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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jacob Whiton on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jacob Whiton on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jacob Whiton on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Sedition Caucus and the Legacy of Reconstruction]]></title>
            <link>https://whitonjacob.medium.com/the-sedition-caucus-and-the-legacy-of-reconstruction-6b15976cb6dd?source=rss-47753cdea37f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[proportional-rep]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[january-6-2021]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[south]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reconstruction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[house-of-representatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Whiton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jan 2022 21:40:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-11T21:40:04.018Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Only equal representation can defeat antidemocratic reaction</h4><p>The January 6 insurrection has inspired much public reflection and debate over the past year as Americans grapple with the threat of white Christian nationalism and its grip on the Republican Party. The anniversary of the storming of the U.S. Capitol is an opportunity to reconsider my own modest contribution to this conversation and hopefully provide some additional insight into how our political institutions have enabled a faction of reactionary Southern Republicans to dominate Congress for the last thirty years. For a poignant illustration, look no further than the ubiquity of <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2021/05/the-gop-is-turning-the-january-6-insurrection-into-a-new-lost-cause/">Lost Cause</a> iconography among the insurrectionists, and until <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/06/29/1011303611/the-house-votes-to-remove-confederate-statues-in-the-u-s-capitol">recently</a>, in the halls of the Capitol.</p><p>My analysis (first posted <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/where-sedition-is-rewarded-2a50ccc70fd">here</a>, later updated and <a href="https://bostonreview.net/articles/jacob-whiton-where-sedition-rewarded/">republished</a> in <em>Boston Review</em>) identified commonalities across districts represented by the so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/07/us/elections/electoral-college-biden-objectors.html">“Sedition Caucus,”</a> the 139 House Republicans who objected to the certification of Arizona’s and Pennsylvania’s 2020 presidential election results following the insurrection. I recommend those who haven’t take a look at the more fully elaborated versions linked above, but in summary:</p><ul><li>Republican objectors represent low density suburban and exurban areas on the fringes of fast-growing metropolitan regions. While these districts are still predominantly white, they have seen the largest relative increases in the share of residents identifying as Hispanic and Asian American.</li><li>Strong population growth has put upward pressure on these districts’ generally lower-priced homes. This has primarily been to the benefit of middle class Hispanic and Asian Americans, whose rates of homeownership have also been converging with white residents.</li><li>Demographic change and upward mobility among racialized groups has induced a sense of status threat among white residents, heightened in objectors’ districts by evangelical angst over religious diversity and secularism. Workers in these places are also more likely to be employed in sectors of the economy perceived as under threat by the political left, like oil and gas extraction, heavy manufacturing, and law enforcement.</li></ul><p>Since sharing, others have published similar findings about the local social context influencing right-wing Republicans’ support for insurrectionary <a href="https://www.prri.org/spotlight/anniversary-of-jan-6-insurrection/">violence</a>. To conclude, I noted optimistically that objectors represent some of the lowest turnout districts in the country:</p><blockquote>…Democrats’ dual Senate victories in the state of Georgia have vindicated a strategy of organizing and mobilizing the latent majority of voters who will reject white Christian nationalism and its antidemocratic politics, even in a state where voter suppression efforts have been infamous.</blockquote><blockquote>The fact that Republican objectors command the least popular support among their own constituents of any congressional elected officials in the country is both a testament to their effectiveness in entrenching their own power and also the foundation on which we must ground our hopes for political change to end minority rule.</blockquote><p>Admittedly, I am far less sanguine today about the potential for electoral organizing to check the power of the reactionary right. Subsequent analysis has not borne out that Democratic victories in Georgia were primarily attributable to greater participation. Turnout was certainly up in November 2020, but the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/upshot/warnock-ossoff-georgia-victories.html">increase</a> among Black voters, Democrats’ electoral base in the state, was smaller than for other groups. In fact, the Black share of the electorate fell to its lowest level in over a decade.</p><p>It was affluent, college-educated suburbanites’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/17/upshot/georgia-precinct-shift-suburbs.html">rejection</a> of Trump that proved decisive in winning Georgia’s electoral college votes for President Biden, many swinging back in favor of the Republican candidates for senate just two months later. While efforts to mobilize Democratic voters around a uniquely high stakes runoff election did help minimize the drop off in participation among Black voters between November and January, their share of the electorate only increased because <a href="https://www.ajc.com/politics/turnout-dip-among-georgia-republicans-flipped-us-senate/IKWGEGFEEVEZ5DXTP7ZXXOROIA/">turnout fell</a> significantly among rural white voters.</p><p>Even if it had been the case that increased turnout unambiguously won these statewide races for Democrats, this tells us little about the party’s prospects in any individual congressional race. In a high turnout year with an electorate that ultimately preferred Biden to Trump, Democrats managed to flip just one House seat in Georgia, the only race in the state decided by a margin of less than five percentage points. Republicans won eight of the state’s 14 seats, each besting their opponent by a margin of more than 15 points. Six of them refused to certify the results of the presidential election on January 6.</p><p>Objectors’ districts are not uncompetitive because turnout is low, turnout is low because they are uncompetitive. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, there are simply too few potential Democratic voters in these places for higher turnout to tip the balance against a Republican candidate. Right-wing Republicans may be hostile to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/22/wide-partisan-divide-on-whether-voting-is-a-fundamental-right-or-a-privilege-with-responsibilities/">universal suffrage</a>, but they are not hostile to American “democracy,” insofar as our ostensibly democratic institutions insulate them from competitive elections and afford them unequal influence on federal lawmaking. As Jedediah Britten-Purdy, constitutional law professor at Columbia University, put it in his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/opinion/us-democracy-constitution.html">essay</a> on the anniversary of the insurrection, “[an] antidemocratic system has bred an antidemocratic party.” To defeat the Sedition Caucus, we need more than equal access to the ballot. We need equal representation.</p><h4>Proportional representation and the Southern bloc</h4><p>Congressional districts are drawn so that each House member represents roughly the same number of constituents. Unlike the U.S. Senate, this ensures that the geographic distribution of seats is proportionate to the distribution of the population within and between states. It does not, however, ensure party seat shares are proportionate to party vote shares. Egregious as Republican efforts at partisan <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2021/10/25/2021-texas-redistricting-explained/">gerrymandering</a> may be, this disproportionality is <a href="https://econfip.org/policy-briefs/majoritarian-versus-proportional-representation-voting/">inherent</a> to plurality elections in single-member districts.</p><p>Imagine a U.S. state where, like Georgia, slightly more than half of voters preferred Republican House candidates and 49% voted for Democrats. If both parties’ voters were distributed perfectly evenly across the state, Republicans would win in every race regardless of how district lines were drawn. The state’s delegation to the U.S. House would be 100% Republicans, even though only 51% of voters actually chose a Republican candidate in the election.</p><p>The extent of this disproportion depends on a number of factors: District size, the statewide vote split, the <a href="http://www.jonathanrodden.com/why-cities-lose">spatial distribution</a> of voters, and of course, how district boundaries are drawn. For instance, Democrats’ seat share in the hypothetical battleground state above would increase if they were more spatially concentrated. While they would still be underrepresented in the state delegation, Democrats could be assured of winning at least one or two safe seats. Republicans may actually prefer such a scenario, as their seats would become less competitive as well.</p><p>Both parties benefit from Congressional overrepresentation. While Republicans have a five seat advantage nationally, adopting a system of proportional representation in each state’s congressional delegation would primarily affect the regional composition of the Republican and Democratic caucuses. The beneficiaries would be Democrats in red states, Republicans in blue states, and the many Americans who would rather be represented by <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/329639/support-third-political-party-high-point.aspx">another party</a> altogether.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/1*cjygKTkSNrmgMiscu_CPHg.png" /></figure><p>Currently, Democrats control a disproportionate number of seats in the Northeast and West, Republicans in the Midwest and South. Unacknowledged in my original analysis, there is a very clear regional divide among congressional Republicans. Fewer than half of the 51 Republicans elected in the Midwest objected to certification, compared with more than three-quarters of all Republican representatives from the South. That’s 85 of the Sedition Caucus’s 139 members. Together these reactionary Southern Republicans represent a larger bloc of House votes than all nine state delegations from the Northeast combined.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t2RFkhsusradrfJyEeHyPA.png" /></figure><p>Southern Republicans are the main beneficiaries of disproportionate representation in the U.S. House. The majority of voters in the region prefer Republican candidates, but their seat share is inflated by an average of 20 percent, an 18 seat boost region-wide. Because of the region’s size, this exceeds the seat boost Democrats enjoy in either the Northeast or the West.</p><h4>Unequal representation and racial polarization</h4><p>Immigrants and people of color prefer Democrats by large margins, regardless of where in the country they reside. Black voters are the party’s most committed bloc of support, more than 80% of whom supported a Democrat in 2020. The extent of Democratic support among immigrants and other racialized groups tends to vary more with Democrats’ overall regional performance, but even in the South, where Republicans perform best, these voters preferred Democratic candidates by a margin of 17 percentage points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hyXeaq1Osemirvg_Sk4YYg.png" /></figure><p>Only white voters’ partisan lean differs by region. In the Northeast and West, white voters showed a slight preference for Democratic congressional candidates, and in the Midwest and South, a strong preference for Republicans. Because the white share of the electorate is much smaller in the South than in the Midwest, party coalitions in the region are especially polarized by race.</p><p>Midwestern Republicans may enjoy large margins among white voters, but supermajorities of both parties’ voters in the region are white. In the South, Republican voters are also overwhelmingly white, but unlike anywhere else in the country, immigrants and people of color constitute a majority of Southern Democrats. Republicans in the region are more than 65% more likely to be white than Democrats, but only 26% more likely in the Midwest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/821/1*tolAfCyem2R3f9OoqHS3JA.png" /></figure><p>Consider South Carolina, where in 2020 Republicans were able to win six of the state’s seven seats with only 56% of votes statewide. Five of these seats are held by election objectors, the one non-objecting Republican from the state having won her race by less than a percentage point. In my original analysis, I noted that non-objecting Republicans came from some of the highest turnout districts in the country and typically won their seats by smaller margins than Republican objectors.</p><p>It is no coincidence that South Carolina’s single Democratic seat, won by a nearly 30 percentage point margin, is held by House majority whip, Representative James Clyburn. In both the majority and minority party, safe seats protect incumbents, who are then more likely to advance into party leadership. Only 27% of the state’s Black residents, who constitute a quarter of the total state population, live in Representative Clyburn’s district. The nearly 940,000 Black South Carolinians who do not are <a href="https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C2020/R13002748">spread</a> across districts represented by some of the House’s most <a href="https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article247233814.html">right-wing</a> Republicans. Under a proportional system, the combined votes of all Democrats living in majority-Republican districts would be sufficient to flip two of the state’s seats.</p><p>In the South as a whole, 13 million Democratic voters are represented by a Republican in the U.S. House, half of all the region’s Democratic voters in 2020. More than 80% live in districts won by more than a 10 percentage point margin and more than half where the Republican’s margin of victory was more than 20 points. It comes as no surprise that these voters seldom feel like turning out to vote is worth their while. Whether they do or not makes no difference, they remain unrepresented in the people’s House.</p><h4>The long shadow of Reconstruction</h4><p>The racially polarized nature of party conflict in the South helps account for the predominance of Southern Republicans in the Sedition Caucus and among the most fervent <a href="https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2020/08/11/cawthorn-turns-hard-right-defends-use-symbols-tied-white-nationalism/3346238001/">champions</a> of white Christian nationalism. Their power in the U.S. House is premised on the structural underrepresentation of Southern Democrats, which more than in any other part of the country, means the underrepresentation of Black voters and other people of color.</p><p>Anyone with a cursory knowledge of the region’s <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/686631">history</a> can recognize the roots of reactionary antidemocracy in the century-long struggle over Black enfranchisement that followed the abolition of slavery. Long the bastion of the Democratic Party’s <a href="https://segregationinamerica.eji.org/segregationists">white supremacist</a> right wing, conservative Republicans began courting disaffected white Southerners and their <a href="https://nyti.ms/3lODtHU">political leadership</a> in the late 1950s and 1960s by reframing opposition to court-ordered desegregation as a principled defense of localism and “states’ rights.” On the eve of the Supreme Court’s 1954 <em>Brown v. Board</em> decision, all 17 Southern states required racial segregation in public education.</p><p>Passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act by Democratic congressional majorities and a Democratic president solidified Black voters’ commitment to the party nationwide and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42864072">polarized</a> partisanship in the South along racial lines. The forty-year partisan realignment triggered by conservative white Southerners’ <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20170572">reaction</a> to federal civil and voting rights legislation concluded with the 1994 midterm elections. Under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, elected from Georgia in 1978, House Republicans retook the chamber after 40 years in the minority.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J-OSQqbwKWr6JQdLrcTo0g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo credit: Don Sniegowski on <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/sniegowski/32974692611">Flickr</a></figcaption></figure><p>As one Republican consultant <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/11/us/1994-elections-south-rising-gop-tide-overwhelms-democratic-levees-south.html">claimed</a> at the time, “‘This is the culmination of a political revolution in the South… young, aspiring white politicians will now see their route to positions of power in the Republican rather than the Democratic Party. That has substantial long-term implications for the balance of power in the South for many years to come.’” Flipping 19 Southern seats, more Republicans were elected to the House than Democrats for the first time since Reconstruction. These seats represent the bonus conferred on the party for flipping the region from majority-Democrat to majority-Republican, winning them control of the U.S. House for 20 of the last 28 years. Given the sitting president’s party typically loses seats in midterm elections, there is a good chance they return to the majority after the 2022 election.</p><p>Breaking the grip of reactionary Southern Republicans on their party and on Congress requires us to take up the unfinished work of Reconstruction, the enduring struggle to institutionalize and enforce equal citizenship throughout the country.</p><p>The Voting Rights Act represented a major stride toward that vision by strengthening the federal government’s ability to overturn or block the state and local restrictions on Black suffrage that undergirded Jim Crow authoritarianism. In the decade since the Supreme Court’s Republican-appointed majority nullified the Voting Rights Act’s main enforcement mechanism, there has been a <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/filling-voting-rights-hole-left-scotus-shelby-county-v-holder">proliferation</a> of new limits on the franchise, many in states formerly covered by federal preclearance. Legislation to protect universal suffrage continues to languish in a Senate paralyzed by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/11/us/politics/biden-filibuster-voting-rights.html">filibuster</a>, an antidemocratic tactic long <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/3/25/22348308/filibuster-racism-jim-crow-mitch-mcconnell">favored</a> by segregationist Southerners.</p><p>Urgent as these bills are, the uncertainty of their passage is evidence of why the struggle to reconstruct our system of government cannot end with the struggle for voting rights. We must work to change all aspects of our political system that continue to deny Americans equal representation and empower a reactionary white minority to thwart majority rule. Ours is not a fight to save American democracy, it is a fight to achieve it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b15976cb6dd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Who speaks for the silent working class?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/who-speaks-for-the-silent-working-class-d28aa410f716?source=rss-47753cdea37f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d28aa410f716</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[minimum-wage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[senate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[class]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2018-midterms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Whiton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2021 21:23:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-13T20:01:53.745Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Elections and Voting</h4><h3>How the Working Class gets Left Behind</h3><h4>Participation and Class bias in American politics</h4><p>Democrats’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/10/us/stimulus-vote.html">passage</a> of the $1.9 trillion COVID-19 relief package, the American Rescue Plan, ensures a vital extension of income support for millions of families, funds vaccination efforts, shores up state and municipal budgets, and includes a temporary expansion of the Child Tax Credit that is <a href="https://www.clasp.org/press-room/press-releases/house-passed-american-rescue-plan-will-help-people-low-incomes-children">predicted</a> to halve child poverty. It is no doubt a major victory after months of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/covid-relief-bill-senate-adjourns-until-after-election/">intransigence</a> on the part of the Trump administration and Senate Republicans.</p><p>Excluded from the final bill, though, was an increase in the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour, <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/541826-senate-rejects-sanders-15-minimum-wage-hike">quashed</a> late in negotiations by the objections of eight senators in the Democratic caucus on both <a href="https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/05/delawares-carper-coons-vote-against-15-minimum-wage-measure/4596136001/">substantive</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/25/politics/minimum-wage-covid-relief-senate-parliamentarian/index.html">procedural</a> grounds.</p><p>Failure to raise the minimum wage — a move President Biden openly <a href="https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2019/04/29/biden-calls-15-minimum-wage-first-2020-campaign-stop-pittsburgh/3616040002/">supported</a> on the campaign trail and which enjoys <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-minimum-wage-idUSKBN2AP2B9">high</a> and <a href="https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/537217-poll-64-percent-support-increasing-the-federal-minimum-wage-to">rising</a> public support — is only the most recent example of the chronic inability of our federal legislature to enact policy that is favored by a majority of the American people. And yet, Americans have also taken notice that procedural hang-ups never seem to be much of an obstacle to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/trump-tax-bill.html?searchResultPosition=1">some pieces</a> of legislation, even when most Americans <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/15/donald-trump-tax-cuts-unpopular-1273469"><em>disapprove</em></a> of their passage.</p><p>There are any number of cases to point to of this fundamental dysfunction, and while the causes are many, the bias is clear. The <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/708815">least wealthy</a> half of the country who own few assets, carry proportionally large debts, and receive low incomes, the American working class, are systematically <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/04/gops-house-seats-are-safe-heres-why.html">underrepresented</a> and <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2021/02/voting-rights-republicans-trump-georgia/">disenfranchised</a> by <a href="https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/the-senate-is-an-irredeemable-institution.pdf">institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/racism-felony-disenfranchisement-intertwined-history">policy</a>.</p><p>Pew post-election <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/dataset/american-trends-panel-wave-39/">survey data</a> collected after the 2018 midterm election, which marked a fifty year high in <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-states-midterm-election-turnout.html">voter turnout</a>, reveals the extent of this bipartisan class bias.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YzKvXs16EskI01skesq6wQ.png" /></figure><p>Half of white working class adults and 60 percent of working class people of color did not vote in the 2018 midterm election. Those without a four-year degree were even less likely to participate, and while the survey’s limited sample size prevents further disaggregation by race-ethnicity group, people of color as a whole were less likely than white Americans to vote even after controlling for education and income.</p><p>Even in an historic election that saw Democrats net 41 seats in the House of Representatives — and win a larger national <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/06/politics/latest-house-vote-blue-wave/index.html">popular vote margin</a> than any opposition party in a midterm election since 1942 — neither party secured votes from a plurality of working class Americans. These figures illustrate both the stark overrepresentation of middle and upper class voters in the American electorate and the class- and identity-based political formations that structure inter- and intra-party politics.</p><p>Among white Americans, the likelihood of voting Republican was effectively uncorrelated with income or educational attainment; across all categories, roughly 30 percent of white adults cast a vote for a Republican candidate. More than income and education, whiteness itself is the most salient aspect of the Republican base’s identity and social class.</p><p>This bloc of white Republican partisans has embraced the <a href="https://bostonreview.net/politics/jacob-whiton-where-trumpism-lives">anti-democratic</a> politics of white Christian nationalism, and for the last fifty years, their leaders have <a href="http://kimphillipsfein.com/books/invisible-hands/">tended the flame</a> of reaction against the New Deal coalition’s major national legislative and judicial accomplishments between 1932 and 1980: the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, collective bargaining in the public sector, the Civil, Voting, and Housing Rights Acts, the Immigration and Nationality Act, Medicare, Medicaid, SNAP, Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, and yes, the federal minimum wage.</p><p>In contrast, Democratic candidates in 2018 secured <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03/20/1-trends-in-party-affiliation-among-demographic-groups/">large margins</a> among all non-white race-ethnicity groups that persisted across income and education levels. Higher income, college educated white voters also broke by a much smaller margin for Democrats, the result of a <a href="http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2018.pdf">multi-decade trend</a> towards greater party polarization on the basis of education.</p><p>Given the stable share of Republican support among white Americans, this would suggest the influence of higher class status on Democratic voting largely flows from its effect on turnout. Put differently, had they not completed college, white Democrats with a four-year degree would have been more likely <em>not</em> to have voted than to have voted Republican. A college education does not turn Republicans into Democrats, it turns nonvoters into voters.</p><p>Scott Keeter and Ruth Igielnik of Pew <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2020/09/08/democrats-made-gains-from-multiple-sources-in-2018-midterm-victories/">note</a> that while American politics’ class bias generally disadvantages Democrats, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/09/14/how-drop-off-voters-differ-from-consistent-voters-and-non-voters/">nonvoters</a> are most distinguished by their irregular participation and general disengagement from organized political activity of all kinds. They are not a natural Democratic constituency “waiting in the wings,” but rather, <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/non-voters-poll-2020-election/">disillusioned</a> and disorganized, without strong ideological or partisan leanings and lacking the private and institutional resources to have much political efficacy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/903/1*NfEXGuDJ_0FXDKlmAgOadA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: Library of Congress</figcaption></figure><p>While it cannot on its own account for the rising class bias of the electorate over the last fifty years, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00541.x?seq=1">research</a> has found de-unionization to have had a significant negative impact on turnout among low and middle income voters.</p><p>The wealthy, in comparison, are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12218">highly engaged</a> politically and enjoy many advantages in shaping policy outcomes even when their preferences diverge from those of the majority. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/709672">Recent work</a> from political scientists Elizabeth Suhay, Marko Klašnja, and Gonzalo Rivero found that Americans in the top 1 percent of the income distribution are significantly more likely to attribute individual economic outcomes to work ethic and genetics rather than luck or social status. Higher income Americans generally — the top 20 percent — are much less likely to support redistributive policies to curb inequality.</p><p>Given the composition of the Democratic coalition, intra-party conflicts have as much of a class bent as political conflicts nationally. Look no further than the minimum wage debate. The Economic Policy Institute has estimated that more than <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-to-15-by-2025-by-congressional-district/">30 percent</a> of workers in West Virginia stand to benefit a higher federal minimum wage, with those affected seeing an average pay increase of more than 17 percent. In 2018, the state’s Democratic senator, Joe Manchin, was reelected to office by only 21 percent of his voting-age constituents; <a href="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.2018.html">57.5 percent</a> did not participate in the election.</p><p>Based on the national data presented above, we can safely assume that the working class West Virginians who would be the principal beneficiaries of the $15 federal minimum wage were significantly underrepresented among the 21 percent of the state that constituted Senator Manchin’s bloc of supporters. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, his campaign committee <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/joe-manchin/summary?cid=N00032838&amp;cycle=2018">raised</a> $9.3 million between 2013 and 2018, over 60 percent of which came from large individual contributions in excess of $200.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*VfLjSJSlBuu45nu1MgbVIA.png" /></figure><p>All five of the no-voting senators reelected in 2018 failed to win a plurality of voters in their state. The three who did were reelected in presidential election years when turnout is typically higher, and yet working class Americans were as <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2020/09/08/democrats-made-gains-from-multiple-sources-in-2018-midterm-victories/">underrepresented</a> in the electorate in 2016 as they were in 2018 (comparable data for 2020 are not yet available).</p><p>In a recent essay on the 2020 election, Princeton historian Matt Karp <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2021/02/the-politics-of-a-second-gilded-age">argues</a> the country has been here before. The United States’ first Gilded Age — the half century between the end of Reconstruction and the Great Depression — was also characterized by fierce political contestation and partisan polarization. But then as now, this reflected the steady disempowerment of the Black and immigrant working class by corrupt party machines and Southern Democrats’ violent <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/welcome-to-the-second-redemption/507317/">Redemption</a> campaign to reestablish white supremacy and reduce Black workers to a state of total dependence on white landowners.</p><p>Karp rightly concludes that a viable political movement powerful enough to enact popular redistributive policies aimed at compressing inequalities in income and wealth will not come about through institutional reform alone. Independent redistricting commissions, term limited Supreme Court appointments, statehood for D.C. and Puerto Rico would all be major victories in the struggle for representative democracy in the new Gilded Age. Such reforms, though, address institutional imbalances in partisan power. They cannot on their own address pervasive imbalances in class power, which as the case of the minimum wage shows, shape conflicts within the parties as much as between them.</p><p>And yet, nothing short of a national mass mobilization will create the political conditions necessary to defeat reactionary authoritarianism. Already Republican-controlled state legislatures are <a href="https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/08/iowa-governor-kim-reynolds-signs-law-shortening-early-voting-closing-polls-earlier-election-day/6869317002/">escalating</a> their <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2021/03/georgia-republicans-pass-the-most-restrictive-voting-laws-since-jim-crow/">assault</a> on the franchise, pointing to President Trump’s claims of widespread fraud during the 2020 election. Stopping them will require organizing tens of millions of working class Americans who, though riven with racial, generational, regional, and linguistic divisions, share a common stake in the creation of a <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w28387">social state</a> that ensures <a href="http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html">as a right</a> to all the necessaries of a comfortable and dignified life.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d28aa410f716" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/who-speaks-for-the-silent-working-class-d28aa410f716">Who speaks for the silent working class?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Where sedition is rewarded]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/where-sedition-is-rewarded-2a50ccc70fd?source=rss-47753cdea37f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a50ccc70fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[voter-suppression]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republican-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[demography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitol-riot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trumpism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Whiton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jan 2021 18:57:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-13T11:47:41.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Politics</h4><h4>An analysis of Pro-Trump congressional districts</h4><p>In spite of the now clear threat posed by continued disinformation about the legality of the 2020 election, a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2021/politics/congress-electoral-college-count-tracker/">majority of House Republicans</a> affirmed their overriding loyalty to President Trump and his political movement by objecting to the certification of electoral college votes from the swing states of Arizona and Pennsylvania. Even though their claims of widespread voter fraud were found to be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2020/election-integrity/">entirely unsubstantiated</a> by independent fact-checkers and rejected by nearly every elected official and court to which they addressed their complaints, they were unmoved in insisting on the merit of President Trump’s claims.</p><p>These representatives chose to persist in objecting to the results even after being forced to flee the House chamber by a mob of thousands of Trump supporters — among them <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/names-of-rioters-capitol.html">white supremacists</a> and paramilitaries — who overran the Capitol grounds, hundreds of whom forced their way into the building bringing the certification process to a halt.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*V-59zzQq1aNwrJhPz9judg.png" /><figcaption>Congressional districts represented by Republican objectors.</figcaption></figure><p>That well over half of the House of Representatives’ Republican caucus would continue to endorse President Trump’s “Stop the Steal” conspiracy, even after its adherents had proven their willingness to use violence and intimidation to thwart recognition of the president’s loss, is a sobering reminder of the extent to which the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2332649218790983">white Christian nationalist</a> movement incubated within the Republican Party has become actively hostile to democratic processes they now see as threatening their political power, personal wealth, and established social hierarchies.</p><p>A demographic and economic analysis of the constituencies represented by the 139 Republicans who objected to the certification of at least one states’ election results helps to clarify the social and material conditions in which this right wing authoritarianism has taken root.</p><p>In particular, the evidence cuts strongly against the conventional wisdom of Trumpism as “lumpen” Rust Belt rage, originating in the country’s shrinking rural hinterland. Rather, the picture that emerges of districts represented by the most committed Pro-Trump Republicans is one of fast-growing, rapidly diversifying greenfield suburbs where inequalities between white homeowners and their non-white neighbors have been shrinking and low voter turnout has helped deliver large margins to Republican candidates.</p><p><em>Growing and diversifying exurbs</em></p><p>In addition to being considerably more suburban, as all Republican districts are, residents of objectors’ districts are more than twice as likely as residents of other Republican districts to live in exurban “sparse suburban areas.” These are districts like North Carolina’s 9th, which runs from Charlotte to Fayetteville. Representative Dan Bishop of NC-9 was the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-bathroom-use-by-birth-gender.html">author</a> of that state’s infamous 2016 legislation prohibiting transgender individuals from using the gendered public facilities of their choice and preempting local minimum wage ordinances. He was also a signatory to the brief in support of <em>Texas v. Pennsylvania, </em>President Trump’s final direct appeal to the Supreme Court to forestall the certification of his loss.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/906/1*OlrSQmA4zz7NcsNANxp39g.png" /></figure><p>These are also among the fastest-growing districts in the country, their population growth on average outpacing that in districts represented by Democrats or other Republicans over the last twenty years. Almost all of this growth has been among non-white groups, specifically Latinos and Asian Americans, resulting in a dramatic shift in the demographic composition of these districts.</p><p>Being on average younger, this growth in non-white residents has also meant age and race have become increasingly correlated. Residents under the age of 18 are 3.6 times more likely to be Hispanic and 1.6 times more likely to be Black or Asian American than those over the age of 65. Concretely this has meant debates over policies involving a transfer of resources between generational cohorts — Social Security and Medicare, public education, housing — have also become highly polarized by race.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_f6A5vdrOLpan_BhRsrh4g.png" /></figure><p>In their work studying the Tea Party protests of the early 2010s, Vanessa Williamson of the Brookings Institution and Theda Skocpol of Harvard identified this <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/williamson/files/tea_party_pop_0.pdf">nexus of racial and generational resentment</a> as central to the ideology animating its white middle class activists. Gabriel Winant, historian at the University of Chicago, <a href="https://nplusonemag.com/issue-37/politics/coronavirus-and-chronopolitics-2/">has also written</a> about the ways in which the concentration of wealth among older American has allowed the authoritarian right to stoke fears about youth-led political movements challenging their direct and indirect claims on younger Americans’ labor and income as employers, landlords, lenders, and pensioners.</p><p><em>White middle class stagnation, Latino and Asian American upward mobility</em></p><p>That constituents of Republican objectors tend to have the lowest levels of formal educational attainment in no way flatters <a href="https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/524038-hawley-on-future-of-the-gop-post-election-day">their pretensions</a> as working class heroes. While partisan polarization by education has <a href="http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2018.pdf#page=151">risen dramatically</a> over the last forty years, voters with higher incomes and who own more wealth, are still significantly more likely to support Republicans. This correlation may have weakened slightly in the last two presidential elections, but it remains to be seen whether this represents a durable trend of wealthier <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/bidens-victory-came-from-the-suburbs/">suburban Republicans</a> abandoning the party.</p><p>The conflation of educational attainment with class obscures the extent to which many white Americans without a four-year degree receive middle class incomes and <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/compare/chart/#quarter:124;series:Assets;demographic:education;population:all;units:shares">own some</a> wealth, primarily in residential real estate and pensions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/860/1*9O4xc0jz5NCYeLWL5cf5DA.png" /></figure><p>Republican objectors represent districts where on average 68 percent of white homeowners did not have a four-year degree. It is also worth noting that a majority of all white homeowners nationwide do not possess a college education, real estate being the most <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/compare/chart/#quarter:124;series:Assets;demographic:networth;population:all;units:levels">equally distributed</a> class of asset.</p><p>Since 2000, strong demand for housing due to relatively fast population growth has put upward pressure on housing prices in Republican objectors’ districts, shrinking the gap in home values between their districts and other Republican districts . One such case is Texas’s 17th, which snakes through the northern Austin suburbs to include Bryan-College Station and Waco and saw median home values rise by an inflation-adjusted 3.3 percent a year from $108,000 to $199,000 in constant 2019 dollars.</p><p>In Republican districts, home ownership rates over the last twenty years were largely stable for white households, plummeted to less than half among Black households, rose modestly among Hispanic households, and rose considerably among Asian Americans. The latter two groups have been the main beneficiaries of real estate appreciation in these districts and also saw the fastest income growth over the same period.</p><p>The persistence of low home ownership among Black households is both the near-term legacy of the 2007–09 <a href="https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Foreclosed.pdf">housing market crash</a> and recession and the longer-term legacy of redlining and Jim Crow <a href="https://time.com/5855900/segregation-wealth-gap/">segregation</a>. Virtually <a href="https://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kuhn/paper/Wealthinequality_final.pdf">no progress</a> has been made in the last 50 years in closing the Black-white wealth gap, the expansion of home ownership among Black households in the 1990s and 2000s having been fueled by the expansion of fraudulent <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-16/the-dramatic-racial-bias-of-subprime-lending-during-the-housing-boom">subprime mortgage lending</a> that left them saddled with high debt burdens after housing prices collapsed.</p><p>While the home ownership rate among Latinos remains well below that for white households, the gap in median home values between white and Latino homeowners in these districts has closed in the last twenty years. This indicates that strong housing price growth largely benefited existing Latino homeowners rather than new buyers. Latino homeowners in Republican districts are also on average more likely to identify as white and to have been born in the United States than Latinos residing in other parts of the country. These facts go some way in explaining President Trump’s modest <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/the-deep-origins-of-latino-support-for-trump">inroads</a> among Latino voters in 2020.</p><p>White homeowners’ perception of a loss of status relative to upwardly mobile Hispanic and Asian American households is the social context out of which has emerged the nativist politics at the center of Trumpism. Middle class whites in Republican objectors’ districts are nevertheless considerably more likely to own their own home and receive higher incomes than any other racial group except Asian Americans. It is whiteness itself that has lost salience as a signifier of social status and class and it is to this status anxiety that Trumpism is addressed.</p><p><em>Evangelicalism and local dependence on resource extraction, heavy manufacturing, and law enforcement employment</em></p><p>The sense of status threat among white suburban homeowners in Pro-Trump districts is compounded by their religiosity and disproportionate employment in industries the President has portrayed himself as <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-protecting-domestic-mining-industry-critical-minerals-supply-chains/">“protecting,”</a> either through trade policy or by <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/environment/climate-action-podesta-prakash/">excluding the left</a> from political power.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/858/1*xD1gT6kDhJPMhNq5vKHo4Q.png" /></figure><p>White evangelical Christians have been integral to the Republican coalition since the 1980s and remain President Trump’s most unwavering <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/11/08/932263516/2020-faith-vote-reflects-2016-patterns">base of support</a>. In more than half of Republican objectors’ districts, evangelicals account for at least a fifth of constituents, making them far more likely to represent evangelicals in Congress than other Republicans or Democrats.</p><p>Public opinion surveys reveal just how much white evangelical Protestants stand apart in their politics. The Public Religion Research Institute’s 2020 <a href="https://www.prri.org/research/amid-multiple-crises-trump-and-biden-supporters-see-different-realities-and-futures-for-the-nation/">American Values survey</a> found that they are the only group among whom a majority expresses a preference for living in a country “made up of people who follow the Christian faith” and who believe that “God has granted America a special role in human history.” Fifty-three percent believe “society punishes men for acting like men,” and they are the only group for whom abortion and terrorism rank in their top three most important issues. They are also the least likely to agree that President Trump has encouraged white supremacist groups, though a majority of Americans overall do, and the most likely to claim that he “models religious values with his actions and leadership.”</p><p>White evangelicals’ aversion to religious pluralism and providential view of the United States stands in stark contrast to the reality of a secularizing country where regular attendance of religious services is <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/">declining</a> and younger Americans are increasingly less likely to identify as Christian. Evangelicals defend their support for President Trump on the grounds that he is an <a href="https://time.com/5161349/president-trump-white-evangelical-support-slaveholders/">“imperfect agent,”</a> chosen by God to use the powers of the American state to proselytize and defend a divinely-inspired <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/american-christianitys-white-supremacy-problem">social hierarchy</a> with white Christians at its top.</p><p>Workers in Republican objectors’ districts are more likely to be employed in sectors of the economy President Trump has routinely identified as most threatened by the political left — <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-coal-mining-trump-biden-2020-election-20201021.html">mining and oil and natural gas extraction</a>, <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/10/17/trump-muskegon-fact-check-auto-industry/3698208001/">heavy manufacturing</a>, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/us/politics/trump-police-reform.html">law enforcement</a>. While the average share of workers employed in these industries is small, they loom large in regional economies <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/06/18/in-too-many-american-communities-mass-incarceration-has-become-a-jobs-program/">dependent on them</a> to provide relatively high wage employment to workers without a four-year degree. In his analysis of the 2020 election, geographer Mike Davis <a href="https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii126/articles/mike-davis-trench-warfare">notes</a> how both large concentrations of workers employed in border security and the region’s expanding shale oil industry created new opportunities for Republicans to grow their vote share in south Texas’s Rio Grande valley.</p><p>Substantively, though, the Trump administration has chosen to prioritize environmental <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html">deregulation</a>, the leasing and sale of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/19/us/politics/in-last-rush-trump-grants-mining-and-energy-firms-access-to-public-lands.html">public lands</a>, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/">trade restrictions</a> over a real full employment agenda.</p><p>Despite his transparently pro-corporate policies, President Trump has burnished his support among workers in these sectors by instead emphasizing the potential threats posed to them by demands to decarbonize the economy, prosecute police violence, and defund local and federal law enforcement agencies (off-duty police officers are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-police-investigation/off-duty-police-firefighters-under-investigation-in-connection-with-u-s-capitol-riot-idUSKBN29F0KH">alleged</a> to have <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/07/capitol-hill-riots-doj-456178">participated</a> in the January 6th riot on Capitol Hill).</p><p><em>Trumpism and antidemocratic politics</em></p><p>The willingness of the most fervent Pro-Trump constituencies to embrace more openly antidemocratic politics on the part of their elected representatives reflects a recognition of their reliance on minoritarian features of our constitutional system to wield political power.</p><p>Republican objectors’ districts had some of the lowest voter participation in the country in 2018 (see Table 3). Turnout in these districts averaged less than fifty percent of voting-age adults in a midterm election when voter turnout nationally was the highest it had been in <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-states-midterm-election-turnout.html">forty years</a>.</p><p>The Mississippi 4th, covering the southeastern part of that state around Biloxi, was one such low turnout district. A mere 39 percent of adults in the district voted in 2018. Its representative, Steven Palazzo, won 68 percent of the vote, meaning he was elected by the votes of only 26 percent of his district’s constituents. He was reelected in 2020 and is currently <a href="https://www.sunherald.com/news/politics-government/article247076877.html">under investigation</a> by the House Ethics Committee for improper use of campaign funds.</p><p>In 2018, only five representatives in the House of Representatives were elected by votes from more than 50 percent of voting-age adults in their district, all of whom were Democrats that received more than 80 percent of the vote.</p><p>The Republican Party’s most Pro-Trump members have been elected by higher income white homeowners in the fast-growing exurban fringe. They feel the social status traditionally associated with their identity as white Christians is being degraded and that left wing political movements pose a threat to their livelihoods and political power. In reaction, they have lashed themselves to a movement within the Republican Party led by President Trump that seeks to defend the privileges of property-owning white Americans in our political system, economy, and public life.</p><p>President Trump’s incitement of his supporters to disrupt the electoral process by force is the culmination of the Republican Party’s decade-long campaign to maintain minority rule by <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/159755/republican-voter-suppression-2020-election">depressing political participation</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/22/republican-dark-money-groups-2020-election">diluting the vote</a> of their political opponents. Having secured control over governor’s mansions and both houses of state legislatures in 23 states, Republicans are now positioned to once again ensure district boundaries maximize their representation in Congress for the next decade as well.</p><p>Bleak as this prospect is, Democrats’ dual Senate victories in the state of Georgia have vindicated a strategy of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/09/democrats-historic-georgia-senate-wins-were-years-in-the-making-thanks-to-local-grassroots.html">organizing and mobilizing </a>the latent majority of voters who will reject white Christian nationalism and its antidemocratic politics, even in a state where voter suppression efforts have been <a href="https://publicintegrity.org/politics/elections/us-polling-places/georgia-hotbed-for-voter-suppression-tactics/">infamous</a>.</p><p>The fact that Republican objectors command the least popular support among their own constituents of any congressional elected officials in the country is both a testament to their effectiveness in entrenching their own power and also the foundation on which we must ground our hopes for political change to end minority rule.</p><p><em>Note: Data and Stata code is available on request (please leave a private comment with contact details).</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a50ccc70fd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/where-sedition-is-rewarded-2a50ccc70fd">Where sedition is rewarded</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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