<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by whoTechnologies on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by whoTechnologies on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by whoTechnologies on Medium</title>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:35:27 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Better questions about deepfakes]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@whotechnologies/better-questions-about-deepfakes-3647d0464d81?source=rss-b53c0cc9ce5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[deepfakes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deepfake-detection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[whoTechnologies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 16:37:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-03T16:38:16.790Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SqM_A6QQ3fUUFkMCJoh3yg.jpeg" /><figcaption>author’s scrawl</figcaption></figure><p>For a couple years I was the only person in the room saying that deepfake detection was going to fail.</p><p>When I’d say this, people used to look at me like I was a lunatic. Part of the problem was that a lot of venture money had gone into deep fake detection, so there was a lot riding on its success. A lot of pride, a lot of sparkly solutions went into deepfake detection. It did turn out that I was right, though. I just needed to patiently wait for the world to catch up to me. And now, here we are! I’m so happy! Now we can finally start having the really interesting conversations. Here’s one of the things I’ve been thinking about for the last few years:</p><p>There’s a way we currently think about deepfakes that’s not precise enough. Because we aren’t precise in the way we think about it, it hampers us from coming up with the best solutions.</p><p>Hints of the imprecision show up in questions like these:</p><p>-”Is this AI-generated?”</p><p>-”Did a human write this or is this a bot?”</p><p>These questions seem reasonable, and important. But over the past few years as I’ve investigated how to best answer them, I’ve discovered that when looked at closely, in real world situations, these questions break down.</p><p>The key thing we have to remember is that no matter how much something was AI-generated, at some point in the process, there’s always human involvement.</p><p>So. Better questions to ask are:</p><p>-How much was a human involved here?</p><p>-At what point was the human involved?</p><p>-At what point did the human walk away?</p><p>AND</p><ul><li>Once the human walked away, how much did the AI continue along or veer away from the path that the human set for it?</li></ul><p>If you ask these questions, you can get answers that make sense. Then you can start asking questions that will illuminate the real pain points of the current landscape.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3647d0464d81" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Post-Quantum Encryption Isn’t Quantum Encryption]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@whotechnologies/post-quantum-encryption-isnt-quantum-encryption-48f25278645c?source=rss-b53c0cc9ce5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-computing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[post-quantum-cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[quantum-cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[whoTechnologies]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 19:12:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T19:12:47.539Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>PSA! “Post-quantum encryption” isn’t the same thing as “quantum encryption.” I realized recently that many people are confused about this, which is understandable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*c6VFle7UhBwYtfBt20NEfw.gif" /><figcaption>Gaussian wave packet, shown in the complex plane, for a=2 and k=4 By OpticalSystem — Own work, CC BY 4.0, <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=144272912">https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=144272912</a></figcaption></figure><p>Here’s the misconception that people have: They think that because we’ve almost achieved cryptographically relevant quantum computing, then that means that when someone says they’re working on “post-quantum cryptography,” then that means they’re working on updating classical encryption over to quantum encryption.</p><p>But that’s not quite right. Let’s break it down.</p><p>First of all, “Q-Day” is defined as the future tipping point when a quantum computer becomes powerful enough to break standard public-key encryption algorithms (such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography). That’s also why I referred above to “cryptographically relevant” quantum computing. We do already have quantum computers right now, technically speaking, but they aren’t that functional yet.</p><p>Next, whenever we talk about this concept of a quantum computer breaking encryption, we’re specifically referring to two algorithms for quantum computers that have already been developed. These are Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms.</p><p>Not all classical encryption is considered vulnerable to Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. Symmetric encryption is considered safe. Asymmetric encryption is considered vulnerable because it relies on the difficulty of factoring very large prime numbers. If quantum computers can do anything, they are going to be very good at factoring large primes.</p><p>Now, coming back to the misconception: People assume that in order to fix encryption’s vulnerability to quantum computers, we’re in the process of replacing classical encryption with quantum encryption. But that’s not right. We’re in the process of replacing old classical encryption that’s known to be vulnerable to being broken by quantum computers, with updated classical encryption standards that are thought to be more resilient to attack by quantum computer.</p><p>Quantum key distribution, (a subset of actual quantum cryptography) does exist, but when people refer to the “post-quantum cryptographic migration mandate,” that’s not what they’re referring to. <em>They’re just referring to updating classical encryption so that it’s still classical, but in a way that’s considered less vulnerable to this new looming danger.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48f25278645c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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