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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Whitney Gibbs on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Whitney Gibbs on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Whitney Gibbs on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Much Information Does OSINT Actually Yield?: A Case Study]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@whitneywgibbs/how-much-information-does-osint-actually-yield-a-case-study-b981c503b0b8?source=rss-727a54e2bc04------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[case-study]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Whitney Gibbs]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2017 16:43:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-14T06:28:29.786Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/593/1*SAO-Znf9YHmYhUlZ8Z6W1w.png" /></figure><p>Have you ever wondered how much information any given person could have about you? In the abundantly technological age we live in, does the access to free and open information make you question how invisible or “off the grid” you really are?</p><p>Being a graduate student studying intelligence and security studies, my mind ponders the topics that we cover in my courses constantly. I think about the ways in which the theories, techniques, and tradecraft work in real world scenarios and jump at any opportunity to put what I have learned into practice. At the start of this term, we had studied open source intelligence (OSINT), its uses and limitations, at great lengths. OSINT, for those of you who are not familiar, can be defined as intelligence collected from publicly available sources.1These sources would include the Internet (also encompassing social media intelligence into what is called SOCMINT), mass media, specialized think tanks or journals, photos, as well as maps and other “commercial imagery products.”2 Learning of all the available avenues the intelligence community could utilize in order to gain information on an individual, organization, or government without a warrant or intrusive and expensive surveillance programs, I began to ask just how much could be found on one seemingly “invisible” individual?</p><p>With this question weighing on my mind, I embarked on a fact finding mission; what could I find on myself, simply from OSINT? I quickly came to realize that I was able to track down nearly every aspect of my life: homes I had lived in, newspaper articles that bore my name, details on each of my family members (including my grandparents who had never used the internet in their lives). I had been able to track down a plethora of intelligence right from the desk in my bedroom; however, my experiment was inherently flawed. I knew too much about myself, I knew which keywords to type such as schools I had attended, cities I was connected to, and employers I had worked for. In order for this experiment to work, I would have to try to find information on a target I knew nothing about. This is when I turned to my friend, Rick.</p><p><strong>Choosing a Target</strong></p><p>Rick (whose name is not Rick; all names of individuals and locations have been changed for the sake of privacy in this article) had many friends I did not know, many I had never even seen. I asked him one day if he would like to ask one of his friends to join in on my experiment. I explained that I would only pursue information on his friend for the sake of my study and would keep the information I obtained to myself. I also explained that I would like to begin the experiment with nothing but a picture so as to make the my search even more difficult. I had Rick take me off all of his social media friend lists and asked that neither him nor his friend change anything about their security settings. After receiving approval and a photo, I began my hunt.</p><p><strong>The Experiment</strong></p><p>My target was a male, around my age and the only thing I knew about him was that Rick knew him in some way. Since I had this information, I began at Rick’s Facebook page (although, if I had not known either men, I would have begun with an image search on Google). Though now I could only see limited information on Rick’s page, his privacy settings in regard to his Friends List was set to public. I scoured the list, trying to match the face in the picture with one of the profiles and within about five minutes, I had located my target’s personal page. Though he too shared very little personal information with the outside world there were three key elements I could still see: his name (Matthew Green), his profile pictures, and his own list of friends. This was enough for me to move forward.</p><p>Next, I moved onto Instagram, since I had a face and a name, I hoped I could find the appropriate profile and perhaps even a location. His profile took about 45 seconds to locate and to my surprise, his photos were public. Here I could see each vacation he had taken over the past 3 years, deduce that his enjoyed cycling as well as American and European football, and even where he had been the night before. Further still, I was able to see photos his friends (who also had public accounts) had tagged him in and learned more personal information about him including the town he lived in and his closest friends and girlfriend’s names. His Instagram username also divulged a wealth of information as it appeared to have his middle initial included in it.</p><p>My next two stops I decide to venture to simultaneously. I opened a second tab on my browser and entered his Instagram username followed by “Twitter” into Google on one and redirected to Linkedin on another. Once again with little effort, I was able to find his profiles on both sites, each overflowing with information for anyone’s eyes. From Linkedin, I was able to find out where he worked, what his occupation was, what he had gotten a degree in, where he went to school, and what year he graduated. This was key information for me because now I could figure out roughly how old he was based on when he had finished high school. On his Twitter page I read tweet after tweet communicating his frustration when the number 12 bus had not reached Washington Street bus stop at 7:23 am, making him “late to work once again.” This confirmed to me not only the town he lived in, but also the neighborhood as well.For fun I continued further, using everything from public birth records in his city to the online white pages to track down as much as I could until finally exhausting my resources.</p><p><strong>Findings</strong></p><p>In only two hours, from the comfort of my own home (and without spending a penny) I had found everything from when he was born and his mother’s maiden name to the street on which he owned his home. I read articles about charity runs he had done with his colleagues to raise money for a children’s hospital and how he had played on his high school lacrosse team back in 2006. When chatting with Matthew two days later, he tried to stump me on questions like “well, where does my girlfriend work?” or “what sort of dog do I own? I never posted a photo of him.” Questions that I was able to answer quickly and with immense ease. Though my findings were limited in that I did not use any special software or tools to sift through or retrieve information, the experiment was utilized to show how much information even the average individual could obtain through open source intelligence.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>From the experiment, it is clear that OSINT can be utilized to obtain vast amounts of information on individuals, regardless of their criminal history or presence on social media platforms. This experiment might shock or even frighten those who, perhaps, believe that only limited personal information can be found about them; information which they can control; yet, I believe it highlights an important truth of OSINT that some within the intelligence community have begun to doubt. For years now, the mass amount of OSINT available to analysts has hindered its ability to be adequately used and its widespread public access has made many question its utility, especially in regard to state actors. However, when a subject such as a lone wolf or non-state actor is targeted, OSINT can be crucial to understanding how the individual thinks about or reacts to a group, ideology, or event as well as who they are connected to. Moreover, within the private sector where espionage campaigns are not an option, OSINT provides market, performance, and product information which is regularly released to the public and can allow organizations to obtain an edge on their competitors. On the other hand, much of the information that was gathered during my experiment could have been protected simply by increased privacy settings by the individual. Though there is little that can be done to completely erase oneself from all public records, a healthy and protected presence online can greatly limit the access a person has on your information without obtaining a warrant. In the end, it comes down to an individual’s decisions as to how much they would want the world to know. If you have nothing to hide, then the concern, conceivably, of such monumental amounts of information being within public reach is not simply what they can find out, but how they can use it.</p><p><em>About the Author: Whitney is a postgraduate student at the </em><a href="https://le.ac.uk/"><em>University of Leicester.</em></a><em> She is currently earning her Master of Arts degree in Intelligence and Security Studies. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Military History from the </em><a href="http://www.amu.apus.edu/"><em>American Military University</em></a><em> and is an Associate with </em><a href="https://www.theintelligencecommunity.com/"><em>The Intelligence Community Inc.</em></a></p><p>Notes</p><p>“INTellingence: Open Source Intelligence,” Accessed on 1 May 2017, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html">https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html</a>.</p><p>Ibid.</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. “INTellingence: Open Source Intelligence.” Accessed on 1 May 2017. <a href="https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html">https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-intelligence.html</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b981c503b0b8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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