A growing body of literature exists on the rise of Chinese soft power (Zheng, 1999; Mingjiang, 2008; Wang, 2008; Glaser, 2009; Hunter, 2009; Pan, 2009; Cao, 2011; Edney, 2012; Nye, 2012; Rawnsley, 2012; Hagström and Nordin, 2020), how it makes use of media representations to do so (Kurlantzick, 2007; Jacques, 2009; Zheng, 2009; Pan, 2014; Warren, 2014; Sun, 2015; Flew, 2016), and charting the limitations of its overtures to foreign publics (Pan, 2004; Wang, 2004; Gill and Huang, 2006; Fan, 2008; Wang and Lu, 2008; Heng, 2010; Manzenreiter, 2010; Sun, 2010; D’Hooghe, 2011; Zhao, 2013; Callahan, 2015). However there has been little primary research looking specifically at the Global Times.

The Global Times, and in particular its role in China’s public diplomacy is not well understood apart from a content analysis (Lee, 2010) of commentary essays. Addressing this concern, this project aims to identify how the efficacy of how the Global Times projects China’s discursive practice in shaping Australia as the ‘other’. Othering is one of China’s less-understood soft power discursive practices (Lams, 2017; Pan et al., 2019; Jaworsky and Qiaoan, 2021). In particular the article Othering as Soft Power Practice: China Daily’s construction of Trump’s America in the 2016 presidential election by Pan Chengxin inspired this work.

Pan et al (2019) defines othering offensive as the construction of a negative and repulsive other as a foil for indirectly fashioning a positive and attractive self-identity.

Does the Global Times practice othering Australia as soft power discursive practice? In contrast, is there evidence of a similar profiled Australian media outlet that offers a competing narrative othering China?

Australians today have to navigate Othering narratives from both Chinese and Australian media and it is the goal of this research project to document these competing narratives over the period of 12 months through a weekly podcast of news representations featuring the ‘Australia’ keyword from the Global Times and the ‘China’ keyword from Sky News Australia. These two hawkish political mouthpieces have been described as Fox News analogs, so it’s hopefully, an interesting comparison of othering practices in action.

The Global Times is a tabloid publication, and it is the only paper in China with both Chinese and English editions. A readership of 2.6m in print circulation, 8m daily page views, in excess of 30m Sina Weibo followers, 1.8m Twitter and 64m Facebook followers demonstrates its clout. Its editor-in-chief Hu Xijin has in excess of 20m followers on Sina Weibo. The Global Times has been at the forefront of China’s increasing assertive othering offensive towards Australia (see Figure 1 below: Headlines of Global Times coverage of Australia in September 2021). On September 16, an article’s headline read: Nuke sub deal could make Australia ‘potential nuclear war target’: AUKUS puts Australia in danger, Morrison’s ambition to ‘bring disaster’. This also prompted a rally cry of Southeast Asian nations against Australia from The Global Times, sometimes described as the ‘Fox News’ of China for the latitude it has to be hawkish.

This occurs in a time when contemporary Australia’s European origins, ideologies, and loyalties while being geographically Asian (Gill, 2019) has exacerbated into a “China Conundrum”(Johanson et al., 2019; Medcalf, 2019; Navdeep, 2020; Kassam, 2021; Lowy Institute, 2021b). As strategic ally US and biggest trade partner China are increasingly at loggerheads with each other (Lowy Institute, 2021b), Australia’s ontological security concerns (Pan and Korolev, 2021) has adversely impacted its relationship with China. Australia’s relationship with China was one formerly characterised by strong trade bonds. It has now been painted as anti-Chinese, becoming a foil for the construction of China’s self-concept to pit self against.

Anti-Chinese sentiment in Australia is now on the rise in the face of Australia’s increasingly hard-line othering of China. A critical discourse analysis of China, COVID-19 and Australian media found that “…credible media outlets have mostly framed China’s efforts in political and ideological terms, rather than as an issue of public health. In comparison, the tabloid media — including commercial television, shock jock radio, and newspapers — have resorted to conspiratorial, racist, and Sino-phobic positions” (Sun, 2021). The 2021 Lowy Institute Poll released in June found that trust towards China has fallen to its lowest in 17 years. Only 16% of Australians trust China to act responsibly in the world, a seven-point drop from 2020. When asked to assign responsibility for the downturn in the Australia–China relationship, the majority of Australians (56%) say ‘China is more to blame’ than Australia (Lowy Institute, 2021b).

This downward spiral according to them dates back to 2017 and then accelerated due to China’s response to Australia calling for a global inquiry into the origins of Covid-19 in April 2020 (Sun, 2021). Beyond sabre rattling with Beijing’s list of 14 demands, a slew of punitive trade bans followed. Will this relationship get worse?

Australia-China Media Watch — YouTube

Starting from November 2021 through to November 2022, a weekly podcast entitled Australia-China Media Watch (52 episodes) will be recorded to document all the news reports from the Global Times mentioning ‘Australia’ and vice versa, Sky News Australia mentions of ‘China’. Upon the completion of the documentation process, I will either be undertaking critical discourse analysis or recording another podcast to capture Australian audience reactions to these news reports and how it shapes their sense of identity and ontological security.

Each article will be (starting from Episode 11) assigned a value from

• Negative
• Somewhat Negative
• Neutral
• Somewhat Positive
• Positive

References:

Callahan WA (2015) Identity and security in China: the negative soft power of the China dream. LSE Research Online 35: 216–229.

Cao Q (2011) The language of soft power: mediating socio-political meanings in the Chinese media. Critical Arts 25(1): 7–24.

D’Hooghe I (2011) The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe: Beijing’s Public Diplomacy Puzzle. Palgrave Macmillan US, pp.163–190.

Edney K (2012) Soft Power and the Chinese Propaganda System. Journal of Contemporary China 21(78): 899–914.

Fan Y (2008) Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion? Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4(2): 147–158.

Flew T (2016) Entertainment media, cultural power, and post-globalization: The case of China’s international media expansion and the discourse of soft power. Global Media and China 1(4): 278–294.

Gill B (2019) Bounded engagement: charting a new era in Australia-China relations. Available at: https://researchers.mq.edu.au/en/publications/bounded-engagement-charting-a-new-era-in-australia-china-relation.

Gill B and Huang Y (2006) Sources and limits of Chinese ‘soft power’. Survival 48(2): 17–36.

Glaser BSM, Mellisa E. (2009) Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics. Reportno. Report Number|, Date. Place Published|: Institution|.

Hagström L and Nordin AHM (2020) China’s “Politics of Harmony” and the Quest for Soft Power in International Politics. International Studies Review 22(3): 507–525.

Heng YK (2010) Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the softest of them all? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese strategies in the ‘soft’ power competition era. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10(2): 275–304.

Hunter A (2009) Soft Power: China on the Global Stage. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2(3): 373–398.

Jacques M (2009) When China rules the world: The end of the Western World and the birth of a new global order. New York: Penguin Press.

Jaworsky BN and Qiaoan R (2021) The Politics of Blaming: the Narrative Battle between China and the US over COVID-19. Journal of Chinese Political Science 26(2): 295–315.

Johanson K, Coles A, Glow H, et al. (2019) Controversy, uncertainty and the diverse public in cultural diplomacy: Australia–China relations. Australian Journal of International Affairs 73(4): 397–413.

Kassam N (2021) By the numbers: Charting the Australia-China relationship in decline. Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/numbers-charting-australia-china-relationship-decline (accessed 01/09/2021).

Kurlantzick J (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. New York: Yale University Press.

Lams L (2017) Othering in Chinese official media narratives during diplomatic standoffs with the US and Japan. Palgrave Communications 3(1).

Lee C-C (2010) Bound to Rise: Chinese media discourses on the new global order.

Lowy Institute (2021a) Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese Communities. Available at: https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinese-communities (accessed 15 September 2021).

Lowy Institute (2021b) Tensions in the Australia-China relationship: Which country is more to blame for the tensions in the Australia-China relationship? Available at: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/charts/tensions-australia-china-relationship (accessed 15 September 2021).

Manzenreiter W (2010) The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power. Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34(1): 29–48.

Medcalf R (2019) Australia And China: understanding the reality check. Australian Journal of International Affairs 73(2): 109–118.

Mingjiang L (2008) China Debates Soft Power. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2(2): 287–308.

Navdeep S (2020) Australia-China Relations: The Great Unravelling. Reportno. Report Number|, Date. Place Published|: Institution|.

Nye JS (2012) China and soft power. South African Journal of International Affairs 19(2): 151–155.

Pan C (2004) The China Threat in American self‐imagination: The discursive construction of other as power politics. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29(3).

Pan C (2009) “Peaceful rise” and China’s new international contract: the state in change in transnational society. In: Li LC (ed) Chinese state in transition : processes and contests in local China. London, England: Routledge, pp.127–144.

Pan C (2014) Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the “Power Shift” Narrative. Asian Perspective 38(3): 387.

Pan C, Isakhan B and Nwokora Z (2019) Othering as soft-power discursive practice: China Daily’s construction of Trump’s America in the 2016 presidential election. Politics 40(1): 54–69.

Pan G and Korolev A (2021) The Struggle for Certainty: Ontological Security, the Rise of Nationalism, and Australia-China Tensions after COVID-19. Journal of Chinese Political Science 26(1): 115–138.

Rawnsley G (2012) Approaches to soft power and public diplomacy in China and Taiwan. Journal of International Communication 18(2): 121–135.

Sun W (2010) Mission Impossible? Soft Power, Communication Capacity, and the Globalization of Chinese Media. International Journal of Communication 4.

Sun W (2015) Slow boat from China: public discourses behind the ‘going global’ media policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy 21(4): 400–418.

Sun W (2021) The virus of fear and anxiety: China, COVID-19, and the Australian media. Global Media and China 6(1): 24–39.

Wang G (2004) The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications. China: An International Journal 2(2): 311–322.

Wang H and Lu Y-C (2008) The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary China 17(56): 425–447.

Wang Y (2008) Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616(1): 257–273.

Warren TC (2014) Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty. International Organization 68(1): 111–141.

Zhao Y (2013) China’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Imperatives, Impediments and Irreconcilable Tensions? Javnost — The Public 20(4): 17–29.

Zheng Y (1999) Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge University Press.

Zheng Y (2009) The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, reproduction, and transformation. Taylor & Francis.

Background

In researching the topic, I found no reportage of the HK extradition bill protests on the English-versions of Chinese mainstream media — China Daily, Peoples’ Daily, Xinhua, CGTN. Plenty of it on the Alibaba-owned South China Morning Post, however. For those of you riled by this — take care to avoid headline bias and media framing. Because nothing is published in any of China’s main broadsheets, it’s a little hard to get the facts right.

Reportedly, between five hundred thousand to a million Hong Kongers took to the streets on 9 June 2019 to give a collective middle finger to the controversial extradition bill. They fear the bill will compromise the semi-autonomous Hong Kong’s judicial system, sounding the death knell of ‘one country, two systems’ more than two decades earlier than promised.

So, one of the safest and most peaceful cities in the world for its size is seeing violence that is uncharacteristic. Reports of police brutality in response to this en masse unlawful assembly is raining in hard and fast, something few saw coming.

The reason for the protest is because of an upcoming bilateral extradition treaty with mainland China. According to an Al Jazeera report dated 11 June 2019:

Hong Kong currently has bilateral extradition treaties with 20 countries including the UK, the US and Singapore, but the amendments put forward by the administration are being framed as a way to enable the sending of suspected offenders to places with which the territory has no formal extradition agreement on a case-by-case or one-off basis.

The push for the extradition bill reportedly comes from Hong Kong itself (see SCMP article dated 1 April 2019 below). Protestors fear that this push will leave them exposed to the long arm of mainland Chinese law.

Extradition bill not tailor-made for mainland China, Carrie Lam says

China’s cure for pain

That said, and it really doesn’t matter if the push for the extradition bills comes from Hong Kong, or engineered from the long arm of mainland Chinese influence, this turn of events suits Beijing perfectly.

The invisible hand to provide China’s cure for pain is the consolidation of central power. You see, the history of China has been the history of centralisation of power.

History has taught them that without a strong in-corrupt centre, the middle kingdom fragments. Read any of China’s classical texts on war and strategy, and you’ll get a sense they’ve been the masters of mindfuckery to centralise power for thousands of years. For instance, a selection of tactics from an ancient Chinese military treatise below should give you a better idea —

18. All warfare is based on deception.

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

Source — Sun Tzu’s Art of War, translated by Lionel Gilles, hosted by MIT. And if proven correct, this manual for war is about 2,500 years old.

Sending signals that misdirect has always been part of the Chinese masquerade. Today, China’s fourth rise has a clear exogenous intention, to establish economic and security guarantees to fuel a sustainable, long-term ride to a position it no longer has to cede a single inch of physical or ideological territory.

Those who are chronically reliant on a western-centric status quo need to wake up to smell what China’s cooking .China will do whatever it takes to pacify the remnant thorn of Pax Britannica (yes the ones who drugged China for their tea) on its shores. Whether Hong Kong was really responsible for pushing the bill doesn’t matter, this protest works in favour of the mainland.

China’s aspiration for Pax Sinica has little tolerance for what it perceives as internal turmoil or anything that threatens central power and its continuing ability to keep to its promise of feeding and satisfy the hunger and desires of 1.418 billion people. That above else, gives it legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

The case with Hong Kong is both ideological and financial

Hong Kong with just 7 million people is nothing but a tiny dot in the grander scheme of China’s population. However, its demonstrated fixation with the ideology of western style democracy is the virus that China knows it must quell, before Hong Kong returns completely, to the mainland.

China knows it must strike on the solar plexus of faith to non-compliant ideology, i.e. Hong Kong’s open embrace of capitalism and its ‘western-style symptoms’ before it’s too late.

This protest, and the bill that was the catalyst fits China’s desire for continued centralisation of power neatly for Hong Kong has proven that it cannot be ‘trusted’ to remain stable in lieu of the greater good. So, while Hong Kong has had a history of peaceful protests since 1997 as a means to voice their dissent, this round of protests paints Hong Kong as a violent and unsafe place. Time to act!

From the perspective of those from Hong Kong, they rightly remain outraged as Deng’s promise of 50-years no change was not honoured. Many of the CCP’s ventures in Hong Kong lack control, and its state-owned quasi-private enterprises chase profits without realising local reactions. The pushing up of property prices by mainland Chinese have left many young Hong Kongers with little hope of owning their own homes, for instance.

What we can expect to see is a mass exodus of young Hong Kong adults (they are the majority amongst the protestors) from the former British colony even if Hong Kong’s leaders relent. It is a pity because for decades, Hong Kongers have proved to the contemporary world that Chinese people could be economic world beaters while mainland China was still recovering from its century of humiliation to Western and Japanese imperialism.

The CCP perspective and possible shortcoming

Looking at matters from the CCP perspective, if they’re indeed responsible as many in the grassroots of Hong Kong claim. the CCP is probably doing this to stem the flow of Chinese money leaking out from the mainland, channeled through Hong Kong, and then onto foreign hands.

While this might work against the CCP in the short-term, despite its size it doesn’t yet have enough competent global-savvy people to market China to the world, the solution has always been the pacification and integration (assimilation) of the best of Hong Kong culture into their toolbox.

After all, the Chinese now know economic strength makes for powerful coercive diplomacy and it’s steadily working to become a stronger and stronger geo-economic force. And Hong Kongers are very good at that, while remaining trusted by foreigners. Hong Kong was the proof of concept that the Chinese can trade like world champions while maintaining Chinese characteristics.

A probable reason leading to this clash is the intersection between China’s ambitions against the intense accumulation of pressure that has been boiling inside the Hong Kong psyche since 1997. It’s easy for outsiders to simply whinge at the fact that China is dealing such a hard hand to its own, but you see this is something China treats as a domestic matter.

But, can you really complain against your biggest customer?

However what complicates things, is that this year China will overtake the US to become the world’s biggest consumer while it still has tremendous upside.

China is still only 60% urbanised with 40% of its population still on the wrong side of the economic divide. Additionally, in terms of World GDP per capita ranking by the IMF, China is not even anywhere close to the top 10 in the world. Imagine when they get there. When more and more of the world relies on China to bring bread and butter to the table, there’ll be less and less explicit complaints, and more and more compliance, such as this example from Belgium.

So, those in the west (apart from those operating businesses that requires large, voluminous markets) the normal working class that account for most votes in elections feel most threatened by the rise of China as they don’t like losing that superior feeling that has privileged their paradigmatic worldview, attitudes and behaviour.

Conclusion

This, I think marks the end of China’s charm offensive as these protests have forced China to unveil its central power ambitions to a keenly attentive foreign audience, and a departure of the harmonious rise posture of misdirection presented to the world at the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Welcome then, to China’s fourth rise. They have memories of what failed them before. Not this time. Central power is key. Anything that compromises that, is a threat to the ricebowls of 1.418 billion Chinese. Now imagine if the world had 1.418 billion Chinese rioting and protesting against the CCP, that is going to be one heck of a global problem. Will your country take them all in — give them shelter, clothe them, and feed them?

Pax Sinica in my opinion means it’s not in anyone’s interests to have a destabilized China. For when that happens, where are the Chinese people who want to leave the middle kingdom going to go? Who is going to take them in? That is China’s open feint by allowing these protests to get out of hand.

• Update: As of 15 June 2019, Hong Kong’s leader Carrie Lam announced the semi-autonomous Chinese city will suspend its controversial China extradition bill in an effort to quell further unrest and demonstrations. She also indicated the bill will be unlikely to be passed this year.

Hold down the clap button if you liked the content! It goes a long way to help me gain exposure. Appreciations sent in advance.

Further Reading

• Hong Kong in shock after anti-extradition violence
• Hong Kong extradition law: the current process and what will change under the proposed bill
• Hong Kong may pause controversial extradition bill after mass protests

BT is an Australia-based academic who was born near the equator in the Southeast Asian archipelago and has ancestry from southern China. This article is made possible with inputs from Daniel Kuan, RT, and a former student of his who prefers to stay anonymous.

The author’s context

2019 marks my 40th rotation around the sun. It too, marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of China-US diplomatic relations and 70 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

As part of the 50-million strong diasporic Chinese growing up at the tail-end of China’s century of humiliation, and then witnessing China’s announcement at the Beijing Olympic Games that they’re back at the winner’s podium, I’ve followed China’s rise with great anticipation and trepidation.

I subscribe to Wang Gungwu’s position that to use the phrase ‘China’s rise’ is imprecise because this is not China’s first ascendancy into significance and hegemony. According to him, the first rise was the Qin-Han bureaucratic unification and centralisation of power in China between 300BC and 200+AD, the second was the Sui-Tang reunification spanning the 7th to 10th centuries, and the last and most powerful rise were the Ming and Qing dynasties spanning the 17th and 19th century before a hundred years of decline and forty years of civil war and internal strife.

This rise is henceforth, its forth. And we now know that China has really risen again because if it was not, China’s internal problems would only be of interest to the Chinese themselves.

With the amount of foreign media attention and outcry over this turn of events in Hong Kong, we can be pretty confident that we are now in a stage where China’s problem becomes a global problem.

“SINGAPORE IS A BONSAI IN CHINA’S IMAGE — A MINIATURE DOPPLEGANGER SIMILAR IN ALL RESPECTS SAVE SIZE.” –CHINA IS TO BE STUDIED, NOT FEARED 1 (JULY 17 2010)

There are few uplifting conclusions to draw upon when one is compared to a bonsai.

A senior Chinese leader once used the word to describe Singapore and its dismissive connotation did not escape a Singaporean businessman in attendance. Despite hosting myriad waves of Chinese immigration and a track record of bankrolling Chinese revolution and war efforts against foreign aggression, Singapore in the eyes of the Chinese leadership today is at best miniaturized model with some genetic similarities.

What can a compact and dense city state 42km across about 4,000 kilometres away offer to a continental nation with more than 200 times the people? So, what’s in favour and what’s not for Singapore if China surpasses the US to take No.1 spot in Asia2, the world’s most populous and fastest developing continent? Anyone who’s played the board game Risk will recall fondly the bonus army advantage gained if Asia was under one’s control….But I digress.

Will securing top spot in Asia become a prelude its drive for the No. 1 spot in the world? This will make them the first non-Western power to do so in two hundred years. From revolution to the capitalist road, the No. 2 is now breathing down No.1‘s neck. That is significant. Who trains for silver placing?

Here are three arguments for and against Singapore’s cause. What’s on the table is by no means exhaustive.

AGAINST #1 Just another brick in the wall: China’s outward interests are extensive today

With BRICS they have in some ways started to chip away at American economic hegemony, providing further ballast in restoring a multipolar world. Bilateral agreements for instance to bypass the USD in favour of direct exchange are hallmark of a seachange from a defensive posture with the yuan.

That said, China’s hard power posturing over territorial disputes in both the South and East China Sea across 2012 and 2013 should at least ring some alarm bells. The media trumpeting of the combat-readiness preps for their new aircraft carrier and stealth fighter in the same period also further suggest a sea-change from the sepia-toned memories of 韬光养晦 (tao guang tang hui), a strategy of misdirection.

Of course if we look further back, China has suffered a history of strategic encirclement since the 19th century starting with the Opium War. What sort of behaviour can one expect from a de-contained power?

Singapore’s China and US hedge against the bigger picture

FPDA has been in effect since 1971. Singapore’s naval facilities have serviced American fleets since the days my dad played in a band at a bar named Melbourne where marines and MPs regularly clashed in the 70s. Singapore’s foreign policy approach today looks a hedge between the US and China3. Can it afford to piss off either, or for either to get pissed off with each other for that matter? Further, the Singapore gateway of 1990s yore sitting at Asia’s southern continental tip is just one cog in its complex foreign policy orientation.

In response to Obama’s (now weakening?) Asian pivot, China has set up its own network of friendlies across the continents to extend influence and protect shipping lanes. Its interests in Africa have been questioned despite its proclaimed non-interventionist independent foreign policy of peace ‘see where America builds drones, China builds roads’. Beyond that, there is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the String of Pearls and its Latin-America pivot right smack in the American backyard.

AGAINST #2 It’s not like they’ve always listened… What happens when Singaporeans the Chinese listen to retire or pass on?

Once, a suggestion was made to a Chinese leader to make English first language to better adapt to the global marketplace. The response was unsurprisingly no. There was no way a leadership with the mindset of a long-continuing civilization and bounded by 4000 years of script would accede to that. It turns out mastering English with millennia of script guiding though continues to be something the Chinese have yet to master.

While former PM Lee Kuan Yew4,5,6, diplomat Tommy Koh and historian Wang Gungwu (technically Malayan-born but currently Singapore-based) remain voices that resonate with the Chinese, what happens when they are no longer around? A recent mainstream state media news article laments this possibility7.

Also foreshadowing this was an incident in 2005 when Straits Times correspondent Ching Cheong was arrested and accused of espionage in China. It took herculean Singaporean efforts a long time to get him back8.

AGAINST #3 People-to-people relations on the decline captured in online public opinion

In a city-state oft-described to thrive culturally looking East yet with an eye looking West strategically, this intricate leverage may be unhinging as xenophobic, anti-Chinese vitriol online permeate Singapore’s political blogosphere further channeled through social media, web forums and web 2.0-based communities. This trend prompted nationwide attention when Singapore’s Prime Minister devoted a sixth of his sixty-minute long 2012 National Day rally to nip the emergence of a divisive, politicking fault-line (this term was covered widely all over mainstream state media and online public discourse, with acknowledgement and action by ruling party members of parliament).

The digital revolution has provided a space for generating public opinion online and this has been redefining the contours, peripheries and centre of gravity of public discourse in a country whose citizens are often associated as operating within self-regulating out-of-boundary markers.

Incidents from Sun Xu9 to Ma Chi10, the curry incident11, the first strike in 25 years (see Figure 1 below for a study of its impact)12, to clashes over public transport etiquette have instigated many a social media frenzy. Many have leveraged the power of web 2.0 and social networking services to organise and amplify their displeasure across time and space.

Singapore pushing the envelope of urban density has had its impact on the latest floodgate of Chinese immigration, the first in 60 years.

This latest wave augments the fifth largest overseas Chinese community in the world. Those who identify themselves as Singaporean Chinese can be generations apart from their ancestral homes in China. Preferring the identifier of Huaren as opposed to Huaqiao and Huayi, this glimpse of self concept is an indicative signifier implying distinction, from the Chinese mainland. 1 million mainland Huaqiao and Huayi Chinese nationals are recent additions (since immigration laws were relaxed in 1989) and they currently share this space with the existing 2.8 million Singaporean Chinese Huaren citizens. 500,000 Peranakans or Straits Chinese make up the earliest arrivals of this diasporic landscape. Who knows how many of these myriad Chinese subgroups in Singapore (a long-time receiving location for Chinese emigration) also subscribe to the China Dream? Further, the Chinese narrative may not resonate at all with Singapore’s non-Chinese population.

If Singapore’s population target of 6.9 million is to be achieved within a generation the ratio of 1 foreigner out of 3 singapore citizens becomes 1 out of 2. The white paper was not well received. It prompted a first — mass demonstrations organized through social networking services and attended by the thousands. Such publicly confrontational acts have been unheard of in decades.

AFFIRMATIVE #1 Long running host country to Chinese immigration and exchange

Singapore is the only place outside greater China with a Chinese-majority population. In 1840, the Chinese in Singapore made up 31% of the 10,000 strong island population. 150 years later in 1990, it was 75% of 3 million. This is a percentage it maintains to this day. That should, by right, naturally make it a great place for the Chinese to do business, work, study, or live.

It maintains top ranking as source of remittance to China. The latest wave of Chinese immigration into the China, the first is sixty years continues a tradition that has gone on record for at least two hundred years.

Singapore trains China’s mayors. High-level exchanges are frequent and narratives about Singaporeans who mattered to China are plenty13.

1. Sun Yat-Sen’s base of operations during the remains well-maintained today, a visual marker that ensures the story of Singapore’s role in the Chinese revolution remains clear.

2. Singapore is a recent recipient of panda diplomacy, that usually comes with more perks than meets the eye.

3. Confucius Institutes: However, Singapore is just a node in this global network. Also, see Conficius Institutes look beyond language. The report notes the number of Institutes and classrooms globally have risen to more than 1,000 over the past nine years.

AFFIRMATIVE #2 Money talks

Economic cooperation is robust and Singapore’s been there from the start. It was given entry into China’s markets before official ties in 1990. Trade between the two has since edged toward S$100 billion in 2010. In that year, China was the second-largest source of tourist arrivals and Singapore’s biggest investment destination. Singaporeans have been actively taking steps to establish themselves in China, imprinting a Singaporean flavour and presence into the Chinese landscape. There were more than 18,000 Singapore projects in China amounting to US$47 billion. Singapore-style condos and food courts dot the Chinese urban sprawl. If Chinese projections are correct, its middle class could one day number up to 700 million. With the amount of building and development yet to be done what we have is a huge market a size the world has never seen, for Singapore entrepreneurs to tap in to. China is Singapore’s third largest trading partner after Malaysia and the EU (See Figure 2).

AFFIRMATIVE #3 Lessons from a one-party state retaining legitimacy while regulating online public opinion

Lessons on the digital revolution: China’s number of internet users stood at 591 million halfway through 2013. For a country often taunted as monolithic and homogenous, that number was a milestone. A little less than a decade ago in 2005, the number was 111 million. Relative to its population however, China’s attempts to bridge the digital divide continues to need work.

According to a study published in the Washington Post that looked at internet penetration rates from 2002 to 2012, the US grew from 50 to 81%. China was in a wholly different league. It started at 5% and grew to 42% in the same period. In 2012, Singapore’s internet connectivity was reported to be at about 99%. Despite the democratising potential of the medium, China took its chance. They saw that Singapore, a familiar country with somewhat similar characteristics had fine tuned the floodgates of the internet, gave some room for alternative voices to emerge online, while maintaining one-party political legitimacy.

– — –

To conclude, these arguments for and against are just the tip of the iceberg. Comments and thoughts to widen the discourse are most appreciated.

Footnotes:

1: Source — ‘China is to be studied, not feared’ published in the Straits Times July 17, 2010. An Insight interview by Rachel Chang with then foreign minister George Yeo

2: Singapore’s first prime minister is in little doubt the Chinese leadership feel compelled to compete for the No. 1 spot in Asia. From the book Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World published by Belfer Center Studies in International Security, 2013

3: Edward Lee (August 29, 2013) US versus China: Which matters more to Asia and Singapore? Singapore: Straits Times.

4: See Lee Kuan Yew presented with a Business China Lifetime Achievement Award in celebration of his upcoming 90th birthday on September 16 @ http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/lee-kuan-yew-receives/803440.html Also in a Global Times piece in 2009, Lee was named as one of sixty foreigners who helped shaped 60 years of the People’s Republic.

5: See Vogel, E. (2011) Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge: Bellknap Press

6: See Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World published by Belfer Center Studies in International Security, 2013

7: John Wong (September 18, 2013) Leader who struck a chord with China. Singapore: Straits Times.

8: Ching Cheong (2013) ‘My 1,000 days Ordeal’ A Patriot’s Torture, Singapore: Straits Times Press

9: For more on Sun Xu who referred to Singapore as a place where there were more dogs than humans on his microblog, go to http://news.insing.com/tabloid/prc-students-planning-protest-for-sun-xu/id-d9333f00

10: View video of the Ma Chi crash here http://sg.news.yahoo.com/ferrari-driver-was-travelling-at-178km-h–coroner.html

11: This was reported as ‘Singapore’s ‘anti-Chinese curry war’ in the Telegraph on August 16, 2011 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/singapore/8704107/Singapores-anti-Chinese-curry-war.html This article had more than 5,000 Facebook likes and 190 retweets.

12: See The Strike that rattled Singapore: a WSJ investigation‘What happened over two days in late November 2012 rattled the foundations of Singapore’s economic success — its business-friendly governance and industrial harmony — and prompted a robust response from the government http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2013/08/26/the-strike-that-rattled-singapore-a-wsj-investigation/

13: See Andrea Ong (July 3, 2013) on Lee Khoon Choy’s book Golden Dragon and Purple Phoenix. The former diplomat made an important remark — that ‘Books on overseas Chinese tend to focus on the Chinese schools and associations the immigrants form rather than the deeper blood ties that have evolved’ Singapore, featured in about 10% of the 584-page tome. http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/ex-mp-and-diplomat-launches-book-multi-ethnic-chinese-descendants-sea-

Bonsai Nation: Will Singapore matter when China becomes No. 1? was originally published in China’s foreign policy intentions toward South East Asia on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

#RisingChina [Opinion] // An overseas-born Chinese sci-fi fan’s slightly irreverent idea that China’s mode of conquest this century will probably not be by hard power, but via assimilation (同化) a la the Borg of Star Trek.

by BT

It is easy to paint China in a single brushstroke. Spare a moment’s thought though about the semantic limitations of a singular word in attempting to represent the narratives of 1.35 billion people. To do so would be almost… being lazy, or genius. A laziness compounded by choosing only to look through haze or sepia-tinted eyes making sense of China’s fourth rise? Genius because it cuts through the fog-of-war calling a spade a spade? This infographic-rich (27 in total) opinion attempts to take a close look at how 21st century China intends to make the rest of the world buy into its worldview as it plays out its great power status .

Will it follow the American interpretation of hegemony? Dominating moving pictures, song and dance, thinking processes, military industrial complex while writing the international law book — all predicated on an ‘us and them’ paradigm. I think rising China’s strategy will take a different course — one that chooses assimilation as mode of conquest. Is it too much of a stretch to think of centrally-planned China behaving like the homogenous Borg of Star Trek assimilating those that come across its path?

What Borg?

The Borg are probably the greatest adversaries of the Star Fleet protaganists in the Star Trek universe. A fictional pseudo-spieces of cybernetic ‘drones’ linked into a hive mind, the Borg exist within a collective. Their/Its ultimate goal of attainment of ‘perfection’ was…

… through the forcible assimilation of diverse sentient species, technologies, and knowledge. As a result, the Borg were among the most powerful and feared entities in the galaxy, without really being a true species at all. Memory Alpha, Star Trek Wiki

China today is made up of 91-93% of the Han Chinese ethnic group (汉族). But, China wasn’t always about just the Han. There are another 55 officially recognised ethnicities in China who make up the minority and possibly countless others lost to antiquity. The Hans weren’t always dominant, or that dominant. In my case, I did not know I was not a part of the Han until I traced the roots back to my ancestral village in Southern China. Throughout my seven years of primary school in Singapore, I was instructed by my Mandarin teachers all Singaporean Chinese were of the Han stock without ever going into lines of query about our lineage.

So, when I got a little older, I eventually found out I descended from a long line of un-Sinicized ancestors who fought against Han conquest in early imperial China. Ethnically I am probably closer to the Yue stock (越) (Vietnam is probably the final bastion of this culture). Yet I grew up identifying with the Chinese monolith, happily declaring myself as a member of the Han till a few years back. The Han Chinese (汉族) have done a pretty good job at assimilating the Chinese population to the point that the rest of the world seldom see the distinction.

Like the Borg and its central nexus (commonly personified by the Borg Queen), the Chinese have their central planners. In the Star Trek universe, Star Fleet’s solution to the Borg problem was to individualise each drone to severe its connection to the hive mind. In some ways, the import of capitalism into the Middle Kingdom mirrors this, no?

Eyes open, minds shut

If your worry about China’s rise has a genesis from the China hard power threat school, here is a list of five things (not exhaustive) to help you reconsider your position about what China’s rise means for the world. And why the way it might happen — is through assimilation (同化).

1. Mass-making stuff, piracy and buying the world.

Is China’s adeptness at piracy purely for making money and lining pockets? That may be a limited view. In just over two decades, they have grown from world’s factory of cheap stuff set in sepia-toned postcards of its capital city; to making many of the world’s premium communicator devices (then ‘arguably copying them via Xiaomi’… to building electric cars at 1/3 the price of Tesla’s in Greater China factories (See also: Elon Musk’s Tesla vs. Warren Buffett-backed BYD: Who Will Win In China?)

The Sleeping Dragon from a hundred years ago is today at the heart of Global Production Networks.

Have you looked at the numbers in terms of how much they are producing (see Figure 1) …and consuming (see Figure 2 and 3)? Once upon a time they walled themselves in and allowed their technology to seep out. They probably now know that will not work well in a multipolar borderless 21st century.

They have even made so much stuff they’ve got sprinklings of contemporary empty forts 空城计 some like to misinterpret as ‘ghost towns’ (See Figure 4). China has only just passed the 50% urbanisation mark and the Chinese mentality is loathe to carry Buddha’s foot at the last minute.

In Australia where I reside, the Foreign Investment Review Board is constantly at work curtailing Chinese takeover of their companies. See Figure 5 and 6 to get a sense of Chinese foreign investments. To get a sense of how deep the Chinese pockets are, check out data from the World Bank in Figure 7

2. Silk Route 2.0

The arteries. It gets a bit more real here. If it produces so much stuff, it has to circulate it effectively, right. Better if the circulation happens on China’s own terms, following its own pulse. If the US$40bn Silk Route 2.0 does not ring a bell— both overland via its high-speed rail (Figure 9) and through its maritime redux/comeback (Figure 8), it might be a good time to catch up now. Like the Borg of Star Trek who come from far away in the Delta quadrant, the Chinese encroachment comes from far away in the far east. And it’s not just about supply routes to move stuff… there are arteries to facilitate its energy needs too (see Figure 10, 11 and 12). For information on just how much stuff it moves via shipping containers alone, see Figure 13.

3. Hard Power and Critical Mass.

China may have a huge standing army and a growing amount of hardware. But wielding their assymetrical dragon’s spear against the top dog at this time will only lessen its aggressor’s effectiveness, not dominate it. Additionally, per capita and per square foot (especially along its borders), its military spend suddenly looks insignificant.

Throughout the millennia, China with ‘Han Chinese’ in charge had little success with hard power outside their borders. The periods of significant expansion beyond their traditional borders happened when Mongolians and Manchurians sat on the throne carrying the mandate of ‘Son of Heaven’.

That said… check out this February 2015 article about Michael Pillsbury of the China threat school in the New York Post article titled, ‘China’s secret plan to topple the US as the world’s superpower’

…he and many other China experts were taught early on to view China as “a helpless victim of Western imperialists” and that as such, assistance should be provided almost unquestioningly. Now, he says, he has come to consider this view — which he now believes came about as a result of intentional deception and misdirection on the part of the Chinese — as “the most systemic, significant and dangerous intelligence failure in American history.”

Is he right, or misdirected? Or simply feeding the US Military Industry Complex? Is he onto China’s 假痴不癫 strategy (Feign madness but keep your balance…the Chinese thought of this and crystallized it as a strategy way before Hamlet)?

To reinforce the point of assimilation… should we discount the rate and efficacy of their hard power copying abilities? For instance… In 30+ years of opening up, they have moved on from importing MIGs to cobbling together the J-31 Stealth Fighter. If you’re still convinced hard power is the road the Chinese are going to take, then this article might be of interest.

And what of the space race?

To reinforce the Borg analogy… the Chinese have made it to space thanks to the enduring efforts of Qian Xuesen (who studied at MIT and then taught at Caltech), and have now become the third nation to have a permanent presence in low earth orbit (see Figure 14).

4. Cultural Capital

Soft power projection via the secondaryness of media will never ever hit home as hard as the primacy of first-hand experience.

Do you live in a major city without a Chinatown? There are over 50 million overseas Chinese today (see Figure 15). That number is significant for two reasons. First, they make up the largest diasporic group in the world, and second, >50 million overseas Chinese is a larger number than what the 27th largest country has in terms of total population. Do you live in a place today where Chinese tourism has not made first contact (see Figure 16)? How many Chinese students are studying in your schools, learning your ways, culture and methods (See Figure 19)? It is more impactful than any experience mediated by media representations on a screen.

Their diasporic history means they have a headstart with assimilation of the physical kind. Now they’re just getting started on the looking-glass, ideological type (See Figure 17 and 18) with an added bonus of financial clout (See Figure 20). And what about the proliferation of Confucius Institutes?

This section is probably trickiest to substantiate. A fine line probably exists between cultural embedding and assimilation.

5. And then they breed a next generation… with some pretty positive results.

1. Tech savvy (See Figure 21)
2. Cognitive Upgrades (See Figure 22 and 23)
3. To learn the host’s methods (See Figure 24)
4. And then becoming world beaters (See Figure 25)

By design or circumstance… Did you know China’s one-child policy is now history? See Why is China relaxing its one-child policy? The Economist explains.

In conclusion…

More powerful than a meme or virus, the Han Chinese are in some ways, like the Borg of Star Trek. Will you be assimilated? Now that almost all within the Great Wall have been assimilated, are they now finally ready to turn their attention on assimilating the rest of the world?

Maybe I am thinking too much.

Maybe this is all happening because of something far more fundamental. Just a century ago (see Figure 25), certain nations in the world gave China two lessons it will never forget. The physical humilation of ceding territory and treaty ports away like water surely sticks as the first (see Figure 26). The destruction of the Chinese will by being fed opiates en masse as a lesson in free trade is the other.

So, if you allow me to indulge in my Star Trek fantasies… assimilation may appear like a symbiont from some angles, but it is ultimately predatory in nature. The act increases its own numbers, gains the technologies of the host, at the expense of the host.

Nevertheless… Conquest through assimilation. How’s that for art of war.

further thoughts…

** There disputes to this perspective — that the Chinese are like the Borg. One argues the Chinese model is more akin to that of the Wizard of Oz:

Central planning collectivists are not the Borg. In fact — keeping with popular cultural references — they are closer in stature to the Wizard of Oz.

by Doug Reich: The Rational Capitalist

* *Another source of disagreement against this point-of-view comes from Singaporean writer Api Ngo who asserts that ‘Han’ is more a matter of culture, than genetics. He also adds that expansionism has always been at the Chinese core.

Here’s sharing his response:

All Chinese adopt the ‘Han’ culture, but genetically, there is no such thing as pure ‘Han’ people now. I myself am descended from the old royal bloodline of the Wu State, your not-so- friendly neighbour of the Yue state.

Consider also the 3 main religion/philosophies that make up Chinese culture today. Buddhism advocates being at harmony with self, Confucianism advocates harmony with society, Taoism advocates harmony with nature.

Current Chinese culture is a combination of all 3 schools of thought, all of which does not advocate conflict or duality as opposed to the mainly Christian-based cultures of the west that is built upon the Abrahamic tradition of good vs evil. Or the idea that that there is always a struggle against an adversary. Taken to the extreme, you get what we now see as modern fundamentalism.

Cultural assimilation by the Chinese is only possible because of the framework of standardisation laid down around 350BC in the Qin state. It expanded and became entrenched after the Qin state united China under the first emperor.

Outwardly, the central governing philosophy changed from Legalism to Taoism (albeit for only 3 generations). Confucianism followed after the fall of the Qin Empire and transitioned to the Han dynasty, the political framework has remained largely the same over the next 2000 years.

This system of 外儒内法 (Confucian exterior, Legalist core) is also the source of much of our internal philosophical conflict as a race/people since the Confucians view the legalists as mortal enemies and have never stopped attacking Legalist ideas since they became the dominant school of thought.

How many other civilisations have you seen apart from the Chinese criticize their own origins as viciously as we do? This constant self-reflexive conflict between ourselves and our origins; and the philosophy of harmony within our culture, has caused the Chinese people to constantly be in a state of conflict.

Soft power and assimilation has always been the Chinese way, but expansionism has always been at our core. The Chinese are not so big on genetic purity but are more insterested in cultural oneness.

It may not be that surprising to see in the future — a planet full of Eurasian people speaking the Mandarin tongue and adopting Chinese culture.

by Api Ngo

This is a response from a South-East Asian friend that thinks China’s attempt to assimilate the world may have its limitations.

Very interesting. I’ve been watching and reading some stuff that’s related to this subject. I remember back in 1973 Mao Zedong offered to send 10 million women to the US. It was viewed as sexist and weird by the white people, but I’m sure he had assimilation in mind. The Manchurians were wiped out by that, and the Mongolians under Genghis also assimilated other tribes.

I think China is in a good position to assimilate as it builds on its military, cultural and economic power. But once the economic power declines, like it might if its “zombie companies” overwhelm the system, it might follow a similar route as Japan. There’s also the danger that the Communist Party might not be able to please the different civil societies and interests that are demanding a bigger say in how the government is run. Although Xi Jinping’s clamping down on corruption is an attempt to appease people and drive the narrative towards corruption instead of other problems.

I just finished reading Age Of Ambition by Evan Osnos, and it’s a good insight into the China psyche, through his observations and anecdotes. One thing I learned from it is how the revived Confucianism to replace a void in the spiritual life of the Chinese people. I think the Confucious Institutes in other parts of the world is a mild starting attempt to assimilate other cultures.

By a friend

Update: Wed April 8, 2015

the end.

BT is a hemisphere-crossing overseas-born Chinese who took over the baton of his grandfather’s diasporic 3,000km boat journey from Southern China to Singapore by doubling it another 6,000 km to the land down under. He is now a media and communications educator with concerns on the growing distortion between representations and the primacy of real events. He also thinks educators should focus more on improving their students’ processing abilities rather than stuffing one-dimensional stories that confuse bias with good intention. Follow him on Twitter here.

China’s fourth rise: You will be assimilated. I was. was originally published in China’s foreign policy intentions toward South East Asia on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Brace for impact and welcome to a twenty-first century of transiting great powers. If the twentieth century anno domini saw the emblematic rule of Captain America, the twenty-first witnesseses a (depending on how you are informed) a rising or returning frequency to the global hum. The Chinese nation, since opening up in 1978 returns to the apex of humanity’s mindshare in a multitude of guises. From world’s factory to human rights abuser to the world’s largest foreign holder of American debt; it is also no stretch of imagination to consider China’s guise as PR champion.

As recently as 2008, foreign nations were still quick to criticize the Chinese model; their representatives quite happy to boycott the Beijing Olympics — today few countries vent their laments about China publicly. And how the tables have turned. From a century of humiliation at the hands of European colonial powers and Japan, China has performed one of the most dramatic comebacks and just last week — was quite happy to criticize the way the US handle their accounts. Such a paradigm shift was facilitated by an increased understanding of political diplomacy, and a media-intensive charm offensive model of public diplomacy; the soft power aspect to building a Beijing Consensus.

To take a diagrammatic approach, if the Washington consensus was represented by the iconography of the bald eagle and Captain America, what would China’s be? Kung-fu Panda (although that is a product of American narrative) seems to fit the description — An adorable-looking fighting force based on a midde path engaged in panda politics. Perhaps even Donnie Yen as the twenty-first century Chinese wuxia hero. I wonder what your thoughts are?