parameters were:</p><p>1. userType=0</p><p>2. jsvalidation_validate_all=false</p><p>We tampered with the request:</p><p>Changed userType=0 → userType=1</p><p>Changed jsvalidation_validate_all=false → jsvalidation_validate_all=true</p><p>Upon forwarding this modified request, we received a 200 OK response. Shortly after, another similar request appeared with the parameter jsvalidation_validate_all=. Again, we set userType=1 and forwarded it. This time, the response was 302 Found, redirecting us to:</p><p><a href="https://www.redacted.com/partner-dashboard">https://www.redacted.com/partner-dashboard</a></p><blockquote><strong>Here’s something important</strong>: during our initial reproduction attempts, we missed the second request modification and couldn’t recreate the privileged account. We tried multiple times and failed until we carefully revisited the flow. Lesson learned — always check every request in the chain.</blockquote><p><strong>Accessing the Dashboard</strong></p><p>Once logged in, the system asked for KYC documents. We uploaded dummy documents and proceeded. At first, the dashboard looked similar to a regular user account, but while exploring the options, we stumbled upon the support ticketing system.</p><p>And that’s where things got interesting.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F2wSe48eAUC15p38UqO%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdWhwcXRvaW40a25oeHFvODhicXVxNGx1eXFieDlqODRkc3htdDdubiZlcD12MV9naWZzX3NlYXJjaCZjdD1n%2F2wSe48eAUC15p38UqO%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExNXFrYm51dzV0YzJ3NHBreHloank2aGN0ODIwZmRxN2szM3g5Mzk2ZiZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2F2wSe48eAUC15p38UqO%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="287" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/727f9381bd6a19972784dcee89620d50/href">https://medium.com/media/727f9381bd6a19972784dcee89620d50/href</a></iframe><p>Upon clicking My Tickets, we suddenly had access to <strong>73,000+ support tickets</strong> 🤯, including customer queries, PII, attached documents, and even the ability to reply on behalf of support staff.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YaP7Eod283Cu8VVgkzFi4A.png" /></figure><p><strong>Reporting</strong></p><p>It was around 4 A.M. when we found this. We immediately prepared a report and submitted it to the security team. By 10 A.M., we had sent them a full PoC with detailed reproduction steps.</p><p>The team responded quickly, fixed the issue within an hour, and asked us to retest. We confirmed the fix.</p><p><strong>Bounty Twist</strong></p><p>Afterwards, they said they’d get back with the bounty amount. Two days later, I asked for an update, and instead of telling me the reward, they directly requested my bank details. I asked them to first disclose the amount, but they ignored my request.</p><p>When I followed up again, they repeated the same thing. Something felt off.</p><p>Finally, I received the bounty mail:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xoe5zzOJjM92rtNQWkcJIA.jpeg" /></figure><p>But here’s the twist, their policy clearly stated $3000–$5000 for Critical. When I confronted them, they claimed the old policy had been updated, and the new range was $500–$2000.</p><p>On checking, we realised they had backdated their updated policy (dated 10th Jan), while we reported the bug on 12th Jan when the old payout range was still live.</p><p>Despite multiple arguments over email and calls, they stood firm on $1000. In the end, we accepted it, though it was disappointing.</p><p>Hope you find this write-up helpful.</p><p>Hope you learned something new. If you like the write-up, give it a clap and follow me on <a href="https://x.com/v3d_bug"><strong>X( Twitter)</strong></a> and<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ved-parkash-320602110/"><strong>LinkedIn</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=572d687566cd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/the-1000-critical-bug-unauthorised-access-leading-to-support-admin-panel-takeover-572d687566cd">The $1000 Critical Bug: Unauthorised Access Leading to Support Admin Panel Takeover</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Information Disclosure: Story of 500€ + 400$ Bounty]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/information-disclosure-story-of-500-400-bounty-97d3b343f9ad?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/97d3b343f9ad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 09:16:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-23T06:47:08.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi, Fellow Hunters, Ram Ram Bhyi Sarya Ne,</p><p>Hope you are doing well and taking care of your health, this side <strong>V3D</strong>.</p><p>I am writing a write-up of one of my findings.</p><p><strong>Issue</strong>: Infomation Disclosure of Customer’s invoices, Customer’s emails</p><p><em>Note: These are private Bug Bounty Programs, so I can’t disclose the program name, let’s consider them as REDACTED.COM</em></p><p>Without any further ado… Let’s Start…</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FkrqnIPLK0EAduikysz%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdWZhMmhkMnY0cjNobW0ybjJmc3MwenkxaWdsazQ5d29jejVrcXcwMCZlcD12MV9naWZzX3NlYXJjaCZjdD1n%2FkrqnIPLK0EAduikysz%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia1.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdHU4ODhxaXkzem5qODdleHZtcTF5ZG5nMTc1MHY3NG14NGo3MXBucSZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FkrqnIPLK0EAduikysz%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7cbde9e06333eb87fd861e122e848f83/href">https://medium.com/media/7cbde9e06333eb87fd861e122e848f83/href</a></iframe><p>One of my friends <a href="https://medium.com/u/b5e9d1b0a7df">Virdoexhunter</a> told me about this website <a href="https://otx.alienvault.com/"><em>https://otx.alienvault.com</em></a>, here OTX stand for (Open Threat Intelligence), It is a platform which is used by security researchers and threat data producers to share research and investigate new threats.</p><p><strong>How to use this website?</strong></p><p>Just navigate to <a href="https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/target.com"><em>https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/target.com</em></a><br>Here you can change target.com to your target website.<br>You can find a lot of information here related to your target, but there is an option of “Associated URLs” When we go to this option it reveals a lot of information and endpoints.</p><p><strong>1st Case of 500€ Bounty</strong>:<br>When I started testing on my target I used OTX. I navigated to <a href="https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/target.com"><em>https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/target.com</em></a> and then I went to the “Associated URLs” option, here I got my target company 50+ customer’s invoices, I downloaded all the invoices and reported to my target company and they award me with 500€ bounty.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*PC5k7h9knMhNPpLGDO4DyA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>2nd Case 200$+200$ Bounty</strong>:<br>Similar to the 1st case I started my testing on my 2 target companies and also I used OTX for them. When I navigate <a href="https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/target.com"><em>https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/domain/target.com</em></a> and then the “Associated URLs” option, here I got companies 400+ customer emails (200+ each), their customers are big MNCs companies, I reported this to my target companies and they rewarded me 400$ (200$+200$ for each) bounty.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2BBcNdjVyobITLpmArg5NQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*786kdWo6_Uyq5gr-buikHA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Currently, OTX is not showing any results and showing 0 results on “Associated URLs”, but you can use the below API request <br><a href="https://otx.alienvault.com/api/v1/indicators/domain/target.com/url_list?limit=100&amp;page=1"><em>https://otx.alienvault.com/api/v1/indicators/domain/target.com/url_list?limit=100&amp;page=1</em></a></p><p>Also, you can use the GAU tool which fetches the result from <em>https://otx.alienvault.com</em>, you can find it here <a href="https://github.com/lc/gau"><strong>GAU</strong></a></p><p>Hope you find this write-up helpful.</p><p>Hope you learned something new. If you like the write-up give it a clap and follow me on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/v3d_bug"><strong>V3D</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=97d3b343f9ad" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/information-disclosure-story-of-500-400-bounty-97d3b343f9ad">Information Disclosure: Story of 500€ + 400$ Bounty</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Beyond Error Messages: Super Admin Deletion due to Broken Access Control (€€€)]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/beyond-error-messages-super-admin-deletion-due-to-broken-access-control-cabb66f873c3?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cabb66f873c3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Oct 2023 08:58:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-29T18:36:10.135Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi, Fellow Hunters, Ram Ram Bhyi Sarya Ne</p><p>Hope you are doing well and taking care of your health, this side V3D. I am writing a quick write-up of one of my findings.</p><p><strong>Issue</strong>: Broken Access Control</p><p><strong>Weakness</strong>: Improper Access Control — Generic</p><p><strong><em>Note</em></strong><em>: It’s a private Bug Bounty Program, so I can’t disclose the program name, let’s consider this as REDACTED.COM</em></p><p>Without any further ado... Let’s Start…</p><p>I started hunting on this program and checking its functionality so as I mentioned in my recent write-up ( <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/privilege-escalation-via-broken-authentication-a-story-of-220588d53d93"><strong>Here</strong></a><strong> </strong>) If you have not read it yet please do read it. While hunting on this program I see there is team functionality, and it’s one of my favourite parts to check.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FpdSncNyYgaH0wqaCqp%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FpdSncNyYgaH0wqaCqp%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FpdSncNyYgaH0wqaCqp%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e3603ac005a9d24a70fab9c4d243536a/href">https://medium.com/media/e3603ac005a9d24a70fab9c4d243536a/href</a></iframe><p>So for this, I quickly created Two Accounts.</p><p>Account A</p><p>Account B</p><p>In this application, there are two different roles called Privileges Profile which are:</p><ol><li>Administrator</li><li>Staff Member</li></ol><p><strong>Administrator</strong>: It has all the admin privileges, Like Invite staff member, Invite Administrator, Remove/Delete Administrator/Staff Member but it doesn’t have the privilege to delete or remove Super Admin.</p><p><strong>Staff Member</strong>: Staff-related work like creating tasks, modifying tasks etc. But don’t have the privilege to invite or remove anyone.</p><p>Hope you understand the Role’s Privilege</p><p>It’s time to check the functionality</p><p><strong>Account A</strong> (<em>Super Admin</em>) invited <strong>Account B</strong> as an Administrator.<br>Account B accept the invitation, but he/she doesn’t have the privilege to delete “Account A/Super Admin”</p><p>Let’s exploit</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FIpgGqOtAy8aTTMZn68%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FIpgGqOtAy8aTTMZn68%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FIpgGqOtAy8aTTMZn68%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/93eda6250d99767d192c3fca6b914e62/href">https://medium.com/media/93eda6250d99767d192c3fca6b914e62/href</a></iframe><p>Now <strong>Account A</strong>, remove <strong>Account B </strong><br>Account B was removed successfully</p><p>But when I check Account B, it still has all the access now I try to create any task but it throws me an error “<em>System Alert: Problem when retrieving the data</em>”</p><p>But in Settings, there is an option for Team, under the Team option there is an option for “Privilege profile”, When I click on this option it shows two profiles one is Account A (<em>Super Admin</em>) and the other is Account B (<em>Invited Account</em>).</p><p>Both accounts have an action tab while I click on it, it shows 3 options:</p><p>1) Edit<br>2) Duplicate<br>3) Delete</p><p>So here I try to Delete Account A (<em>Super Admin</em>) it throws me an error “<strong>You do not have the privileges to access this resource</strong>” However when I go to Account A (Super Admin) its privilege of super admin is deleted and also Account A is no longer able to invite any other user as “Administrator role”</p><p>Account A (Super Admin) is now a regular member (Staff Member)</p><p>In this way, by checking what functionalities a user cannot perform and trying to break it often leads to a bug.</p><p>Hope you found this writeup helpful.</p><p><strong>Tip: Never Forget To Check Functionality, there is a huge scope for finding bugs in Functionalities</strong></p><p><strong><em>Timeline:</em></strong></p><p><strong>Report Sent: 10–05–2022</strong><br><strong>Bounty Rewarded (€€€): 10–05–2022</strong></p><p>Hope you learned something new. If you liked the write-up give it a clap and follow me on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/v3d_bug">V3D</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cabb66f873c3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/beyond-error-messages-super-admin-deletion-due-to-broken-access-control-cabb66f873c3">Beyond Error Messages: Super Admin Deletion due to Broken Access Control (€€€)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Privilege Escalation via Broken Authentication: A Story of $$$]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/privilege-escalation-via-broken-authentication-a-story-of-220588d53d93?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/220588d53d93</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bounty-hunter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Mar 2023 17:19:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-23T06:04:14.212Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Fellow Hunters, Hope you are doing well and taking care of your health, this side V3D. I want to write a quick write-up with my friends Anuj (<a href="https://medium.com/@whhackerbsac">whhackerbsac</a><a href="https://medium.com/@whhackerbsac">)</a> and Manav (<a href="https://medium.com/@A_s_h_hunter">A_s_h_hunter</a>) on our recent findings. Which is a <strong><em>“Lower Privilege Admin Can Delete Super Admin and Takeover The Workspace”.</em></strong></p><p><strong>Note:<em> It’s a private Bug Bounty Program, so I can’t disclose the program name, let’s consider this as REDACTED.COM</em></strong></p><p>Without any further ado... Let’s Start.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FE7VoLmb5BoHYs%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FE7VoLmb5BoHYs%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FE7VoLmb5BoHYs%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6823ffc39041d62c48f2d7271fb89494/href">https://medium.com/media/6823ffc39041d62c48f2d7271fb89494/href</a></iframe><p>During my hunting on this program, I see there is team functionality, and it’s one of my favourite bug to check, so quickly I created “Account A” and its super admin account. While inviting another user I came to know there are 3 different roles, which are:</p><p>Admin<br>Read-Write<br>Read-Only</p><p><strong>Admin:</strong> Admin has all privileges like creating any task, deleting a task, invite other user but admin don’t have the privilege to delete or remove Super Admin</p><p><strong>Read-Write:</strong> In this role, user have privilege like create tasks, and delete task but don’t have privilege to invite any user</p><p><strong>Read-Only:</strong> In this role, user have only read privilege</p><p>Hope you understand the Role’s privilege</p><p>It’s time to check the functionality</p><p>User A, invite User B as a Admin role<br>User B accept the invitation, but he/she doesn’t have the privilege to delete “User A/Super Admin”</p><p>Let’s exploit it</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FcUpOMrVpmmLCF3rjyA%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FcUpOMrVpmmLCF3rjyA%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FcUpOMrVpmmLCF3rjyA%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/578ce492509601f864ee66bfec34faf7/href">https://medium.com/media/578ce492509601f864ee66bfec34faf7/href</a></iframe><p>User B, Invite User C as a Read-Write role<br>Now User B try to delete/remove User C</p><p>So the delete request looks like this</p><p>DELETE /workspace/workspaceID/users/userID<br>Host: api.redacted.com</p><p>Note: UserID is alphanumeric and not guessable</p><p>So now you think it’s easy to get UserID, but it’s not easy I check all the endpoints but I can’t find any endpoint where I got the other user’s UserID.</p><p>Don’t Give Up</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FgHBQEIcBPml33MF5es%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FgHBQEIcBPml33MF5es%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FgHBQEIcBPml33MF5es%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/deb99d40f5ad3e98a398e7ea0a83cd8e/href">https://medium.com/media/deb99d40f5ad3e98a398e7ea0a83cd8e/href</a></iframe><p>So change the User C role from Read-Write to Read-Only and the request looks like</p><p>POST /workspace/workspaceID/updateUser/userID<br>Host: api.redacted.com</p><p>So I change this request with the following GET request</p><p>GET /workspaces/{Workspace_ID}/settings<br>Host: api.redacted.com</p><p>From here we can get all the workspace members’ UserID (Super Admin, Admin, Read-Write, Read-Only).</p><p>Now we have Super Admin UserID which is “User A”.</p><p>Now try to Delete the “User C Read-only” user and intercept this request in the burp suite.</p><p>Change Read-Only UserID with Super Admin UserID and forward the request</p><p>Super Admin Deleted Successfully,<br>Try to refresh the super admin page and account logout and deleted successfully.</p><p>I quickly reported the issue and the team triaged it immediately but the severity is set to P3 by the team, I explained the severity clearly to the team but they said: “Our CVSS evaluation ratifies the severity awarded as P3”.</p><p><strong>Tip: Never Forget To Check Functionality, there is a huge scope for finding bugs in Functionalities</strong></p><p>Hope you learned something new. If you liked the write-up give it a clap and follow us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/v3d_bug">V3D</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/bsachunter/">Anuj</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/a_s_h_Hunter">Manav</a></p><p><strong><em>Timeline:</em></strong></p><p><strong>Report Sent: 11 December 2022<br>Bounty Awarded($$$): 29 Dec 2022</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/917/1*WxUJ2qfSvXPXQkq5cEBSdw.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=220588d53d93" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/privilege-escalation-via-broken-authentication-a-story-of-220588d53d93">Privilege Escalation via Broken Authentication: A Story of $$$</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BROKEN ACCESS CONTROL LEADS TO CHANGE OF ADMIN DETAILS]]></title>
            <link>https://v3d.medium.com/broken-access-control-leads-to-change-of-admin-details-a783e31729c4?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a783e31729c4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 07:18:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-08-31T07:22:02.056Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Fellow Hunters, hope you are doing well and taking care of your health in this pandemic situation, my name is <strong>V3D (Ved Parkash)</strong>. I want to write a quick write-up on my recent finding which is a <strong><em>BROKEN ACCESS CONTROL LEADS TO CHANGE OF ADMIN DETAILS</em></strong>.</p><p>Without any Further ado.. Let’s Start.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FflbcUFdLSHwZC03p11%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2FMecanicus-triumph-1964-herald-flbcUFdLSHwZC03p11&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia0.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2Fv1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExdWh5Z3dqc3oza2V4b3UweTY0OG01NTNneWJyZWF4cmZhNXp4ZmRwcCZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw%2FflbcUFdLSHwZC03p11%2Fgiphy_s.gif&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="270" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0f8f6012756e991a0cb326022f9f9744/href">https://medium.com/media/0f8f6012756e991a0cb326022f9f9744/href</a></iframe><p>Using Google Dorks, i started searching for private programs.</p><p>Here are some dorks for searching Private Bug Bounty Programs.</p><p><em>“powered by bugcrowd” -site:bugcrowd.com</em></p><p><em>“powered by hackerone” “submit vulnerability report”</em></p><p>Then i came across a program <strong><em>REDACTED.COM</em></strong> which i immediately started looking for bugs.</p><p>As usual I started with subdomain discovery and i got nearly 30 subdomains and after probing with httpx i got 20 alive subdomains. I started checking for functionalities that each subdomain has, there are only 2–3 subdomains with some functionality. I started checking bugs in Password Reset Functionality, Email Verification Functionality and checking for flaws in input sanitization. I am unable to find any bugs in these functionalities.</p><p>I recently read a write-up by @<a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">sunilyedla.</a></p><p>You can check it out here -&gt; <a href="https://sunilyedla.medium.com/simple-sweet-bypassing-email-update-restriction-to-change-emails-of-team-members-6ce5770e7929">https://sunilyedla.medium.com/simple-sweet-bypassing-email-update-restriction-to-change-emails-of-team-members-6ce5770e7929</a></p><p>In this write-up, sunilyedla bhai came across a target in which users can invite other users in various different roles. I thought to check that functionality in my target since it also contains the same functionality where an admin can invite a user</p><p>I created two accounts an <strong>admin account</strong> and a <strong>user account</strong> to test the functionality. There is a section where a user can view the details of his account and the admin who invited him.</p><p><strong>A user can</strong></p><p>→ Invite other user</p><p><strong>An admin can</strong></p><p>→ Invite other user</p><p>→ Remove any user</p><p>Here user can edit his details but he can only view admin details and cannot edit them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/856/1*yaZh9bF5DSDoVfGTTUxL1w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Overview of User Account</figcaption></figure><p>Here i thought Let’s check if there is a flaw in <strong>Update Functionality</strong>. So i tried to update user details and to my surprise i can see the admin details are also being passed in the request. You know what to do know, Yeah you are right i changed the details of admin and to my surprise there is no back-end check and i successfully able to edit the details of admin.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F26vUxsBp9qkrLSl7q%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Fkingfisherworld-26vUxsBp9qkrLSl7q&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia2.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F26vUxsBp9qkrLSl7q%2Fgiphy.gif%3Fcid%3D790b76115b41bd3e651e3b7a75e9b2b1e5015d68e9f68e8f%26rid%3Dgiphy.gif%26ct%3Dg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/7930c10a7f3d4d2b9579c76cc3d95305/href">https://medium.com/media/7930c10a7f3d4d2b9579c76cc3d95305/href</a></iframe><p>To confirm the Vulnerability I opened the admin account in another browser to see whether the details are updated or not.</p><p>And they were successfully changed, i can edit the <strong><em>first name, last name and mobile number of admin</em></strong>. I quickly reported the issue and the team triaged it immediately but the severity is set to P4 by the team, I explained about the severity clearly to team and they bump it to P2.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ae1_ZnxAl1gdxEk7yLsTYQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Tip: Never Forget To Check Functionality, there is a huge scope for finding bugs in Functionalities</strong></p><p>Special Thanks to my dear brother’s: <a href="https://twitter.com/ADITYASHENDE17">Aditya Shende</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">Sunil Yedla</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/harshbothra_">Harsh Bothra</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/ManasH4rsh">Manas Harsh</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/Assass1nmarcos">Aditya Sharma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/theshubh77">Shubham Bhamare</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/0xdln">0xdln</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/theXSSrat">The XSS Rat</a></p><p>Hope you learned something new. If you liked the write-up give it a clap and follow on twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/v3d_bug">V3D</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a783e31729c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Full Account Takeover via Password Reset Flaw (My First Blog)]]></title>
            <link>https://v3d.medium.com/full-account-takeover-via-password-reset-flaw-my-first-blog-10d6e11df2e0?source=rss-dd63e2d275c6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/10d6e11df2e0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[V3D]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2021 16:51:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-04T17:12:28.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi fellow hunters, hope you are doing well and taking care of your health in this pandemic situation, my name is V3D (Ved Parkash). I want to write a quick write-up on my first bounty of 2021 which is a Full Account Takeover via Password Reset Flaw. I got many DM in twitter and Linkedin for the write-up of this finding.</p><p>Without any Further ado.. Let’s Start.</p><p>As a beginner , i was struggling to find bugs from many days. While the whole world is in pandemic situation Unfortunately at the same time i got positive with COVID-19.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FOP7EWGCAZix75aHcSQ%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Fcameo-quarantine-going-crazy-stuck-inside-OP7EWGCAZix75aHcSQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia3.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FOP7EWGCAZix75aHcSQ%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="580" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/47681248b79f6eac0646aebbfaf3953d/href">https://medium.com/media/47681248b79f6eac0646aebbfaf3953d/href</a></iframe><p>So after accumulating some knowledge from blog posts, write-ups, videos and twitter tips, i finally decided to test that knowledge on real websites. So i used some google dorks to find Responsible Disclosure programs to hack on.. I found a program let’s say REDACTED.IO (due to their policies).</p><p>So as a part of the recon i started enumerating Subdomains of the website and sadly there are only 8–10 subdomains. So i checked manually every subdomain for some low hanging fruits like Token leakage in Referrer , rate limiting bugs etc..<br>But haven’t found any low hanging bugs.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FH3r9GpmVB9Yd7D9ki5%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FH3r9GpmVB9Yd7D9ki5%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FH3r9GpmVB9Yd7D9ki5%2Fgiphy.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ddc4f80f1c275df4d142a2476f484d87/href">https://medium.com/media/ddc4f80f1c275df4d142a2476f484d87/href</a></iframe><p>In my corona Quarantine time , i read a lot of write-ups on “Account Takeover via Password Reset Flaw”. So i thought to check the functionality of Password reset in this website. So i created 2 accounts one as a victim and another as an attacker and fired up the burp.</p><h3><strong>Coming to the Kutti(short/choti) Story..</strong></h3><p>I requested for password reset from account 1 and i got the mail containing the reset link.</p><p><a href="https://projects.redacted.io/password/reset?token=ad52bb9b9984075b56ace70a5fd69a073cde0d5c43d7afeb17438c1fbb9b2adf&amp;email=attacker@mail.com&amp;utm_source=letter&amp;utm_campaign=tech&amp;utm_medium=password"><em>https://projects.redacted.io/password/reset?token=ad52bb9b9984075b56ace70a5fd69a073cde0d5c43d7afeb17438c1fbb9b2adf&amp;email=attacker@mail.com&amp;utm_source=letter&amp;utm_campaign=tech&amp;utm_medium=password</em></a></p><p>After clicking on the reset link the website showed two fields i.e New Password and Confirm password which is a normal expected Behavior of any website.</p><p>I’ve entered the password in both fields and intercepted that request and in the request i have found that reset token,mail and password is being passed directly and i thought to tamper it a bit, and check the response..</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zZdK-xJLsa5Bm9GPZLlvLw.png" /><figcaption>fun begin’s here</figcaption></figure><p>So i changed the mail to the 2nd account which i have created as a victim account and forwarded the request and guess what, it says the password is changed successfully!!!</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2FzhNNxi6S9fnDnm8PP2%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;display_name=Giphy&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Ffreeform-home-alone-homealone-25-days-of-christmas-zhNNxi6S9fnDnm8PP2&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia0.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2FzhNNxi6S9fnDnm8PP2%2Fgiphy.gif%3Fcid%3D790b7611e378f33dc97c8f62c8724a7718b0f6ffc5657128%26rid%3Dgiphy.gif%26ct%3Dg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="435" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0a6a44bec4efada13497b7dd4443dda3/href">https://medium.com/media/0a6a44bec4efada13497b7dd4443dda3/href</a></iframe><p>Now, i tried to login with the victim account and yeah i have successfully being able to log in as the victim..</p><p>FULL ACCOUNT TAKEOVER !!!</p><p>To show the impact of this bug, i takeover the support mail account of their website, which contained information of their invoices , card details etc…</p><p><strong>Bug Tip:</strong> Don’t forget to add Wappalyzer extension to your extension list which helped me to identify the existence of this bug..</p><p>In my journey as a BugBounty hunter many people have helped me along the way.</p><p><strong>Report Sent: 11 December 2020<br>Bounty Awarded($$$): 1 Feb 2021</strong></p><p><strong>Special thanks to :</strong></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/ADITYASHENDE17">ADITYASHENDE17</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/theshubh77">theshubh77</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/sunilyedla2">sunilyedla2</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/ManasH4rsh">ManasH4rsh</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/0xdln">0xdln</a> , <a href="https://twitter.com/debangshu_kundu">debangshu_kundu</a></p><p>Hope you guys liked reading this blog and hope you learned new things from my blog :) if you have any queries you can contact me through twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/v3d_bug">@v3d</a>_bug</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=10d6e11df2e0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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