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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Varun Koundinya on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Varun Koundinya on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Will COVID-19 make our machines less productive?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/will-covid-19-make-our-machines-less-productive-7bddf266ab6b?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7bddf266ab6b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2020 19:47:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-06T19:56:08.930Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/864/1*jYC8rNq9A-sSaW3YckCPaw.gif" /></figure><p>Let’s think about how a McDonald&#39;s restaurant works. You come in and place an order — I would personally get a Buttermilk Crispy Chicken Burger with fries and a coke. As soon as your order is placed and the kitchen staff receives the order, they begin to prepare your order with the ingredients they have and two other inputs:</p><ul><li>the various machines they have at their disposal, like the frier and oven</li><li>their own two hands</li></ul><p>For simplicity&#39;s sake, let’s refer to the machines as (Mc)capital and to their own work as labor. The workers at McDonald&#39;s use a combination of these two inputs to serve up a delicious plate of burger and fries. Note: I am not being paid to say this (obviously!), I just like a McDonald&#39;s burger.</p><p>Now, let’s think of a hypothetical. Let’s say that McDonald&#39;s reduces the workers at this branch by half and the demand remains the same. What would be the consequences of this change? Firstly, the branch as a whole would probably produce fewer burgers. Second, each remaining worker is probably doing a lot more work to fill the same orders that come in every day. Third, a lot of the (Mc)capital is going to waste since having 2 workers and 10 ovens will mean that at least some of the ovens aren’t running at full capacity (like they would if there were, say, 10 workers and 10 ovens).</p><p>The big takeaway from here is that it is not the total number of labor and capital but the ratio of capital-to-labor that determines which input (capital or labor) does the heavy lifting.</p><h4><strong>Linking McDonald&#39;s to the Macroeconomy</strong></h4><p>The above analogy is a good way to think about the functioning of the economy as a whole. There are a large number of workers, let’s refer to them as labor, and machinery like factories, roads, vehicles, etc., let&#39;s refer to that as capital. Capital and labor combine to produce output, but as we saw with the McDonalds analogy, the ratio of capital-to-labor plays an important role in determining the relative importance of each.</p><p>I hear you asking — what has this got to do with the current pandemic? A possible effect of this pandemic is that moving forward there will be a depressed labor force participation, especially in hard-hit places like New York. At the same time, the total capital available doesn’t change dramatically. Therefore the ratio of capital-to-labor will be larger, having some effect on the economy as a whole.</p><h4><strong>Measuring this Effect</strong></h4><p>I have laid out a neat theory above that has a prediction similar to the McDonalds example — over the coming years, labor will do more work and there will be some capital waste. The question now is can we measure this?</p><p>The indicator used by the researchers in the paper linked below is the natural rate of return (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_rate_of_interest">link</a>) — which is to interest rates on safe assets like the US Treasury bonds. This accurately measures the rate of return from capital overall in the economy since these bonds are mainly used to finance investment in capital. Let’s call this measure <em>return to capital</em>.</p><p>They use data going back to the 14th century from Europe to find out if this effect can be spotted in pandemics through history, which is shown below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/802/1*34DWpT5SMNTQjmIYrQvqew.png" /><figcaption>Pandemics through history — events to measure <strong>return to capital</strong> (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26934.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong><em>Returns to capital</em> after Pandemics</strong></h4><p>To analyze the <em>return to capital</em> after each of the Pandemics above, they use a regression that controls for general changes in interest rates, i.e. they measure only additional changes to <em>return to capital</em> that occurs right after pandemics, not changes that are independent of the pandemic events. Their result is visualized below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/651/1*W9-_17sZXs-JSbf1q9gGzw.png" /><figcaption>The response of <strong><em>return to capital </em></strong>after pandemics (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26934.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Right through history, pandemics are followed by a decline in r<em>eturns to capital</em> and this effect persists for between 20 to 30 years, where there is a decline of 1 percentage point in yield and the effects are statistically significant. This is explained by the fact that nobody wants to invest in the years following pandemics (they have too much capital and not enough labor). To show that this is indeed due to the pandemic and not a coincidence, they remove two events — the Spanish Flu of 1918 and the Black Death of the 14th century and find that the results remain the same. They remove these two because the Spanish Flu was followed by the Great Depression and the Black Death by the Peasant Rebellion in England (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peasants&#39;_Revolt">link</a>), which were just coincidences.</p><h4><strong>Impact of Pandemic on Wages</strong></h4><p>As seen above, since capital has been less important after previous pandemics, the <em>return to capital</em> has gone down since then. But from the McDonalds example, we know that labor should become more important. The paper looks at this by measuring the impact of pandemics on wages, controlling for other factors like before. They find that wages went up faster in the years after a pandemic than in normal times, and this is persistent over the long term as they went up by around 3 to 4% over a 30-year window. This too is consistent with our McDonalds theory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/709/1*pPRjLlFla0X7lYa6QX6bPA.png" /><figcaption>The response of <strong><em>wages </em></strong>after pandemics (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26934.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Contrasting Pandemics to Wars</strong></h4><p>In pandemics, the ratio of capital-to-labor goes up, meaning that there will be more capital like cars and factories for every working individual since the number of people working goes down. This is different from wars where, due to capital destruction during the war, the ratio of capital-to-labor goes down. Therefore, using the logic that has tied together all the results so far, <em>return to capital</em> should go up. The results from the paper finds just this, as seen in the figure below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/1*6ugorLZv1J9nLmtNgB0xhw.png" /><figcaption>Contrasting the response of <strong><em>return to capital </em></strong>after pandemics and wars (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26934.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Summary</strong></h4><p>If the findings from the previous pandemics are extrapolated to this one, there should be a decline in interest rates and an increase in wages in the years and decades after the COVID-19 pandemic. But it isn’t as easy to simply extrapolate the results from the previous pandemics over to this one. A few things have changed since the last one occurred in 1918. Firstly, central banks have become a major force around the world and actually control interest rates. So the interest rate that is seen in the financial markets doesn’t accurately reflect the <em>return to capital,</em> where supply would meet demand but can be set by the government. Secondly, since transportation costs have gone down, a dearth of labor in a place like New York can be filled by people immigrating there from inside and outside the country.</p><p>Both of the above prescriptions that can temper the effects detailed in this article are difficult to execute, especially in a politically fraught environment like now. So, if the COVID-19 shock actually leads to an oversupply in capital, the rate of return from investing in them will be depressed in the years to come. This way, my Buttermilk Crispy Chicken Burger will still be made by humans, with the aid of some less productive equipment. So much for the buzz of automation.</p><p>— — — — — — — —</p><p><em>The results presented in this article are from a paper called “Longer-Run Consequences of Pandemics” by Òscar Jordà, Sanjay R. Singh, and Alan M. Taylor. The link to the paper is below.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26934.pdf">https://www.nber.org/papers/w26934.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7bddf266ab6b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Consumer Spending Reaction to COVID-19: Data from the US]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/consumer-spending-reaction-to-covid-19-data-from-the-us-42a586a9dffb?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/42a586a9dffb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2020 14:49:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-27T20:52:44.790Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With almost all of the world in lockdown, the patterns that normally govern our behavior have changed considerably. A big portion of this change is driven by our lack of spending. Speaking for myself, the thing I previously used to spend on have been either completely shut down or have migrated to other places that are more compatible with the lockdown. Each of us has taken aboard the shock of the pandemic differently and a recent NBER paper by a group of economist have shed further light into this consumption shifts by using data from the United States. Their insightful results tell a tale of how the people in the US view the threat of the coronavirus and how their reactions differ based on personal characteristics.</p><p>It is important to note that most of the results in the paper are summary statistics. And since their summary stats present the mean behavior and not the variance, their paper (although very insightful) doesn’t tell the whole story. An interesting exercise for the readers will be to compare how their behavior contrasts with their mean.</p><h4><strong>Data and COVID-19 timeline</strong></h4><p>Before describing the results, let me set up the data used in the paper along with the timing of the growth of COVID-19 in the US.</p><p>The data used by the researchers are from the non-profit Fintech organization in the US, whose name is unspecified. This provides them with transaction-level data on incomes and spending by category (grocery, travel, restaurants, etc.) along with personal indicators such as age, gender, location, and others. It is also important to note that all the <em>data they have is de-identified</em> and so the researchers do not know who the users are. Although a large number of people use the services of the non-profit, their analysis is constrained to those users who have updated their accounts through the end of March. This gives them a sample of 4,735 users.</p><p>The paper also looks at data on social distancing and how strictly people have followed the lockdown rules. For this, they use data from Unacast (<a href="https://www.unacast.com/covid19/social-distancing-scoreboard">link</a>). This a company that uses mobile GPS data to measure the average distance traveled by people living in a particular district. It does not look at human interaction and so is a rough measure of distancing since a person living on a farm could (maybe?) travel miles without interacting with other people but the data would suggest that they aren’t following protocol. But it is also fair to assume that there will be a high degree of correlation between average distance traveled and strictness of distancing.</p><p>To get an understanding of the growing awareness of coronavirus in the US, the graph listed below gives an idea. It takes articles from over 3000 newspapers in the country and measures the number of articles that mention the virus. We can see that there is a big spike starting in late February with it reaching a stable level of around 65% of articles in late March. The federally mandated lockdowns in the US started March 11. Therefore, there are 3 main time periods for the lockdown. Stage1 is the pre-lockdown period of late February and early March. Stage 2 is the early lockdown period of the week beginning March 11. Stage 3 is the latter weeks of March. The researchers haven’t used any data from the month of April.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/877/1*HZRfhVdVC0ztLEzcw3PgVA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Newspaper coverage of COVID-19 in the US (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4>Overall Consumption Reaction</h4><p>An expected reaction to the lockdown should be a spike in spending during stage 1. Many of us can relate to this behavior as we all went into grocery stores and stockpiled on food and durables to last for the weeks that followed. But after the start of the actual lockdown very few of us actually went into shops, and if we did, bought fewer items. This should mean lesser consumption in stages 2 and 3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UpHzwYZdOcfFZ7LbMOblcg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Overall spending and grocery spending trend in the US (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>This trend is reflected in the data as well, shown above in figure 2, with an initial spike of overall consumption followed by a dramatic fall that has persisted till the end of the month.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/307/1*D0DChVJ3X1_EPnZUMTd-Jg.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Spending changes by category (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>To get a more nuanced understanding of how different types of consumption reacted over all three stages, we can look at figure 3 which shows how spending in each of the listed categories changed with respect to the average pre-coronavirus level of 2020. We can see a big spike in all categories during stage 1. The initial spike in public transit and air travel could be driven by people all across the country traveling to get back home for the quarantine. The other categories are probably driven by general stockpiling. Stage 2, which is when the lockdown began, shows a dramatic fall in public transit which is intuitive and a weakening of stage 1 effects. But the big winners from the lockdown seems to be food delivery services who have seen growth throughout.</p><h4>Spending and Social Distancing</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/483/1*GNkb7wuIlqmr4kVO9BGm4g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Difference-in-movement VS spending (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>With the data in hand, the researchers also ask the question ‘how much does restricting movement affect consumer spending?’. To answer this, they plot the logarithm of spending by households against the difference in the movement during the lockdown weeks. Unsurprisingly, they find that a drop in movement negatively affects spending in all categories except credit card spending. We can assume that since credit cards can be used from home for services like e-commerce and streaming, the relationship between credit card use and movement is flat.</p><h4>Spending and Partisanship</h4><p>The next big result of the paper is looking at how people respond to the government calls for social distancing based on political beliefs. To provide a little context, the messaging from the US government on the pandemic can be best described as confusing. Even as late as February 24th, President Trump was quoted saying “The coronavirus is very much under control in the US”, declaring a lockdown 2 weeks later. So, based on one’s partisan beliefs, the believability of the words coming out of the president&#39;s mouth would be different and hence the degree to which social distancing protocols are followed would differ as well.</p><p>This relationship is very much present in the data when the researchers looked at the 50 US states by plotting percent of Trump voters against the average drop of travel in the weeks after the lockdown was in place (data on this from <a href="https://www.unacast.com/covid19/social-distancing-scoreboard">Unacast</a>). We can see that states that were more pro-Trump were also more likely to break the lockdown.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/596/1*WmHqUjOAIRWB93wvi-8g7g.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Share-of Trump-votes VS social-distancing-obedience (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>The magnitude of changes in consumption is also different across the different groups. We can see the independents stockpiled the most and democrats the least. This could be because democrats, in general, earn a lower income and can hence afford less (source: <a href="https://www.debt.org/faqs/americans-in-debt/economic-demographics-republicans/">link</a>). But surprisingly, republicans also stockpiled and did so with a greater extent than democrats, but their fall in consumption during the latter stages is less steep.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/574/1*nL7OKgLenbTNvOqyLF96rA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Spending trends by political affiliation (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>A broader look at the spending by the different categories throw up a few surprises. Firstly, democrats have spent a lot more on air travel and public transit than any other group. This may indicate that democrats are more likely to live away from home and hence had to travel back during the early weeks of the lockdown. Also, Democrats have the highest credit card spending. This could be another channel for the income effect mentioned previously. Finally, a look at republican spending indicates that they spend the least on food delivery, maybe indicating how they live in more rural areas compared to democrats (source: <a href="https://www.debt.org/faqs/americans-in-debt/economic-demographics-republicans/">link</a>).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/727/1*O60eNfu8KRJqBJUHaPgZEQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Spending in different categories by political affiliation (Source: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">link</a>)</figcaption></figure><h4>Summarising</h4><p>This paper takes the various consumers of the United States and places them into different buckets based on the degree to which they follow social distancing and political beliefs. They find that although all consumers generally spent more in the early stages of the crises, in activities related to stockpiling, and later cut down on spending, this relationship is uneven across the different buckets. They find that more strictly someone follows social distancing, more sharply their consumption falls. Also, democrats are more likely to follow social distancing and hence to cut their spending more sharply. They also look at the effect of age, gender, and wealth on consumption and find that younger people cut back on spending by a lesser degree and so did men. Wealth had a practically zero impact on spending changes which suggests that all wealth groups are treating the virus with the same level of severity.</p><p>Putting all these together, it may be fair to state that the bucket that is marked ‘young republican men’ is the one that has least changed during the pandemic as compared to before. But since we are only looking at average stats, jumping to a larger conclusion will be difficult.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — —</p><p><em>The results presented in this article are from a working paper at the Nation Bureau of Economic Research called “How does household spending respond to an epidemic? Consumption during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic” by Scott R. Baker, R.A. Farrokhnia, Steffen Meyer, Michaela Pagel, and Constantine Yannelis. The paper can be found here: </em><a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf">https://www.nber.org/papers/w26949.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=42a586a9dffb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Time for more competition in the power sector?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/time-for-more-competition-in-the-power-sector-d7f893822a8d?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d7f893822a8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2019 22:15:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-06T22:15:04.206Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Christensen &amp; Greene, two empirical economists, had written a paper in the 1970s where they explored the effects of ‘economies of scale’ on the power industry. Economies of scale says that as firms get larger their cost per additional unit of output gets lower.</p><p>It had been conventional wisdom at the time that larger was better in the power business. The authors speak about how regulators allowed firms in the power sector to get larger based on this logic. One of the biggest beneficiaries of this was Pacific, Gas, and Electric (PG&amp;E).</p><p>The results Christensen &amp; Greene showed was fascinating. They found that as firms in the power sector get large enough, the additional costs of producing a unit of electricity hits a constant, and stays constant for firms of a range of firm sizes. They graphed this relationship as seen below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/614/1*qRo3bKv4TpY_JptEjLzlyg.png" /></figure><p>Since the relationship they use in the graph is (total output / total cost), we can actually say that the marginal cost is increasing.</p><p>The question to ask now is, what is the need to introduce more competition? As long as the marginal cost is below 1, everyone is fine right. Well, there are two points to make here.</p><p>Firstly, if policymakers want to minimize the cost of electricity they well prefer to have smaller firms on the nearer end of the flat portion of the graph rather big ones at the far end.</p><p>Secondly, if the PG&amp;E bankruptcy tells us anything, it’s that as firms get really big it becomes a lot harder to disentangle them, and it is ultimately the consumers who pay the price.</p><p>So maybe the PG&amp;E event will provoke policymakers to take a second look at introducing competition to this industry.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d7f893822a8d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Economic Effects of Automation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/the-economic-effects-of-automation-325e1928c949?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/325e1928c949</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[commentary]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jan 2019 03:27:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-23T04:06:52.515Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><a href="http://www.track.datadriveninvestor.com/1B9E"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*7ew54VFv-KI5Ot97" /></a></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5JT1f3LUsgbUhcYmVAw4wQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I recently read a paper on the NBER website that provoked some thought. It was called ‘AI, Labor, Productivity, and Need for Firm-Level Data’ by Manav Raj &amp; Robert Seamans. The most interesting/surprising thing about the paper was the lack of consensus about the actual effect of AI and Robotics on our economy. With all the talk on the public forum about the negative impact of automation, this seems like a phenomenon that we need to understand soon. I’ve summarized some ideas from the paper I found interesting.</p><p>The two main schools of thought when it comes to the debate on automation are:</p><ol><li>Automation is good- it makes the economy more efficient. There is actually empirical evidence to back this, with studies showing that automation causes industry productivity to go up and wages to go up too. In fact, there is also evidence that automation in Europe led to an increase in productivity growth by 15% from 1993 to 2007.</li><li>AI will destroy jobs. This is a story that we have heard before and is something that plays out in the news often. It is a point of view that has evidence to back it up. Based on data from the International Federation of Robotics, people have found that each new robot installed causes a reduction in 6 workers.</li></ol><p>Although the two points of view differ, we can agree on a few things: automation causes an increase in productivity and a decrease in employment in the industry where automation occurred. But the magnitude of these effects is unknown to the author, which is why they make the case for collecting firm-level data. But the paper points out that over history, technological innovations have always been a net positive to society. But to understand if this AI revolution will be the same needs further investigation.</p><p>Apart from the main theme of the paper, two other ideas really jumped up at me.</p><p>The first was a study by Mann &amp; Puttmann. That paper found an overall positive effect on employment due to automation. But this additional employment was due to job migration from manufacturing jobs to service-related jobs. This seemed to be like Joseph Schumpeter’s creative destruction in full view. Maturing businesses, like manufacturing, where demand for their product is already being met face significant price pressures, and are embracing automation because it increases productivity, reduces costs and is an overall deflationary force on the economy. Looking at that happening, it seems obvious to me that policy shouldn’t stop automation but actually encourages it. Also, policy should make it easier for folks who lost manufacturing jobs to find ones in areas where the rate of job creation is high (I know, easier said than done).</p><p>The second interesting study was the European Commission Report on Robotics and Employment. This report asked where automation growth was largest and found that most of the automation in Germany was happening in export-oriented firms. This phenomenon rings globalization. When firms in Germany are competing with countries all over the world, where input costs are cheaper, they need to take up technologies that are deflationary. Automation reduces prices. And that seems to be driving force behind the move towards it. My hunch is that we will see more and more automation in firms with a lot of price pressures.</p><p>In order to actually find out the economic effects of automation, we need to study firm-level effects. That is, we need a controlled experiment where automation is introduced to a firm, and have to ability to observed its upstream and downstream effects. Although this isn’t possible, having firm-level data will give researchers the ability to understand when automation is introduced to a firm and the effects it has inside the firm, and knowledge that comes out of such analysis will be very valuable to policymakers.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fb2a0d6%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Upscribe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fb2a0d6%2F&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0707f5c806284d01a4a13c7b13a91ce3/href">https://medium.com/media/0707f5c806284d01a4a13c7b13a91ce3/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=325e1928c949" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/the-economic-effects-of-automation-325e1928c949">The Economic Effects of Automation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/">DataDrivenInvestor</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[BioTech vs Pharma: Market Shifts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/biotech-vs-pharma-market-shifts-4c242733fac8?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4c242733fac8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biotechnology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Aug 2018 18:57:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-27T22:04:40.467Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most cash-intensive industries around. With the R&amp;D cycles taking over ten-years and FDA approval notoriously difficult, only companies with are cash strapped and patient can make. If you are like me, you might be thinking that this industry would be perfect for larger companies, with cash to spare and drugs already in the market to absorb losses. But in 2018, this hasn’t worked out to be true.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*WNy0jXzM6xwA0UREh_23wQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*ZrAJlUgLa0pBnZPAKNohdw.png" /><figcaption>THE PHARMA INDEX TO THE LEFT(UP 6.63% THIS YEAR) AND THE BIOTECH INDEX TO THE RIGHT (UP 12.47% THIS YEAR)</figcaption></figure><p>The S&amp;P Biotechnology Select Industry Index, which measures the market activity of small-to-mid size biotech firms, has significantly outperformed the S&amp;P Pharmaceuticals Select Industry Index, which measures activities of larger pharma firms like Pfizer.</p><p>In this article, I will look into this strange phenomenon and answer why the makers thinks the smaller firms are a better bet.</p><h4><strong>Where are all the low hanging fruits?</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/766/1*YJi8E8xgCKJkind9DJiXhQ.png" /><figcaption>OLD INDUSTRY STRUCTURE</figcaption></figure><p>The typical pharmaceutical cycle functions in three steps — R&amp;D, trials &amp; approvals, and Marketing. These three steps, as can be seen, often takes a long time and hence would require a lot of capital. This need for large capital and long time inherently favours larger firms.</p><p>This market skewness towards large firms turned out to be true through the 20th century as large files like Johnson &amp; Johnson, Novartis, and Pfizer grew from moderately sized firms into behemoths. But from the early 2000’s, there has been a steady change in the market of the pharma firms.</p><p>In the early days, the big pharmaceutical firms were working on “easier” problems, like a cure for the common flu, which required less effort and more importantly lower R&amp;D productivity. Hence, these big companies could afford to throw money at their R&amp;D team and they in turn picked out the low-hanging fruits of the industry and solved them. But after the low-hanging fruits were picked, the industry faced what UBS Analyst Jack Scannell called the “Better then Beatles Problem”:</p><p><em>“Imagine how hard it would be to achieve commercial success with new pop songs if any new song had to be better than the Beatles, if the entire Beatles catalogue was available for free, and if people did not get bored with old Beatles records”</em></p><p>Companies all of a sudden had to solve harder problems, which didn’t just require money but also required using that money to do more, i.e. companies need to increase their R&amp;D productivity.</p><h4><strong>The R&amp;D Productivity Problem</strong></h4><p>Research done by Prof. Patricia Danzon from the University of Pennsylvania on R&amp;D Productivity has suggested that companies with a <em>greater focus</em> in the healthcare industry, in terms of number of diseases they tackle and the number of functions they perform, have greater productivity that firms doing multiple tasks, i.e. concentrate on one disease and do that well. The larger pharma firms could get away with focusing on various task as long as they were picking the low-hanging fruits. But as they were taking on harder problems, investors on Wall Street pressured them to improve their R&amp;D productivity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*VxW5wMXX5ZMoEmGygrKc3Q.png" /><figcaption>NEW INDUSTRY STRUCTURE</figcaption></figure><p>It was around this time, in the early 2000’s, that the pendulum swing from the big pharmaceutical firms to the more nimble biotech upstarts. Now, the structure of the industry started to change as biotech firms working on exciting problems became valuable as the bigger pharma companies were desperate to partner with them. The new structure of the industry, as seen here, now had a greater collaboration between both biotech and pharma firms.</p><p><strong>The New Dealmaking Environment</strong></p><p>With smaller and bigger firms working closer together than before, an efficient dealmaking market was vital so that both the players can benefit in the long term. A typical deal between both companies looked like this.</p><p>Small Firms:</p><p>— Received cash and/or equity upfront for their R&amp;D work</p><p>— Had clauses to receive milestone and royalty payment based on performance of the drug</p><p>Big Firms:</p><p>— Received the right to develop and market the products that came out of the R&amp;D</p><p>— Retained majority of the revenue</p><p>From the above deal structure, it is clear to see that both the firms benefit. The large firms can continue to grow with greater R&amp;D productivity and the small firms have the shorter product life-cycle, thus lowering their risk.</p><p><strong>Solid Biosciences: A 2018 Example</strong></p><p>A perfect example of this trend towards smaller and more more productive firms in 2018 is Solid Biosciences, a biotech firm from the Cambridge, Massachusetts area. The company was founded in 2014 with a sole focus on tackling one disease, Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy.</p><p>The company has also been very strategic about their partnerships, the earliest one being BioGen, a $72 Billion pharma giant. In addition to that, the company has also gathered the investment of known names like JP Morgan and Bain Capital. This combination of have a strong focus in their R&amp;D as well as gaining renowned institutional investors has been rewarded in the market. The company went public in January of 2018, and despite not producing any revenue yet, their stock has doubled since then.</p><p>Solid Biosciences is a great example of how the market rewards smaller and more nimble biotech firms that focus more on R&amp;D productivity.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In this article, I have shown the changes in the small-to-mid cap biotech firms and have compared them to the larger pharmaceutical companies. I have also provided an argument as to why the market seems to be rewarding the smaller firms more than the larger firms. Currently, all the larger firms are chasing growth, and small companies in this space who are conducting productive research are being priced higher due to a high demand from large pharma firms to partner with them.</p><p>But we can see from the current market movements that the smaller firms are getting a better side of the current dealmaking environment. If the larger firms, which have the greater power in this dealmaking environment, wake up to this realisation and decide they are going structure deals to suit them more, the market for the small-to-mid cap biotech firms could undergo a correction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4c242733fac8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Yield Curve Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/the-yield-curve-explained-18e88c59be3a?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/18e88c59be3a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-markets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:37:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-17T19:37:10.365Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KWwl5Bs5qMw0YLnfkyVuvw.jpeg" /></figure><p>We all need meaningful data in order to make good decisions:</p><p><em>In deciding on whether to fill up cars with petrol, we look at the fuel gauge.</em></p><p><em>Doctors, when they try to diagnose us, need information like our body temperature, our blood haemoglobin info, etc.</em></p><p><em>Even football (or soccer..) managers look to data like possession, percent of long passes vs short passes, and other pieces of information to understand how a team plays.</em></p><p>Economists and investors are no different. They look at indicators like inflation, GDP, etc. in order to understand how the economy is doing. But indicators like GDP and inflation are backward-looking, i.e. they provide information of economic activities that happened in the past and thus don’t have strong predictive power. One indicator that people rely on for it’s predictive nature is the yield curve.</p><p>In this article I want to describe the yield curve, talk a little bit about why it has been in the news a lot lately, and provide a point of view as to whether that attention is justified.</p><h3><strong>The Yield Curve Basics</strong></h3><p>The yield curve is a graph that plots the different yields on US Treasury Debt as a function of time-to-maturity. The curve itself is the slope of this line and is commonly represented by the difference between the yields of the 2-Yr note and the 10-Yr bond.</p><p>For example, if the 2-Yr US Treasury has a yield of 0.6% and the 10-Yr yield is 2.5%, then the yield curve would be represented by the difference between them, 1.9%. For the above example, which is from 2014, the curve can be seen below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/581/1*fKoLj5i-ko-zZKtWSTJdKQ.png" /></figure><p>This above example where the curve is sloping upwards is referred to as the “normal” condition. Why? Because investors typically ask for a higher yield from long-term treasury debt as compared to short-term treasury debt, and this higher yield is referent as the <em>term premium</em>.</p><p>The term premium exists because investors want to be compensated for the extra risk they are taking on by investing in longer-term bonds. So where this risk come from? It comes from inflation. Debt instruments usually pay the owner a fixed interest payment periodically, and finally repays the principal. But for debt with a longer maturity, investors want a higher yield as they expect higher inflation and this higher inflation over a longer time will eat into their interest payments and principal. Thus we have the term premium.</p><p>Although the above condition is normal, the curve doesn’t always behave that way. There are two special conditions called a flat yield curve and an inverted yield curve, which are shown below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/481/1*6hkVmb7ZwMLSnGxG2Rl8DQ.png" /></figure><p><em>I. Flat Yield Curve</em></p><p>During a flat yield curve, the yields on both short-term and long-term debt are the same. So what do imply from this? Here, investors have removed the term premium because they think that the short-term holds the same amount of risk as the long-term.</p><p><em>II. Inverted Yield Curve</em></p><p>At inversion, the yield on short-term debt is actually higher than the yield on long-term debt. So in this case, investors are implicitly telling us that they actually think the short-term horizon is riskier than the long-term horizon. In other words they see an economic slowdown or recession in the short-term.</p><p>The question now remains: ‘I understand how the yield curve could predict a recession in theory, but is this really the case?’. The answer is a resounding yes as there is a very strong correlation between an inversion of the yield curve and a recession. The yield curve inverted before each of the past 4 recessions in 1981, 1991, 2000, and 2008.</p><h3><strong>Are we Headed for a Recession?</strong></h3><p>Now we know what the yield curve is used for (it is used by economists, who are notoriously bad at predicting the future state of the economy, to predict the future state of the economy). At this point you are probably thinking if we heading for a recession. Has the yield curve inverted??</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/483/1*HpwDv4-sry3mXRk4047kAQ.png" /></figure><p>The answer is the yield curve hasn’t inverted, but from the start of this year the curve has become flatter and flatter, thus fuelling speculation about an economic slowdown. The table to the side was put up by the <em>Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland</em> shows this flattening and their probability of a recession occurring.</p><h3><strong>Is this time Different?</strong></h3><p>Even though there is evidence that a flattening yield curve could lead to a recession, the consensus is not universal. Since the markets decides the yield on treasures and since there are many forces that drives the market, there is always a possibility of a false-positive while looking at the yield curve.</p><p>There are several reasons that justify this flattening of the curve while not implying a recession. One is that the Federal Reserve Bank, which has control over the short-term yield, is raising rates pretty quickly. Thus this raising of the interest rate is squeezing the spread on the yield curve, resulting in it flattening.</p><p>Another reason is that the ‘term premium’, which is additional yield investors expect for holding riskier long-term debts like 10-Yr treasury bonds have gone away as we are in a more low-inflation environment.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>In this article I have described the yield curve, spoken about it’s power to predict recessions and have provide a case for that not being true this time. The question on your mind now is probably- are we actually headed for a recession. And the answer to this question is: I don’t know.</p><p>It is undeniable that the yield curve is a strong predictor of a recession. Also, there is a case for the “this time it’s different” syndrome. But if this flattening of the yield curve continues and it inverts, you can expect the fear of recession to spread through the economy, leading to possible bear market.</p><p>But then again, maybe not…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=18e88c59be3a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions in 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/mergers-acquisitions-in-2018-cd859fb6a736?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd859fb6a736</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mergers-and-acquisitions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[valuation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jun 2018 16:26:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-25T16:26:27.907Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*svy9giComCXrEGYoZBRLoA.png" /></figure><p>It kicked-off last year with a $64 Billion bid from Comcast. Then it was announced that Disney had won the deal for $52.4 Billion. A few months passed and the bidding war is back on, with the current and likely winner to be Disney at $71.3 Billion.</p><p>The question on your mind is probably ‘What are you talking about?’. I’m referring to the current fight for the assets of <em>20th Century Fox</em> by the two largest media conglomerates — <em>The Walt Disney Co.</em> and <em>The Comcast Corporation.</em></p><p>Although the above deal seems to be dominating the business news cycle, it is not the only Mergers &amp; Acquisitions deal happening this year. In fact, 2018 is on course to be the biggest M&amp;A year on record according to <em>Deloitte</em> — both in terms of the number of deals and the size of those transactions.</p><p>But what makes 2018 so popular for M&amp;As? In a recent interview, <em>Hernan Cristerna</em> who is the Global Co-Head of Mergers &amp; Acquisitions at <em>JP Morgan</em> said that business confidence is at an all-time high, and it is this confidence that is fuelling more deals. In this article, I want to find out if the confidence is actually justified.</p><h3><strong>3 Factors of Investor Confidence</strong></h3><p>Mergers &amp; Acquisitions are just another form investment. Therefore, analysing the sentiment of investors should give us a good idea of the current M&amp;A mood. Investor confidence is generally driven by the following three criteria:</p><ol><li>Global Economics Growth</li><li>Low Valuations</li><li>Low Borrowing Costs</li></ol><p><strong>Global Economic Growth</strong></p><p>The past few years have seen considerable global economic growth and the results of this growth can be seen in the stock market as the S&amp;P 500, the Euronext 100, and the MSCI Emerging Market Index have all gone up. But today, we are in the later stages of the current business cycle. In addition to that, there is considerably more geo-political uncertainty. The above two factors could together cause a slowdown in growth and investors seem to agree with that too, with the CBOE Volatility Index, which is referred to as the ‘investor fear gauge’, reaching two-year highs recently.</p><p>Therefore, although 2018 will see global economic growth, this can’t be the major driver of the current M&amp;A climate.</p><p><strong>Low Valuations</strong></p><p>If the market perceives that the current valuations are low, and that they can get good value for their money in M&amp;A transactions, it would make sense to boost spending there. But this doesn’t turn out to be true as well.</p><p>The Valuation Confidence Index put out by the <em>International Centre for Finance at Yale University</em> show that investors feel stock valuations are the highest they have been since the dot-com bubble in 1999–2000. So, low valuations are clearly not a reason for the growth in M&amp;A activity.</p><p><strong>Low Borrowing Cost</strong></p><p>Compared to overall historical averages, borrowing cost today are on the lower side. But compared to the period after the 2008 financial crisis, borrowing cost have gone up and will continue to go up with tighter monetary policy worldwide.</p><p>Therefore, although the current low borrowing cost could be a factor in boosting M&amp;As, it can’t be the major driving force behind it.</p><h3><strong>So… What Is It Then??</strong></h3><p>I have ruled out the three reasons stated above as a driver M&amp;As. So if it’s not them, what could they be?</p><p>In the interview of <em>Hernan Cristerna</em> mentioned above, he spoke about the mentality of businesses in M&amp;A today as “attack is the best for of defence”. What did he mean? Companies today are trying to ‘defend’ themselves from competitors by going on the offensive- making M&amp;A deal. And, if they don’t do the deal their competitors will.</p><p>What I am trying to say is that the major driver of M&amp;A activities is competition, i.e. if Company A doesn’t acquire Company X, then their competitor Company B could come in and do so. Disney and Comcast fighting it out for 20th Century Fox is a great example for this.</p><p>Now that we have the key reason for M&amp;As, which is competition, we need to talk about a company’s ability to pull off these deals. In situation like this, companies making the acquisition will often overpay for their target company due to the increased competition. But can they afford to do so? If the two factors mentioned above (global economic growth and low interest rate) persist for the next few years, companies can get away with overpaying.</p><h3><strong>What Will Come of This?</strong></h3><p>In my opinion, companies playing this game could get into trouble, especially if they are financing these acquisitions with debt. If interest rate rise faster than expected, their increased interest payments could put a strain on their activities and maybe even cause defaults. But if the economy continues to grow for a few more years in a stable manner, it could provide companies engaging in M&amp;As a long enough runway to recover the increasing money they are spending on such activities.</p><p>So what will happen? Only time will tell…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd859fb6a736" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NIKE, Inc.: An Intrinsic Valuation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/nike-inc-an-intrinsic-valuation-24dc5389e749?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/24dc5389e749</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[value-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[valuation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Jun 2018 21:32:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-17T21:32:03.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/399/1*XX5Rt9O0Ub5BXi1zfIL3-w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Over the past few decades, one of the most successful companies in the consumer-goods space has been NIKE, Inc. They have built themselves into a global brand and have become a cash machine, with their revenues growing by over 85% in the last 10 years. Most of this growth has been driven by the North American and Western European markets, and today the region accounts for about 62% of their total revenues. But with growing competition and slow-down of the sportswear market in developing nations, NIKE is seeing declining growth here as seen in the graph.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/854/1*92QZSegrM06gXsjkTLm_yQ.png" /></figure><p>In the midst of this decline, which started in 2016, NIKE has actually seen market cap grow by over $25 Billion. In this article, I want to analyse the causes of the growth and value the company in order to answer the question, “Is NIKE’s 128B Valuation Justified?”.</p><h3><strong>NIKE, Inc. Story</strong></h3><p>The NIKE corporate strategy has always been forward-looking and is the key in driving value for the company in the stock market. Going through the statements put out by the company, NIKE is driving growth by concentrating in two key areas:</p><ol><li>Consumer Direct Offerings</li><li>China &amp; Emerging Market Presence</li></ol><p><strong><em>Consumer Direct Offerings</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1002/1*ECmpgM-7nOK8OdA-NfbFrA.png" /></figure><p>NIKE sells their products through two ways. One is through retailer who carry NIKE products and other is through direct to consumer (DTC) offering through their own physical retail stores and their digital stores. Over the past few years, NIKE has been ramping up their DTC offerings, with their growth seen the graph here.</p><p>You maybe wondering why DTC services are so valuable to NIKE. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, DTC sales is a higher margin offering for NIKE since they can price their products at full retail price and not at their wholesale price which is usually a lot lesser.</p><p>The second and the more important reason is that their DTC service, especially their digital offerings through the NIKE app and website, provides a great opportunity for the company to collect meaningful user data. This data being used to make products that are more catered towards their customers and at the same time create stickier users. Thus, the growth in their DTC business is going to create more future revenue for the company and their recent acquisition of Zodiac (a data analytics firm) has seen their market cap go up.</p><p><strong><em>China &amp; Emerging Market Presence</em></strong></p><p>The second major value driver for NIKE is their growth in emerging markets and China. The graph below show a split up in the revenue for NIKE for their different global locations. It is clear that NIKE is capitalising on global economic growth and the slowdown in revenue for the company in North America is offset by the growth in these locations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SHRIuIjZN6D4ZVt8KhD7og.png" /></figure><h3><strong>NIKE Valuation</strong></h3><p>In order to value the NIKE equity I have used an intrinsic valuation model based on discounted cash flows. For the cash flows, I have used their Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF), which is their operating income (adjusted for taxes) minus short term and long term reinvestment needs. The formula is shown below.</p><p>Free Cash Flow to Firm = Operating Income (1 — Tax Rate) — Change in Working Capital — (Capital Expenditure — Depreciation)</p><p>I have split Nike’s growth into three stages. In the first stage, I see their FCFF grow by 7.17%. This is because their higher revenue growth will be offset by their investments in supply chain needs and digital needs. In their second phase, their FCFF will tick up slightly as they reap the fruits of their current investments through productivity gains, showcased by an improving ‘return on invested capital’. The second stage is also going to see their cost of capital go up as interest rate move higher. In their third stage, I have assumed that their growth rate will come down to a stable 3.97%, one-percentage point higher than the risk-free rate. This might seem conservative but I have used a their current lower cost of capital to compensate for it. In all three phases, their top-line growth is driven by emerging markets and a move to DTC.</p><p>The above explanation has been summarised below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Po9YVz14bu-pDYqpiULBXQ.png" /></figure><p>By adding up those present values and removing debt obligations, I get a value per stock for NIKE to be $74.29.</p><h3><strong>NIKE: Verdict</strong></h3><p>As of June 16th, NIKE stocks are trading at slightly above $75. Since the price of the stock is slightly more that its intrinsic value according to my calculations, the verdict should be don’t buy NIKE….yet.</p><p>The things to look for in terms of whether NIKE should become a buy or not would depend on the NIKE earning report which is due to come out on July 1st. If the company doesn’t hit analyst estimates and stock drops to below $70, Nike could be a good investment since they have strong fundamentals.</p><p>Potential risks for NIKE over the short terms are rising commodity prices and labor cost, as well as strengthening US dollar which will affect their sales in developing countries. But looking at the company over a longer time horizon, NIKE, Inc. definitely looks strong.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24dc5389e749" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[LIBOR & its Dance with Debt: Economic Effects]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@varunkoundinya/libor-its-dance-with-debt-economic-effects-44be4ec8d113?source=rss-5d4ee55a42a0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/44be4ec8d113</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[loans]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Varun Koundinya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 Jun 2018 21:20:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-03T21:20:31.102Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/357/1*N_9SduvbULHxSTcyrprPJg.png" /></figure><p><strong>$350,000,000,000,000</strong>. That is the estimated amount of financial products and loans tied to the London Interbank Offered Rate, otherwise known as LIBOR.</p><p>I know what you are thinking- what are you talking about and why do I care?</p><p>I had the exact same reaction until I found out more about LIBOR, which is described as <em>the most important number in the world</em>. In this article, I want to explain LIBOR and the effect it is having on the world economy today.</p><p><strong>Let’s Start With Floating-Rate Loans</strong></p><p>Floating-rate loans are regular debt instruments where the periodic interest payment varies based on a benchmark. LIBOR is one such benchmark, with some others being the Fed Funds Rate (set by the US Federal Reserve) and the US 10-year treasury rates. The interest payments on these floating-rate debt, called as the ‘coupon rate’, is thus calculated by adding the benchmark rate with a predetermined spread.</p><p>If that sounds complicated, let me give you an example. Let’s say the benchmark for a floating-rate debt is the US 10-year treasury rate, which is currently at 2.90%. And the spread on the debt, which is a function various factors like the credit worthiness of the borrower, is 0.8%. Then the current coupon rate of the debt is attained by adding these two numbers. Therefore,</p><p>Floating-Rate = Benchmark Rate + Spread = 2.90% + 0.80% = 3.70%</p><p>Now this floating rate varies since the benchmark rate, which in the above example is the US 10-year treasury rate, changes all the time.</p><p>Now that we know know a little bit about how floating-rate debts work we need to answer the question ‘why do they exist?’. That is a valid questions since many of the loans out there have a fixed coupon payment. But having a fixed coupon payments comes with disadvantage to the loan issuer, which is typically a bank, called the “Interest Rate Risk”.</p><p>Economies go through boom and busts, and over the course of these cycles, they have periods of high-interest rates and periods of low-interest rates, which are subject to factors like economic growth and inflation. When interest rates are high, debt with fixed coupon payments is worth lesser as some of their value is eaten away. Therefore, banks want to minimise this risk through floating-rate debt instruments. This can also be beneficial to borrowers since lower risks to banks can mean lower spreads on the coupon payments.</p><p><strong>LIBOR</strong></p><p>In the previous section we spoke about some of the important indicators tat are used as benchmarks in floating-rate debts. The indicator most widely used is LIBOR. The London Interbank Offering Rate first came about in the late 60’s and early 70’s in order to bring transparency to syndicate loan transactions, where multiple banks together provide loans for large projects. It was only in 1986, when the British Bankers Association took charge of the indicator, did LIBOR emerge as a major benchmarking indicator.</p><p>Today there are 35 LIBOR rates in total, which includes the Overnight Rate, 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year rates, for 5 currencies the US Dollar, Euro, Pound, Yen, and Swiss Franc. Each of these rates are calculated in the same way and are publish once every working day in the U.K at 11:55 am. The way they are calculated is through a survey where multiple banks are asked the question:</p><p><em>“At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”</em></p><p>Of the answers received, the bottom quartile and top quartile are removed, and an arithmetic mean of the remaining answers is taken to reach the LIBOR rate for the day.</p><p><strong>The Economic Effects of LIBOR</strong></p><p>Now that we’ve understood floating-rate debts and LIBOR, and the link between them, the economic impact this indicator can have is obvious. As LIBOR goes up, the coupon payments tied to trillions of dollars of debt around the world would go up. This would reduce economic activity since money that would be spent buying other goods and services would now be spent on interest payments. This is where the world is heading today.</p><p>Since the 2008 financial crisis, the world has been on a long economic expansion, which according to many experts is currently reaching its latter stages. In this stage, inflation would tick up, along with interest rates indicators, as the US Fed has begun raising interest rates as well. The LIBOR is no different and has grown significantly over the last year, with everyone feeling the pinch.</p><p>So with us heading towards a high-interest rate world, what options do we have to reduce it from impacting us? Companies are actually actively engaged in answering that question and preserving their bottom line. I will write about what they are doing soon.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44be4ec8d113" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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