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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Will Forster on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Will Forster on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Will Forster on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Picking Fleas to Poetry: How may the evolution of language have benefited Homo evolution?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@willforster/from-picking-fleas-to-poetry-how-may-the-evolution-of-language-have-benefited-homo-evolution-2946c8dd3f6d?source=rss-6f471d046e62------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[evolutionary-biology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[evolution-of-language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[evolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Forster]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2020 06:53:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-27T06:53:58.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>“I wandered lonely as a cloud<br>That floats on high o’er vales and hills,<br>When all at once I saw a crowd,<br>A host, of golden daffodils;<br>Beside the lake, beneath the trees,<br>Fluttering and dancing in the breeze.” —</blockquote><p>As Wordsworth himself most probably would have said, language is a remarkable thing. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a world without it; yet no other species have the linguistic abilities to parallel our own (Berwick <em>et al., </em>2013; Leiberman, 1994). But how did humans acquire this fascinating ability? What were the evolutionary processes affecting <em>Homo </em>ancestors that led to its current state ingrained in our own species? And what were the incremental benefits which allowed it to comprehensively outstrip other methods of social interaction?</p><p>As verbal communication leaves very little trace of its existence in paleo-anthropological records, it will always be difficult to explain how language first arose. In spite of this, there are several hypotheses spanning neuropsychology, sociology and archaeology which each offer different and interesting possibilities as to how human-like communication gradually materialised, stemming first perhaps from physical gestures, serving as a means of detecting ‘cheats’, and developing to become a way of cementing social unity (Calvin, 1983; Deacon, 1997; Barrett <em>et al.</em>, 2002). The following sections will outline the various concepts of language as both a cognitive tool (Berwick <em>et al. </em>2013) and one of communication, along with the genetically defined neurological mapping. The fundamentals of some of the more substantial social theories including the Social Gossip and Social Contract hypotheses and the Scheherazade Effect will be discussed, especially the potential selective pressures encouraging language to supplement, and later overtake, other communication methods such as grooming.</p><h3>Language: food for thought, or thought itself?</h3><p>There are two broad opinions that can currently be taken when discussing the evolution of language and its link to thought (generally defined, in this case, as mental perception of the world) (Deacon, 1997). The first, as proposed by Pinker (1994), states that language is fundamentally a tool for communication, whose principle purpose is for the conveyance of information between individuals (e.g. hunter-gatherers). Advocates of Pinker’s studies believe language — or specifically grammar — to be distinct from a person’s reasoning ability, ‘modulated’, and furthermore to be an innate human instinct.</p><p>The second theory, proposed by Berwick <em>et al. </em>(2013), suggests that syntactical complexity of language, neurological mapping between Broca’s area (e.g. BA 44) and the posterior superior cortex, and a hierarchical framework for building grammatically structured sentences are all so intricate that it results in what is effectively an entirely new dimension of thought (Friederici <em>et al.,</em> 2006). From pragmatic studies involving functional MRI brain scanning, they argue that verbal communication is only an ancillary to the internal workings of the brain, providing an externalisation of language-related neural processing. That’s to say, language is ‘meaning with words’, as opposed to ‘words with meaning’ (Figure 1) (Berwick <em>et al. </em>2013).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/558/1*p8wIoSFUb6qokHMlPTEYAg.png" /></figure><p>It may seem like a ‘chicken or the egg’ scenario, but the subtle differences have a profound effect on how the evolution of language can be understood, especially in view of selective advantages. For example, Pinker (1994)believes that logical reasoning is detached from a person’s cognitive capability of grasping grammatical rules. He is supportive of the concept of a ‘universal grammar’ (‘metagrammar’) (Chomsky, 1998) but claims that evidence of infants forming their own ‘babble’ grammar and even signals with underlying structural complexity unseen in primates cousins indicates that humans have an innate <em>instinct</em> for language, much like a spider has an instinct to build a spider’s web, or a bird has to fly. Yet its evolution would not likely have benefited human’s perception of the world, merely one’s way of interacting with it.</p><p>On the other hand, use of state-of-the art equipment and the accumulation of scientific research should mean Berwick <em>et al.</em>’s work (2013) be recognised as the more up to date and arguably more accurate concept of how language relates to the brain, and through that to the environment. According to this theory, if a primitive language ability arose (presumably spontaneously through genetic mutations, described below) in an interbreeding population of primates then it would offer some form of additional cognitive apparatus with which to make sense of the world around them, aside from behavioural shifts in communication. This is supported by genetic analysis, particularly of the FOXP2 regulatory gene (often referred to anecdotally as the ‘language gene’) which is involved with the embryonic development of subcortical structures (Lieberman, 2006; Fisher <em>et al.</em>, 2006). This gene is largely responsible for the unique patterning of the human brain and neural bridges. Lieberman (2006) reveals commonalities between language impairment and neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s to suggest that previous models which place language squarely in the court of Broca’s area or other localized regions are false (Figure 2). Genetic studies have shown that the current form on the FOXP2 governing the basal-ganglia development exclusive to humans arose around 100,000 years ago, and that true ‘reiterative’ processing was not possible before then (Lieberman, 2006; Fisher<em> et al.</em>, 2006). This corresponds roughly to when the first modern humans are seen in archaeological records (Figure 3). From this it is possible to deduce that the additional processing power had cognitive benefits possibly in addition to communication, which is acceptable when considering the vast energy investment for the brain (King, 1996).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*LZOJ85u1tTOTifAimZhZig.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Why is language successful?</strong></h3><p>So far this essay has concentrated on <em>what </em>language’s primary purpose might be, as a communication tool or otherwise, and how it arose, but left the reasons for its existence unexplored. There is as diverse an array of theories surrounding <em>why</em> human-like language came about as there are academic fields studying it. These range from developmental biology through to linguistics and philosophy, but the following theories all share one common theme; that the principle driving force behind the establishment of language was in some way social. Some of these hypotheses deal sympathetically with the continuity theory; they state that language is a result of a gradual process of change to precursors such as gesturing or calling due to different selection pressures (King, 1996). The following concepts will suggest what these selection pressures may have been.</p><h4>Language and group size</h4><p>One theory suggested by Dunbar (1996) explains how one-to-one grooming plays an inherent role in the daily lives of Old World monkeys and apes, who spend anywhere up to one fifth of their waking day engaged in the social activity. His studies also show how the average group size of a population is positively correlated with the proportion of the day spent grooming, perhaps because there are more individuals with whom to interact. For human groups of around 150, we would require 43% of our waking to day socialise by the same mechanism. This is clearly not feasible given the energy requirements and efficiency cost on food- or resource-gathering for early populations. As it stands, however, modern day humans spend on average 20% of their day verbally socialising (or complaining), which aligns conveniently with the maximum permitted in primate groups (Figure 3)(Dunbar, 1996; Barrett <em>et al.</em>, 2002). This is understandable when considering the ‘broadcasting range’ of verbal speech; in one-to-one grooming the number of individuals involved is limited to two, however if the communication mechanism is speech then several individuals may be part of a single interaction. If a social group involves three different recipients (Cohen, 1971) then it could support the observed maximum group size of 150, which happens to be three times that of grooming primate groups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*IhziBu-yQUYwlJ5EQxfkeQ.png" /></figure><p>This is all very interesting; however it does not begin to answer why this may have been of an evolutionary advantage. Indeed many populations of Polar Eskimos are able to survive in some of the harshest of conditions despite living in smaller group sizes (Matsumura, 2008), though one could argue that their communities are less culturally diverse than others. The second theory looks at how gossiping led to better group bonding and language’s role in ensuring social convention.</p><h4>Social gossip hypothesis</h4><p>Work with apes and monkeys show that they communicate predominantly with gestures and grunts (a precursor to verbal language according to continuity theorists (King, 1996; Barrett <em>et al.</em>, 2002)) when trying to convey information about their immediate environment such as quarrelling over food (Calvin, 1983). A large part of monkey society and communication depends on forming friendships and recognising who your rivals are, and therefore gestural communication is considerably less functional in cases where such alliances are forged over large distances; in a dynamic social playing-field, a monkey must be present to learn when a truce has been made or broken between other individuals, and failure to do so could have catastrophic consequencs. This is where language comes in useful, as it allows third parties (i.e. other group members) to transmit globally any ‘news and gossip’ about spatially- or temporally-distant events. The same is true for discussing behaviour of an individual, with a ‘policing’ system concurrently being established; if one individual acts in a socially unscrupulous way (e.g. steals another’s food) then gossiping enables others in the group to avoid — or punish — the perpetrator. This is believed to be a greater problem in larger groups where cheats are more likely to arise and pass undetected (Barrett<em> et al.</em>, 2002; Deacon 1997). It is not hard to see how this carries a wider benefit to the group as a whole in protecting the majority against a few, especially where sparse resources are at stake. Co-operation (or at least conformation to group policy) is favoured over competition.</p><p>Another value of language may be the opportunity for individuals to advertise their own character or boast about their achievements (e.g. “I’ve found a good foraging spot around the corner”). This impacts mating selection as males will wish to uphold their reputation and prove their worth, especially when exposed to a rudimentary policing system (Barrett<em> et al.</em>, 2002). When taken in conjunction with Dunbar’s (1996) group size hypothesis, this is complimentary, with verbal language first permitting larger group sizes to exist and then providing the selective advantages to support them.</p><h4>Social contract hypothesis</h4><p>The discussion progresses naturally onto the next theory, which places language as the key to social unity. It is the case that humans across the globe live in monogamous pairs or family groups (Barrett<em> et al.</em>, 2002). However it was postulated by Deacon (1997) that in prehistoric tribes, hunter-gatherers faced the constant risk that the females at home were susceptible to mating by other males while they were away hunting. On return this would undoubtedly cause social tension, magnified in larger communities, and lead to conflicts breaking out. Verbal language, therefore, supposedly could have been used to publically announce a partnership between a hunter and his female and offspring for whom he would be gathering food (Deacon, 1997; Barrett<em> et al.</em>, 2002; Hyme, 1987). The male would want to ensure that his efforts were being directed to his own progeny, after all. Cultural studies of Hazda and !Kung hunting tribes reveal that monogamous groups have a higher child survival rate when the father remains married to and supports one wife and their children, providing the children are incapable of obtaining their own food (Hawkes <em>et al.,</em> 1991; Blurton Jones <em>et al., </em>1996; 2000). As a result there is a pay-off for males who ensure they feed their own young as opposed to mating with many women and doing little in the way of paternal care.</p><p>By publicly pronouncing a marriage between couples, then, the individuals are committing to a social structure which is more beneficial than polygamy thus should out-compete others who don’t. While free-riders can take advantage even if language is established (a present-day issue for divorce lawyers), the hypothesis suggests that it would be sufficiently less likely (Barrett<em> et al.</em>, 2002). Formation of pair bonds could evolve into a social tradition with a ritualistic ceremony helping secure the longevity of the relationship while simultaneously allowing a large group of individuals to cooperate.</p><h4>The Scheherazade effect</h4><p>The final theory is named after the wife of the legendary Persian king Shahryār, who, due to be beheaded on his orders, proceeded to tell him an intricate web of stories to postpone her demise. The title was coined in evolutionary psychology to describe how captivating a spouse and bedazzling them with their wit and mental agility can serve as a selectively attractive feature. This is not to say that a good grasp of language is of any practical benefit, indeed it is claimed by Miller (1999) that it may even be classified as a handicap; however while possessing no physical advantage, there is a reproductive one. The handicap principle states that an individual with good genes will display this by expressing their traits with extravagance (Grafen, 1990). If they are able to express a handicap with vivacity then that would be an indicator to potential mates (usually the females) that the quality of the individual’s genes are such that it allows them to support the costs of maintaining that handicap — however this only works in cases where the handicap is expensive, so that the quality of its expression (and thus genes) will stand out. If even weak individuals can express the handicap with extravagance, as the handicap is not expensive, then the benefit is negated. Studies by Miller (1999) show that men use language with much greater verbal flamboyance than women and that they tend to go ‘over the top’ in many social areas — from jazz music to painting and poetry — perhaps as a display to attract a mate in a similar way that peacocks do with their colourful exhibitions. Therefore he describes humans as a <em>lekking</em> species whereby males present their genetic prowess through verbal exchanges, and females choose their mate on this basis, thus providing an evolution pressure to select for those with better traits — in this case language skill.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>While the true nature of language evolution may remain equivocal, the most recent scientific studies shed light on little-known aspects of its integration with the human brain. Berwick (2013), Fisher (2006), Lieberman (2006) and colleagues’ work suggest that viewing language as merely a communication tool is archaic and should be updated to account for different brain linkages and the role of the human FOXP2 gene in patterning the brain from the core basal-ganglia up. Pinker’s (1994) viewpoint therefore, although not entirely devalued, does not give the complete picture. FOXP2 ‘language’ gene analysis revealed that the gene reached its current functional state around 100,000 years ago, corresponding approximately with the first records of <em>Homo sapiens</em>. Language probably had several assets which allowed it to replace primate grooming or other precursors (according to continuity theorists), and none of the hypotheses mentioned here are mutually exclusive. The group size hypothesis of Dunbar and workers’ (1996) gives a solid founding for how the limits of grooming were overcome, with an increased broadcasting range and transmission rate of information, which frees up more time in the day to interact with other individuals. Gossiping allows the transmitted information to contain details of other group members and their friendship status while also spreading word of bad behaviour and creating a policing mechanism, thus enabling larger groups to live in harmony. The Social Contract hypothesis looks at present day tribes and suggests that public unification of a male and female could serve as a deterrent to cheats and ensure a male only provides for his own young. Greater child survival rates support monogamy, yet observing current tribes that have encountered other civilisations (Blurton <em>et al.,</em> 2000) may not reflect the living habits of early <em>Homo</em> ancestors and thus is more speculative. Taking an approach more directed to modern societies, Miller’s Scheherazade effect (1999) uses many sociological studies to infer that language in fact has no practical benefits, but counter intuitively acts as a handicap. The very display of this handicap can however attract mates, much in the same way as peacocks do, if the reproductive benefits outweigh the functional ones.</p><p>To conclude, many theories across several disciplines fit together to help sketch the history of language, its biological state, uses and advantages. Very few theories are mutually exclusive, but some, thanks to a greater depth of research, hold more credibility than others. Some complement each other logically, and it is entirely possible that many of the social processes happened in tandem. With such a diverse and well-studied field, the big theories of today could be an old wives’ tale tomorrow.</p><p><em>Bibliography</em></p><p>Barrett L., Dunbar R., Lycett J.<em>, </em>(2002) Human evolutionary psychology. Houndmills: Palgrave; pp 322–344</p><p>Berwick R. C., Friederici A. D., Chomsky N. <em>et al</em>., (2013) Evolution, brain and the nature of language. <em>Trends in Cognitive Science</em>; 2–8</p><p>Blurton Jones N. G., Marlowe F. W., Hawkes K., <em>et al., </em>(2000) Paternal Investment and Hunter-Gatherer Divorce Rates. <em>Adaption and Human Behavior; </em>69–80</p><p>Blurton Jones N. G., Hawkes K., O’Connell J. F., (1996) The global process, and local economy: How should we explain the differences between the Hazda and the !Kung?. <em>Cultural Diversity of Twentieth Century Forages</em>; 159–187</p><p>Calvin W. H., (1983) A stone’s throw and its launch window: timing, precision and its implications for language and the hominid brain. <em>Journal of Theoretical Biology,</em> <strong>104</strong>; 121–135</p><p>Chomsky N., (1998) The minimalist Program<em>.</em> <em>Journal of Linguistics</em>, <strong>34</strong>:<strong>1</strong>; 213–226</p><p>Cohen J. E., (1971) ‘<em>Casual Groups of Monkeys, Apes and Humans’. </em>Cambridge: Harvard University Press.</p><p>Deacon T. W., (1997) ‘<em>The Symbolic Species: the Coevolution of Language and the Human Brain’</em>. Harmondsworth: W. W. Norton &amp; Co.</p><p>Dunbar R. I. M., (1996) ‘<em>Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language’</em>. London: Faber and Faber; pp 185–193</p><p>Dunbar R. I. M., Knight C., Power C., (1999) ‘<em>Culture, honesty and the freerider problem’.</em> Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press</p><p>Fisher E., Marcus G. F., (2006) The eloquent ape: genes, brains and the evolution of language. <em>Nature Reviews Genetics,</em> <strong>6</strong>; 9–18</p><p>Friederici A. D., Bahlmann J., Heim S., <em>et al</em>., (2006) The brain differentiates human and nonhuman — grammars: functional localization and structural connectivity. <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Science U.S.A.,</em> <strong>103;</strong> 2458–2463</p><p>Grafen A., (1990) Biological signals as handicaps. <em>Journal of Theoretical Biology,</em> <strong>144</strong>; 517–46</p><p>Hawkes K., O’Connell J. F., Blurton Jones N. G., (1991) Hunting income patterns among the Hazda: Big game, common goods, foraging goals and the evolution of the human diet. <em>Philosophical Transactions of the Society of London</em>. <strong>334</strong>; 243–251</p><p>Hyme D., (1987) Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting. <em>Journal of Social Issues</em>, <strong>23:2</strong>; 8–10</p><p>King B. J., (1996) Syntax and Language Origins. <em>Language &amp; Communication, </em><strong>16:2</strong>; 193–203</p><p>Leiberman P., (1994) Human Language and Human Uniqueness.<em> Language and Communication</em>, <strong>14:1</strong>; 87–95</p><p>Lieberman P., (2006) The FOXP2 gene, human cognition and language. <em>International Congress Series, </em>115–126</p><p>Matsumura S., Forster P., (2008) Generation time and effective population size in Polar Eskimos. <em>Proceeding of the Royal Society of Biology</em>, <strong>275</strong>; 1501–1508</p><p>Miller F. G., (1999) Sexual selection for cultural displays. <em>The Evolution of Culture</em>; 71–91</p><p>Pinker S., (1994) ‘<em>The Language Instinct’.</em> Great Britain: W. Morrow and Co.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2946c8dd3f6d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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