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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Will Rinehart on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Will Rinehart on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[The digital divide, digital equity, and the nature of the problem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/the-digital-divide-digital-equity-and-the-nature-of-the-problem-547f2952c950?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[broadband]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jun 2021 19:24:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-03T19:24:45.977Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cuArtZpkH8pXT3ltQrq02w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@leerspace?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">John Reed</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/s/photos/rural?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>This post is the second in a series of four posts, </em><a href="https://www.thecgo.org/news/an-in-depth-look-at-the-broadband-infrastructure-bills/"><em>which first explores the current infrastructure bills</em></a><em>, diagnoses the problem inherent in the digital divide, explores broadband as an infrastructure problem, and finally lays out an algorithm for action.</em></p><p>In just two decades, high-speed Internet access has gone from a novelty to near ubiquity, yet still some are left unconnected. For years, federal and local leaders have sought to plug this digital divide by supporting infrastructure buildout. The ongoing pandemic has served to heighten the concern over broadband access, as more Americans than ever have shifted to working from home and healthcare providers have shifted to virtual appointments.</p><p>As policymakers consider measures to bridge this divide, it is essential to know that,</p><ul><li>Unconnected individuals typically have low educational attainment, low income, are elderly or are disabled;</li><li>Two-thirds of those not connected say that lack of interest is the primary reason for being offline; and</li><li>Just this year federal programs began supporting households to offset cost of service.</li></ul><p>As the technology has matured, gotten cheaper, and faster, the digital divide has become an increasingly difficult problem to solve. The final post in this series will lay out a plan to tackle the digital divide. Before plans are made, however, the nature of the digital divide needs to be established.</p><h3>Understanding the unconnected</h3><p>While it is understood that a sizable chunk of Americans are not connected to the Internet, just how big this group is can vary considerably depending on the source. Pew’s most recent survey from February 2021 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Non-internet_users_2021_Methodology-Topline_FOR_RELEASE.pdf">suggests about 7 percent of adults in the US</a> aren’t using the Internet. Since there are <a href="https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-detail.html">roughly 255 million adults</a>, by their count, some 18 million people aged 18 and above about the size of the New York City metro area, aren’t using the Internet.</p><p>The Census, on the other hand, estimates that 49.9 million people weren’t connected to the Internet by any means in November 2019. Their estimate clocks in at 18.9 percent of the population aged 15 and above, or about <a href="https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=internetUser&amp;disp=map">about 16 percent of all households</a>.</p><p>Data from the Federal Communications Commission paints a slightly different picture since their data tracks broadband deployment, and thus speaks to broadband availability. If satellite operators and fixed wireless services are <a href="https://broadbandmap.fcc.gov/#/area-comparison?version=jun2020&amp;tech=acfsw&amp;speed=25_3&amp;searchtype=county">included in the tally</a>, around 102,000 adults in the U.S. cannot access the Internet because service isn’t available to their home. <a href="https://broadbandmap.fcc.gov/#/area-comparison?version=jun2020&amp;tech=acf&amp;speed=25_3&amp;searchtype=county">Excluding these technologies</a>, as many estimates often do, just over 17 million people are without an Internet connection to the home.</p><p>Data from 2020 is still forthcoming, but the disruption caused by Covid might have acted as a demand shock cajoling laggards to get online. <a href="https://www.leichtmanresearch.com/about-4860000-added-broadband-from-top-providers-in-2020/">The largest cable and wireline</a> phone providers in the U.S. added 4.9 million Internet subscribers in 2020, compared to 2.6 million in 2019. Overall, broadband subscription rates rose to their highest levels in a decade <a href="https://www.lightreading.com/cablevideo/cable-broadband-sub-growth-to-slow-in-2021---analyst/d/d-id/766190">at the end of 2020</a>, suggesting that the official Census estimates are probably too high.</p><p>While there might be disagreement about the size, the characteristics of this group are widely known, <a href="https://github.com/willrinehart/broadband/blob/main/simple_analysis.md">as CGO analysis shows</a>. The unconnected tend to have a high school diploma or less education, income with less than $25,000 a year, a disability, or be aged are 65 and up. Minority and rural households also see higher proportional rates of no Internet connection.. However, as far as absolute numbers are concerned, the digital divide is still an urban phenomenon since nearly 85 percent of this group is located in a metropolitan region.</p><p>Knowing why households remain unconnected should help guide expectations about current policy proposals. Data from the <a href="https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=internetUser&amp;disp=map">Census Computer and Internet Use survey</a> is below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*vbY6d4ShDPD84UWlKG_m3Q.png" /><figcaption>Author’s calculations</figcaption></figure><p>The same data is presented below in relative terms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/629/1*-Z1NJeWcc51WvXjd58qScQ.png" /><figcaption>Author’s calculations</figcaption></figure><p>In the broadest of strokes, we should contrast demand-side issues like cost and interest with supply-side concerns like availability and security. The number of homes that lack access to a service provider has been growing in size over time, but it still ranks especially low, affecting a little over 850,000 households. As the <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/news/an-in-depth-look-at-the-broadband-infrastructure-bills/">previous post</a> laid out, the infrastructure bills currently under discussion aim to solve this broadband availability gap, which is a small part of the overall problem.</p><p>Two groups stand out from the rest. By far, lack of interest is the dominant reason why people aren’t connected at nearly two-thirds. For ease of reference, this group will be called the <em>Internet incalcitrant</em>. Next to that, people aren’t connected because they find the service too expensive. Together these two causes make up 88 percent of the problem. If leaders could help solve these demand-side concerns, much of the digital divide could be gapped.</p><h3>Digital equity and the digital divide</h3><p>The driving forces for non-adoption highlight a key difference between the digital divide and the much broader term, digital equity. Equity is a longstanding tradition in the United States and other liberal democracies that strives to allocate resources and opportunities to those in need in order to reach an equal outcome. In a world increasingly dominated by the digital, having Internet service and a computer is only half the battle. Knowledge of how to use these resources is key as well. <a href="https://www.benton.org/blog/what-do-we-mean-when-we-say-digital-equity-and-digital-inclusion">Digital equity</a> thus includes issues related to access, sometimes called the first-level digital divide, as well as the second-level digital divide, which is related to the use of digital tech.</p><p>For two decades, public policy has focused on the first-level digital divide, specifically the broadband availability gap to ensure that individuals have access to digital technologies. Recently, however, Congress has also taken up the issue of digital equity with the Digital Equity Act. In pushing this bill, Senator Murray <a href="https://www.murray.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/mobile/newsreleases?ID=016FCF9F-F00F-42D7-BD98-EFDA3D9784EF">explained that it</a> “will direct significant new federal investments to help ensure people in our communities have the tools, support, and technologies necessary to take full advantage of a broadband connection when they have access to one.”</p><p>Still, broadband equity exists in tension with the choices that the Internet incalcitrant make. In talking through a central goal of public policy in democracies, philosopher <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170810184132/http://omega.cc.umb.edu/~pubpol/documents/RobeynsJHDoncapabilities.pdf">Ingrid Robeyns shed light</a> on this little-discussed part of the digital divide,</p><blockquote>What is ultimately important is that people have the freedoms or valuable opportunities (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do and be the person they want to be. Once they effectively have these substantive opportunities, they can choose those options that they value most. For example, every person should have the opportunity to be part of a community and to practice a religion; but if someone prefers to be a hermit or an atheist, they should also have this option.</blockquote><p>Importing this thinking to the digital divide, what official stance should federal and state governments take in response to those that have chosen freely not to be online?</p><p>A vast majority of those not connected, two-thirds, show a clear preference for not being connected. They have chosen to abstain. Neither access nor price is the limiting factor because they don’t want to be a part of the service. Anne Evans of Naples, Florida <a href="https://thehustle.co/meet-the-11-of-americans-who-dont-use-the-internet/">explained to The Hustle</a> that there are multiple reasons why she’s not connected: “It’s too impersonal… It’s a machine that doesn’t involve human-to-human contact…I like to stick with my old ways. Not because I’m stubborn — I just like it that way.” Luke Holtschneider, rural development manager for the Missouri Department of Economic Development, <a href="https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/state_news/little-legislative-progress-on-improving-missouri-broadband/article_edb766a8-da37-11e7-8cb0-2bbf35fb3a91.html">repeated a similar narrative to The Missourian</a>. Supporting communities requires that policies take an agnostic view of this group, but in turn, that goal remains in conflict with digital equity which seeks to ensure everyone is educated and has access.</p><p>Indeed, the public is less enthusiastic about the project of digital equity. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2020/04/PI_2020.04.30_COVID-internet_REPORT.pdf">Pew polling</a> from April 2020 found that a majority of Americans (62%) did not think it is the federal government’s responsibility to ensure that all Americans have a high-speed internet connection at home during the COVID-19 outbreak. As one might expect, partisan differences exist. Roughly half of Democrats and independents who lean to the Democratic Party say it is the federal government’s responsibility, while only 20 percent of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents hold this view.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/0*0zl4nahMKHyBwTJq" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2020/04/PI_2020.04.30_COVID-internet_REPORT.pdf">Pew</a></figcaption></figure><p>Moving forward from COVID, broadband public policy will increasingly chase after the Internet incalcitrant. Internet, social media use, and device ownership have all <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/28/internet-social-media-use-and-device-ownership-in-u-s-have-plateaued-after-years-of-growth/">plateaued</a>. Broadband subscription rates rose to their highest levels in a decade <a href="https://www.lightreading.com/cablevideo/cable-broadband-sub-growth-to-slow-in-2021---analyst/d/d-id/766190">at the end of 2020</a>, suggesting even more people went online. Speaking on the unconnected, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/22/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/">Pew noted</a>, “The size of this group has changed little over the past four years, despite ongoing government and social service programs to encourage internet adoption in underserved areas.” As such, policy levers aimed to bridge the gap are meeting limits as the marginal value of any program drops.</p><h3>Supply-side efforts to solve the digital divide</h3><p>Governments at all levels have largely sought to bridge the digital divide by altering the supply. Local and federal agencies have directly funded new networks, supported key institutions like schools and libraries, and streamlined the regulatory processes to speed up deployment. Built into these policies is the implicit assumption that demand for broadband service will quickly emerge once the facilities are operational. Projects have been funded through one-off programs and through continuing programs.</p><p>Until Covid, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, colloquially known as the Stimulus, counted as the only time Congress has provided one-off support. In total, $7.2 billion of the act was allocated to extend broadband Internet access, including $2.5 billion for rural communities via the Broadband Infrastructure Program (BIP), which was administered by the Rural Utilities Service (RUS). <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0740624X10001036#">Research on this program</a> found that broadband adoption did increase in the targeted communities for a couple of years, but didn’t increase economic measurements like median income and employment. Congress also appropriated $4.7 billion to create the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP), which was administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).</p><p>As the table below helps to illustrate, federal agencies provide support for Internet infrastructure development on an ongoing basis. The Universal Service Administrative Company, chartered by the Federal Communications Commission, oversees the Universal Service Fund (USF), which is the largest of these. The USF is supported through a federal Universal Service Fee, which often shows up as a tax on telephone and wireless bills. This fund is then redistributed to schools, libraries, and individuals through a number of programs meant to support communication infrastructure. All told, this program will spend $9 billion in 2021.</p><p>While Congress has been debating a larger infrastructure package, the FCC has already put into motion the Rural Digital Opportunity Fund (RDOF), which is funded via USF. As noted <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/news/an-in-depth-look-at-the-broadband-infrastructure-bills/">in the first post</a> in this series,</p><blockquote>RDOF intended to bring “high speed fixed broadband service to rural homes and small businesses that lack it.” At its close in late 2020, $9.2 billion in support was given out to 180 different groups which will bring service to over 5.2 million unserved homes and businesses, almost 99 percent of all locations targeted. Phase II of the auction, which has yet to be announced, has an additional $11.2 billion in support that will be allocated for the same purpose.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/517/1*e6MfogUYDW2PkoFoayzi1g.png" /><figcaption>Author’s calculations</figcaption></figure><p>Still, this year is slated to be a banner year in broadband spending. At least $22 billion should be headed out the door in 2021, over twice what was dispersed in 2020. Importantly, this figure doesn’t include the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds">$350 billion in emergency funding</a> for eligible state, local, territorial, and Tribal governments to respond to the COVID-19 emergency. States like <a href="https://edsource.org/2021/broadband-gets-a-major-boost-in-california-budget-revision/654684">California</a>, <a href="https://www.journal-news.net/journal-news/state-officials-encourage-creative-use-of-new-covid-19-relief-dollars-for-infrastructure-broadband/article_dde5cd71-e980-56f8-bd6b-6d609dd67812.html">West Virginia</a>, and <a href="https://fox4kc.com/news/education/nearly-2-billion-in-covid-relief-money-on-way-for-missouri-schools/">Missouri</a>, just to name a few, are using these monies to boost their own state broadband programs or begin new programs outright. Even if the larger infrastructure package stalls, broadband funding will look very different after next year.</p><p><a href="https://www.thecgo.org/research/are-government-owned-broadband-networks-effective/">Previous work of mine</a> reviewed the effectiveness literature detailing the impacts of subsidies on Internet usage, GDP growth, unemployment, firms, and industries. As I cautioned then, leaders need to attend to the specifics of each proposal and what they want to accomplish. The fourth post in this series will offer a detailed course of action for both the states and the federal government.</p><h3>Demand-side efforts to solve the digital divide</h3><p>While demand-side efforts are likely to yield the greatest results in bridging the digital divide, no federal program existed to help low-income households with standalone broadband service until late last year.</p><p><a href="https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-116HR133SA-RCP-116-68.pdf">The budget package</a> passed at the end of 2020 set aside $3.2 billion for <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-369043A1.pdf">a new Emergency Broadband Benefit Program</a> (EBB) administered by the FCC to help families struggling with COVID by giving them $50 per month. Those already enrolled in Lifeline, one of the four major programs at USF, are automatically eligible, but it is also available to families that are eligible for free school lunches, college Pell Grant recipients, and people who have lost jobs or been laid off at any point since this economic crisis began.</p><p>The EBB shares some key features with the Lifeline program. Lifeline was originally created in the Reagan era to help low-income people get a phone line, but in 2009, the FCC expanded the program to support wireless phones, and then expanded it again in 2016 to support wireless broadband services. Today, participants can get a $9.25 cut off their monthly bill if they qualify, for a total <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/general/lifeline-program-low-income-consumers">spending of $2.4 billion</a> in 2020. Both the EBB and Lifeline support families in buying communication services.</p><p>Still, Lifeline spends billions each year as it has for decades, but there is very little known about the effectiveness of the program as a means of pulling people out of poverty. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1007902329324">Research from the late 1990s</a> when Lifeline still targeted telephones found it did have a positive effect on telephone penetration, but this came with a large price tag. As economists Garbacz and Thompson explained, “program elasticities are extremely small, suggesting that very large expenditure increases per poor household would have little effect on telephone penetration.” Indeed, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-335">the GAO has recommended</a> since 2015 that Lifeline needs to be subject to a program evaluation. Policymakers are still making blind decisions since little is known about the effectiveness of the program. The EBB needs to course-correct and ensure better analysis of its programs.</p><p>The last time the FCC dove into the topic in 2012, it <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/general/low-income-broadband-pilot-program-0">supported 14 broadband pilot programs</a> to collect data on what policies might overcome the key broadband adoption barriers. The results show just how difficult it is to target non-adopters. In the end, <a href="https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-624A1.pdf">8,634 new</a> Internet users got connected because of the project, yet, the agency <a href="https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-12-2045A1.pdf">estimated 74,000 households</a> would opt in. Results from surveys conducted before and after the programs reveal the difficulty in getting people connected, as economist Scott Walstein <a href="https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Wallsten_Learning-from-the-FCCs-Lifeline-Broadband-Pilot-Projects.pdf">first pointed out</a>. Cost was the most cited reason for not being on the Internet before the program, and yet, participants later said the reduction in price wasn’t a driving factor in getting them online.</p><p>Other research confirms the difficulty of getting people connected. As far back as 2007, <a href="https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Broadband/2007-05-02SurveyReport050207.pdf">Seattle</a> recognized that for the disconnected, “Many of these households are not interested in Internet access at any price.” Comcast’s Internet Essentials program stands as the longest-running private version of a supplemental Internet program. Just last year, <a href="https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/20-001_0.pdf">Rosston and Wallsten found</a> that the program caused roughly 292,000 households to subscribe to broadband service between 2011 and 2015. As they concluded, “we generally do not know how best to entice the remaining broadband non-adopters to connect to broadband.”</p><p>The lesson from policymakers is clear. Cost might be a barrier for some, but lowering cost doesn’t get a lot of people newly connected.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>For years, leaders funded efforts to plug the broadband availability gap by supporting infrastructure buildout even though lack of infrastructure is a small part of the divide overall at just 4 percent. A bigger chunk of Americans, 21 percent, say that cost is the determining factor. Beginning last year, Congress decided to give families a $50 credit outright.</p><p>Both of these causes pale in comparison to the dominant reason for non-adoption, which is lack of relevance at 67 percent. The nature of the problem is key since all too often, leaders underrate important policy details. Few programs in the arsenal can target this group. Getting people online has been much harder than imagined. The next two posts in this series lay the groundwork for better policy in broadband.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=547f2952c950" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/the-digital-divide-digital-equity-and-the-nature-of-the-problem-547f2952c950">The digital divide, digital equity, and the nature of the problem</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[An in-depth look at the broadband infrastructure bills]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/an-in-depth-look-at-the-broadband-infrastructure-bills-28383e95df81?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[broadband]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biden]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2021 18:25:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-15T16:35:38.601Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7dZ6hQjCCVPsT1LNxloFUg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mbaumi?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Mika Baumeister</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/s/photos/broadband?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>This post is the first in a series of four posts, which first explores the current infrastructure bills, diagnoses the problem inherent in the digital divide, explores broadband as an infrastructure problem, and finally lays out an algorithm for action in broadband.</em></p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>President Biden recently <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/">laid out an agenda</a> to spend $2 trillion on infrastructure, $100 billion of which is targeted to “bring affordable, reliable, high-speed broadband to every American.” Where the White House lacks specifics, bills in both the Senate and the House of Representatives have already filled in the gaps. If something happens on infrastructure, broadband will be included.</p><p>Acolytes claim that massive broadband expenditures will close the digital divide, but all of the plans are unabashedly focused on infrastructure. In reality, only a small part of the digital divide will actually be solved by making broadband infrastructure available everywhere.</p><p>Importantly, policymakers need to recognize the distinction between the total expenditures to plug the broadband gap and the level of government-provided support to reach that goal. Internet service providers don’t need to fully rely upon government funds to provide service, as past experience shows, which means $100 billion is probably too high.</p><p>Moreover, leaders should understand that,</p><ul><li>Completely closing the broadband availability gap will be costly;</li><li>The FCC needs to build better maps to target the unserved;</li><li>All reasonable attempts should be made to ensure this group is connected first before gigabit service; and</li><li>More stringent rules need to be put into place to ensure monies are properly directed.</li></ul><p>This first post examines the proposals being discussed in Congress and explains why they aren’t going to solve the problem they have been tasked to plug. The focus on broadband infrastructure has taken our eye off the real problems, failures, and successes of past policies and lacks a clear vision about the digital divide. A sketch of what is needed is laid out in the final section of this series.</p><h3><em>Broadband infrastructure spending</em> proposals</h3><p>Biden’s $100 billion for broadband is a telling target since the number fits nicely with the “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210311173255/https://www.majoritywhip.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Accessible-Affordable-Internet-for-All-Act-Clyburn.pdf">The Accessible, Affordable Internet for All Act</a>” or the Internet for All Act. Representative Clyburn, sponsor of the Internet for All Act, <a href="https://www.rollcall.com/2021/03/16/next-infrastructure-bill-aims-to-end-digital-divide/">was reportedly crucial</a> to getting the White House to increase their broadband funding fivefold, from $20 billion to $100 billion. Given the Representative’s leadership on this issue, one would expect the final plan that passes Congress would closely echo the Internet for All Act.</p><p>Under the Internet for All Act, the federal government would,</p><ul><li>Authorize $80 billion to deploy high-speed broadband infrastructure, giving $20 billion to the states and the other $60 billion to the FCC for a nationwide auction;</li><li>Allocate $5 billion for low-interest financing of broadband through a new secured loan program;</li><li>Establish a new office within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to ensure efficient use of federal money;</li><li>Extend the Emergency Broadband Benefit, created last year, which gives families a $50 monthly discount on their Internet plans or $75 for consumers on tribal lands;</li><li>Direct the Federal Communications Commission to collect data on prices charged for broadband service;</li><li>Conduct a biennial study to measure the extent to which cost remains a barrier to broadband adoption; and</li><li>Provide over $1 billion to establish two new digital equity plans to help close gaps in broadband adoption and digital skills.</li></ul><p>The bulk of the spending comes in the form of the $80 billion that is to be split between two programs. The states, US Virgin Islands, Guam, and US protectorates are slated to get $20 billion right off of the top. The bill is written so that states spend their allotment through a competitive bidding process, similar to the national version. The table below approximates the funding each state will receive, as a one-time payment, under the state funding portion of the program.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/0*iOAUxLv7H9AJ5xnL" /><figcaption>Author estimates</figcaption></figure><p>The remaining $60 billion of the Internet for All Act will go towards a nationwide competitive bidding process that involves at least two rounds of funding. Evident in its structure, the Internet for All Act is an infrastructure program aimed at gigabit service. If indeed the bill were truly about the digital divide, the two-step process would be swapped.</p><p>In the first part, funding will go to proposals that can commit to gigabit service or projects that connect unserved anchor institutions like schools and libraries with superfast broadband. Up to twenty percent or $12 billion has been reserved for those projects that can specifically commit to gigabit service in four years. Up to $12 billion could be spent in this first round, on gigabit service, even though there is no requirement that a project targets needy areas.</p><p>After this first round, one or more further rounds will be held to award the rest of the funds, which could be around $48 billion, to unserved areas, areas with low-tier service or mid-tier service, and unserved anchor institutions. In these subsequent rounds, priority will be given to unserved areas, which is defined as an area where at least 90 percent of the population has no access to broadband service with a download speed of at least 25 Mbps and an upload speed of at least 3 Mbps. However, the Commission and the states might further prioritize projects if the projects have at least 20 percent matching funds from non-Federal sources, expand access on Tribal lands, offer high speeds, quickly deploy, or expand access to persistent poverty counties, among other features.</p><p>Still, the unserved should be a priority, and only after a reasonable attempt has been made to address this group would it be appropriate for the process to move on towards other goals like gigabit fiber. To its credit, the House’s “<a href="https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/LIFT%20American%20Bill%20Text.pdf">Leading Infrastructure for Tomorrow’s America Act</a>” or the LIFT America Act prioritizes the unserved, a feature that should be adopted in any final infrastructure package.</p><h3><em>The cost of funding broadband infrastructure</em></h3><p>While it is not explicitly mentioned, the $80 billion target in the Internet for All Act comes from a 2017 <a href="https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0119/DOC-343135A1.pdf">cost estimate</a> of Paul de Sa, Chief of the Office of Strategic Planning &amp; Policy Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). de Sa estimated the total capital expenditures “to increase and accelerate profitable, incremental private-sector investment to achieve at least 98% nationwide deployment of future-proofed, fixed broadband networks.” Closing the broadband availability gap with fiber or cable would total $40 billion for 98 percent coverage, and another $40 billion will get the last two percent connected for a total of $80 billion.</p><p>The estimate is rooted in the unique <a href="https://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/broadband-availability-gap-paper.pdf">economics of networks</a>. Like all other investment decisions, new network investments are made when the project is cash-flow positive. Deployment decisions are thus highly sensitive to service-area economies of scale, <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/research/are-government-owned-broadband-networks-effective/#when-does-building-a-broadband-network-make-sense">which can vary greatly</a> depending on the population density, the cost of building in an area, and the regulatory regime. Most of the costs of building broadband networks come upfront. Maintaining and operating the infrastructure are generally inexpensive. That means some areas where investments don’t make sense today might be able to develop a network if the startup costs are subsidized.</p><p>The de Sa cost estimate <a href="https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0119/DOC-343135A1.pdf">assumes that</a> “approximately 14% of the ~160m U.S. residential and small-and-medium business locations lack access to [25 Mbps download and 3 Mbps upload] capable fiber-to-the-premise (FTTP) and/or cable service.” But the broadband market has changed significantly since the whitepaper was drafted. The total number of households in the U.S. without a cable or fiber provider in this speed tier stands at 9.3 percent <a href="https://broadbandmap.fcc.gov/#/area-comparison?version=dec2019&amp;tech=cf&amp;speed=25_3&amp;searchtype=county">as of December 2019</a>. In other words, the current funding gap is sure to be lower than the 2017 forecast, tentatively in the range of $8 billion less.</p><p>Importantly, de Sa suggested that only the first $40 billion should be targeted (in 2017 dollars) because the last 2 percent of locations, which tack on another $40 billion, have unique characteristics. This is where the bills differ since the LIFT America Act only spells out $40 billion to close the broadband availability gap compared to the White House plan of $100 billion. The last two percent are the most costly group to connect. It costs just as much to connect the last two percent as it costs to connect the first 12 percent.</p><p>Adjusting de Sa’s estimates to 2021 dollars, it will cost on average $96,000 per location to build broadband infrastructure accessible for the last two percent. That adds up to a total cost of $43 billion for only the last two percent of locations. More important still, this group of locations, which I’ve dubbed <em>economically stubborn</em>, is unique because subscriber revenues won’t be sufficient to pay for yearly operational costs. In the world of finance, these projects will be <a href="https://www.wallstreetmojo.com/negative-cash-flow/">cash flow negative on an operational basis</a>, meaning they lose money in their operation.</p><p>As written, both bills tackle the locations currently without broadband up until the point where locations become economically stubborn. In this range, projects should be expected to have high initial capital costs that could be offset by funding, but they should also have the cash flow to maintain the operations once they are built. Both bills all but guarantee that economically stubborn projects won’t be funded after they are put in place because the funding methods assume that the network will be able to maintain operational costs once the initial investment is made. This isn’t a death blow to the bill. Rather, leaders need to be clear-eyed about the limits of getting the last 2 percent of locations connected.</p><h3><em>Reverse auctions leverage private funds</em></h3><p>Still, there is a deep disconnect between the work of de Sa and the current discussions over funding. Given that there is a gap in broadband expenditures, policymakers need to ask as a follow-up, should the federal government completely foot the bill, or are there mechanisms that can be used to leverage private money to get everyone a connection?</p><p>Traditionally, the FCC has relied upon reverse auctions, which solicit bids from multiple companies to provide broadband service in an area, to plug this gap. Both the Rural Digital Opportunity Fund (RDOF), which ended late last year, and the Connect America Fund Phase II (CAF II), which ended in 2018, were reverse auctions that provided federal support for unserved areas of the country. Moreover, language found in both bills suggests funding will occur through a reverse auction.</p><p>Reverse auctions make sense. Research from economist Sarah Oh finds that these auctions are typically <a href="https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Oh-Reverse-Auctions-Lessons-from-BTOP-Jan-2021.pdf">the most efficient way</a> to support broadband subsidies because they leverage private and public funds. Leaders need to embrace this. If there truly is an $80 billion hole, the government support levels to fill it will be much smaller than $80 billion. A lot of housework needs to be completed.</p><p>Assuming that <a href="https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-364457A1.pdf#page=69">the process proceeds like RDOF</a>, the next auction will consist of timed rounds where bidders will be asked to provide service to an area, at a specified performance tier, in return for a specific support amount. The support amount is only a small part of the overall investment needed to build a network, but it signals the cost needed for a private entity to enter into a market. In each subsequent round, the support will drop in price, which will cause bidders to drop out. This reverse auction is known as a multi-round, descending clock auction because it descends to the lowest price for a service area.</p><p>RDOF intended to bring “high speed fixed broadband service to rural homes and small businesses that lack it.” At its close in late 2020, <a href="https://auctiondata.fcc.gov/public/projects/auction904">$9.2 billion in support</a> was given out to 180 different groups which will bring service to over 5.2 million unserved homes and businesses, almost 99 percent of all locations targeted. Phase II of the auction, which has yet to be announced, has an additional $11.2 billion in support that will be allocated for the same purpose.</p><p>Originally, the FCC estimated that $16 billion would need to be given out, but the real amount came out to be nearly $7 billion under this mark because bidders were able to deliver service at a support level much lower than estimates first suggested. Since RDOF was technology-neutral, it selected the least costly structure for service, allowing high-speed wireless technologies to get support in areas where it is competitive.</p><p>A similar sort of result should be expected with a new auction. While it is an outcome that should be embraced, a political compromise will probably come in the form of the Internet for All Act since <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/bidens-bungling-broadband-plan?fbclid=IwAR3SHGHWZDsFiEwk07nEmvUJojCgajFogPacGBhNXO6Nx19f0H70appDT5s">there is a push to build fiber</a>. Wireless tech cannot provide gig service while fiber can, so the two-part system funds fiber first by supporting gig service in the first round and then runs additional rounds which would allow for tech neutral bidders. It is a political solution but a convoluted method to achieving ubiquitous broadband.</p><p>Still, a trend of declining support comes into clear focus when RDOF is considered alongside a similar auction, the Connect America Fund Phase II (CAF II). In 2014, CAF II <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/general/rural-broadband-experiments">estimated that support</a> would roughly total $2,400 per location to serve the hardest to reach locations, but the actual auction secured support at only $2,000 per location. The RDOF continued that trend and pushed down support to $1,700 per location only four years later.</p><p>Given this trend, it remains an open question whether $80 billion, estimated four years ago, is the right amount to bridge the availability gap. RDOF is only now being distributed and the FCC hasn’t conducted any recent studies to recalculate the cost of filling the broadband availability gap or the support levels needed to bring service into an area. The maps on which those costs, and therefore an auction, would be based are only now being updated with more fine-grain data; a perennial stumbling block to proper targeting of monies. Additionally, there is nearly <a href="https://voqal.org/telecommunications-update-how-will-congress-spend-over-40-billion-in-c-band-auction-revenues/">$40 billion sitting in the bank</a> from a completely separate wireless auction that hasn’t yet been attached to any spending. There is still a lot of work that needs to be completed to ensure a successful auction.</p><p>The time component to rolling out the broadband infrastructure plan presents its own challenges. Once the bill is signed into law, the Commission and the states will have 18 months to get 75 percent of the monies out the door. While agencies shouldn’t be sitting on a pile of cash, the year and a half window will tend to favor those with knowledge of the FCC process and existing businesses for whom it is easiest to make a business case. The losers in this process will be new entrants into the broadband market seeking to serve the unserved. Even now, cities are <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-prem-chicago-illinois-transportation-infrastructure-joe-biden-20210402-jwc6fjfoqzae7fgulpzxwnddg4-story.html">lining up their infrastructure projects to get funded</a>.</p><p>An injection of $80 billion should be expected to accelerate business plans that have already been in the works, instead of opening up new opportunities in places where networks would not have been built. None of the bills prioritize new networks despite this being critical to solving the broadband gap. While duplicate networks serving the same community should be avoided, priority should be given to new builds that can prove they are new via a certification process, as de Sa suggested.</p><p>Among all of the issues with the proposed bills, the most concerning is that they make no effort to limit duplicate efforts in a region. Overbuilds, as they are called, are new networks that are built in areas already serviced by an incumbent Internet service of the same type. Recent <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Broadband-Speeds-in-Fibered-Markets-An-Empirical-Analysis.pdf">CGO research</a> from economists Michael Kotrous and James Bailey found that cable overbuilds tend to have significantly lower average download speeds than cable broadband in blocks with no overbuild. Crowding out in these regions is a real phenomenon, recognized even by de Sa. For this reason, it would be best to implement a rule that limits overbuilds. The success of a broadband infrastructure plan hinges on its funding mechanism. Simply put, more groundwork is needed to ensure success.</p><h3><em>A better way forward</em></h3><p>With the Biden Administration has come a fresh look at policy and some are hopeful that the digital divide might receive the attention it deserves. As it currently stands, however, the $80 billion slated for broadband won’t be spent wisely.</p><p>A better path forward for closing the digital divide would mean first getting our house in order. Policymakers interested in effectively and quickly closing the digital divide should take four additional measures:</p><ul><li>First, the FCC should estimate the cost of support to get the unserved connected to broadband, built on up-to-date maps;</li><li>Using new cost data, the FCC should oversee a reverse auction where unserved locations are prioritized first;</li><li>As part of this auction, projects that would not have been executed under existing business plans should be prioritized; and</li><li>Rules should be put into place limiting overbuilds.</li></ul><p>At the end of the day, the broadband plan being discussed by the administration and in Congress is still an infrastructure plan, and a limited one at that since it does not tackle the cost of construction or permitting. To faithfully tackle the digital divide, a more comprehensive approach is needed. Without it, the funds meant for underserved areas will likely go towards projects that would have happened anyway. That will leave the underserved in the same position that they’re in now, disconnected from the country’s increasingly digital economy. The next three posts in this series lay out that approach, by explaining the nature of the problem, exploring broadband infrastructure, and finally laying out an algorithm for action.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=28383e95df81" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/an-in-depth-look-at-the-broadband-infrastructure-bills-28383e95df81">An in-depth look at the broadband infrastructure bills</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reinvigorating communities will take more than broadband]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/reinvigorating-communities-will-take-more-than-broadband-65a77a508a23?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/65a77a508a23</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[broadband]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 17:01:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-23T17:01:41.297Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9k74z0I0v9cL4KUvz39ONg.jpeg" /></figure><p>There is a bipartisan push to make high-speed broadband a key component of an infrastructure bill. <a href="https://joebiden.com/rural-plan/">President Biden promised</a> to support cities and towns wanting to build broadband networks during his campaign, saying it “will encourage competition among providers, to increase speeds and decrease prices in urban, suburban, and rural areas.” Ultimately, Biden concludes, “high-speed internet access should be a great economic equalizer for rural America, not another economic disadvantage.” <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/research/?_focus=technology-and-innovation">The CGO has published</a> a spate of research recently, which suggests that policymakers should moderate their expectations. Oddly enough, competition is poorly connected to broadband quality, and broadband buildout is unlikely to cause a dramatic shift in local economic conditions. It’s popular, but broadband expansions are not a cure all for sluggish economies.</p><p>CGO recently <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Broadband-Speeds-in-Fibered-Markets-An-Empirical-Analysis.pdf">released a paper</a> from economists Michael Kotrous and James Bailey that explores the impact of new fiber broadband offerings on broadband quality within a market. Like so many other research papers in this space, the results are complicated and require context. However, Kotrous and Bailey’s findings show that entrants do not have the level of impact that would merit calls for widespread investment in municipal broadband.</p><p>Kotrous and Bailey use the FCC’s Form 477 data on fixed wireline broadband service to create a data set that spans from December 2014 to December 2018. The analysis puts a spotlight on fiber, cable, and aDSL technologies, and excludes satellite and wireless competition. The data has its limitations, derived mainly from gaps in the FCC’s data generating process, but there is still much to glean about the shifts in broadband competition over time.</p><p>The authors kick off their discussion by underscoring the dynamic competition environment among broadband providers in the U.S. Among other takeaways, they find:</p><ul><li>Speeds for all services have increased, but the rates of increase varied widely. Average fiber download speeds increased about 165 percent from 2014 to 2018, cable increased 617 percent, while aDSL speeds increased by only 34 percent. (Table 2)</li><li>Fiber services had the highest average download speeds in December 2014, but cable speeds surpassed fiber in December 2018. (Table 2)</li><li>Most census blocks had one and only one provider for each technology. (Table 5)</li><li>The average number of aDSL and fiber providers in cable-served blocks increased significantly between 2014 and 2018. (Table 6.2)</li></ul><p>In short, competition between the same type of providers, or intraplatform competition, isn’t a common trend. If there is a cable service in a region, there will typically be only one cable company, just as there will only be one fiber provider and one DSL service. Much as the Telecommunication Act of 1996 <a href="https://internetinnovation.org/images/misc_content/study-telecommunications-competition-09072013.pdf">had hoped</a>, Internet service competition is among different service technologies. The biggest story in interplatform competition is the expansion of fiber into new markets in the 2014 to 2018 time period.</p><p>The second part of the paper uses a variety of economic models to test the impact of fiber on the rest of the market. The results of their econometric model reflect a complex market.</p><p>The authors find that cable overbuilds, in areas already serviced by an incumbent, tend to have significantly lower average download speeds than cable broadband in blocks with no overbuild.</p><p><a href="https://www.thecgo.org/research/are-government-owned-broadband-networks-effective/">In previous work</a> at the CGO, I explored one common model used to understand infrastructure builds, derived from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2937655?seq=1">Bresnahan and Reiss’s</a> pioneering work. As they found, the population required to support a second firm in a region is often much larger than the population needed for a single firm. As I explained,</p><blockquote>In their example, a small town of 800 people could support one dentist, but if the entry of a second dentist intensifies competition, it will take more than 1,600 residents to support two dentists. Sometimes, it will take nearly double the population. In Bresnahan and Reiss’s example, a total of 2,400 residents would be needed to support a second dentist. The addition of a third or fourth firm often requires an incremental population increase similar to the second. Moreover, competition often kicks in quickly, but doesn’t increase much with each additional entrant. Using the Bresnahan and Reiss framework, Xiao and Orazem estimated that, “Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.”</blockquote><p>In other words, Kotrous and Bailey’s findings suggest that it is probably economically inefficient to overbuild. In turn, policymakers might consider implementing a rule that limits overbuilds in their grant programs due to this effect.</p><p>The relationship between cable and fiber is far more complex. Because the FCC doesn’t report any speeds above 1 GB, gigabit fiber projects are all grouped together, complicating the analysis. Gigabit fiber competition is negatively correlated with cable download speeds (Table 9 in the paper). At the same time, non-gigabit fiber providers tend to predict faster cable speeds. Overall, this relationship explains a small share of the observed increase in cable speeds between 2014 and 2018. Fiber competition seems to have also pressured cable companies to upgrade to a new technical standard, DOCSIS 3.0 to DOCSIS 3.1, which greatly improved the quality of the service. But, as the authors were quick to point out, “our econometric results suggested that the economic and statistical relationship between gigabit fiber provider entry and incumbents’ service quality is limited.”</p><p>As I’ve <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/research/are-government-owned-broadband-networks-effective/">laid out in other CGO research</a>, there can sometimes be a crowding out effect of municipal broadband. Subsidized investment in the form of a municipal broadband service might shift support from cable and telephone providers if an area can only support only so much investment. <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/iepoli/v52y2020ics0167624520301220.html">Work published</a> last year by economist Steven Landgraf discovered that municipal broadband services are “associated with lower maximum upload and download speeds offered by private cable and DSL providers.” It could be, then, gigabit fiber projects are having a small substitution effect on the top end, while all of the non-gigabit fiber projects are cajoling incumbents to increase their speeds everywhere else.</p><p>Policymakers should pay special attention to two big takeaways from Kotrous and Bailey. For one, competition between services is still a small part of the overall shift towards higher quality offerings. New fiber entrants don’t have a huge impact on service quality, especially since there have been dramatic increases in broadband speeds over time. Since quality changes typically come from either competitors or consumer demand, cable and aDSL services are probably responding to consumer demand rather than market competitors.</p><p>Second, there are some critical limitations to the Kotrous and Bailey paper, which apply broadly to broadband research and policy. As they are clear to point out, their model doesn’t allow for causal inference. Market entry by a gigabit fiber provider isn’t random, so the results might pick up relationships connected with the market-entry decision rather than the market-entry effect. Likewise, policy should be crafted with an effect in mind, not just for the purpose of having another broadband provider in a region.</p><p>The big selling point for broadband is economic development. Indeed, Biden is right that broadband <em>should</em> be the great equalizer, but it remains one component among many, critical for local economic success. As I <a href="https://www.thecgo.org/research/are-government-owned-broadband-networks-effective/">explained elsewhere</a>,</p><blockquote>The few studies that try to understand this relationship by employing causal identification strategies muddle the picture even more. <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/notnotecp/14_2f06.htm">De Stefano et. al.</a> found no effect from broadband on the performance of firms in England, while <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejuecon/v_3a71_3ay_3a2012_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a100-113.htm">Kolko found</a> a positive effect on economic growth but not on employment rate or wages. <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w20826">Work from Akerman et. al.</a> discovered that broadband rollouts tend to skew skill demand, improving the labor outcomes and productivity of skilled workers while worsening the outcomes and productivity of low skilled workers. <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46830/1/Michaels_Natraj_VanReenen_Has-ICT-polarized-skill-demand_2014.pdf">Other research</a> tends to confirm this skill polarization effect.</blockquote><p>CGO’s recent research on broadband should temper the unrealistic proclamations about what this service can do when taken together. Reinvigorating communities will take much more effort than just putting broadband in the ground.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65a77a508a23" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/reinvigorating-communities-will-take-more-than-broadband-65a77a508a23">Reinvigorating communities will take more than broadband</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How platforms broke antitrust analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/how-platforms-broke-antitrust-analysis-90a4f14e91d7?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/90a4f14e91d7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2021 18:20:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-22T15:21:17.247Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A series on big tech and antitrust in the 21st century</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oG3HE9VLXGTmcpnq2Sj5CQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>This post is part one of a series that explores the current Big Tech antitrust cases.</em></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328941/download#page=10">The case against Google</a> filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) finds its roots in a common theory about platforms. As the complaint summarizes,</p><blockquote>Most general search engines do not charge a cash price to consumers. At least one, Bing, even offers to pay consumers rewards for using its general search engine. That does not mean, however, that these general search engines are free. When a consumer uses Google, the consumer provides personal information and attention in exchange for search results. Google then monetizes the consumer’s information and attention by selling ads.</blockquote><p>The term <em>free</em> is deceptive. In one context, free means that a good or service has no explicit price. In this sense, free means that there is zero price at the point of use, such that consumption does not depend on the ability to pay. On the other hand, free also suggests that a thing or service has no cost. But every choice comes with a cost, or more precisely, an opportunity cost. In <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_69">the classic definition</a> offered by economist James Buchanan, opportunity cost is the anticipated value of “that which might be” if the choice were made differently.</p><p>While both zero price and opportunity cost are critical for understanding platforms like Google, pricing is key to properly apply antitrust principles. Public policy that ignores the role for pricing will ultimately make consumers worse-off.</p><p><a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.23.3.125">For some time</a>, economists have recognized the unique nature of multisided platforms. Malls, credit cards, gaming consoles, social media sites, and search engines all fall into this special category because they can bring together two or more distinct user groups for mutual exchange. However, integrating these groups in a mutually advantageous way requires pricing and investment strategies that just don’t make sense in normal one-sided markets. The prices for each side are a function of the total value that the group gets from being a part of the platform.</p><p>Both restaurants and their diners save time and effort with reservation platforms like OpenTable. But each group values the exchange in a different way. Users tend to care about the total number of restaurants that are a part of the platform. In contrast, restaurants care about which networks consumers actually use. They want to know, do patrons go to OpenTable or Resy for a night out? This two-way relationship means that demand on one side of the platform is impacted by demand on another. What distinguishes platforms from other kinds of business are these relationships, often called <em>demand interdependencies</em>.</p><p>Similarly, the value created by Google hinges on the demand interdependencies between advertisers and users. As I explained in <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0050-d-0038-155063.pdf">a filing before the Federal Trade Commission</a>,</p><blockquote>If users experience an increase in price or a reduction in quality, then they are likely to exit or use the platform less. Yet, advertisers are on the other side because they can reach users. So in response to the decline in user quality, advertiser demand will drop even if the ad prices stay constant. The result echoes back. When advertisers drop out, the total amount of content also recedes and user demand falls because the platform is less valuable to them. Demand is tightly integrated between the two sides of the platform. Changes in user and advertiser preferences have far outsized effects on the platforms because each side responds to the other. In other words, small changes in price or quality tends to be far more impactful in chasing off both groups from the platforms as compared to one-sided goods.</blockquote><p>Normal businesses will price their good or service based on their marginal cost and how a consumer responds to price increases. Formally, this is a classic example of what is known as demand elasticity. But platform businesses have to price at least two goods with two different cost structures and two different consumer responses that are themselves interconnected. Most of the economic research into platforms in the past 30 years concerns these difficult pricing problems.</p><p>The Xbox gaming console, which was launched in 2001, serves as a great example of the pricing problem. By and large, the first Xbox was a failure. Research, design, manufacturing, support, and gaming development were costly for Microsoft and the losses <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2015/09/27/a-decade-later-the-former-chief-xbox-officer-revisits-his-critical-decisions/">totaled nearly</a> $7 billion. Yet, consumers buying a console never paid the full price. Instead, the company hoped to jumpstart a platform that would spur users to buy more games, since Microsoft retains a portion of game revenue. Had consumers paid the full price of the console, there would have been fewer console sales and, in turn, fewer sales of games. The company built off the lessons learned in making the next iteration, the Xbox 360, a financial success. But if you look only at the sales of the first Xbox, it’s a failure. Microsoft lost money on each console sold. Yet looking at the entire legacy of Microsoft’s Xbox shows why the system is a money maker today.</p><p>Even for businesses taking risk, pricing is tough to get right. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8W_DBAAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA424&amp;lpg=PA424&amp;dq=%22The+key+point+is+that+it+is+wrong+as+a+matter+of+economics+to+ignore+significant+demand+interdependencies+among+the+multiple+platform+sides%22&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=moisiTVrjL&amp;sig=ACfU3U2jKcx22-a9prhifumEfyb1ACAJxg&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiim9_h8vHuAhXsElkFHXJpCeQQ6AEwAHoECAUQAg#v=onepage&amp;q=%22The%20key%20point%20is%20that%20it%20is%20wrong%20as%20a%20matter%20of%20economics%20to%20ignore%20significant%20demand%20interdependencies%20among%20the%20multiple%20platform%20sides%22&amp;f=false">Economists David Evans and Richard Schmalensee</a> explained why this insight is so critical, “The key point is that it is wrong as a matter of economics to ignore significant demand interdependencies among the multiple platform sides.” If ignored, the typical analytical tools used in antitrust will yield incorrect assessments. As it stands, the DOJ is poised to make this very mistake in their case against Google.</p><p>To take just one example, competition authorities might be concerned with market power when conducting an investigation or bringing a case. Typically market power is defined as a firm’s ability to raise prices significantly above the competitive level. Yet, platforms come into existence because they shift prices among two or more groups of users. If only one side of the platform is considered, it might be inappropriately concluded that a firm is raising prices above a competitive level. In the case of search engines and social media sites, users face zero price while advertisers pay. Whether or not advertisers are paying too high of a price is a concern that the courts will have to parse in the Google case.</p><p>Economists and antitrust scholars have been actively working on merging insights from the nascent platform literature into traditional antitrust analysis. A legitimate assessment of Google’s pending case will necessitate that the entire platform is considered.</p><p><em>The next edition of this series will analyze why zero price products, like social media sites and search engines, are unique and require special attention for antitrust.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90a4f14e91d7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/how-platforms-broke-antitrust-analysis-90a4f14e91d7">How platforms broke antitrust analysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Debunking the myths surrounding the COVID-19 vaccines]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/debunking-the-myths-surrounding-the-covid-19-vaccines-771015f3c15e?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/771015f3c15e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vaccines]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fda]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2020 20:57:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-20T20:57:01.471Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C1iqfz57m_LRmQS7HUUcMA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Last week, <a href="https://twitter.com/pfizer/status/1325767629890592771">BioNTech and Pfizer</a> announced that their COVID-19 vaccine had shown efficacy in human trials, and this Monday, <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/early-data-show-modernas-coronavirus-vaccine-is-94-5-effective/">Moderna did the same</a>. No one was sure this point would ever be reached. Both groups have submitted applications to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for emergency approval, paving the way for the vaccines to be distributed beginning sometime next year. Both are projecting 95 percent effectiveness, far above <a href="https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(20)30284-1/fulltext">the threshold of 80 percent</a> required to extinguish an epidemic without any other measures like social distancing.</p><p>Since the first discovered case in the U.S. in January of 2020, COVID-19 has left entire industries beleaguered, and continues to tighten its stranglehold on the global economy. At the same time, the crippling effect of COVID-19 has rallied an army of talented and courageous healthcare professionals into action, creating a global coalition of governments, companies, health institutes, and research groups to find solutions. Researchers have pursued over <a href="https://covid-19tracker.milkeninstitute.org/#vaccines_intro">200 potential candidate vaccines</a>, and narrowed the number of viable vaccine candidates down to just <a href="https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2768155">five in record time</a>.</p><p>Political wranglings by President Trump injected unnecessary confusion into the process. While the White House pushed its own desired coronavirus timeline, vaccines were always going to be governed by the development process and efficacy requirements of the FDA. However, the White House has been key in shifting cost burdens and eliminating uncertainty through Operation Warp Speed, which was funded through the CARES Act.</p><p>Polling shows there will be challenges ahead in convincing the public that vaccines are safe and effective. The speed of development comes from three factors. First, vaccine developers had a head start on research because of SARS. Second, new vaccine technologies have been debuted, which has significantly shortened development times. Finally, the failure to stop the spread of COVID meant that human trials would progress swiftly.</p><h3><em>Polling, and the public policy problems ahead</em></h3><p>According to Morning Consult, which has been <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2020/10/12/48-of-u-s-adults-now-say-theyd-get-a-covid-19-vaccine-a-new-low/">polling</a> 2,200 U.S. adults weekly since February, public sentiment regarding a vaccine has soured. In February, when participants were asked whether they would take a vaccine if it were made available, 72 percent of adults said they would. Fast-forward nine months to November and the number of adults that say they would take a vaccine if available now stands at only 49 percent. Nearly a quarter of Americans have changed their minds.</p><p>Global comparisons of vaccine adoption polling are equally alarming. In 2019, the U.S. was the second most accepting of vaccines, according to <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/faith-benefits-vaccines-drops-across-globe">Ipsos MORI</a>. Now, the U.S. has fallen behind, down to just 63 percent from its 2019-level of 80 percent. Global sentiment is similarly pessimistic. Great Britain, Italy, and France experienced roughly 10 percent declines in the percent of citizens willing to take a vaccine. Even still, faith in medicine has hardly budged according to that same poll.</p><p>Bernice L Hausman’s book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Anti-Vax-Reframing-Vaccination-Controversy/dp/1501735624"><em>Anti/Vax: Reframing the Vaccination Controversy</em></a>,<em> </em>provides valuable insights into why a person would reject a life-saving vaccine. Among other concerns, Hausman found that resistance was driven by:</p><ul><li>belief in the value of natural illness;</li><li>desire to avoid unnecessary medicine and treatment;</li><li>alternative views about health and medicine;</li><li>lived experience with illness, especially with illness that is not effectively treated by mainstream medicine;</li><li>protection of the body and control over what goes into the body;</li><li>experience with perceived vaccine injury;</li><li>distrust of mainstream scientific studies of vaccine safety; and</li><li>distrust of medicine’s entanglement with big business (especially “Big Pharma”) and government.</li></ul><p>The likely culprit for swift declines across a range of countries is some combination of lived experience with the illness, distrust in the entanglement of pharmaceutical companies and the government, low faith in government’s ability to manage vaccine production in light of its mismanagement of the crisis, and uncertainty about the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. The new normal is just muddling through.</p><h3><em>Why so fast? Covid vaccine development</em></h3><p>Bringing a vaccine to market typically takes <a href="https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-development-testing-and-regulation">ten to fifteen years</a>, which is why the timeline for COVID-19 vaccine development is all-the-more impressive. Not surprisingly, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/health/coronavirus-vaccine-trials-african-americans.html">worries have flared up</a> about the efficacy of vaccines that have been developed nearly ten times faster than normal.</p><p>According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), vaccine development can be broken up into <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/basics/test-approve.html">six stages</a>, including:</p><ol><li>Exploratory Stage;</li><li>Pre-clinical stage;</li><li>Clinical development;</li><li>Regulatory review and approval;</li><li>Manufacturing; and</li><li>Quality control.</li></ol><p>As Mitchell, Philipose, and Sanford relay in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK236428/#top"><em>The Children’s Vaccine Initiative: Achieving the Vision</em></a>, vaccine development stages are not so neatly divided in practice. Basic research, which is considered part of the exploratory stage, continues to inform the process of development even during clinical testing. Likewise, findings at the manufacturing and clinical stages feed observations and questions back to basic research.</p><p>Researchers had a massive head start on the Covid vaccine because the 2003 outbreak of SARS led to a surge in vaccine research. Covid is remarkably similar to SARS in that both have spike proteins, so <a href="https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/30/a-huge-experiment-how-the-world-made-so-much-progress-on-a-covid-19-vaccine-so-fast/">the research community</a> easily built on that prior work.</p><p>Development times have also been compressed because mRNA vaccines, a new type of vaccine, are being debuted. To elicit an immune response, most antigens deliver a dead or weakened version of the pathogen. <a href="https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/rounds/top-5-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-explained#:~:text=So%20an%20mRNA%20vaccine%20is,are%20delivering%20the%20instructions%20alone">An mRNA vaccine</a> bypasses this process and delivers the instructions directly to the cells to produce the antigen. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41541-020-0159-8">The mRNA method has important benefits</a>, namely that vaccines can be developed and manufactured <a href="https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005630">much faster</a> than the traditional method. Instead of the normal timeline of 2 to 4 years, the exploratory stages for both Pfizer and Moderna were completed in less than 10 weeks.</p><p>The second stage, known as the preclinical stage, can take anywhere from 1 to 2 years. In this stage, researchers will test for an immune response, explore safe dosages, and understand how to administer the vaccine by exposing the candidates to tissue-cultures, cell-cultures, or animals, such as mice and monkeys. Yet again, because of the experience with SARS and the inherent benefits of mRNA vaccine tech, promising vaccines quickly moved through the process.</p><p>After the preclinical stage, vaccines then undergo Phase I human trials, the first part of the clinical stage. Phase I focuses on the general safety of the vaccine, dosaging, and the response effect known as immunogenicity on a small population of health individuals. Candidate vaccines were ushered through Phase I trials at breakneck speed. Promising vaccines might <a href="https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2025111">take anywhere from 3 to 9 years</a> to get through the first stage of human trials, but the combination of new technology, prior experience, and worldwide demand pushed this down to <a href="https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2025111">6 months</a>.</p><p>If a candidate vaccine makes it through Phase I, the number of subjects is expanded for Phase II, and again safety, dosage, and immunogenicity is examined. Finally, in Stage III the trial’s total participant pool is expanded to understand safety. The table below dives into more details about each of the phases. Many COVID vaccines are somewhere around stages II and III, which can be tracked by <a href="https://covid-19tracker.milkeninstitute.org/#vaccines_intro">the Milken Institute</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/633/1*-mPc2S85Ed6GKQpbywY6FQ.png" /><figcaption>Sources: The number of subjects was calculated by the author from <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3551877/">a sample of previous vaccine trials</a>. Each purpose comes from <a href="https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-development-testing-and-regulation">The History of Vaccines</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic meant that human trials would progress quickly. Fundamentally, clinical trials test a hypothesis about vaccine efficacy, which is dubbed the primary efficacy endpoint. Once the primary endpoint is selected, a sample size can be calculated to ensure the trial is properly powered. For COVID-19 vaccines, researchers have been looking for a set number of infections.</p><p>A grisly calculus then ensues. As more of the population gets sick with the disease, the potential vaccine racks up more cases to reach its endpoint. In contrast, diseases that progress slower, like cancers, will be in clinical trials for years because it takes that long to reach the primary efficacy endpoint. The recent increase in COVID-19 cases advanced everyone’s timetable. <a href="https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Article/2020/11/19/A-big-week-for-mRNA-COVID-19-vaccines-Pfizer-Moderna-leap-forward">As one report noted</a>, Pfizer had expected to reach its 164 case efficacy point in December, but was in a position to release the data earlier because of the surge. As Pfizer CEO <a href="https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/1328792799861325824">Albert Bourla said</a>, “The election was always, for us, an artificial deadline. It may have been important for the president, but not for us.”</p><h3><em>Shifting the risk burden</em></h3><p>While the Trump Administration hasn’t been involved in moving timelines, it has been key in shifting cost burdens and eliminating uncertainty through <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/explaining-operation-warp-speed/index.html">Operation Warp Speed</a> (OWS), which is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Developing a vaccine and taking it through human trials isn’t cheap, and over time, these costs <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3551877/">have increased</a>. Companies limit their financial risk of drug development by spreading the costs over consecutive years and completing stages in sequence.</p><p>OWS has compressed the time to market by <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/explaining-operation-warp-speed/index.html">providing assistance at key points</a> in the development process to 14 promising drugs. Starting in March, the OWS program began doling out its $10 billion allocation to support research by a number of big name companies like:</p><ul><li>Johnson &amp; Johnson;</li><li>AstraZeneca–University of Oxford and Vaccitech;</li><li>Moderna;</li><li>Novavax Inc.;</li><li>Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc.;</li><li>Merck and IAVI;</li><li>Novavax; and</li><li>Sanofi and GlaxoSmithKline.</li></ul><p>OWS has also been working with these companies and others to start the manufacturing process at industrial scale well before the demonstration of vaccine efficacy and safety. This move is risky. If a vaccine that has already been mass-produced is deemed unsafe, it will be thrown out, resulting in a serious financial loss to the government.</p><p>Moreover, OWS has guaranteed that it will buy a set number of vaccines. Indeed, while Pfizer wasn’t involved in direct research assistance, they have entered into a contract with the government <a href="https://ca.news.yahoo.com/so-is-pfizer-part-of-operation-warp-speed-or-not-well-its-a-little-complicated-175429888.html?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9lbi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnLw&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAACGtT7sZjEjNdivxEPhQjaqZHsyVeM7evJaC_K2C5v9loM-Fq9kgtVCgoVderz6-YErduJBKbKhtUHVqNvfG2ThMMBCqfZgXTrBu7LukIaO5hqIhd5CdHmWfAPjwRDmqqTqWhejG3Xrvc3XvMN5ATAI1AGgVN0zRJL4Aev-vAKWX">for 100 million doses</a>. <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00646">One study of these purchase</a> agreements suggests that $110 billion in targeted funds will generate net benefits of $2.8 trillion, nearly double the baseline. All of these actions increase financial risk, which is shifted to the government, but not the product risk.</p><p>Beyond funding, OWS coordinated efforts to ensure that companies knew exactly what the FDA would need to give a vaccine the go ahead. In June, <a href="https://www.fda.gov/media/139638/download">the FDA released guidance</a> and said they were looking for at least 50 percent efficacy in drugs, with a lower bound of 30 percent. By way of comparison, flu vaccines average <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(11)70295-X/fulltext">around 67 percent effective</a>. Both Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech have blown this out of the water with 95 percent effectiveness. These results are incredibly heartening, since <a href="https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(20)30284-1/fulltext">80 percent effectiveness would</a> “largely extinguish an epidemic without any other measures (e.g., social distancing).”</p><h3><em>Conclusion</em></h3><p>Moving forward, leaders should work to dispel myths around COVID-19 vaccines. Safety and efficacy aren’t being sacrificed. Rather, the rapid pace of progress comes from innovations that have been in the works for decades backed by strategic investments by the government. While the United States is far from snuffing out this virus, the last year has shown that cooperation among private and public sector actors, especially in times of crisis, is the key to solving critical problems.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=771015f3c15e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/debunking-the-myths-surrounding-the-covid-19-vaccines-771015f3c15e">Debunking the myths surrounding the COVID-19 vaccines</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What you should know about the Google antitrust case]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/what-you-should-know-about-the-google-antitrust-case-1cc35db92595?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1cc35db92595</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[competition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2020 18:01:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-04T18:01:18.297Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Sku9gGNsfgpW-cfnWoPOyQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://www.pexels.com/@caio?utm_content=attributionCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=pexels">Caio</a> from <a href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/light-smartphone-macbook-mockup-67112/?utm_content=attributionCopyText&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_source=pexels">Pexels</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Department of Justice (DOJ) <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.223205/gov.uscourts.dcd.223205.1.0_1.pdf">has now filed</a> its long-awaited case against Google, taking aim at the company for its “anticompetitive tactics to maintain and extend its monopolies in the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising.” The primary focus of this case is narrower than expected, alleging that Google “entered into exclusionary agreements, including tying arrangements, and engaged in anticompetitive conduct to lock up distribution channels and block rivals.” This post explains the DOJ’s motivation for bringing a case against Google, the conspicuous gaps in the DOJ’s case, and then concludes with a look at what to expect.</p><h3><em>Basics of the case</em></h3><p>The real meat of <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.223205/gov.uscourts.dcd.223205.1.0_1.pdf">the complaint</a> begins on page 52 in paragraph 166, where the DOJ alleges, “Google has maintained unlawful monopolies in the general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising markets through its many exclusionary agreements.” In other words, the complaint primarily focuses on Google’s exclusionary market power, through which the DOJ claims Google has either deprived competitors of needed inputs and access to markets, or raised their competitors’ costs, negatively affecting competition in the long run.</p><p>The exclusionary market power at issue in the DOJ complaint originates from contracts that Google maintains across the software and hardware ecosystem. For example, Google contracts with Apple, ensuring that Google is the default search provider for iPhones and iPads. For Android device manufacturers, in return for the free use of the Android operating system and their app store, Google maintains the Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA). This ensures handset manufacturers don’t distribute devices powered by a non-standard version of Android. Google also manufacturers that are parties to the MADA the opportunity to enter into revenue sharing agreements (RSAs). Revenue sharing agreements also extend beyond handset manufacturers to both U.S. wireless carriers such as AT&amp;T, T-Mobile, Verizon, and browser developers such as Mozilla, Opera, and UCWeb.</p><p>Between its exclusionary contracts, its owned properties (the Android operating system), and its operated properties (the devices that have Google set as the default search engine), the DOJ alleges Google has “dominance in 80 percent of the general search queries in the United States” and “has thus foreclosed competition for internet search.” According to the DOJ, the result is that “competitors are denied vital distribution, scale, and product recognition — ensuring they have no real chance to challenge Google.”</p><h3><em>Allegation of harm</em></h3><p>In short, the DOJ is alleging that Google locked up a variety of players in the ecosystem to ensure that its product was the default for search, which made it difficult for consumers to exercise choice. As a result, this had the effect of stifling innovation.</p><p>The intuition is sound; there is a lot of evidence that defaults matter. Johnson and Goldstein first demonstrated the massive effect default choices had when comparing countries by their organ donation practices. In countries where organ donation was a default choice that required people to opt-out of, the total number of people giving organs was significantly higher than in countries whose default was an opt-in policy. A year later, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/380085?seq=1">Benartzi and Thaler</a> released results from the ‘Save More Tomorrow’ (SMarT) program, which used changes in defaults to increase employees’ savings rates. By shifting the default, they showed that the program was able to bump up the number of people saving from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent over the course of 40 months. This paper, and the research that came from it, was pivotal in securing the Nobel Prize for Richard Thaler, one of the authors.</p><p>However, shifting defaults doesn’t always mean people will stay with that choice. In one study, <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeeneeco/v_3a39_3ay_3a2013_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a128-134.htm">Brown et al</a> analyzed office employees’ reactions after researchers changed the default settings on office thermostats. The study showed that office employees who were more likely to adjust the office thermostat before the experiment were less likely to accept the research team’s default temperature. <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w16887/w16887.pdf">In a separate study</a> of the influence of defaults, a group of low-income participants had their tax refund automatically invested in U.S. Savings Bonds as the default, requiring those participants to take additional action to choose another allocation method like direct deposit. In this study, it was found that there was little difference in the saving behavior of a similarly situated study group who were not subject to the default investment and the study group who was. As the authors explained, strong preferences can overwhelm the effect of the default. As one review of the literature summarized, <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11215415/04_Willis%20FINAL%20print.pdf?sequence=1">defaults tend to be powerful</a> only when options are numerous, have complex attributes, or are difficult to distinguish. That isn’t the case for web search, especially on mobile devices where switching search engines only takes a couple of taps in the settings menu.</p><p>By going after Google for these exclusive contracts, the DOJ asserts that these deals pushed companies to bypass consumer choice and choose Google over another, better choice. In the absence of Google, the DOJ’s assertion begs the question: what would have been consumers’ choice if Google was not the default? While there isn’t a large body of recent research on the subject, consumer preference has historically favored Google over other search engines. One <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/lyclr26&amp;div=4&amp;id=&amp;page=">randomized experiment</a> in 2013 found that a majority of participants preferred Google search to Bing when presented with search results from both companies. Another study from 2013, conducted by <a href="https://www.wired.com/2011/02/bing-copies-google/">SurveyMonkey, examined the influence of name recognition </a>by switching the headers for Bing and Google search results. Again, in this study, consumer preference trended in favor of Google results.</p><p>The claim that these deals had a negative impact on innovation has a subtle suggestion, which might be called <em>the shadow problem of monopolization</em>. The DOJ is clear about the monopoly it aims to curb; there are too few search providers. But the shadow of this statement is just as important to consider. Since the monopoly is characterized as too few goods being produced in one sector, the implication is that there are too many goods being produced elsewhere. In this case, the DOJ wants to trade off the consumer surplus in handsets and Internet service for more choice in the search space.</p><p>Economists recognize that exclusive deals <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656635">can support competition</a>, and Google’s deals have been beneficial to consumers in other parts of the economy. Revenue sharing agreements likely reduced the cost of both Apple and Android handsets as well as wireless services, making <a href="https://pricetheory.substack.com/p/thank-you-google-for-subsidizing">them more affordable to consumers</a>. Google’s deal with Firefox is a <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/google-firefox-search-deal-gives-mozilla-more-money-to-push-privacy/#:~:text=The%20lion&#39;s%20share%20of%20Mozilla&#39;s,as%20Google%2C%20Yandex%20and%20Baidu.">major source of income for the browser</a>, which it uses to invest in better products and create<a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/google-firefox-search-deal-gives-mozilla-more-money-to-push-privacy/#:~:text=The%20lion&#39;s%20share%20of%20Mozilla&#39;s,as%20Google%2C%20Yandex%20and%20Baidu."> new privacy tools</a>. Cutting off these vital contracts would likely result in deep cuts for Firefox to the detriment of consumers, harming browser innovation globally in the long run.</p><p>Indeed, to see a glimpse into a world without these deals, one only needs to look at the European Union. After the European Commission (EC) forced Google to unbundle its search products and apps from the Android operating system, <a href="https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/10/google-to-charge-android-oems-as-much-as-40-per-phone-in-eu/">Google started charging manufacturers</a> anywhere from $2.50 to $40 per device for use of Google’s apps. Through the act of unbundling, the EC forced Google to make the value in the contract into an explicit cost because the bargained for deal was no longer allowed to happen. At the end of the day, consumers bear the burden of these decisions.</p><h3><em>Some oddities of the case and what’s next</em></h3><p>What’s most striking about this complaint is its limited scope. The DOJ didn’t go after Google for their display ads, their presence in the ad tech industry, their Ad Mob/DoubleClick mergers, or self-preferencing in search, even though <a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf">the recent report</a> from the House Antitrust Subcommittee calls out each of these areas for closer scrutiny. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/us/politics/google-antitrust-justice-department.html?smid=tw-share">If reports are true</a>, this case might just be the first salvo. Countless states investigating the company declined to join the DOJ in the complaint, suggesting these states are holding out to bring their own, more expansive case against Google in the near future, probably <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-antitrust-google-states/seven-states-may-sue-google-in-coming-weeks-ny-ag-idUSKBN275225?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTTJFeVkySmxPVEJrTURkaCIsInQiOiJjWHUzMGJTY3h2UCtnczJxSnJocHVzNU1hM1R1WUZGdDZTcG02WDJZVnBOekR1KzdXV2N2c25HNTFDQVh5Z0YxNnFFaDZuRnkxM1pjZEdEdkNDQ0N0WmlqV25jK1NEVlExTlc0Qk9FSTRUWW5RYVwvS1hSUjlwMjQ1RWc2S0I1R2MifQ%3D%3D">in the coming weeks</a>.</p><p>What’s more, even if Google’s exclusive deals with other companies are broken up, this could actually be a boon for Google. <a href="https://www.aei.org/pethokoukis/some-thoughts-on-washingtons-war-against-google/">As JPMorgan explained</a> in a new research note:</p><blockquote>Ironically, if the court were to prevent Google from entering into agreements w/distributors &amp; consumers were presented with the option to choose their preferred search provider, we believe Google would maintain its search dominance w/o needing to pay TAC [traffic acquisition costs], making the company far more profitable than it is today.</blockquote><p>There are a lot of missing pieces to the DOJ’s complaint that will need to be uncovered in court. Chief among those missing pieces is what extent the DOJ believes Google’s deals have been detrimental to consumers, a piece that received little substantive discussion in the DOJ’s 194 paragraph complaint. If this case really is in consumers’ interest, the DOJ has a long way to go toward supporting their claims.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1cc35db92595" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/what-you-should-know-about-the-google-antitrust-case-1cc35db92595">What you should know about the Google antitrust case</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The curious case of Romanian broadband]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/the-curious-case-of-romanian-broadband-c58291b2fcda?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c58291b2fcda</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[broadband]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2020 20:48:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-15T20:48:41.942Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/0*P3twe58YcUKBBLso" /><figcaption><a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/66/Electric_wires_Cluj-Napoca.jpg/576px-Electric_wires_Cluj-Napoca.jpg">Source</a></figcaption></figure><p>Photographers often lament taking pictures in Romania. Taking a clear photo of centuries-old homes and city centers is difficult because of the wires. Everywhere they are strung, breaking up the views.</p><p>Part of the reason for these dense nests of wires comes as a result of Romania’s wired broadband networks, which had their genesis in the apartments of Bucharest. Even before the commercial Internet came to the country in the late 1990s, computers were common in the apartment complexes in the capital city. Back then, people would network themselves together into large <a href="https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/L/local_area_network_LAN.html#:~:text=A%20local%2Darea%20network%20(LAN,telephone%20lines%20and%20radio%20waves.">local area networks</a> to play games, watch movies, and share music. These small networks are now known as reţea de bloc or reţea de cartier, which translates to block networks or neighborhood networks.</p><p>Truth be told, these early networks were fueled by rampant <a href="https://np.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/2ct58s/average_internet_speed_in_eu_by_country/cjiyt5n/?context=3">pirate content</a>. They sprang up because the government did little to stop neighborhoods from wiring themselves together. Most cities require underground infrastructure, which is expensive to approve, build, and maintain. But the Bucharest neighborhood networks never went through regulatory approval processes. Due to salutary neglect, aerial connections proliferated in Romania, giving rise to the poles with wire nests. As even the International Telecommunications Union <a href="http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/broadband/BB_MDG_Romania_BBCOM.pdf">noted</a>, “Often, aerial fibre is deployed in areas where [underground] duct-based network roll-out is mandatory.” Even though the law often required underground deployment, neighborhood networks would use poles to wire their community.</p><p>Despite the drawbacks, the regulatory leniency also had its benefits. When the commercial Internet started to take hold in the late 1990s, it piggybacked off of these local small Internet service providers to create superfast networks. Simultaneously, Romania lacked a robust telephone market, and so instead of upgrading telephone services through DSL, Romanians jumped directly into fiber through these neighborhood networks.</p><p>By the early part of the 2010s, it became clear that Romania had something special going on. A <a href="https://foxnomad.com/2012/03/15/why-is-the-internet-in-romania-so-damn-fast/">travel blog in 2012</a> commented,</p><blockquote>Romania, and Bucharest specifically, is something of a travel blogger’s digital fantasy come true. Walk down most streets, stop on any corner, whip out your smart phone and more often than not you’ll find a wireless connection. That’s open. No password required; generally because a commodity as common as an Internet connection here isn’t worth stealing.</blockquote><p>The early start endures today. As of the latest rankings in August 2020, Romania placed <a href="https://www.speedtest.net/global-index#fixed">third in the world</a> for fastest wired broadband, just behind dense, urban regions like Singapore and Hong Kong. Even though the country isn’t especially dense or wealthy, Romanian broadband remains a standout.</p><p>Of course, this story about broadband excellence has its limits. Importantly, while the cities continue to experience fast wired, rural areas still struggle with broadband. As for <a href="https://www.speedtest.net/global-index#mobile">mobile broadband</a>, the speeds are hardly of note; the country ranks in the middle of the pack.</p><p>Still, Romania’s wired broadband experiment foregrounds a key lesson on the possibilities of network development. The country shows what could happen with reduced restrictions for wired infrastructure. Networks could quickly pop up organically as dictated by current demand. This stands in sharp contrast to places like many U.S. cities where regulatory approval serves as a steep barrier to entry and deployment.</p><p>Stephen Milton, who helped to design and build the Gigabit Now service in Sea Ranch, California <a href="https://docplayer.net/65178842-Get-connected-at-the-summit.html">explained that his company</a> had to obtain permission from 23 separate local, county, and federal granting agencies to get the new project up and running. Broadband provider Sacred Wind out of New Mexico wrote in <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191120202800/https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7021712146.pdf">a filing to the FCC</a> that an application involving one landowner and one authorizing jurisdiction commonly takes 2–4 years to complete, while something more complex, that involves more than one piece of land spanning multiple authorizing jurisdictions, can take anywhere from 4–8 years to complete. Slow response times translate into delays and adoption lags.</p><p>In some cities, it is even more dire. On <a href="https://gimletmedia.com/shows/reply-all/39hz8w">the podcast Reply-All</a>, host PJ Vogt dug into the issue and was shocked to discover how extensive the problem is,</p><blockquote>Ray, who is a Verizon spokesperson, still can’t actually can’t get Fios in his own Hell’s Kitchen apartment. And he says that’s because in Manhattan there are neighborhoods where you just can’t run cables on telephone poles. There’s no telephone poles outside and so you might have to string them from apartment building to apartment building. So even if your landlord is fine with having Fios you still might need permission from the landlord of the guy next door. Ray says it can get really complicated.</blockquote><p>Fast regulatory approvals aren’t going to solve all of our broadband ills, but, as the contrast with Romania’s laissez-faire approach to communications infrastructure shows, they are a major component of a better infrastructure regime. As cities and states consider reforms of broadband to deal with the pandemic, ensuring that approvals are timely should be at the top of the list.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c58291b2fcda" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/the-curious-case-of-romanian-broadband-c58291b2fcda">The curious case of Romanian broadband</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is data nonrivalrous?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/is-data-nonrivalrous-f1c8e720820b?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f1c8e720820b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2020 17:55:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-14T17:55:06.029Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H6lNg9EiyHQSetGC_Vf8rQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@campaign_creators?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Campaign Creators</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>A recent paper published in the <em>American Economic Review</em> has reignited interest in data property rights. In “<a href="https://christophertonetti.com/files/papers/JonesTonetti_DataNonrivalry.pdf">Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data,</a>” economists Charles I. Jones and Christopher Tonetti generate insights on data property regimes by beginning first with a simple model of data. After articulating the idea within a model of the economy, the authors can conclude, “Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal.” These conclusions hinge on how the authors define both data and rivalry.</p><p>Jones and Tonetti are upfront in their goals in that the “paper develops a theoretical framework to study the economics of data.” Continuing, they write, “the starting point for our analysis is the observation that data is nonrival. That is, at a technological level, data is infinitely usable.”</p><p>The concept of rivalrous goods was first laid out by Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom in a book <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338473118_Public_Goods_and_Public_Choices">chapter titled</a>, “Public Goods and Public Choices.” Previous to this work, economists like Samuelson and Musgrave emphasized exclusion. Where individuals could be excluded from using a good, those goods were considered private goods, while everything else was considered a public good. Radio and TV stations were the classic examples used to understand these public goods.</p><p>The Ostroms added another dimension to public goods by introducing the concept of subtractability. Now often referred to as rivalry, subtractability describes goods where one person’s use subtracts from or prevents the use of that good by another. The following two by two square that resulted from the Ostrom’s work is a common method of understanding goods today.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*8Kc2cqBA4o-8_4DG" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://livingeconomics.org/article.asp?docId=239">Living Economics</a></figcaption></figure><p>The ultimate aim of the Ostroms was to cleave public goods into two parts to study their differences. Non-rivalrous public goods like over-the-air TV were bifurcated from their rivalrous common pool counterparts like fisheries and access to water supplies. Elinor Ostrom ultimately received the Nobel in economics for her subsequent work on the governance of common pool resources.</p><p>The concept of rivalry has been foundational to information economics, but there are still problems in translation. While the Ostroms used the concept as an organizing principle, Jones and Tonetti built the idea into the core of their economic world. First, they make a distinction between information and data:</p><blockquote>Following Romer (1990), an <em>idea</em> is a piece of information that is a set of instructions for making an economic good, which may include other ideas. <em>Data</em> denotes the remaining forms of information. It includes things like driving data, medical records, and location data that are not themselves instructions for making a good but that may still be useful in the production process, including in producing new ideas. An idea is a production function whereas data is a factor of production.</blockquote><p>More data eventually leads to productive ideas, which is captured in the production of a firm. The relationship between information and data is key since Jones and Tonetti’s model has a novel addition that allows for firms to incorporate data from other sources to increase their own productivity. As they explain it, “Tesla learns from the customers of Uber and Waymo as well as from its own customers. In this case, there is an additional scale effect: the more firms there are in the economy, the more data is created, so the more Tesla is able to learn, which raises Tesla’s productivity.”</p><p>However, the model falls apart if there is no scale effect associated with this transferred data, such that “each firm learns only from its own consumers.” To continue the example offered in the paper, Tesla’s data structure might be built in such a unique way that data from Uber and Waymo are simply not useful. If this were the case, then this term in their model would hit zero and make the entire function undefined.</p><p>Taken as a whole, Jones and Tonetti claim to be modeling nonrivalry in data, but they are actually modeling the specificity of data. As economist Benjamin Klein <a href="http://masonlec.org/site/files/2012/05/WrightBaye_klein-b-asset-specificity-and-holdups.pdf">defined the term</a>, specific assets are assets that have a significantly higher value within a particular transacting relationship like a company than outside the relationship. For Jones and Tonetti, data is understood to be a radically non-specific asset where massive data sets easily yield more output. This model primitive is important. If firms are unlikely to learn productive insights from the data of others, then “there is no scale effect associated with data” and policy regimes to expand data access through property rights would be nullified.</p><p>In practice, data doesn’t transfer easily. In <a href="https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/engelberg/pubs/2019-11-06-Data-Portability-And-Platform-Competition">one of the few surveys</a> on this topic, Gabriel Nicholas and Michael Weinberg at the NYU School of Law asked a range of people, from junior engineers to serial C-level executives, how they would use exported Facebook data to build new products to compete with the company. In summarizing their findings, they wrote, “trying to use exported user data to reproduce Facebook would be like trying to use furniture to reproduce the office building it came from.” Nicholas and Weinberg continue, “Ported data is simultaneously insufficient to replicate Facebook and too tailored to Facebook to be useful for much else.”</p><p>The bankruptcy proceedings for Caesars Entertainment, a subsidiary of the larger casino company, offers another example of asset specificity in data. As the assets were being priced in the selloff, the Total Rewards customer loyalty program got valued by assessors at nearly $1 billion, making it “the most valuable asset in the bitter bankruptcy feud at Caesars Entertainment Corp.” But the ombudsman’s report understood that it would be a tough sell because of the difficulties in incorporating it into another company’s loyalty program. Although it was Caesars’ most valuable asset, its worth to an outside party remained an open question.</p><p>Again undercutting the Jones and Tonetti model, there are many cases where firms are unable to transition to a production process that incorporates advanced data analytics. As I noted in a <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/tracing-the-impact-of-automation-on-workers-and-firms-79e12bb65343">previous Benchmark</a> post,</p><blockquote>Firms struggle to keep up because it is costly to transition to new production processes that use robotics or insights derived from advanced data analytics. These switchover costs can sometimes be insurmountable. <a href="https://www.protiviti.com/US-en/insights/aiml">Survey</a> after <a href="https://www.ironmountain.com/resources/landing-pages/p/pwc.aspx">survey</a> finds that technology upgrade projects offer businesses little or no advantage. Surveying a wide range of these reports, <a href="https://ibmsystemsmag.com/Power-Systems/2/2012/7-reasons-it-projects-fail">IBM found</a> that 25 percent of technology projects fail outright, while another 20 to 25 percent don’t show any return on investment, with the final 50 percent needing massive reworking before being finished.</blockquote><p>For many firms, then, there is no scale effect with data. Many companies today aren’t even capable of incorporating insights from their own data, let alone another company. A more permissive data-sharing regime won’t do much to solve this endemic hurdle.</p><p>This paper from Jones and Tonetti exemplifies the cutting edge of economic research in information. Like all research, however, it needs contextualization. The way data rivalry is defined and is then made into a model fails to capture the complexity of the real world. As such, attentive readers should be skeptical of the authors’ policy prescriptions. Data transferability is complex and public policy proposals need to take into account that complexity by avoiding simple models of a complex world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f1c8e720820b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/is-data-nonrivalrous-f1c8e720820b">Is data nonrivalrous?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tracing the impact of automation on workers and firms]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/tracing-the-impact-of-automation-on-workers-and-firms-79e12bb65343?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/79e12bb65343</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[automation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2020 16:29:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-14T16:29:13.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JSFybJd2cQtjGyGJPWYSkw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@franckinjapan?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Franck V.</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/s/photos/robot-factory?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Policymakers worry about the impact on workers from robots and other automation techniques. COVID-19 has <a href="https://time.com/5876604/machines-jobs-coronavirus/">pushed</a> many companies to consider automating or embracing robots for public health. Workers worry that after the pandemic, they’ll find a robot in their place. Those fears are overblown. After all, it took a global pandemic for many companies to embrace automation.</p><p>Fears about losing jobs are realistic in some industries. Vending machines, electronic toll booths are just two forms of everyday automation. However, the data don’t support the broad strokes of a fearful story. Instead, automation will be a slow process in many sectors. If automation were replacing workers, companies would be investing more in these technologies, resulting in higher output from fewer people. Instead, productivity data is uneven. Firms are reluctant to change, and only some industries seem to be affected by robotics or other automation methods.</p><p>The most dire stories about a job apocalypse are hard to find, even though there are some occupations affected by robotics and automation. Still, everyone would benefit from better knowledge. The Census seems poised to help answer many of the tough questions when they release a new series of new datasets later this year that will detail the levels of automation in significant industries. The following post reviews the data as it stands now, detailing productivity across firms and how industries change after automation.</p><h3><em>Productivity across firms</em></h3><p>If automation were on the horizon, businesses should be investing in these labor-saving technologies, which would be present in business investment surveys. But business investment has plateaued. As the graph below helps to illustrate, domestic investment in the private sector has been below the peaks in the early 2000s.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*4iiJgyKNbspyrKOl" /></figure><p>Second, the official numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on productivity are hardly enthusiastic. From 2007 to 2019, the economy’s productivity grew by the second slowest rate since these statistics were first collected. <a href="https://www.bls.gov/lpc/prodybar.htm">The table below</a> puts this into perspective.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/681/0*mYt4x9cED8rvdsS1" /></figure><p>The slow aggregate numbers do hide variation within industries. Some firms have gotten much more productive. As<a href="http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/Frontier-Firms-Technology-Diffusion-and-Public-Policy-Micro-Evidence-from-OECD-Countries.pdf"> the OECD calls them</a>, frontier firms have taken off <a href="http://repec.iza.org/dp7991.pdf">all across the world, including</a> the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Union. These companies exist across the economy in retail, manufacturing, mining, services, telecommunications, and the information sector. Productivity growth is sluggish because all of the <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/27/150728/it-pays-to-be-smart/">other firms aren’t keeping up</a>.</p><h3><em>The impact of automation and switchover costs</em></h3><p>Although some firms have gotten more productive, automation techniques are unevenly adopted across industries. The classic example of robots working in manufacturing underscores this point. From 2004 to 2013, there was virtually no change in the level of robotization in non-metallic mineral products like ceramic and glass. But, the automotive industry, which was already heavily reliant on robots, <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/robots-and-rise-european-superstar-manufacturers">experienced a spectacular rise</a> in the robot density between 2004 and 2013.</p><p>Understanding the impact of robots and other automation technologies will require analysis of every industry. In particular, it’s usually larger firms that can afford the costs of automating their processes. <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/robots-and-rise-european-superstar-manufacturers">As the authors</a> of a report on Europe’s superstar manufacturers explain,</p><p>A firm will invest in productivity-enhancing technology, such as industrial robots when the expected gains from a reduction in marginal costs are greater than the fixed costs of adoption. Since large firms with higher output and sales tend to benefit more, they might be more willing to incur the fixed costs of investment.</p><p><a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Does-Technology-Substitute-for-Nurses-Staffing-in-Lu-Rui/04b0d280b9e9fb4953f7b7d7d7c0a152a34c598f">Research into nursing homes</a>, for example, found that automation technologies decreased the staffing levels by 5.8 percent in high-end nursing homes. In comparison, low-end homes saw an increase in staffing by 7.6 percent. As the authors of the study pointed out, “these findings suggest that the impact of automation technology on staffing decisions depends crucially on a facility’s strategic position in the local marketplace.”</p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3328877">Studies of one specific Dutch company</a> undergoing automation found a range of complex impacts. Overall, workers were more likely to separate from the firm and see a decrease in days worked, leading to lower wage incomes, but the overall wage rate didn’t change. These lost wage earnings were only partially offset by various benefits systems, but the lost earnings were disproportionately borne by older workers and workers with longer firm tenure.</p><p>Meanwhile, a large study of <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/aah/aarhec/2019-05.html">Spanish manufacturing firms</a> found that more productive firms were more likely to adopt robots, leading to substantial output gains over time. While these frontier firms increased their worker numbers, at the same time, the report found “substantial job losses in firms that do not adopt robots, and a productivity-enhancing reallocation of labor across firms, away from non-adopters, and toward adopters.”</p><p>Firms struggle to keep up because it is costly to transition to new production processes that use robotics or insights derived from advanced data analytics. These switchover costs can sometimes be insurmountable. <a href="https://www.protiviti.com/US-en/insights/aiml">Survey</a> after <a href="https://www.ironmountain.com/resources/landing-pages/p/pwc.aspx">survey</a> finds that technology upgrade projects offer businesses little or no advantage. Surveying a wide range of these reports, <a href="https://ibmsystemsmag.com/Power-Systems/2/2012/7-reasons-it-projects-fail">IBM found</a> that 25 percent of technology projects fail outright, while another 20 to 25 percent don’t show any return on investment, with the final 50 percent needing massive reworking before being finished.</p><p>Competitors might influence a company’s willingness to adopt an automation technology, but these changes are minor when compared across industries. As Ryan Avent described it, “It is complicated to figure out how to get these systems working and operating in a way that generates profits. While labor is cheap, firms face little pressure to make those massive investments in intangible capital in order to automate key processes.” The disruption created by COVID might create a new crucible whereby companies experiment with new tech. As policy continues to respond to this crisis, leaders would benefit from knowing what is changing in real-time.</p><h3><em>Conclusion</em></h3><p>Importantly, the wheels are already in motion to better understand these changes. <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-257">After being prodded</a> by the Government Accountability Office in 2019, the Department of Labor began working with the Census Bureau to create a new set of stats to better understand how the workplace is affected by technological changes like automation and AI. Once the first of these reports are released next month, leaders will have their first look into this important part of the economy.</p><p>These datasets will give policymakers a baseline to understand how organizations and firms use robotics and other advanced automation techniques. Automation is an area that has been bereft of clear stats but is teeming with questions. Armed with information by Census, leaders will be able to craft appropriate responses.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=79e12bb65343" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/tracing-the-impact-of-automation-on-workers-and-firms-79e12bb65343">Tracing the impact of automation on workers and firms</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What can we expect at the tech antitrust hearing, an FAQ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/what-can-we-expect-at-the-tech-antitrust-hearing-an-faq-b17451bf7641?source=rss-b7ce404578ba------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b17451bf7641</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Rinehart]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2020 15:39:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-29T16:17:32.018Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uVlzucQeK1Mn4aM3NWF8lQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jhonkasalo?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Joakim Honkasalo</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/s/photos/congress?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>CEOs from Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple are set to appear before the House Antitrust Subcommittee today <a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3114">to discuss competition</a> on their platforms. This hearing will vary dramatically in the key questions and policy remedies posed to each company. The following FAQ helps cut through the noise.</p><h3><em>Why is the Antitrust Subcommittee hauling in these tech CEOs?</em></h3><p><a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3114">In a joint statement</a>, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jerrold Nadler and Antitrust Subcommittee Chairman David Cicilline explained the purpose of this hearing,</p><blockquote>Since last June, the Subcommittee has been investigating the dominance of a small number of digital platforms and the adequacy of existing antitrust laws and enforcement. Given the central role these corporations play in the lives of the American people, it is critical that their CEOs are forthcoming. As we have said from the start, their testimony is essential for us to complete this investigation.</blockquote><p>Each of the four companies face dramatically different competitive concerns. Facebook will likely be grilled over its acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram, <a href="https://www.axios.com/dcs-assault-on-tech-crest-ceo-hearing-92dd16fb-7f2f-4887-8943-24eb461788a6.html">as well as efforts</a> “by Facebook to cut off companies from its social graph.” Google is under investigation by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-doj/u-s-state-attorneys-general-likely-to-bring-antitrust-lawsuits-against-google-source-idUSKBN22R37I">a group of state attorneys general</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/google-anti-trust-justice-261434">the Department of Justice</a> (DOJ) for its ad business. Amazon’s Jeff Bezos will be questioned on a <a href="https://link.axios.com/click/20979002.73765/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cud3NqLmNvbS9hcnRpY2xlcy9hbWF6b24tc2Nvb3BlZC11cC1kYXRhLWZyb20taXRzLW93bi1zZWxsZXJzLXRvLWxhdW5jaC1jb21wZXRpbmctcHJvZHVjdHMtMTE1ODc2NTAwMTU_dXRtX3NvdXJjZT1uZXdzbGV0dGVyJnV0bV9tZWRpdW09ZW1haWwmdXRtX2NhbXBhaWduPW5ld3NsZXR0ZXJfYXhpb3Nsb2dpbiZzdHJlYW09dG9w/5eb46a98bf00815ced141c14B9bebf1ac">Wall Street Journal report</a> that suggested employees could access third-party seller data. However, the company said that its teams were restricted from it. Finally, Apple will be interrogated about the commission it charges for the app store.</p><h3><em>What are the worries about Facebook’s mergers?</em></h3><p>When Mark Zuckerberg last faced congressional scrutiny, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/read-sen-grahams-blistering-line-of-questioning-for-mark-zuckerberg.html">the toughest questions</a> came from Senator Lindsey Graham, who wondered, “Car companies face a lot of competition: they make a defective car, it gets out in the world, they stop buying that car and buy another one. Is there an alternative to Facebook in the private sector?” Implicit in the Senator’s line of questioning was the 2012 <a href="https://www.vox.com/2017/4/9/15235940/facebook-instagram-acquisition-anniversary">acquisition of Instagram</a> by Facebook, as well as the company’s <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/032515/whatsapp-best-facebook-purchase-ever.asp">buyout of WhatsApp in 2014</a> that seemed to have taken out two competitors.</p><p>Competition in digital markets differs from standard logic. Importantly, there aren’t prices on the content side of the market, which allows users to sign up for many different platforms, a tendency known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multihoming">multihoming</a>. In the attention economy, exiting the service becomes a strong signal of consumer choice. Since the Cambridge Analytica story broke, <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/6/18253274/facebook-users-decline-15-million-people-united-states-privacy-scandals">roughly 15 million</a> people have left Facebook and those that have stayed on spend four fewer minutes per day on the site. <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/consumers-value-facebook-to-the-tune-of-1-trillion-each-year-48c2ecb8bdee">CGO estimates suggest</a> that consumers have taken back nearly $200 billion of their time.</p><h3><em>Should Facebook be broken up?</em></h3><p>To remedy a perceived lack of competition in social media, some have suggested breaking up Facebook, but this would be the wrong move. In <a href="http://ide.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Multi-Sided%20Platform%20Strategy,%20Taxation%20and%20Regulation%20October%202019.pdf">one of the few papers</a> that modeled a breakup of Facebook, consumer surplus dropped by 44 percent. For regulators, a breakup would be a logistical nightmare. <a href="https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/breaking-up-tech-means-breaking-up-technology-and-teams/">As I explained in another context</a>,</p><blockquote>Any trust-busting action would also require breaking up the company’s technology stack — a general name for the suite of technologies powering web sites. For example, <a href="http://malteschwarzkopf.de/research/assets/facebook-stack.pdf">Facebook developed its technology stack</a> in-house to address the unique problems facing Facebook’s vast troves of data. Facebook <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/bigpipe-pipelining-web-pages-for-high-performance/389414033919/">created BigPipe</a> to dynamically serve pages faster, Haystack to store billions of photos efficiently, Unicorn for <a href="https://research.fb.com/publications/unicorn-a-system-for-searching-the-social-graph/">searching the social graph</a>, TAO <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/tao-the-power-of-the-graph/10151525983993920/">for storing graph information</a>, <a href="https://code.facebook.com/posts/192453007596052/under-the-hood-scheduling-mapreduce-jobs-more-efficiently-with-corona/">Peregrine for querying,</a> and MysteryMachine <a href="https://muratbuffalo.blogspot.com/2015/03/the-mystery-machine-end-to-end.html">to help with end-to-end performance analysis</a>. The company also <a href="http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/data-center-faqs/facebook-data-center-faq">invested billions in</a> data centers to quickly deliver video, and it <a href="https://thenextweb.com/facebook/2017/09/22/microsoft-and-facebook-just-laid-a-160tbps-undersea-cable-17000-feet-deep/">split the cost</a> of an undersea cable with Microsoft to speed up information travel. Where do you cut these technologies when splitting up the company?</blockquote><p><a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/23/20926792/facebook-access-act-interoperability-data-portability-warner-hawley-bill-explainer">A less stringent option</a> would force Facebook to allow consumers to export all of their data. While Facebook does allow for information to be exported currently, it is thought that a more expansive policy would yield more competition in social media. However, engineers working in this segment of the industry are far more skeptical of the idea, <a href="https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/engelberg/pubs/2019-11-06-Data-Portability-And-Platform-Competition">telling researchers that</a>, “Ported data is simultaneously insufficient to replicate Facebook and too tailored to Facebook to be useful for much else.” Regulatory proposals aiming to split up tech assets share a common flaw in assuming that they can easily be adapted for other uses or by competitors, which is simply not the case.</p><h3><em>What are the concerns with Google’s ad business?</em></h3><p>Spurred by ongoing investigations by state attorneys general and the DOJ, Google CEO Sundar Pichai will be in the hot seat today for his company’s advertising business. But, by a number of common measures, online advertising actually looks quite competitive. Ad prices have seen a dramatic drop <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU365">in the past decade</a>, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and are now nearly half their 2009 level. Amazon is eating into the online ad shares of both Google and Facebook and is projected to be <a href="https://www.emarketer.com/content/amazon-advertising-2019">about 10 percent</a> of the total market next year. Additionally, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/08/tiktok-opens-up-self-serve-ad-platform-gives-ad-credits-to-smbs.html">just this month</a>, TikTok opened up advertising to the United States. On its face, then, the market doesn’t show clear signs of a problem.</p><h3><em>Should Google’s mergers be reversed?</em></h3><p>Some have suggested that Google should be forced to spin off its acquisition of DoubleClick and AdMob. Policymakers should be careful when trying to translate lessons from a previous era of antitrust onto digital markets because information exhibits unique qualities. Concentration in the ad market, for example, gives ad buyers better information, allowing for more efficient targeting of keywords. In other words, concentration seems to have <a href="http://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f112403.pdf">a negative effect</a> on the search engine’s revenues, which would be reversed if ad tech deals were undone.</p><p>Another flawed move would simply stop all further acquisitions by the company. Not only would this sidestep the critical work of merger review at the DOJ and the FTC, but this kind of rule also misconstrues the purposes of mergers and acquisitions. Most deals aren’t consummated to stop competitors, but to buy innovative ideas and talent, which has the end effect of being pro-consumer. <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/welcome-to-the-kill-zone-852339601fbb">As a previous CGO report noted</a>,</p><blockquote>Google’s acquisition of Android in 2005 serves as one example. Today, the deal seems like a smart move, but at the time Eric Schmidt was <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2012/4/24/2970872/live-eric-schmidt-testimony-oracle-google-trial">uncertain where the company</a> would fit into Google. He was skeptical of the purchase which was orchestrated by Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Both Page and Brin had a vision for mobile and acquired Android, which had no viable product in 2005 and put Android’s Andy Rubin and Rich Miner at key places within the company. With Google’s resources on its side and the talent gained in the deal, Android launched and has since become the largest mobile operating system, a clear win for consumers.</blockquote><h3><em>Is Amazon a dominant retail platform?</em></h3><p>In April, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-sellers-to-launch-competing-products-11587650015">the Wall Street Journal broke the news</a> that executives of the retail company had violated company rules regarding data usage. According to the report, executives allowed teams to access private data from third-party sellers on the site to build competing products. What is less clear is how extensive the practice is, since company representatives told Congress that safeguards were in place to prevent such a thing from happening.</p><p>Amazon will also be questioned over its market share in online retailing. <a href="https://www.emarketer.com/content/amazon-remains-the-undisputed-no-1">eMarketer estimates</a> that the online retailer will capture about 39 percent of all e-commerce sales this year. But market definitions matter, and if the broader retail market is included, not just online sales, then that share drops precipitously to <a href="https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2019/12/amazons-market-share19">about 6 percent</a>. While Amazon is projected to grow in the upcoming years, the online retail market is far from being static. The Canadian company Shopify burst into broader recognition this year, driven by a stellar year in 2019 and <a href="https://marker.medium.com/first-shopify-saved-main-street-next-stop-taking-on-amazon-7035620d19b8">continued growth</a> as brick and mortar stores have moved payments online in response to COVID.</p><h3><em>Should Amazon be regulated like a public utility?</em></h3><p>Last year, Senator Elizabeth Warren <a href="https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c">laid out a plan</a> to regulate Amazon through platform utility regulation. If this policy were enacted, companies with annual global revenue of $25 billion or higher that provide an online marketplace, an exchange, or a platform would be broken up. At the same time, all similar businesses, regardless of size, would be subject to a new series of regulations.</p><p>This proposal, and others like it, will spark years of litigation. <a href="https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/four-reasons-why-senator-warrens-public-utility-proposal-will-backfire/">As I noted before</a>,</p><blockquote>[A]ll platforms would be required to engage in “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing with users,” swinging open the door to regulation. Because these terms are hard to define, an agency would need to be given wide latitude, much like the amorphous public-interest standard at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). As former FCC Commissioner <a href="https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1168&amp;context=fclj&amp;sei-redir=1&amp;referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dpublic%2Binterest%2Bmandate%26btnG%3D%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%252C9#search=%22public%20interest%20mandate%22">Glen Robinson explained</a>, this standard “is vague to the point of vacuousness, providing neither guidance nor constraint on the agency’s action.” Something similar would be expected for platform regulation under this proposal.</blockquote><h3><em>Is Apple’s pricing on the App Store of concern?</em></h3><p>While Apple is nominally a tech company, the Antitrust Subcommittee seems to be interested in understanding if the current pricing model, which assesses a 30 percent commission for specific kinds of apps, is harming competition. Confusion abounds over this system because countless apps are simply not included in the commission schedule. Free apps and apps that use advertising aren’t included, which includes Google, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, as well as some users of Pandora and Spotify. Apps that are considered “readers” are also not subject to the pricing scheme. Readers are defined as those apps where users purchase or subscribe to content through a source outside of the app, but consume it through an Apple product. This category includes many users of Spotify in addition to Netflix and Kindle.</p><p><a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/10/16/does-apples-discrimination-against-rival-apps-in-the-app-store-harm-consumers/">As legal scholar Ben Sperry explained</a>, apps that have the 30 percent commission are relatively limited. This list includes:</p><ul><li>paid apps, which covers countless games;</li><li>free apps with in-app purchases;</li><li>free apps with digital subscriptions like Pandora, Hulu, and some select Spotify users; and</li><li>cross-platform apps, such as Dropbox, Hulu, and Minecraft, which allow for digital goods and services to be purchased in-app, although the commission is limited to Apple products.</li></ul><h3><em>Should Apple be forced to change its commission rate?</em></h3><p>While Spotify has been particularly outspoken in its opposition to Apple’s pricing practices, the 30 percent cut is an industry standard. Amazon’s Appstore, Google’s PlayStore, and the Microsoft Store <a href="https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/insights/publishing/apples_app_store_and_other_digital_marketplaces_a_comparison_of_commission_rates.pdf?source=email">all take 30 percent</a>. Most of the large gaming platforms follow this breakdown as well. The Playstation Store, XBox Games Store, Nintendo eShop, Steam, and Epic Games Store all <a href="https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/10/07/report-steams-30-cut-is-actually-the-industry-standard">split the revenue 70–30</a>. In other words, Apple’s inclusion in this subcommittee hearing, given what has been reported thus far, seems misplaced.</p><h3><em>What’s next for the Antitrust Subcommittee?</em></h3><p>Today’s hearing will surely include much more than the intended topic of platform competition. But representatives should stay the course and keep themselves from straying into privacy issues and speech concerns. While tech companies need to be held accountable when they harm consumers, this hearing should be used for its intended purpose, to answer lingering questions that would help close the investigation and issue the committee report.</p><p>While this report is sure to include suggested legislative changes, members of Congress need to be careful. As I cautioned in an <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/488771-changing-antitrust-rules-will-cause-confusion">op-ed that appeared in The Hill</a> in March,</p><blockquote>[T]he FTC and the Department of Justice are investigating the biggest names in tech, including Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook. We should wait until these investigations have run their course. Only then will we know if the laudable intentions behind this recent reform proposal will actually tackle the problem.</blockquote><p>That game plan is still the best one.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b17451bf7641" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/what-can-we-expect-at-the-tech-antitrust-hearing-an-faq-b17451bf7641">What can we expect at the tech antitrust hearing, an FAQ</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark">The Benchmark</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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