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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Verve Industrial Protection on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Ultimate Guide to Protecting OT Systems with IEC 62443]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/the-ultimate-guide-to-protecting-ot-systems-with-iec-62443-bef36f0d264d?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-controls]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-automation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jul 2021 15:57:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-16T15:57:35.229Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ol><li>What is IEC 62443?</li><li>Focus on Basics: The IEC 62443 Checklist</li><li>Taking advantage of IEC 62443’s broad applicability and inclusiveness</li><li>Examining IEC 62443 Zones, Conduits and Security Levels</li><li>The IEC 62443 aligned Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS)</li><li>Guiding risk assessment with IEC 62443</li><li>Using IEC 62443 to secure product development lifecycles</li><li>Leveraging IEC 62443 in product selection and procurement</li><li>Blending IEC 62443 with other frameworks and standards</li><li>Acknowledging IEC 62443’s cyber-physical limitations</li><li>Getting started with IEC 62443</li><li>IEC 62443-specific certifications and source material</li><li>How Verve aligns to IEC 62443</li></ol><h3>What is IEC 62443?</h3><p>While many cyber security standards enjoy success in enterprise IT environments, the ISA/IEC 62443 standards were purpose-built to address security issues unique to industrial automation and control systems (IACS) and operational technology (OT). As such, they can be an extremely valuable resource for organizations looking to strengthen defenses and corral risk in specialized industrial systems.</p><p>Unlike the more general <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-the-nist-cybersecurity-framework/">NIST Cybersecurity Framework</a> (CSF) or ISO 2700x guidelines, ISA/IEC 62443 (IEC 62443, for short) provides a series of requirements and methods to manage security challenges in IACS and industrial environments. Such challenges include:</p><ul><li>The relative criticality of data confidentiality in facilities operations or functions.</li><li>Potential dangers to personnel, the environment, and society in the event of cyber-physical failures.</li><li>The increased need for compensating controls to protect legacy IACS/OT systems.</li><li>The relative difficulty of applying common IT security techniques without severe systems modifications.</li><li>Prospects for financial loss due to an incident-related drop in productivity.</li><li>Unique approaches to ensuring systems reliability and integrity in industrial environments.</li></ul><p>Originally developed by the International Society of Automation (ISA) ISA 99 standards committee and adopted by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), These non-regulated standards are consensus-based. The standards body regularly consults IACS security experts were to maintain relevant guidance that applies to all industry sectors and critical infrastructure.</p><p>The result is a family of documents that illustrates a defense-in-depth model via “zones” and “conduits,” describes how to build a cybersecurity management system (CSMS), and offers instruction for performing risk assessments in IACS/OT environments. The IEC 62443 helps organizations define IACS security maturity and posture and offers selection criteria security products, programs and service providers. IEC 62443’s core guidance is also routinely supplemented with technical reports covering specific technological situations and solutions.</p><p>The IEC 62443 documents are structured into a multi-tier grouping of four layers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*axVz3pmplcQkpv-0.png" /></figure><p>The four logical groupings and their associated contents include:</p><ul><li><strong>General:</strong> Introductory information, vocabularies, concepts, and example use cases.</li><li><strong>Policies and Procedures: </strong>Program requirements, patching, implementation guidance, etc.</li><li><strong>System:</strong> Assessment approaches, security requirements levels and technologies.</li><li><strong>Component:</strong> Product lifecycle and technical requirements for components used within a system.</li></ul><p>The ISA/IEC 62443 standards do not directly supersede nor replace the ISA95 and Purdue models. Instead, they leverage previous concepts, and divide security and management of cyber risk into several areas. These cover not only cyber security reference architectures, but also guidance for security processes, requirements, technology, controls, security acceptance/factory testing, product development, security lifecycles, and a cybersecurity management system (CSMS).</p><p>The 62443 standards reach beyond ISA95 in terms of coverage, cybersecurity and modern concepts, but ISA95 and the Purdue models may still have value for organizations that have specific security requirements, for example when Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices are connected directly to the Internet or the cloud.</p><h3>Focus on Basics: The IEC 62443 Checklist</h3><p>IEC 62443 was purpose-built to guide the development of IACS components to be secure-by-design and to be governed by an OT/IACS-centric security management system that has policies, procedures, periodic review, specific requirements and instill best practices. However, its hefty, comprehensive collection contains many documents and a trove of information that can be intimidating to new users. To get started, focus on these core document:</p><p><strong>ISA/IEC 62443–1–1: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems Part 1–1: Terminology, Concepts, and Models</strong></p><p>Defines IACS as a “collection of processes, personnel, hardware, and software that can affect or influence the safe, secure and reliable operation of an industrial process.” This document establishes the fundamental taxonomy and basic concepts for the standards collection at large and should be read first before diving into the other standards components.</p><p><strong>ISA/IEC 62443–2–4: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems — Part 2–4: Security Program Requirements for IACS Service Providers</strong></p><p>Specifies a comprehensive set of requirements covering IACS service providers that can be used during integration and maintenance activities. It also provides the basis for a larger IEC 62443 initiative to develop “profiles” that address the nuances and realities in different industrial environments, for example, the unique requirements of oil and gas producers versus those of electricity generation and distribution.</p><p><strong>ISA/IEC 62443–4–2: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Technical Security Requirements for IACS Components</strong></p><p>Provides the cybersecurity technical requirements for components that make up an IACS, specifically the embedded devices, network components, host components, and software applications. The standard sets forth security capabilities that enable a component to mitigate threats for a given security level without the assistance of compensating countermeasures.</p><p><strong>ISA/IEC 62443–4–1: Product Security Development Life-Cycle Requirements</strong></p><p>Specifies process requirements for the secure development of products used in an IACS and defines a secure development lifecycle for developing and maintaining secure products. The lifecycle includes security requirements definition, secure design, secure implementation (including coding guidelines), verification and validation, defect management, patch management, and product end-of-life.</p><p>These requirements can be applied to new or existing processes for developing, maintaining, and retiring hardware, software, or firmware. Mostly aimed at developers and vendors, the ISA-62443–4–1 lifecycle requirements can also apply to integrators handling systems creation, implementation, and maintenance.</p><p><strong>ISA/IEC 62443–3–2: Security Risk Assessment, System Partitioning, and Security Levels</strong></p><p>Based on the understanding that IACS security is a matter of risk management. IACS customizes risk to an organization depending on the relevant threat, risk exposure, the likelihood of an event, inherent vulnerabilities, and consequences of compromise. Each organization that owns and operates an IACS has its own tolerance for risk, and organizations are required to provide inputs used to assess the risk of a particular IACS. Based on those inputs, ISA/IEC 62443–3–2 can help when engineering a solution by guiding the identification/application of security countermeasures to reduce that risk to tolerable levels with respect to defined security levels, zones, conduits, and other security fundamentals.</p><p><strong>ISA/IEC 62443–3–3: System Security Requirements and Security Levels</strong></p><p>Defines the security assurance levels of the IACS components. Security levels define the cybersecurity functions embedded in the products to be used in industrial and critical infrastructure environments; they are crucial to achieve product robustness and add resistance to accidental or malicious cyber threats.</p><p>Reviewing the relevant standards based on needs, then diving into appropriate specifics is a solid approach for organizations readying an IEC 62443-orientated security program.</p><h3>Taking advantage of IEC 62443’s broad applicability and inclusiveness</h3><p>IEC 62443 is growing in popularity and many countries are adopting the collection in what is rapidly becoming a global set of standards. These guidelines specifically target ICS/IACS/OT security and feature a wealth of knowledge focused on action items such as:</p><ul><li><strong>Performing OT cyber risk assessments</strong></li><li><strong>Building OT cyber security management teams</strong></li><li><strong>Driving patching and other protective controls/capabilities</strong></li><li><strong>Framing requirements in both solutions and products</strong></li><li><strong>Considering asset and system security lifecycle</strong></li><li><strong>Isolating, segmenting, and securing network zones and conduits</strong></li><li><strong>Deriving processes and governance</strong></li><li><strong>Creating appropriate roles and responsibilities for users or resources</strong></li><li><strong>Evaluating cyber risk reduction factors (CRRFs)</strong></li></ul><p>The standards provide excellent, centralized knowledge to supplement existing guidance, create net new programs, and define security conversations. They also deliver a turnkey resource that can be used unaltered for a foundational OT program. The IEC 62443 standards are regularly updated, modified, and expanded and all are welcome to join the community or serve on its various subcommittees.</p><p>Organizations looking to tackle cyber security in the ISA or engineering-centric way can make good use of IEC 62443 standards in whole or in part based on their current and future needs. Vendors, product owners, IT professionals, engineers, risk management analysts, and security professionals will all find substantial value in IEC 62443, even if only as a secondary information source</p><h3>Examining IEC 62443 Zones, Conduits and Security Levels</h3><p>In addition to overall ICS-specific security guidance, IEC 62443 is built on core concepts of identifying systems under consideration (SuCs), security levels (SLs), and so-called “zones”, and “conduits.” It is this taxonomy that helps ICS/OT security professionals assess, design, and implement cybersecurity architectures and solutions as well as manage cyber-related risk through traditional FMEA, HAZOP, and LOPA study inputs.</p><p>To begin, asset owners select a system under consideration (SuC) and use pre-defined SLs to describe the desired target security levels (SL-Ts), achieved levels (SL-As), and capability levels (SL-Cs) for the SuC or for subsystems within it.</p><p>Four levels are assigned to evaluate the SL-A, SL-C and SL-T vectors :</p><ul><li><strong>SL 4</strong>: Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills, and high motivation</li><li><strong>SL 3</strong>: Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills, and moderate motivation</li><li><strong>SL 2:</strong> Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills, and low motivation</li><li><strong>SL 1:</strong> Protection against casual or coincidental violation</li></ul><p>Asset owners can apply these levels in various ways assuming that the SuC was also separated into “zones” and “conduits” which are defined as:</p><ul><li><strong>Zones</strong>: A grouping of logical or physical assets that share common security requirements based on factors such as criticality and consequence.</li><li><strong>Conduits:</strong> Groupings of assets dedicated exclusively to communications and which share the same security requirements. Conduits can also be used to describe tunnels communicating between zones.</li></ul><p>This taxonomy allows architects, engineers, and security professionals to describe desired risk levels and mechanisms required to achieve specific security objectives or cyber risk reduction factors (CRRFs).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*zGavXyx7pQWSU3kV.png" /><figcaption>While there are similarities to ISA 95 layers, the overlap is mostly just an homage to IEC 62443’s predecessor. What matters is that IEC 62443 standards demonstrate solid guidance asset owners can use as a basis for building a comprehensive OT/IACS program, and to standardize their security taxonomy, design elements, and requirements.</figcaption></figure><h3>The IEC 62443 aligned Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS)</h3><p>In keeping with language similar to that of ISO 27001, the IEC 62443 standards lay out a comprehensive process for creating an OT/IACS/ICS security program, also known as a cybersecurity management system, or CSMS. A CSMS is categorized into three areas: risk analysis; addressing risk; and monitoring and improving the CSMS itself.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nyxPEgw4gWgZ43_L.png" /></figure><p>Inside each of the top levels reside elements to define: business rationales; risk identification; classification and assessment; policy, organization and awareness; countermeasures; program implementation; conformance; and performance review.</p><p>For example, an excerpt from the distilled IEC 62443–4–2 CSMS requirements under risk analysis lists numerous requirement areas and values associated with measuring an organization’s conformance to them. IEC 62443 does not define the conformance values per se, but most organizations tend to use a CMMI rating, or some other, less formal alternative such as FULLY, PARTIALLY, MINIMAL, NONE, and N/A.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*0f1-zYRhOJ7KaI6R.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Example ISA62443 CSMS requirements matrix subsection</figcaption></figure><p>Overall, there are approximately 127 requirements in the IEC 62443 CSMS standard document, and not all of those need to be met immediately. Some of the requirement areas lean heavily on policy writing, for example, or require advanced implementation efforts and organizational commitment. Other examples targeted at more mature IEC 62443 CSMS users include:</p><ul><li>2.3.12 Conduit risk assessments throughout the lifecycle of the IACS.</li><li>3.2.3.2 Establish the security organization(s).</li><li>3.2.5.3 Develop and implement business continuity plans.</li><li>3.3.2.4 Address security responsibilities.</li><li>3.4.3.1 Define and test security functions and capabilities.</li></ul><p>Security is both a sprint and a marathon. Organizations need budget, commitment, resourcing, road mapping, and strategic initiatives in order to achieve an appropriate level of maturity and desired security posture. The IEC 62443 CSMS covers most foundational areas ranging from assessing risk, resourcing, policies, procedures, technology, and the monitoring and evolution of the CSMS.</p><h3>Guiding risk assessment with IEC 62443</h3><p>IEC 62443 assessments follow a well-defined process once SuC is determined. Following the process outlined in ISA-62443–3–2 — or creating a version modeled after it but specific to the organization or client — offers an effective way to discover, derive risks, and determine recommendations or work packages for controlling risk levels.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Y_XSHX61xqaMNZT1.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Image based on workflow diagrams in IEC 62443–3–2 Security for IACS</figcaption></figure><p>Assuming there are competent assessors, the IEC 62443 process for performing an OT security risk assessment (SRAs) is well thought out, can leverage past assessments (e.g., gap assessments, cyber maturity reviews, PHAZOPs, LOPA reviews, etc.), and can be performed consistently and repeatably. It can be high level (see blue process) or detailed (see orange process), or some combination of the two.</p><p>However, academic or paper-based assessments are only as good as:</p><h3>Using IEC 62443 to secure product development lifecycles</h3><p>IEC 62443 standards provide a high-level set of prescriptive requirements and processes for secure product development lifecycles (SDLCs) fit for IACS/ICS/OT environments. They are, however, less detailed than, for example, a NIST special publication (SP) that enumerates a number of technical capabilities and best practices for user or encryption management.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/0*lzNCJy0-E5UDMDal.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: FRs vs. Res — The 7 areas broken down and can have different sub-requirements called Requirement Enhancements (Res).</figcaption></figure><p>Despite that shortcoming, IEC 62443–3–3 defines the security Foundational Requirements (FRs) and includes processes for user authentication, enforcement of roles and responsibilities, change management, encryption, network segmentation, audit logs, and system backup and recovery. Using IEC 62443–4–2 as a CSMS delivers another full list of sub-requirements, all of which are grouped by the IEC 62443–3–3’s seven FR areas.</p><p>During product development, however, hitting a specific security level target (SLT) involves meeting and designing for a specific set of requirements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*qJXN-Xwx6CExdeZ4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Example requirements for FR1 courtesy of ISAsecure <a href="https://www.isasecure.org/en-US/Documents/Articles-and-Technical-Papers/2018-IEC-62443-and-ISASecure-Overview_Suppliers-Pe[/caption]">https://www.isasecure.org/en-US/Documents/Articles-and-Technical-Papers/2018-IEC-62443-and-ISASecure-Overview_Suppliers-Pe</a></figcaption></figure><p>Creating a secure product demands more than simple checkbox ticking, however. Product vendors must take action on desired sets of requirements as well as implement a multi-phase development lifecycle.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*A7S4aDcdXNp0RWPK.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Phases courtesy of ISAsecure <a href="https://www.isasecure.org/en-US/Documents/Articles-and-Technical-Papers/2018-IEC-62443-and-ISASecure-Overview_Suppliers-Pe[/caption]">https://www.isasecure.org/en-US/Documents/Articles-and-Technical-Papers/2018-IEC-62443-and-ISASecure-Overview_Suppliers-Pe</a></figcaption></figure><p>The majority of a product’s lifecycle is spent in the design, develop, verify, release, deploy, and respond phases. There’s a good reason for this.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fdSSOiBPJXpKMVcT.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Most developments organizational process for creating products</figcaption></figure><p>Industrial products are developed like most other technology wares. However, the majority of an industrial product’s lifetime is not spent in development, but rather in maintenance, updating, and bug fixing. The post-release period is poorly accounted for in terms of tracking costs or efforts, but remains critical for maintaining a robust, durable, secure-by-design systems.</p><p>Many vendors and OEMs think of a product as a one-time endeavor to create products according to the requirements defined by sales or by implementations. This mindset, and the myth that security adds costs, results in insecure-by-design products. In fact, security does not cost more, and does not necessarily add time or complexity to deployment and use. The majority of vulnerabilities in ICS/OT devices or applications are the result of poor engineering, lack of comprehensive testing, and mediocre component maintenance.</p><p>IEC 62443 standards outline processes and requirements to securely design and develop products, define basic security requirements, detail better coding practices, and describe risk-aware deployments. Organizations already performing or implementing SDLC functions can use IEC 62443 to augment current practices.</p><h3>Leveraging IEC 62443 in product selection and procurement</h3><p>Like most standards and frameworks, IEC 62443 offers guidance to improve existing processes for technology project scoping, vendor selection and procurement.</p><p>For example, an organization that wants to create a machine cell for a new process with a minimum level of security (e.g., SLT-1) to prevent accidental issues can reference the requirements in ISA-62443–3–3 and other sibling documents to develop pre-selection criteria and achieve its objective. The standards can also be used to dictate how factory and site acceptance testing includes security verification before handoff.</p><p>While there are numerous requirements for each security level, an informed individual or team can create a subset of requirements and map the standard to a minimum set of viable guidelines for re-use across the organization.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*pL5wGNt653MQsvnX.png" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Example subset of the IEC 62443 requirements</figcaption></figure><p>Meeting and validating the requirements before the design phases reduces the security burden and lowers the total cost of ownership (TCO) over the system’s lifetime.</p><h3>Blending IEC 62443 with other frameworks and standards</h3><p>IEC 62443 standards are fully compatible and mostly map directly with other well-known guidance such as the NIST CSF. There can be, however, substantial differences in language and application that require the use of OT-specific overlays and adaptation of IT variations in order to manage exceptions in a converged OT/IT environment. Getting the best of both worlds requires organizations to get a little creative.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*EkXbh4dY1azomsfZ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Comparing standards and guidance to IEC 62443.</figcaption></figure><p>In the enterprise, for example, the common ISA27001 standard is highly prescriptive as a security system and orientated towards processes and IT. Meanwhile, the NIST CSF and its OT supplement (NIST-SP800–82) can be made OT acceptable across its five functional areas. Any standard that works for the organization is better than no standard or direction, and that these can be made to work for OT depending on audience, business culture, engineering strategies, and industry.</p><h3>Acknowledging IEC 62443’s cyber-physical limitations</h3><p>IEC 62443 makes excellent companion for the security of cyber-physical systems, but they are not designed to replace ISA84/SIL or PHAZOPS. Where some of the SIL and relevant ISA standards are lack specific language or guidance for electronic/networked/computerized systems, IEC 62443 makes an ideal complement.</p><p>IEC 62443 cannot be used in place of extensive safety and reliability standards or proper PHAZOP study, however. All should all be used together to identify risks and potential impact to ensure the organization stays running and avoids a negative Health-Safety-Environment (HSE) event.</p><h3>Getting started with IEC 62443</h3><p>At the outset, IEC 62443 should be viewed less as a replacement for current security schemas and more as a way to identify gaps, needs, and potential enhancements to existing programs. It is also useful for taking into account the security impact of digitalization on traditional, mechanical processes and protocols covering areas such as disaster recovery.</p><p>One approach might include:</p><ul><li>Identifying security gaps and reviewing findings from previous risk assessments</li><li>Prioritizing problem areas by cost, efforts, relevancy and potential risk reduction</li><li>Determining the correct IEC 62443 requirements or work packages needed</li><li>Completing relevant work packages and verifying they’re operationalized</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*E9TrYGKbXi99N7bL.png" /><figcaption>Figure 10: examples of where the IEC 62443 could be of help to an asset owner</figcaption></figure><p>From another perspective, organizations already leveraging NIST CSF-style framework in place might use IEC 62443 standards to:</p><ul><li>Establish an IT-to-OT mappable security program, ensuring correct terminology is used and ICS concerns are covered</li><li>Define security requirements for new product procurement and their factory/site acceptance testing</li><li>Validate current policies and processes for sufficient OT security and domain relevancy</li><li>Provide guidance when selecting firewalls and creating patch management regimes for OT/ICS systems</li><li>Create an OT/IACS risk management and assessment process</li></ul><p>There are many ways to map/implement the standards conveniently but also to establish the security language required to speak amongst the communities within your organization, or at large!</p><h3>IEC 62443-specific certifications and source material</h3><p>As with other standards such as ISO 27001, individuals and organizations can take advantage of certifications purpose-built for IEC 62443, including:</p><ul><li><strong>Individuals</strong> can take one or all of ISA’s four exams to be certified on the standards collection’s core concepts covering fundamentals, risk assessment, design and maintenance. Completing all four earns the taker a designation of ISA/IEC Cybersecurity Expert</li><li><strong>Vendors</strong> can certify their products as IEC 62443 compliant for various security levels</li><li><strong>Asset owners</strong> can certify their sites or systems with respect to the IEC 62443 standards</li></ul><p>More information on all of the IEC 62443 certification options is available on the ISA website; the standards are also free for online viewing for ISA members.</p><h3>How Verve aligns to IEC 62443</h3><p>Verve was built on a foundation of OT knowledge from their 30 years of history working in the process control/OT environment. This expertise ensures that both our dedicated services and the Verve platform are safe to operate with all brands of OEM equipment, allowing us to help nearly any OT/ICS organization achieve higher levels of security even within proprietary, embedded controls devices.</p><p>Verve’s asset management, detection, compliance, and protection capabilities create an informational hub that can inform you on the potential risk and assessment activities within your organization. Within one platform, effective in both IT and OT environments, we can determine whether your organization uses NIST CSF, IEC 62443, or CSC20 (now rebranded as the CSC18) — the Verve platform can suit your organization’s needs.</p><p>With our deep OT knowledge along with the comprehensive platform, Verve provides a range of benefits over alternative solutions and cybersecurity services organizations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*6rwKJBWGFFmb0a6x.png" /><figcaption>Verve Security Services: Turnkey compliance and security for industrial environments</figcaption></figure><p>To be fair though, one of the biggest challenges in complying with security requirements for industrial organizations is the labor and knowledge shortages both within the organizations as well as in the market. Tools are critical, but people are necessary to achieve ongoing compliance. Verve recognizes this which allows us to combine our unique platform with a range of options for enabling clients to assess, remediate and maintain compliance with security standards.</p><p>Verve offers a range of managed services designed specifically for operational environments for clients who are budget conscious. Starting with our subscription services, we provide low-cost, high-value services from our highly skilled team. Our ability to watch all third-party and vendor-related apps allows for sharing of research across our clients, thus distributing the cost across a fleet of clients.</p><p>We also offer ‘boots on the ground’ services to help backup, test, rollout, and restore systems when performing tasks such as patching, updates, and assessments (including mandates that are IEC 62443 based). These services can be scheduled or ad-hoc service as needed. Finally, Verve provides 24/7 emergency technical support and accessibility. In all cases, Verve delivers the ‘best of the best’ skillsets to benefit your organization.</p><p>The following table breaks down our managed services capabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/942/0*MbMvuKA5hFaZuTIJ.png" /></figure><p>Verve is pleased to support industrial organizations in securing our critical infrastructure against attacks. We look forward to the opportunity to share more about our platform and services with you.</p><p><strong>Ron Brash, Director of Cyber Security Insights</strong></p><p><em>This article was originally published at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/the-ultimate-guide-to-protecting-ot-systems-with-iec-62443/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/the-ultimate-guide-to-protecting-ot-systems-with-iec-62443/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bef36f0d264d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TSA Pipeline Cyber Security Directive is a Strong First Step]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/tsa-pipeline-cyber-security-directive-is-a-strong-first-step-7ac40a2a215c?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7ac40a2a215c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[homeland-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2021 21:30:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-17T21:30:48.913Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Following the ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline, DHS and CISA have released a new Security Directive for critical pipeline operators. More are likely to follow.</p><p>On May 27th, the United States Department of Homeland Security <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/05/27/dhs-announces-new-cybersecurity-requirements-critical-pipeline-owners-and-operators">announced its initial regulatory response</a> to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57050690">Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack</a>. As the Security Directive highlighted, this is only the first step in what is likely to be a much more robust set of regulatory changes to improve the cyber security of the nation’s critical pipeline infrastructure.</p><p>This first directive has significant implications for pipeline operators. Not only does it require disclosure and reporting of incidents, but importantly makes what was a set of voluntary cyber security measures mandatory and auditable. This begins what will likely become a more rigorous compliance regime for pipeline operators.</p><h3>What is in the May 27th Security Directive?</h3><p>DHS and CISA released the Pipeline Security Directive. “The cybersecurity landscape is constantly evolving and we must adapt to address new and emerging threats,” said Secretary of Homeland Security <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/person/alejandro-mayorkas">Alejandro N. Mayorkas</a>. “The recent ransomware attack on a major petroleum pipeline demonstrates that the cybersecurity of pipeline systems is critical to our homeland security. DHS will continue to work closely with our private sector partners to support their operations and increase the resilience of our nation’s critical infrastructure.”</p><p>The order has three components.</p><h4>1. Report confirmed and potential cybersecurity incidents to the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)</h4><p>This requires that pipeline companies build an incident response capability, which is included in the recommended cyber security elements of the original DHS may 2018 security release. This order adds the requirement to share any cyber incidents with CISA</p><h4>2. Designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator to be available 24X7</h4><h4>3. Review current cybersecurity practices and identify any gaps as well as related remediation measures and report those to TSA within 30 days</h4><p>This final directive relates back to the March 2018 (updated in April 2021) Pipeline Security Guidelines — which were only recommendations. This directive implies they will now become mandatory. This is likely the most significant part of the order as it begins a regime of more compliance requirements. These recommendations are a relatively comprehensive list of security controls and will likely require significant effort for many pipeline operators to achieve.</p><p>Perhaps most importantly, the directive makes clear that this is the first step in what is likely to be a more extensive set of requirements over the coming months.</p><h3>How to review the current pipeline cybersecurity practices?</h3><p>As mentioned, TSA released a set of security guidelines in 2018 and then updated in April of this year. These guidelines will form the basis of any review for pipeline operator. So, the first question is: what are the cyber security controls included in the current TSA pipeline recommendations?</p><p>TSA constructs its recommendations into the same categories as the <a href="https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework">NIST Cybersecurity Framework</a> of Identify-Protect-Detect-Respond-Recover. TSA then narrowed the traditional NIST components to a more targeted set of controls that are relevant for converged cyber-physical systems such as pipelines. We won’t try to speculate here and now as to how this list may expand in any future regulatory orders. The current list of controls will already be a challenge for many pipelines to achieve efficiently and effectively.</p><p>The list of controls is included below. As can be seen, they include both procedural and technical requirements. They do not distinguish between IT and OT systems. But the implication is that the guidelines should apply to both, with any necessary adjustments for the OT environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/984/1*NyY_hDXZho-XeTGbA_qDEw.png" /></figure><p>The first step against this is to conduct an assessment against these guidelines. Our experience is the best means for this is a technology-enabled assessment that allows the operator to get visibility into the actual assets, networks and information of the environment. This approach can be accomplished quickly, but importantly provides not only the gaps and roadmap but also the capability to begin remediation immediately rather than to wait for several months to implement tools and technology to remediate. (For more info, please see our <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Vulnerability-Assessment-data-sheet-Verve-Industrial-1.pdf">Tech-enabled vulnerability assessment document</a> )</p><h3>Steps to achieve pipeline security compliance with the DHS recommendations.</h3><p>Beyond the assessment, the question becomes how to make progress in overall security maturity. Many operators have not taken programmatic cyber security measures over the past 3 years since the original recommendations came out. Others have taken some steps such as segmenting IT from OT or implementing intrusion detection and/or creating employee cyber security awareness programs. Few will have a comprehensive approach to the controls listed above. Therefore, how should operators go about addressing compliance with these new requirements?</p><h4>1. Begin at the beginning with a robust asset inventory.</h4><p>All of the controls included in the list are grounded in the <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ot-ics-asset-inventory-and-why-is-it-the-foundation-of-a-cyber-security-program/">foundation of a robust asset inventory</a>. That inventory is much more than knowing what hardware devices are on your network. It becomes the source of truth for a large portion of the rest of the requirements: software inventory, patch status, status of antivirus signatures, configuration settings and compliance with secure settings, etc. One of the things we often here from potential clients when we first talk with them is that they use a network monitoring tool to get asset visibility. However, the “visibility” gained doesn’t provide the depth of inventory of software, users, accounts, patch status, etc required by these compliance standards.</p><h4>2. Think Global-Act Local.</h4><p>Compliance with the DHS controls is only partially a “security” challenge. For the most part, it is an operational or labor challenge. When asked for the biggest barrier to <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/in-the-age-of-ransomware-cfos-need-to-re-assess-their-cyber-physical-security-risk/">securing cyber physical systems</a>, IT and OT leaders list availability of talent as the number one challenge — significantly more than budgets or technology or any other barrier. We have been helping customers with compliance for NERC CIP or other controls regimes for almost 15 years. Efficiency of approach separates the successful ones from the less successful.</p><p>To achieve these controls, therefore, requires an approach we call “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBOwqEjtc2A">think global-act local</a>”. This approach centralizes the key data, analysis and reporting across all assets and all security controls in a single enterprise database. This is necessary given the limited number of security knowledgeable resources within organizations. But these controls don’t only call for information and monitoring. They require actions such as patching, user and account management, configuration hardening, etc. These actions, in sensitive OT environments, can cause operational disruptions. Therefore, the approach must enable “act local” when security actions need to be taken. This requires personnel that understand the process and it’s sensitivities to be certain actions are executed in alignment with process. This “think global-act local” approach enables efficiency and operational resilience required in cyber physical systems.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/946/1*6vwNESYSDSUGZMnefuJ13g.png" /></figure><h4>3. Focus on OT Systems Management skill development</h4><p>Still one of the questions we are asked most often is “where do we find the right people for IT-OT cyber security? “ It is critical not to be distracted by the “shiny object” of fancy cyber security “artificial intelligence“, “machine learning” and/or the fancy names used by cyber security researchers like “fancy bear” and “xenotime” etc. The key to achieving improved security maturity and compliance with the controls is <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ot-systems-management-why-is-it-critical-to-ics-security/">OT systems management</a> (OTSM). OTSM is a set of practices similar to those on the IT side. Patch management, vulnerability management, configuration management, user and account management, etc. In fact, according to the Cyberseek database from NIST, over 75% of the jobs in cyber security are systems management jobs, rather than fancy advanced analytics or threat hunting. The good news is these skills are more available AND they can be developed more easily within an operational organization. Furthermore, these skills can be automated more effectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*oQbflFaGA3vjG_YCzTgYLA.png" /></figure><h4>4. Automate, Automate, Automate</h4><p>Per the above, many of these tasks can be automated. To achieve maturity with these controls efficiently will require automation. Tools (such as Verve or others) can enable these security tasks to be automated. Practically no organization can afford to achieve security requirements manually.</p><h3>How does Verve help increase pipeline security?</h3><p>Verve has been working with pipeline operational technology for over a quarter-century. We have developed solutions, combining our unique security management software platform along with expert Verve design-for-defense solutions. Verve provides a comprehensive solution to support our clients leveraging our almost 30 years of operations controls experience. Our team can help provide assessments of the requirements to determine the gaps present as well as develop the appropriate roadmap to close these gaps. We leverage the Verve Security Center which gathers a comprehensive “360-degree” risk score that includes all of the elements of the TSA guidelines. Therefore, the assessment enables a single view and reporting of status and gaps. Most importantly, however, the Verve platform enables operators to immediately pivot from that assessment to remediating actions, instead of a long gap between assess and remediate. Verve enables a “closed-loop” approach to demonstrate maturity improvement within 30 days.</p><p>The <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/verve-security-center/">Verve Security Center platform</a> brings together these security elements into a single platform to drive management efficiency. If an organization has invested in prior tools, Verve integrates with dozens of tools to provide a single pane of glass for analysis and reporting.</p><p>As stated above. This all starts with the foundation of a robust inventory, but from there Verve enables all of the other security requirements.</p><h4>Verve Security Management Platform</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*g5dvMOqL39CtjEYHBYfoXA.png" /></figure><p>As importantly, Verve enables closed-loop actions to reduce the mean time-to-remediation of <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/in-the-age-of-ransomware-cfos-need-to-re-assess-their-cyber-physical-security-risk/">security risks</a>, accelerating time-to-compliance but also making the whole process more efficient.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QW_pAQkq-NZiq7OIPl_htw.png" /></figure><p>The Verve platform provides a range of advantages for addressing the IT-OT security risks in pipeline networks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*G51z26I6Rw1ZUIgoQ7hZ3g.png" /></figure><h3>What’s next for Cyber Security and Pipeline Operators</h3><p>May 27th 2021 marked the beginning of what will be a significantly greater regulatory regime for pipeline operators. The initial set of recommendations that are now requirements will require a new approach from many pipeline operators to achieve. Verve stands ready to help our nation’s infrastructure operators increase their cyber security maturity and readiness with our combination of software and services.</p><p>John Livingston</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/tsa-pipeline-cyber-security-directive-is-a-strong-first-step/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/tsa-pipeline-cyber-security-directive-is-a-strong-first-step/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7ac40a2a215c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Prevent Ransomware in 2021]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/how-to-prevent-ransomware-in-2021-ef2887582dfb?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef2887582dfb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonial-pipeline]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2021 21:18:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-17T21:18:27.177Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reduce the risk of a ransomware attack with these proven tips for preventing and protecting against OT/ICS ransomware.</p><p>Between May 6 and May 12, 2021, Colonial Pipeline, owner of 5,500 miles of pipeline carrying natural gas, gasoline, and diesel from Texas to New Jersey, shut down its operations in response to what it said was a ransomware attack targeting its IT network. In a media statement, Colonial officials indicated the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/us/politics/pipeline-hack.html">damage was limited to their IT systems</a>, but that the company “proactively took certain systems offline to contain the threat.”</p><p>That response, which included disabling select OT/ICS systems, “temporarily halted all pipeline operations … which we are actively in the process of restoring.” The company added that its operational technology (OT) systems were fine, and the shutdown was a measured response to enable quick recovery. Without such an abundance of caution, the IT malware might have proven much more disruptive thanks to the interconnectedness of pipeline infrastructure and participants upstream/downstream (e.g., custody transfers, shared remote metering, available storage/capacity, etc.).</p><p>Since the Colonial incident, several other major ransomware attacks on operating entities have been reported: <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/massachusetts-ferry-service-slowed-by-ransomware-attack-11622655610">Martha’s Vineyard Ferry Service</a>, <a href="https://news-block.com/fujifilm-shuts-down-network-after-suspected-ransomware-attack/">FUJIFILM</a>, and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/jbs-meat-plants-face-slow-restart-after-cyberattack-11622633982?mod=article_inline">JBS meat company who</a> supplies 40% of all the US meat supply. This comes on the heels of several other large public ransomware events at the second-largest paper company, Westrock, Molson Coors, and others just this year.</p><p>The reality is that industrial organizations are now in the crosshairs of the ransomware gangs as the impacts from lost availability is in the millions of dollars, so the ransom demands can be quite high. A recent report by Digital Shadows found that industrial goods and services was the number one most targeted industry in 2020 at 29% the number of attacks was more than those on the next 3 industries (retail, construction, and technology) <a href="https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/ransomware-analyzing-the-data-from-2020/">combined</a>.</p><h3>What is Ransomware?</h3><p>Ransomware is a form of virus or more commonly called malware. Essentially the bad guys find a way in (phishing, social engineering, etc) to first invade the target network. Their ‘software’ then runs around the network (traversing network shares, local drives, etc) encrypting everything it finds with a key that only the bad guys know. If you want to unlock your files you have to pay the bad guy to give you the key. The costs to get the key and decrypt files can range from hundreds to thousands or even millions of dollars depending on the specifics of the attacker and victim.</p><h3>Why is Ransomware used and what are the potential impacts?</h3><p>Ransomware has roots in the scam and extortion criminal world, but by nature, it can also be used to target larger asset owners and organizations or to mask other activities that might be more devious.</p><p>Let’s first look at why ransomware is becoming such a challenge for industrial organizations today:</p><ul><li><strong>Ransomware takes advantage of “availability” risks and is highly profitable in industrial organizations. </strong>The business of cyber theft of personal information used to be quite profitable, but prices for that information have fallen dramatically as supply has increased. So cyber criminals have found new business models. They have shifted from the “C” in the Confidentiality -Integrity-Availability triad to the “A”. And industrial organizations require availability to operate, so the payment is usually quick and large.</li><li>In most cases, insurance covers a significant portion of the cost of the ransom and recovery. As a result, with current policies in place, the payment process is greased by the presence of insurance. This, however, is changing as insurers start to change policies going forward as seen in AXA’s recent announcement to stop coverage for ransomware payments.</li><li><strong>Even IT attacks can shut down OT operations. </strong>Why is this so? First, OT systems are usually highly susceptible to ransomware if it gets to those systems. So, the first step in any incident response plan is to stop the spread by disconnecting OT systems. While IT systems are costly to restore, OT systems may be 3–4X as costly and may take much longer. Hence the “ abundance of caution” we always read about. Second, we in many cases operations does not solely rely on “OT” systems, but “IT” systems such as billing or supply chain software are now necessary to operate effectively. Thus, shutting down key IT systems can essentially require an OT shut down as well.</li><li><strong>Why is OT so susceptible?</strong></li><li><strong>Most ransomware takes advantage of older vulnerabilities that have been left unpatched</strong>. In OT we know there are a huge number of both exploits and unpatched systems</li><li><strong>Ransomware often exploits network</strong>-<strong>based insecurities to gain access (eg, through RDP) but spreads from endpoint to endpoint.</strong> Compensating controls, system hardening, vulnerability management and other techniques such as network isolation all play a critical role in reducing the impact and spread of a virus attack.</li><li><strong>Ransomware is often very effective because many organizations are insufficiently equipped to recognize</strong> <strong>(avoid) potential incidents (phishing?) L</strong>arge numbers of legacy, unpatched assets often poorly monitored and supervised by a handful of non-cyber security personnel is a recipe for disaster.</li></ul><p>To put the cycle into perspective the diagram below illustrates the typical path ransomware takes to get into a facility:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LN4lYwteiemn5TZE34PNDw.png" /></figure><h3>What happened to Colonial specifically?</h3><p>According to published reports, part of Colonial’s immediate reaction to the attack late Friday was to enlist the services of incident response specialist FireEye. Those investigators have since attributed the attack to a prolific Russian criminal ransomware group known as DarkSide, a crew credited with around 40 similar attacks with ransom demands ranging from $200,000 to more than $2 million.</p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html">DarkSide has claimed</a> its attacks feature a professional “experience,” focusing on providing “quality products” to its consumers. The hacker crew claims it will only attack those who have the means to pay, or who are known to have cybersecurity insurance. The group also has been known to employ a double extortion methodology — getting victims to pay for unencrypting their data or, failing that, blackmailing them with the threat of public release of data exfiltrated as part of the crime.</p><p>By Monday, the DarkSide attackers expressed contrition for the Colonial Pipeline attack. Perhaps in response to the international publicity and the focused governmental and law enforcement efforts spun up in the wake of the incident, the hackers took to their dark website to say they never intended to disrupt public utilities.</p><p>“We are apolitical,” the hackers wrote. “We do not participate in geopolitics, do not need to tie us with a defined government and look for other our motives. Our goal is to make money, and not creating problems for society.”.</p><p>Too bad they had already collected close to $5M dollars worth of Bitcoin!</p><p>As mentioned above, the Colonial attack specifically targeted their IT systems that operate things such as billing and inventory. In fact, the ransomware never did cross over to infect the company’s OT systems. However, operations were halted anyway, due to the risk of further spread into OT.</p><p>What does this mean for OT? Are OT systems immune because they are less connected to the internet? Are they just “later in the spread” so rather than being patient 1–100, they are patients 101 and following — it’s just a matter of time? Should we focus all our resources on stopping the ransomware from impacting IT and, if we can do that, OT is safe? Is the solution more about incident response and how to protect operations from potential IT ransomware by creating redundancy for those systems or barriers that let OT run without reliance on those critical IT systems? The questions are numerous and should raise strategic questions for all industrial operators.</p><h3>How to protect against a Ransomware attack on industrial organizations?</h3><p>Any security program is intended to try and ensure ‘safe, reliable, expected’ operations. Note that 100% avoidance of downtime or incidents is not a possibility. Rather the true measure of security is in your resiliency. In other words, how quickly do we detect, respond and recover to a threat or activity?</p><p>And while an overall security program (like the NIST CSF, IEC 62443, or CSC18) are the proper ‘end game’ for operational security there are a few specific security controls you can emphasize directly related to ransomware. They are listed here with some very specific ‘OT Notes’ where application of these practices are more challenging particularly due to the nature of OT.</p><h3>How to Protect Against Ransomware in your OT Environment</h3><h3>Know how an IT attack can impact OT, build clear incident response gameplay, and prioritize risks to ensure as little impact on operations as possible in case of emergency.</h3><ul><li><strong>Well-defined maps of potential threats and impacts</strong>. One of the biggest questions is the risk levels and priorities of assets and systems. What systems are tied to what systems, not just technically but operationally? The great news is many industrial organizations already have disaster recovery plans. We need to extend those to cyber events so we understand what we can disconnect, what we can keep operating, etc. This is key as attacks can spread from IT to OT so easily.</li><li><strong>Risk prioritization:</strong> These exercises then can determine the true crown jewels — which systems are the lynchpins to operations, all the way down to the individual servers etc. This then allows the organization to prioritize risk management on those systems and add extra layers of security to protect those key assets.</li><li><strong><em>OT Challenge:</em></strong><em> OT specific policies and procedures — Most IT tools and behaviors MUST be modified to provide similar effects without disrupting OT. This type of balance requires significant knowledge of both security practices but also Operational awareness</em></li><li><strong>Robust backup and recovery:</strong> Expanded backup coverage and frequent snapshots (more hosts): The more hosts that are frequently backed up SECURELY, and assuming an adequate pipeline to get systems back those backups (e.g., enough network bandwidth), the faster you can recover from a ransomware attack. However, you must ensure the vulnerability is mitigated or the host is isolated when the backup is restored, or they may become re-infected.</li><li><strong><em>OT Challenge:</em></strong><em> Legacy systems, lack of bandwidth and need to track multiple backup solutions/products in most OT environments makes management difficult</em></li><li><strong>Have offline backups of critical assets:</strong> Offline backups as a resilience or disaster recovery strategy is critical to ensure your most important OT assets are protected or can be readily restored if your infrastructure is down. This includes PLC logic code, configuration, documentation, and system images/files. It may sound expensive, but it is often accomplished with securely encrypted USBs that are periodically rotated such that file integrity is maintained.</li><li><strong><em>OT Challenge:</em></strong><em> Complexity of OT environments, number and variations of source code type, location, etc — requires a wholistic backup and recovery program</em></li><li><strong>Regularly have “cyber fire drills” to test backups and their recovery:</strong> Again, I cannot stress this enough, a frequent training regime should be absolutely applied for OT and cyber-related events. Forensics, failed hardware, shutdowns, etc. should have at least an initial note for cyber, just to ensure it was not cyber-related, and if so, a chain of custody and due diligence can be assured. Secondly, it is important that your resources know what to do when there is an issue, so this is another way to double-check processes while improving the likelihood of a quick recovery.</li></ul><h3>Endpoint Management</h3><p>As stated above, one of the reasons organizations use an “abundance of caution” and shut down their OT processes is the fundamental endpoint risks on these assets. While we might like to avoid this hard topic, the reality is that resilience requires more secure OT endpoints.</p><p>The first question in this effort (as well as in beginning monitoring for potential threats) is ‘what do we have and how is it configured’? In other words, you need to know about the endpoints in question. To do this you need many items but for starters the following are fundamentally required:</p><ul><li><strong>Asset inventory:</strong>Effective endpoint management begins with a <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ot-ics-asset-inventory-and-why-is-it-the-foundation-of-a-cyber-security-program/">robust asset inventory</a>. As the age-old saying goes, if you don’t know what you have, you can’t manage the risks. A rich view of a 360-degree picture of each endpoint enables proper endpoint management.</li><li><strong><em>OT challenge:</em></strong><em> Incorporating an automated asset inventory that includes all asset types from OS based to networking but also embedded with deep asset profiles including set criticality, users and accounts, presence of compensating controls, etc.</em></li><li><strong>OT systems management:</strong>OT asset inventory is only the beginning of a robust endpoint management program. A <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ot-systems-management-why-is-it-critical-to-ics-security/">robust OT Systems Management program</a> includes configuration hardening, user and account management, software management, etc. In many cases, OT systems are insecurely designed and unpatched, making it ripe for ransomware.</li><li><strong>Patch management: </strong>Most threats enter through commodity systems such as Windows machines. You cannot patch everything in OT, but an <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/6-steps-to-patch-management/">end-to-end patch management program</a>(i.e. automation and intelligent application of patches) is of great importance due to several environmental factors such as compliance, legislation, and risk management (e.g., patches on hosts with RDP or firewalls connected to the Internet should be prioritized over a PLC protected by several layers). Where unfeasible, application whitelisting, and policy enforcement makes an attacker’s life very difficult to improve your chances to defend or deny a ransomware attack on your OT organization.</li><li><strong><em>OT challenge:</em></strong><em> need to have a prioritized patching process and move to </em><a href="https://www.controleng.com/articles/compensating-controls-in-ics-cybersecurity/"><em>compensating controls</em></a><em> when/where necessary.</em></li><li><strong>Removable media:</strong>USBs, removable media, and transient devices are other forms of low hanging fruit, especially if your network is “air-gapped” or heavily controlled. Users WILL bypass your controls by way of removable media. As a best practice, system policies are easily deployed, whitelisting software used, registered secure drives, and other technologies such as 802.X ensure authorized systems are allowed on network segments.</li><li><strong><em>OT challenge:</em></strong><em> Enumerating, applying, monitoring and enforcing removable media policies as well as extending to transient cyber assets</em></li></ul><h3>Monitor network, system and application logs for anomalies</h3><p>An attack often has precursory elements that indicate an infection. However, it could indicate a vulnerable system that is amidst an attack or is about to be compromised giving your defensive team an advantage to prevent a wide-scale infection or attack. One way of doing this is with what is called a “Canary “ that places a system in the network that acts as the “canary in the coal mine” and alerts as the ransomware is impacting that endpoint allowing you to more quickly react.</p><ul><li><strong><em>OT challenge:</em></strong><em> providing ‘OT context’ to traditional SIEM and alerting tools</em></li><li><strong>Monitored external attack surfaces:</strong> Many attacks are successfully accomplished due to a misconfiguration or an inadvertent hole caused by a gap in change management. It is a best practice to monitor for exposed services (e.g., Shodan).</li></ul><h3>Access Control and network segmentation</h3><p>Stopping the spread of ransomware often comes down to placing firebreaks in its path. These can be in the form of network protections such as firewalls or other forms of segmentation or strict access control.</p><ul><li><strong>Implement network separation or segmentation. </strong>One key way to slow the spread of ransomware is to place network barriers between IT and OT (or even within segments of IT and/or OT) networks. This approach is a foundational element but one, because of its technical challenges, often underutilized.</li><li><strong><em>OT Challenge: </em></strong><em>segmentation is not easy on IT or OT but in OT particular challenges arise due to legacy equipment, need for physical cabling, the downtime required to move systems onto new firewalls, etc. OT segmentation requires a team with deep knowledge of networking and the OT systems themselves.</em></li><li><strong>Isolate systems based on software, user role, and function:</strong> To protect systems compromised through remote access, local Windows networking flaws (e.g., print spool or SMB/NETBIOS), or Office/Acrobat, isolate them based on function and ensure unnecessary software is NOT included in standardized golden images or the same AD server is not serving policy for IT and OT. This also applies to user-based accounts; if an HMI is an HMI, treat its operator as an operator, not as an administrator.</li><li><strong><em>OT Challenge:</em></strong><em> Finding, profiling and securing these types of controls — ability to correct and enforce baselines</em></li><li><strong>Technical Diversity between zones or systems:</strong> Consistency across systems has scaling advantages, but when a single vulnerability affects multiple products this strategy grounds your entire operations if exploited. Barriers such as a VPN with 2FA, a remote access terminal server, and multiple firewall vendors exponentially increases the efforts it would take for an external attack to be successful.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HiZcbx8VyjfJaKbeZaaTIw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://gca.isa.org/blog/how-to-define-zones-and-conduits">Example of a zone and conduit network and acceptable vs unacceptable connections</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Conclusion and success stories</h3><p>Improving these five categories reduces the risk and impact of a ransomware attack, leverages existing technology investments, and improves recovery in the event of a compromise. Each of these add successive protections and safeguards against a possible ransomware attack.</p><p>OT-specific challenges are identified in this document not to show that a robust OT security program is unattainable or improbable but rather to help the reader identify key decision points that will help a successful program to achieve maximum protection with minimal challenges.</p><p>The application of ‘IT-like’ security controls in OT is increasingly being achieved in numerous industries, companies and countries around the world. But the true measure of success is in the maintenance and monitoring of their initial efforts. The companies that are significantly improving their security posture are acknowledging the unique challenges of an OT environment and making decisions such as:</p><ul><li>Building robust, 360-degree asset views</li><li>Incorporating multiple functions into a single platform</li><li>Tying together IT and OT skill sets at an enterprise level to review, monitor, plan and execute systemic security controls</li><li>Automated data collection and remediation tasks</li><li>Partnering with proven OT safe software and services vendors/consultants</li></ul><p>To learn more about options for your operational environment look no further than your <a href="https://www.cs2ai.org/chapter-locations">local CS2AI chapter</a> for access to a significant body of OT professionals, best practices, research, resources and insight.</p><p>Rick Kaun and Ron Brash</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/5-ways-to-reduce-ransomware-risk-for-ot-ics/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/5-ways-to-reduce-ransomware-risk-for-ot-ics/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef2887582dfb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Colonial Pipeline Attack: Lessons Learned for Ransomware Protection]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/colonial-pipeline-attack-lessons-learned-for-ransomware-protection-156bdd6961fa?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/156bdd6961fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[colonial-pipeline]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-controls]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 May 2021 20:26:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-10T20:26:32.834Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How to leverage lessons learned from the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack to prepare for cyber-related threats in oil &amp; gas</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QTg80uBGX94pEM5g" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@quinten149?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Quinten de Graaf</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>After a weekend of hundreds of posts about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/us/politics/cyberattack-colonial-pipeline.html">Colonial Pipeline ransomware event</a>, we thought some “Monday morning quarterbacking” was in order. As with all cyberattacks, one must be cautious when reacting to news headlines and not depend too heavily on public reports in the first 48 hours of an ongoing incident.</p><p>Even today, almost 72 hours later, the view of what happened at Colonial remains cloudy. The fog is lifting just enough, however, to offer a glimpse of some practical recommendations related to the attack and its developing aftermath. Here’s what we know so far:</p><p>Over the weekend, Colonial Pipeline, owner of 5,500 miles of pipeline carrying natural gas, gasoline, and diesel from Texas to New Jersey, shut down its operations in response to what it said was a ransomware attack targeting its IT network. In a <a href="https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption">media statement</a>, Colonial officials indicated the damage was limited to their IT systems, but that the company “proactively took certain systems offline to contain the threat.”</p><p>That response, which included disabling select OT/ICS systems, “temporarily halted all pipeline operations … which we are actively in the process of restoring.” The company added that its operational technology (OT) systems were fine, and the shutdown was a measured response to enable quick recovery. Without such an abundance of caution, the IT malware might have proven much more disruptive thanks to the interconnectedness of pipeline infrastructure and participants upstream/downstream (e.g., custody transfers, shared remote metering, available storage/capacity, etc.).</p><p>As of Sunday, the company’s four main lines, which supply 45% of the East Coast’s supply of gas, diesel, and jet fuel, were still shut down, though some smaller lateral lines between terminals were back online, company officials said. Colonial Pipeline officials declined to say when all systems might be brought back online, though <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/09/business/energy-environment/colonial-pipeline-shutdown-gasoline.html">experts say it could be several more days</a> before the company’s systems return to normal.</p><p>Colonial Pipeline operates the largest refined products pipeline in the U.S., moving some 2.5 million barrels per day through its combined infrastructure, according to its website. The shuttered portion of the pipeline, which connects 29 refineries and 267 distribution terminals, accounts for some 12% to 15% of daily oil capacity in the U.S.</p><p>According to published reports, part of Colonial’s immediate reaction to the attack late Friday was to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack/">enlist the services of incident response specialist FireEye</a>. Those investigators have since attributed the attack to <a href="https://www.varonis.com/blog/darkside-ransomware/">a prolific Russian criminal ransomware group known as DarkSide</a>, a crew credited with around 40 similar attacks with ransom demands ranging from $200,000 to more than $2 million.</p><p><a href="https://www.wired.com/story/ransomware-gone-corporate-darkside-where-will-it-end/">DarkSide has claimed its attacks feature a professional “experience,”</a> focusing on providing “quality products” to its consumers. The hacker crew claims it will only attack those who have the means to pay, or who are known to have cybersecurity insurance. The group also has been known to employ a double extortion methodology — getting victims to pay for unencrypting their data or, failing that, blackmailing them with the threat of public release of data exfiltrated as part of the crime.</p><p>By Monday, the DarkSide attackers expressed contrition for the Colonial Pipeline attack. Perhaps in response to the international publicity and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57050690">focused governmental and law enforcement efforts</a> spun up in the wake of the incident, the hackers <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvzzez/colonial-pipeline-hackers-statement-darkside">took to their dark website</a> to say they hadn’t meant to disrupt public utilities.</p><p>“We are apolitical,” the hackers wrote. “We do not participate in geopolitics, do not need to tie us with a defined government and look for other our motives. Our goal is to make money, and not creating problems for society.”</p><p>The DarkSide hackers promised to do better in the future, steering clear of targets like Colonial. “From today we introduce moderation and check each company that our partners want to encrypt to avoid social consequences in the future,” they added.</p><h3>Lessons learned from the Colonial Pipeline attack</h3><p>While Colonial has been mostly transparent, it is still unclear how effective their incident response has been to date. It may have been highly effective, with early detection providing enough warning to allow defenders to quickly disconnect IT and OT and prevent the spread of the ransomware into critical OT systems. Or they may have just been lucky that the malware did not bridge into OT. It’s too early to know for sure.</p><p>Still, there are a few noteworthy takeaways for industrial organizations from the early days of the Colonial Pipeline crisis:</p><h3>Industrial organizations are the new front-line of the cyber battle</h3><p>Although personal information remains a significant target among threat actors, the returns from ransomware, particularly among industrial companies have shifted the focus to the “A” in the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) triad. Financial services and retail, which hold vast amounts of customer data, have been living under cyber threats for years, but <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/defend-against-ransomware-with-a-360-degree-ot-vulnerability-management-program/">the rise of ransomware</a> changes the game, putting industrials on notice. The financial impact of a shutdown can be significant. Cyber now needs to be a primary component of all disaster recovery planning and must become a larger area of management focus, even for organizations that don’t see themselves as a natural target.</p><h3>Industrial cyber security is not an “IT” vs. “OT” thing</h3><p>Operations can be affected by attacks on both sides of the system. Critically, organizations need to work on <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/webinar-how-to-achieve-it-security-in-ot-environments/">bringing these two organizations together </a>to protect the entire system. Billing and pricing systems and the data needed to operate them are critical processes — just as critical as the SCADA network operating the pumps and valves. Visibility and protection across the IT-OT landscape is key to protecting operations</p><h3>Properly managed security is key to industrial protection</h3><p>In our 25+ years of work on industrial systems, the largest gaps we see are in the management and maintenance of security. Firewalls may exist, but personnel have adjusted rule settings to allow remote access and created servers that route around critical protection layers. Patching policies may exist, but the manual tasks that are often standard do not get completed given the urgencies of operations. There is no central visibility of these gaps. Standard secure configurations may exist, but exceptions are made, users adjust them, new software is allowed, and ports are opened, leaving gaps in that secure structure. Availability of robust and timely backups can significantly reduce downtime in case of a ransomware attack. But are these backups up to date? Do they restore quickly? Without management, the backups you thought you had may not be ready “in case of emergency.”</p><p>The ability to <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/solutions/by-challenge/integrated-it-ot-security/">consolidate the security status across all systems into a common database</a> to track and ensure protections are maintained is critical to strong protections. Owners must patch, segment, harden configurations, ensure appropriate backups, and limit access to least privilege. These core, fundamental elements of security can be the difference between being a victim or not.</p><h3>Rapid response and recovery are critical</h3><p>It may be the case that Colonial Pipeline reacted very quickly to reduce the spread of the ransomware. Obviously, detection is key. But the real advantage the defender can have is the immediate ability to take actions across endpoints within the fleet — IT or OT — to stop the spread of malware. This <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/verve-security-center/incident-response/">integration of detection and response</a> actions allows industrial organizations to significantly reduce the spread, and the cost, of ransomware attacks.</p><h3>Conscious shutdowns to avoid a real OT incident while balancing loss is an acceptable alternative to a major incident</h3><p>Incidents like the Colonial crisis have become the new norm within the critical infrastructure cyber security community. As such, organizations should be adequately trained and prepared to handle incidents like this via a well-defined procedure.</p><h3>Legislation and compliance may help to raise the security bar for non-energy-related private industry</h3><p>Regulatory compliance isn’t glamourous, but it has improved some basic areas of cyber security in the energy industry, for example. Given that energy generation generally requires traditional fuel sources, <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/texas-power-grid-supply-chain-risk/">contributing infrastructure</a> might eventually be subject to security governance that goes beyond simple guidance or recommendations.</p><p>As the situation continues to develop in real-time, we are bound to learn much more about the Colonial Pipeline attack in the coming weeks and months. But for operators, there are things that can be done today to reduce the chances of falling victim to a similar attack.</p><p>Ron Brash, Director of Cyber Security Insights</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/colonial-pipeline-attack-lessons-learned-for-ransomware-protection/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/colonial-pipeline-attack-lessons-learned-for-ransomware-protection/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=156bdd6961fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Relay Race: Getting a Handle on Known Risks in the GE UR Family]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/relay-race-getting-a-handle-on-known-risks-in-the-ge-ur-family-e8ffb207b083?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e8ffb207b083</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[general-electric]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ot-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[power-distribution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2021 20:48:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-06T20:48:35.650Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Verve research featured in ICS-CERT warning on GE’s popular line of advanced protection and control relays. Here’s what asset owners need to know.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Jpx8JQhnqnTT8fEH" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@metelevan?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Andrey Metelev</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>ICS-CERT this week issued an advisory detailing nine critical vulnerabilities affecting GE’s Universal Relay (UR) Family including several that could allow an attacker to access sensitive information, reboot the devices, gain privileged access, or crash the system via denial-of-service.</p><p>The vulnerabilities in <a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-21-075-02">ICSA-21–075–02</a> affect GE’s B30, B90, C30, C60, C70, C95, D30, D60, F35, F60, G30, G60, L30, L60, L90, M60, N60, T35, T60 relays and carry an aggregate CVSS score of 9.8. Researchers at Verve Industrial as well as teams from SCADA-X, VuMetric, and the U.S. Department of Energy’s <a href="https://www.energy.gov/ceser/cybersecurity-testing-resilient-industrial-control-systems">Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS)</a> program contributed individual discoveries to the multi-part advisory.</p><p>Verve researchers found that the GE products in question could allow unrestricted file uploads via the official OEM tool, including unsigned and unvalidated firmware. The Verve team also reported exposure of sensitive information (insecure Modbus functions and non-standard behavior) and the presence of hard-coded credentials in the associated bootloader that could be leveraged by an attacker when interrupting the boot sequence.</p><p>Other issues covered in the advisory include inadequate encryption, weaknesses in SSH implementation, use of insecure HTTP, poor input validation, and an inability to disable the devices’ factory service mode.</p><p>To mitigate the risks associated with <a href="https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-21-075-02">ICSA-21–075–02</a>, GE recommends updating UR devices to firmware Version 8.10 or higher. GE provides additional information on mitigation for registered users in their publication <a href="https://www.gegridsolutions.com/Passport/Login.aspx">GES-2021–004</a>.</p><p>Beyond the OEM’s specific recommendations, when it comes to significant advisories like this, we always recommend a calm, measured approach with a healthy dose of security basics. Some things to keep in mind when vulnerabilities make headlines:</p><ul><li><strong>Similar vulnerabilities are ubiquitous</strong>. As we move to more modern IoT/IIoT devices, developers integrating components and bolt-on functionality on top of protocol implementations will continue to make software engineering blunders.</li><li><strong>Bootloader vulnerabilities require local access and power control.</strong> Without the ability to cycle device power on and off, an attacker cannot execute the bootloader code.</li><li><strong>Web functionality offers a large attack surface. </strong>Owing to the eccentricities of their daemons and programming languages, web-based functions are best left disabled or, at least, sheltered behind multiple firewalls.</li><li><strong>Vulnerable-by-design protocols are not necessarily (vulnerable).</strong> If an attacker gets unfettered network access or lands in a privileged position, things can get dicey fast. But neither condition should occur if proper networking segmentation and access controls are in place. Direct remote access should be limited to secure methods such as IPsec VPN.</li><li><strong>The security of protocol implementations, especially for cryptography, degrades over time. </strong>Direct access to systems that are slower to be patched, if at all, should be avoided. Still, SSH is far preferable to HTTP-based communications, particularly when you force strong ciphers and prevent downgrading.</li><li><strong>Industrial protocols generally lack strong security features.</strong> In the case of the GE UR devices, the “unlock” function leaves passwords intact and accessible. Be mindful of the limitations of security functions and don’t rely on them.</li><li><strong>Assume all devices are vulnerable.</strong> Multiple layers of security — from deployment to retirement — are necessary and require effective management and maintenance to retain their risk-reduction qualities.</li></ul><p>Advisories such as these are concerning, but no cause for panic. GE UR devices are responsible for the safe and reliable creation of energy after all, so their security weaknesses certainly deserve our full attention. As always, we suggest a balanced and realistic approach to remediation consistent with the vendor’s recommendations.</p><p>On top of that, a layered-defense approach goes a long way toward safeguarding any affected organization. Asset owners should always be maintaining accurate, detailed inventories, keeping up with patching and updates, disabling unnecessary functionality, and monitoring for abnormal behavior.</p><p>These security fundamentals, coupled with controls on both physical and remote access to systems and devices, constitute an effective first line of protection for OT/ICS environments no matter what new threat is making news on any given day.</p><p><strong>Ron Brash</strong>, Director of Cyber Security Insights</p><p>Originally published at <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/relay-race-getting-a-handle-on-known-risks-in-the-ge-ur-family/">https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/relay-race-getting-a-handle-on-known-risks-in-the-ge-ur-family/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e8ffb207b083" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is ICS Security?]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/what-is-ics-security-ef64b1ae92ee?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef64b1ae92ee</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operational-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-controls]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2021 20:43:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-06T20:43:07.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>ICS (or Industrial Control System) Security is growing in importance as cyber-attacks increasingly focus on physical processes for either ransom or to cause harm to critical production systems. Attacks such as those at the Oldsmar water treatment plant, the various ransomware attacks on the vaccine supply chain, and the more extensive threats to the Ukrainian and US power grids and oil refineries in the Middle East generate greater worry for boards, governments, and operators of industrial organizations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Udtsyl5pdJ7aGB_d" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@publicpowerorg?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">American Public Power Association</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>What is ICS security?</h3><p>To begin, “What is ICS Security”? ICS security is defined as the protection of industrial control systems from threats from cyber attackers. It is often referred to as OT security or security. It includes a wide range of practices including:</p><ul><li>Asset inventory and detection</li><li>Vulnerability management</li><li>Network intrusion protection and detection</li><li>Endpoint detection and response</li><li>Patch management</li><li>User and access management</li></ul><p>ICS security differs from traditional IT security in several ways:</p><ul><li>The type of devices protected are often sensitive to unintended changes or interaction, including a whole new class of OT assets known as embedded equipment, and are typically much older than IT systems.</li><li>Risks are not only to information confidentiality but especially to the availability and integrity of the process or safety to personnel and property.</li><li>The remediation of risks requires different techniques because of the differences in types of devices.</li></ul><p>What is an industrial controls system? This is a broad category of computing systems sometimes referred to as “Operating Technology” or “SCADA” or “Cyber-Physical Systems”.</p><p>Industrial control systems specifically focus on industrial processes or automation rather than other operating systems such as building controls, medical devices, etc. Industrial control systems provide the components that ensure proper and continuous operation of a wide range of industrial systems — from power to water to manufacturing and beyond. They provide control over the inputs and outputs of key elements in an operational or physical process. The processes are often adjustable in real-time to ensure proper and safe operation. They often include the safety systems themselves to ensure shutdown in case of processes getting out of certain boundaries of performance.</p><p>Historically, these systems were separated from traditional IT networks and used a wide range of specialized components. More and more, these OT systems integrate with IT to increase operational efficiency and reduce the total cost of ownership. As a result, cybersecurity threats increase as formerly “air-gapped” systems, becoming more integrated into the internet-connected components of the enterprise IT environment.</p><h3>Why do we need ICS security?</h3><p>So this question is obvious at one level — ICS security is critical because these systems are under attack and the consequences of compromise are significant financially, operationally, and safety-wise. But, why do we need a separate category of security to address these types of systems? Why not just replicate what we’re doing in IT security?</p><p>First, the devices themselves create challenges for traditional IT security processes and technology. A sample of devices includes old versions of Windows such as Windows XP or Windows 7, a wide range of embedded devices such as PLCs, controllers, relays, sensors, etc., industrial (and traditional IT) networking equipment, and more. These devices require a different approach to security from the modern, updated, OS-based, or cloud-based devices in today’s IT stack.</p><p>Second, the potential impacts are different. In most IT cyber security efforts, the priorities are Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability, in that order. In the ICS world, the greatest risks are to the safety of people and property, followed by availability and integrity. Information confidentiality, while perhaps of some importance, pales relative to these others. As a result, the focus of risk management must also adjust.</p><p>Third, incident detection and response require specific knowledge of the systems affected. In many senses, IT systems are commodities with specific functions but are commonly grouped and analyzed with a wide range of available detection rules. Similarly, when responding to a threat, there are a variety of safe and effective actions to take uniformly and automatically. However, industrial control systems behavior is unique — often to that particular process. In addition, the response must be measured and handled in a way that does not cause more harm than good by stopping the expected operational process inappropriately.</p><p>Finally, to secure ICS safely and with operational resilience, specific knowledge of control systems and security is required, which is a unique combination in even shorter supply than the stretched IT security resources. Industrial control systems were designed years or decades ago and there is a shortage of skilled personnel that understands them. To secure ICS, the industry needs to join IT security capabilities to these people with knowledge of the systems.</p><p>As a result of these four factors, industrial control systems security must adapt a unique approach from our traditional IT security practices and technology.</p><h3>How do we achieve ICS security?</h3><p>This topic is worthy of much more than a blog post. Please visit our website at <a href="http://www.verveindustrial.com/">www.verveindustrial.com</a> for a comprehensive set of materials on how to achieve critical functions in ICS security. As an initial installment, there are three key elements to make significant progress towards a more secure ICS infrastructure.</p><h3>Establish an objective and design an ICS security program</h3><p>The first step in robust ICS security is to establish the goal you are trying to achieve. The great news is that there is a range of standards out there — <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-are-the-top-cis-controls/">CIS Top 20</a>, <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-the-nist-cybersecurity-framework/">NIST CSF</a>, IEC 62443, etc.</p><p>Across working with dozens of clients throughout their <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/webinar/on-demand-webinar-how-to-begin-the-ot-cyber-security-journey/">ICS security journey</a>, often the biggest stumbling block is defining the destination. Many companies struggle because they pursue a specific initiative — network segmentation, network intrusion detection, asset visibility — for short-term gain. Success in industrial security requires a true program that brings together an integrated set of actions. Selecting a standard and focusing on delivering against it is the best way to make meaningful, measurable progress.</p><h3><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/webinar-how-to-achieve-it-security-in-ot-environments/">Bring IT and OT together</a> to develop an ICS security solution that works for both</h3><p>We often see this as “IT is going to lead.” Or “ICS/OT will determine what will work at this plant”. ICS is different, as said above, and the right answer is not just to employ the same tools and processes as in IT. By the same token, IT security has a lot to bring to the table in knowledge and capabilities — as well as the need to have a consistent measurement for the board and other stakeholders. It is critical to bring the two groups together to make this happen.</p><h3>Leverage a security platform, rather than a series of individual tools</h3><p>Of course, we have a stake in this game, but we truly believe that this is the only way to deliver true ICS security efficiently. In fact, Gartner analysts agree, stating “Solutions that offer multiple valuable features easily deploy, can be easily explained to operations as not adding additional risk, and are interoperable with other security tools are preferred.” Gartner highlights the benefits of a platform approach in their <a href="https://www.gartner.com/doc/3995558">Market Guide for Operational Technology Security</a> which includes lower total cost-of-ownership and better prioritization and remediation of risks.</p><p>Verve is one such platform that you can learn more about here. But regardless if it is Verve or another security vendor, find a platform that can bring the key requirements of ICS security together in a way that is both safe and effective in ICS, but also delivers the same quality and measurement as IT security.</p><p>Industrial control system security does not have to be a black box. You can apply many of the same principles as IT security, but it needs to be done with a platform that can address those unique challenges highlighted earlier in this blog.</p><p><strong>John Livingston</strong>, CEO</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ics-security/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ics-security/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef64b1ae92ee" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is Stuxnet?]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/what-is-stuxnet-4440395938f2?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4440395938f2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operational-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stuxnet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2021 20:36:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-06T20:36:06.763Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The game-changing malware that shocked the ICS/OT world is back in the news and still has lessons to share.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xImNR5VWRBR6jVYsBC-QfA.jpeg" /></figure><p>It’s been more than a decade since security researchers in Belarus <a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet">first identified a virus that would come to be known as Stuxnet</a>, a sophisticated cyber weapon used in a multi-campaign attack targeting a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran. Now, fresh infrastructure attacks in the volatile region are renewing the discussion about Stuxnet, its origins, its methods, and its contributions to the current compendium of ICS defenses.</p><p>Last month, Iranian authorities revealed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/natanz-nuclear-israel-iran-cyber-attack/2021/04/12/f97f1a60-9b51-11eb-b2f5-7d2f0182750d_story.html">a catastrophic explosion and power outage at the same Natanz facility</a> once again aimed at disrupting nuclear production processes there. Israeli media reported that Mossad, the Israeli spy agency, was involved in most recent attack, part of that country’s ongoing shadow war with Iran. The latest salvo (while likely not cyber-related) drew immediate parallels to Stuxnet, with Iranian officials saying their nation had once again been subject to “an act of nuclear terrorism” and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-natanz.html">calling on the international community to confront the threat</a>.</p><h3>What did Stuxnet do?</h3><p>First unleashed in 2009, the Stuxnet virus had multiple components including an aggressive malware tuned to find and corrupt processes run by Siemens STEP7-based PLCs. Its objective was to stealthily manipulate the speed of the sensitive enrichment centrifuges — causing attrition rather than blatant physical destruction. The Stuxnet worm reportedly infected more than 200,000 machines in 14 Iranian facilities and may have ruined up to 10% of the 9,000 centrifuges in Natanz.</p><p>A second Stuxnet variant released several months after the first contained multiple Windows zero-day vulnerabilities, used stolen certificates, and exploited known simulation functionality in the Siemens PLCs. The more aggressive Stuxnet variation found its way into non-Iranian environments, but, thankfully, did not result in much damage.</p><p>From a historical perspective, the Stuxnet worm signaled that well-equipped, nation-state-sponsored actors possessed advanced capabilities that would set the stage for more serious cyber-physical attacks such as those in Ukraine, Estonia, and Saudi Arabia.</p><p>In the real world, advanced nation-state attacks are rare compared to common, opportunistic disruptions caused by things like ransomware. But Stuxnet demonstrates the importance of a well-engineered environment complete with adequate ICS cybersecurity. Such an environment requires a thorough understanding of asset inventory and security posture, Windows system hardening, network segmentation and monitoring, isolated process monitoring, adequate process instrumentation, supply-chain and third-party risk management, properly trained operators, and decent operational security (OPSEC).</p><h3>How Stuxnet works: The air gap myth</h3><p>Back in 2010, Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, like many others before and since, relied on the concept of non-connected and isolated networks as a form of cyber security. Proponents of this approach — dubbed an <em>air gap</em> because it implies physical space between the organization’s networked assets and the outside world — believe it provides sufficient protection for facilities that don’t require Internet access or ubiquitous IT/enterprise services.</p><p>They’re wrong.</p><p>Relying on air gaps as a single form of defense remains but one in a list of unfortunate fallacies used to justify a lackadaisical approach to ICS security. Others include oft-debunked beliefs like:</p><ul><li>Attackers lack sufficient knowledge and incentive to target ICS and SCADA systems.</li><li>Cyber security is important mostly for IT and enterprise systems.</li><li>Proven security strategies don’t apply to the majority of operational technology systems because the risk of disruption is too high in OT.</li></ul><p>Events such as those at Natanz demonstrate that once an ICS perimeter, even an air-gapped one, is breached (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line">cue Maginot line</a>), attackers enjoy nearly free rein within such soft environments.</p><p>While not much is publicly known about how Stuxnet and its variants made their way into the facilities at Natanz, it’s widely speculated that the malware entered through infected removable media such as a USB stick, via a laptop used by a contractor, an outside vendor, or concealed in an infected file like a corrupt .pdf version of a technical manual.</p><p>These well-understood attack vectors are a known risk to almost any facility and, in themselves, are not overly sophisticated. Transient assets such as technicians’ laptops, third parties coming onsite, infected installers, and auto-play exploits on removable media are hardly novel. The salient point in the Stuxnet case is that a determined actor managed to infiltrate a purportedly secure facility, delivering malware that ultimately found its designated target.</p><h3>How did Stuxnet spread?</h3><p>Stuxnet came in two waves. Less is known about the first wave, which was more of a slow burn and less noisy, making it less likely to be discovered. The second wave was the one that made international headlines with its more demonstrative and decidedly less surgical approach.</p><p>This second Stuxnet variant likely did not propagate from an initial infection on a susceptible PLC or controller, but rather gained access to one commodity Windows system through the use of zero-day exploits. From that one infected commodity Windows host, the malware moved laterally from one Windows box to another across the unsegmented network.</p><p>In particular, the second Stuxnet wave:</p><ul><li>Noisily pivoted through the environment via Windows Remote Procedure Calls (RPC), Server Message Block (SMB), and MS SQL protocols.</li><li>Leveraged a Windows Shortcut (.lnk) <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2010/ms10-046">zero-day vulnerability</a> that thwarted the disabling USB and removable media auto-play.</li><li>Used stolen code signing certificates to make its malicious payloads appear as legitimate drivers that were recognized by the operating system and ignored by anti-virus and policy enforcement controls.</li><li>Leveraged <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2010/ms10-061">vulnerabilities</a> in Windows print spooling network services (usually on by default) hosts where infection was not possible through RPC/SMB/SQL and USB insertion. This included <a href="https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1337">privilege escalation</a>.</li><li>Possessed the <a href="https://www.tofinosecurity.com/stuxnet-central">ability to leverage the OPC protocol</a> to traverse segments.</li><li>Infected Siemens STEP7 project files, replacing legitimate STEP7 DLLs with modified malicious ones, and using hard-coded credentials to log in to the Siemens WinCC SCADA database to identify specific targets.</li><li>Rendered itself dormant if appropriate criteria were not met.</li></ul><p>Through the successful compromise of the facility, the malware found its targets presumably by identifying matching project files, identifiers, strings, or some other criteria. Once it had done so, it inserted malicious STEP7 logic into the PLC to quietly increase failure rates of the operating centrifuges. The malware also contained command and control capabilities designed to provide updates manage exfiltrated data, though using such noisy functionality almost certainly would have tipped off the victims to the attack in progress.</p><h4>How to prevent Stuxnet</h4><p>It’s unlikely Stuxnet could have been entirely averted given the skill and motivation of the parties responsible. Let’s face it, if you attract the ire of highly skilled and well-funded nation-state attackers, not much can be done to avoid compromise. Still, there are some lessons to be learned from the Stuxnet scenario. ICS/OT defenders today can glean prescriptive insights on what didn’t work including:</p><ul><li>Reliance on an air gap as a stand-alone security measure was an absolute failure.</li><li>Traditional anti-virus would not have found this type of malware.</li><li>Updated host OS may have helped with some of the exploits, but again, unlikely given the attackers’ skill level.</li></ul><p>So, what would have helped?</p><ul><li><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/5-steps-to-successful-whitelisting-deployments-in-ot-2/">Application whitelisting</a> and host integrity checking probably would have detected the replaced STEP7 DLLs and altered project files.</li><li>Strict removable media policies and enforcement (potentially even hot glue) could have prevented an initial infection or, at least, made it much harder.</li><li>Sufficient <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/services/system-hardening/">host hardening</a> to include disabling unnecessary services like the Windows printer spooling service would have made lateral movement more difficult.</li><li>Sufficient <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/services/network-segmentation/">network segmentation</a> might have stopped the attackers from pivoting across the environment while better monitoring might have alerted defenders to anomalous traffic.</li><li>Diligent application of security policy could have isolated and contained the malware as it beaconed across network zones and layers where it did not belong.</li><li>Most importantly, better-trained resources and appropriate out-of-band (OOB) monitoring for anomalies within the centrifuge halls could have contained the damage early on in the attack.</li></ul><p>The fear with the release of a capability like Stuxnet is that other nations will be emboldened to try similar ICS attacks. So far, there have been few real assaults targeting ICS — most have been collateral to enterprise/IT systems being compromised and would have benefited by adequate application of cybersecurity basics and well-thought-out engineering principles.</p><p>Time will tell if Stuxnet remains an outlier — an example of an exotic ICS attack limited to the rarified air of nation-states in conflict. In the meantime, the lessons Stuxnet continues to demonstrate about fundamental ICS security controls remain relevant to defenders of every size and stripe.</p><p>Ron Brash, Director of Cyber Security Insights</p><p><em>This article was originally published at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-stuxnet/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-stuxnet/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4440395938f2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Asset Management and Cyber Security in Rail Transport]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/asset-management-and-cyber-security-in-rail-transport-57cdda26de82?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57cdda26de82</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operational-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2021 16:36:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-12T16:36:52.166Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rail transportation: Digitalization and securing current and future assets require comprehensive cyber security</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TI4Uhc0e77FrBZec" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@bennmcguinness?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Benn McGuinness</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Economics and technological transformation of business generally go hand-in-hand. If revenue is down, or there is an opportunity to increase revenue through automation, most businesses are apt to make decisions that improve profitability and redundancy. After all, who can blame leadership for ensuring a return for stakeholders and keeping business in the black? In the rail transport industry, ridership is likely down, logistics need optimization, and technology is making all sorts of promises (when isn’t it?).</p><p>Keeping a business feasible centers around risk management and Return on Investment (ROI) decisions. If I do X, there is a cost, and potentially a return (e.g., an ROI). Conversely, if I do Y, and that is a negative cost with little return, then Y should be avoided unless it results in some benefit (e.g., brand recognition, legislation/regulatory compliance, long-term gain, or safety). Unfortunately, cyber security is often considered a cost sink, difficult in Operational Technology (OT) or Industrial Control Systems (ICS), or it is an afterthought.</p><p>While most of the world is experiencing new challenges, various industrial companies pre-COVID-19 have had numerous scenarios that have led to an increased focus on automation:</p><ul><li>Global commodity/market price crashes (e.g., oil and gas)</li><li>Increased competition by various nations (e.g., overseas manufacturing)</li><li>Availability and affordability of technological solutions (e.g., commoditization of processing power)</li><li>Increased focus on uptime, sales/revenue, and delivery commitments.</li></ul><p>The last point is worthy of discussion because it is THE core driver in business, but it is a central piece of the puzzle when managing risk: cost vs. benefit vs. risk vs. direct vs. indirect consequences. It’s often a mesh of interdependencies that might not be obvious at first, but they are there.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/995/0*feFJXAxxSL_Y7pvK.png" /><figcaption><em>Rail transportation: Digitalization and securing current and future assets require comprehensive cyber security</em></figcaption></figure><p>When implementing or deploying new technology, the idea is to thoroughly understand that short-term gains are often negated by ownership costs:</p><ul><li>The longer an asset is deployed, and the quicker it reaches End of Life (EOL), the more it costs if it is not properly maintained, the more vulnerabilities it acquires, and the likelihood of its involvement in a breach or cyber security incident increases</li><li>Systems are often not standalone — they are systems of systems, interact/communicate frequently and depend on one another</li><li>Securing any asset (legacy or new) requires mitigations or changes such that the organization’s risk threshold is maintained</li></ul><p>For today’s discussion<strong>, Verve’s position is that an organization struggles to maintain and retain long-term gains from technology if cyber security basics are not in place</strong>. In the rail industry, and like many industries before it, there has been variation of digitalization. So, while it is not new, there are lessons and observations that rail and transport should be aware of before leaping ahead into transformation projects.</p><p>At the end of the day, people and products need to safely and reliably get from point A to point B, and it’s possible that some IoT gadget will help you find revenue, but it may very well cost you — just like that derelict Windows maintenance laptop when it gets compromised.</p><h3>Industrial cyber security basics and asset management: IoT and ICS commonalities</h3><p>In continuation of the above, we are observing a global trend of purchasing new solutions and deploying them (which is not bad per se), but as concerned advisors, we are adamant that the IOT/IIOT or technology of tomorrow, will become the legacy device of yesteryear.</p><h3>Rail transport organizations should ensure they have the following in place before committing to net-new technology projects:</h3><h4>Cyber security in rail needs to be adequately covered by governance, process, and procedure perspectives.</h4><p>To be fair, a lot of organizations have traditional processes for ensuring safety or maintenance of physical assets, or even for IT, but OT processes might need updates for cyber security. For example, how are security patches qualified and applied? How are cyber-enabled disruptions handled in OT? (e.g., ransomware on a system that provides OT functions such as controlling signal lights or scheduling). This may also include security requirements appropriate to OT, and even incident handling/recovery.</p><p>Technology should not dictate how your business operates, but rather <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/whitepaper/5-step-guide-designing-a-successful-governance-model-for-ot-cyber-security/">guide it through organizational policies and procedures</a>. Even the best-laid plans can go sideways, but with frequent training and process validation, governance assures all aspects are covered from identification to recovery. Imagine trying to build an awareness program without clear objectives? Or to manage assets if there is no process to inventory or secure them? I didn’t think so.</p><h4>Automated asset management and inventory are fundamental for assessing cyber risk, making technological decisions, performing vulnerability management, and assuring compliance.</h4><p>It is not an afterthought because you cannot defend what you do not know, and you cannot make adequate risk management decisions without accurate and timely information or complete visibility. Today, proven OT-safe solutions actively interrogate assets, and reliable connectivity is not as rare as it once was; <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ot-ics-asset-inventory-and-why-is-it-the-foundation-of-a-cyber-security-program/">detailed asset management</a>, inventorying, and patching has never been this feasible; even for transient, mobile, and embedded assets.</p><p>Any new assets should be recorded and tracked across their entire lifecycle (including user accounts, firmware, logic, and settings/configuration). If embedded systems often outnumber Windows assets 5–10x, keeping track from the very beginning is critical for tomorrow (and far cheaper than after the fact). It may be fair to assume all assets have vulnerabilities, but visibility on those risks is critical when managing changes and investments in a controlled manner.</p><h4>Vulnerability and endpoint management is not limited to Windows systems.</h4><p>Asset management also enables these capabilities, but vulnerabilities and risks relating to embedded/non-commodity systems, and even those that are IT/OT convergent require adequate protections. In many cases, this might be patching, but it also includes configuration hardening, user/account management, application whitelisting, backup/restorative images, and other compensating security controls. If new assets are added to assets owned by a corporation, the underlying basics for securing them will apply, and legacy caveats will emerge for any system or software over time. Initially, this might be a manual process, but ideally, when combined with a technology backed solution, the overhead will drastically reduce and allow operators to focus on their core duties.</p><p>Endpoints are not limited to only Windows or commodity IT/OT convergent systems. This includes <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/protecting-embedded-systems-in-ot-cyber-security/">embedded automation and control devices</a>, IP-addressable systems, IoT devices, cloud components, remote laptops, Virtual Machines (VMs), network infrastructure, and more. Most of the above have an Operating System (OS), are configurable, have users, and run software/applications — all of which need to be managed as best as they can be.</p><h4>Network security requires more than perimeter and bastion-based security.</h4><p>Technological diversity, proper network segmentation into “zones” and “conduits”, access controls, and modern networking infrastructure can go a long way to reducing the network-born risks in an organization. Firewalls are not a cure-all (like patching or leveraging VPNs by themselves for that matter), but they are a critical component in a holistic security strategy.</p><p>Security is really about engineering, and engineering is about functionality and the removal of risks. Many attacks (accidental or malicious) are network born, so limiting the impact of an eventual event while having the network bandwidth for recovery at scale or for data transmission is truly important. Even <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/challenges-using-anomaly-detection-tools-for-asset-inventory/">passive anomaly solutions</a> require double the bandwidth necessary to forward packets for analysis or network taps, but they will not stop or eliminate a cyberattack. Air gaps are not a solution, and they will often result in users bypassing controls. Therefore, control what you can control –but networking including remote access provides immense operational benefits if you manage the risks appropriately.</p><h4>Alerts, logs, monitoring, and SIEMs do not work out-of-the-box.</h4><p>All the aforementioned items need onboarding, connectivity, and incident/analysis playbooks, but they also need enablement. For example, anti-virus alerts cannot be generated with active AV software and UpToDate, or without log forwarding to a system that digests them.</p><p>OT systems and embedded/ICS systems often generate logs and events, but these functions need to be enabled, understood, and acted upon. This takes experience, but it is both feasible and critical for <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/webinar/watch-next-generation-ot-ics-endpoint-detection-response/">detecting anomalous behavior</a> (especially for legacy and standalone systems like IoT products). Alerts need investigation to ensure adequate context is provided, concisely defined processes are present, and personnel are trained to manage them.</p><h4>Risk management frameworks are necessary for considering and managing cyber risk not only for Informational Technology (IT) but also for OT assets.</h4><p>This may require rethinking cyber not in the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) triad, but instead, a shift to Safety-Reliability-Productivity (SRP).</p><p>IoT is not without its risks, and many of those risks are merely amplified given their standalone nature or their cloud-connectivity features. Be aware, up-to-date, and ready to apply the 4 T’s to risk (Tolerate, Transfer, Terminate, and Treat) for current and future assets. If new assets enable or are enabled through connectivity, assume it may be a two-way street and other assets may also be affected by a cyber-related incident.</p><h4>Technology needs people and processes.</h4><p>To summarize the above lessons, whether your organization is within rail or transportation, OT security shares many of the same recommendations across all industrial segments (oil and gas, energy, pharma, manufacturing, and aviation).</p><p>Businesses are like houses — while built on a solid foundation, they require maintenance or renovation over time. Due diligence needs to be applied for insurance, risk management, and regular human training &amp; awareness can go a long way. However, it’s important to recognize that in OT, detection is often over-relied upon as a capability, but not enough emphasis is present on Prevention, Action, and Recovery; organizations need to be prepared for an incident, and ready to get back on their feet ASAP.</p><p>Cyber security basics (or cyber security hygiene) provide immense benefits to a variety of organizations, including rail and transportation. In fact, they are often the enablers of the largest risk reductions an organization may invest in, so before moving to or deploying countless IOT devices, we recommend starting with the basics before the problem becomes insurmountable or any hard work becomes undone by tomorrow’s decisions.</p><p><strong>Ron Brash</strong></p><p><em>This article was originally posted at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/asset-management-and-cyber-security-in-rail-transport/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/asset-management-and-cyber-security-in-rail-transport/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57cdda26de82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Key Takeaways from Published 2020 ICS Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/key-takeaways-from-published-2020-ics-vulnerabilities-b3ca4fae8635?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b3ca4fae8635</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operational-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2021 16:34:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-12T16:34:30.642Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Alice and the ICS Vulnerability Looking Glass — How to Avoid Going Down the Rabbit Hole with ICS Vulnerabilities</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NQx_3fwo1MRWNd5e9LbqQg.jpeg" /></figure><p>In 2020, ICS-CERT issued 248 cyber security advisories for public consumption on the CISA’s ICS-CERT portal. <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/ics-advisory-report/">Verve analyzed all these advisories</a>, regardless of whether they came from large or small vendors to ensure accuracy even for geographies where the primary vendors are lesser-known. We compared them to 2019 releases. This report summarizes the conclusions, implications on remediation strategies, as well as a perspective on what 2021 might hold.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/0*jmDR1z-tZlavUdPS.png" /></figure><p>ICS-CERT advisories increased by ~30% over 2019 with the number of CVE’s growing by almost 50%, and the average CVSS score of these CVE’s increased to over 8.0 out of 10. These advisories were equally split between OEM application software and embedded device vulnerabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xgAaviFA0Iiri862.png" /></figure><p>These vulnerabilities create risks as networks are increasingly connected. Almost two-thirds (63%) are exploitable remotely with little skill required. This is up from 56% in the 2019 total. And the total number of remotely exploitable/low skill vulnerabilities increased by 66% in 2020 vs. 2019. This should raise the hair on the back of the necks of OT operators everywhere, especially in a world of greater remote connectivity to critical infrastructure during COVID and in the future.</p><p>These are not just small, minor risks, either. The trend is towards higher risk scores with advisories scored as 8 through 10 increased at roughly twice the rate of those ranked 7 or less. So not only are there more risks, but the severity is growing.</p><p>The largest type (~35%) relates to authentication or validation errors which can enable unapproved actors to make changes. And the second (30%) relate to Buffer Overflows. For the security researcher, this term is well-known, but to the operator the implications of this are enormous. These types of vulnerabilities can be used to:</p><ul><li>Consume/exhaust a device’s or software’s available resources and require a restart.</li><li>Create unsafe conditions where a device is unable to respond deterministically.</li><li>Generate a HALT or a STOP condition due to unexpected communications or commands.</li><li>And potentially be used to compromise the system or application via remote code exploit (RCE).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/743/0*DQaF-WVcvGubLsZN.png" /></figure><p>As in 2019, Siemens constituted the largest number of advisories — in 2020 31% of alerts were related to Siemens whereas in 2019 the percentage was 23%. This is not to say that Siemens devices are “less secure”. In ICS, we need to learn that published vulnerabilities may, in fact, indicate a more mature vulnerability management program rather than more risky software.</p><p>One telling fact is that almost three quarters (73%) of vulnerabilities were reported by third parties. It is great that more researchers are diving into the complex world of ICS, but this also means that the adversaries are also diving into these devices and finding vulnerabilities that they are likely not disclosing. The bar for OEMs is going up quickly to begin more aggressive efforts to discover, report, and disclose vulnerabilities.</p><p>One of the most significant underlying trends is the increasing threat that emerges as we evaluate the software bills of materials on these ICS embedded devices. In 2020, 36 out of the 248 (15%)advisories were related to these supply chain risks. But we believe this dramatically understates the risks to these hidden vulnerabilities. Through our independent research, we regularly discover embedded devices leveraging insecure software stack elements.</p><p>One might surmise from the disclosures from supply chain/third-party component vulnerabilities has not risen, but products are increasingly incorporating vulnerable third-party components. Similarly, with the increased focus on the supply chain (URG11, Treck, and SolarWinds) — we suspect this to widen the risk theatre, but not in the same profound ways researchers &amp; vendors proclaim.</p><ul><li><strong>5%</strong> of ICS CERT advisories affected multiple products, and <strong>99%</strong> affected multiple versions.</li><li><strong>9%</strong> of CVEs from all ICS CERT advisories were generated alone from supply chain vulnerabilities or third-party dependencies.</li><li><strong>And this is just the tip of the iceberg…</strong></li></ul><p>Our view is that this will be a major cause of increasing vulnerability disclosures in years to come.</p><h3>It can seem overwhelming to ICS security teams or OT engineers responsible for keeping track of all of this.</h3><ol><li><strong>Keeping track of vulnerabilities is overwhelming</strong> — in the face of nearly constant advisories, the threat of ransomware, breaches, and a continuous flood of CVEs.</li><li><strong>Expectations and actions upon the data are unclear </strong>— it’s great to be informed of risks, but how should anyone prioritize remediations? No workaround is mentioned, what should an organization do? What is a buffer overflow vs. an underflow vs. resource exhaustion? These are common questions.</li><li><strong>What you don’t know can hurt you</strong> –given the rate of growth and supply chain risks, what else is lurking under the covers of these ICS devices?</li></ol><h3>So what can you do? We recommend several actions:</h3><ol><li>Ensure you have a robust inventory not only of OS-based devices and their versions but also all of the underlying application software as well as all of your embedded devices with their corresponding firmware. These risks make up over two-thirds of the total vulnerabilities in the OT environment</li><li>Centralize the tracking of the risk. One of the most challenging parts of these OT vulnerabilities is that they often don’t all make it into a standard database. Many vendors are providing advisories that are not included in the ICS-CERT database privately to their customers. Many supply chain advisories don’t necessarily tie back to a specific OT firmware. Embedded OT devices can be spread across dozens or hundreds of locations. A centralized database and analysis capability is critical to managing these risks efficiently.</li><li>Assign a centralized resource to get up to speed on ICS vulnerability management. Our <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/whitepaper/the-ultimate-guide-to-reading-ics-cyber-security-advisories-like-a-pro/">“Ultimate Guide to Reading ICS Cyber Security Advisories Like a Pro”</a> is a helpful starting point. This doesn’t necessarily require years of experience, but distributing the analysis across lots of plants or engineers is very difficult. Centralizing this and enabling a small group of people to become experts at reading these and drawing implications for OT is key to efficiently managing these risks.</li><li>Aggressively pursue compensating controls. We often hear that patching is just not feasible in OT. The reality is true in some cases, but in many cases, there are feasible means to patch effectively to address the most severe risks. Automated tools can help with the labor challenges of doing so. But, we do understand that updating firmware on all the embedded devices can be challenging or impossible. Operators can take a range of compensating controls to address the risks at least partially. We provide a robust list in our longer whitepaper. But in short, apply robust patch management on the HMI/Server layer combined with improved configuration management and user/account management of the OS and embedded devices and strong network protection can provide a range of benefits that can deliver greater security until the upgrade cycle can deliver the updates necessary.</li></ol><p>We hope this 2020 review serves to raise the focus and energy on protecting our most critical infrastructure.</p><p>Ron Brash</p><p><em>This article was originally posted at </em><a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/key-takeaways-from-published-2020-ics-vulnerabilities/"><em>https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/key-takeaways-from-published-2020-ics-vulnerabilities/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3ca4fae8635" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Future of OT Security: OT Systems Management]]></title>
            <link>https://verveindustrial.medium.com/the-future-of-ot-security-ot-systems-management-4f65a6629175?source=rss-8e9694a902c8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4f65a6629175</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[operational-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Verve Industrial Protection]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2021 16:34:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-12T16:34:13.301Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Learn why there’s an increasing need for OT security to adopt the core elements of IT Systems &amp; Security Management in the coming years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*DtKm0BfO2UDnIwxtAT6z0w.png" /></figure><p>The basic premise of Dale Peterson’s article <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-ot-visionary-dale-peterson/">“How to be an OT Visionary” </a>was to look at what is happening in IT and assume it will arrive in OT five years later. He provides a range of great examples from Antivirus to virtualization, and I would wholeheartedly agree with his sentiment. We have been told many times that agents won’t work in OT only to demonstrate for the past dozen years, that in fact they work quite well and are much less intrusive than other methods of gathering information if tuned appropriately for ICS.</p><p>One of the clearest “coming attractions” for OT is <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/webinar/it-is-from-mars-ot-is-from-venus/">the application of traditional IT Systems or Security Management into the industrial controls environment</a>. For nearly 20 years, IT teams have applied foundational techniques such as hardware and software management, secure and sustainable configuration management, patch management, user and account management, etc. These processes — and the tools they use to automate them — have not only delivered improved security of IT systems, but have also ensured improved reliability, lower operating costs, and better customer satisfaction with IT as an organization.</p><p>Robust IT Systems Management is conducted comprehensively, regularly, and with statistics on compliance and outliers. It provides the basis for much of the security within the IT realm — from ensuring updated security patches, to proper network rules in firewalls, etc.</p><p>These tools, techniques, and processes are missing from almost all OT environments. Organizations and their OEM partners build cyber security systems to last 20 or 30 years. Upgrade cycles are measured in decades, not three-year refreshes or monthly updates. There are many good reasons for these approaches given the unique processes and sensitive devices involved. But, in most cases, these computing devices — servers, workstations, switches, PLCs, relays, sensors, etc. are not “managed” in a typical ITSM model.</p><p>We see this clearly in our assessments of these industrial environments — unpatched systems, device configurations with significant insecurities, many dormant and insecure users and accounts, failed or non-existent backups, and at the foundation a fundamental lack of accurate and deep asset inventory. The focus in most industrial organizations is the process itself rather than the management of the computing devices that control that process. Ease of operation is the primary driver, enabling the technicians to reduce the cost and complexity of the process.</p><h3>The Need for Greater OT Systems Management</h3><p>Over the next five-to-ten years, OT needs to adopt the core elements of IT Systems &amp; Security Management. To date, most industrial organizations have relied on network protections for their OT systems — firewalls or data diodes, the mythical “air gap”, network anomaly detection, or IDS/IPS. No one would debate the value of these initiatives in a defense-in-depth model. However, the next five years will make these defenses less and less effective, requiring a push to greater OT Security Management programs. Several trends and events drive this change:</p><h3>Increasing IIOT/ Industry 4.0 connectivity between industrial operations and the internet</h3><p>Organizations have trialed and proved connected plant initiatives for a decade. In the past three years or so, organizations pivoted from trial to wide-spread adoption and the “wave” is gaining steam. Based on multiple analyst views (<a href="https://www.gartner.com/doc/3983783#:~:text=The%20enterprise%20IoT%20platform%20market,enabler%20of%20IoT%20digital%20scenarios.">Gartner predicts</a> the enterprise IOT platform market will grow to $7.6 billion in 2024), these initiatives are set to grow dramatically over the next five years. Whether it be OEMs connecting to wind turbines to regularly update the programs or monitoring the flow of fluids through a valve to tune for maximum output, we already see these connections occurring. As connectivity explodes, network protection alone will grow increasingly untenable as a solution to OT security.</p><h3>Increasing public vulnerabilities in OT equipment</h3><p>In our recent <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/2020-ics-advisory-report/">ICS Advisory Report</a>, we found a 75% increase in CVE’s in ICS-CERT advisories between 2019 and 2020. This growth highlights the growing research into the vulnerabilities of these industrial-specific software and embedded systems. Moreover, this is just the tip of the iceberg as the software supply chain risks from the underlying components of these systems are hardly identified at all yet. The reality is that OT systems’ reliance on “security by obscurity” is falling away as the curtain is pulled back. This will require a much more robust, IT-like, endpoint management capability of these systems.</p><h3>Increasing regulatory pressure</h3><p>Over the next three years, almost every developed country, and many developing countries, will implement rigorous security requirements that apply to OT systems. From the US Department of Defense’s recent <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/webinar/webinar-get-ready-for-cmmc-improve-ot-cyber-maturity-in-30-days/">CMMC standard</a> to the UK’s RIIO2 standard to Qatar and other locations within the Middle East. The trend is to greater regulatory oversight of the world’s critical infrastructure. We have seen how these regulations impact utilities in North America with the <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-are-the-nerc-cip-standards-in-ics-security/">NERC CIP requirements</a> which essentially require true OT endpoint systems management — patching, configuration management, user and account control, backup management, etc.</p><h3>Increasing pressure from CISO/Board of Directors</h3><p>As all of these changes occur, boards of directors place more emphasis on securing the OT environment. This is not surprising given the potential financial impact of these attacks –see the results from Merck, Maersk, Norsk Hydro, and more recently at many organizations involved in the supply chain for critical COVID vaccines. Insurance companies are pressuring companies to ensure all systems are protected. Therefore, <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/5-questions-a-ciso-should-ask-about-ot-ics-cyber-security/">CISOs put greater emphasis on OT</a>. They expect the same type of security capabilities and systems management as they achieve in IT, which will drive greater push for OT Systems and Security Management.</p><h3>The Future of OT Cyber Security</h3><p>So, what does this mean for OT leadership? How will it impact the “leaned out” operational excellence achieved over the past 15 or 20 years? What is the impact on the day-to-day jobs of the Instrumentation and Controls techs?</p><p>In short, a coming tidal wave of new requirements, reporting, and security responsibilities on the computing equipment that runs industrial operations. Why do we call this a “tidal wave”? Because we have seen it. The North American electric utility industry over the past dozen years has adopted an increasing set of requirements of OT systems management. Is NERC CIP perfect? Of course not. It has many areas that may not deliver a great ROI on security.</p><p>But would we expect the regulatory requirements around the rest of the world to be significantly more efficient? Probably not. In addition, these were established before the presence of IIOT and cloud, before the increasing numbers of endpoint vulnerabilities, etc. As those areas grow, <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/whitepaper/ot-endpoint-management-whitepaper/">the need for endpoint management</a> will grow ever greater.</p><p>The reality is that most OT environments do not manage these endpoints. Therefore, as these new requirements emerge, most will be relying on manual tasks to gather critical reporting for the C-suite or regulators. Most will be using different OEM tools to try to patch systems manually or with an inefficient approach of the system by system. Most won’t have automated asset inventory or vulnerability assessment to provide real-time visibility, so will rely on manual teams to gather this information into spreadsheets, etc.</p><p>We often hear forecasters talk about the coming risk from hackers, and this is real. But the real coming risk is the operational costs in keeping up with the necessary OT systems management to ensure security in connected, vulnerable, regulated environments.</p><h3>OT Endpoint Systems Management</h3><p>As Dale Peterson said, to predict the future of OT, just look at IT and add on 5–10 years. The future is clear: It involves a greater and greater need for endpoint systems management of OT computing equipment. The challenge is that doing this efficiently and effectively does not happen overnight.</p><p>Verve has a decade of experience helping organizations adopt efficient OT endpoint systems management. This begins with a truly robust asset inventory. But an <a href="https://verveindustrial.com/resources/blog/what-is-ot-ics-asset-inventory-and-why-is-it-the-foundation-of-a-cyber-security-program/">inventory is only the foundation</a> of a true OTSM program. It also includes efficient and OT-safe vulnerability management, patch management, configuration management, etc. This integrated and automated approach can reduce the labor requirements by 70% over traditional manual methods. As this tidal wave approaches, we encourage industrial organizations to begin to map out their OT endpoint management roadmap. We look forward to helping.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*90v48WFpa3_q6jHq.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4f65a6629175" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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