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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Will Bunnett on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Will Bunnett on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Will Bunnett on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Liberal’s Guide to the Collapse of Neutral Media]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/a-liberals-guide-to-the-collapse-of-neutral-media-17922d1a6b7d?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberal-media]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Nov 2024 14:05:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-22T21:56:49.860Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>America’s legacy media giants were powerless to stymie the fire hose of right-wing conspiracy theories, disinformation, and bullshit that just propelled Donald Trump to an unthinkable second term in the White House. And they often seemed disinterested in even trying.</p><p>We’ve entered a new era of our media. The “neutral” information environment those gatekeepers have tended for so long is no longer just losing a little ground to social media here and there. It’s reached a tipping point in its influence and is now propelling the demise of its own relevance to things like deciding presidential elections.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5Arj9shquXjdhLxRq8Qeqg.jpeg" /></figure><p>That’s bad for liberals’ ability to get our messages into voters’ brains. While paid ads are helpful, we all just saw their limits when the news environment is not functional. And it’s only going to get worse as legacy media continue to shy away from the truth.</p><p>Fortunately, I finally see <a href="https://newrepublic.com/post/188197/trump-media-information-landscape-fox">more</a> and <a href="https://www.offmessage.net/p/democrats-please-try-to-fix-this-problem">more</a> of us <a href="https://www.salon.com/2024/11/08/americas-political-discordance-the-want-progressivism/">saying</a> that liberals must step in with our own solutions to fill the media vacuum.</p><p>But why should that type of investment work now, when it hasn’t worked before? Because — rather than producing more Air Americas, Current TVs, Crookeds, Intercepts, and others — this time <strong>we must target non-news consumers.</strong></p><h3>The Self-Propelling Demise of “Neutral” News</h3><p>The decline of legacy media’s influence has been in motion for at least 20-some years, but the signs this cycle were especially stark.</p><p>Disinformation about Hurricane Helene ran rampant. Kamala Harris showed there was no need to fear legacy journalists’ squawking about her limited slate of interviews. Decades of tilting coverage rightward in a fruitless attempt to placate conservative critics and lure back conservative readers started to catch up to outlets like the New York Times, who faced more <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/11/03/2024/in-a-frank-internal-meeting-the-new-york-times-wrestled-with-its-political-role">criticism</a> than ever over their bothsidesing and sanewashing.</p><p>Moving forward, we will see more “<a href="https://lithub.com/resist-authoritarianism-by-refusing-to-obey-in-advance/">obeying in advance</a>” like we saw from the LA Times and Washington Post in their billionaire owners’ refusals to endorse a presidential candidate rather than risk Trump’s ire by endorsing Harris. And while knuckling under without a fight might have been smart business for the Post’s owner Jeff Bezos, it reportedly cost him the loyalty of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/10/28/nx-s1-5168416/washington-post-bezos-endorsement-president-cancellations-resignations">hundreds of thousands of subscribers</a>.</p><p>We already see this type of obeisance from established press continuing, e.g in stories describing Elon Musk’s relationship with Trump as “<a href="https://qz.com/elon-musk-politics-election-donald-trump-america-pac-1851695635">close</a>” rather than “wildly corrupt,” as we might otherwise call someone dumping hundreds of millions of dollars into super PACs to support a candidate and then getting literally brought into his administration to pursue his own agenda.</p><p><strong>These weaknesses </strong>are more than just annoying to would-be consumers of neutral news. They <strong>actively undermine relevance and credibility, which will only further alienate audiences and accelerate the decline of traditional news media.</strong></p><p>In the first Trump administration, liberals flocked to support traditional media as a bulwark for democracy, most famously exemplified by the Post’s own “democracy dies in darkness” slogan. Media fortunes sagged again during the comparatively boring Biden era when the threat to democracy seemed to pass for the moment and the daily outrages waned.</p><p>But don’t expect readership and viewership to pick back up again now that Trump is back. As big media players pull their punches with respect to the president, liberal readers and viewers will have all the less reason to stand with them. And their inability to cover the inevitable Trump scandals with the salacious gravity they deserve will cost them opportunities to entice audiences.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*qsTY2FJK-RJaRrSUIkJq7Q.png" /></figure><p>Oh, and on top of all that, the right is planning further escalate <a href="https://x.com/RonFilipkowski/status/1848442612291666048">spending to swamp what’s left</a> of traditional media and already has a huge <a href="https://www.usermag.co/p/the-majority-of-news-influencers">head start</a> in share of social media creators. Some media executives are even <a href="https://x.com/brianstelter/status/1851766313279963218?s=46&amp;t=7jeFr6fwDfHF0NAkaQR2Kg">admitting</a> that <strong>“mainstream media is dead in its current form” already.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/323/1*OE0B7LiytwIa6fqbkybHzw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Ads Won’t Save Us</h3><p>Take it from me as someone who literally co-founded and successfully ran a Democratic advertising agency for eight years: we can’t just advertise our way out of the collapsing neutral media environment.</p><p>The Harris campaign outspent the Trump campaign by almost 3-to-1, per <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/2024-presidential-race">Open Secrets</a>. In swing states — or even just states like <a href="https://www.kpax.com/news/montana-voters-feel-ad-fatigue-as-senate-race-spending-tops-250m">Montana</a> with a competitive Senate race — the volume of ads becomes so overwhelming, they’re nothing more than an unbearable nuisance for most voters. In a budget environment like 2024’s, much of Democrats’ spending essentially gets wasted on ads aired well past any reasonable point of diminishing returns.</p><p>If outspending our opponents were the answer, we would win by doing it. But we don’t. There is a history here — <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-clinton-campaign-fundraising-totals-232400">Hillary Clinton</a> out-raised Trump 2-to-1 herself, after all.</p><p>Now, don’t get me wrong: we can’t just stop running ads either. Unilateral disarmament won’t get us anywhere, and there are plenty of instances where a reasonable ad budget is helpful and effective. But if you took a small fraction of those wasted ad budgets and put it into building up a modern liberal media ecosystem, the scale of progress would be massive.</p><p>But Donald Trump’s single most important constituency in this election wasn’t the white working class or the male voters of color who swung toward him or any other traditional demographic — <strong>it was people who are wrong</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*t4NjI6Ehd8L82Wbd" /></figure><p>For virtually my whole life, the Democratic Party and those aligned with it have been obsessed with making just the right messaging tweaks to build a winning coalition. By and large, they’re good at it.</p><p>But all this messaging effort is wasted when it doesn’t even get to the people who need to hear it. And advertising alone isn’t enough.</p><h3>Pumping Liberal Info into the News Environment the Right Way</h3><p>The main problem with previous efforts to bulk up liberal news offerings is that they focused too much on news. Consumers of traditional news, for the most part, are already with us. And while traditional news may collapse in relevance to deciding presidential elections, it’s not going to disappear outright.</p><p>So it’s the people getting their information in 21st century environments — and especially those who are not interested in news at all — that we need to reach.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DNoSrt7EWsaXTJK2GqVYbQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: </em><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/11/09/social-media-traditional-news-elections-00188548"><em>https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/11/09/social-media-traditional-news-elections-00188548</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>So how do you build something that will reach these people? <strong>You build a liberal media presence that’s focused on culture, not news, and you sneak the politics in the side door.</strong></p><p>The ethos the right used in building up the power of its media ecosystem is exactly what the left needs to embrace: politics is downstream of culture.</p><p>What is culture? It’s all the most popular things people are consuming these days: sports, personal finance, housewives, cooking, home renovations, comedy, and all the rest.</p><p>It doesn’t seem political, and certainly not partisan. But where you can slip something political in, it has a better chance of reaching someone who’s not watching MSNBC or reading the New York Times, let alone one of the thousands of local newspapers that’s closed up shop in recent years.</p><p>But would that really work?? Yes, dammit! It already does. Just not for us.</p><p>Joe Rogan has a large conservative political footprint, but not because he’s imitating Rush Limbaugh. He mostly talks about random stuff like MMA, rock climbing, space exploration, and what have you. Only occasionally does he slip politics in.</p><p>If you want more formal evidence, lots of academic study supports the effectiveness of <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/steamy-plots-with-a-social-message/">“social soaps,”</a> i.e. story-based programs that succeed at public education goals like reducing racism or improving hygiene where more direct efforts fail.</p><p>And in pretesting for one of my own projects, <strong>I saw moderate male voters move 26 points (!) toward Kamala Harris</strong> from reading a college football blog post that mentioned her as a mere aside . Unfortunately our full field test didn’t show the same results, but that pretest result is so gonzo that it’s just begging for a follow-up.</p><p>The right knows politics is downstream of culture, and they’ve just scammed their way into power again on the basis of that insight. So let’s stop being the victims of that approach and start being the agents of it.</p><p>Let’s:</p><ul><li>Save the money it would take to stand up a cable network to compete with Fox News and spend it instead on efficient modern approaches, like sponsoring and/or buying non-political podcasts and blogs and YouTube shows.</li><li>Or put as many left-leaning social media creators on year-round retainer as we can find, even if (especially if!) they don’t normally talk about politics.</li><li>Position this effort outside the official party, like the right has done. This is crucial for building the trust and credibility of the effort, which must register to people as non-political/non-partisan.</li><li>Do pieces of this first even if we can’t do it all at once.</li><li>Maintain the fortitude to see this through over multiple years, even if the impact isn’t immediately obvious. Fox News spent its first several years losing money, after all.</li></ul><p>The longer we wait to start this, the smaller the traditional neutral news ecosystem will get and the harder it will be to catch up. There’s no time to waste. Let’s act.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17922d1a6b7d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Should Kamala Harris Be Brat Again?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/should-kamala-harris-be-brat-again-0182263883cd?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0182263883cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-dominance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[presidential-campaign]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kamala-harris]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Oct 2024 21:42:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-09T21:42:07.931Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kamala Harris rocketed up the polls in July and August only to plateau and backslide. The difference is showing dominance.</p><p>On July 28, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump were two hundredths of a percentage point apart from each other in <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/2024/national/">538’s national polling average</a>. On August 23, Harris led Trump by 3.7 points. By September 9, her lead was down to 2.6 points — where it has essentially stayed since.</p><p>This week, there’s clearly been shift in vibes momentum to Trump. POLITICO just <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/05/harris-30-days-00182592">wondered</a> why Harris isn’t “everywhere,” like Trump, and found some anonymous Democrats to carp about her “risk-averse,” “play it safe” campaign. The gist of their argument was that Harris is not doing as many events as Barack Obama did in 2008.</p><p>I would counter that the Harris campaign <em>does</em> seem to be playing it much more safe these days, but the impact is<strong> less about event schedule and more about <em>driving the news narrative</em></strong>.</p><p>Harris used to embody joyful dominance, and this caused the news to react to <em>her</em>, which put her in the position of dominator. Now she talks about the economy, which is boring and causes the news to look elsewhere for the kind of conflict that always drives coverage, making Harris look less in command.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/willbunnett/status/1839029810166931675&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b858f609366fbf4898c69c54d561d1a8/href">https://medium.com/media/b858f609366fbf4898c69c54d561d1a8/href</a></iframe><p>When Harris first took over for Biden, she was <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-polling-brat-summer-young-voters-1946802">brat</a>, she was <a href="https://19thnews.org/2024/09/kamala-harris-campaign-strategy-joy/">joy</a>, she was determination and progress (“<a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/kamala-harris-delivers-only-response-need-trumps-regressive-messaging-rcna165102">we’re not going back</a>”), she was mockery (“<a href="https://apnews.com/article/kamala-walz-vp-weird-trump-gen-z-f9d718890c3ca907f42dba5934075382">weird</a>”), she was defiance (“<a href="https://apnews.com/article/harris-georgia-trump-rally-atlanta-4454ff5825d8f6cf90929147f5b84a71">say it to my face</a>”).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Mh78u9kAe4DpYAfR" /></figure><p>Add it all up, and she was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_dominance_orientation">dominance</a>. She was in charge. She looked like a big leader, and Trump looked small.</p><p>He couldn’t land an attack on her. In her debate with Trump, she led him around by the nose, baiting him into stupid dead-ends. The media followed the direction she set. And a big section of voters <a href="https://medium.com/@willbunnett/for-democrats-maybe-its-not-the-economy-stupid-you-idiot-you-worm-ff7440060dc">love a dominator</a>.</p><p>Better yet, she was doing it all in a Democratic way, without compromising her values or trying to be the next Trump herself.</p><p>The polls responded, and she attained her biggest polling leads.</p><p>But somewhere around Month Two of her campaign, she shifted gears.</p><p>It hit me during the vice presidential debate between Tim Walz and J.D. Vance. <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tim-walz-2024-vp-debate-closing-statement/">Walz said</a>, “Kamala Harris is bringing us a politics of joy.” And that really felt true in August. But by the time of that debate, it felt out of date.</p><p>I thought back to early <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/18/politics/kamala-harris-presidential-campaign/index.html">reports</a> about how the same campaign advisers who had coached Biden into a polling deficit were trying to get Harris to be as boring as her boss had been. And how, at the time, she had rejected them.</p><blockquote>Over the line came a lot of praise, but also some suggested tweaks. First, said veteran Democratic numbers man Geoff Garin, summarizing their analysis, stop saying, “We’re not going back.” It wasn’t focused enough on the future, he argued. Second, lay off all the “weird” talk — too negative.</blockquote><blockquote>Harris’ advisers listened. They considered the arguments. They decided to stick with what the crowds were chanting in the arenas.</blockquote><p>It sure seems like she reconsidered that decision and is no longer sticking with what crowds chant.</p><p>The good news, such as it is, is that all this talking about the economy seems to be working, in the narrow sense that Harris has <a href="https://thehill.com/business/4903854-vice-president-harris-economy-gains/">closed a lot of the gap</a> with Trump in polls about their respective abilities to lead the economy.</p><p>The question is whether that’s a winning formula.</p><p>The core issue is that the people whose votes swing elections don’t cast those votes based on policies and issues. They may think they do, but they don’t. (See <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo11644533.html">here</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thinking,_Fast_and_Slow">here</a>, <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/09/24/2023/new-study-shoots-down-popular-democratic-theories">here</a>, and many others.) So just because voters rate the economy as their #1 issue and they rate you well on that issue doesn’t mean you’re going to get their votes.</p><p>Look, I see a fair amount of panel testing data. And it’s true that economic messaging seems to move voters more than “weird” messaging in those panel tests.</p><p>But panel tests are for when you can’t run real-world tests. And we have what amounts to some pretty damn good real-world testing data that shows: when Kamala Harris was driving the conversation, she was rising in the polls. Once she started talking about the economy, she lost her mojo — and her commanding polling margins.</p><p>They say fortune favors the bold. I say let Kamala Harris be bold again.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0182263883cd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Conflict and Dominance: How Liberals Positioned Themselves for Victory in Britain and France]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/conflict-and-dominance-how-liberals-positioned-themselves-for-victory-in-britain-and-france-fcd3c049d930?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fcd3c049d930</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[scandal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[positioning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[french-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[british-election]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jul 2024 20:57:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-09T20:57:13.333Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you’re an American liberal envying the success of your counterparts across the pond this month, you might be wondering how the good guys can pull off something similar here.</p><p>Of course many factors always combine to produce outcomes like these, but I’d argue that <strong>the way the liberals positioned themselves — and their opponents</strong> — in these races was especially important. After all, most strategic decisions a campaign makes will be (or should be) downstream of their <a href="https://medium.com/@willbunnett/speed-up-and-power-up-your-political-messaging-with-the-right-positioning-fa5bf35afbd9">positioning strategy</a>, which is why it’s one of the most important <a href="https://www.willbunnett.com/services">services</a> I offer my clients.</p><p>Let’s dig into how.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NZzGumO72Jo4TQ_M" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/04/labour-wins-uk-election-results-2024/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/04/labour-wins-uk-election-results-2024/</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*740RehHx043IFHda" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/07/france-election-result-2024-left-far-right/?_pml=1">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/07/france-election-result-2024-left-far-right/?_pml=1</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Britain: Positioning the Tories as Scandalous</h3><p>The first thing that stood out to me in the British elections was how firmly liberals were able to position the Tories as “mired in scandal” — and how tame the scandals in question were compared to what the Republican Party in America has been doing.</p><blockquote>Calicia Tavernier, a history and politics student at Leicester University in central England, said reading about MP scandals has become routine.<br><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/british-election-conservative-party-change-1.7252025">https://www.cbc.ca/news/british-election-conservative-party-change-1.7252025</a></blockquote><p>Among the more well known Tory <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/british-election-conservative-party-change-1.7252025">scandals</a> were “’Partygate’ (the lockdown parties in Downing Street that enraged a nation stuck at home during the COVID pandemic) to allegations of sexual harassment and assault to one MP who admitted to twice watching pornography in the House of Commons chamber” and “suspicion of using inside information to place bets on the election date.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*4s2_76JU3EX_j_bB" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijVz5oPfUwE">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijVz5oPfUwE</a></figcaption></figure><p>In comparison, liberals in America have not locked in a similarly pervasive sense of scandal around Donald Trump despite his track record of making the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/trump-white-house-made-deliberate-efforts-undermine-covid-response-report-n1286211">pandemic worse</a> on purpose, being found liable for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/19/trump-carroll-judge-rape/">rape</a> in court, or trying to violently <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-the-final-report-from-the-jan-6-committee">overthrow the government</a>. Or, if we want to take Trump himself out of the equation and talk about Republicans more broadly, how about stoking <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/22/ron-desantis-covid-vaccine-skepticism-00116526">anti-vaxx conspiracies</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/13/behind-gaetz-scandal-theres-bigger-issue-most-states-have-loopholes-that-let-men-exploit-teen-girls/">sexual trafficking</a> of underage girls, and rampant <a href="https://newrepublic.com/post/175709/clarence-thomas-corruption-saga-just-got-even-worse">Supreme Court corruption</a>.</p><p>Britain doesn’t seem like a strikingly more ingenuous country, nor does its press corps seem to operate with higher standards of integrity. I think the difference is that liberals in America don’t seize their opportunities to drive negative news stories about conservatives like their British counterparts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*E7RLCg3CiRQ-pFRM" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.libdems.org.uk/news/adlib-articles/the-a-z-of-tory-sleaze-scandal">https://www.libdems.org.uk/news/adlib-articles/the-a-z-of-tory-sleaze-scandal</a></figcaption></figure><p>The oldest rule in the book of public relations is that conflict drives coverage. Yet Democrats specifically often seem to hold back on engaging in the type of conflict that would position their opponents in unfavorable light.</p><p>For example, after Trump’s attempt to overthrow the government, Democrats cut short his second impeachment trial to <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/impeachment-senators-wanted-to-get-home-for-valentines-day-2021-2">get home for Valentine’s Day</a> and shifted their focus to the economy. In the face of Justice Thomas’s wild, over-the-top corruption on the Court, the Democratic head of the Senate Judiciary Committee <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2024/02/07/congress/durbin-thomas-scotus-trump-2024-ballot-eligibility-00140147">couldn’t even call on Thomas to resign</a>. Would he have resigned? Of course not. But it would certainly provide fodder for news coverage!</p><p>On some level, it’s clear the Biden campaign at least gets that positioning this election as a battle over democracy is key: Biden surrogates routinely use the phrase “democracy is on the line.” But those positioning attempts don’t hit home as hard when top Democrats won’t do what it takes to drive press coverage to support it. Liberals in Britain got it done, and they had far less to work with. We must do it here.</p><h3>France: Positioning Rassemblement National as a Threat Both Serious and Silly</h3><p>While liberals in Britain positioned the Tories as corrupt and incompetent, positioning the far right in France was a much darker affair.</p><p>Much has been made of the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/france-elections-legislative-drop-final-vote-macron/">coalitional compromises</a> made by the center and left in France to stop the far right, and deservedly so. But from what I’ve seen, those compromises arose from a sense of urgency that was enabled by positioning: these forces positioned the far right as simultaneously a grave threat and a subject of mockery and belittling, thus creating urgency and making them seem beatable.</p><p>Full disclaimer: my couple of semesters of French in college may mean I’m missing some nuance in the wording of these videos. But I recognize as well as anyone historical imagery of Nazis and subtitles talking about how our parents and grandparents fought them, connecting the old fascism we already defeated to the current, supposedly ascendant far right in France.</p><p>And for all the <a href="https://joebiden.com/project2025/">#Project2025</a> emphasis I’ve been glad to see from Democrats in America lately, I certainly haven’t seen any Democrat of consequence talking about how the people pushing Project 2025 are basically the same guys your grandfather went to shoot in the face in the name of Democracy in the 40s.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*fpuVCCWAEB6bESth7D6luw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/C8aDIk0irmk/?igsh=MW1hNmtzemh3MHhibA%3D%3D">https://www.instagram.com/reel/C8aDIk0irmk/?igsh=MW1hNmtzemh3MHhibA%3D%3D</a></figcaption></figure><p>Now, the risk here is making these wannabe fascists seem scary and intimidating. That’s just what the bad guys want, which is why all that old Nazi footage projects projects strength and inevitability. For a movement that thrives on <a href="https://medium.com/@willbunnett/for-democrats-maybe-its-not-the-economy-stupid-you-idiot-you-worm-ff7440060dc">Social Dominance Orientation</a> (SDO), you can’t afford to adopt a posture of fear in confronting them.</p><p>In fact, in keeping with SDO, the best thing you can do is make <em>them</em> look fearful, weak, small, and powerless. I would certainly argue that depicting the fascists as a little plate of shit and depicting someone who would consider voting for them as silly and irrational qualifies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/674/1*B0Yy40n4MTzaHPK1ftUv7Q.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/C885hz2oXn8/?igsh=MTg0c3hiNnYzaDVq">https://www.instagram.com/reel/C885hz2oXn8/?igsh=MTg0c3hiNnYzaDVq</a></figcaption></figure><p>The closest I’ve come to seeing someone strike a similarly effective balance in positioning their opponent was just <a href="https://medium.com/@willbunnett/for-democrats-maybe-its-not-the-economy-stupid-you-idiot-you-worm-ff7440060dc">John Fetterman in 2022</a>. But the list of prominent Dems who have utilized mockery to belittle and undermine their opponents in the Trump era pretty much begins and ends with him.</p><p>It’s a lesson liberals in the U.S. would do well to learn from. Conflict drives coverage; urgency and belittling motivate coalitions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fcd3c049d930" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When to Bring in Outside Project Leadership]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/when-to-bring-in-outside-project-leadership-4acc48d61a9a?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4acc48d61a9a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[project-leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2024 17:53:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-16T17:53:37.426Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The broader the range of possibilities you face, the greater the value you’ll get from good leadership. That’s because every leader’s job is ultimately to turn <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/324750">complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity</a> into direction, structure, and results.</p><p>As someone with 8+ years of experience co-founding and running a Democratic digital marketing agency, there’s a ton I can contribute to your effort in the areas of team management, strategic direction, project scoping, process development, structure development, and more.</p><p>And while I can’t make the decision to hire myself for you, like any good leader I can at least give you some direction.</p><p>You should probably consider bringing in outside project leadership if:</p><ul><li>You’re running an agency and you’re in a position to sell more digital ads work than you can handle on a senior client relationship level, even though you could service it perfectly well at lower levels.</li><li>You’re running a program for an NPO, and you have a digital creative planning need that requires some advanced skills — but doesn’t require getting upsold on everything else an agency offers.</li><li>You need an agency to provide email fundraising expertise you don’t have in house — but you’re not sure you have the expertise in house to find and/or manage the right agency.</li><li>You have someone senior heading out for six months of family leave and need an experienced and tested professional overseeing their budget and their team in the meantime.</li><li>You’ve promoted somebody into a digital leadership role they’ll grow into over time, but right now you need to figure out whether to hire a designer in-house or bring one on freelance — and your new leader isn’t ready to make the call yet.</li><li>And more!</li></ul><p>It’s funny how when you’re an employee, you think of being a leader a bit like a kid thinks of being an adult.</p><p>“When I’m a grownup, I’ll be able to eat ice cream all day every day!” Except then when you actually are a grownup, you probably get to eat even less ice cream than when you were a kid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*m0APCNVe7k4Dn4er.jpg" /><figcaption>When I was searching for images to use with this post, my six-year-old literally walked into the room, pointed to this picture, and said, “I would eat all of that!”</figcaption></figure><p>It may seem to the person starting their career like the boss has all the freedom, when really it’s just that they can’t see the invisible webs of direction and structure yet.</p><p>If you need someone who can see those invisible webs — and navigate them! — <a href="/service/mailto:wb@willbunnett.com">let me know</a>. I’ll be happy to help if I can.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4acc48d61a9a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Speed Up — and Power Up — Your Political Messaging with the Right Positioning]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/speed-up-and-power-up-your-political-messaging-with-the-right-positioning-fa5bf35afbd9?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa5bf35afbd9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[positioning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[messaging]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2024 23:24:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-27T01:23:53.879Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Speed Up — and Power Up — Your Political Messaging with the Right Positioning</h3><p>People love to accuse various politicians and/or parties (i.e. Democrats) of having a “messaging” problem — but most of the time they’re actually looking at a <em>positioning</em> problem.</p><p>To get a handle on the difference, think of it this way: the job of “messaging” is to communicate a “position.” Messaging looks good when the position is good. But messaging that effectively and memorably communicates a bad position is still <em>good messaging, </em>no matter how much it rubs you the wrong way. It’s just the position that needs work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_JB8ivSWcME10t7Q" /><figcaption>Chess moves, like messaging, work best when you’ve already thought through your positioning.</figcaption></figure><p>Even without changing a single policy or issue stance, positioning can be the difference between everything you say tying together in the minds of your audience vs. falling short of making a connection with people. Strong positioning is what makes a Mercedes a luxury vehicle and a Ford truck tough, not to mention what made <a href="https://medium.com/@willbunnett/for-democrats-maybe-its-not-the-economy-stupid-you-idiot-you-worm-ff7440060dc">Donald Trump irresistible to Social Dominance Orientation voters</a>.</p><p>There are many dimensions you can consider when establishing a positioning framework for yourself: emotional, social, self-expressive, values-driven, etc. You don’t have to use every dimension to achieve strong positioning (a good guide 🙋 can help you choose where to focus), but fleshing out just about any of them will leave you stronger than the sum of your policies.</p><p>Not for nothing, there are also important practical benefits to putting in the work to establish strong positioning, especially in modern times.</p><p>Gone are the days when you can cram the precise wording of a poll question into a :30 second TV commercial and control your message completely. Now you have to be able to communicate quickly and succinctly in :15 second and :06 second ad formats.</p><p>Actually, that was four years ago. <em>N</em>ow<em> </em>you also have to navigate the increasingly important world of social media influencers and creators, where getting full value out of the partnership means surrendering script control to the talent. It’s not going to work if it’s too ornate.</p><p>A well thought out position helps simplify what you need to communicate to the point where it will fit into those shorter formats, where you can give a creator nothing more than general direction and have them stay completely on message, where you don’t have to spend all day negotiating the wording of everything because it’s the positioning that counts.</p><p>If defining and strengthening your positioning to better resonate with your vision could help you, <a href="/service/mailto:wb@willbunnett.com">let me know</a>. I’m always happy to talk.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa5bf35afbd9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Panic, It’s Just a Giant Digital
Creative Campaign]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/dont-panic-it-s-just-a-giant-digital-creative-campaign-a412f180bbad?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a412f180bbad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[political-advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-advertising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[creative]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[campaign-strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2024 00:23:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-23T00:23:14.932Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With a small spend on limited channels, digital advertising creative is easy to plan. But delivering everything on time can be enough to give you a panic attack when you’re spending millions of dollars on dozens of channels over multiple months and Election Day is creeping up.</p><p>So take a deep breath. We’re going to break down everything you need to track in a master planning document that will keep you on task and on target.</p><p>When you’re done, all you’ll need to do is exhale and brag about the pitfalls your smart planning helped avoid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*iysJo07asxVflP-p.jpg" /></figure><h3>Content Tracks</h3><p>Lots of campaigns break their content up into separate tracks for persuasion and turnout audiences — but you might also need distinct tracks for federal vs. state legislative races, or for economic and abortion-related messaging, or maybe something else entirely. Detail them in your master planning document so you always know where to look.</p><h3>Audiences</h3><p>Beyond persuasion and turnout, you might need to approach other audiences differently — maybe suburban BIPOC audiences vs. exurban women, college-educated audiences vs. non-college, and so forth.</p><h3>Phases and Timing</h3><p>Tracks can change dramatically around key events over the course of a campaign, so it’s always helpful to map big events out ahead of time. The most obvious one is the shift from the primary to the general, but other pivot points might include getting the endorsement (or not) at the state party convention, moving from summer foundation-laying to post-Labor Day sprint, etc.</p><h3>Messaging</h3><p>Aim for two to three messaging points for each track and record them here with everything else you need to plan a round of creative. This number is the sweet spot because using fewer messaging points risks putting too many eggs in one basket, while trying to squeeze in four or more points risks spreading your message too thin.</p><h3>Testing</h3><p>Saying something ineffective more loudly doesn’t work. When you level up to multi-million-dollar budgets, it’s silly not to run a few pre-flight tests to make sure your creative works and you don’t waste media budget. But preparing multiple concepts and running the tests take time. I usually build in a window for testing around the beginning of each new phase.</p><h3>Channel-Specific Best Practices and Specs</h3><p>Nothing eats at you like having to delay creative because you don’t know the required frame rate or the character count limit. When media plans are simple, it’s not that big a deal to search back through your email for that message where the rep sent you specs.</p><p>But you need to centralize this info when you’re going to be running one or more tracks of creative on Facebook, Instagram, Hulu, Roku, programmatic video, Google search, banner display, Pandora, and more.</p><p>It’s also a good idea to note best practices like how often each channel will need refreshed creative. Depending on your reach and frequency, some channels might only need new creative every four to six weeks, while some might need a refresh every two weeks.</p><h3>Production Calendar</h3><p>When it comes to fully mapping all this out month by month, working backward is your best friend.</p><p>Starting with election day, what’s the last day before then to traffic new creative? How long before that will it take to get approval? How long before that will production take? How long before production will you need in order to brainstorm and settle on concepts?</p><p>Add up the answers to those questions, and that’s when you need to start work on that round of creative. From there, keep going backward from the end of each phase.</p><p>Using what you know about your content tracks, testing plans, and refresh schedules, map out everything that has to get done in each month.</p><p>And don’t worry if things change along the way — by having this roadmap, you’ll know right where to make the adjustment when change happens and what the ripple effects will be. You’ll know which stakeholders to notify, what to cut or double down on, and most importantly how to stay on schedule.</p><p>Did you hear that? That was the sound of your breathing returning to normal as you realize this is doable. But <a href="/service/mailto:wb@willbunnett.com">let me know</a> if you need someone to talk with about it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a412f180bbad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[For Democrats, Maybe it’s Not the Economy, Stupid. You Idiot. You Worm.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willbunnett/for-democrats-maybe-its-not-the-economy-stupid-you-idiot-you-worm-ff7440060dc?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ff7440060dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[political-messaging]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-dominance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-performance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 19:12:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-01T19:12:44.176Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New round of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/28/democrats-biden-middle-class-economy/">Democratic handwringing about economic messaging</a> just dropped. But what if I told you the best way to improve voters’ opinions about your job on the economy wasn’t by talking about the economy at all?</p><p>Lots of people seem to think Trump got so much credit for the economy from voters during his presidency because he was constantly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/07/president-trumps-repeated-claim-greatest-economy-history-our-country/">bragging about it</a>. In reality, the connection between messaging and perception may not be as direct as you would assume.</p><p>Think back to November of 2016. As of the beginning of the month, just 16% of Republican voters in <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/197474/economic-confidence-surges-election.aspx">Gallup’s tracking poll</a> thought the economy was heading in the right direction. A mere week later, that figure shot up to 49%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/925/1*KWQRAxkXf3_eQA1NKe585Q.png" /></figure><p>No, America did not win the lottery or inherit money from a long-lost uncle that week. But that was right when Donald Trump was declared the winner of the presidential election. He hadn’t even taken office yet, let alone started bragging about what he’d done in office. Yet there he was, already getting credit.</p><p>Uncovering what’s going on with examples like this reveals a key lesson for the Democrats who are constantly worried about how to talk about the economy, from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It%27s_the_economy,_stupid">James Carville</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/commentisfree/2022/oct/10/democrats-midterms-victory-economy-bernie-sanders">Bernie Sanders</a> to <a href="https://punchbowl.news/archive/101922-punchbowl-news-am/">Nancy Pelosi</a> to that latest example from just last week.</p><p>This is really counterintuitive, so let me just say it again before we get into the details: <strong>Democrats don’t actually need a better economic message in order to make people think they’re good on the economy.</strong> They might just need to get comfortable with exerting some dominance. And I have evidence to back it up.</p><p>The clever reader will have figured out by now that those 2016 Republican voters actually only improved their assessment of the economy because their guy won. But this goes deeper than partisanship or Joe Biden would be getting more credit on the economy already. The real secret is how you build affinity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/783/0*9CwMLw9nEU7c5XmU" /></figure><p>Trump had built a massive reservoir of credibility and affinity with his supporters by November of 2016. Notwithstanding his <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/as-a-businessman-trump-was-the-biggest-loser-of-all">ill-deserved reputation</a> as a savvy businessman, it’s no exaggeration to say Trump bullied and dominated his way to forging that connection.</p><p>“Little Marco” Rubio. Ted Cruz’s ugly wife. Running circles around Jeb Bush before he could even respond. The hits in the runup to Trump’s victory seemed superficial at times, but the more they discombobulated his opponents, the more they conveyed a critical subtext: he was the dominator.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/856/1*DG1H4x_EA_SVRqlnI_SLcw.png" /></figure><p>And those hits were funny. We all want to think we choose which politicians to vote for based on their policy and issue positions. But we’re mostly wrong, just like how we all think advertising only works on other people. It’s not cool to admit it, but entertainment value counts, especially with less engaged voters. In my years of <a href="https://twitter.com/willbunnett/status/1608896012185374720">studying undecided voters</a> , I’ve come to see that they often actively resist absorbing political information. But entertainment is something a political information resister will still tune into.</p><p>It’s more than the transactional value of a laugh, though. No one wants to get mocked or dominated, so when they see someone successfully mocking or dominating, they’re likely to choose that person’s side, even if only subconsciously. It’s a version of the <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/the-two-psychological-principles-tearing-democratic-digital-fundraising-apart-ea77180d8c3d">bandwagon effect</a> that was the original non-policy driver of affiliation in US politics. People want to be on the winning team.</p><p>Democrats don’t want to adopt Trump’s hyper-aggression, lying, or other hallmarks of authoritarianism, nor should they. Even if they did want to, it would seem as phony as John Kerry going hunting and riding a Harley coming from them. But I would argue that <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-09-07/2020-election-fetterman-dr-oz-trolling-reaches-voters-in-pennsylvania-senate-race">John Fetterman’s mockery</a> of Mehmet Oz was a key component of his victory in Pennsylvania last year. There are ways to make it work for Dems.</p><h3>John Fetterman on Twitter: &quot;pic.twitter.com/y7A4h1BXRe / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>pic.twitter.com/y7A4h1BXRe</p><p>Reports that Trump’s growing fandom in 2015–2016 was made up of voters driven by <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/donald-trump-and-economic-anxiety/496385/">“economic anxiety”</a> became a running joke because of the way that frame papered over his constant racism. But it ultimately wasn’t just White voters gravitating to Trump. By 2020, his vote share had grown dramatically with <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-vote-rising-among-blacks-hispanics-despite-conventional-wisdom-ncna1245787">Hispanic and Black voters</a> as well.</p><p>Although rosier views of the economy correlated to some degree with support for Trump among these voters of color, it’s not necessarily the case that those policy views drove Trump support rather than the other way around. That is, it’s possible and even likely that preexisting support for Trump among those audiences drove up his issue and policy ratings. Indeed, the numbers below are almost certainly inflated by a lot of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thinking,_Fast_and_Slow">post-facto rationalization</a>. Much like how I recently had to buy myself a PlayStation 5 so I could get my kids playing spelling games, and not at all because I wanted it anyway and had to find a justification to tell my wife.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/816/1*jDJLG6eINxunMSi-Amz17A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/816/1*enK4kWaOluHdMY347lEPZw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results/6"><em>https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results/6</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Men especially seem to respond to the combination of confidence, aggression, and domination that Trump represents, no matter their ethnicity. In psychology, it’s called <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/3207711">social dominance orientation</a>, and outside of Fetterman’s relentless mocking of Mehmet Oz last year, Democrats usually do almost nothing to appeal to people who exhibit this personality trait.</p><p>Social dominance can mean mocking, but it can mean a lot of other things, too.</p><p>If Democrats had wanted to keep non-college voters from defecting to Republicans between 2008 and 2016, they could hardly have done worse than failing to put anybody of consequence in jail for lying the nation into the Iraq War or wrecking the world economy.</p><p>And so far, the party has largely repeated the same mistakes in the post-presidential portion of the Trump Era. Democrats cut short a promising impeachment trial over the January 6 insurrection so they could make it <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/sen-chris-coons-hounded-dems-to-drop-witnesses-because-people-want-to-get-home-for-valentines-day">home for Valentine’s Day</a>, then went out of their way to try to get <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/17/pelosis-9-11-style-commission-on-capitol-riot-stalls-in-political-quicksand-476801">the perpetrators</a> of the crime to join the House committee investigating it.</p><p>Heck, when you think about it, you probably won’t even be able to pull up many examples of a Democrat naming a villain of any kind in their stories or talking about punishing anyone for anything. They may propose things that <em>amount to </em>punishment or they may denigrate broad unnamed swaths of people (e.g. billionaires), but they don’t quite name names, and the punishment/dominance language isn’t there.</p><p>It doesn’t feel like a coincidence that the Biden Administration couldn’t manage to indict Trump for crimes we all saw take place on live TV until it appointed a special prosecutor who didn’t take orders from them. This timidity has not worked out well for the party’s political brand, to put it mildly.</p><h3>Anat Shenker-Osorio 🟧 on Twitter: &quot;When we ask people in focus groups to liken Democrats to an animal, their most common picks are turtles, slogs and sloths, followed by complaints that Dems don&#39;t fight. / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>When we ask people in focus groups to liken Democrats to an animal, their most common picks are turtles, slogs and sloths, followed by complaints that Dems don&#39;t fight.</p><p>If showing dominance is so powerful, somebody should test it. Oh, hey, I tested it!</p><p>I came up with two versions of a message about the Inflation Reduction Act, Joe Biden’s signature legislative accomplishment on the economy. One ran down the material benefits: investments in renewable energy, strengthening supply chains, etc. The other showcased a more punitive message, talking about how the law had dominated corporations and lobbyists. Then I ran the videos through the Swayable rapid testing tool to compare results.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F850384417%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F850384417%3Fshare%3Dcopy&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1704725231-f542398ef4bb9cd80769e83f2027c98241300841c131591c5b3e7121c45e174c-d_960&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="960" height="540" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e8e722d3bdfb5c899f8986f31d79f033/href">https://medium.com/media/e8e722d3bdfb5c899f8986f31d79f033/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F850384445%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F850384445%3Fshare%3Dcopy&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1704725183-f637605b9ea2dbbd435e69bf89587fc0d3242e3aa7b8b26f179f0a9a32497f9d-d_960&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="960" height="540" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/dadb0fed6ac04c06f44b3eb93b8b6865/href">https://medium.com/media/dadb0fed6ac04c06f44b3eb93b8b6865/href</a></iframe><p>If Democrats think the voters who have moved away from them in the Trump Era need to hear about the economy in order to move back, they might want to think again. Look at these results with key groups:</p><ul><li><strong>Rural</strong> voters moved <strong>5.3 points</strong> toward Democrats on the generic ballot when they saw the punitive message</li><li><strong>White</strong> voters moved <strong>3.3 points</strong></li><li><strong>Non-college</strong> voters moved <strong>3.2 points</strong></li><li>Voters with <strong>incomes under $80,000/yr</strong> moved <strong>3.1 points</strong></li><li><strong>Moderates</strong> moved <strong>2.8 points</strong></li><li>None of these groups moved in a statistically significant way when they saw the material benefits video</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/718/1*vnCQ_QLat1JczOO6YwI7uw.png" /></figure><p>Further testing is clearly warranted to better understand what’s happening here. But I will say from my years of professional message testing that it’s unusual to see a message on a popular economic policy exhibit this magnitude of movement on these key audiences. Imagine how the electoral college map would change if rural voters moved 5 points in Democrats’ direction.</p><p>We can stop pretending that Republicans get high marks on the economy because their issue policies are more appealing. Huge chunks of <a href="https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2020/12/30/republicans-dont-know-anything-about-their-party">their own voters don’t even know what the Party stands for</a> on economic issues.</p><p>Indeed, the paper trail of support for the proposition that people simply adopt the positions of their preferred candidates, rather than picking candidates who align with their preexisting issue preferences, is <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo11644533.html">getting</a> <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/people-are-changing-their-views-on-race-and-gender-issues-to-match-their-party/">very</a> <a href="https://peterenns.org/wp-content/uploads/Enns_Jardina_TrumpRace2016_POQ_forthcoming.pdf">long</a> at this point.</p><blockquote><a href="http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-america-made-donald-trump-unstoppable-20160224">Cheryl Donlon</a> says she heard the tariff message loud and clear and she’s fine with it, despite the fact that it clashes with traditional conservatism. <br> <br>“We need someone who is just going to look at what’s best for us,” she says. <br> <br>I mention that Trump’s plan is virtually identical to Dick Gephardt’s idea from way back in the 1988 Democratic presidential race, to fight the Korean Hyundai import wave with retaliatory tariffs. <br> <br>Donlon says she didn’t like that idea then. <br> <br>Why not? <br> <br>“I didn’t like him,” she says. <br> <br>Trump, though, she likes. And so do a lot of people.</blockquote><p>What these voters do know is that Trump went out and dominated people. He gave them something not just to vote for, but something to root for. And on a deep psychological level, that social dominance orientation is what many of them crave in leadership.</p><p>For Democrats to get the economic approval that they crave, they need to meet voters where they are. They need to stop dwelling on policy once in a while and show they can throw a punch. The specific way they approach it can be more Fetterman than Trump.</p><p>But if they don’t do something different, well, when it comes to voter perceptions of the economy, Democrats will just keep getting dominated.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ff7440060dc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Two Psychological Principles Tearing Democratic Digital Fundraising Apart]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/the-two-psychological-principles-tearing-democratic-digital-fundraising-apart-ea77180d8c3d?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ea77180d8c3d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2021 20:48:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-17T20:48:56.975Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v2YJGBnztnZnujsihslJ3A.png" /><figcaption><em>Were Terry McAuliffe’s fundraising emails in the Virginia gubernatorial race a self-fulfilling prophecy? (h/t </em><a href="https://twitter.com/Pr0gressAmerica/status/1455930036075339777?s=20"><em>Mike Phelan</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Maybe you heard, but Terry McAuliffe was blowing it in the run-up to this month’s gubernatorial election in Virginia. Or at least that was what his campaign was telling you if you were on their digital fundraising lists going back to last summer.</p><p>The funny thing is, McAuliffe really did end up blowing it. (Well, maybe not that funny if you’re one of the people who will now suffer from cruel and destructive Republican policies in Virginia.) So it’s pretty natural to wonder, did all those annoying, doom-and-gloom messages become a self-fulfilling prophecy, depressing or alienating the key base voters the McAuliffe campaign needed to win?</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FYa9onCut4z4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DYa9onCut4z4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FYa9onCut4z4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/59e805c35e6037c3581f984bcb638074/href">https://medium.com/media/59e805c35e6037c3581f984bcb638074/href</a></iframe><p>What we’re seeing here, what’s really tearing apart defenders of these techniques and their increasingly loud critics, is a spectacular, high-speed collision between two of the most powerful psychological forces in politics when it comes to explaining how voters interact with campaigns: loss aversion and the bandwagon effect.</p><p>It seems pretty clear from anecdotal observation that a lot of Democratic digital fundraisers are getting the balance wrong here, so it’s worth understanding. Loss aversion explains why the doom-and-gloom raises so much—but the bandwagon effect helps explain why it may be counterproductive.</p><h3>Loss Aversion</h3><p><a href="https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/loss-aversion/">Loss aversion</a> is one of the most fundamental insights in the world of behavioral economics:</p><blockquote>Loss aversion is… encapsulated in the expression “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman &amp; Tversky, 1979). It is thought that <strong>the pain of losing is psychologically about twice as powerful as the pleasure of gaining</strong>. People are more willing to take risks (or behave <a href="http://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/honesty/">dishonestly</a>; e.g. Schindler &amp; Pfattheicher, 2016) to avoid a loss than to make a gain. (emphasis added)</blockquote><p>Telling Democratic partisans (who would be the core audience for any digital fundraising universe) that they could lose the election is a textbook example of loss aversion. These partisans are bought into the successes and failures of the Democratic Party and its candidates, and the thought of losing races is mentally or emotionally painful for them. To resolve the pain (at least temporarily), they can make a quick donation. Bingo, pain of loss soothed!</p><p>It’s an incredibly powerful motivational concept — to the tune of about $16,000,000 in McAuliffe’s case, per the report cited below from his fundraising team. But by definition it only works on those who are already bought in enough to feel like they stand to lose something from a bad outcome in the election.</p><p>What about the swing voters or Dem-aligned voters who are deciding whether to even bother turning out? For them, the prospect of McAuliffe losing doesn’t necessarily represent the prospect of a painful personal loss. Instead, raising that prospect risks costing these voters’ support because of the bandwagon effect.</p><h3>Bandwagon Effect</h3><p><a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bandwagon-effect.asp">This concept</a> refers to people’s desire to join the winning team, be a part of what other people are doing simply because they’re doing it and it looks more fun. Hey, check it out over here, the music and dancing are infectious!</p><blockquote>In politics, the bandwagon effect might cause citizens to vote for the person who appears to have more popular support because they want to belong to the majority. The term “bandwagon” refers to a wagon that carries a band through a parade. During the 19th century, an entertainer named Dan Rice traveled the country campaigning for President Zachary Taylor. Rice’s bandwagon was the centerpiece of his campaign events, and he encouraged those in the crowd to “jump on the bandwagon” and support Taylor.</blockquote><p>So who wants to jump on a bandwagon that’s playing funeral dirges?</p><p>Answer: nobody, and certainly not people who aren’t experiencing loss aversion. The people you can’t count on to vote for you (i.e. the voters will decide whether you win or lose) are much more likely to want to join up with you if it doesn’t look like you’re destined to lose.</p><h3>Balancing Loss Aversion Money Against Bandwagon Effect Alienation</h3><p>Most of us in Democratic digital fundraising have memorized the way this argument typically plays out by now: defenders of doom-and-gloom fundraising point to all the money it raises, while critics point to all the people it alienates. The critics’ argument makes logical sense, but has trouble landing the decisive blow because it’s so easy to measure money raised yet so hard to measure negative impact. And sure enough, that’s how it played out here.</p><p>After receiving copious criticism, the McAuliffe fundraising team pointed to the bottom line:</p><h3>Christina Freundlich on Twitter: &quot;It&#39;s Election Day! Final, final grassroots fundraising update:$16 MILLION from 500,000 donations from the online fundraising program that Twitter loves to question.Cheers to Carole King and James Carville!✨ / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>It&#39;s Election Day! Final, final grassroots fundraising update:$16 MILLION from 500,000 donations from the online fundraising program that Twitter loves to question.Cheers to Carole King and James Carville!✨</p><p>Meanwhile, the critics pointed out that raising money is not a substitute for moving voters:</p><h3>Josh Nelson on Twitter: &quot;As far as I know, no one who works in the industry denies that guilt-tripping people, using extreme hyperbole that borders on deception and sending an exceptionally-high volume of email works to raise money. That&#39;s not the concern people are raising. / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>As far as I know, no one who works in the industry denies that guilt-tripping people, using extreme hyperbole that borders on deception and sending an exceptionally-high volume of email works to raise money. That&#39;s not the concern people are raising.</p><h3>Josh Nelson on Twitter: &quot;The concern is that those very same tactics are driving some potential donors away from the Democratic fundraising ecosystem entirely, and that they may be doing damage to the public&#39;s perception of the Democratic Party and its candidates as a whole. / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>The concern is that those very same tactics are driving some potential donors away from the Democratic fundraising ecosystem entirely, and that they may be doing damage to the public&#39;s perception of the Democratic Party and its candidates as a whole.</p><p>By the time the race was over, McAuliffe had lost by a couple points. With an outcome that close, you can point to just about anything to say it was decisive and you’ll probably be right. Did the money raised make the outcome closer than it would have been otherwise? Probably. Did the repetitive, annoying, doom-and-gloom fundraising alienate some voters that could made it closer or won it? Again, probably.</p><p>Look, at the end of the day, the point of raising money is to spend it to make people like you. If the process of raising that money makes people hate you (or wonder about your sanity or competence, or not feel like opening their wallet, or not feel like submitting their ballot…), then you’re just raising wasted money.</p><h3>Anne-Marie Kinney on Twitter: &quot;Wish I&#39;d never donated to Democrats because the texts I get are so infuriating! &quot;Shameful!&quot; &quot;Did you see what the GOP did this time??&quot; Like...go to hell?? / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>Wish I&#39;d never donated to Democrats because the texts I get are so infuriating! &quot;Shameful!&quot; &quot;Did you see what the GOP did this time??&quot; Like...go to hell??</p><p>Evidence that Democrats have a problem raising enough money to win is shockingly limited compared with the lengths some campaigns are willing to go to in order to raise it. There’s substantially more evidence, however, that Democrats aren’t that great at turning money into votes, given all the recent high-profile elections where Dems raised a gazillion dollars and still lost, including now this one. You might say Democrats don’t have a fund-raising problem, they have a fund-spending problem.</p><p>A little loss aversion can be a successful part of a healthy digital fundraising program. But because of the bandwagon effect, it’s clear that dialing the loss aversion all the way up isn’t helping as much as its defenders think. It’s time for Democrats to reevaluate their approach to making people like them, both in terms of raising and spending.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ea77180d8c3d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/the-two-psychological-principles-tearing-democratic-digital-fundraising-apart-ea77180d8c3d">The Two Psychological Principles Tearing Democratic Digital Fundraising Apart</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management">Digital Brand Management</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Remember the Georgia Runoffs? Here Are Three Important Takeaways Not to Lose Sight of]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/remember-the-georgia-runoffs-here-are-three-important-takeaways-not-to-lose-sight-of-8c641df2e3d7?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c641df2e3d7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[stimulus-check]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia-senate-runoff]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[campaign]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2021 18:51:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-22T22:44:44.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While the political world has been consumed the past few weeks with the attempted violent coup at the U.S. Capitol, the ensuing impeachment effort, and finally the inauguration of a new president, I like to remember way back to a simpler time before all this craziness.</p><p>That simpler time I refer to, of course, was one day before the Trumpist mob invaded the Capitol — yes, the day Democrats Raphael Warnock and Jon Ossoff won the runoff races for Georgia’s two U.S. Senate seats.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dV195Qg8rf3fRcfJ" /><figcaption>Winners, Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock</figcaption></figure><p>Because, assuming democracy continues in this country, those two victories that once seemed impossible in the Deep South can tell us a lot about the future of Democratic campaigns as they will be and as they should be. There are three things I think you should watch out for in particular:</p><ol><li>Democrats won without running as “Republican Lite” candidates.</li><li>Warnock used puppies to de-fang racism.</li><li>Untargeted stimulus checks provided a political advantage over more targeted forms of aid.</li></ol><p>Let’s explore why these points are so key, shall we?</p><h3>Democrats Running as Democrats in the South</h3><p>For decades, the conventional wisdom for Democrats running in conservative areas was to distance themselves from their party and what it stood for. You’re going to need some conservative voters to win, the thinking would go, so you’d better not come across as too liberal. Just focus on local issues and loudly repudiating some super liberal straw man argument and you should be good to go. The catch is, it didn’t really work. Or at least it stopped working years ago when <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/3-zombie-myths-about-winning-elections-and-why-they-need-to-die-110bd4ef1921">politics stopped being local</a>.</p><p>Warnock and Ossoff didn’t do that.</p><h3></h3><p>One of the things that stands out about Warnock and Ossoff is that they did not campaign as if they were afraid of backlash. And I think that refusal to take a defensive crouch was an important part of neutralizing Republican attacks.</p><p>They recognized that they had a path to campaign on popular, easy-to-grasp platforms, and they approached that opportunity aggressively. This doesn’t mean they campaigned as if they were Bernie Sanders. But they leaned hard into large COVID stimulus checks, and attacked their opponents aggressively for corruption and exploiting racism. They campaigned on things like voting rights and other controversial national issues, rather than pretending they’d never heard of the Democratic Party and focusing on getting local projects funded.</p><h3></h3><p>Your daily reminder that David Perdue tried to profit off of the pandemic but opposed $1200 stimulus checks for his own constituents. pic.twitter.com/kiHjNKS3sT</p><h3></h3><p>Unelected Senator @KLoeffler wants to undermine your vote and overturn Georgia&#39;s election.Let&#39;s show her that Georgia voters will not be silenced or ignored. Tomorrow, let&#39;s vote her out. https://t.co/MbVus5xXQh</p><p>This marks a stark departure from past efforts by Southern Democrats. I’ll always remember working on Mary Landrieu’s 2014 campaign that tried and failed to <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/3-zombie-myths-about-winning-elections-and-why-they-need-to-die-110bd4ef1921">localize an election</a> that was bound to be nationalized. More recently, it’s a far cry from Doug Jones <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/3-zombie-myths-about-winning-elections-and-why-they-need-to-die-110bd4ef1921">declining to even put his condemnation of Roy Moore</a>’s alleged pedophilia in his own voice.</p><p>To be fair to those who came before Warnock and Ossoff, these narrow runoff victories — and thus the success of these new strategies — might not have been possible without the recent growth in support for Democrats among college-educated white voters. And given the demographics of their respective states, that still might not be a winning strategy and winning coalition in states like Louisiana and Alabama that don’t have as many college grads as Georgia.</p><p>But it took a different kind of strategy to step up and prove whether this rising new Democratic coalition really could carry a state that hadn’t elected a Democrat to the Senate in who-knows-how-long. Warnock and Ossoff provided an encouraging proof of concept.</p><h3>The Puppies De-Fang the Dog Whistles</h3><p>Warnock in particular faced a tough balancing act: he (and Ossoff) needed strong turnout from Black voters in Georgia, which would argue for embracing his own Black identity in his campaign. But he needed to simultaneously avoid playing into the racist dog whistles that his opponent, Kelly Loeffler, was <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/georgia-senate-runoff-black-voters-raphael-warnock_n_5ff292f5c5b6e7974fd44706?ew">jumping in on</a> with both feet.</p><p>A big part of Warnock’s response was to project himself as <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/03/raphael-warnock-georgia-race-453222">someone who liked policy and puppies</a>:</p><blockquote>“Ever since the start of the U.S. Senate runoff campaigns, the Democratic newcomer has relied on light-hearted ads where he walks dogs and jokingly brushes off the attempts of his Republican opponent, Sen. Kelly Loeffler, to demonize him.”</blockquote><h3></h3><p>I told you the smear ads were coming, but Georgians will see Sen. @Kloeffler&#39;s ads for what they are. pic.twitter.com/0sgU8ndC63</p><p>The strategy here is pretty obvious and straightforward: use the puppies to define yourself as approachable and relatable and kind, then when the anti-Black stereotypes come out, they won’t land for most voters.</p><p>Warnock and his team did a pretty fantastic job with this, applying it consistently and effectively. Forging an emotional connection like this with voters is actually something way more Democratic candidates should try to do as part of their comprehensive <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/politicalbrand?src=hashtag_click">political brand</a> strategies.</p><p>Seeing this also got me thinking about how much I’d love to get the opportunity some day to test out other approaches to solving this challenge. We know from political psychology that racist attacks often tap into subconscious concepts people hold about “natural” hierarchies in society. For example, the racist trope of the “uppity” Black person relies on white people’s assumptions that Black people are or should be beneath white people in society’s hierarchy.</p><p>The puppies distracted from these racist attacks against Warnock and helped forge an emotional connection between him and voters that made it harder to attack his character in general. He won. It worked. But the puppies didn’t directly address or engage with the hierarchy question.</p><p>Would puppies have been more effective if Warnock had also framed the other issues he talked about to position his opponent as the one bent on upsetting hierarchies? What if Warnock had consistently framed his voting rights push as a matter of Loeffler keeping the people working for the politicians instead of the politicians working for the people, like it should be? Maybe it would have made a difference or maybe not, but that’s why I’d love to test it!</p><h3>Untargeted Aid</h3><p>The debate in Washington over $2,000 COVID relief stimulus checks seems to have helped Warnock and Ossoff by allowing them to <a href="https://www.savannahnow.com/story/news/2020/12/24/georgia-u-s-senators-put-defense-after-stimulus-relief-stalls/4040770001/">advocate for relief</a> while their opponents opposed it. That was important, because the aid was pretty popular with voters, and drawing sharp contrasts on popular issues is the bread and butter of a good campaign.</p><p>But the broader lesson I draw here is about why the relief checks were so popular. Because there was a lot of discussion over ways to make the checks less popular.</p><p>Specifically, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/barack-obama-top-economist-stimulus-checks-unfortunate-1558700">some economists and legislators</a> argued that the checks were too broadly targeted. Too many people who didn’t really, really, really need the aid might get it, the argument went, and the same aggregate benefit to the health of the economy could be achieved at lower cost by targeting the aid more narrowly to those with the greatest need. That may be true from a strict policy standpoint, but there is no policy without politics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/790/0*k3nEMmlvv8Cr_-sC" /><figcaption>Former Obama Administration economist Christina Romer criticized loosely targeted COVID stimulus checks.</figcaption></figure><p>Politically, this election reinforces the effectiveness of untargeted aid. That’s because <em>people don’t really understand narrowly targeted aid.</em> When there are lots of ins and outs about who qualifies and what they have to do to apply, it’s easier for voters to misunderstand what the government is actually doing for them and why it’s important. That means whoever worked to secure the aid doesn’t get much credit for it.</p><p>And when people don’t necessarily know if they’re eligible or how to apply if they are or what this is even really supposed to do, fewer people take advantage of the aid than need it. That experience even leaves those who do take advantage of the aid feeling frustrated by the confusing and byzantine application process. To drive home the point, one commentator recently referred to the complex rationales that contributed to the unpopularity of Obamacare for so many years by <a href="https://www.eschatonblog.com/2021/01/morning-thread_6.html">claiming</a>:</p><blockquote>“Bend the cost curve” was far more damaging than “defund the police.”</blockquote><p>Whether that claim is true or whether it’s hyperbolic, voters in Georgia could almost certainly understand the blanket nature of the aid being debated. The could see that they would get aid easily and quickly if the bill passed, and they could see that the Republican Senate candidates would make it harder to get aid if they won. Bam.</p><p>It’s also worth mentioning that untargeted aid is more politically potent because of the stakeholders it creates. Look at Social Security and Medicare, both of which have survived numerous attacks over the years more or less unscathed. Each of these cornerstone achievements of the New Deal coalition basically grants benefits to everyone of a certain age, whether or not they have the means to “need” said benefits. To be crass for just a moment, that means rich people appreciate Social Security too, not just poor people. And rich people, sad to say, have a lot more power in politics. So when the inevitable assaults against these programs come, powerful defenders line up behind them. It was a much lonelier coalition defending welfare when it came onto the chopping block in the 90&#39;s.</p><p>So why have Democrats been more apt to pursue narrowly targeted aid in recent decades, rather than leaving targeting more broad? Part of the answer is undoubtedly technocratic; Democrats do like to listen to economists, which is generally actually a good idea. But Democrats have also let Republicans intimidate them for decades with disingenuous fearmongering about the deficit. Certainly Democrats like Joe Biden and Nancy Pelosi would remember those welfare fights from the 1980&#39;s, where Republicans were able to make political hay out of <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/154404/myth-welfare-queen">people receiving aid who maybe didn’t deserve it</a>. But again, welfare didn’t have those wealthier allies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*orX7PC_Ruxf7ehS_.jpg" /><figcaption>Supposed “welfare queen” Linda Taylor</figcaption></figure><p>There are now some signs that Democrats in the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/joe-biden-wants-set-aside-deficit-concerns-invest-ailing-u-n1253638">White House</a> and in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-07/democrats-plan-return-to-earmarks-to-pave-way-for-infrastructure">Congress</a> are giving up on being scared of deficit nonsense. Hopefully the clarity of the results in Georgia will help the remaining non-believers in Democratic circles come around to the power of keeping aid simple and giving it powerful friends.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c641df2e3d7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/remember-the-georgia-runoffs-here-are-three-important-takeaways-not-to-lose-sight-of-8c641df2e3d7">Remember the Georgia Runoffs? Here Are Three Important Takeaways Not to Lose Sight of</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management">Digital Brand Management</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Joe Biden’s Call for Unity Doesn’t Have to End in Catastrophe for Democrats]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/joe-bidens-call-for-unity-doesn-t-have-to-end-in-catastrophe-for-democrats-1e13134ff6a8?source=rss-68269ca0722f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e13134ff6a8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[abraham-lincoln]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[joe-biden]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-branding]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Bunnett]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2020 16:45:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-19T21:55:22.742Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Joe Biden, like Abraham Lincoln, is making it clear these days that the closing argument for his presidential campaign will be a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-moderates-former-republicans/2020/10/12/85b29d58-0a71-11eb-a166-dc429b380d10_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_2">call for unity.</a> And why shouldn’t he? Unity polls well, and it’s a neat aspirational vision for a country that feels increasingly torn apart.</p><blockquote>“The closing argument is that we need to unify the country,” said Mike Donilon, Biden’s chief strategist and architect of the speech. “He won’t represent just Democrats or Republicans, he’ll represent everyone.”</blockquote><h3></h3><p>We need a president who will unite our country and bring out our best - not one who stokes division and brings out our worst.</p><p>So what if all the savvy insiders <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/bidens-illusory-bipartisanship/616431/">make fun of him</a> for believing in a long-gone fantasy world where Republicans would actually collaborate with Democrats on the project of productively governing our great nation in good faith. So what if Republicans are already <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/14/how-republicans-will-try-destroy-biden-presidency/">telegraphing</a> in very obvious and unmistakable ways that they’re preparing to destroy his presidency from day one. Voters consistently tell <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/16/many-americans-say-they-want-politicians-to-compromise-but-maybe-they-dont/">pollsters</a> and <a href="https://raceclassnarrativeaction.com/">message researchers</a> they like unity and working together to find solutions. Shouldn’t Biden follow the lead of decades’ worth of Democratic campaigns and run on a concept that voters say they want? Even if he’ll never be able to deliver on collaboration with Republicans, it’s gotta be better than running on a platform of more partisan bickering, right?</p><p>The trick with running a campaign on unity is how you use it. Sometimes Democrats win on it, and sometimes they don’t. But they haven’t been running on unity the way Lincoln did. The key to using unity successfully, especially in an age of polarization, is to start using unity less as an olive branch and more as a cudgel.</p><p>Unity is a highly problematic concept in an inherently adversarial political process. An infamous California conundrum shows why.</p><p>In California, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_California_Proposition_13">Prop. 13</a> is mostly known for fixing property taxes at low rates and helping kick off a nationwide “tax revolt” at the end of the 1970s. Less well known is that Prop. 13 set a ⅔ majority threshold for raising any and all taxes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IX0-2l-5X9UKDEJ0" /><figcaption><em>A blue-clad American political faction pursues unity in this illustration. Not pictured: any pursuit of compromise.</em></figcaption></figure><p>With California Republicans obdurately refusing to ever raise taxes on anything ever, this created decades of horrendously dysfunctional budgeting for the state. Revenue is one of the key levers budget setters have to pull, after all.</p><p>Things have gotten a little more rational in recent years as Democrats have achieved supermajorities in the state legislature and no longer need Republican buy-in to budget. But throughout those years of dysfunction, the idea of removing or reforming that ⅔ requirement never really gained any traction. Why? Because polls consistently showed that voters supported it. And after all, what voter wouldn’t?</p><p>The subtext of any poll question asking whether you support that ⅔ requirement is effectively whether you would like the bickering factions in your legislature to please get along or not. And of course voters want people to get along! No one wants to see their parents fight or sit at a table next to the couple that came to the restaurant to argue. When kids fight, they get a timeout. By gum, if those legislators can’t find a way to get along, just require them to work it out!</p><p>Once you see this dynamic for what it is, it shows up everywhere. In my career as a political consultant, just about every race I’ve worked on has featured at least one poll that shows some form of the idea of working together to get results, working across the aisle with Republicans, or putting aside differences etc. is pretty popular. This finding shouldn’t be surprising, but the real mistake Democrats make is when they think they should then campaign on a promise of compromise — or worse yet, govern on it.</p><p>The first problem with Democrats campaigning on promises to work with Republicans is that it undercuts the core value proposition of their political brand and hands the edge to their opponent. After all, if voters want someone who will work with Republicans, they can just vote for the actual Republican candidate. This brand confusion also makes moral clarity around the GOP’s descent into naked white supremacy and authoritarianism harder to call out. Imagine saying, “Elect me because Republicans are undermining the vote and supporting racist terror militias — and I pledge to work with them hand in glove if elected!” It may be #2020, but making sure voters know clearly and definitively that you are not the party of overt racial hegemony is still an electoral advantage in most districts.</p><p>The second problem is that, no, you can’t work with Republicans. <em>You</em> may be perfectly <em>willing</em> to work with them, but Republicans aren’t returning the favor. This is the first lesson Barack Obama should have learned in 2009 when he got zero Republican votes on his <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2009/02/senate-passes-787-billion-stimulus-bill-018837">stimulus bill</a> in the House. Instead, he proceeded to water down his health care reform bill over the course of protracted negotiations in an effort to get Republicans to sign on — only to end up with zero Republican votes again. And take your pick of examples of Republicans refusing to compromise from current events in 2020, like say Republicans <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/19/the-left-channels-its-fury-toward-mcconnell-418542">disregarding their own precedent</a> of denying a vote (and even so much as a hearing) to President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland during an election year by turning around and ramming through an election-eve vote on a new nominee from President Trump.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QSvuy6lS3LIhKmJH.jpg" /><figcaption>They’re not here to compromise with Democrats.</figcaption></figure><p>The third problem with how Democrats have approached the challenge of “working across the aisle to get results” is that they’ve focused too much on the “working across the aisle” part and too little on the “getting results” part. Without getting too sidetracked, this is the part that killed Obama’s brand (and effectively killed the rest of his presidency): he promised change, then went into office with giant majorities in the House and Senate and didn’t get things done. Things didn’t change, as people could judge themselves from the results.</p><p>And getting things done, it turns out, is about the only thing voters can successfully evaluate — at least if you define “success” as something that will make voters actually change their minds. <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo11644533.html">Extensive research</a> has shown that, at least among the voters who change their minds during elections, policy doesn’t matter. Personality/credibility matters in some circumstances. But what swings voters consistently is whether they’re seeing results from incumbents or not:</p><blockquote>“Voters do pass the relatively easy tests of judging politicians on performance. When people think a politician has performed well — perhaps by boosting economic growth or winning a war — they become or remain supportive of that politician. Likewise when people perceive a politician as having desirable character traits relevant to performance, such as honesty, they become or remain likely to vote for that politician.</blockquote><blockquote>“But voters fail the policy tests. In particular, I find surprisingly little evidence that voters judge politicians on their policy stances. They rarely shift their votes to politicians who agree with them — even when a policy issue has just become highly prominent, even when politicians take clear and direct stances on the issue, and even when voters know these stances.”</blockquote><p>So everyone likes “working across the aisle to get results.” But over the years, it’s become evident that working across the aisle without getting results doesn’t make people want to keep voting for you — while research has shown that getting results without necessarily working across the aisle does make people like you.</p><p>Where does that leave unity as a campaign concept?</p><p>No politician in the history of America has staked more of his campaign and his administration on the theme of unity than Abraham Lincoln. Heck, he even named his side the Union. That, of course, would be his side <em>in the Civil War.</em> That’s because Lincoln was so committed to unity that he was willing to literally kill his opponents with rifles and canons to get it. That’s a far cry from the holding-hands-around-the-campfire version of unity that Democrats usually turn to these days; call it unity as conciliation. Obviously war is never a great option when you can avoid it, but it’s important not to overlook that this extreme example of conflict — an event that made Lincoln one of the most revered leaders in the country’s history — was fought in service of unity.</p><p>Few Americans would regard George W. Bush as any kind of great leader these days. Yet Bush’s side did win out in the 2002 midterm elections (when typically a president’s party would lose seats in his first midterm election) and again in 2004 largely by <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/09/opposing-bush-becomes-unpatriotic.html">calling for unity by accusing Democrats of undermining it</a>. In other words, we’re going to unify the country with MY unity, not their unity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/0*PLSJgnSYxKZ-5muZ.gif" /><figcaption>Yeah, my unity.</figcaption></figure><p>And of course the happy resolution of California’s dilemma that I described above ended not in the two sides coming together, but in California Democrats all but <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/California-Republicans-are-stuck-with-an-15580288.php">running Republicans out of the state</a>.</p><p>So should Democrats like Joe Biden mount a bloody Civil War to cement the nation’s unity? Should Democrats strip their opponents of any claim to patriotism as part of a cynical partisan ploy? Certainly not.</p><p>But unity doesn’t have to mean compromise, either. If Democrats complete their projected sweep of this fall’s elections, they would do well to remember that results beat style points. And Democrats are more likely to get results if they press their agenda by eliminating the filibuster, expanding the Supreme Court, and using their power to enact their own priorities than if they waste time trying to find common ground with the party that’s looking to destroy them.</p><p><em>Will Bunnett is a principal at </em><a href="http://www.clarifyagency.com/"><em>Clarify Agency</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e13134ff6a8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management/joe-bidens-call-for-unity-doesn-t-have-to-end-in-catastrophe-for-democrats-1e13134ff6a8">Joe Biden’s Call for Unity Doesn’t Have to End in Catastrophe for Democrats</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-brand-management">Digital Brand Management</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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