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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Will Sarvis on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ad Hominem and Related Beasts]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/ad-hominem-and-related-beasts-8fa8caa79643?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[arguments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ad-personam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[debate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ad-hominem]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 19:09:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T19:09:36.526Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Multifaceted Vices and Unavoidable Necessities</strong></p><p>Translated from Latin, ad hominem means “to the person” in contradistinction with “to the argument.” Our most broad and common understanding of the term is as a fallacious tactic, when a debater starts attacking an opponent rather than addressing the logic, evidence, or substance of argument itself. We call this most commonly understood version of ad hominem the “direct” or “abusive” variety.¹ Far more esoteric is the <em>tu quoque</em> version of ad hominem (the “poisoning of the well” argument), in which a debater opens the discussion with a derogatory remark about her or his opponent in hopes of creating immediate prejudice in the audience. Deserving far more appreciation is the “circumstantial” version of ad hominem, in which a debater’s personal vantage point — or circumstances, or subjectivity — possibly predisposes that person toward one bias or another. Thus, circumstantial ad hominem is crucial for pointing out hypocrisy,² and other bad behavior such as dishonesty, self-righteousness, insults, slander, et cetera. In those cases, the debater’s personal disposition as it relates to his argument is fair game.</p><p>By contrast, we rightfully interpret the direct ad hominem as a sign of a debater losing an argument and resorting to a sort of rearguard action of desperation. Being so obvious, such a last resort invariably fails to win the argument. The direct ad hominem is thus a distraction (often an emotional distraction) from the matter at hand.³ For example, two debaters might exchange the following:</p><p>Debater A: “We need to refine our homeless policy to distinguish between those who want a hand up in contrast to those who want a handout.”</p><p>Debater B: “Why aren’t you more sympathetic with the homeless?”</p><p>Debater B’s response is a direct ad hominem response that avoids addressing Debater A’s point. It is also a presumption, a question that presupposes an answer, and possibly a complete falsehood. Certainly, it is a distraction from the matter at hand. In other words, whether or not Debater A sympathizes with the homeless is logically immaterial regarding the policy distinction s/he proffers. Perhaps the policy distinction has merit, perhaps not; maybe the policy distinction presents a useful dichotomy, or not. But attacking Debater A personally does not further the argument. It is important to remember that ad hominem attacks only truly arise in <em>arguments</em>, not in other interpersonal exchanges or criticisms.⁴ This is why ad personam is in a separate category,⁵ even though the two can overlap. But we would also well remember C.L. Hamblin’s observation that “purely abusive arguments . . . are not arguments at all.”⁶</p><p>We constantly find the direct ad hominem in political debate between campaign opponents, and sometimes between lawyers and even judges during heated criminal and civil trials. The circumstantial ad hominem argument is a very different beast. Prominent philosophers like Charles Taylor persuasively argue that all worthwhile moral debates may require the circumstantial ad hominem variety.⁷ This becomes especially important when we distinguish philosophical values from scientific facts. “Scientism” is a legacy of the logical positivist school of philosophy which (one could argue) was overly infatuated with logic and thereby dismissive of non-logical explanations.⁸ Those who find the logical positivist school overly reliant on rational explanations would find an inevitable and inescapable human subjectivity in even the most rigorous of logical sciences, like mathematics, physics, chemistry, and geology. The life sciences (biology, zoology, ecology, et cetera) would then become more prone to subjective interpretation, but also a deliberate or inadvertent insertion of philosophical values. Contemporary arguments about medicine or environmental sciences very regularly reflect a conflation of scientific facts and philosophical values, opening such debaters up to the circumstantial ad hominem rebuttal (or at least qualification).</p><p>Direct ad hominem attacks, often overlapping with ad personam attacks, are par for the course in political debate and campaigning,⁹ which have similarities with battle and thus abide by the same cliché about everything being fair in war. But these tactics extend beyond politics-proper to wherever we find interpersonal interaction. Because humans are a social species, interpersonal politics are everywhere: at the workplace (office politics), in academia (Sayer’s Law), in neighborhood communities and non-communities, in the military, in extended and nuclear families, et cetera. Almost always, the ad hominem and ad personam attacks in these situations involve power struggles, whether petty or profound. Depending upon one’s philosophy, Machiavelli and <em>realpolitik</em> dominate in politics-proper. But we find Machiavellianism wherever we find struggles for control.</p><p>“Character” often holds ambiguous value in political campaigns, and not merely because it is a subjectively-interpreted topic. Many political candidates do not care if their attacks on their opponent’s character are accurate or not. Ad hominem becomes irrelevant when ad personam seems to be the entire point. Ad hominem in its direct form is a distraction from an <em>argument</em>, but ad personam <em>is</em> the argument.</p><p><strong>Scholarly Gray Areas</strong></p><p>In his precocious 1970 book, <em>Historians’ Fallacies</em>, David Hackett Fischer offered the standard scholarly objections to ad hominem arguments,¹⁰ but then illustrated the ad hominem with some surprisingly weak examples or even non-examples. In one, David Spring merely pointed out what he perceived were differences between analytical and narrative historians.¹¹ A second “example” was even more baffling, in which Adrienne Koch reviewed edited volumes of founding father James Wilson’s written work with no ad hominem or personal attack on Wilson or the editor, whatsoever.¹² A third example was criticizing Dr. Johnson for resorting to an ad hominem when pointing out Catherine Macaulay’s hypocrisy for advocating the equality of humanity while employing servants.¹³ But this ad hominem would be of the legitimate circumstantial variety, not the direct ad hominem deviating from an argument. In another layer of irony, Fischer’s important book is itself replete with derision of a personal nature. Thus we find that Anglo-American historians are supposedly haters of logic,¹⁴ England’s Charles II was “a consistent living argument for republicanism,”¹⁵ Forrest McDonald’s mind “was moving on hinges”¹⁶ instead of furthering an interpretive argument, how one of Daniel Boorstin’s historical interpretations was “simple-minded, uninformed, and seriously inaccurate,”¹⁷ how Hegel was a “poor twisted Teutonic soul,”¹⁸ and a great many more.¹⁹ This is not to detract from Fischer’s important book, but it does illustrate a common gray area in academia where we see intertwined criticism of scholars and their works, with shades of direct ad hominem, circumstantial ad hominem, but also ad personam. In a negative book review, when does describing the author’s argument as “simpleminded” imply or insinuate that the author himself is simpleminded? Not everyone is as overt as Fischer was when criticizing Boorstin.</p><p>In another overt example, Joseph Epstein wrote a 2002 essay about literary critic Harold Bloom that intermixed some literary analysis with heavy doses of ad personam and circumstantial ad hominem.²⁰ Epstein wrote that Bloom was not an aesthete and didn’t “seem to have a clue about how to produce anything approaching the aesthetically pleasing in his own writing.”²¹ Epstein criticized Bloom for habitual “bombast, rant, and confident obscurity”²²and how he was among a fortunate few authors “whose books sell without being actually read,”²³ a common enough accusation (especially in New York City circles), but one that ever-remains difficult or impossible to prove with anything approaching empirical evidence. Epstein concluded that Bloom’s reputation needed deflating, partly because Bloom was “merely learned” and not very smart.²⁴ Obviously Epstein criticized Bloom’s writing but also Bloom himself. We ourselves could analyze Epstein’s text without employing any form of the ad hominem. If we speculated about his motives, that would necessitate use of the circumstantial ad hominem. In formal academic writing it might be unlikely to find the ad personam, but obviously not in the free market of ideas as protected by the First Amendment.</p><p>The field of history sometimes invites employment of the non-fallacious circumstantial ad hominem. As Peter Novik noted, historians often work in remote archives utilizing non-digitized documents few if any re-explore.²⁵ Thus, one historian questioning another historian’s credibility somewhat resembles a lawyer routinely questioning expert witnesses’ trustworthiness. In Novik’s example, Historian Harry Elmer Barnes considered himself an “objective” interpreter of German culpability in World War I and made repeated and intensive personal attacks against another historian, Bernadotte Everly Schmitt,²⁶ claiming the opposite. Was Schmitt actually a non-credible scholar? Was Barnes merited in attacking Schmitt’s supposed subjective biases?</p><p>Not all historians even use the term “objectivity” in the same way, ranging from a strict definition that equates objectivity with a philosophical ideal that no one every attains, to “objectivity” as a mere synonym for other terms, such as “balanced,” “impartial,” “detached,” or “neutral” — though these latter terms themselves only ultimately beg the question of a stricter definition of objectivity. In any case, what we usually have in historical interpretation is at least some tacit subjectivity, and that renders plausible the circumstantial ad hominem response. To illustrate this, consider how certain American Civil War scholars sometimes take sides in the conflict regardless of common access to the same sources, such as the massive and monumental <em>The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies</em>.²⁷ Whether or not white Confederate soldiers massacred African American soldiers at Saltville, Virginia, illustrates but a single example of varying degrees of subjectivity in the larger debates.²⁸</p><p>The problem of obscure and remote historical evidence and how that can foster the circumstantial ad hominem is somewhat less pronounced in legal scholarship. This is due to legal scholarship’s wonderful preoccupation with footnotes and the ready availability of most sources in standard databases or, even in the analog age, published reports in law libraries. Countless law students and law journal editors alone have regularly vetted every single citation in legal articles and essays. This leaves open the matter of interpreting statutes and common law precedents, but at least all are invited to examine the same, readily available evidence.</p><p>But scholarly arguments and the ad hominem are sometimes not purely about facts, logic, or even disagreements over interpretation. As Raymond Macdonald Alden wrote over a century ago, “Occasionally it seems to be necessary to answer a fool according to his folly, and a boor according to his rudeness.”²⁹ For example, Judge John J. Gibbons frequently employed the ad hominem when reviewing Raoul Berger’s <em>Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment</em>.³⁰ Berger responded to that review,³¹ going to great extents to cite evidence, his and others’ interpretation of that evidence, and Gibbons’ flawed knowledge that inevitably yielded flawed interpretations of the topic. Almost as an aside, Berger also indicated Gibbons’ ad hominem attacks upon himself and handed it right back to him. In this case, one could argue — not that two wrongs make a right — but that a maligner merited rectification with a judicious dose of its own medicine.</p><p>Once upon a time, perhaps we nurtured a myth about academia in which the ad hominem became a flagrant violation of gentlemanly/ladylike behavior.³² Even in political debate, sometimes we still hear echoes of this when one candidate says something like, “Let’s discuss the issues. Let’s avoid personalities.” In many cases, they are actually responding to ad personam attacks. As mentioned, ad personam sometimes overlaps with the direct ad hominem, but is ultimately in a separate category where there is no real debate in the first place. Sustained ad personam attacks in politics, sometimes called “character assassination,” make the opponent’s character <em>the issue</em> of the non-debate. There is no distraction from the issue, whether or not the issue and the attack are legitimate. But even regarding debate club rules, in certain circumstances there is ample room for attacking the opponent’s character, especially when hypocrisy enters the arena.³³ Now we’re back in the circumstantial ad hominem realm. If a libertarian advocates smaller government but refuses to relinquish federal agricultural subsidies, the charge of hypocrisy (or at least of harboring a double standard) is probably merited. As in courtroom settings, the circumstantial ad hominem becomes viable when a debater relies upon an argument based upon a questionable or unreliable witness.³⁴</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/432/1*kWC2kvofPII4n8lVlIJaHA.png" /><figcaption>“Argumentum ad hominem,” 1831 lithograph by John Doyle. Duke of Gloucester (on the left) says, “Oh! There’s no good to be hoped from such people.” His companion replies, “What can you expect from such a ministry, my dear Coz. Men who could not discover your wisdom and talents for office.” The Duke of Gloucester was upset because Charles Grey, the second Earl Grey, had become prime minister and (along with his Whig party) took control of the government. Thus the Duke was attacking <strong>the people</strong> who took power, not their <strong>political ideas</strong>. (public domain image).</figcaption></figure><p>Beginning in the 1930s, and long before contemporary identity politics, legendary African American debate coach Melvin B. Tolson schooled Black students in standard debate tactics at historically black Wiley College in Marshall, Texas. His team gained a reputation for logical argument, use of perfect mainstream English, and citation of evidence.³⁵ Tolson’s students learned to avoid standard fallacies (including the ad hominem) and finding them as weaknesses in oppositional teams.³⁶ Today such “assimilation” has fallen out of fashion, but Tolson himself was no fawning follower of white culture and “blended conservative language instruction with race pride and radical politics.”³⁷ Tolson’s important precedent, however, has proved to be no antidote to today’s standpoint epistemology. Ironically enough, standpoint epistemology has fostered the development of a sort of “inverse ad hominem” argument in debate circles. In the inverse ad hominem, rather than attack an opponent in lieu of the opponent’s argument, debate team members have framed the topic at hand through <em>their own</em> <em>personal oppression</em> and how that purportedly disadvantages them in traditional debate.³⁸ This hybrid of identity politics and standpoint epistemology creates the inverse ad hominem that some people celebrate as “performance debating,” or kritik debate.</p><p>Kritik debate focuses on an opponent’s worldview rather than the opponent’s words.³⁹ By attacking opponents’ world-views, kritik debaters can employ a subtle form of the ad hominem that mixes the direct and circumstantial versions. A person’s worldview is (at most) only half a step removed from the person — this constitutes the direct ad hominem. But kritik debaters can also imply, insinuate, or even overtly call out opponents as biased, privileged, hypocritical, “un-woke,” or other claims that more clearly mix the direct and circumstantial ad hominem. The indicatively named “Malcolm X Debate Team” created the Louisville Project in 2003, probably the most widely known manifestation of kritik debate,⁴⁰ at least in the United States.</p><p>Roger Solt accurately criticized the kritik phenomenon by pointing out how debaters with different worldviews can simply end up talking past each other in different languages. Kritik debate can end up being anti-intellectual and merely therapeutic for its proponent without furthering any understanding or appreciation of the issues at hand, including those genuinely important different worldviews. Publicly performing personal therapy also opens kritik debaters up to susceptibility of personal attack. In other words, their ad hominem can become a double-edged sword.⁴¹ As Solt wrote, “in public, where different groups interact, it is necessary that there be some common standards of conduct. And it is here that debate’s multiculturalism stumbles. It’s hard to have a good game when the two sides want to play distinctly different sports.”⁴²</p><p>Jessica Flanigan also persuasively argues that employing identity politics and standpoint epistemology is problematic in debate. It can be misleading, as when a debater claims or insinuates representing a larger oppressed demographic. It can be counterproductive by distracting the debate from actually pertinent information that has nothing to do with the debater’s identity or standpoint. If employing identity becomes the criterion, then those refusing to do find practitioners excluding them from or minimizing their contributions in the debate.⁴³ All of this invites liberal use of the circumstantial ad hominem and sometimes the direct ad hominem.</p><p><strong>Legal Arena</strong></p><p>There is an old lawyer’s joke that goes, “emotion comes in the door and logic flies out the window.”⁴⁴ Journalist Zachery Mack described how he could not logically engage with his father, who had succumbed to a conspiracy theory mentality. After seeking much advice from others about how to deal with this, Mack ended up engaging his father on an emotional level.⁴⁵ Emotional engagement is fine and well, but we can never confuse it with logical debate or rational argument. One of the great virtues of the attorney’s endeavor is defusing emotional responses with rational reasoning. But a lawyer fighting adamantly for her or his client, as they are duty-bound to do, cannot always afford to be polite when arguing against the opposition. The adversarial nature of the American legal system creates a Catch-22 here. Attorneys are supposed to represent their clients to the best of their professional ability without crossing an ill-defined line of civil behavior. Some lawyers think they must cross that line in order to serve their clients; others cross the line in the heat of the moment.</p><p>As previously mentioned, ad hominem objections pose a potentially non-fallacious rebuttal when a debater uses questionable witness testimony to support her or his point. The character of that witness becomes fair game. Rules 607 and 608 of the <em>Federal Rules of Evidence</em> support the circumstantial ad hominem regarding witnesses. Rule 607 states that “Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.”⁴⁶ Rule 608(a) allows any party to question a witness’s personal character, honesty, or reliability.⁴⁷</p><p>This is no more obvious than when prosecutors use incarcerated informants as witnesses to purported cell mate confessions. As Russell D. Covey points out, jailhouse “Snitches are deeply unreliable witnesses. Many are con artists, congenital liars, and practiced fraudsters. As compensated witnesses, all snitches have deep conflicts of interest.”⁴⁸ Covey is also careful to point out that lack of corroborative evidence⁴⁹ is a damning feature of too much incarcerated informant testimony. Proper procedure would have an informant wear a wire to prove what the alleged confessor is saying. So, for example, if an inmate expresses interest in hiring a professional killer to eliminate an enemy, an incarcerated informant can not only arrange to audio-record this request, but police can then use an undercover officer to pose as a hitman and thus gather more substantial evidence. By contrast, without such corroborating evidence, oppositional attorneys would be negligent if they did <em>not</em> employ the circumstantial ad hominem to attack the informant’s character, veracity, and motives.</p><p>As Jessica Roth has documented at length, jailhouse snitch testimony is particularly troublesome regarding false criminal convictions. Such testimony is doubly bothersome because juries seem to find it persuasive despite its inherent undependability. Many of these convictions lack biological evidence, thus precluding DNA exoneration.⁵⁰ It is daunting to consider overly-aggressive prosecutors willing to get convictions at any cost, but that is an undeniable aspect of our legal system (and probably all legal systems). In any case, the questioning of jailhouse informants’ character and motivation is an obvious example of legitimate use of the circumstantial ad hominem, but so too is the interrogation of so-called “expert witnesses” who are not always as “objective” as they wish to appear.</p><p>Most so-called expert witnesses have a preconceived agenda in mind before hiring on as professional testifiers. In the first place, plaintiffs or defendants are paying them to appear in court. Some seek celebrity,⁵¹ which of course will also help garner them future gigs as hired and paid witnesses. In many trials, both sides hire their own respective professional witnesses, and thus the contest becomes (in part) a matter of dueling experts. This can present a paradox of experts attempting to appear objective while also clearly advocating for one side, which of course invite the circumstantial ad hominem attack from the opposition.⁵² In the final analysis, we find precious little scientific objectivity in such testimony — and thus, again, an attorney would be negligent in <em>not</em> employing the circumstantial ad hominem. Judge Alex Kozinski of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals put the matter well when he wrote, “Our task, then, is to analyze not what the experts say, but what basis they have for saying it.”⁵³ In recent years we find new evidence illustrating the problematic nature of expert witnesses due to a rash of revelations showing that much forensic “science” turns out to be junk science.⁵⁴ So not only can experts present problematic testimony, but their cited evidence can be equally erroneous.</p><p>Here we have a problem that sometimes mirrors the ad hominem: the ad verecundiam or “appeal to authority” argument.⁵⁵ We live in an era of highly politicized and monetized science. If experts claim certain chemicals cause human disease, many millions of dollars in liability, profits, and government funding can be at stake. Naturally causation becomes especially complex in such matters, and we should fully expect a chemical manufacturer’s team of attorneys to raise valid factors like an ill person’s inherited propensity toward their disease, environmental factors other than exposure to the chemical in question, or personal behavior such as alcohol and tobacco use, junk food consumption, or sedentarism as possibly contributory factors. We like to think that “science” is somehow objective, but that detachment is only as viable as the scientists propounding their hypotheses.</p><p>Aside from legitimate and necessary use of the circumstantial ad hominem, many attorneys and scholars have rightly decried the direct ad hominem in the courtroom as part of a broader problem of “uncivil behavior.”⁵⁶ Reform efforts, including attorneys’ civility codes, have not fundamentally changed nor improved the situation. Lawyers, judges, and scholars calling incivility a <em>growing</em> problem is debatable,⁵⁷ but no one doubts its existence and continuation. State bar associations and other organizations only “recommend” rules of conduct rather than require them, knowing they would be unenforceable anyway, given the nature of the adversarial system. The language of rules thus remains necessarily vague.⁵⁸</p><p>There are literally hundreds of recent examples of courts sanctioning lawyers for abusive or direct ad hominem attacks.⁵⁹ For such behavior, a judge can order an attorney to a disciplinary hearing. This happened in 2007 when District Judge Jose L. Linares made such an order for attorney Abraham S. Alter.⁶⁰ In 2003, attorney Alter represented claimant Jose Cruz before an administrative law judge. Cruz was seeking supplemental social security income and disability insurance benefits, which the administrative law judge denied. This inspired Alter to call the administrative law judge an incapable, ignorant quack who had purportedly made absurd assumptions and attempted to invalidate evidence.⁶¹ In an appellate hearing, Judge Linares affirmed the denial of Cruz’s disability claims and reluctantly chastised Alter for his repeated unprofessional behavior in this and previous cases going back to 2000 or earlier. Judge Linares said Alter had “hurled insults in a manner that has become his trademark.”⁶² In an earlier case⁶³ a judge had struck Alter’s brief because it was “rife with ad hominem attacks” in violation of Local Appellate Rule 28.1(c) requiring attorneys specifically to refrain from employing the ad hominem.⁶⁴ Due to Alter’s “steady stream of invective” and his “repeated ad hominem attacks,” Judge Linares thus referred Alter to a disciplinary hearing “for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.”⁶⁵</p><p>In another interesting example, in 2018, plaintiffs Chris Sevier, et al, brought suit to compel the state of Colorado to issue them marriage licenses (and for a bakery to make them wedding cakes) for proposed polygamist and objectofilia unions. U.S. District Judge William J. Martínez dismissed all plaintiffs’ claims — not because of the unconventional nature of the case — but because of repeated ad hominem attacks against him and the court, and for refusing to comply with court orders to cease and desist from such attacks.⁶⁶ The main problem was defiance of court orders, which Judge Martínez interpreted was a calculated component of the plaintiffs’ self-righteousness, attempt to garner publicity, and a national strategy of “judge-and forum-shopping” in search for a sympathetic hearing.</p><p>Courtrooms are not arenas for the faint of heart. But they are supposed to be formal places where we resolve conflict with a minimum of personal attacks. This precludes the ad personam and the direct ad hominem, but welcomes the circumstantial ad hominem and rightfully questions the ad verecundiam.</p><p><strong>Closing Remarks</strong></p><p>There’s an old truism about the (direct) ad hominem being a sign of a debater losing an argument. Many speak of this version of ad hominem negatively, but rarely appreciate its distinction from the circumstantial ad hominem. Sometimes they confuse the direct ad hominem with the ad personam. In the classic sense of argumentation, the direct ad hominem is indeed almost always a distraction from the matter at hand and thus deserves disparagement. The ad personam in these circumstances is even more offensive, yet endemic in political campaign speeches, debates between or among candidates, attack ads, and in laying blame on the opposition for whatever current sociopolitical maladies. Journalism, being the Fourth Estate of politics, employs personal invective all the time. Instead of ad hominem, what we usually find here is more in the realm of the negative types of gossip. In 1874, Edward Eggleston wrote, “For what is journalism but elevated and organized gossip?”⁶⁷ Nina Totenberg offered a recent update to this when she described her profession of covering the U.S. Supreme Court as “high level gossip.”⁶⁸ Clearly, without gossip, we would have no journalism.</p><p>As for law, many Americans like to disparage attorneys . . . until they need one. Lawyers are like soldiers fighting legal battles for their clients, and ad hominem is among the ammunition as a legitimate tool (the circumstantial variety) or a tempting taboo (the abusive variety). Sometimes the lay citizenry gets frustrated when prosecutors refuse to admit they prosecuted the wrong person even after DNA evidence later exonerates that person. But the public also expresses frustration in cases where a defendant seems obviously guilty despite their defense attorney refusing to acknowledge it. Quite obviously, professional duty forbids all attorneys in a courtroom from philosophizing about legal matters the way they once did as law students in a classroom. Whether for the prosecution or the defense, such lawyerly behavior or misbehavior often reflects the characteristic warrior mentality. That some lawyers would cross the line and resort to the direct ad hominem and other uncivil behavior in court should not surprise us, even if they deserve sanction for such conduct. Prosecutorial misconduct, being an abuse of official power, occupies its own special category far beyond ad hominem matters.</p><p>Outside of politics, formal debate circles, and the legal arena — in any number of public and private settings — people attack others all the time. This is an inevitable feature of a social species. Slanderous backbiting has done far more harm in office politics alone than ad hominem ever could in formal debates. Beyond that, we have multiple levels of gossip; idle, speculative, comparatively harmless, but also the slanderous and malicious varieties.⁶⁹ Yet it would be difficult to get through social life without at least overhearing inquiries about others for various informational purposes. Escaping gossip might be one of the great motivators for the hermit. But we might remember that sometimes people make benevolent queries about others’ well-being. Sometimes people even praise others behind their backs.</p><p>Copyright © 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p><strong>ENDNOTES</strong></p><p>[1] For examples, see Murat Borovali, <em>Ad hominem Argumentation in Politics</em>, 44 Philosophy and Social Criticism 426–36 (2018); C.L. Hamblin, Fallacies (Vale Pr., 1970), 41; Christopher M. Johnson, <em>Reconsidering the Ad hominem</em>, 84 Philosophy 251 (April 2009); Kevin W. Saunders, <em>Informal Fallacies in Legal Argumentation</em>, 44 South Carolina Law Review 345–49 (1993); Kevin W. Saunders, <em>Premises and Conclusions: Symbolic Logic for Legal Analysis</em>, 73 Notre Dame Law Review 677–78 (1998); Douglas Walton, Ad hominem Arguments 104 (University of Alabama Pr., 1998).</p><p>[2] Walton, <em>supra</em> note 1 at 4; Douglas N. Walton, Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach 107–77, 185–89 (Cambridge University Pr., 2008). The most thorough single volume on the topic of argument ad hominem is probably Walton, Ad hominem Arguments, <em>supra</em> note 1. In this book Walton not only explains contemporary usage, but (especially in chapter 2) offers a deep historical examination of how the term “ad hominem” has evolved, and how textbooks have been inconsistent in describing it.</p><p>[3] Hamblin, <em>supra</em> note 1, at 31.</p><p>[4] <em>Id</em>. at 224.</p><p>[5] Chaïm Perelman, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 111–12 (University of Notre Dame Pr., 1969).</p><p>[6] Hamblin, <em>supra</em> note 1, at 42.</p><p>[7] Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments 39, 53 (Harvard University Pr. 1995). Also see Walton <em>supra</em> note 1, at 29, 40.</p><p>[8] Taylor, <em>supra</em> note 7 at 36, 38, 39, 40, 59.</p><p>[9] Walton <em>supra</em> note 1, at 42, 121, 133, 197, 264.</p><p>[10] David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward A Logic of Historical Thought 290–93 (Harper Touchstone, 1970).</p><p>[11] Id. at 293n.33; David Spring, <em>reviewing J.B. Conacher’s</em> The Aberdeen Coalition, I852–1855: A Study in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Party Politics, (Cambridge University Pr., 1968) <em>in</em> 74 The American Historical Review 966–97 (1969).</p><p>[12] Fischer, <em>supra</em> note 10, at 293n.33; Adrienne Koch, <em>reviewing Robert Green McCloskey, ed.</em>, The Works of James Wilson 1710–11 (Belknap Press of Harvard University, I967).</p><p>[13] Fischer, <em>supra</em> note 10, at 292.</p><p>[14] Id. at x, xi.</p><p>[15] Id. at 8.</p><p>[16] Id. at 29.</p><p>[17] Id. at 57.</p><p>[18] Id. at 66.</p><p>[19] See the accurate if lampooning description of antiquarians, Id. at 140–41; Donald Fleming’s “self-righteousness,” Id. at 212; W.J. Cash’s <em>personal</em> experiences in the mountainous South as flaws in his book, <em>Mind of the South</em>, Id. at 219–20, or how David Donald “lost his temper” when responding to a graduate student’s critique of his work, Id. at 284. Ironically enough, Cash’s error would easily be solved by simply renaming his book <em>Mind of the Highland South</em>. Having personally experienced editors who insisted on changing three of my own book titles for the worse, I can sympathize.</p><p>[20] Joseph Epstein, <em>Bloomin’ Genius</em>, 55 The Hudson Review 213–221 (2002).</p><p>[21] Id. at 213 (quote), 214.</p><p>[22] Id. at 216.</p><p>[23] Id. at 220.</p><p>[24] Id. at 221.</p><p>[25] Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 220–21 (Cambridge University Pr., 1988).</p><p>[26] Id. at 212–19.</p><p>[27] 128 volumes, published by the U.S. War Department, Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.</p><p>[28] Regarding differing interpretations of the massacre of African American soldiers at Saltville, Virginia, see William C. Davis, <em>Massacre at Saltville</em>, Civil War Times Illustrated 4 (1971), and William Marvel, <em>The Battle of Saltville: Massacre or Myth?</em> 8 Blue and Gray Magazine 10–19, 46–60 (1991). The most extensive research on this subject lies in Thomas Davidson Mays, The Price of Freedom: The Battle of Saltville and the Massacre of the Fifth United States Colored Cavalry, (MA thesis: Virginia Tech, 1992).</p><p>[29] Raymond Macdonald Alden, The Art of Debate 135 (H. Holt and Co., 1904).</p><p>[30] John J. Gibbons, <em>Book Review of</em> Government by Judiciary, 31 Rutger Law Review 839 (1978). Judge Gibbons sat on the bench of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.</p><p>[31] Raoul Berger, <em>Government by Judiciary: Judge Gibbons’ Argument Ad Hominem</em>, 59 Boston University Law Review783 (1979).</p><p>[32] This myth may have held more substance among academic debating teams. See Douglas N. Walton, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation 122 (Cambridge University Pr., 2006).</p><p>[33] Douglas N. Walton, Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach 190, 192, 193 (Cambridge University Pr., 2008). Not all philosophers agree that an arguer’s personal disposition is fair game. See Id. at 191.</p><p>[34] Raymond Macdonald Alden, The Art of Debate 108, 109, 110–11 (H. Holt and Co., 1904); Hamblin, <em>supra</em> note 1, at 42; Walton, <em>supra</em> note 32, at 122.</p><p>[35] David Gold, Rhetoric at the Margins 47, 49 (Southern Illinois University Pr., 2008).</p><p>[36] Id. at 48.</p><p>[37] Id. at 15. Also see pages 49–55.</p><p>[38] Jessica Carew Kraft, <em>Does Traditional College Debate Reinforce White Privilege?</em> The Atlantic (April 16, 2014); Jeff Parcher, <em>Factions in Policy Debate: Some Observations</em>, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 89–94 (2004); Roger E. Solt, <em>Debate’s Culture of Narcissism</em>, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 43–65( 2004); Joseph P. Zompetti, <em>Personalizing Debating: Diversity and Tolerance in the Debate Community</em>, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 26–39 (2004).</p><p>[39] For a useful synopsis of kritik debate, see <em>Model Diplomat</em>, “Kritik,” available via <a href="https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/glossary/kritik.">https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/glossary/kritik.</a></p><p>[40] The journal Contemporary Argumentation and Debate celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Louisville Project in a special June 2023 issue. See Shanara Reid-Brinkley and Shauntrice Martin, <em>Identity, Performance, &amp; Debate: Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Louisville Project</em>, 38 Contemporary Argumentation and Debate (June 2023). For an illuminating earlier essay describing the rise of kritik and performance debating and the rift that created with traditional policy debating, see Solt, <em>supra</em> note 38.</p><p>[41] Solt, <em>supra</em> note at 57–59.</p><p>[42] Id. at 60.</p><p>[43] Jessica Flanigan, <em>Credibility and the Standpoint Expectation</em>, 20 Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 846, 847 (2022).</p><p>[44] Will Sarvis, J.V. Conran and Rural Political Power: Boss Mythology in the Missouri Bootheel<em> </em>107 (Lexington Books, 2012).</p><p>[45] Ari Shapiro, <em>A Reporter Tries to Bridge the Divide After His Dad Embraces Conspiracy Theories</em>, NPR’s All Things Considered (Feb. 26, 2025).</p><p>[46] Federal Rules of Evidence, <a href="https://www.uscourts.gov/file/78325/download.">https://www.uscourts.gov/file/78325/download.</a></p><p>[47] Id.</p><p>[48] Russell D. Covey, <em>Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony</em>, 49 Wake Forest Law Review 1376 (2014).</p><p>[49] Id. at 1377.</p><p>[50] Jessica A. Roth, <em>Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions</em>, 53 American Criminal Law Review 738, 798 (2016).</p><p>[51] David L. Faigman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law 54, 55 (W.H. Freeman &amp; Co., 2000).</p><p>[52] Jack V. Matson, Effective Expert Witnessing, 9, 67, 71 (2nd ed., Lewis Pubs., 1994). Matson writes from experience as a veteran expert witness himself.</p><p>[53] <em>Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc</em>. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).</p><p>[54] Faigman, <em>supra </em>note 51, at 76, 77. For some media coverage of this phenomenon, see Ken Dilanian and Michael Kosnar, <em>Bite Mark Analysis Has No Basis in Science, Experts Now Say. Why is it Still Being Used in Court?,</em> NBC News (Jan. 15, 2024); Martin Kaste, <em>‘Great Pause’ Among Prosecutors as DNA Proves Fallible</em>, NPR’s All Things Considered (Oct. 9, 2015); Bob Rocklin, <em>Better Late Than Never, Oregon is Acting On Junk Science in the Courtroom</em>, Lookout Eugene-Springfield (May 2, 2026); Brandon Wissbaum, <em>Forensic Testing Abandoned Over Flaws</em>, Investigate TV (May 16, 2026).</p><p>[55] Hamblin, <em>supra</em> note 1, at 43; Walton, Ad hominem Arguments, <em>supra</em> note 1, at 182–83, 204–06.</p><p>[56] For a small sampling of some of the literature, see Elana S. Einhorn, <em>Writing Respectfully: Why Is It So Hard for Lawyers to Refrain from Personal Attacks in Their Writing and What Can Be Done to Help Fight the Urge to Hit Low?,</em> 92 Advocate 38–39 (Fall 2020); G.M. Filisko and Matt Mahurin, <em>You’re OUT OF ORDER! Dealing With the Costs of Incivility in the Legal Profession</em>,” 99 ABA Journal 32–40 (2013); David A. Grenardo, <em>Making Civility Mandatory: Moving from Aspired to Required</em>, 11 Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal 239–95 (2013); Christopher J. Piazzola, <em>Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule</em>, 74 University of Colorado Law Review 1197–1239 (2003); Brenda Smith, <em>Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the “Civil” War Over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark</em>, 24 University of Dayton Law Review 151–86 (1998).</p><p>[57] Lydia P. Arnold, <em>Ad Hominem Attacks: Possible Solutions for a Growing Problem</em>, 8 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1075–98 (1995). Unfortunately, this author employs the “reversible reference,” a subset of the “fallacy of pseudo proof,” as per Fischer, <em>supra</em> note 10, at 43–45. As Fischer writes, “The problem of reversible reference rises whenever [a writer] tries to draw an inference directly from law to life.” (Id. at 45). In this case, Arnold conflates the rise of rules and codes with a rise in prohibited conduct. The rise of rules and codes could be preemptive, imitative (of other rules and codes in other jurisdictions), or merely coincidental. Or, indeed, they could be responsive to rising ad hominem conduct. But it takes more than a handful of cases (the few that Arnold cites) to make a persuasive thesis. Arnold’s most persuasive evidence is the 7th Circuit’s <em>Report on Civility</em>, but her argument would be stronger if we had similar reports from many additional districts.</p><p>[58] Richard Zitrin, et al, Legal Ethics in the Practice of Law 572, 573, 580, 581 (4th ed., LexisNexis, 2013).</p><p>[59] A small sampling: <em>Matter of Kover</em>, 134 A.D.3d 64, 74 (1st Dept. 2015); <em>Mokay v. Mokay</em>, 111 A.D.3d at 1178; <em>Nachbaur v. Am. Transit Ins. Co</em>., 300 A.D.2d 75–76; <em>William P. Pahl Equip. Corp. v. Kassis</em>, 182 A.D.2d 22, 32, 588 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dept. 1992); <em>Rector v. Video Editions, Inc</em>., 4 Misc 3d 43, 44–45, 780 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2004); <em>Capetola v. Capetola</em>, 96 A.D.3d 612, 613, 947 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1st Dept. 2012); <em>Jeffers v. River Park Residences</em>, 71 Misc 3d 1222(A)( Civ. Ct. Bronx Co. 2021).</p><p>[60] <em>Cruz v. Commissioner of Social Security</em>, 244 Fed.Appx. 475 (2007).</p><p>[61] Id., at 484.</p><p>[62] Id.</p><p>[63] <em>Meyler v. Commissioner of Social Security</em>, №06–4280 (3d Cir. June 22, 2007).</p><p>[64] <em>Cruz, supra </em>note 60, at 484–85.</p><p>[65] Id., at 485.</p><p>[66] <em>Sevier v. Hickenlooper</em> (2018), U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, Civil Action №17 — cv — 1750 — WJM — NYW, Civil Action №17 — cv — 1666 — WJM — NYW. This case was not reported to the <em>Federal Supplement</em>; accessed through Westlaw.</p><p>[67] From the third paragraph of Chapter XII, <em>Mr. Brady Prophesies</em>, in Edward Eggleston The Circuit Rider: A Tale of the Heroic Age (J.B. Ford &amp; Company, 1874), available in unpaginated version at Project Gutenberg, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org./">https://www.gutenberg.org.</a> This would be pages 110–11 in the 1937 reprint (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons).</p><p>[68] In an interview with Henry Louis Gates in <em>Against All Odds</em>, Finding Your Roots, season 7, episode 2 (Jan. 26, 2021).</p><p>[69] An interesting collection of essays about gossip may be found in Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Zéev, eds., Good Gossip (University Press of Kansas, 1994). Despite some unsupported and unprovable claims about gossip (examples on pages 11, 14, 18, 22, 85–86, 99) the authors in this compilation illustrate how people who feel powerless can use gossip for self-therapy to denigrate people they perceive as powerful (examples on pages 3, 5, 21, 25, 99), or how gossip is necessary for building friendship and community (examples on pages 3, 15–16, 71).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fa8caa79643" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Academic Bullshit Artistry]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/academic-bullshit-artistry-df35c0f34294?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df35c0f34294</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[poppycock]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[publishing-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hooey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malarkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Oct 2026 23:41:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-25T23:55:43.076Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2005, Princeton University Press published an interesting philosophical booklet, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Bullshit">Harry G. Frankfurt’s <em>On Bullshit</em></a>. Frankfurt captured the essence of this topic: bullshit is basically “deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes.” To Frankfurt, the bullshit artist is thus “misrepresenting whatever he is talking about” but is also “misrepresenting his own mind.” In other words, are bullshit artists even bullshitting themselves? That’s a mystery only the bullshit artist himself can ultimately know, and then only if they avoid self-deception. Frankfurt writes, “bullshit itself is invariably produced in a careless or self-indulgent manner” and “is never finely crafted.” This is because the bullshit artist is “trying to get away with something.” Getting away with something is sometimes going through the motions of doing a job without actually doing it, or at least not doing it well.</p><p><a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/skim-this-article-or-just-skip-it/">Robert Cabin</a> described a standard bit of academic bullshit artistry regarding a committee chair who interrupted arguing committee members by asking if they had read the document pertinent to their disagreement. All the committee members groaned and said they had indeed read it. “Well, that’s quite interesting,” the chair replied, “because I still haven’t managed to find the time to write up and send that document!” Cabin went on to describe his work as a scholarly journal editor in which he regularly encountered “people turning in brief, superficial, poorly written reviews.” Getting book reviews published are standard items for tenure committees to consider — but how many committee members track down those books and assess the merits of both the books and those reviews? Book reviews are probably an easy area for exercising bullshit artistry, especially when book review editors (unlike Cabin) merely function as switchboard operators shuttling correspondence without assessing merits, thereby becoming complicit in the bullshit artistry through their own laziness and failure to do their jobs.</p><p>For example, an acquisitions editor for a regional academic journal once rejected my article about civil rights legal history in Tennessee (later <a href="https://jaah.org/jaah/jaah-index-v88.htm">published elsewhere</a>), claiming I needed to cover the topic for the entire South, not just for one state. This was hilariously and transparently false. Within literally ten minutes of perusing electronic back issues, I found eight articles in this journal that flatly contradicted this claim. Who knows what the real reason for rejection might have been — certainly there was no logical reason. For all I know, it was because I submitted the piece without a university letterhead. Confusing status and substance is as common as dirt in academia, as elsewhere in human society, and there is no reason to think acquisition editors would present any major exception. The late Hal Rothman was indeed an exception. I submitted an article to him (also without benefit of university letterhead) when he was editor of <em>Environmental History Review</em>. He was <em>only</em> interested in the substance of the piece, and adamantly so. <a href="https://willsarvis.medium.com/remembering-hal-k-rothman-1958-2007-6a4ee7ed3112">As I’ve described elsewhere</a>, one reason (among many) he was such a great editor was related to the fact that he himself was such a prolific writer.</p><p>As bad as confusing status with substance is the editorial invention of reasons for rejecting a piece. I encountered this no more egregiously than with <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4946175">those who falsely claimed</a> there was a “corpus of literature” I was supposedly failing to acknowledge regarding <a href="https://www.bcu.ac.uk/Download/Asset/acecfa6b-59c9-4f7b-a2cd-6a09a1bc281b">my interracial friendship study</a>. None of these people could name a single article or book to support their claim, much less a corpus of literature. Instead, they were practicing bullshit artistry. This sounds related to what <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-3-types-of-peer-reviewers/">Mike Duncan</a> described as the “Type 2” peer reviewer, whose “criticisms are couched in generalities and are impossible to resolve as there is no clear path to follow.” The Type 2 reviewers resemble bullshit artists instead, representing about a third of all peer reviewers in Duncan’s experience and echoing what Robert Cabin observed above.</p><p>The much-publicized “replication crisis” (circa 2012–16) in social psychology reflected some classic examples of academic bullshit artistry, particularly among professors and programs seeking dramatic or even merely clear results, partly for renewing grant applications. Articles in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/science/psychology-replication-reproducibility-project.html"><em>New York Times</em></a>, <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-flaw-at-the-heart-of-psychological-research/"><em>Chronicle of Higher Education</em></a>, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18952667">other</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/2016/10/01/496093672/power-poses-co-author-i-do-not-believe-the-effects-are-real">media</a> outlets documented this debacle in detail. Replication of results is a hallmark of the scientific method; massaged or outright invented results cannot, of course, be replicated at all. Social psychology at its best is extremely limited in what it can tell us about society or the human condition. But in its aspirations to be a “science” with exact or measurable results, it is a field that practically invites bullshit artistry as its <em>modus operandi</em>. The replication crisis was no surprise at all.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*c7R9U3hh_cuiPbWvbIYj7Q.png" /><figcaption>Only the metaphorical source of the problem, not the culprit. (author’s illustration, 2014)</figcaption></figure><p>In 2016, my long-suffering literary agent Priya Doraswamy and I finally conceded defeat after two years of trying to find a publisher for a manuscript of mine about land and home, later entitled <em>Sacred and Ephemeral</em>. Just for the hell of it, I decided to submit the piece to several dozen university presses. Sometimes it is appropriate to dot every “i” and cross every “t.” I fully expected uniform rejection because I wrote the book for a more general educated audience, not an academic one. I sent two sample chapters to one university press editor, one heavy with case law and legal history (about homelessness), the other about rural America with significant focus on New Mexico. The editor responded:</p><blockquote>While there’s something undeniably appealing about your unhurried approach and casual voice here, the project as a whole seems somewhat shaggy. For me, at least, the multiple shifts in scale and topic create a muddle rather than a kaleidoscopic portrait of a wide-ranging concept. I never found myself especially surprised by what you were saying, either — there are a lot of familiar dynamics and well-established history worked in here.</blockquote><p>This editor demonstrated no understanding of the material I submitted, especially regarding the chapter about homelessness with all its case law and legal conundrums. His claim that he was never especially “surprised” was also a false criterion that functioned as a cloak or a diversion, as were his uses of “shaggy” and “muddle.” If esoteric new information does not “surprise” the non-specialist, what can? “Shaggy” is hardly a precise term that tells us anything. “Muddle” was borrowed from my homelessness chapter itself, which referred to Robert Ellickson’s 1990 article, “The Homelessness Muddle.” And yes, the topic of homelessness <em>is</em> a policy muddle and a legal muddle, and has been for decades, but I clarified this incredibly complex topic in the chapter he so readily dismissed.</p><p>An aside: would anyone really desire a “kaleidoscope” distortion of any topic?</p><p>The editor’s response was no better when it came to the chapter on rural land and home. I doubt he had ever heard of or read about its many subtopics, like the Santa Fe Ring, the repeated mentions of “God’s Country” from all across the nation, and most definitely not the unique northern New Mexico understanding of <em>querencia</em>. If the latter did not “surprise” him, nothing would. “Surprise” beginning as a false premise ends up a bullshit artistry excuse. Additionally, the property law aspects of this chapter were probably lost upon him, as it was with the legal aspects of the homelessness issue. Here, they pertained to the clashes between Anglo-American law and its predecessors in old French and Spanish colonial domains. The Old World roots of these legal system differences are profound, with Franco- and Spanish-American property concepts going back to Roman law in contrast to England’s markedly different path that profoundly informed American law. None of this is exactly common knowledge, so it seems highly unlikely that it would have failed to “surprise” the editor, if he had actually read the material.</p><p>Pity the poor acquisitions editors, who are inundated with far more submissions than they can possibly read carefully. The job practically requires bullshit artistry, even if its practitioners couch it in pseudo-authoritative criticism. My favorite literary rejection is, “Not for us, thanks.” No more is needed. By contrast, acquisition editor bullshit artists apparently feel compelled to “justify” their decisions, even when they are hopelessly and inevitably poorly informed. As <a href="https://books.google.rw/books?id=1yFpxa-ffpMC&amp;hl=no&amp;source=gbs_navlinks_s">Mary Midgley</a> observed, “anyone who has to write something in a hurry . . . always finds it easier to grouse than to grasp the real problem.”</p><p>Yet, interesting things happen!</p><p>A singular event occurred a few days after receiving the university press editor’s rejection. Law professor Julie Cheslik, editor of the <em>Urban Lawyer</em> (published by the American Bar Association) quickly accepted the homelessness chapter that the editor had so blithely dismissed. Of course, law professors and students have no qualms about diving into case law. And apparently my piece did not strike them as “shaggy” at all; either that, or one of the journals most cited by the U.S. Supreme Court has decided to go the bohemian route. So much for the university press editor’s dismissal.</p><p>By the way, Cheslik responded to my electronic submission within hours of my submitting the piece in an instance of record-shattering rapidity I’m sure I will never witness again. I immediately withdrew the submission from the other two dozen law journals (multiple submissions are standard procedure with law journals). Granted, Cheslik’s response in general was unique, but her work and the work of law student Julie A. Sims was typical of what I have experienced in the legal publication world: they simply do not screw around. “Must possess a hyperactive work ethic” should be a descriptor for all those considering enrollment in law school; and, as a writer, if you’re willing to run with them at their pace for a brief moment, it can all be great exhilarating fun. Certainly, it is a great antidote to bullshit artistry.</p><p>Harry G. Frankfurt, aforementioned philosopher on bullshit, observed the following: “The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides . . . is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him; what we are not to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it.” Again, the bullshit artist is trying to get away with something: in some of the foregoing cases it was getting away without having done one’s duty, at least not honestly, thoroughly, or professionally. So ultimately the bullshitter (as Frankfurt puts it) becomes “a greater enemy of the truth” than the overt liar. A lie is contradicted by the truth. Bullshit artistry allows someone to pretend they possess knowledge and authority when they do not know what they’re talking about.</p><p>If all of this sounds like the epitome of a whirlwind in a piss pot, I say, “welcome to academia.” This is exactly the sort of characteristic that gave rise to Sayre’s Law. Wallace Stanley Sayre’s notorious observation reads as follows: “Academic politics is the most vicious and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so low.” This all might seem amusing until you witness (as I have on three occasions) an excellent professor get fired for reasons of office politics, not lack of merit. Others, like <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/paul-piccone-outside-academe/">Russell Jacoby</a>, have observed this as well.</p><p>Some parents tell their children things like, “If you cannot say anything good, don’t say anything at all.” Practically the opposite aphorism holds true among academic bullshit artists. Their motto might as well be, “If you have nothing to say, say something negative.” By doing so they further the scholarship not one iota. But once in a while we should call out bullshit artistry for what it is. As Raymond Macdonald Alden <a href="https://archive.org/details/artofdebate00alderich">wrote</a>, “Occasionally it seems to be necessary to answer a fool according to his folly, and a boor according to his rudeness.” That is as true as it is unfortunate. But that is also the way of the world.</p><p>Copyright © 2021, 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df35c0f34294" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Climate Consensus]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/climate-consensus-f726025c3b9f?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f726025c3b9f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[archaeology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scientific-method]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 18:07:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-11T21:37:48.397Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Political agendas sometimes advance through the consensus of its participants. Science generally does not. The news media both accepts and perpetuates the idea of a “climate consensus” among scientists who supposedly believe in human-caused global warming. But “climate consensus” is a political advocacy term claiming the <em>authority</em> of science.</p><p>“Consensus” reeks of groupthink that is antithetical to the scientific method. Science advances through the asking of open and honest questions, addressing both conventional wisdom and unexplored ideas, employing empirical analysis in experiments that may or may not produce hypotheses or working hypotheses. Replicable results, more experiments, and sometimes sheer luck advances scientific hypotheses toward scientific theory.</p><p>In any case, the great beauty of science is its utility as a <em>method of inquiry</em>, not as a fount of received wisdom. The idea of a “scientific consensus” quickly starts to smell like dogma. Far more useful and accurate is the concept of scientific paradigms, as Thomas Kuhn described them in his rightfully famous 1962 book, <em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em>. Scientific paradigms can be quite useful operational concepts for years and years, but as Kuhn’s title implies, revolutions overturn them. “Paradigm shift” is another way to describe this.</p><p>A paradigm shift might await the “climate consensus” regarding the idea of the greenhouse effect causing global warming. Conversely, the greenhouse effect could turn out to be valid. But the better climate scientists continue to question it rather than preach it as secular gospel, the way so many journalists routinely do. By questioning any so-called consensus, they advance climate science and remain true to the core spirit of scientific inquiry. This should not surprise us. The history of science is replete with examples of scientists overturning received wisdom. After all, geocentric astronomy and Aristotelian physics once represented a scientific paradigm. But by the time we got through the Copernicus-Kepler-Galileo-Newton revolution, we had heliocentrism.</p><p>During the 1960s, after decades of debate, geologists shifted their sciences’s paradigm to plate tectonics, the theory of ocean floors and continents being in constant geological motion. Around 1980 I took a class with an old geology professor who remembered some of his own professors who had resisted the idea of plate tectonics. That earlier generation of geologists has had a more recent counterpart in archaeologists who resisted the proposition of pre-Clovis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/1*tdDifA-J_-Llb7IAe-GBuQ.png" /><figcaption>Plate tectonics explained what many had previously speculated about regarding how east coast South America and west coast Africa seemed to mirror each other. (Cropped from a <strong>WikiCommons</strong> image).</figcaption></figure><p>For decades, “Clovis first” proponents thought there were no human artifacts in the western hemisphere older than 15,000 years. They also followed the idea of the Beringia land bridge as the sole or main human migration route that should have left the oldest human evidence in Alaska, the youngest in South America. Now we have ample evidence that invalidates the Clovis first paradigm.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*aW2pwgUxXGHonFVWsi3emg.png" /><figcaption>Some of the pre-Clovis archaeological sites, as of 2017. Especially noteworthy are some of the South American sites that the “Clovis first” paradigm hypothesized could not be older than North American sites. (<strong>WikiCommons</strong> image).</figcaption></figure><p>Kuhn observed that young scientists or those new to a scientific field have often been generators of scientific revolution. Free of accumulated mental baggage, they have the potential of seeing things afresh — especially when it comes to outliers. All sciences feature outliers that contradict or at least qualify prevailing paradigms. It is understandable (and all too human) that older scientists who spent their careers wedded to an earlier paradigm would resist a new generation overturning it.</p><p>My veteran geology professor readily admitted that he and some of his equally elder colleagues, all embracing plate tectonics, had nevertheless begun forming pet theories of their own that might turn out to be inadvertently skewed. In other words, the danger of confirmation bias can settle in for any scientist who pursues a field long enough. This has probably happened to some scientists who now assume that anthropogenic climate change outweighs incredibly powerful geological causes of climate change.</p><p>As Francis Bacon warned us centuries ago, confirmation bias is fundamentally detrimental to the scientific endeavor. Or, as C.H. Waddington wrote in 1948, “scientists must be ready for their pet theories to turn out to be wrong. Science as a whole certainly cannot allow its judgment about facts to be distorted by ideas of what ought to be true, or what one may hope to be true.”</p><p>Proponents of the climate consensus might consider what the great Zen master Shunryu Suzuki said: “In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert’s there are few.” Occasionally purging ourselves of our expertise can be a very healthy way to look at science (and other things) anew.</p><p>Copyright © 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>SOURCES</p><p>Francis Bacon, <em>First Book of Aphorisms</em>, Aphorism XLVI, available through <a href="http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/bacon-aphor.html">Fordham University’s Modern History SourceBook</a>.</p><p>Robson Bonnichsen, et al, <em>Paleoamerican Origins: Beyond Clovis</em> (College Station: Texas A&amp;M University Pr., 2005).</p><p>Thomas S. Kuhn, <em>Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em>, 2nd ed. (1962; Chicago: University of Chicago Pr., 1970), pages 79, 82, 90, 110, 135.</p><p>Shunryu Suzuki, <em>Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind</em> (NY: Weatherhill, 1970 ), quote from page 21.</p><p>C.H. Waddington, <em>The Scientific Attitude</em>, 2nd ed. (West Drayton Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1948), quote from page 28.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f726025c3b9f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Climate Changers]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/climate-changers-3a3a3e6091c2?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a3a3e6091c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[carbon-emissions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-models]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 00:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-22T12:47:52.932Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When journalists or the general public talk about climate change, they’re almost always referring to <em>anthropogenic</em> or human-caused climate change. In some mainstream media circles (such as NPR, PBS, or the BBC) journalists take anthropogenic climate change as a given fact. But climate science is far more complex and uncertain than they seem to realize. Our inability to predict climate changes reflects that complexity. As William Poundstone wrote long ago, no model (including climate models) can accurately predict phenomena that are more complex than the models themselves. Thus, for example, the previously un-factored component of terrestrial nitrogen alone invalidated earlier climate models and their predictions. But if previous climate modelers failed to include terrestrial nitrogen, what other components might they be inadvertently excluding now? Do we even know all the components that might affect climate? How much cardon dioxide and methane is the sea floor naturally releasing, and how will those rates change in the future? No one knows. Climate models also invariably fail to predict future human technological changes that could affect the climate. In fact, humans have never been able to predict the future at all, and thus climate predicting models end up being about as useful as tarot cards, tea leaves, crystal balls, and the like.</p><p>Here’s an irrefutable fact: every day humanity is dumping megatons of carbon into the atmosphere. But here’s another fact: the so-called “greenhouse effect,” in which atmospheric carbon and methane cause global warming, is a scientific <em>hypothesis</em> — not a scientific theory. It sure seems like a plausible hypothesis, but it is far from a proven fact. And, to be sure, most science never reaches the theory stage. Darwin’s theory of evolution is a fairly rare example of true scientific theory, one that geneticists have only improved upon since Darwin’s own time. But as so many scientists and philosophers of science will tell you, science is primarily a <em>method of inquiry</em>, not a dogmatic progenitor of convenient claims of fact — and certainly not the politicized and monetized science that unfortunately obscures so much of the climate change conversation. Climate change alarmists and climate change deniers swirl around in their own partisan whirlpool, and few in this whirlpool ever mention geological or astrophysical causes of climate change. For them, it’s anthropogenic or nothing.</p><p>Geologists can no more predict the planetary future than historians can predict the human future, except in the most general terms. We’ll all die and most of us will pay some taxes. Empires will come and go. Our sun will expire in about five billion years — but what sort of geology will characterize the earth between then and now? No one knows. Regardless of anthropogenic carbon emissions, conditions on earth might or might not remain agreeable to mammals. The vast majority of the earth’s geological history was not conducive to human life at all. For one dramatic example, over 50 million years before the human species appeared, the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum was an era of high atmospheric carbon (much higher than now) that was so warm it melted all the earth’s ice. Geologists and other scientists are not sure what caused that warming, but (following the greenhouse hypothesis) speculate that natural methane release, asteroid phenomena, high volcanic activity and its associated emissions, and other factors may have contributed to the atmospheric warming.</p><p>So what would happen if we ended all anthropogenic carbon and methane emissions? What if we even began capturing and sequestering carbon already in the atmosphere and thus actually <em>reducing</em> levels of carbon? Would the earth cool? Not necessarily. The fact is, nobody knows what would happen because (for one thing) we cannot currently distinguish potential anthropogenic climate changing agents from geological and astrophysical factors. For all we know, the geological warming trend that began about 20,000 years ago (with the peak of the Wisconsin glaciation) will continue toward a new Thermal Maximum. If so, humans could do little or nothing to stop such massive planetary forces. Maybe we would retreat underground and try to survive, but obviously we would also witness a massive die-off of current configurations of life.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c5wV66eWxsort9NLolWKtA.png" /><figcaption>The maximum extent of the Wisconsin glaciation as seen from the North Pole, covering Canada, northern Europe, and parts of the northern U.S. (Image from <strong>WikiMedia Commons)</strong>.</figcaption></figure><p>Those preoccupied with anthropogenic climate change seem to have an ironic presumption that we actually control or at least significantly influence global climate. Maybe we can effectuate changes large or small, or maybe not. I would prefer erring on the side of caution. How wonderful it would be if we could stop dumping all that carbon into the atmosphere. Yet a perennial complication of climate policy involves its socioeconomic consequences. Most of the world does not live in the comparatively luxury found in the United States, whose population represents only around 5% of the world total but is responsible for about a fourth of the world’s energy consumption. Yes, hypocrisy more than abounds. In fact, the elite preaching environmentalism insults the poor, who already “reduce, reuse, and recycle” out of pure necessity, not from some righteous moral imperative.</p><p>Obviously we’re not going to return to pre-industrial technology, population levels, and their associated lower carbon emissions. But there is also no reason to despair. If human ingenuity has led us into environmental problems, human ingenuity can lead us out. Still, we should not expect any cooperation from astrophysical and geological forces, which will eternally remain indifferent to us and our aspirations. That’s just life on planet earth.</p><p>Copyright © 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>SOURCES</p><p>Ralph Ellis and Michael Palmer, “Modulation of Ice Ages via Precession and Dust-Albedo Feedbacks,” <em>Geoscience Frontiers</em> 7, no. 6 (Nov. 2016): 891–909.</p><p>Ben Z. Houlton, et al, “Convergent Evidence for Widespread Rock Nitrogen Sources in Earth’s Surface Environment,” <em>Science</em> 360, no. 6384 (April 6, 2018): 58–62.</p><p>Phil Jardine, “The Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum,” <em>Paleontology Online</em> 1, no. 5 (Jan. 10, 2011): 1–7.</p><p>William Poundstone, <em>Labyrinths of Reason: Paradox, Puzzles, and the Frailty of Knowledge </em>(NY: Anchor Pr., 1988), 253.</p><p>Will Sarvis, <em>Embracing Philanthropic Environmentalism: the Grand Responsibility of Stewardship</em> (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Pubs., 2019), 134, 136–37.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a3a3e6091c2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Monarch Butterflies]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/monarch-butterflies-d5201798a6c9?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5201798a6c9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[environmental-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monarch-butterfly]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[habitat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eucalyptus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environmental-issues]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 13:10:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-23T13:10:51.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Iconic Status Can Obscure Science and Philosophy</h4><p>No wonder we admire Monarchs. Their unique migration from Mexico to Canada (and back) rightly inspires our awe. But Monarchs also serve as icons for the “environmentally worried elite” who rarely think through all the scientific, historical, and philosophical implications of their concerns. They especially seem oblivious to the many ironies that accompany contemporary concern for Monarchs.</p><p>In the 2015 film, “Butterfly Town, USA,” ecologist Lincoln Brower cited a number of factors that he perceived as threatening Monarchs: GMO agriculture and its related herbicides, global warming, and habitat loss — including illegal logging in Mexico pertaining to one of the Monarchs’ overwintering homes. If people are illegally logging in Mexico, in some ways they’re merely mimicking the habitat destruction in California that began during the 1850s. New herbicides may indeed have dire consequences for the Monarchs’ milkweed plant, but probably only within the farming fields themselves (over a million acres of California savanna remain free from agricultural interference). And sadly, <a href="https://medium.com/@willsarvis/climate-hitchhiker-f2ebaec79a3a">all sorts of unrelated problems hitchhike on the environmental bogeyman of our times, global warming</a>. Establishing actual causation between various environmental changes and climate change is actually far more difficult than media stories would have us believe.</p><p>When 19th century loggers stripped millions of acres of eastern woodlands in the United States, the Monarch population exploded, since open lands (including meadows and savannas) favor these butterflies as much as forests repulse them. During the 20th century, landowners and government forestry agencies began fostering a limited return of eastern forests, but that geography still favors Monarchs now far more than it did before all that logging. Yet those concerned about Monarchs never mention this.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b-sbhY48UA685SAhNuNXbg.png" /><figcaption>A monarch butterfly on a milkweed plant in Michigan (photo from <strong>WikiCommons</strong>).</figcaption></figure><p>Also during the 19th century, farmers in California began converting the Central Valley and other locations into agricultural land that now produces around a fourth of America’s food supply. Unfortunately, some of this acreage once hosted the milkweed habitat that Monarchs so highly favor. But, at the same time, Californians were also introducing the eucalyptus from Australia — and Monarchs are strongly attracted to this tree, often gathering on their branches by the thousands during the overwintering season. Beginning in the 1960s, some Californians began opposing the eucalyptus with the usual objections about non-native species. The city of Santa Cruz even proposed eradicating them, but lost a 2015 court case to eucalyptus defenders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/1*1qOmtSCvUv4bg-pprAOyxA.png" /><figcaption>A dual row of eucalyptus trees transplanted in California, ca. 1900. Photo from the California Historical Society, via <strong>WikiCommons</strong>.</figcaption></figure><p>Monarch butterflies are an iconic species, and thus receive a disproportionate amount of human attention and concern. Organizations like the World Wildlife Fund or WildEarth Guardians use poster child species to appeal to humans for their causes, and thus we see pandas, elephants, tigers, or other iconic species in their advertisements — but poster child campaigns tend to bypass more complex scientific facts or the philosophical values that people sometimes confuse with science. We see all of this reflected in debates over the Monarch and eucalyptus habitats in California.</p><p>Alarm over an apparent recent drop in western Monarch populations is similar to alarmism regarding coral reefs. Monarch populations and coral reef health have highly incomplete assessments during very short historical periods of data gathering. In other words, we have not been paying attention to these topics long enough to appreciate any “natural” cycles that may exist. What was the situation of the oceans’ coral reefs in any era before the advent of underwater technology? No one knows. How have the Monarch populations in California fluctuated since the 1850s? No one knows. Monarch populations may oscillate wildly for reasons we do not yet understand, and possibly due to factors unrelated in whole or part to human activities. But if we experience the coming insect apocalypse that some entomologists fear (sometimes primarily blaming climate change), should we expect Monarchs to be exempt from the general die-off?</p><p>In the meantime, among all of earth’s species, humanity has a unique role and responsibility as environmental stewards, and our stewardship does not take place in an environmental paradise where human activity is, <em>ipso facto</em>, defiling. We need as much science as possible to inform our stewardship, but we also need to distinguish between the general realms of scientific facts and philosophical values, lest the quality of both suffer. This worldview extends far beyond considerations for a single iconic species.</p><p>Copyright © 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>REFERENCES</p><p>Anon., “Wildlife Dilemma: Kill Birds to Save Fish? Cormorants Near the Mouth of the Columbia are Threatening Fish Runs,” <em>Associated Press</em> (Aug. 2, 2014).</p><p>Achva Benzinberg Stein and Jacqueline Claire Moxley, “In Defense of the Nonnative: The Case of the Eucalyptus,” <em>Landscape Journal</em> 11:1 (Spring 1992), pages 35–50.</p><p>Matthew Daly and Jeff Barnard, “U.S. Moves Ahead with Plan to Shoot Spotted Owl’s Rival,” <em>Associated Press</em> (Feb. 29, 2012).</p><p>Christopher Joyce, “Saving One Species at the Expense of Another,” NPR’s <em>Morning Edition</em> (July 11, 2013).</p><p>Bjørn Lomborg, <em>The Skeptical Environmentalist</em> (Cambridge University Pr., 2001), page 330 (coining the phrase, “environmentally worried elite”).</p><p>Stephen B. Malcolm and Myron P. Zalucki, eds., <em>Biology and Conservation of the Monarch Butterfly</em> (Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County, 1993) — especially see John Lane, “Overwintering Monarch Butterflies in California: Past and Present,” pages 335–44; Richard I. Vane-Wright, “The Columbus Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Dramatic 19th Century Range Expansion of the Monarch Butterfly,” pages 179–87.</p><p>Emma Marris, “The Great Eucalyptus Debate,” <em>The Atlantic</em> (Nov. 30, 2016).</p><p><em>Save Our Big Trees v. City of Santa Cruz</em>, et al, Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California (filed Oct. 23, 2015), 241 Cal.App.4th 694.</p><p>Alana Wise, “Insect Populations Drop Even Without Direct Human Interference, a New Study Finds,” NPR’s <em>All Things Considered</em> (Sept. 12, 2025).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5201798a6c9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Teaching, Not Preaching]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/teaching-not-preaching-b084259e2856?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b084259e2856</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[integration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interracial-adoption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-advocacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[segregation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 18:54:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-23T19:02:14.466Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If there was one thing that pleased me during my college teaching career, it was students unable to discern if I was a liberal or a conservative, or if I was a religious person or not. I taught history and we covered a great deal of historic politics and religion. Every few years (often during an election year) a student or a group of students would ask me outright about my affiliations, but I never told them. Instead, I said something like, “Good. I’m glad you couldn’t tell. The class is not about my personal point of view, but about encouraging you to think for yourself with as much information as possible.”</p><p>Thinking for ourselves is supposed to be a staple of western culture, going back to the Socratic method and the Rabbinical approach of encouraging students to interrogate the Torah. Unfortunately, the past 50 or 60 years have seen political preaching in American academia significantly encroach upon this tradition. I’ll offer one admittedly mild example.</p><p>Many years ago I had a colleague who taught an ethnic studies class and preached that only Black people should be allowed to adopt Black children. Even at first blush I knew this had to be a bigoted point of view, and later research informed me that my colleague was merely parroting the old 1972 policy platform of the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW).</p><p>The NABSW and many others believed (and continue to believe) that minority children would experience a healthier sense of self if they grew up in families of people who “looked like them,” to use a later cliché. Back in the 1990s, researchers such as Rudolph Alexander and Carla Curtis concluded there was no psychological harm to White-adopted African American kids and no correlation between interracial adoption, the cross-cultural home, and the well-being of adopted children. This conclusion seems especially pertinent if you accept the idea that subcultures (and particularly self-conscious subcultures) are less important than escaping poverty, violent domestic environments, absentee parents, dangerous neighborhoods, and the usual run of negative factors that often contribute to children being put up for adoption in the first place.</p><p>Interracial adoption controversies are yet another post-Civil Rights double standard of integration and segregation. As Cassondra Wiedenhoeft put it, “Out of one corner of our mouths we cry for racial equality; out of the other we stress racial differences and attempt to maintain unofficial racial separation. The arguments against transracial adoption are fraught with the very evils they intend to prevent.” Richard Thompson Ford pointed out this double standard regarding higher education: some non-Whites want integration when it comes to college admissions, but once admitted, then insist upon segregation to enjoy race-based dormitories, culture clubs, and student associations. The voluntary apartheid in higher education may be comparatively harmless, but the consequences in transracial adoption are quite serious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JIpxMz8zbG_rSjj-6i9QrA.png" /><figcaption>Scottish missionary Mary Slessor (1848–1915) with Janie, Alice, Maggie and Mary — four abandoned Nigerian girls she rescued and adopted. These girls were in danger of literally losing their lives, but all orphans face very unenviable circumstances. Photograph (circa 1880) from <strong>WikiCommons</strong>.</figcaption></figure><p>No teacher achieves the ideal of objectivity, but some do not even try. My former colleague was welcome to his personal opinion, but he should have identified it as such and mentioned that the National Association of Black Social Workers’ perspective was only one among others. If I had taught the subject I would have described the cultural argument, its counter-argument, the 1994 Multiethnic Placement Act (as amended by the 1996 Interethnic Placement Act), people finding ways to circumvent these laws, and the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act (recently reaffirmed by SCOTUS) and its unique status in matters of interracial adoption. And finally, I would have mentioned how there have never been enough prospective African American adoptive parents for the number of orphaned Black kids, thus presenting a very real <em>practical</em> problem aside from all other arguments.</p><p>So what, then, is the final answer regarding interracial adoption? There is none. That’s the point. This is a contentious issue for a reason, and students becoming aware of its contentiousness (and why) is crucial if they are ever to attempt thinking for themselves. Forcing one point of view upon them by excluding other perspectives is worse than overt political advocacy, for students are a captive audience in an unequal power relationship with their instructors. Even equipped with multiple perspectives, there is no guarantee students will think for themselves — but at least they would have the resources to try.</p><p>Copyright © 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>SOURCES AND FURTHER READING</p><p>Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996, in the Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Public Law 104–188, 1808(c), 110 Stat. 1755, 1904 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b)), also called “section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,” wherein it is subtitled “Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption.”</p><p>Rudolph Alexander and Carla M. Curtis, “A Review of Empirical Research Involving the Transracial Adoption of African American Children,” <em>Journal of Black Psychology</em> 22:2 (May 1996), 223–235.</p><p>Elizabeth Bartholet, <em>Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative</em> (Boston: Beacon Pr., 1999).</p><p>Elizabeth Bartholet, “Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,” <em>University of Pennsylvania Law Review</em> 139 (May 1991): 1163–1256.</p><p>Suzanne Brannen Campbell, “Taking Race Out of the Equation: Transracial Adoption in 2000,” <em>Southern Methodist University Law Review</em> 53 (Fall 2000): 1599–1626.</p><p>Gerald Early, “Their Malcolm, My Problem: On the Abuses of Afrocentrism and Black Anger,” <em>Harpers Magazine</em> (Dec. 1992), 62–73.</p><p>Richard Thompson Ford, <em>The Race Card: How Bluffing about Bias Makes Race Relations Worse</em> (NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), especially pages 11, 269, 270, 273, 274, 276, 305–06.</p><p>National Association of Black Social Workers. “Statement on Trans-Racial Adoption,” September 1972, in <em>Children and Youth in America: a Documentary History</em>, vol. 3, parts 1–4, Robert H. Bremner, comp. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pr., 1970–74), pages 777–80.</p><p>Cassondra L. Wiedenhoeft, “Should Race be Considered in the Adoption of a Child?,” <em>The Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues</em> 11 (Spring 2000): 600–606.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b084259e2856" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Paternalism Revisited]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/paternalism-revisited-9c044e169769?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c044e169769</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[individualism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-species]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paternalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[american-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chinese-culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 16 May 2026 15:50:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-16T15:50:06.773Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“Paternalism” means an adult acting in the capacity of a parent toward other adults. Almost uniformly, individualistic Americans have long denounced paternalism. For example, in 1928, President Herbert Hoover specifically contrasted American “rugged individualism” as “diametrically opposed” to the “paternalistic and state socialism” found in Europe. The Great Depression would soon qualify this sentiment in a major way. Today, Americans are far less individualistic in practice than in ideology.</p><p>In certain academic circles, denouncing paternalism is one of those shallow fads that fails to grasp the unavoidable context of humanity as a social species. All social species feature individuals with different abilities, interests, ambitions, et cetera. That some adults would end up functioning as quasi-parents and others as quasi-dependents is practically inevitable. The better philosophies involving paternalism acknowledge the basic limitations regarding individual freedom within societies.</p><p>Regarding one of my earlier works about <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4946175">interracial friendship</a>, a couple of critics falsely assumed that some of those relationships were paternalistic. Ironically or not, that inspired me to explore the topic much further in a lengthy article called “<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5296300">Problematic Paternalism</a>.” But here I just wish to make a few personal observations.</p><p>By the way, even though they are loathe to call it paternalism, a wide spectrum of people and entities rely on the federal government for corporate bailouts, agriculture subsidies, protective tariffs, and the like. Individuals who live beyond their means sometimes look to governmental paternalism to bail them out of financial trouble, as widely occurred in the aftermath of the 2007–10 Subprime Mortgage crisis. Granted, the Subprime Mortgage crisis was a complex phenomenon involving predatory lending practices, racism, a house-flipping craze, inflated property appraisals, and many other factors — but some bailout recipients included homeowners who had voluntarily bought upscale houses they could barely afford, then subsequently benefited from federal paternalism via the 2009 Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan. In any case, unquestionably, there are many elements of paternalism in the current political economy.</p><p>There are also entire sectors of the population in the United States who cannot or do not live without paternalism. These include military lifers, repeat offender inmates, and portions of the homeless population.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rnw2PfjtqEyGBS0tRyuJmg.png" /><figcaption>Above, an 1897 cartoon “On To The Abyss,” from the satirical magazine, <strong>Puck</strong>, depicting socialists and populists following the fairy of paternalism toward doom. Below, an 1899 cartoon from <strong>Puck</strong> entitled “Deserting the Old Idol,” here meaning William Jennings Bryan and his populist platform built in part upon paternalism. Both cartoons reflected a long and deep American distaste for paternalism going back to the nation’s founding and continuing today, at least in rhetoric. (Both images from the Library of Congress).</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M-jhl-3mBLwOIO4D8sIosg.png" /></figure><p>I’ve now lived long enough to watch the entire lives of particular individuals who never escaped their own voluntary subjugation to paternalism, mainly because the big wide world out there bewildered them. Supposedly this is now a growing problem with young people “addicted” to their screens and unable or unwilling to find jobs, attend college, learn social skills, and otherwise gain some degree of personal autonomy. The comparative few I remember from the analog age remained dependent upon family, social services, and the charity of strangers. They were homeless sometimes and only semi-functioning on the fringes of a community. Not to romanticize the Old World clan, but I used to imagine them doing better within an extended family.</p><p>One of my maternal grandfathers was a military lifer, and he often referred to the Navy as his “surrogate mother,” for he had been a homeless orphan child-laborer sleeping on the Philadelphia hosiery factory floor where he worked. He paid a price, though; by the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor he was a middle-aged man in the reserves and got called back into active duty. He then had to survive some of the most horrific Pacific Theater fighting during World War II.</p><p>Military lifers sometimes compare their institutional dependence to repeat-offender inmates. My father observed this during his own U.S. Navy tour, 1941–45. He met old salts who still had H-O-L-D F-A-S-T tattooed on their eight fingers, a “superstition” related to climbing ship rigging. He also remembered that some of them, old enough to be his father, blew their entire paychecks during weekend shore leaves. At that point they would have become homeless were it not for the Navy providing them food, shelter, medicine, and clothing.</p><p>As for inmate lifers, Morgan Freeman’s character “Red” captured this sentiment perfectly in the 1994 film, <em>Shawshank Redemption</em>, when he spoke of prison: “These walls are funny. First you hate ’em, then you get used to ’em. After long enough, you get so you depend on ’em.”</p><p>One of my high school classmates led such a life; in and out of incarceration until ill health from chronic alcohol abuse killed him at the young age 54. The county jailers all knew him, generally liked him, and regularly made him a trusty. He was amiable and passive when locked up. Outside, he could not hold a steady job and his daily plans never seemed to go beyond finding enough money to buy that night’s worth of alcohol. It always struck me as a tragic life that might have benefited from the right kind of paternalism. Perhaps he would have fared better had he grown up in China.</p><p>Among the most ancient political concepts in China is the idea of a ruler having moral responsibility to and for the people. We could call this “Confucian paternalism.” An early example comes from the 5th century BCE treatise, <em>Doctrine of the Mean</em>, which includes the idea of the emperor regarding the masses as dependents. Some American academics would decry this as paternalism <em>extraordinaire</em>, but that would reflect the aforementioned American cultural bias. It would also reflect the fallacy of ethnomorphism. Not everyone is a fan of American-style individualism.</p><p>After World War II, many western European governments imitated the American model of anti-paternalism. Then some of them abandoned it as a failed experiment, especially when diminished social services coincided with higher incarceration rates. After that, some turned to what Dutch researchers Evelien Tonkens and Jan Willem Duyvendak called “caring paternalism.” Social workers in this context try to avoid punitive measures toward their clients’ non-conformist behavior, and instead focus on supporting or improving their clients’ quality of life. In doing so, they also acknowledge something pervasive about paternalism and our social species.</p><p>Copyright © 2026 Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>REFERENCES</p><p>For some examples of “Confucian paternalism,” see William Theodore de Bary, et al, comps., <em>Sources of Chinese Tradition</em>, vol. 1 (NY: Columbia University Pr., 1960), 7, 8, 18, 87, 161–65, 174–82, 412.</p><p>The reference from the <em>Doctrine of the Mean</em> (or <em>Zhoung yong</em>) is from its chapter 21. This and tons of other ancient documents are available at the <a href="https://ctext.org/pre-qin-and-han">Chinese Text Project</a>.</p><p>The Hoover quote comes from Herbert Hoover, “Rugged Individualism,” in <em>A Documentary History of the United States</em>, Richard D. Heffner, ed. (New American Library, 2002), 309.</p><p>For an interesting comparison of the U.S. and China, see Eric X. Li, “A Tale of Two Political Systems,” <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_systems"><em>TED Talk</em></a> (July 2013).</p><p>Evelien Tonkens and Jan Willem Duyvendak, “Paternalism — Caught Between Rejection and Acceptance: Taking Care and Taking Control in Community Work,” <em>Community Development Journal</em> 38 (Jan. 2003); see pages 11–15.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c044e169769" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Real Way to be an Anti-Racist]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/the-real-way-to-be-an-anti-racist-b0e29a06a003?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0e29a06a003</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[race]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humanity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moral-cosmopolitanism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 14:57:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-13T15:03:00.833Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The real way to be an anti-racist is to abandon the concept of race.</p><p>Okay, I’ll give you a moment to stop laughing.</p><p>But seriously, as countless thousands have observed, “race” is a social construct, not a scientific fact. In other words, society has invented or “constructed” the idea of race. The consequences of this have included endless atrocities, to say the least, but the fact remains: if society can construct race, it can also dismantle it. And without race we have no racism. This does not engender utopia, as I illustrate below. But first, consider what has become American society’s standard five categories.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UlrWShHPZPpRG069OSQFtg.png" /><figcaption>The artificiality and even the arbitrariness of the five categories is obvious when we consider the endless actual variations in “racial mixing.” For one of many examples, scholars estimate that around three-quarters of African Americans have at least some non-African ancestry. That society refers to them as “Black” is merely another reflection of a nuance in the social construct of race.</figcaption></figure><p>As we have long known, we are all ultimately Africans if we trace our ancestry back to the beginning of our species. After people migrated out of Africa, multi-generational exposure to different environmental factors began to explain variation in physical appearance. This not only explains variation in skin color, but also variations in eye color, hair texture, and hair color. Even body types evolved due to environmental factors: the northern polar regions produced short and squat people as an obvious response to the climate (retention of heat, in this case). Short and squat people passed on these genes to subsequent generations. By contrast, tall and skinny people survived more successfully in equatorial climates since that body type more effectively dissipates heat.</p><p>To illustrate an example of science versus social construct: sickle cell anemia is a disease we associate with <em>certain parts</em> of Africa, but certainly not all of Africa. Sickle cell anemia is an ironic product of people’s bodies coping successfully with malaria. Geographical proximity to malaria is thus the simplified scientific cause of sickle cell anemia, not being a member of the African or Black “race.” African Americans who have one or more ancestors from (say) the Congo region may be susceptible to sickle cell disease, but not African Americans with ancestry from (say) the Horn of Africa.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O38yFwY6MlgqFbl3sgzmnA.png" /><figcaption>(modified from Google Maps)</figcaption></figure><p>But let us be clear upon something: even if we as a society deconstructed and abandoned the concept of race, tribalistic problems of the “us versus them” variety would persist. For example, think of 11th century Ireland, before England invaded: practically everyone was White, Christian, and Irish. Does that mean they all got along? Of course not. People will find a way to configure rival tribes. Tribalism arises out of family feuds, territorialism, competition for resources, perceived and actual betrayals, multi-generational cycles of revenge, et cetera. This is simply the nature of humanity.</p><p>As a final disqualification of the social construct of race, consider how different society would be if we thought of people in very different sets of categories and their mixtures, such as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zv2Z_W2lJbloY8v_loWDjA.png" /></figure><p>If you have not met people of various “races” who do not exhibit these and other human traits, you simply have not socialized with people of that race. If you had a non-racist disposition and socialized with all races, the spectrum of your relationships would not alter much from your current configuration: a few deep friends, friendly and less friendly acquaintances, maybe a few enemies, and a great many ambiguous or indifferent strangers. Unfortunately, you would also encounter people who reacted negatively to you because of your “race.” Interracial animosity flows in every imaginable direction. Such is the pervasive nature of racism and racial tribalism. But if you look for it, you can also find interracial good will among all races.</p><p>One qualifier: culture.</p><p>I once met a young, college-educated, White woman who considered herself to be a social liberal. She reluctantly told me that she left her home of many years in Miami because she got sick and tired of her Cuban-American neighborhood. As gently as I could, I asked her one question: “Did you learn to speak Spanish?” She admitted she had not. This is not to blame her or to say that bilingualism would have solved her problem, but by not learning Spanish she had effectively excluded herself from participating in her neighborhood’s culture. It’s difficult to make friends without speaking a mutual language, even though warm people have a way of exuding benevolence no matter what.</p><p>If you are attracted or repulsed by a particular culture, then that merely becomes one of endless personal preferences. For example, some people find Japanese traditions of politeness to be an epitome of highly refined civilization; others find it overly restrictive or impossible for outsiders to learn.</p><p>There’s nothing wrong with subjective cultural preferences per se; allowing them to bleed over into racism is where we go wrong in our contemporary societies. It is a sad mistake, but a reversible one . . . even if some form of tribalism will always persist.</p><p>Copyright © 2026, Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>SOURCES</p><p>Peter T. Katzmarzyk and William R. Leonard, “Climatic Influences on Human Body Size and Proportions: Ecological Adaptations and Secular Trends,” <em>American Journal of Physical Anthropology</em> (1998), 483–503.</p><p>Image of Africa from Google Maps, sickle cell locations derived from Scott D. Grosse, et al, “Sickle Cell Disease in Africa: A Neglected Cause of Early Childhood Mortality,” <em>American Journal of Preventative Medicine</em> 41:6 (Dec. 2011), S398-S405.</p><p><a href="https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/genetic-differences-humans-shaped-geography-history">Liese Greensfelder, “Genetic Differences in Humans Shaped by Geography, History,” University of California-Davis (June 05, 2009)</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0e29a06a003" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Eternal Two Tiers of Justice]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/the-eternal-two-tiers-of-justice-1ad1680a9e85?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ad1680a9e85</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[revenge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[retaliation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ancient-law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 15:01:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-06T15:04:21.732Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hammurabi’s Code is the oldest written law in world history, inscribed around 1750 BCE. It is the documented origin of what we variously call reciprocal justice, retaliatory justice, or — more openly — legalized revenge. This is captured in Hammurabi Code’s “eye for an eye” stipulation of repaying harm for harm. Over a thousand years later, the “eye for an eye” idea shows up in the Hebrew Bible’s books of Exodus and Leviticus. Before such written accounts, notions of reciprocal justice undoubtedly went back to prehistoric ideas of revenge. Legalized revenge also persists to this day, most obviously among supporters of capital punishment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aFr0KC1TOjXNjFiO7p8Mow.png" /><figcaption>A passage from Hammurabi’s Code, written in the Akkadian language. Image from Ernest Alfred Wallis Budge and Leonard William King, “A Guide to the Babylonian and Assyrian Antiquities” (1908), via <strong>WikiCommons</strong>.</figcaption></figure><p>But if you read Hammurabi’s Code, “eye for an eye” only pertained to poor folk. Wealthy people could pay a fine and keep both of their eyes. Hence, from the earliest written law code down to the present time, there have been two basic tiers of justice: one for those of means, the other for the poor. Ask any public defender in the United States and you will hear a tale of how judges and prosecutors behave very differently in legal aid cases compared to cases where defendants can afford to buy legal representation. Purchased legal representation is also a matter of degree; look at any wealthy person charged with a serious crime, and they likely have a <em>team</em> of lawyers, not merely one. Expensive teams of lawyers can feature experts in various legal specialties, and thus potentially create a formidable defense against prosecutors. The tables are often turned when public defenders find themselves vastly outgunned by a prosecutorial team. This is a main reason why so many public defenders’ clients take plea deals when facing such steep odds for a fair trial, even when those clients are completely innocent of the charges levied against them.</p><p>By the way, there have always been opponents of reciprocal justice. The famous Greek playwright Aeschylus described a series of vengeful killings in his drama, <em>Oresteia</em>, written during the 5th century BCE. In the <em>Oresteia</em>, King Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter to appease the goddess Artemis. In revenge (and for other reasons) Agamemnon’s wife Clytemnestra kills him. Then their son Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father’s death. But the cycle of revenge ends when the goddess Athena pardons Orestes and thus circumvents the further reciprocal justice of the Furies, goddesses who oversaw such matters. One moral of the story is how the cycle of revenge can go on endlessly unless some force intervenes to end it. In the <em>Oresteia</em>, that force was society backed by a goddess. And, ironically or not, the same Hebrew Bible that mentioned “eye for an eye” also contained another noted passage (in the book of Deuteronomy) that reserves revenge solely for Yahweh, by then the sole Jewish deity.</p><p>Another opponent of reciprocal justice was Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626), who wrote, “Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more man’s nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out.” But even while opposing illegal revenge, Bacon alludes here to one of its great motivators: a personal sense of justice.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*HSklnWy09T9tS6Loyv4vtA.png" /><figcaption>Sir Francis Bacon (image from the <strong>Library of Congress</strong>). In addition to being a philosopher, Bacon was also a judge. Upon Bacon’s death, chaplain William Rawley wrote that Judge Bacon avoided vindictiveness, slander, malice, and the temptation to oust those in power simply because he had the authority to do so. In other words, Bacon practiced what he preached by eschewing (judicial) revenge. See the brief essay, William Rawley, “The Life of The Right Honourable Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban.”</figcaption></figure><p>Some among the powerless poor are bound to revert to revenge simply because they see no legal recourse in their lower tier of justice. And since revenge and the two basic tiers of justice go back to prehistory and continue today, we might as well expect them to remain eternal features of humanity.</p><p>Copyright © 2026, Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><p>[For Bacon’s quote, see “Bacon’s Essays and Wisdom of the Ancients” (available for free at Project Gutenberg). Hammurabi’s Code in English translation is widely available on the Internet].</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ad1680a9e85" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cronyism Rules!]]></title>
            <link>https://willsarvis.medium.com/cronyism-rules-eaf12bed68c2?source=rss-742b632ea7ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/eaf12bed68c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[human-nature]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[meritocracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[myth-of-meritocracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Will Sarvis]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 15:01:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-27T15:01:46.915Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>When Status Trumps Substance</strong></p><p>Let’s say you’re on a community college hiring committee with a hundred applications for a single teaching job. Are the committee members going to go through all hundred applications with even a coarse-toothed comb? Of course not. Logistics and sanity forbid that. Instead, here is how the basic screening process works:</p><p>First, the committee members ask, “Who among the applicants has taught at a community college before?” A quick run through the hundred applicants immediately eliminates half. Now, among the remaining fifty, “Who has taught at a community college for at least five years?” Now they’ve eliminated another thirty applications. The final twenty receive something approximating fine-toothed comb scrutiny. Among those, the committee will offer the three or five “best” candidates an interview.</p><p>Were there any worthy applicants among those eighty screened out earlier? Of course. Did they stand a chance in hell of getting an interview? Of course not.</p><p>So your college expends a few thousand dollars to fly in the “best” candidates, puts them up in a motel, and buys their meals. That is, if the candidates are lucky. California is notorious for not offering applicants a dime. There is some serious provincial arrogance at work there, but that is another story.</p><p>But here’s the best part! After those five “saps” do their interviews your committee discovers the wonder of wonders: the inside candidate — who was already a part-time adjunct at the school and who has friends on the hiring committee — gets the job. Cronyism rules!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GWAQl5uqsjVhXhdt6ZekAw.png" /><figcaption>from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary</figcaption></figure><p>As community college veteran <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/a-song-of-vice-and-mire/">Rob Jenkins</a> and others have noted, community colleges are among the schools most notorious for such cronyism; I saw half a dozen examples during my own eighteen years teaching at such an institution. As one of my colleagues once sarcastically said of such a hire, “Oh my, we searched the entire nation, and lo and behold, the most qualified candidate was here all along!”</p><p>Here is another example I personally witnessed at the U.S. Forest Service, where employees at one level have to apply for higher level jobs along with outside applicants. In this case a boss wrote a job description that was literally based directly upon the resume of the person he wanted to promote. This process was not necessarily evil, and possibly not even illegal; the candidate was basically qualified, regardless of the tailor-made job description. Perhaps more importantly, his boss knew him. They got along well and we should never underestimate the importance of allies in office politics. Yet I couldn’t help but think of all the “saps” who applied for the advertised job (a technical legal requirement) and possibly had no idea that the fix was already in. Many times, I myself was just such a “sap,” applying for jobs at various institutions.</p><p>The above phenomena reflects human nature combined with practicality. So much for Progressive era civil service reform, which was intended to eliminate nepotism, cronyism, and the political spoils system in general. To a major degree, the Progressives’ efforts only resulted in people finding ways to circumvent the then-new civil service system. Systems come and go, but human nature remains a constant — and the law of unintended consequences remains pervasive in politics and policy. As the late Missouri state representative <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=http://digital.shsmo.org/digital/collection/ohc/id/555&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjgwZvWloyUAxWWOzQIHaduJa8QFnoECBkQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw1rDplxX-grhhxqF4oGlPMf">Francis M. Barnes, III</a>, liked to say: “The first rule of politics is, <em>Beware of Reformers.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PI8WC6pVg3coDMMlUUOhxQ.png" /><figcaption>The famous satirist Thomas Nast criticized the Boss Tweed political machine of New York City. Political machines were notorious for cronyism, but here the cronies blame each other for their common graft. [Thomas Nast, “Who Stole the People’s Money?” <strong>Harper’s Weekly</strong> (Aug. 19, 1871), courtesy of the <strong>Library of Congress</strong>].</figcaption></figure><p>Academic publishing is not immune from cronyism, a dynamic wherein editors and their boards sometimes allow status to obscure substance. Imagine being a university press acquisitions editor inundated with manuscript proposals — would you treat submissions from a gmail address the same as from an edu address? Especially if that edu address came from an elite institution? We shouldn’t be surprised if many editors opt for the latter. But there are exceptions. The late great <a href="https://medium.com/@willsarvis/remembering-hal-k-rothman-1958-2007-6a4ee7ed3112">Hal Rothman</a>, once the editor of <em>Environmental History Review</em>, was famously more interested in substance than “status,” and thereby contributed a great deal of scholarship, both through his own prolific writing but also by being an excellent editor who facilitated other writers.</p><p>Cronyism is eternal because the social nature of the human species is eternal. Meritocracy is a nice dream and even a great societal aspiration — but it has its limits, even at its best. Status of questionable merit overriding unappreciated substance is simply part of this eternal game.</p><p>Copyright © 2026, Will Sarvis. All rights reserved.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=eaf12bed68c2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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