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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Nikola Vukovic on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Nikola Vukovic on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Nikola Vukovic on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Interface Theory of Perception: The Cognitive Revolution That Wasn’t]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@vukovicnikola/interface-theory-of-perception-the-cognitive-revolution-that-wasn-t-732ea6172df5?source=rss-b6af7a8cd523------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[perception]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikola Vukovic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2015 16:40:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-20T16:42:00.475Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dfmm8xqFK9b2osNHXv8pVA.png" /></figure><blockquote>This is the way psychology ends<br>This is the way neuroscience ends<br>This is the way the perceived world ends<br>Not with a bang but a hashtag</blockquote><p>Had he not died too soon, this is how T. S. Eliot might’ve reworked his immortal verses. In his absence, the scholarly equivalent of the plaintive stanza was given to us by none other than the Psychonomic Society — one of America’s most prominent psychological organisations. They ceremoniously marked the end of September with the publishing of a “startling” and “game changing” <a href="http://link.springer.com/10.3758/s13423-015-0890-8">paper</a> — a special edition, in fact — accompanied by its own <a href="http://www.psychonomic.org/featured-content-detail/interfacetheory-our-species-specific-desktop"><em>dedicated website</em></a>, week-long <a href="http://www.psychonomic.org/featured-content-detail/interface-theory-of-perception-future-of-science-o"><em>digital event</em></a>, and moreover, an official Twitter hashtag (<a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23interfacetheory"><em>#interfacetheory</em></a>). The paper in question describes and “tests” The Interface Theory of Perception, a new theory proposed by Donald Hoffman and colleagues.</p><p>If you are like me, a person forever baffled by the complexity of the mind, your surprise at all the editorial fanfare might only be matched by the eagerness to discover the contents of this new theory! And the insight, we are assured, is immense; the “<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758%2Fs13423-015-0930-4"><em>implications for the science of the mind are profound</em></a>”. Fortunately for the non-technical spectator, an informative summary of the theory is given by the lead author himself in the form of a TED talk, published earlier this year:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=http%3A%2F%2Fembed-ssl.ted.com%2Ftalks%2Fdonald_hoffman_do_we_see_reality_as_it_is.html&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ted.com%2Ftalks%2Fdonald_hoffman_do_we_see_reality_as_it_is%3Flanguage%3Den&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Ftedcdnpe-a.akamaihd.net%2Fimages%2Fted%2F0d94db5a9365c874223bd578f47e629832379b8d_240x180.jpg%3Flang%3Den&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=ted" width="560" height="315" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/16acedbcef0bb5f131743deafcbff3ae/href">https://medium.com/media/16acedbcef0bb5f131743deafcbff3ae/href</a></iframe><p>If, after this, you are still interested in the full, 30-page scholarly treatment, you can read it <a href="http://link.springer.com/10.3758/s13423-015-0890-8"><strong><em>here</em></strong></a>. Having done so myself, I must report that I am none the wiser, more convinced, or impressed, than after watching the TED talk, which does a great job of covering all the important points. The evolutionary simulations and genetic algorythms covered in the paper are impressive, and the underlying math rigorous — alas, the theory crumbles long before you press “Run Script” in Matlab. Below are just a few points that for me, a professional newcomer to cognitive science, and a long-term lay reader of philosophy, render Interface Theory unconvincing.</p><p>The Claim: “<em>In a nutshell, interface theory postulates that our perception operates like a species-specific desktop: We perceive the world in representations that do not represent the “truth” about the world as it actually is, but that are useful “icons” which represent fitness-relevant information about the world.</em>” This <a href="http://www.psychonomic.org/featured-content-detail/interfacetheory-our-species-specific-desktop">extract</a> highlights the core novel idea behind Plato’s-<strong>khm</strong>-Kant’s-<strong>khm</strong>-Heidegger’s-<strong>I’m sorry</strong>… Hoffman’s theory. We do not, in simple language, perceive reality as it truly is.<br>The main problem with the argument is that it proceeds from a false premise about the nature of perception. In their paper, Hoffman et al. outline the common notion that what evolves in perception is veridicality. They write: “<em>Those who see more truly outcompete those who see less truly and thus are more likely to pass on their genes that code for truer perceptions. … We are thus the offspring of those who, in each generation, saw a bit more truly, and we can be confident that we too, in most situations, have veridical perceptions.</em>” Unsurprisingly, the authors go on to disprove and burn this scarecrow at the altar of Evolutionary Modelling.</p><p>Having masterfully severed fitness from truth and veridicality, the paper pits the two against each other in a series of computer simulations, and “proves” that evolution favours fitness over truth. Yet, a question remains: what is it about an organism’s perception which causes improved fitness? The answer reveals the flaw in the argument: an organism survives to the extent that it perceives and adapts to true properties of the world. Thus the starting assumption is wrong in claiming that organisms evolve to see the world “more truly”. Here’s a kicker for you: <em>Every organism that has ever perceived, no matter how complex or primitive, had 100% true perceptions!</em> This fact is guaranteed by the uninterrupted causal chain running between perceived objects in the world and the physical organism, including its equally physical perceptual machinery (barring some mystical form of perception).</p><p>“But what about Hoffman’s jewel beetle molesting a beer bottle!”, you scream. “The beetle perceives the world wrongly!” Think about this for a moment. Is it warranted to claim the beetle percieves wrongly, because it doesn’t perceive what a <strong>human thinks he should perceive</strong>, namely female members of the species <em>Julodimorpha Bakewelli in the family Buprestidae</em>? What if, instead, we entertain the scandalous idea that jewel beetles, lacking a brain to support conceptual faculties, actually do not seek out “female members of their species”, but instead search for “brown, dimpled, and shiny objects” (to identify the former, one needs concepts; to identify the latter, perception suffices)? If this idea sounds fine to you, then the discovery of bugs which were evolved to seek out dimpled brown objects, and which in reality <strong>end up finding said objects</strong> (even if these sometimes don’t coincide with what they historically did — a female beetle), is actually convincing <strong>proof</strong> that the bug’s perceptions are veridical. The tragedy of the jewel beetle is not that it doesn’t properly perceive reality, but that it didn’t evolve to be an entomologist! Not a huge surprise, considering the evolutionary recency of beer bottles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*NQbrwVw0GymghcSX.png" /></figure><p>Likely, what I wrote will raise some eyebrows. How can I say that humans don’t see more truly than photosensitive bacteria, for example? The former are obviously more veridical than the latter! Is this really the case, however? Let me answer by asking a question in turn. Which statement is <strong>more true</strong>: that I live 10 minutes walking distance from work <strong>OR</strong> that I live 812 meters and 40 centimeters from work? The answer is: both are true, they just approach the problem from different scales and angles. Similarly, the diffuse, directional differences in light intensity that a bacteria might detect are as true and valid as the full spectrum of frequencies visible to the human eye.</p><p>One might object: humans, too, don’t see the world as it <strong>really</strong> is! We can’t see ultraviolet light, for example. This objection is misguided — we veridically see those properties of the environment which fall within the parameters of our visual system. Any past, present, or future perceptual machinery must have an identity, meaning it can only interact with a limited set of objects/features in the world, consistent with that identity. To say that this invalidates perception is to appeal to a logically impossible standard — a kind of godlike perception which is unrestrained by physics, and percieves everything at once, but by no specific means. Clearly, this argument will not work. Philosophically, it amounts to saying that our perception is invalid because it is our perception — humans are blind <strong>because</strong> they don’t have super-human eyes, just like beetles are blind becuse they lack human eyes. (<em>Pro Tip</em>: please don’t email me pictures of optical illusions in response. The fact that we veridically see ambiguity in artificially constructed stimuli designed to be ambigious, thus prompting higher-level visual interpretation, does not advance the argument.)</p><p>Once one understands that perception, at any evolutionary stage, is always veridical (and thus fitness-promoting, relative to its absence), one can appreciate why the “simulation proof” of Interface Theory fails. Simulating evolution is fine and sometimes useful, but simulations can ultimately do nothing but obey the assumptions you put into them. This point has already been raised and discussed in an <a href="http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/the-interface-theory-of-perception-view.html">excellent post</a> on Andrew and Sabrina’s Psychology blog. Thus, we arrive to the defeating realisation that what counts as a “revolutionary insight” in psychology, is nothing but a logical necessity in mathematics.</p><p>Finally, it’s interesting to reflect on the reasons why Interface Theory has garnered so much popular attention during these past weeks. My impression is that a big component of its success lies not in the formal treatment of the subject matter, but rather in the extremely intuitive appeal of its main rethoric vehicle — the Desktop metaphor. As it happens, I have <a href="http://www.vukovicnikola.info/brain-is-not-a-computer/"><em>already written on my blog</em></a> about the dangers (and futility) of using computer-based metaphors in cognitive theorising. Humanity has always had a tendency to conceptualise big problems using whatever most advanced technology they have at the time. While sometimes useful, such poetic treatment of scientific matters is also invariably wrong, and has often led us astray. This is especially true when the object of our explanatory metaphors is at the same time the subject which came up with them in the first place, i.e. our brain.</p><blockquote>If you liked this story, press the green heart icon below.</blockquote><blockquote>Nikola Vukovic is a neuroscientist researching language and the brain. You can follow him on <a href="https://twitter.com/vukovicnikola">Twitter</a> or at <a href="http://www.vukovicnikola.info/">vukovicnikola.info</a>, where the story was published originally.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=732ea6172df5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ditch the Consensus: Why your Brain is definitely not a Computer]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@vukovicnikola/ditch-the-consensus-why-your-brain-is-definitely-not-a-computer-8156f843123f?source=rss-b6af7a8cd523------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8156f843123f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikola Vukovic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2015 14:44:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-20T14:45:32.228Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Our brain functions like a computer.</em> This idea has become so commonplace that hardly a day passes without some newspaper article, book, or movie, reaffirming its intuitive appeal. In cinemas, we regularly see people <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0133093/"><em>copy</em></a> their <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2209764/"><em>consciousness</em></a><em> </em><a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1843866/"><em>into</em></a> a <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1823672/"><em>computer</em></a>. We see computers becoming so complex as to <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1798709/"><em>contemplate</em></a> their existence, and we see our own <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088247/"><em>threatened</em></a><em> </em><a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1059786/"><em>soon</em></a><em> </em><a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0062622/"><em>after</em></a>. Outside of cinemas, we see governments paying billions to build <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Brain_Project"><em>digital versions</em></a> of<em> </em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Brain_Project"><em>human</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRAIN_Initiative"><em>brains</em></a>, and we see <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/28/bill-gates-on-dangers-of-artificial-intelligence-dont-understand-why-some-people-are-not-concerned/"><em>billionaires</em></a><em> </em><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-ai-biggest-existential-threat"><em>seriously</em></a><em> </em><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540"><em>lamenting</em></a> the <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/021d3484-fd1d-11e3-8ca9-00144feab7de.html#axzz3m7gDZSQW"><em>impending</em></a><em> </em><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/22/robots-google-ray-kurzweil-terminator-singularity-artificial-intelligence"><em>singularity</em></a> and AI kill squads. The notion that the brain is <strong><em>computing</em></strong> consciousness is at the core of much of modern philosophy, popular culture, psychology, linguistics, and the mind sciences in general. Unfortunately, the computational view of cognition is not only deeply flawed — it is fundamentally incoherent.</p><p>The habit of conceptualising the mind as whatever most advanced tool currently available is likely as old as technology itself. Having been compared to a hydraulic machine by Descartes, or a steam engine by Freud, it is not surprising that the mind populating present day psychology textbooks is computational through-and-through. This is a notion evident not just in coffee shops or TV shows, but in the most up-to-date scientific texts, where programming terms are all too naturally applied to speak about the brain’s “memory capacity”, “encoding”, “computational cost”, “algorithms”, or “executive processes”.</p><p>At this point, one might wonder: “<strong><em>What exactly</em></strong> is so problematic about using computer theory to explain brain functioning? After all, it doesn’t take a professional to realise the brain is not made of silicon and transistors, so cognitive scientists <strong><em>obviously</em></strong> mean that the brain is <strong><em>like</em></strong> a computer — and not actually one!”</p><p>This, in fact, is a misguided objection, because it rests on the idea that computers have to be digital, much like the Mac-, PC-, or iPhone-like devices we are using every day. Alan Turing, the proverbial father of computation, did not entertain such prejudice. He noted that computers and brains are similar not because both are electrical, but because both exhibit functional similarity(1). He noted, indeed, that Babbage’s Analytical Engine was an entirely mechanical digital computer. Moreover, long before Babbage was able to mechanise the process, computers were <strong><em>actually</em></strong> humans hired to perform complex calculations! In other words, computers can be physiclly instantiated in any form, including conceivably an organic one, which is why many cognitive scientists believe the brain is not just like a computer — but is one, in one form or another!</p><p>If computers: digital, analog, or biological, are not defined in terms of hardware, then what are they? The standard position in computer science is spelled out by David Chalmers in his famous “implementation theory” of computing(2). Put simply, a computer is any physical system which instantiates an abstract set of step-by-step instructions, designed to perform an intended function. This detailed set of instructions through which an input is transformed into some desired output is called a program.</p><p>At a formal level, a program is an abstract mathematical object, and separate from specific media in which it might be realized. In the concrete sense, a program is the behavior of a physical system designed to implement the abstract mathematical instruction(3). This is why the original computers could be humans — they were manually computing a series of steps designed by some specialist (Babbage, Turning, or any other programmer).</p><p>Understanding that computation is the process through which an abstract program is implemented in a physical (and necessarily artificial) system is the nail in the coffin of any computational theory of mind. Being an abstract mathematical object, a program requires design by a conscious, intentional agent, who specifies the problem solved by the computation, or “the output”. None of this would flabergast a professional programmer, but for anyone thinking the brain can be explained as a computational system it entails a radical conceptual overhaul.</p><p>Computation is a term which has consciousness <strong><em>baked</em></strong> into itself, and as we all know — you cannot have your cake and eat it. In other words, you cannot circularly use computation to explain consciousness, because the former depends on the latter if it is to have any meaning.</p><p>One commonly heard objection to the above argument is that systems can be considered computational even if they do not implement a pre-specified program. All that is needed for computation, detractors claim, is “information processing” i.e. a system having inputs and outputs. The problem with this kind of argument is that it is hopelessly indeterminate. What precisely counts as an “input” or “output”? Once we realise that defining inputs or outputs itself demands interpretation, it becomes clear that anything and everything could fit the bill. Any object or system can be described as a continuous change in state space, and therefore there is an infinite and arbitrary number of higher dimensional properties which can be projected onto a lower-dimensional “output” layer. The brain, on this account of computation, really can be considered a computer — but so can anything else, including a falling rock which “computes” Newton’s gravitation equations. John Searle, an eminent philosopher, echoes this point when he says that even:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/150/1*NW2ZhrKk2pFc02BUvSU1wA.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>“The wall behind my back is right now implementing the WordStar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the formal structure of WordStar. But if the wall is implementing WordStar, if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain(4).”</blockquote><p>Thus, computation as an account of the mind is either logically incoherent, on traditional definitions, or is, granting a looser conception, utterly trivial. If everything computes, then computation is useless as an explanatory mechanism.</p><p>The human brain is the single most complex organic structure known to man. It is completely natural, as we struggle for understanding, to use metaphors and analogies for inspiration. Indeed, the computer metaphor of consciousness has given impetus to decades of neuroscientific research. Its usefulness as a functional account of the brain, however, is questionable at best, and profoundly misleading, at worst.</p><p>Astronomers struggled for centuries before they replaced the Ptolemaic system, based solely on epicycles, with the empirically superior heliocentrism. Yet even at their most obscure, the ancients never dreamed to observe, as they traced heavenly movements, a “square circle”.<br>As we wait for neuroscience’s own Copernican revolution, we must remember that whatever they turn out to be, true explanations cannot be based on contradictions. Computation is an idea conceptually parasitic on consciousness, and so cannot be used to explain it. “What else could the brain be doing, if not computing?” might not be a good reason to brush aside criticism, but it <strong><em>is</em></strong> a fascinating question — one that will intrigue cognitive scientists for decades to come, and a question I hope we will answer some day.</p><blockquote>If you liked this story, press the green heart icon below.</blockquote><blockquote>Nikola Vukovic is a neuroscientist researching language and the brain. You can follow him on <a href="https://twitter.com/vukovicnikola">Twitter</a> or at <a href="http://www.vukovicnikola.info/">vukovicnikola.info</a>, where the story was published originally.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8156f843123f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Growing Up Bilingual:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@vukovicnikola/growing-up-bilingual-8c2939c41a63?source=rss-b6af7a8cd523------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c2939c41a63</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[parenting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[childhood]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikola Vukovic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2015 08:49:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-30T09:03:08.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>a short audio piece about raising bilingual children, including the neuro-cognitive aspects of speaking many languages</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*98IG7mhAtZ_KCHibYMV1Ag.jpeg" /></figure><p>Ten days ago I was approached by <a href="https://twitter.com/SyTpp">Sylvia Tippmann</a>, a young science journalist from London. Sylvia was very much interested in the phenomenon of bilingualism and wanted to record a short audio piece about raising bilingual children, including the neuro-cognitive aspects of speaking many languages. As someone who spends most of his time researching and thinking about words (and, if I’m not careful, thinking about thinking about words), I was easily persuaded to take part. It is my pleasure to share with you Sylvia’s excellent audio piece, featuring myself, <a href="http://www.mml.cam.ac.uk/dtal/staff/tp209/">Teresa Parodi</a> and <a href="http://www.mml.cam.ac.uk/dtal/staff/nk248/">Napoleon Katsos</a> from DTAL, <a href="http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/people/matt.davis/">Matt Davis</a> from the MRC CBU, together with teachers, parents of multilingual kids, and other language specialists from around Cambridge and London.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fw.soundcloud.com%2Fplayer%2F%3Furl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fapi.soundcloud.com%252Ftracks%252F153616444%26show_artwork%3Dtrue&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fsoundcloud.com%2Fsy-tpp%2Fgrowing-up-bilingual-sytpp&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fi1.sndcdn.com%2Fartworks-000081915200-rge2hl-t500x500.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=soundcloud" width="500" height="166" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fc82a89d9499f3f43d1c23222bf50ce1/href">https://medium.com/media/fc82a89d9499f3f43d1c23222bf50ce1/href</a></iframe><blockquote>If you liked this story, press the green heart icon below.</blockquote><blockquote>Nikola Vukovic is a neuroscientist researching language and the brain. You can follow him on <a href="https://twitter.com/vukovicnikola">Twitter</a> or at <a href="http://www.vukovicnikola.info/">vukovicnikola.info</a>, where the story was published originally.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c2939c41a63" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[All Language is Body Language]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@vukovicnikola/all-language-is-body-language-ad73adb23e04?source=rss-b6af7a8cd523------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ad73adb23e04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikola Vukovic]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2015 20:15:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-04T23:10:27.874Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Early this morning, long before you decided to read this blog post, your body awoke to a new day. Your arm torpedoed up, perhaps, smashed onto the table top, and with unthinking precision incapacitated the alarm clock. Your other arm, still weak from the anesthetised stupor of preceding hours, rubbed some clarity into your out-of-focus eyes. What went on next was a sequence, as individualised as it is ritualised, of noisy drawers opening and closing, twisting faucets, toothpaste tube caps and brushes, shower doors, and refrigerator doors. Perhaps, while having breakfast, you turned on the radio or TV. You learned, from the way compressed air waves made by the stereo speaker hit your ear drums, that today is going to be another rainy day, and that you’d better grab an umbrella before going to work.</p><p>Having arrived to work and turned on your computer, you are finally ready to begin productive activity. That is, after you read this one blog post. Well, I’m here to say that already you should be proud of yourself! The kind of physical and cognitive acrobatics that you effortlessly squeezed into a single morning are beyond the capacity of any other species known to man. Indeed, a whole army of cognitive science graduates could wither away trying to understand how you’re doing what you’re doing right now — looking at squiggly lines on a computer screen and extracting sense from them. However, you would be surprised to find that cognitive science, when looking for an explanation of how you achieve these mental feats, thought it more instructive to look not at you or the way you act and move in the world, but at your computer. This is not because you accidentally forgot to erase your browsing history but because, for the last century or so, scientists believed that human thinking is computational.</p><p>What goes on in your head when you understand language, according to traditional thinking, is in fundamental ways no different than running a very sophisticated computer program. Out of this idea was developed an entire orthodoxy — namely, that linguistic thinking is based on the manipulation of abstract symbols (as abstract as a computer’s binary code) by a computational mechanism that is entirely modular and “informationally encapsulated” (just like any computer component is modular). The goal of cognitive science became to specify what these computations are, and because an algorithm is an algorithm whether it runs on a PC or a Mac, it needn’t worry about the fact that human cognition is implemented in the wet-ware that is a biological body.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*hhFaSGvL2WITEvEnauGsiQ.gif" /></figure><p>However, a wealth of behavioural and neuroscientific research conducted over the last twenty years has uncovered a radically different picture of language. Far from being abstract and symbolic, meaning is rooted in our bodily interactions with the environment (like the ones described before), and thus grounded in sensorimotor mechanisms. For instance, scientists found that hearing or reading a word such as “run”, “punch”, or “smile” activates in your brain the very same areas which you use to perform the action of running, punching, or smiling. Similarly, they found that words related to smells activate olfactory circuits, visual terms depend on the visual system, and sound-related words spark the auditory cortex. In other words, language is neither completely symbolic, nor is it modular and independent of modal neurocognitive mechanisms.</p><p>To understand a word, new research shows, is to perform a mental simulation which reuses the very same representations and mechanisms used during action, perception, and emotion. Indeed, researchers have found that people simulate a whole variety of perceptual features, including shape, size, colour, and more. We even simulate abstract features such as event duration in this way. Did you know, for example, that it takes you longer to process a sentence such as “Road 49 crosses the desert” if I tell you that the desert is 400 miles in diameter, as opposed to only 30 miles? Other studies show that your body posture and movements can influence the way you understand sentences. For example, responding to a string such as “You deliver the pizza to Andy” is faster if the response involves moving your hand away from your body. Similarly, participants are faster to judge sentences such as “She delegates the responsibilities to you” when the response movement matches the motion implied by the sentence. What all of these studies suggest is that people understand language, even when it is abstract, in terms of bodily action and the motor programs used in movement. Neurobiologically, this supports theories of language learning which place experience at the centre stage, and which argue that meaningful language units are instantiated in neuronal assemblies arising through the coupling of action-perception circuits.</p><p>The last century marked a Cartesian effort to dissociate mind from body, reason from emotion, language from the lived and embodied realities in which it is used. While early psychologists ousted the study of mental phenomena from their science, focusing solely on observable behaviour, the violent compuatationalist backlash which they provoked threw away the baby with the bathwater, alongside everyone happening to be in the apartment at the time. Only recently have people started to pay attention to both the mental and the physical constraints which shape our thinking. The newfound realisation that higher cognition and our sensorimotor systems form an interconnected and dynamic whole places theorising at a much firmer footing, and promises a more unified, coherent, and comprehensive linguistics and cognitive science.</p><blockquote>If you liked this article, press the green heart icon below.</blockquote><blockquote>Nikola Vukovic is a neuroscientist researching language and the brain. You can follow him on <a href="https://twitter.com/vukovicnikola">Twitter</a> or at <a href="http://www.nikola.me/">www.nikola.me</a>.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad73adb23e04" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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