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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Võ Tuấn Anh on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Family Resemblance: Understand this most revolutionary idea of Wittgenstein]]></title>
            <link>https://votuananh.medium.com/family-resemblance-understand-this-most-revolutionary-idea-of-wittgenstein-b691ae41d656?source=rss-3df14948d234------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[linguistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytic-philosophy]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[wittgenstein]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Võ Tuấn Anh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2021 11:03:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-08T11:03:06.782Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is all the fuss about you being kind of look-alike your siblings? There is some brainy account on that!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x9wXUzqILZ8y3MPSEwMklQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Wittgenstein’s portrait, along with his sisters Gretl, Hermine, and Helene. The woman on the left never existed. She is a composite created by overlaying all the images on the right.</figcaption></figure><p>The motivation of this post is to explore the concept of <em>family resemblance</em> in two possible directions: Wittgenstein’s original discussion of it as his major attempt to overturn an established approach that had reigned over Western philosophy for thousands of years; and then proceed to reflect on the immense influence that the notion had on subsequent movement of cognitive linguistics, most notably in the case of Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory.</p><p>But first, what is family resemblance? Wittgenstein originally used the German compound word ‘Familienähnlichkeit’, which he himself translated to English as ‘family likeness’ when lecturing (The Blue Book, p. 17,33; The Brown Book, §66). The concept is as straightforward as it seems, like the similarity in the way people look because they are related. Wittgenstein most likely wanted the readers to use this plain intuition to venture into his own distinctive use, which was as a complex philosophical tool of investigation for a very primary, yet most puzzling notion of <em>a concept</em>.</p><h3>FROM SOCRATES TO EARLY WITTGENSTEIN’S TREATMENT OF CONCEPT</h3><p>Not even in sciences, mathematics or philosophy where the conception of <em>concept</em> is of vital importance, we are all somehow aware of it in normal daily use. Intuitively, concepts such as love, or an idea, a virtue, a game, etc. are universally perceived, though it may vary amongst different people <em>the way they define it</em>. For example, both can be considered as virtue ethicists, but Confucius and Aristotle could hypothetically disagree on what is a list, or combination of human characteristics which are categorized as a virtue.</p><p>The established solution for that variation, was to find things in common. The tendency to think that a concept applies to the various subjects that fall under it, if those subjects possessing common properties, is as old as philosophy.<em> </em>Indeed, for this whole process we can give credit to the historical Socrates (or more probably Plato) in his quest of ‘common nature’ with an unsatisfied answer from Meno on <em>‘what is virtue?’</em> (Plato, Meno 71e–72a). Socrates, therefore, “fixed thought for the first time on the notion of definition” (Aristotle, Metaphysics I 6, 987b1). Plato even further extended this essentialist argument in the Cratylus (388c). Definition, thus conceived, became known as ‘real definition (<em>definitio rei</em> )’, i.e. definition of things, and was contrasted with mere ‘nominal definition (<em>definitio nominis</em>)’, i.e. definition of names.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/0*HrYkff2TVI1NWN-Y.gif" /><figcaption>Socrates on Virtue</figcaption></figure><p>This simple yet powerful idea had survived immensely well into early modern philosophy. Arnault’s Port-Royal <em>Logic</em> (1662) characterized real definition as identifying the nature of a thing by identifying its essential characteristics. Spinoza, writing at much the same time as Arnauld, held that “a definition, if it is to be perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing” (Spinoza 1955, I. 31). It was fiercely attacked though, by J.S. Mill in the nineteenth century in his <em>A System of Logic (1843)</em>, where he dictated that a definition is just ‘‘a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions affecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn”</p><p>Mill’s criticism was a precursor of later treatments of concept from pivotal figures of the school of analytic philosophy, Wittgenstein himself included, but in his early philosophy of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. Gottlob Frege was the first to come up with the demand for an <em>‘analytic definition’ </em>(Frege 1959, p. ii)., where the specifying <em>characteristic marks </em>of concept must be distinguished from the urging demand of “completeness of definition”. In other words, concepts “must have a sharp boundary”, he argued. G. E. Moore, in his <em>Principia Ethica (1903)</em>, raised the question of how <em>good </em>is to be defined. A verbal definition for him is either an arbitrary stipulation or a description of usage. But a philosophical definition should be totally different, “solely with the object or idea . . . that the word is generally used to stand for”. Bertrand Russell elaborated this remark, by arguing that definition, at least in philosophy, is the analysis of an idea into constituent ideas (Russell 1927, 27)</p><p>The Tractatus followed in the footsteps of Frege, Moore and Russell. Names of complexes are analysable by a variant of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. Complex <em>concept-words</em> (in the terminology of the Tractatus) are analysable into their ‘<em>characteristic marks</em>’. What finally left for analysis consists in just the <em>simple names</em>. Those names’ meanings are<em> simple objects that</em> constitute the substance of the world. The Tractatus investigates the nature of propositions, giving Wittgenstein the reason to believe in the illusion of the unity of all concepts. It could be said this treatment of Tractatus, though obviously more advanced, still somehow paid homage to the essentialist approach of Platonic tradition over 2000 years ago.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/553/0*BsGUMDvHb36gnLKd.jpg" /><figcaption>Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein</figcaption></figure><p>Wittgenstein himself, however, started to go against this conception of explanation as early as in the 1930s. At several places in his unpublished manuscripts, he then explicitly contrasted the method of explaining concepts with his own earlier Tractatus’s attempts at defining the essence of terms like ‘proposition’, or ‘language’ (Hacker &amp; Baker, 2005). It was right in this period that he was harboring the revolutionary idea of an antidote for essentialism, a notion of <em>family resemblance,</em> with the ambition to dissolve forever the illusion of ‘common properties’.</p><h3>FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AS IT APPEARED IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS</h3><p>Wittgenstein introduces the idea of family resemblance in Philosophical Investigations §§65–71.</p><p>Here are the crucial bullet points (with some simplification within the scope of this essay), that he made to gradually uncover the essential nature of family resemblance, which is clarified chiefly via the concept of game:</p><p>(i) Games must have something in common, otherwise we would not call them all ‘games’. It is because if we look at a range of games, we <em>see only a network of relationships and overlapping similarities</em>. Yet we call them ‘games’ for all that (§66). Such a concept resembles an image of long rope twisted together out of many shorter fibers (§67).</p><p>(ii) Although we could draw a sharp boundary around the extension of the concept of a game, we generally have not done so, and never will. We use the word ‘games’ perfectly comfortably without circumscribing it exactly (cf. §§68–9). Just for special purposes we can draw such boundaries (§§68f.)</p><p>(iii) The explanation of what a game is consists in giving appropriate examples (§71), i.e. in describing games (§69). It could be done by a discussion of how other sorts of games can be constructed, or a specification of certain activities that would not be included among games (§75). This is important, since <em>we can describe a game without understanding its essential nature.</em></p><p>(iv) Games, because of its network of relationships and overlapping similarities, form a single family (§67). Family-resemblance concepts are susceptible to extension by the accretion of new members to the family. The expansion of the family does not imply a change in the meaning of the family-resemblance term.</p><p>The whole purpose of these remarks are to dethrone the orthodox, Platonic interpretation of the meaning of concept, or definition as discussed previously. He convinces that<strong> games have no common properties, even suggesting that we can see that they have none (§§65f.)</strong>. Games are heterogeneous, so be the <em>language games</em>, the most important concept of Wittgenstein on Investigations; on this account, there is nothing common to all language games in virtue of which we call them so.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*2nS3aeLCZuD3xtzW.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: Existential comics</figcaption></figure><p>One, however, might argue against him: games are played as a human activity, shared by all of us — so games surely have this as a common property. Furthermore, it is difficult to deny that games are rule-governed.</p><p>Wittgenstein’s strategy to answer is, even if such properties exist, typically we would justify calling some activity ‘a game’ by just referencing to examples of games rather than by citing properties common to all games, the form of explanation that we don’t need to understand the nature of the concept to do. Furthermore, the alleged unity of a family-resemblance concept seems fragile. What are the criteria of identity for a ‘family’? Why should we agree that games form one family, not several? This leads to the impossibility to draw a sharp boundary when defining a game with a set of common features.</p><p>It is one thing to note the family resemblances between different languages and to group the various languages into families according to their genesis. It is quite a different (and wrong thing), however, to extend the notion of a family resemblance to concepts (including the concept of a language), i.e. to argue that the extension of a concept may be united not by common characteristics but by overlapping similarities between the members. The consequence, says Wittgenstein, is that “what we call “sentence” and “language” has not the formal unity that he imagined [i.e. in the Tractatus], but is the family of structures more or less related to one another” (2006 [1953], §108: 40).</p><h3>FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND PROTOTYPE THEORY</h3><p>We move on to the influence of Wittgenstein’s notion to the field of cognitive approach, in particular here is cognitive semantics. At the beginning of <em>Women, fire and dangerous things</em> (1987: 18), cognitive linguist George Lakoff praising J. L. Austin, a British philosopher of language and leading proponent of ordinary language philosophy, as “prefigured much of contemporary cognitive semantics”, especially on account of Austin’s discussion of the polysemy of <em>healthy</em>.</p><p>Austin’s work on polysemy therefore became the foundation for psychologist Eleanor Rosch to develop <em>prototype theory</em>, with important applications in cognitive semantics. In the 1970s, Rosch was extending her prototype theory from ‘natural categories’ (colors and shapes) to ‘semantic categories’, or <em>lexical concept</em>. However, whereas the natural categories possess specific Gestalt-like internal structure, Rosch needed a counterpart structure for semantic categories that could coordinate along a continuum of variations with peaks of typicality corresponding to prototypes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/0*t4PSxPbYmMnrl0JB.gif" /></figure><p>This is where Wittgenstein’s family resemblances entered the scene. According to Rosch, a family resemblance might be what linked the various referents of a word. A family resemblance relationship consists of a set of items of the form AB, BC, CD, DE. That is, each item has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items. Once it was established that semantic categories had a family resemblance structure, Rosch felt she needed an explanation for the formation of these categories. More precisely, three aspects of this structure had to be accounted for:</p><p>First, <em>Why are semantic categories formed at all?</em> The answer is: categories are formed because they are useful, and they are useful because they correspond to bundles of interpredictable attributes (e.g. what looks like an apple is also edible); This interpredictability was measured by a probabilistic index (which is <em>cue validity</em>, first proposed by the Viennese psychologist Egon Brunswik, 1903–1955).</p><p>Second, <em>How can they be cohesive given that their members need not have features common to all?</em> Apparently the degree to which members of a category resemble each other was higher than the degree to which they resemble members of contrastive categories. Regarding this, of all members, a prototype could be defined as the one with the highest cue validity (Rosch &amp; Mervis 1975: 602).</p><p>Lastly, <em>How can the taxonomic organization of semantic categories be explained?</em> The existence of degrees of taxonomy was not thoroughly justified, except for a level called “basic level”, which, explained Rosch, among other properties, was the level with the highest number of interpredictable attributes.</p><p>As a consequence, prototype theory was essentially reduced to two tenets: there are central meanings, and meanings of polysemous words are linked by family resemblance. By identifying prototypes with attested meanings (e.g. certain spatial relations in the case of prepositional meanings), cognitive linguists interpreted Roschian prototypes as members of a category. They were justified to do so insofar as Rosch &amp; Mervis (1975) explicitly invited this interpretation. However, in other places, Rosch warned against this construct, speaking of prototypes as “grammatical fictions” resulting from the reification of judgments of typicality (Rosch 1978: 40).</p><p>To conclude with this highly influential direction we should take a look at a larger context. The first generation of cognitive linguists, who sought to enter fields left open by generative linguistics, were somewhat distant from the tradition of lexical semantics. They therefore found that prototype theory was a handy tool for engaging in this field of research and especially for dealing with polysemy (Kleiber 1990). So a simplified and reifying version of prototype theory served to reopen the field of lexical semantics, in an environment (American post-Bloomfieldian linguistics and generative linguistics), to a large extent oblivious of the modern European tradition, which showed little concern for it.</p><h3>REFERENCES</h3><ul><li>A. Arnauld, <em>The Art of Thinking: The Port Royal Logic</em> (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1964), Pt II, ch. 16.</li><li>Aristotle. (1941).<em> The Basic Works of Aristotle.</em> Ed. R. McKeon. New York: Random House.</li><li>Austin, John L. 1961 [1940].<em> The meaning of a word. </em>The Moral Sciences Club of the University of Cambridge and the Jowett Society of the University of Oxford. In Philosophical Papers, 1961, James O. Urmson and Geoffrey J. Warnock (eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press: 55–75.</li><li>Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S. (1980/2005). Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. Volume 1 of an <em>Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.</em> Part 1. Essays. Second edition. Extensively revised by P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford: Wiley‐Blackwell.</li><li>Frege, Gottlob, <em>The Foundations of Arithmetic</em>, tr. J. L. Austin, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1959).</li><li>G. E. Moore, <em>Principia Ethica </em>(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960), p. 7.</li><li>J. S. Mill, <em>A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, </em>vol. 7 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1973), I, viii, §5</li><li>Kleiber, Georges. 1990. <em>La Sémantique du Prototype</em>. Catégories et Sens Lexical. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.</li><li>Lakoff, George, 1987. <em>Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind</em>, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.</li><li>Plato. (1871). Meno. Trans. B. Jowett. Oxford: Clarendon Press.</li><li>Rosch, Eleanor &amp; Mervis, Carolyn B. 1975. <em>Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories</em>. Cognitive Psychology 7: 573–605.</li><li>Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. <em>Principles of categorization.</em> In Rosch, Eleanor &amp; Lloyd, Barbara B. (ed.), Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 27–48.</li><li>Russell, B. <em>‘The Principles of Mathematics’</em>, 2nd edn rev. (Allen and Unwin, London, 1937).</li><li>Russell, B. ‘<em>On Scientific Method in Philosophy</em>’ (1914), repr. in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 8 (Allen and Unwin, London, 1986), p. 66.</li><li>Spinoza, B., <em>Improvement of the Understanding</em>, I. 31, in <em>The Chief works of Benedict de Spinoza</em>, tr.R. H. M. Elwes (Dover, New York, 1955), vol. 2.</li><li>Wittgenstein L., <em>Philosophical Investigations</em>, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr.G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd edn (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958).</li><li>Sedley, D. N. (2003). <em>Plato’s Cratylus</em>. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Wittgenstein L., <em>The Blue and Brown Books</em>, London: Blackwell (1958);I 68, 17, 73</li><li>Wittgenstein L., <em>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,</em> tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961).</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b691ae41d656" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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