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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by VentureSouth on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by VentureSouth on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Papers exploring how angel investors select deals]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/papers-exploring-how-angel-investors-select-deals-21e159ff7e82?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21e159ff7e82</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angels]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shark-tank]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2024 15:48:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-15T15:48:02.747Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the last couple of weeks, we have explored some academic research into how angel investors select investments. Here’s a quick recap for you.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O4mKYxUZ_lesWFmaKc1qFQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>A frequent question from entrepreneurs is: How do angels select deals? Often selection of an appealing investment feels random or biased. In the first paper, which <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432044">you can go download here</a> (if you come back), <strong><em>Attracting Early Stage Investors: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment</em></strong> authors Shai Bernstein, Arthur Korteweg, and Kevin Laws examine the characteristics that seem most important to investors in early-stage companies.</p><p>Bernstein and Korteweg are from business schools in California, and Laws is from AngelList — a nice combination of academia and real-world practitioners. They were also covering new ground in 2014, with the first experiment showing the causes of particular investment selection.</p><p>The experiment was to send 16,981 emails about 21 companies to 4,494 active investors (and really 8,189 emails that were opened by 2,925 investors, as many didn’t open any of the emails) on AngelList during its early years. The emails randomly varied the information shown on three key variables — founding team, traction, and lead investors — and recorded the decisions to “learn more” about the investment opportunities. (This is to address the selection bias of only looking at companies that are actually funded.)</p><p>To cut to the chase: investors respond to information about the team, but do not respond to information about traction or lead investors (p.4). The paper confirms experimentally the angel investor cliché that angel investors “back the jockey and not the horse”.</p><p>The paper goes on to examine the related questions of “why” information on the team affects investment decisions (investors value execution — “operational capabilities” — more than ideas); and whether focusing on the team actually creates better results (in Section VI: no answer in this paper, though more experienced angels (who presumably have better returns) have the strongest response to team information and lowest reaction to other subjects… suggesting overall “yes it does”).</p><p>Several interesting insights or further conclusions emerge:</p><ul><li>The paper highlights a key theme of “growth” investing — how companies move from “human capital focused” (i.e. back the jockey not the horse in the earliest stage) to “asset” focused, as one of the ways companies create enterprise value is to move from founder personality to established business.</li><li>Given how often early-stage investors are accused of “herd behavior” and basing their investment decisions on who the shallow idea of who the lead investor is, it’s interesting to see the experimental evidence that “notable lead” really isn’t a determinant of whether companies get investors’ attention. This is true of the active investors on AngelList; is it true generally?</li><li>What can entrepreneurs learn from this? Team is key! If you’re going to spend extra time on presentation, emphasize the credibility and skillset — especially operational capabilities — of the founding team.</li></ul><p>Overall, nice to know the clichés have some experimental validation!</p><p>Early-stage investors back the jockeys and not the horses. But that is not everything we need to know about how angel investing decisions are made. Luckily, one source for more ideas is <strong><em>Angels or Sharks? The Role of Personal Characteristics in Angel Investment Decisions</em></strong>, which focuses on the personal characteristics (race, gender, age) of the entrepreneurs being backed. If you are studious, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2886855">download the paper here</a>.</p><p>A paper that doesn’t rely on AngelList data! Instead, authors Thomas J. Boulton, Thomas Shohfi, and Pengcheng Zhu do the work so that we don’t have to: they watched the first eight seasons of ABC’s <a href="https://abc.com/show/535e2b07-18a9-4d94-9803-9ed8257b9d23">Shark Tank</a>!</p><p>You might know everything you know about angel investing from Shark Tank. (That’s a good start, but you might want to check out VentureSouth’s “<a href="https://www.venturesouth.vc/myths-overview">Myths of Angel Investing</a>” too…) Angel investing on Shark Tank differs considerably from hometown angel investing at VentureSouth. Nonetheless, the dataset of 1,089 entrepreneurs, 707 ventures, and 14 angel investors on Shark Tank’s earlier seasons gives some interesting insights into how (some) angel investors make decisions.</p><p>What does watching every episode of Shark Tank reveal?</p><ul><li>Some academics go the extra mile for a good paper!</li><li>Angels are more likely to fund younger and “better” businesses (higher profit margins and businesses with patents held or pending) (p.2)</li><li>Older entrepreneurs are less likely to receive offers, as are potentially black entrepreneurs (p.2), who are also likely to get lower valuations.</li><li>Generally, younger, female, and black entrepreneurs request lower valuations; Asians and “<em>entrepreneurs from top universities</em>” request higher valuations (p.2) (but do not receive them) (p.23)</li><li>Gender does not seem to matter (p.3).</li><li>“Homophily” is important (p.3) — investors fund people “like them” — with, for example, black investors more likely to make offers to black entrepreneurs, and black founders more likely to take deals from black investors.</li></ul><p>First, let’s tackle some objections to using Shark Tank data: presenters are highly selected (including for characteristics like entertainment value) and therefore probably not representative of early-stage companies generally; the investors are equally unusual (celebrities and ultra-HNW individuals with net worths estimated between $70M and $3.4BN) and not typical angel investors; and, more subtly, Shark Tank activity is public so perhaps the impacts of biases and preferences are <em>lessened</em> compared to what happens usually in private? All true, but at least the data makes a change from survey responses and anecdotes.</p><p>With these caveats in mind (and which, of course, the authors try to control for and/or examine), what are we to make of these experimental results?</p><p>There are some in here that aren’t a surprise. In all walks of life, people like to interact with people “like them”, so the homophily discussion is not a shock. (It may still, of course, be a problem.) The mixed evidence of bias against women might be surprising, if you didn’t read <a href="https://www.venturesouth.vc/resources/are-angels-biased-against-women-i-maybe-not">the prior articles we discussed here</a> <a href="https://www.venturesouth.vc/resources/are-angels-biased-against-women-ii">and here</a>, or any of the previous angel investing literature (see the discussion of prior literature being mixed on p.7). In this case, female Shark Tank contestants <em>request</em> lower valuations (p.18 and table 3 p.37) but are <strong>not</strong> less likely to receive an offer or a “discount” offer (tables 4–6). If true, this would have significant implications for efforts to equalize funding for female entrepreneurs.</p><p>While these primary hypothesis questions combine both the expected and the unexpected, there are several “asides” in the paper that reinforce accepted wisdom in angel investing. As three quick examples:</p><ul><li><em>A shared geography also increases the likelihood that an offer is made</em> (p.21). Even <a href="https://www.venturesouth.vc/investing-in-the-southeast">sharks like to invest close to home</a>.</li><li>Valuations are higher when multiple angel investors compete to make an investment (p.2). Getting a competitive situation going helps maximize value during negotiations</li><li><em>Ventures pitched by a single entrepreneur are less likely to receive an offer, which is consistent with angel investors having concerns with respect to key man risk.</em> (p.19). Indeed, a company with just one founder does not get into screening at VentureSouth, as there’s too much risk of 100% of the team leaving.</li></ul><p>Fun paper. We’ll leave you, as usual, with extra interesting nuggets and observations from the scholars:</p><ul><li><em>The average firm has $0.26 of sales per dollar of requested valuation </em>(p.14) — so ~4x LTM revenue is the Shark Tank valuation benchmark but…<em>The price-to-sales ratio of approximately 4 is lower than Sievers et al. (2013) who report multiples as high as 13</em>. (p.14) Not much help answering the perennial question of “how do you value early stage companies?”!</li><li>Troy Carter has a 75% bid rate (p.35). I hear you — I want to invest in everything too!</li></ul><p>There are plenty more papers examining decision-making of angel investors — and much more on venture capitalists and investors in general. Hopefully these two articles lead you down a fun research path, and help you become better investors.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21e159ff7e82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Papers exploring Angels vs. Venture Capital: how are they different, and are they complements?]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/papers-exploring-angels-vs-venture-capital-how-are-they-different-and-are-they-complements-61be495465db?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61be495465db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[deal-terms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fund-raising-for-startups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssrn]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jul 2024 14:02:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-12T14:02:27.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Our reviews of <a href="https://venturesouth.medium.com/intro-to-ssrn-series-angel-investors-and-their-investments-232b574beabf">SSRN papers this month</a> have explored the overlap and differences between angel investing and venture capital. Here are two papers analyzing whether “VC” and “angel” are two separate funding tracks, and how deal terms differ between the two.</p><p>How do angel investors overlap, collaborate with, compete with, benefit from, or get punished by venture capitalists? There is a lot of opinion and research about this topic — <a href="https://ventureinthesouth.buzzsprout.com/2116908/14842339-e113-why-that-startup-investment-exit-wasn-t-so-great">here about pay to plays and VC behavior</a>, for example. In their paper <strong><em>Angels and Venture Capitalists: Substitutes or Complements?</em></strong><em> </em>Thomas Hellmann, Paul Schure, and Dan H. Vo provide an interesting review of how angels and VCs overlap. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602739">The article is available here on SSRN.</a></p><p>The authors look at how much, and how, angels and VCs work together on investments, or invest separately. Are “<em>angels and VCs synergistic members of a tightly knit ecosystem</em>,” with angels supporting companies first and then sending them over to VCs to scale (p.3), or are they “<em>separate financing paths that rarely cross each other</em>,” as angels back different types of companies or try to avoid their portfolio companies working with VCs (p.4)?</p><p>Using data on tax credits related to the British Columbia Investment Capital Program, so not the usual Crunchbase or Pitchbook sets, covering 469 companies (mostly technology-based) from 1995–2009 (a total of 18,925 investments by 9,424 unique investors across 2,184 financing rounds in 469 companies), the authors find a few interesting results:</p><ol><li>“Dynamic persistence” within investor types — i.e. a company that raised capital from one type of investor is likely to raise more from the same type (p.24).</li><li>“Negative dynamic effect” between angel and VC financing — i.e. companies that obtained more angel financing in the past are less likely to subsequently obtain VC funding; and vice versa (p.24).</li><li>These choices are “company-led” (i.e. driven by the company characteristics), not “investor-led” (section 5).</li><li>There is no “quality contingent complements” — meaning that VCs were not just backing the “better companies” from the angels’ portfolio, though there is evidence that VCs had better results (section 6).</li><li>Overall the second description above, of separate financing paths, is much more the norm than the tightly knit ecosystem.</li></ol><p>These results are summarized on pages 4–5 and derived in detail, with supporting statistics that for brevity we’ll skip here, in the rest of the article.</p><p>This is pretty fascinating stuff. If you read the Silicon Valley-dominated tech press or consume angel content, I’m sure you would selected the “ecosystem” and “quality contingent” hypotheses. The overwhelming public opinion is (i) angels fund early to set up a company for VC money and (ii) angels fund weaker companies that often fail to “graduate” to VCs. Turns out, these ideas might not be correct.</p><p>Does this translate to the VentureSouth experience?</p><p>Speaking personally and from anecdata, I (Paul) would agree with the article and side against the agreed wisdom, but I think it has changed over time and still varies by geography. Ten years ago, VentureSouth members absolutely prioritized businesses capable of achieving an “early exit” without necessarily seeking large amounts of venture capital funding, because that was simply not available in the southeast. This is consistent with the conclusion and data timeframe of the study.</p><p>But as more VCs have entered the SE market, and perhaps our members’ appetites have evolved to prefer slightly-later-stage, larger rounds, and more VC-coinvesting, this has changed a bit over time. We still prioritize time to exit, and hold rounds that intentionally bridge to large raises to stricter scrutiny. But we have coinvested with many smaller southeastern venture capital funds (and the boundary between “angel” and “micro VC” always gets more blurred), and appreciate the positive momentum from seeing a later-stage VC round well capitalize the company and increase our book value. Perhaps the dynamics change as ecosystems “mature” or get more VC capital locally or more interest from tech-hub VCs?</p><p>As we have noted in prior papers, getting good data is hard. This paper struggles, like all do, with quantifying exits. For example, resorting here in some instances to rating an acquisition successful “if there is some kind of press release with substantial and positive praise of the acquired company” (p.16) — which is a leap of faith! It also has to fill in a bunch of gaps (e.g. investors don’t necessarily claim or take their tax credits).</p><p>The jury remains out on whether recent trends will lead to better returns or not. In the paper, the VC investors had more frequent positive exits than the angel investors (with VC-only companies having a 27% higher probability of exit and 18% lower probability of failure). But this is not necessarily saying the VCs had higher returns — outcome depends on the entry valuation, ownership and dilution, challenges along the way, and much more. Either way, angel investing and VC investing is hard.</p><p>Our experience aside, the paper is a valuable reminder that good angel deals do not necessarily involve venture capitalists, and that positive exits can be achieved, and potentially more quickly and, though not covered in the paper, potentially with greater founder liquidity, without VCs. There are substitutes and complements to the “right way” to fund early stage companies! <em>Overall, the literature remains inconclusive about the relationship between angel and venture capital funding</em> (p.11).</p><p>As always, we like to pick out a couple of interesting nuggets of data or ideas. Here we learned:</p><ul><li>In this dataset, VCs invested only slightly later than angels (p.18 and Panel A) — at 2.3 years for angels and 2.7 for VCs. The received wisdom is VCs invest much later than angels; even in early/non-SV markets like British Columbia 1995–2009, this was not true. (This supports the main “substitute” hypothesis, but even by itself is an interesting stat.)</li><li>24 companies IPO had an IPO — 5%, more than I would have guessed. More angel-only deals (6) IPOd than VC-only deals (5) — the opposite of what you guessed?</li></ul><p>Of the 7215 angels in the study, 6801 are casual angels — meaning they only invested in one company in the dataset. (214 were serial angels and 200 angel funds.) Yikes. Please be diversified!</p><p>Given these differences, let’s explore how angel investments and venture capital investments have in the past been structured different — using <strong><em>Are Angels Different? An Analysis of Early Venture Financing</em> </strong>by Brent Goldfarb, Gerard Hoberg, David Kirsch, and Alexander Triantis<em> </em>from 2013. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024186">Paper available here.</a></p><p>Goldfarb <em>et al</em> look at 182 Series A preferred stock deals from 1993–2002 into high-growth / tech companies from the records of a defunct law firm saved in a “Closed Archive” in the Library of Congress — an interesting set of source data for sure! — documenting the varied deal terms and participation from investors. The records cover 458 founders (across 165 companies), 482 different VCs (across 150 deals), and 2,528 angels (mostly individuals, but also including non-VC institutions like universities or banks, across 144 deals). They also crunched the usual sources for internet presence, later rounds, and exit data.</p><p>“<em>We find support for the conventional wisdom that angels invest with fewer protections than do VCs</em>” (p.2). These are deals involving a prominent law firm, so the angels are most likely to be “sophisticated” and “most like VCs” (p.3). Even being sophisticated, they accepted fewer downside cash-flow and control protections than VCs.</p><p>Why do they do that? In section 2, the authors outline prior scholarship about why, despite the earlier-stage, “higher-risk” investments angels make, they do not require more protections than later-stage VC investors. This has been a puzzle for some time.</p><p>The authors consider three potential explanations: 1. transaction costs — legal fees are expensive, and on smaller deals no-one can afford them, so the deals have fewer terms including protections; 2. “preferences” — angels are often entrepreneurs, and are more closely aligned with entrepreneurs, and can influence them socially rather than contractually (or are just more naïve); 3. “selection” based on some kind of unobserved variable (which, honestly, I don’t get!). And conclude that #2 (angels align with entrepreneurs more than VCs do) is best supported by their data.</p><p>Let’s quickly review what these protections are. The first is dividends: VCs have them, angels do not (p.18, and none of the angel-only deals had them per p.20). The authors argue this suggests VCs are less patient and use this tool (“a strong incentive for the firm to accelerate to a successful exit event” (p.18)) to get things moving. Not sure we agree this is really that powerful a tool — though maybe that proves the authors’ point!</p><p>Second is liquidation preference. Honestly we don’t quite follow what the descriptions here mean — they don’t seem to describe “liquidation preferences” as we understand them. But whatever exactly is being measured, here the protections for angels are “much less favorable” (p.20) — with the difference looking fairly stark (0.579 for VC, 0.125 for angel-only, significant at the 1% level) on Table IV.</p><p>Lastly, redemption rights. Again VCs have them (72 of 150 deals), angels do not (4 of 32 angel-only deals) (p.20).</p><p>Today, we would expect <a href="https://www.venturesouth.vc/typical-liquidation-preferences">1x liquidation preference on all deals</a>, no dividend, and only sometimes a redemption right. Why are the structures in this dataset so different from that expectation? Have things changed over time, so that angels have learned the lessons from forgoing some protections (liquidation preference), or have angel investors’ preferences become less aligned with founders as angels have become more “professional”? Have VCs learned to be more investor friendly (forgoing redemption rights)? Is the sample misleading?</p><p>At VentureSouth we propose “VC-style” structures in our deals — priced preferred equity rounds using NVCA model documents — even if (in the wisdom of some) that is “overkill” for what’s needed in an angel round. We try to <a href="https://venturesouth.medium.com/the-case-against-convertible-notes-9664bd4390c1">avoid SAFEs and convertible notes,</a> wholly avoid common stock, and judge equity rounds lacking protections harshly. Not all funds do. Whether this leads to better or worse returns, we’ll leave for you to judge — but this paper definitely suggests limited protections can lead to worse returns.</p><p>This is a fascinating paper overall, and leaves us with more questions than when we started! In addition, there are some random interesting nuggets that we thought you would enjoy:</p><ul><li>The superior performance of VC-only, larger deals is only present when the board of directors is not firmly under the control of either common or preferred shareholders. (p.4). A balanced board of directors is the way to go. We mentioned this in Episode 99 of the <a href="https://ventureinthesouth.buzzsprout.com/2116908/14205639-e99-startup-boards-of-directors">Venture In The South podcast here</a>.</li><li>Warrants were also sold in 15% of the rounds, and more so in the smaller deals (20%) (p.17). How does that square to how often your deals include warrants? Seems high to me. Wonder why?</li><li>We find that the average time between first and second closings is 153 days, though it is much longer for large deals (198 days on average) (p.17). It’s absolutely standard practice for rounds to take some time to fill entirely (despite FOMO and overnight deals you might read out), but this length is surprising even so.</li></ul><p>And any attorneys reading might be interested to learn the average billing was for 169 hours of work (p.17). Ooof.</p><p>If you like these reviews, have feedback, or have anything we should add to our reading list, please get in touch!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61be495465db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Papers on Public Policy: Trade off Between Protecting Investors and Promoting Entrepreneurial…]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/papers-on-public-policy-trade-off-between-protecting-investors-and-promoting-entrepreneurial-6bbfb1c13fa9?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6bbfb1c13fa9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2024 16:17:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-12T16:17:43.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Papers on Public Policy: Trade off Between Protecting Investors and Promoting Entrepreneurial Activity</h3><p>Do investors need “protecting” from making angel investments? What actually happens when those protections are made?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O4mKYxUZ_lesWFmaKc1qFQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Today we will examine two papers on SSRN that cover a seemingly-innocuous change to accreditation rules, so see what effect changes to who can invest have on the companies seeking funding.</p><p>The first paper <strong><em>Is There a Trade-off Between Protecting Investors and Promoting Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence From Angel Financing</em> </strong>by<strong> </strong>Jiajie Xu, an excerpt from a dissertation from the University of Iowa. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3510686">Available here</a> (and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/is-there-a-tradeoff-between-protecting-investors-and-promoting-entrepreneurial-activity-evidence-from-angel-financing/D41E776BA1BD238AD394AB4615929CDB">here too)</a>.</p><p>This paper looks at the impact of the change in 2011 to the definition of accredited investor, where the SEC removed the value of a primary residence from the wealth definition. This sounds like an innocuous and minor change to the rules governing who can invest in startups.</p><p>Well, this apparently-innocuous change had a significant impact! Removing home equity possibly removed over 20% of previously-eligible households (p.3), because a significant proportion of household wealth for single-digit millionaires would be their home’s equity.</p><p>Even more dramatically, the rule change had a clear, material impact on angel funding, and a whole cascade of downstream impacts. It “<em>had a significantly negative impact on local angel financing</em>” (p.3), with a decrease in angel funding as “marginal angel investors” had to leave the market; fewer follow-on rounds; fewer exits (p.4); fewer patents, reduced revenue, and fewer jobs; greater borrowing from SBA loans and more entrepreneurs taking out second mortgages. A whole litany of costs on entrepreneurs and society that significantly exceeded the benefit (from estimated lost investments avoided) to the supposedly-protected investors. Yikes!</p><p>How did the paper reach those conclusions? The paper looked at the ratio of home value (from Zillow) to individual net worth (from SIPP and IRS data) to create a “HV/NW ratio” for each city. The higher the ratio, the more impact the rule would have, as a higher proportion of high-net-worth people would be removed from the market. It looked at the differential impact in subsequent activity in several different areas, and whether the impacts were worse in areas with higher HV/NW ratios. The results were dramatic (and statistically-significant).</p><p>How plausible is this? As always, we can complain about the data — Crunchbase, Form Ds, etc., give incomplete and sometimes entirely wrong information. We could object to some of the concepts and assumptions, in particular that as accreditation by income was unchanged it’s not obvious that just changing the wealth calculation would have impacted angels (who also generally self-certify, so may not have read the rules or necessarily followed them truthfully). And we always question if “ability to raise a next round” (p.28) is very illustrative. (And we’ll leave for you to opine on the benefits and concerns of difference-in-difference analyses more generally.)</p><p>Particularly powerful for us, as investors in “local markets” was that the negative impact was particularly acute outside of the traditional hubs of San Francisco , NY, and Boston (p.26). It’s also pleasing (while also being upsetting) that removing the “marginal” angels did not just prevent “marginal” companies being funded, as the impact on jobs, sales, etc., were significant, indicating high quality companies were hurt too. Local market angels do invest in good companies (when they’re allowed to!).</p><p>Overall, the paper is disturbingly effective in showing the impact of one small regulation change — a net negative of (at best) $6.32 billion (p.41) (though with major caveats about second-order effects here).</p><p>If this is repeated with new innocuous rule changes, or potentially some dramatic changes like indexing accreditation to inflation, there could be big negative impacts on early stage funding as angels are removed from the market. All the work going on to increase entrepreneurship could be undercut in one easy rule change.</p><p>Academics love a good change in the rules, as they often create clear boundaries that show how things really worked. The second article covering the same rule change is <strong><em>Angels, Entrepreneurship, and Employment Dynamics: Evidence from Investor Accreditation Rules</em> </strong>by Laura Lindsey from Arizona State University and Luke Stein from Babson College, first uploaded to SSRN in 2017 (<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939994">get it here</a>).</p><p>The paper explores the same rule change; it also uses some of the same datasets and difference-in-difference methodology. But the focus this time is the impact on new business formation and related effects (like job creation and wage effects). Can you guess the impact Lindsey and Stein found?</p><p>Of course you can: fewer businesses were started. “<em>We find a negative and statistically significant reduction in new businesses of about 2% on average.” </em>(p.3) That’s an “<em>economically meaningful and plausible</em>” effect (p.23). And that, of course, leads to fewer new jobs (this is pretty common knowledge — new businesses create all net new jobs — but here is more supporting evidence) and to lower wages for employees overall.</p><p>The particular nuances here are that it is smaller angel investors (people investing a few thousand dollars in total), not high profile celebrities or super angels, that got hit most — and it is smaller businesses that also got most hurt. They weren’t bad investors and bad businesses: the paper shows once again the good/bad news that these “marginal investors” were not just funding businesses of lower quality. Good businesses didn’t get funded that otherwise would have.</p><p>We might not be enough of a conspiracy theorist to say this impact was deliberate, but it’s hard at this point to see these consequences as “unexpected.”</p><p>A couple of fun nuggets:</p><p>- Like Jiajie Xu, the authors think this rule change reduced the number of accredited households by “almost 20%” (p.11). Not every household that is allowed to make angel investments does, but still that remains a surprising proportion.</p><p>- “<em>for West Virginia… the SIPP sample included no potentially accredited investors</em>.” (p.15). This doesn’t quite mean there are no angel investors in WV, but it does mean the <a href="https://wvcran.com/">Country Roads Angel Network</a> needs extra appreciation!</p><p>“<em>In the U.S., many angel transactions require no disclosure, and where disclosure requirements do exist, enforcement is lax and compliance levels may be low.</em>” I don’t know what US this is referring to, but the one I’m in does not sound like this!</p><p>Hopefully you found those papers though provoking. As legislators and regulators propose new or changed rules (like the <a href="https://ventureinthesouth.buzzsprout.com/2116908/14755559-e111-legislating-for-startup-investing">HB2799 discussed here</a>) we hope they do too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6bbfb1c13fa9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Intro to SSRN series: Angel Investors and their Investments]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/intro-to-ssrn-series-angel-investors-and-their-investments-232b574beabf?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/232b574beabf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2024 13:17:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-10T13:17:55.345Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As angel investors, we are constantly seeking ways to improve our performance “<a href="https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx">in the arena.</a>” One of our techniques is that we sometimes consume academic studies about angel investing.</p><p>Few things are more interesting to read, on pretty much any subject, than the <a href="https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/">SSRN Electronic Paper Library</a>.</p><p>Combining these two unlikely statements resulted in a new series of VentureSouth discussion posts starting today.</p><p>Every couple of weeks (time permitting) we plan to review one paper (or related set of papers) about angel investing, venture capital, entrepreneurship, or ancillary subjects that interested or surprised us. We’ll widen the aperture to scholarship in other journals, but SSRN alone will keep us busy for a while!</p><p>We are not rigorous academic scholars, and our statistical skills are…lower quartile. Lots of the details of these papers are beyond our ability (and time) to evaluate with sophisticated mathematical techniques. But still, we thought overlaying our experiences and opinions as angel investing practitioners might elaborate, contradict, or supplement these studies. Let’s see what we find.</p><p><strong>***</strong></p><p>As a gentle warm up, we’ll begin with this introductory paper: <strong><em>Angel Investors and their Investments</em> </strong>by<strong> </strong>Ramon P. DeGennaro from 2010. You can <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1784489">download the paper here</a> to follow along. I promise this is a quick and easy read!</p><p><a href="https://www.luc.edu/quinlan/about/leadershipcenterslabs/finpol/bios/ramonpdegennaro/">Professor DeGennaro</a>, from the University of Tennessee, provides an overview of what angel investors are and what they do. Although the early-stage investing world has developed substantially since 2010, some of these basic questions are timeless.</p><p><em>What is an angel investor?</em> Angels invest their own money (unlike a venture capital fund that primarily invests others’ money), but how “independent” must an investor be to be an “angel”? Do only VentureSouth-style angels — people investing in companies they are not related to — count, or is an uncle lending a nephew money for his startup, or a CEO investing in her own company, an angel investor?</p><p><em>What do they invest in? </em>Here we are on more solid ground — early stage companies. Often pre-revenue or with limited sales, tangible worth, and “proof” of traction. Angels invest earlier than venture capitalists, in smaller amounts but in many more companies.</p><p>The article also covers other basics effectively, including the varied types of company funded, accreditation levels and regulations, motivation for angel investing (mixing financial return, intellectual stimulation or emotion fulfillment, and community development — a.k.a. “Make Money, Have Fun, Do Good”), the advantages of angel investing in groups (diversification, division of labor, deal-flow, visibility, administrative leverage, social benefits), the lack of attention given to angel investing from wealth managers and writers, the characteristics of companies that angels seek, the long time to liquidity, and the challenges of evaluating returns in opaque private markets.</p><p>As a survey introduction to angel investing, there is little to pick fault with. One could argue that the division between “sophisticated” investors (those that invest in high-growth tech companies) vs. “unsophisticated” or typical angels (who invest in any businesses), is a bit insulting and misleading; there are sensible and potentially lucrative ways to invest in “regular” businesses. The discussion of why angel groups typically prefer investing into convertible preferred stock (“<em>They claim that this has the advantages of deferring valuation of the firm until more information is available</em>.”) seems to confuse preferred equity (which requires a valuation) and convertible notes (which defer the valuation discussion, sort-of). But otherwise, as a quick survey of angel investing, it’s an efficient and quick read.</p><p>In addition, a couple of interesting nuggets stood out to me:</p><ul><li>The more patents in the Metropolitan Statistical Association, the smaller the angel group (p.10). I wonder if that is still true, and why? Seems counterintuitive.</li><li>Angel groups with paid managers invest more (p.10). This one does seem believable.</li><li>Angels are often from “first-generation” wealth, because those individuals tend to have higher risk tolerance for a given amount of investment (p.24). Generalizing some, but this also seems to match our experience of the type of individuals who like joining VentureSouth.</li></ul><p>That was an easy introduction. Next time we’ll tackle something more controversial!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=232b574beabf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Filing your Form]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/filing-your-form-48e982306013?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/48e982306013</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2024 18:01:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-14T18:01:16.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Do startups have to register with the SEC?</strong></p><p>Incoming question to VentureSouth last week from an ecosystem partner: <em>I was asked whether a start-up, looking for VC funding, is required to file with the SEC. Do you know if this is a requirement, and what are the criteria or situation that triggers this filing? Is there a document to fill out?</em></p><p><strong>Yes. Yes, yes, yes. Oh yes.</strong></p><p>Surprised? If you raise capital in the United States, you are regulated by the SEC.</p><p>Which form, and when/how, varies depending on what you’re doing, but the short answer is: you have to fill out forms with the SEC. Typically, within 15 days of taking your first investment.</p><p>And with the Attorneys-General in each state where you have investors!</p><p>Hopefully you reached this post BEFORE you raised money. If so, here’s a very quick set of tips to fill out forms correctly, but you need to some your own research on this. If not, call your securities attorney — a late SEC filing is better than no SEC filing.</p><p>(If you need a securities attorney, <a href="https://www.mandnlegal.com/">Morgan Malino linked here</a> keeps us on the straight and narrow on these questions and we’re happy to connect you.)</p><p>— -</p><p>We aren’t providing all the nuances, details, processes, etc. here. We’re not your attorneys. We’ll keep it brief, and you can dig in further if you want.</p><p>If you sell equity in your company…</p><p>…or something similar to equity, like a convertible note or a SAFE…</p><p>…in the US…</p><p>You must “register” with the SEC.</p><p>That’s a grueling process. Fortunately, there are ways to be “exempt” from registering. Most companies become exempt. But to get that exemption, you should (i) follow fundraising rules correctly — see our posts here about private vs public fundraising and (ii)<strong> FILE A FORM D WITH THE SEC.</strong></p><p>If you mess up (i) or (ii), you may upset the SEC — which is bad. Please don’t do that. The SEC has the power to bar you from using any exemption in future financings. If the SEC uses that power on you, then you will need to file a full-blow registration statement with every future financing.</p><p>— -</p><p>Filing a Form D is a pain, but it’s not hard.</p><p>You can DIY. Start here at the SEC website <a href="http://www.sec.gov/">www.sec.gov</a> and navigate to “EDGAR — Information for Filers” and then “Step 1 — Apply for EDGAR access.” From there, you can both “Apply for EDGAR Access” and “Generate Access Codes.” If you don’t have a CIK code, click “Apply for EDGAR Access.” You will need to download the “Form ID” and get it notarized to receive a CIK and a pass<em>phrase</em>. It may take a few days for the SEC to issue your CIK, so start early! Once you have a CIK, you will then need to “Generate Access Codes” to receive a CCC and pass<em>word</em>. Once you have the CIK, CCC, and password, you are ready to file the Form D.</p><p>Navigate back to “EDGAR — Information for Filers” and then, under “Step 2 — Submit and manage your EDGAR filings,” click “Log in for … Regulation D.” Although you will need to identify directors and officers, most people would rather their home address not be made public in a Form D filing and prefer you use a c/o with the company address.</p><p>You are almost done. Cost (to this point) = a notarized document.</p><p>Or your attorney can do (some of) that. They are a little more expensive obviously, but will save you some frustration!</p><p>— -</p><p>Am I good now? Sadly, no, because securities offerings are <strong>also</strong> regulated by your state, and by the all the states in which your investors live. Every state (except Florida) requires that you file a copy of Form D with them if you are raising money from investors in the state. A Delaware company who is raising money from people in South Carolina and North Carolina? You need to file with the SEC, South Carolina, and North Carolina.</p><p>Luckily there’s a slick system that posts the Form D to the required states. Go here to start that process: <a href="https://www.efdnasaa.org/FORMD/Search">https://www.efdnasaa.org/FORMD/Search </a>The bad news? It costs between $50 and $1,500 PER STATE (South Carolina is $300, North Carolina is $350, and the website is a bargain $160 for a “portal fee”).</p><p>— -</p><p>Good luck with conducting a compliant fundraising!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48e982306013" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are startups founders automatically “accredited investors”?]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/are-startups-founders-automatically-accredited-investors-87511296f180?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87511296f180</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2023 12:29:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-11T12:29:35.670Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We have debated on the <a href="https://www.ventureinthesouth.com/"><em>Venture In The South</em></a> podcast whether startup founders are “accredited investors.”</p><p>My answer, which might surprise you, is “probably.” Here are some ways founders could be. <em>Number three will shock you</em>, as all good clickbait says.</p><p>— -</p><p>First, obviously if a founder meets one of the “regular” accreditation criteria — net worth, annual income, or holding a Series 7, 65, or 82 license, <a href="https://www.sec.gov/education/capitalraising/building-blocks/accredited-investor">as outlined by the SEC</a> — the founder is accredited like anyone else.</p><p>— -</p><p>Second, <strong>for</strong> <strong>your own company or investment fund</strong>, you are accredited. The SEC says that “Directors, executive officers, or general partners (GP) of the company selling the securities (or of a GP of that company)” are accredited. So, if you are a director or the CEO (or other executive officer) of the company, you are accredited and therefore can buy shares in your own company.</p><p>That matters for several reasons. One overlooked reason in South Carolina is that your investment could be eligible for the South Carolina Angel Investor Tax Credit. Invest $10,000 in your own startup? If you did it correctly, you might be able to get $3,500 back in a state income tax credit. Follow the <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/angel-investor-tax-credit/">rules here</a>. Few people know this.</p><p>Similarly, for investments in a private fund, “knowledgeable employees” of the fund (even if you are not part of the GP) are accredited. You are “knowledgeable” if, in connection with your regular duties, you participate in the investment activities of the fund, and have (at your company or a similar prior one) for at least a year. So, for example, our head of diligence, <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/venturesouth-firm/">Molly Vinkler</a>, and head of portfolio management <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/venturesouth-firm/">Alex Biermann</a>, would be “knowledgeable” because they are actively involved in diligence and deal execution. (They also know a lot, of course, but that’s irrelevant here!)</p><p>This only applies to your company (or fund) — not to others. And it doesn’t apply to regular employees — only to the most senior members of the management team (or general partner), not to everyone.</p><p>— -</p><p>Not accredited yet? There’s a third possible approach. This may come as a surprise but there is a decent chance a founder that has already raised capital is accredited. How?</p><p>Equity in privately-held companies counts towards the net worth definition in the first section above, because equity is an asset (like cash in your bank account or your car).</p><p>If you raised even a modest equity round, the implied value of your shares could be enough to make you accredited. Take this example. The CEO and CTO of this company created the company at a 75/25 split, and then raised a $1M pre-seed round at a $3M pre-money valuation. Here’s the math:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/586/1*zEUkN0Pi8AoNy4eIroHbGg.png" /></figure><p>$1M on $3M pre-money valuation sells 25% of the company. That left the CEO with 56.3% and the CTO with 18.8% of the company worth a $4M post-money valuation.</p><p>The value of the CEO’s stake is therefore $2.25M and the CTO’s stake is now $750K. Ignoring all their other assets and liabilities — and assuming all these shares are vested — the CEO is accredited on this alone. The CTO is not.</p><p>Obviously your company’s details and cap tables are different. Convertible notes and SAFEs don’t count; unvested shares don’t count; and different classes of shares have different fair market values. (If our CEO held common stock and investors held preferred stock, the CEO might instead rely on an independent appraisal to determine the fair market value of the common stock — something that most companies already do in connection with their incentive stock option plans and is called a 409A valuation.</p><p>But hopefully you see there’s a chance the CEO is accredited — for all companies, not just the CEO’s own. <a href="https://blog.stonks.com/founders-startup-employees-you-are-likely-accredited-and-can-invest-in-other-startups-b18e4b9c277c">Here’s another source</a> for this idea.</p><p>— -</p><p>Of course, that doesn’t change that early stage investing is risky, and even if you are accredited it is not a great idea to invest money you can’t afford to lose. All the usual warnings (risky, illiquid, diversification required, etc.) apply.</p><p>— -</p><p>Lastly, if the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2797/text">Equal Opportunities for All Investors Act of 2023</a> becomes law, anyone — including founders — capable of passing the test would be accredited. Hopefully more to come on that!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87511296f180" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SC AITC 2021 Users]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/sc-aitc-2021-users-53610fa20491?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53610fa20491</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 16:23:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-28T16:23:04.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As we celebrate South Carolina angel investing <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/angel-investor-tax-credit/">tax credit transfer season</a> (among other things), we found this report on the <a href="https://dor.sc.gov/resources-site/publications/Publications/2021%20Angel%20Investor%20Credit%20Report.pdf">SC Dept of Revenue’s website here</a> (under Publications / Reports / Additional Reports) about who applied for the credit in 2021. We thought you might enjoy reviewing it with us.</p><p>The maximum $5M of credits were awarded in 2021. (We <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/south-carolina-angel-investor-tax-credit-scaitc-2022/">noted that here</a>, when the award letters revealed a 30% credit, indicating $5.78M of valid credit applications.) These data tell us (I think for the first time) where those awardees came from, and raises a few interesting questions.</p><p><strong>South Carolina</strong></p><p>Most credits were awarded to people in South Carolina — $3.37M, or 67% of the total awards. Not a great surprise: South Carolinians are naturally the most likely to be making angel investments in South Carolina companies.</p><p>Maybe surprising, though, is Greenville County’s total dominance here. Over half (58%) of the credits to South Carolina locations, or 39% of all the awards, were in Greenville. Charleston was a distant second at 14% overall, and Columbia (Richland and Lexington counties combined) only just over 2%.</p><p>Does that reflect a more vibrant tech community in Greenville? More knowledgeable angel investors? Another possible explanation is more “wholesale” applicants in Greenville, which we have thought in the past used up large amounts of credits — but the average award in Greenville ($43k) is lower than in Charleston ($70k), so that does not seem to be it.</p><p>Whatever the reason for Greenville’s lead, it is not a small difference!</p><p><strong>Not South Carolina</strong></p><p>Equally interesting (at least to us) is the location of non-SC investors. First, it’s surprising how few credits went to direct neighbors — just 4% from North Carolina and essentially nothing (0.3%) from Georgia. Apparently, it remains difficult to attract investors up or down I-85!</p><p>Second, Virginia posts an impressive showing, and especially the coast — almost 12% of the total awards, and over 1/3 of all out-of-state investors. Could that <a href="https://twitter.com/VentureSouth_VC/status/1593597342653026304?s=20&amp;t=5KL-VZmS-mMKTD2E-RCsTw">be because there’s an excellent angel group there</a> (and a VentureSouth group)? Or because Virginia has an angel tax credit of its own so people are more familiar?</p><p>Third, New England (MA, CT, NH, NY) has more awards at 8% than the southeast (excluding SC, so NC, GA, FL, TN). Areas with well-established early stage investing ecosystems create investors that become more willing to invest anywhere — if you give them compelling investment opportunities and structures. Or perhaps simply everyone from New England is moving to South Carolina…</p><p>And lastly, notably absent are credits to any west coast locations. California usually dominates angel investing and venture capital statistics, but not in this report! Are west coast investors simply not willing to look this far afield for early stage investments? Maybe this data illuminates <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w27751">academic studies like this one</a> on the importance and use of angel tax credits. Whatever the reason, it’s their loss!</p><p><strong>Just one more thing</strong></p><p>One last interesting note is how many applications were denied. Of the 138 applications sent in, only 123 were approved — meaning more than 10% of applications people thought would get a credit ultimately did not. Given the challenges on paperwork timing, this is a lower rejection rate than I would have guessed — but still disappointing if you’re part of the 10%.</p><p>Make sure the company is properly qualified before you invest. And if you are applying for a credit on investments made in 2022, make sure your applications are submitted before the end of the year! <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/angel-investor-tax-credit/">More guide here</a>.</p><p>Happy Investing!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53610fa20491" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[THREE ANGEL INVESTING FLYWHEELS]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/three-angel-investing-flywheels-ae79580485c0?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ae79580485c0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investors]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2022 15:10:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-12T15:10:04.374Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you have followed Matt’s writings about angel investing, you’ll know he has been a fan of the “flywheel” metaphor for angel investing and startup communities from long before VentureSouth even existed. (See <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/top-10-angels-sends-a-strong-signal-for-sc/">here</a> and <a href="https://upstatebusinessjournal.com/management-2/top-10-angels-send-strong-signal-sc/">here</a>, for example.)</p><p>In the last few weeks, we have seen three examples of how the flywheel of <strong>investment -&gt; company building -&gt; exit -&gt; reinvestment</strong> leads to strong and dynamic early-stage communities — right in line with Matt’s thesis.</p><p><strong>1) Founders -&gt; Angels</strong></p><p>One of the things successful entrepreneurs can do after selling their startup is reinvest some of their gains in the next vintage of startups. We were very excited this week to welcome as a VentureSouth member an entrepreneur who had sold his previously-VentureSouth-backed company.</p><p>Seeing entrepreneurs able to apply their wealth and expertise from their first entrepreneurial journeys to help the next cohort of startups is fun — and the foundation of enduring and dynamic startup ecosystems.</p><p>(And it’s flattering that these entrepreneurs want to participate in VentureSouth voluntarily, even when we are not funding them any more!)</p><p><strong>2) Founders -&gt; Founders</strong></p><p>Recently we have had the privilege of funding two companies led by CEOs of companies previously backed by VentureSouth. In February, VentureSouth members invested in <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshmichaelmiller/">Josh Miller</a> and the team at <a href="https://gradienthealth.io/">Gradient Health</a>; several years ago, we invested in Josh’s first startup, FarmShots, with positive results. Similarly, several weeks earlier, we invested in <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/meg-powell-324b67/">Meg Powell</a> and the <a href="https://wraltechwire.com/2021/10/27/new-chapel-hill-startup-bio-54-raises-3-1-million-for-working-capital/">team at Bio54</a>; in 2016, VentureSouth <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/venturesouths-latest-investments-crowdr-and-target/">members invested</a> in Meg’s first startup, <a href="https://www.targetrwe.com/">Target PharmaSolutions</a> — with <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/venturesouth-announces-2018-record-breaking-results/">even more spectacular results</a>.</p><p>Being able to fund serial entrepreneurs — especially funding from “house money” — is another great flywheel in action.</p><p><strong>3) Gains -&gt; Investment</strong></p><p>If you have read <a href="https://venturesouth.medium.com/more-than-you-want-to-know-about-the-tax-impacts-of-angel-investing-b2c8bf8c5ef6">our guide to angel investing taxes</a>, you know about the <strong>Section 1045 “rollover” provisions of the tax code. (If you are an angel but aren’t familiar with this, go check it out — you’ll thank us later.)</strong></p><p>On another recent “early exit,” a significant proportion of the proceeds to our members were QSBS Section 1045-eligible. This means (simplifying a bit) that if the proceeds were quickly reinvested in new startups the gains from the first exit would not yet be taxed; and if the total hold period extends past five years, all the gains would be exempt from capital gains.</p><p>A significant proportion of those proceeds were rolled over under these rules, meaning more investment (from pre-tax dollars) directly supporting the next cohort of startups.</p><p><strong>Wrap up</strong></p><p>These are three examples of flywheel effects in early stage company investing. We invite you to experience some more <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/join/">by joining VentureSouth</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ae79580485c0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Behind the press release — breaking down VentureSouth’s activities for 2021]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/behind-the-press-release-breaking-down-venturesouths-activities-for-2021-cf8bc6e63c5a?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cf8bc6e63c5a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2022 22:02:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-26T22:26:12.806Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Behind the press release — breaking down VentureSouth’s activities for 2021</strong></h3><p>Thanks to <a href="https://www.wfmz.com/news/pr_newswire/pr_newswire_business/venturesouth-invests-over-10m-in-2021-as-part-of-a-record-year-of-angel-investing/article_07302c3f-bfbe-5ec0-bd03-c00d7e27af12.html">WFMZ-TV 69</a>, <a href="https://gsabusiness.com/news/banking-finance/81529/">GSA Business Report</a> and others for covering <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/venturesouth-invests-over-10m-in-2021-as-part-of-a-record-year-of-angel-investing/">a record year of angel investing</a> at VentureSouth in 2021.</p><p>VentureSouth members set new personal bests last year in new companies receiving investment (11) and total investment rounds completed (36), and came close for total capital invested ($10.7 million). Most importantly, it was a record for distributions returned to investors ($20 million) too.</p><p>We thought it might be fun to take you “behind the headlines” to learn more about what we got up to last year.</p><p><strong>New companies vs. follow-on rounds</strong></p><p>While we are always looking for new companies to invest in, supporting existing portfolio companies with follow-on investments is a critical part of being a good early stage investor. Last year we invested slightly more of our total invested dollars (56%) into existing portfolio companies compared to new ones.</p><p>Follow-on rounds continue long after the initial investment. In 2021, two-thirds of the follow-on rounds we participated in represented our third or later investment into the respective company. Three rounds were our fifth round of participation, while two more were our seventh and eighth respectively. The bottom line — VentureSouth portfolio companies that perform well can expect to receive ongoing investment from our members and other investors.</p><p><strong>Investments by deal type</strong></p><p>We also invest in different round structures. Our 2021 deals were split 20–12–4 between priced equity rounds, convertible note rounds, and SAFE rounds respectively.</p><p>The split gets more telling when you separate new investments from those into existing portfolio companies. Most (83%) of the <em>new</em> rounds we participated in were priced equity rounds, while our <em>follow-on</em> rounds were more equally split (42% equity, 46% convertible notes, and the remainder SAFEs). We have a strong preference for priced equity rounds when we first invest in a company, but support our companies in whatever follow-on structures they feel are appropriate.</p><p><strong>Investments by location</strong></p><p>Most VentureSouth angel investors (and portfolio companies) are based in the Carolinas. However, last year we launched VentureSouth Virginia, our first local investor group outside of the Carolinas. We were also active investing outside of the Carolinas, with 20% of our total invested dollars in 2021 going to companies in other parts of the Southeast; about one-third of those dollars went to Virginia-based companies as we grew our efforts there.</p><p>Speaking of launching new groups, in late 2021 we formalized our existing members, fund investors, and portfolio teams in North Carolina’s Triangle region into <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/venturesouth-triangle/">VentureSouth Triangle</a>. 2021 saw 40% of our total invested dollars go to Triangle-based companies, demonstrating our active involvement in one of the Southeast’s leading entrepreneurial hubs.</p><p><strong>Investment by valuation</strong></p><p>One advantage to investing in the Southeast is the lower company valuations we see compared to those more typical in Silicon Valley or the Northeast. While we are willing to invest in follow-on rounds at higher valuations, we maintain a disciplined approach to pricing, especially when adding new companies to the portfolio. Excluding one investment outside of our usual investment criteria, the weighted average post-money valuation on our 2021 equity investments into new portfolio companies was around $11M. This is a touch higher than in previous years, but still far lower than comparable deals in other markets.</p><p><strong>Returns by tax status</strong></p><p>Investing at reasonable valuations is the first step in generating good returns; dealing with capital gains taxes is, hopefully, the last step!</p><p>Current tax policy offers valuable allowances that help investors to benefit from gains, and therefore incentivizes more investment in early stage companies.</p><p>Head over to our guide <a href="https://venturesouth.medium.com/more-than-you-want-to-know-about-the-tax-impacts-of-angel-investing-b2c8bf8c5ef6">here</a> for more background on angel investing tax treatments. For our record-breaking proceeds in 2021, about half of the proceeds will benefit from Section 1202 of the tax code, which offers a full federal capital gains tax exclusion for qualified small business stock (QSBS) held for at least five years.</p><p>Another ~17% of our gains qualified for Section 1045, which allows investors to rollover proceeds from QSBS held for fewer than five years into other qualifying investments. A significant proportion of these proceeds will go right back into supporting the next round of entrepreneurs in early 2022.</p><p>The rest were primarily long-term capital gains, with only a small minority of “other” (short term gains, interest income, and return of capital) treatments.</p><p><strong>A bonus note</strong></p><p>Lastly, for a bonus tidbit on how our 2020 investments did in 2021. One metric early-stage investors use is TVPI — total value to paid-in capital — which compares the book value of investments (based on any later equity raises) with the amount of capital invested. The TVPI of all the investments we made in 2020 is about 1.5, which demonstrates the strong fundraising and operational momentum we are seeing in our portfolio.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cf8bc6e63c5a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Guide to RollingSouth]]></title>
            <link>https://venturesouth.medium.com/a-guide-to-rollingsouth-f2e836f6f2ef?source=rss-da0851dba58f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f2e836f6f2ef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rolling-fund]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angel-investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angellist]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[VentureSouth]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Oct 2021 13:46:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-07T13:46:40.842Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*vetdeYUgLojarle6XudyVA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here comes <a href="https://www.rollingsouth.vc/">RollingSouth</a>!</p><p><a href="https://www.rollingsouth.vc/">RollingSouth</a> is the first “Rolling Fund” affiliated with <a href="http://venturesouth.vc/">VentureSouth</a>. The fund is launching now to make investments in early-stage tech companies in the Southeast.</p><p>In this post we will cover what RollingSouth is, what it will invest in, what its differentiators are, how it is structured, what other funds are doing similar things, and how it differs from what we do every day at VentureSouth.</p><p>Hopefully by the end you will understand why you might invest, and take the leap to participating in VentureSouth’s mission to Make Money. Have Fun. Do Good.</p><p>You can <a href="https://angel.co/v/back/rolling-south">subscribe via the Apply Now button here.</a></p><p><strong>What is RollingSouth?</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.rollingsouth.vc/">RollingSouth</a> is an <a href="https://angel.co/v/back/rolling-south">AngelList Rolling Fund</a>. <a href="https://www.angellist.com/blog/rolling-venture-fund-launch">Here is a longer guide</a> to what that means, but the summary is an investment fund for investing in early stage tech companies in the Southeast.</p><p>A Rolling Fund:</p><ul><li>Can be advertised in public — which is why you can read this! The fund is being raised under “General Solicitation” rules. You can read all about <a href="https://venturesouth.medium.com/the-perils-of-general-solicitation-venturesouth-38cddc21be5e">General Solicitation here</a>.</li><li>Is subscribed to quarterly. Rather than make a big upfront commitment, investors sign up for a smaller quarterly subscription for as long as they would like.</li><li>The fund is all powered by AngelList, a premier online platform for angel investing. AngelList handles all the fund administration (paperwork, taxes, investor reporting, …).</li></ul><p>RollingSouth combines the benefits of a Rolling Fund with the proven investing processes at VentureSouth. VentureSouth is one of the leading angel groups in the US, repeatedly recognized as a top 10 angel investment group, with over 400 members that fund early-stage companies in the Southeast.</p><p><strong>What will RollingSouth invest in?</strong></p><p>RollingSouth will invest in early stage, technology-based companies in the Southeastern United States. Its investments will typically be in collaboration with VentureSouth, in companies VentureSouth members are funding, exercising pro rata rights in, or doing our diligence on.</p><p><strong>RollingSouth’s differentiators</strong></p><p>There are dozens of Rolling Funds listed on. What does <a href="http://www.rollingsouth.vc/">RollingSouth</a> offer that these other funds do not? Here are our four key differentiators.</p><p>1. Southeastern focus:</p><ul><li>Positive demographics and economic performance plus entrepreneurial dynamism give the southeast great tailwinds: there are many reasons “Techxodus” is seeing people move here.</li><li>Diversified deal flow at lower valuations than major markets, in industries the southeast specializes in.</li></ul><p>2. Aligned with the leading angel group in the region</p><ul><li>VentureSouth: a top 10 angel group in North America, with over 400 members, proven processes, a mature track record, and investment relationships with every investor in the region.</li></ul><p>3. Team</p><ul><li>Established team of experienced angel investors active in this market.</li></ul><p>4. Established track record:</p><ul><li>Over $50 million invested in 80 companies in the region, with positive ROI and cash returns.</li></ul><p>Let’s unpack each of those ideas.</p><p><strong>Differentiator 1 — the Southeast</strong></p><p>The southeast is 30% of the population and economic activity in the US, with positive demographic trends (both organic and with net inward migration from other states), and above-average rates of economic growth. It’s also a great place to live!</p><p>Yet the southeast has not historically been known for its tech scene. That is changing — dramatically. With the emergence of unicorns and mega-acquisitions in Atlanta, VCs moving <em>en masse</em> to Miami, new campuses from Apple and Google in the Raleigh/Durham area, and many more organic trends that don’t make national headlines — from innovation at Furman to unicorns in Greenville to tech communities in Charleston to … — the southeast’s tech scene is advancing rapidly.</p><p>Despite this, sources of investment for tech companies remains limited. Few VCs spend substantial time here; even fewer are based or engage much time here. Early-stage capital is becoming more available, but it remains a challenge for entrepreneurs to find local risk-tolerant investors.</p><p>As a result, investors enjoy a fairer balance of risk and reward than in some other places. Uncapped SAFEs are rare here!</p><p><strong>Differentiator 2 — angel group affiliation</strong></p><p>Rolling Funds affiliated with angel groups are unusual; most are individuals, operators, or celebrities. Why does being affiliated with an angel group, and specifically with VentureSouth, help a Rolling Fund?</p><p>Not to blow our own trumpets too much, but here are just three of the reasons why we think having <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/">VentureSouth</a> on your side is a help:</p><ul><li>Having rounds led by an experienced investment group help entrepreneurs get rounds funded on reasonable terms.</li><li>Having a lead investor with established relationships with all the local funding sources helps later fundraising; and an existing investor enthusiastic to participate in follow-on rounds helps too.</li><li>Having 400 angels on your side gives entrepreneurs a better chance of finding the connection, advice, suggestion or introduction they need.</li></ul><p>VentureSouth, a top 10 angel group in North America, with over 400 members and a professional full time team whose job and mission it is to make their investments successful, can bring much value to portfolio companies.</p><p><strong>Differentiator 3 — team</strong></p><p>Rolling Fund managers are an intimidatingly impressive roster of talented entrepreneurs, investors, and influencers. What does the RollingSouth team bring that others do not?</p><ul><li>Team: RollingSouth is led by VentureSouth — whose three-person team have worked together for 7 years — and David Grisell, a long-standing member of VentureSouth. We are not a solo-GP or a new partnership; we’re an established team.</li><li>Full time: angel investing is not our side hustle or a hobby; this is what we do, full time, every day.</li><li>Angel investing history: we are not new investors learning how to invest on your dime; we’ve been doing this for decades!</li><li>Experience in the southeastern market: we are not recent transplants developing relationships or establishing a brand in the southeast.</li></ul><p><strong>Differentiator 4 — track record</strong></p><p>As a result of working together for many years, the RollingSouth team has an established track record of angel investing.</p><p>82 companies, 190 rounds of investment, hundreds of term sheets negotiated, thousands of pitches reviewed. We have collectively deployed over $50 million, exclusively into early stage technology companies in the southeast — the target of RollingSouth.</p><p>Lots of people have deployed capital. Unlike many, though, RollingSouth’s principals have a tangible track record. 36 exited companies, 10x+ returns, 2500% IRRs, SPAC’d companies, and a consistent record of 3x TVPI funds in VentureSouth sidecar funds demonstrate investing success that have resulted in cash proceeds for investors. Book markups are nice; cash is king.</p><p><strong>How is RollingSouth structured?</strong></p><p>RollingSouth is a Rolling Fund. This explains <a href="https://www.angellist.com/blog/rolling-venture-fund-launch">how Rolling Funds work.</a></p><p>There are several things we think you should consider about RollingSouth’s structure: fees, carry, and GP commitment.</p><p>On fees, VentureSouth believes in two things: complete transparency; and keeping fees as low as we can. For the Rolling Fund:</p><ul><li>Management fee: Investment funds charge a management fee, typically this is 2% of committed capital for 10 years. Given the infrastructure RollingSouth uses at AngelList and VentureSouth, our fees are lower: 1% per year for the fund managers and 0.15% per year for AngelList.</li><li>Investment funds often charge other fees for lots of minor things. RollingSouth will not.</li></ul><p>On carry: investment funds charge a “carried interest” (a share of the net gain on the fund). RollingSouth does too: 15%. The standard is 20%: if you get all your invested capital back (including fees) back, you pay 20% of incremental gains to the fund manager. We think carry remains a good model for aligning incentives and rewarding good investors, and believe 15% is a fair share. On $50,000 at a 3x (net) returned fund, this delta is an extra $5,000 in the investor’s pocket.</p><p>On GP commitment: As Alexander Hamilton says, “When you got skin in the game, you stay in the game”. The “GP commitment” (the investment from fund managers) varies substantially across investment funds. The “market practice” is 1% of committed capital. At RollingSouth, the GP will invest at least 10% of the fund, or a minimum of $25K per quarter. Incentives are best aligned when investors have skin in the game, and we intend to have more skin in the game than most fund managers.</p><p><strong>Are other Rolling Funds doing the same thing in the Southeast?</strong></p><p>One of the questions investors often ask startups is “who else is doing what you are doing”? So it’s only fair that <a href="http://www.rollingsouth.vc/">RollingSouth</a> tackles this question too!</p><p>Since they were launched in February 2020, there have been dozens of AngelList Rolling Funds — <a href="https://www.angellist.com/rolling">many of them on here</a>. They cover an impressive range of investment theses, investing teams, geographies, and niches. A saturated market already?</p><p>We don’t believe so. Almost none operate in the Southeast; in fact, we believe there are only three based here, and none of them are focused only on investments in this region.</p><ul><li><a href="https://angel.co/v/back/anthony-pomplianos-rolling-fund?_ga=2.202844311.70081158.1631043134-1402888484.1628871797">Pomp Investments</a>: formed by Anthony Pompliano, investor, media personality and Bitcoin advocate, focused primarily on crypto-related startups, and invests nationally from Pomp’s base in NC.</li><li><a href="https://angel.co/v/back/sustainable-food-ventures?_ga=2.40913444.70081158.1631043134-1402888484.1628871797">Sustainable Food Ventures</a>: GPs Ryan and Mariliis are based in Durham, from where they invest exclusively in food-related companies nationally.</li><li><a href="https://angel.co/v/back/lab-proptech-fund?_ga=2.78717842.70081158.1631043134-1402888484.1628871797">LAB PropTech</a>: from their base in Miami, Tigre Wenrich and Rafael Valdivia invest in property technology companies, again nationally / globally.</li></ul><p>So no “direct competition” from other Southeastern-based Rolling Funds focused on the Southeast.</p><p>How about indirect competition? Looking more widely, RollingSouth competes against Rolling Funds and other early-stage investment vehicles nationally for investors. There are 16 million of households (see <a href="https://venturesouth.vc/accredited-investor-definition/">this blog post</a>) that could invest in these vehicles — plenty of market even for dozens of early-stage investment vehicles limited to 99 investors each!</p><p>Lastly, how about competition for good deals? You might think RollingSouth “competes” against Southeastern early-stage investors for access to investments here. However, if you’re familiar with the local early-stage investment scene, you know that “too many investors chasing too few deals” is NOT the biggest complaint! Silicon Valley might be overrun with investors; Silicon Harbor is not. VentureSouth, and therefore RollingSouth, collaborates with syndication partners across the region to fully fund rounds of even the most exciting companies in the region.</p><p><strong>How does RollingSouth compare to VentureSouth’s existing activities?</strong></p><p>Fundamentally RollingSouth does the same thing that VentureSouth does — invests in early stage technology companies in the Southeast. In some ways — which we explore in more detail here — Rolling Funds just angel funds with some new marketing!</p><p>RollingSouth can be raised through public marketing and <a href="https://venturesouth.medium.com/the-perils-of-general-solicitation-venturesouth-38cddc21be5e">general solicitation, explained here</a>), which is not unprecedented but is unusual. It takes new subscriptions on a “rolling basis” — so investors can dial up or down their investment depending on the fund’s execution or the investor’s liquidity. This is a flexible structure for early stage investing.</p><p>So while it’s possible to deploy small checks, flexibly, through a diverse range of situations through “traditional” angel groups and funds, small quarterly subscriptions is a nice feature of Rolling Funds.</p><p><strong>So what should I do now?</strong></p><p>Hopefully it is obvious by now that you <a href="https://angel.co/v/back/rolling-south">subscribe to RollingSouth via the Apply Now button here!</a> You should do your diligence, though, so if you have any questions please reach out. We hope you will join us in our mission to Make Money, Have Fun, Do Good.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2e836f6f2ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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