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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by William Fleishman on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by William Fleishman on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@william-fleishman?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by William Fleishman on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@william-fleishman?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[President Putin’s Ukraine Disaster: What Went Wrong?]]></title>
            <link>https://william-fleishman.medium.com/president-putins-ukraine-disaster-what-went-wrong-4fa582bc1bf?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[roads]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logistics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[William Fleishman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 May 2022 13:16:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-02T13:37:06.034Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*KU-4IJGDhdin5lmLmKf1tw.jpeg" /></figure><p>It has been suggested by some that President Putin is on the verge of victory in Ukraine. Those who take this line seem to believe that Mr. Putin is engaged in a five-dimensional chess strategy and that it will pay-off in the end. Perhaps they are right, but the simpler explanation is that Mr. Putin’s invasion is a colossal disaster.</p><p>Let’s break down everything the Russians screwed up.</p><p>On February 24th, the Russians invaded, and there were multiple avenues of attack. Three were directed at Kiev, one through Kievskaya Oblast through the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, the second through Chernigov, and a third coming from the direction of Bryansk.</p><p>Another group of Russians attacked Kharkov, and another group attacked north, east, and west out of Crimea.</p><p>You don’t have to go to be a staff college genius to see the problem with this.</p><p>The Russians launched an invasion of a country larger than Texas with no main effort. Normally, an objective is picked and a main effort is put together with sufficient mass to achieve said objective. To prevent the enemy from massing against your main effort, you can have two or three supporting efforts.</p><p>But not the Russians.</p><p>They attacked all over the place in insufficient mass, expecting the Ukrainians to rip off their uniforms, flee in terror, or surrender <em>en masse</em> like Iraqis.</p><p>But the Ukrainians stood and fought.</p><p>Most people thought they wouldn’t, even many Ukrainians I know, but they did and inflicted high casualties on the Russians.</p><p>One can forgive the Russians for underestimating the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian army (hell, everyone did), but the attack through the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone was stupidly unforgivable.</p><p>The Russians went through the Exclusion Zone with tanks and mechanized infantry and paras landing at the airport in Gostomel ahead of them. From there, they thought they would parade into Kiev.</p><p>Anyone who knows anything about the Exclusion Zone or the general area north of Kiev knows it’s not tank country. It’s deep and impenetrable forest, swamps, and rivers, and there are only two roads leading out of Ivankov that can be used by heavy vehicles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TSmkghxL_w0G-f8LYzhNAQ.png" /><figcaption><strong><em>South West of Chernobyl</em></strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/1*zeqO7Ze6vdQyKIdS3GWvUw.png" /><figcaption><strong>Area around Ivankov</strong></figcaption></figure><p>When you’ve achieved tactical surprise, your battalion tactical groups may be able to roll down those roads unopposed at 70 mph, but whatever goes down those roads needs to be resupplied, and that’s not going to happen on one or two roads leading in one direction and no connecting roads. Whatever sustainment units the Russians had supporting this attack likely got stuck in traffic jams because they didn’t have space to deliver their supplies, turn around, and go back the other way.</p><p>Getting back to those battalion tactical groups, attacking from Chernobyl to Kiev via Ivankov may have solved the operational problem of Kiev’s distance from the Russian border, but it created a new problem; the inability to manoeuvre once they reached Kiev’s outskirts.</p><p>Again, it’s roads and terrain.</p><p>From Bucha and Irpin the only ways into Kiev is the E-373 and P-30 running north west to south east. From Vyshgorod there is Minskiy Prospekt and Bogatyrskaya Street running north to south. Whenever a book is written about the war, there will be a passage saying the Russians got stacked up on those roads and couldn’t move.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8tiWMyHxODdBs2Ik6A8nGQ.png" /><figcaption>Even light infantry would have problems getting through that forest belt. For mechanized units it’s impossible.</figcaption></figure><p>Why?</p><p>Because either side of those roads are dense forests and urban developments, inhibiting a mechanized army’s ability to manoeuvre.</p><p>When the Russians realized they couldn’t get into Kiev directly, they tried going south to cut the Zhitomir Highway.</p><p>Again, they experienced the same problems with roads leading in one direction and dense forests, and the new problem of muddy fields as the forest grows less dense further south along the route of advance. The Russians got stacked up, shot up, and they had nowhere to go but backwards.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ScOZWtWiYzMIa5KmLddouw.png" /><figcaption>Notice that the roads marked in yellow leading from Russian assembly areas go in one direction. There are few connecting roads.</figcaption></figure><p>Former Marine Corps intelligence officer <a href="https://www.rt.com/russia/554729-us-ukrainian-perception-donbass/">Scott Ritter</a> believes this attack was a diversion from the main effort in Donbas. If he is correct, which I doubt, it was a poorly executed diversion that failed in its objective, as the Ukrainians still control much of the region.</p><p>How could the Russians, who gave us military geniuses like Alexander Suvorov and Georgiy Zhukov, execute this war so stupidly?</p><p>Because their Suvorovs and Zhukovs didn’t plan this war, President Putin and his political advisors did, basing their beliefs on lousy intelligence provided to them by the FSB’s Fifth Department.</p><p>President Putin and his advisors believed Ukrainian army was not fit for purpose, wouldn’t fight for President Zelenskiy, and the Russian-speaking population would welcome their liberators with open arms. This belief explains why Mr. Putin believed he could mount a successful invasion during the muddiest period of the year.</p><p>Only people don’t fight for presidents, ideologies, or linguistics, they fight for hearth and home.</p><p>The Ukrainians are still likely to lose this war despite President Putin’s best effort to help them win. They are running out of fuel, and considering their pleas for anti-tank weapons, planes, tracked vehicles, and anti-aircraft weapons, they are running out of those, too. The quantity of men and weapons the Russians have will be the deciding factor.</p><p>But it will be an embarrassing pyrrhic victory that cost the Russians over 10,000 casualties, hundreds of tracked and wheeled vehicles, and dozens of fixed winged and rotary aircraft— if not more.</p><p>President Putin is not playing four-dimensional chess with anyone. Instead, he is throwing crap at the wall and hoping something sticks. Unfortunately for Ukraine, he has a lot to throw.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fa582bc1bf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The War in Ukraine: What Happens Next and How to End It]]></title>
            <link>https://william-fleishman.medium.com/the-war-in-ukraine-what-happens-next-and-how-to-end-it-acff052474d1?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[volodymyr-zelensky]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[William Fleishman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2022 10:17:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-02T10:17:15.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*mfxTuZQpgLSdCIPqA0yHHg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Please follow me on </em><a href="https://t.me/yankersperspective"><em>Telegram</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://blockster.com/WilliamFleishman484684"><em>Blockster</em></a><em> if you like my articles.</em></p><p>Currently, it seems that the Russian advance has stalled outside of Kiev. It is impossible to say why, but there are two possible reasons. First, the Russians likely expended significant amounts of fuel and ordinance getting to the outskirts of Kiev. Secondly, the Ukrainian army is proving a tougher nut to crack than the Russians thought. However, I think it is improbable that Kiev will be able to hold out despite the admirable efforts of the city’s defenders.</p><p>I believe Kiev will fall because the Russian army is a lot bigger than Ukraine’s, and the longer the battle goes on, the more Russia’s numerical advantage will begin to show. However, this does not mean the Russians will have an easy time taking the city. An urban environment is a significant force multiplier for any defender, as evidenced by the battles of Stalingrad, Breslau in 1945, and Grozny after the Soviet Union’s collapse. If the Ukrainians can inflict high enough casualties on the attacker, they may hold the city yet.</p><p>Even so, the Russians still have cards to play. After the Russians resupply, they will likely launch a new operation to cut Kiev off from the rest of Ukraine. If successful, the Russians can then assault the city directly, as they did Berlin and Grozny, or they could besiege Kiev and let it whither on the vine.</p><p>If the Russians want to assault the city, they will likely use artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to reduce the city block-by-block. However, while doing this may result in the Russians taking the city, it will further damage Russia’s world and domestic image because such an action would result in massive amounts of destruction and civilian and military deaths, and high Russian casualties.</p><p>On the other hand, a siege would put a significant amount of pressure on President Zelenskiy to come to the negotiation table without Russia suffering excessive casualties, as it would result in Kiev’s food and other vital stocks of supplies eventually being expended. With no food or any chance of relief, Kiev would have to capitulate.</p><p>Those are the only two possibilities I foresee, and I will not make further predictions. However, I can assuredly say that if the Russians think they can buffalo the Ukrainians into the Eurasian Economic Union and Collection Security Treaty Organization, they have another thing coming.</p><p>Before the war, there was much doubt as to whether the Ukrainian army would stand. But they proved a lot of people wrong, including yours truly. Their successes have emboldened the Ukrainian fighting man, and he will take to the countryside and fight as a partisan rather than submit to Russian domination. If I know this, Russia’s politicians, soldiers, and diplomats do too. For if they try to break Ukraine, Ukraine will wind up breaking Russia, just as Afghanistan broke the Soviet Union.</p><p>The United States would happily fund an anti-Russian Ukrainian insurgency, and there are several reasons to believe it would be successful:</p><ul><li>The Russian army and economy are not as strong as the Red Army or Soviet economy.</li><li>NATO is adjacent to Ukraine, which will make supporting the insurgency far easier than it was post-1945.</li><li>General Secretary Joseph Stalin’s grip on power was far stronger than President Putin’s, meaning Stalin could lead the country in any direction he wanted. Putin does not have that kind of control.</li></ul><p>Even so, such a war would be a great tragedy, and it could potentially escalate beyond Ukraine depending on how the Russians react to the Americans and their allies aiding a Ukrainian insurgency. For this reason, the Ukrainians and Russians should immediately hammer out an agreement in which both parties get what they want.</p><p>Here is my advice to both parties before they sit down to negotiate.</p><ul><li>President Zelenskiy should commit Ukraine to neutrality</li><li>Recognize the independence of Lugansk and Donetsk and exchange embassies</li><li>Accept Crimea’s current status as Russian territory</li><li>Never develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.</li></ul><p>In exchange, President Putin should:</p><ul><li>Withdraw his troops from Ukraine</li><li>Respect Ukrainian neutrality and sovereignty</li><li>Compensate Ukraine financially for the loss of Crimea and Donbass</li><li>Compensate Ukraine financially for damage to its infrastructure, or provide direct assistance in repairing it</li><li>Provide humanitarian aid and relief for Ukrainian civilians</li><li>Allow Ukraine to use any lost portage on the Black Sea coast at no cost</li><li>Increase the flow of gas to Ukraine to reduce prices</li></ul><p>Another possible compromise would be for Russia to accept Ukraine joining the EU but not joining NATO. In this case, Ukraine would have greater access to the European market, and the Russians would not have to worry about NATO troops being on their doorstep. Finland enjoys such status, and Russia hasn’t suffered any grief because of it.</p><p>Such an agreement allows both sides to save face. President Putin can claim victory by saying he kept Ukraine out of America’s orbit and protected Ukraine’s pro-Russian breakaway regions, while President Zelenskiy can say he secured Ukrainian independence against an aggressive neighbor.</p><p>If neither side can come to an agreement, both will be ruined. Ukraine will be physically destroyed, and Russia will be economically destroyed. Furthermore, like in 1914, the war may spread beyond Ukraine until it encompasses all of Europe. Events such as these can take on a life of their own, and once they pick up momentum, they are beyond man’s control.</p><p>Messrs Putin and Zelenskiy, put a stop to this while it is still possible to do so.</p><p>In my next article, I will detail how I think Ukraine should develop after the war.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=acff052474d1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ukraine’s Childless Future and Its Consequences]]></title>
            <link>https://william-fleishman.medium.com/ukraines-childless-future-and-its-consequences-f1ed47ab9e82?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine-collapse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[demographics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[William Fleishman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 20:58:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-08T21:05:05.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Ukraine’s Demographic Collapse Is the Real Threat, Not Russia</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/799/1*j2Dz4WJBBV5ZiQCs_WG0dg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Ukraine has serious problems, and not the ones it has with Russia over Donbas and Crimea. It has deathbed demographics, and looking at them makes one wonder whether there will be a Ukraine by the end of the century.</p><h3>Finishing Hitler and Stalin’s Work</h3><p>As of 2020, the birth rate was 8.1 live births per 1,000, and the death rate was 14.7 deaths per 1,000. Three out of ten Ukrainian men will die in car accidents or face down in vodka. 3.2 million Ukrainians have jobs in other countries. 500,000 Ukrainian women have worked abroad as prostitutes since 1991.</p><p>When the Soviet Union fell, Ukraine had over 50 million citizens. According to the National Academy of Sciences, it now has 35 million. That is a loss of 15 million people due to emigration and deaths of despair from drugs and alcohol, car accidents, HIV/AIDs, etc.</p><p>The Red Army suffered 10 million killed in action during the Second World War. Stalin’s botched collectivization of Ukrainian agriculture killed 7 million. Pick your tragedy. Ukraine’s elites have killed or driven off a third more of their own people than the Germans killed Red Army soldiers. They have killed or driven off twice as many people as Stalin starved or shot in 1932–33.</p><p>Are Ukraine’s leaders determined to finish off the work Stalin and Hitler started?</p><h3>It’s Time to Change the Topic of National Debate in Ukraine</h3><p>Maybe, just maybe, the national conversation in Ukrainian media, government, and at kitchen tables shouldn’t be about Crimea, Donbas, and Russian intrigues in the east, but reversing its demographic decline. This national conversation should involve Ukrainians asking themselves some very tough questions.</p><p>Here are some questions to start that conversation.</p><p>Is an economic model based on exporting prostitutes and day laborers to Europe and importing cheap crap made in China conducive to families having babies?</p><p>Will killing the young men Ukraine has left by sending them off to Donbas result in more babies?</p><p>Does encouraging young men and women to study in school until the 33rd form and having one designer baby in their middle ages result in population growth or decline?</p><p>I’ll answer these questions one at a time.</p><p>No, an economic model based on providing labor and sexual services for the rest of the world and importing cheap Chinese crap isn’t working. There would be more Ukrainians than Chinese, Indians, and Nigerians combined if it were.</p><p>Sending young Ukrainian men to Donbas doesn’t result in more babies for obvious reasons. You can’t make babies if you are dead or sitting in a trench. It doesn’t require a degree in biology to figure that one out.</p><p>And finally, encouraging young people to live a life of permanent adolescence by being school children until they’re in their mid-twenties and then working and being single until they’re in their late 20s or 30s, isn’t going to result in an above replacement level fertility rate. No degree in statistics is required to figure that out.</p><p>If Ukrainians keep going on this trajectory, Russian aggression will be the least of their worries because they’ll emigrate, over-educate, and drink themselves out of existence. Since that is the case, the national conversation needs to move from “How do we recover Donbas and Crimea?” to “How do we get people to have more babies?”</p><h3>It’s Not Too Late to Change Course</h3><p>It is possible to change Ukraine’s trajectory, but it will require a Herculean effort on their part to force their politicians to make pro-family reforms.</p><p>You may think it is impossible to get their current crop of politicians to do anything useful, and I can’t blame you if that’s your opinion. But the recent by-election in England shows it is possible to make politicians do what they are sent to parliament to do.</p><p>The British Conservative Party held the North Shropshire seat for 200 years until they lost it in the 2021 By-Election to the Liberal Democrats. They lost that seat because so-called Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson wouldn’t lift lock downs and wouldn’t do anything about British goods being taxed by the EU when they entered Northern Ireland, which happens to belong to the Crown, by the way.</p><p>British voters were incensed by this incompetence and voted the Conservatives out of that seat.</p><p>That defeat spurred Johnson’s cabinet finally to get off their arses and end the lock downs. And then, a few days later, Northern Ireland’s agricultural minister Edwin Poots coincidentally ordered that goods coming from the rest of the United Kingdom stop being checked and taxed.</p><p>If the British and the Irish Unionists can do it, Ukrainians can do it. They certainly have a lot more to lose than the British if they can’t.</p><p>I’ll end this by saying that the Russians are a disease of the skin. Ukraine’s demographic decline is a disease of the heart. If Ukrainian’s do not change course, that disease will become fatal.</p><p><em>If you like these articles, please join my </em><a href="https://t.me/yankersperspective"><em>Telegram channel</em></a><em> to receive notifications when I publish.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f1ed47ab9e82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Євразійський економічний союз — організація, приречена на провал]]></title>
            <link>https://william-fleishman.medium.com/%D1%94%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D1%96%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%8E%D0%B7-%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%96%D1%8F-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB-bb808faca249?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb808faca249</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kazakhstan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[riots]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[William Fleishman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jan 2022 11:10:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-17T11:10:02.472Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Євразійський економічний союз — організація, приречена на провал</strong></h3><h3>Протести в Казахстані демонструють справжню безглуздість створення союзів безпеки і митних союзів та приєднання до них</h3><p>Росіянам потрібно серйозно задуматися, чому вони повинні залишатися в політичному й економічному союзі з Казахстаном та іншими країнами-членами Євразійського економічного союзу (ЄАЕС).</p><p>Сформувавши по суті митний і військовий союз із Казахстаном, Росія зробила соціальні й політичні проблеми Казахстану своїми проблемами. Нещодавні події показали, що громадяни Казахстану готові до повстань, щоб отримати те, що їм потрібно. Країна, громадяни якої готові до протесту за мить, є нестабільною і стає стратегічним зобов’язанням для будь-кого, хто має владу над нею.</p><p>Казахстан має глибші проблеми, аніж просто громадяни, незадоволені клептократичною елітою. Казахстан — це багатоетнічна держава, якщо хтось навіть може назвати це державою. Згідно з даними останнього перепису населення, лише 68,5 відсотка населення є казахами-мусульманами. Водночас білі християни росіяни й українці переважають серед національних меншин країни. До інших меншин належать німці, уйгури, поляки, таджики і десятки інших національностей й етнічних груп.</p><p>Якщо історики могли б винести лише один урок із 20-го століття, це має бути розуміння того, що багатоетнічні і багаторелігійні суспільства за своєю природою нестабільні. Історія Казахстану з 1991 року показує, що це актуально і в 21 столітті. Новоузенська різня в червні 1989 року та зіткнення в Усть-Каменогорську в 1992 році відзначилися сутичками між узбеками і кавказцями, при цьому кількість загиблих налічує від десятків до сотень жертв. У 2020 році сталися сутички між дунґанами і казахами в Кордайському районі на півдні країни, в результаті яких загинуло 11 осіб і сотні людей були поранені. Для відновлення порядку знадобилося вводити армію. Вищезазначені події — це лише кілька прикладів із десятків конфліктів, які ілюструють, що таке багаторасове і багатоетнічне життя в Казахстані.</p><p>Дійсно, останніми днями росіяни по-справжньому відчули, що таке об’єднатися з такою країною, коли жителі Алмати почали трощити власне місто, а Організація договору про колективну безпеку (ОДКБ) під керівництвом Росії мала ввести в Казахстан війська для уникнення громадянської війни. Якщо ситуація погіршиться, і це ще досі ймовірно, Росія матиме ввести щось більше, ніж миротворчі війська, щоб уникнути спалаху в країні багатонаціональної громадянської війни.</p><p>Ці критичні зауваження стосуються не лише Казахстану, але й інших членів ЄАЕС та ОДКБ. Візьмемо для прикладу Таджикистан, де таджики пережили громадянську війну в 90-х, причиною якої частково були кланові й етнічні суперечки, або християнську Вірменію, яка нещодавно воювала з мусульманським Азербайджаном щодо спірного району кордону між ними.</p><p>Якщо будь-яка з цих країн скотиться до громадянської війни або війни зі своїми сусідами, Росію заповнять мільйони мусульманських і кавказьких біженців. Враховуючи проблеми, які Росія має із власними національними меншинами, зокрема з чеченцями, наплив мільйонів інших мусульман і жителів Кавказу призведе до ще більших соціальних проблем у країні.</p><p>Навіть якщо все те, про що я попереджаю, не справдиться, економічне об’єднання Росії з Центральною Азією і Кавказом зрештою призведе до політичного об’єднання, як це трапилося в Німеччині за часів Бісмарка і сьогодні в ЄС. Політичне об’єднання неминуче призводить до вільного пересування населення. У такій ситуації очевидно, що мільйони казахів, таджиків, вірменців і Бог зна кого ще почнуть прибувати до Росії, щоб отримати вищий рівень життя. Насправді, це вже відбувається, оскільки Росія вже є одним із <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-the-worlds-second-largest-immigration-haven-11053">найпопулярніших напрямків для імміграції</a>.</p><p>У Росії достатньо своїх проблем навіть без інтеграції з мусульманською Центральною Азією та Вірменією. Кількість населення наразі стрімко падає вниз через народжуваність нижче рівня відтворення та велику кількість людей, які хочуть емігрувати. Якщо відкрити двері мусульманським іммігрантам, жінки яких мають по чотири–п’ять дітей до менопаузи, це призведе до демографічної ситуації, схожої на США, де білі американці стануть меншиною в середині цього століття.</p><p>Якщо президент Володимир Путін такий націоналіст, як стверджують його прихильники, він повинен від’єднати Росію від Центральної Азії та Кавказу. Краще б він зосередився на вирішенні демографічних проблем Росії.</p><p>Якщо росіяни хочуть створити постійний економічний і військовий союз, це мають бути християнські країни, а не люди, настільки відмінні від росіян, як марсіани від жителів Землі. Звісно, Росії слід підтримувати добросусідські відносини з Центральною Азією та Кавказом. Але не варто об’єднуватися за останньою модою соціально, економічно або політично.</p><p>Українці, що підтримують Росію, з Донбасу, Криму та інших російськомовних регіонів України мають враховувати це, коли вони починають замислюватися щодо повторного об’єднання з Росією.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb808faca249" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Eurasian Economic Union — An Enterprise Doomed to Failure]]></title>
            <link>https://william-fleishman.medium.com/the-eurasian-economic-union-an-enterprise-doomed-to-failure-84c83a368043?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/84c83a368043</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[riots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kazakhstan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[William Fleishman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jan 2022 08:27:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-17T08:27:56.200Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Eurasian Economic Union — An Enterprise Doomed to Failure</h3><h3>The Kazakhstan Riots Show the True Stupidity of Creating and Joining Security and Customs Unions</h3><p>Russians need to start asking themselves why they should remain in a political and economic union with Kazakhstan and other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states.</p><p>By forming what is essentially a customs union and military alliance with Kazakhstan, Russia has made Kazakhstan’s social and political problems its problems. Recent events showed that Kazakhstan’s citizens are willing to riot to get whatever they want. A country with a citizenry ready to riot at a moment’s notice is unstable and is a strategic liability to whoever has authority over it.</p><p>Kazakhstan has deeper problems than a citizenry dissatisfied with what they view as a kleptocratic elite. Kazakhstan is a multi-ethnic nation if one even wants to call it a nation. According to the most recent census data, only 68.5 percent of the population are Muslim Kazakhs. At the same time, white and Christian Russians and Ukrainians make up a significant majority of the country’s share of minorities. Other minority groups include Germans, Uighurs, Poles, Tajiks, and dozens of nationalities and ethnicities.</p><p>If historians can take only one lesson from the 20th Century, it should be that multi-ethnic and religious societies are inherently unstable, and Kazakhstan’s history since 1991 shows that this remains true into 21st Century. The Novozenskaya Massacre in June 1989 and the Ust-Kamenogorsk riots in 1992 saw clashes between Uzbeks and Caucasians, resulting in death tolls ranging from dozens to the hundreds. 2020 saw clashes between Dungans and Kazakhs in the Korday district in the South, resulting in 11 dead and hundreds injured and the army having to be deployed to restore order. The events above are only a few of the dozens that add a little colour to multi-racial and ethnic life in Kazakhstan.</p><p>Indeed, Russians got a taste of what it means to be wedded to such a country over recent days when Almaty’s residents started razing their own city, and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) had to send troops there to prevent a civil war. Had the situation deteriorated further, and perhaps it still will, Russia would have had to send far more than a peacekeeping force to prevent the country from collapsing into multi-racial civil war.</p><p>These criticisms extend not only to Kazakhstan but to other EAEU and CSTO members, like Tajikistan, where Tajiks experienced a civil war in the 90s partly fuelled by clan and ethnic rivalries, or Christian Armenia, which recently fought a war with Muslim Azerbaijan over their disputed border.</p><p>If any of these countries descend into civil war or war with their neighbours, Russia could be flooded with millions of Muslim and Caucasian refugees. Considering the problems Russia has with its own national minorities, most notably the Chechens, an influx of millions of more Muslims and people from the Caucasus would result in even more social problems for the country.</p><p>Even if the things I warn about do not come to pass, the economic unification of Russia to Central Asia and the Caucasus will eventually lead to political unification, as happened in Bismark’s Germany and now in the EU. Political unification necessitates the free flow of people. In that event, it stands to reason that millions of Kazakhs, Tajiks, Armenians, and God knows who else would stream to Russia for its higher standard of living. In fact, this is already happening, as Russia is one of the world’s <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-the-worlds-second-largest-immigration-haven-11053">highest destinations for immigrants</a>.</p><p>Russia has enough problems without integrating itself with Muslim Central Asia and Armenia. Its population is cratering with below replacement level fertility and scores of people who want to emigrate. Opening the doors to Muslim immigrants whose wives have four or five kids before they reach menopause will result in a demographic outlook similar to that of the United States where white Americans will be a minority mid-century.</p><p>If President Vladimir Putin is a nationalist, as his supporters claim, he should de-couple Russia from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Let him instead focus on solving Russia’s demographic problems.</p><p>If the Russians want to form permanent economic and security arrangements, let them be with Christendom, not with people as different from Russians as men from Mars would be from human beings. Russia should certainly be neighbourly to Central Asia and the Caucasus. But it should not be joined with them at the hip socially, economically, or politically.</p><p>Pro-Russian Ukrainians in Donbas, Crimea, and other Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine should consider the above when they flirt with the idea of re-joining Russia.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84c83a368043" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Should Ukraine Join NATO? The Problems of Being in the Alliance]]></title>
            <link>https://william-fleishman.medium.com/should-ukraine-join-nato-the-problems-of-being-in-the-alliance-d6565300f74d?source=rss-6bba3ecc46ce------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6565300f74d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donbass]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[William Fleishman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 May 2021 08:03:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-20T07:17:14.206Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of pro-Russian rebels in Donbas, Ukrainians have begun to look to the United States and NATO as their protectors. In 2020, President <a href="https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1896076-zelenskiy-u-britaniyi-zayaviv-scho-ukrayini-potriben-pdch-v-nato">Vladimir Zelenskiy</a> stated that Ukraine needs a NATO membership action plan. A few months later, Minister of Defense <a href="https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2020/12/07/andrii-taran-ukraine-hopes-to-receive-an-action-plan-for-nato-membership-in-2021/">Andrei Teran</a> also said that Ukraine needs a NATO membership action plan in an interview posted on Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense website. Clearly, there is a strong political will on the part of Ukraine’s leadership to join NATO.</p><p>Several polls taken since the Maidan revolt in 2014 indicate that a substantial portion of Ukraine’s population support joining NATO. According to the Democratic Initiatives Fund, <a href="https://dif.org.ua/en/article/public-opinion-of-the-population-of-ukraine-on-nato">47 percent</a> of Ukrainians believe that joining NATO is the best way to maintain their security. NATO membership is particularly popular in Western Ukraine, where, according to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/10/3-ukrainian-public-opinion-dissatisfied-with-current-conditions-looking-for-an-end-to-the-crisis/">Pew Research</a>, 68 percent of Ukrainians support it. This poll also shows that a substantial number of Ukrainians living in the Russian-speaking east outside Donbas, 38 percent, also support joining NATO.</p><p>The question remains, however, whether NATO has the ability to defend Ukraine if attacked by Russia. The logistical obstacles of moving forces and equipment to Ukraine from the United States and Germany are high and possibly insurmountable. There is also the question of whether Ukrainians fully understand the consequences of being a part of NATO. Ukrainians want to be in NATO to be fully protected from what they see as an aggressive neighbor; however, they could easily find themselves in a war over an entirely different reason than why they joined in the first place. Considering the strategic and operational level problems posed by joining the alliance, Ukrainians should consider other avenues for ensuring their national security.</p><h3>The Logistical Problems</h3><p>Any NATO war against Russia over Ukraine will have to be led by the United States. It is one of the few members who can fight a major air-land-sea war against Russia and win. The British army is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2020/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-1-october-2020">too small</a>, with only 80,000 active-duty personnel and 30,000 reservists, while Germany owns “helicopters that cannot fly, tanks that cannot shoot and minesweepers that cannot sweep” as Mr. Konstantine Richter wrote in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-military-bundeswehr-defense-budget/"><em>Politico</em></a>. Judging by the aforementioned excerpt, Germany’s military has one of the worst readiness levels in its history. Many of the other members, excluding Canada and France, have not seen significant combat action or overseas deployments since 1944–45. The burden of responsibility for defending Ukraine will fall on the United States.</p><p>The problem with this burden falling on America’s shoulders is that it has no troops in Europe save for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Stryker), 41st Artillery Brigade, and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade in Germany; there is also the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, as well as various sustainment brigades and military police. It is absurd to believe that such a force could stop several Russian armoured and mechanized corps.</p><p>The United States would have to bring a large number of forces from North America and other theaters of operation in a short period to fulfill its treaty obligations to defend Ukraine. However, the United States has not practiced doing this since the Campaign Reforger Exercises of the Cold War. These exercises were meant to prepare the US military for moving forces from the US to Europe in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, where they would collect supplies and equipment at prepositioned stock sites throughout West Germany and then march to the front. In the case of a war in Ukraine, these troops would arrive in Germany, where the majority of these sites remain, collect their supplies and equipment, and then embark on trains and travel several hundred miles east. It is doubtful that the US is prepared to deploy corps and division-sized units in this fashion.</p><h3>The Task Force Charlie Conundrum</h3><p>The results of asking the army to move large amounts of forces from one point to another when it is not prepared to do so can be seen by reading about the history of the <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a527985.pdf">Cuban Missile Crisis</a>. The military wanted to conduct a full-scale invasion of Cuba to rid the island of Fidel Castro once and for all. This operation called for moving American forces to ports on the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Coast, from which they would sail to Cuba and invade. This force was called Task Force Charlie.</p><p>One component of Task Force Charlie was the 1st Armored Division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. It was tasked with relocating to Fort Stewart in Georgia from whence they would go to ports in Georgia and Florida. The army quickly discovered that Fort Stewart did not have enough railroad siding to park the 660 flat cars containing the 1st Armored Division’s men and gear, even though nearby Hunter Air Force Base had a railyard which, together with Fort Stewart’s railyard, would have provided adequate space for parking the division’s flat cars. Once the division was finally able to move to its designated ports, its soldiers found that the USNS <em>Comet </em>did not have enough space in its holds to accommodate the size of the division’s tanks.</p><p>It took over two weeks for the division to move from one point in the US to another for an invasion of an island 90 miles away from Florida at the height of the Cold War in the middle of a nuclear standoff. These problems were encountered because the United States had not prepared for an invasion of Cuba the way it had for a massive movement to Germany in the Reforger exercises.</p><p>Politicians are unknowingly putting the United States, Ukraine, and other NATO members in a similar situation. If Russia invaded Ukraine, the US would struggle to move corps sized units to its prepositioned stock sites in Germany. But, at least they have practiced this with the Reforger exercises. What they have not practiced is moving corps-sized units to Ukraine from Germany. The US and its NATO allies may quickly find that their armies are unprepared for a deployment of that scale, just as the US Army was unprepared to invade Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a result, it will take longer than Ukrainians expect for NATO forces to reach them. By the time they reached Ukraine, Ukrainian forces could be defeated with the Russian army dug in, resupplied, rested, and waiting.</p><p>The problem of moving American and NATO forces from Germany to Ukraine by rail will be further compounded by the fact they would be making this move under combat conditions. The Russians cannot be expected to sit idly by while massive amounts of NATO troops are relocated to Ukraine. The Russians know where all the railroads, bridges, and rail yards are located, as Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, and would possibly target them with everything in their arsenal.</p><p>One alternative is for US forces to arrive by ship to the Black Sea ports of Odessa and Izmail; however, their proximity to Crimea presents another problem. The Russians would use Crimea as a base from which to launch attacks against American shipping in the Black Sea. They would not even have to sortie their fleet; instead, they could disrupt shipping using land-based anti-ship missiles and aircraft, conducting stand-off attacks from afar. Moving naval and logistical assets into the Black Sea would be very risky and dangerous considering that the Russians likely have more missiles than the Americans and their allies have ships.</p><p>To be fully prepared for a Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO would have to relocate its prepositioned stocks to Ukraine, likely the western half so that they are not overrun in the opening moments of a war, and they would have to regularly train for large scale deployments to Ukraine as they did with the Reforger exercises. It might even be the case that NATO would have to establish a permanent presence in Ukraine as it did in West Germany during the Cold War. Considering Russia’s response in 2008 to Georgia’s attempt to get closer to the European Union and NATO, Russia could very well go to war to prevent what it views as an enemy from establishing a permanent presence on its near abroad.</p><h3>The NATO Conveyor Belt</h3><p>Permanent alliances inevitably lead to wars over issues that had nothing to do with the alliance’s original purpose in the first place. In short, they are conveyor belts for unnecessary wars. The British Empire learned this lesson by guaranteeing Belgium’s independence from France in the 1830s, only to be thrown into a war with Germany over the same issue in 1914. The result was catastrophic for Britain, and she would lose her empire a generation later.</p><p>Ukrainians believe they are entering this alliance so that they can be protected from Russia. Any foreigner who has spoken with the average man on the street in Kiev knows this. There is no doubt that Ukrainians would flock to their color to defend their nation in the event of a war with Russia, but would they be willing to send their sons to die for some other country in the alliance?</p><p>Take, for example, the recent tensions between Russia and Turkey over Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, or America’s recent troubles with China. Would Ukrainians be enthusiastic about participating in a full-scale war with Russia over something in Syria or the Caucasus? If China and the United States went to war over Taiwan, would Ukraine be willing to send troops to the Pacific?</p><p>The Ukrainian people and their leaders must seriously consider the consequences of locking themselves into a pact with nations that do not share their interests or policy objectives. Ukraine’s strategic goal is to be safe from Russia; Turkey’s strategic goal seems to be expansion at the expense of Russia’s Middle Eastern and Caucasus allies, while one of America’s policies is to protect its allies in the Pacific from the Chinese. Ukraine has no apparent interests in these regions, so why should it go to war over them?</p><h3>The Prussian Alternative</h3><p>Ukraine finds itself in the same position Prussia found itself throughout its history. Prussia was a resource and manpower poor kingdom surrounded by France, Austria, Sweden, and Russia. Frederick William responded to this challenge by creating one of the finest armies the world ever saw, an army that would eventually crush France and Austria and bring Russia to its knees in 1918. Ukrainians should look to themselves, as did the Prussians, instead of locking themselves in a permanent alliance and depending on someone else for their defense.</p><p>The road to self-dependence is not an easy one, and Prussian men like Frederick II and Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher knew this all too well, seeing their nation nearly wiped off the face of the earth by Russia and France in the Seven Years’ War and the Napoleonic Wars, respectively. But Prussia rose from the ashes to become one of the most dynamic economic and military powers the world has ever seen. There is no reason why Ukraine cannot put itself on a similar trajectory. It certainly has more advantages than Prussia did, with a population of 40 million people, a large agricultural economic sector, and the military-industrial complex it inherited from the Soviet Union.</p><p>A nation can only depend on itself to defend its interests. The Carthaginians were dependent on mercenaries in its land forces during the First Punic War. These mercenaries revolted, severely crippling Carthage’s war effort. Carthage eventually fell to Rome. Indeed, Rome fell partly for the same reason; employing barbarians in its legions. One of these barbarians, Flavius Odovacer, a general in the Roman army, overthrew the child emperor Romulus Augustulus, leading to the collapse of the western empire. More recently, Poland entered into an alliance with Great Britain and France, only for those powers to sit behind the Maginot Line while Poland was consumed by Germany and the Soviet Union.</p><p>Dependence on another for one’s well-being breeds vulnerability. If Ukrainians want to be a truly independent nation, they will endeavor to create a combat effective military capable of defending their new nation, not delegate their responsibility to defend themselves to someone else.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6565300f74d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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